Disputed Victory: Schley, Sampson and The Spanish-American War of 1898

More so than most American wars, the Spanish-American War of 1898 was fought by naval forces. *Disputed Victory: Schley, Sampson and The Spanish-American War of 1898* is the story of the naval aspects of that war and the quarrels over the glory that followed.

The book begins with a background of the US Navy of the late nineteenth century and its battleships. It was a period of change as navies of the world transitioned from wood and sail to metal and steam, armaments improved, and naval theory advanced. For the United States, insulated by oceans and lacking overseas empires to protect, it presented a tug-of-war between those seeking to make do with the relics that survived the post-Civil War downsizing and those stiving to keep pace with European navies whose threat might never approach American shores, or at least until the next generation of ships was launched. It also became a contest between those clinging to the tactics of the past and the visionaries studying new horizons at a new Naval War College.

The book next focusses on the main characters involved: Winfield Scott Schley, commander of the Flying Squadron that fought the Spanish fleet off Santiago de Cuba; William Thomas Sampson, Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, of which the Flying Squadron was a part; George Dewey, Commander of the Asiatic Squadron and hero of Manila Bay; Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy who put many of the pieces into place until organizing the Rough Riders and going to Cuba with an Army command. Other major characters are Alfred Thayer Mahan, a driving intellect in the molding of the then-modern navy and Pascal Cervera, the Spanish naval commander.

The narrative then explores the relationships between the United States and Spain and American preparations for conflict. Having laid out the background, the author turns his attention to the actual naval encounters.

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**Book Reviews**


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Although generally working chronologically, Barry devotes a chapter to Admiral Dewey’s Battle of Manilla Bay on 1 May 1898, which he posits Dewey almost could not have lost. That set up the next nearly fifty years of American occupation of the Philippines.

Then Barry takes the reader to the main theatre of operations, the Caribbean. Those who know even a moderate amount about the Spanish-American War may be aware of the battle off Santiago de Cuba on 3 July 1898, but this saga begins weeks before. Cervera’s departure from Spain, in an era before satellite surveillance, placed a strain on the navy that was charged with protection of the whole eastern seaboard. That duty had to be balanced against offensive operations, first a blockade of Havana followed by the abortive 12 May attack on San Juan, Puerto Rico. When Cervera’s fleet was located within Santiago Harbour, all American ships assembled offshore.

Prior to the climatic naval battle of the war were American probes of the harbour, coordination with Army units ashore, and manoeuvres in preparation for Cervera’s exit from the harbour. Under pressure from Madrid, Cervera sailed out on 3 July at 9:30 a.m. and into the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet. Destroyers Furor and Pluton were out of action within four miles of port, armoured cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago, and Cristobal Colon completed the capitulation by surrendering fifty miles west of where it emerged. Though suffering some hits, all American ships remained in action throughout. Spanish casualties were reported as 323 killed and 151 severely wounded. American casualties were minimal.

It would seem that a one-sided victory such as this would contain sufficient glory for all victors, but not so. Sampson filed a report critical of his subordinate, Schley. Newspapers, congressmen, and commentators, most prominently Albert Thayer Mahan, debated the relative heroism and cowardice, competency and ineptness, and triumph and tragedy of the two commanders. Navy Secretary, John D. Long, ordered a Board of Inquiry to investigate and report on the matter. I will not spoil your read by revealing the outcome, but the controversy made for a messy denouement to a spectacular victory.

Author Quintin Barry has assembled a detailed account of the naval aspects of the Spanish-American war in general and the Battle of Santiago and its subsequent controversy in particular. Drawing on a multitude of accounts and the transcript from the board hearing, he has directed attention to a consequence of the battle that was new to me, at least. The bibliography is a valuable guide to further reading. The footnotes provide citations but little additional information. The division of the index into four indices for people, places, ships, and general terms, aids the reader in locating information more expeditiously than a single index. Photos of individuals and ships, including
action shots, assist the mind’s eye in creating scenes while the maps place the combat in geographic context. I recommend *Disputed Victory* for those seeking a deeper understanding of the US Navy’s role during the Spanish-American War.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


“What cheer, mate?” Who can forget the “half-grown boy in sea clothes” of Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic novel *Kidnapped* (1886)? Alas, there was little cheer for him or his real-life counterparts in the age of sail. More often than not, as movingly demonstrated by Vyvyen Brendon in this well-researched study, the story of children afloat is generally one of backbreaking work, peril, abuse, suffering, and neglect.

In her introduction, Brendon explains that she “was drawn to this subject by a strong affinity for the sea” (1). Her forbears grew up in Britain’s remote Isles of Scilly, and several, as teenagers, took to the waves, where they lived, worked, and died hard. During the Second World War, when Brendon herself was yet a child, her father served on the dangerous Murmansk Run. While too young to fathom what he was facing, she easily recalls her mother’s “anxiety” (1). Brendon studied history at St. Anne’s College, Oxford, and went on to a teaching career. After retirement, she devoted her energies to research and writing, producing two previous works, *Children of the Raj* (2005) and *Prep School Children* (2009).

Brendon is clearly qualified to explore her latest topic. As with her previous books, her scope is limited to the experience of children who were born “in Victorian and Georgian times, when the sea was still the key element of Britain’s national existence” (5). This presents certain challenges to reconstructing their stories. To begin with, these children lived in an age when they were “supposed to be seen and not heard” (4). Many of them were “waifs and strays” (5) for whom the only records are from hostile or indifferent institutions like the police or law courts. Evidence for what these children themselves thought or felt is limited. If a child was lost or buried at sea, there was often no documentation, and those who survived frequently disappeared and are difficult or impossible to trace in their destination countries.

Undaunted, Brendon persevered and, thanks to creative sleuthing, manages to highlight some remarkable stories. She focuses on eight children, including
Mary Branham, a convict bound for Australia; Joseph Emidy, an African boy enslaved by the Portuguese, freed, and impressed into the Royal Navy, who became a successful concert violinist in Cornwall; Sydney Dickens, one of Charles Dickens’ sons, who became an officer in the Royal Navy; and Ada Southwell, whose father’s suicide led to the dissolution of her family and her forced emigration to Canada.

Brendon effectively interjects life and colour into the hard experiences of these children. For example, Mary Branham was accused in December of 1784 of “stealing clothes and taking them to the pawnbroker” (9). Her mother described Mary as not yet 14 and “seduced” away by bad people (9). Unloved at home and a thief in the eyes of the law, the child was sent to the new penal colony in distant Botany Bay. As she and everyone else knew, her prospects of returning after her seven-year sentence were poor. And so she found herself on board the transport Lady Penrhyn, chained below decks for months before the ship even sailed, one vessel among a fleet loaded with such unfortunates. Lady Penrhyn carried only women and girls. Despite a compassionate fleet commander, they suffered all the vicissitudes of a dangerous open-ocean passage. The stormy south Atlantic tumbled Mary and her fellow convicts about their cramped quarters and left them badly bruised. As if foul weather was not bad enough, the girls were constantly exposed to the revolting smells emanating from the bilge, made up of “sea water mixed with urine, puke, dung, rotting food and dead rats” (15). Shamefully but predictably, the sailors preyed on the girls, and some of the latter prostituted themselves, trading sexual favours for treats. By voyage’s end, many of these “sea-wives” (17), Mary among them, were pregnant. Brendon, unable to discover Mary’s fate, loses track of her in 1791. She sadly concludes that in the British government’s zeal to get rid of children like Mary, it “also cut them off from history” (27).

Joseph Emidy’s astonishing odyssey is recoverable through a variety of sources. When he was a music teacher in Cornwall, one of his students was the young James Silk Buckingham, to whom Emidy told much, but not all, of his story. Buckingham later included the tale in his own autobiography. Perhaps understandably, Emidy chose not to share his slavery years with his young student. In order to better understand that painful experience, Brendon relies on the “ample documentation about the infamous system” (5) penned by many contemporary witnesses. Fortunately for Brendon, Emidy’s later years were well chronicled in Cornish newspapers and memoirs. That Emidy was able to marry an Englishwoman and successfully raise a large and happy family is tribute to his fortitude and his ability to parlay his musical gift into broad community acceptance in spite of racial prejudice.

Even better documented is the life of Dickens’ fifth son, Sydney. Born in 1847, during which time his father was writing the briniest of his novels,
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*Dombey and Son*, Sydney emerges as a distinctive personality. When a toddler he accompanied his family on a seaside holiday and was observed “casting a faraway look over the ocean” (164). He was promptly nicknamed “Ocean Spectre.” Dickens thought the boy “an odd child” but one with “a great deal of originality and character” (167). Despite his beloved public persona, Dickens was a “quixotic” father, prone to depression, distraction, and strange practical jokes (165). Among the latter was the suggestion that three-year-old Sydney walk down to the train station to see if an expected guest had arrived. The boy went some distance before the family retrieved him.

The woefully undersized Sydney went to naval school to become a midshipman at the tender age of 12. He genuinely wanted to join the navy, so his father helped arrange it. Two years later Sydney departed on the steam frigate HMS *Orlando*. Dickens senior quipped that the lad boarded with a sea chest “in which he could easily have stowed himself and a wife and family of his own proportions” (174). The boy appears to have been well-liked by his shipmates who, inspired by the 1861 publication of *Great Expectations*, good-naturedly nicknamed him “Little Expectations” (176). Unfortunately, the moniker proved apt. Sydney drank and ran up gambling debts to such an extent that his father despaired and actually wished him dead. At only 25, Sydney obliged, the cause “general debility” according to an official report. His body was “committed to the Indian Ocean” (184). Brendon makes it clear that a sailor’s life made harsh emotional as well as physical demands, and Sydney, alas, was poorly prepared to meet them.

*Children at Sea* is a heartbreaking read. One is thankful to live in a modern society that no longer condones enslavement of children or routinely sends them to sea as convicts or naval officers. At the same time, one marvels at the determination of the human spirit, nowhere as manifest as in the life of Joseph Emidy, to endure and achieve some measure not simply of survival but triumph.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


The objective of Svatopluk Soucek, the modern editor, and the publishers of this work is to introduce a classic text of Turkish maritime history and its author to a general English-speaking audience. At the time of its writing in the seventeenth century, it was intended to exhort the leaders of the Empire how to
best take advantage of geography and naval technology to compete with rivals like Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, Spain and Portugal. The title of the book is taken from the title of the 1831 translation by John Mitchell of Kâtip Çelebi’s Tuhfet ül-Kibar fi Esfar il-Bihar. An alternative title, *Gift to the Great Ones on the Subject of Maritime Campaigns*, indicates the purpose in galvanizing the leadership of the Empire by imparting an interest in geography and naval warfare as the critical element in creating success in military campaigns.

The book itself is a many-layered bibliographic puzzle. An expansive preface explains the tortuous history of its production and presentation for English-speaking readers and prepares them for the hard work ahead required to understand the original text at the centre of the book. That text is a facsimile of the 1968 Johnson Reprint facsimile of a translation by John Mitchell of the first chapters of Kâtip Çelebi’s *Tuhfet ül-Kibar fi Esfar il-Bihar*, printed in London in 1831 by the Oriental Translation Fund as a fragment of the classic history of the maritime wars of the period during expansion of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. The complexity of the process as well as the collection of documents assembled to create this book has left us with as many questions as answers.

The author of the brilliantly translated central text, Kâtip Çelebi, is the “quintessential Ottoman intellectual, whose erudition spanned the entire range of Muslim learning: theology, law, history, and literature” (1). Unlike contemporaries, he was interested in the world outside the confines of the Empire and saw gaining a deep knowledge of geography and cartography as tools for competing with naval rivals of the time. He takes every opportunity to promote and celebrate the Muslim faith, which he believed to be the true religion, in a way that today would be considered fanatical, but this is not inconsistent with the ethos of the times, that is, about the end of the Hundred Years’ War.

The modern editor also introduces problems with scholarship created by archaic language and transliteration at the junction of Turkish and Western languages, based on the Roman alphabet. This confusion occurs most often in the variable spelling of place names, which remains a problem in dealing with the text. Along with geographical terms are general terms (Porte, divan) and naval terms, like vessel-types (kalyon and sandal) that badly need a glossary. What makes this author especially fascinating is that he was a “landlubber and library researcher” rather than a practitioner of naval warfare.

Kâtip Çelebi writes that “This Epitome then consists of an Introduction, two parts, and a Conclusion” (46). As an epitome, he considers it only an outline or summary of all things he wishes to impart. The modern editor points out in his preface that the book consists of “the first two thirds of the text; a summary of the chapters that constitute the missing third; a translation of
the missing third”; and summaries of other documents all done by himself. Despite confusion at every turn in the history of transmission, what emerges is a wonder of concise writing that transmits the essentials of information and excitement.

The text opens with a geography lesson aimed at the political leadership: “Be it known, that to those engaged in the affairs of state, no science is so necessary as that of geography” (47). The original text included maps to illustrate the globe, the major seas, and a commentary on sea- and landmarks along the most travelled coasts, culminating with their perennial rival, Venice. The descriptions go beyond geography and sailing directions to include brief, informative notes on culture, religion, and social structure.

Kâtip Çelebi writes at a time when everything for the Empire is in the balance. On the state of the wars, he writes of the principal islands in the Mediterranean: “At present they are all, except for Cyprus and Rhodes, in the possession of the Infidels; and the subjugation of Candia [Crete] has not be fully accomplished” (55).

The book at its simplest level is fast-moving adventure story. It is a breathtaking lesson in the geography and history of that period in which the Ottoman Turks swept past Constantinople and, using newly-acquired techniques of naval warfare, extended their power throughout the centre of the world. It is a history from the conquest of Constantinople in the mid-fifteenth century to the campaign to wrest Candia (Crete) from Venice in the mid-seventeenth century.

The theatre in which events occurred includes the Mediterranean Sea, made familiar in classical mythology and history, and the Black Sea. By virtue of Turkey’s commanding location between East and West, Turkish ships mounted voyages of discovery and conquest in the Red and Arabian Seas.

Çelebi sets the siege of Constantinople as the real beginning of the Ottoman Turks as a maritime nation. He describes ships of the fleet “by a novel and surprising contrivance of raising weights, they lifted them out of the water, and placing them on oiled rollers, thus carried them over the land, and again lowered them into the sea” (57). Every campaign thereafter is described in a few sentences or paragraphs. Engagements are outlined in spare but dramatic language which covers leading actors, numbers and types of vessels and warriors, also including fortifications, weapons, and tactics. He describes the mechanics of warfare, the role of morale, religious fervour, and political and diplomatic rules under which events occur, especially those involved in surrender. Plunder serves as a motivator, occasionally dominating a situation. He even depicts the arms-race between Venice and Turkey, competing to build the largest vessel carrying the biggest guns and the most warriors.
A picture emerges of the author as an even-handed historian who records reverses and disasters as well as victories. Through the virtuosity of the fragment of text written by Kâtîp Çelebi and translated by John Mitchell, the objective is attained: the reader receives a concise, colourful geography and history lesson about Ottoman expansion and a general understanding of the importance of sea-power. The work presents the maritime history of the Ottoman Empire with wide-ranging advice that applies today.

Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Now that we have available probably 1,000 books on all phases of the Battle of the Atlantic, more first rate volumes are appearing on the finer details, assessments of strategy, preparedness, endings, and beginnings. This excellent major volume by talented Norwegian author Geirr Haarr, like his earlier ones on the Norwegian war, is a worthy addition to any collection on submarine warfare. It is a detailed examination of the first year and a half of the Second World War, predominately by the Royal Navy (RN), but with sections on the early contribution to the struggle by Polish, Dutch, and French submarines (s/m). Brief references to the navies’ positions when the war began helps establish context.

For researchers, Haarr’s appendices will prove helpful: named boats by flotilla number and locations, the 20 s/m lost (16 RN, 2 Dutch, 1 Polish, 1 French) just in those 16 months; ships attacked, and minefields laid by Allied submarines. The multitude of photographs are of excellent quality, and frequent sub-headings are useful. The sharp learning experiences in the northern North Sea, in the Danish straits, and the Baltic that Haarr recounts make sober reading. The first RN s/m losses were that of HMS Oxley, sunk in error by fellow boat HMS Triton off Norway on 10 September 1939, and HMS Seahorse lost to a mine off Denmark in January 1940. In fact, as an example of both his extensive research throughout the volume and of the general hazards of submarining is his first 22-page description of the loss of HMS Thetis in June 1939 during acceptance trials off Liverpool. As his title states (quoted from Admiral Sir Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief of the western approaches) there was “No room for mistakes.”
The balance of Haarr’s stories start with more general descriptions of submarine construction, operation, and life of those who manned them followed by briefer stories, often with quotations from diaries, logs or messages of exploits when on patrol. These vary from offensive operations off the still neutral or Allied European coasts, Heligoland, to the occupation of the Low Countries and northern France. Almost every operation, whether offensive, resulting in successful attacks or minelaying, RN or Polish and French patrols, are supported by frequent, clear photographs of Allied or enemy ships and crews, many with expanded cut-lines, maps of locales or even drawings of equipment on board. Quotations from crew members lends a sense of realism and immediacy. His twenty-eight pages of notes and references are more than just that, with many expanding on the reference and its relevance, a welcome change for the interested reader.

The somewhat hard first winter of the war played a part for the submariners, as did neutral Norwegian and Danish fishermen, again illustrated by supporting photos. Haarr gives a useful assessment of the various classes and sizes of RN boats and their several Allied companions, such that we have an understanding of what subjective attack and defensive moves were controlled by the commanding officers. In the 18 months covered by this book, twenty s/m were lost in total, with losses attributed across the spectrum, four or five with uncertainty to this day: German submarines – 4; to collision – 1; to aircraft – 2; and five each to enemy surface vessels or mines, several of these being either/or. Many patrols are described day-by-day once the area of operation was entered – North Sea, Bay of Biscay, or the Baltic. Others, particularly those involving minelaying – a frequent occupation – are more general, although frequently enlivened by quotations.

Crews faced many hazards as they learned their jobs, capabilities, and dangers. Despite its 450 pages, this book is well worth shelf space for those interested in the submarine game.

Fraser McKee  
Toronto, Ontario


This is not a book that you will read cover-to-cover. There is no narrative, nor argument. Yet, for researchers of the Royal Navy of the Seven Years War (or the middle of the eighteenth century more generally) this book will be a uniquely valuable resource. Nearly 500 pages contain the service records of
some 2000 Royal Navy officers who served as commissioned officers between
1748 and 1763, a period dominated by the Seven Years War. It was the conflict
that handed the British full control of eastern North America and established
a sizeable fiefdom for the British East India Company in India. The Royal
Navy’s role in that conflict was extraordinary, and any study of its naval
campaigns could benefit from the depth of biographical information compiled
in this volume.

Meticulously researched, it contains the wealth of information that would
otherwise be scattered amongst 15,000 archival documents at the National
Archives in Kew. In terms of scope, the book includes every identifiable officer
commissioned between the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (which ended the War of
the Austrian Succession) and Treaty of Paris (which ended the Seven Years
War), as well as every officer commissioned prior, who was definitively serving
in the Royal Navy on or after 1 January 1755. Each entry provides biographical
information on the officer in relation to their service: dates of birth and death,
dates of appointments to ships and promotions, and, interestingly, significant
actions in which they served. Some include family members (including those
who also served in the Royal Navy), dates of baptisms, and honours received.
The entries do not begin or end at 1748-1763 and extend through the whole
of the officer’s career and include every known date. Thomas Hollingworth,
for example, joined the navy in 1747 as a midshipman (at the age of 15) and
last served at sea as the lieutenant in command of a hired tender, \textit{Prosperity},
in 1783. He was promoted into retirement as a superannuated commander in
1796, just a few years before his death. The entries are arranged alphabetically
and an appendix lists each name by date of commission.

The appendices themselves are a key selling-point of the book. They
include a complete list of all warships in commission during the Seven Years
War, including the name and rating of each, from the great 1st Rate ships
of the line like \textit{Royal Sovereign}, to the lowly but vital transports, storeships,
hired vessels, and even yachts employed by the Royal Navy and the Royal
Family. Such lists are very difficult to come across for any period earlier than
the twentieth century. A list of naval commands and the ships attached to them
as of 1 May 1756, extracted from the Admiralty Disposition book (ADM
8/30 1755-1756) follows – another excellent and difficult to acquire resource
for those outside of England. It tells exactly which six Royal Navy vessels
were stationed in Halifax in 1756 and the names of the 22 warships under the
command of Admiral Hawke tasked with watching the French fleet at Brest.

As well, it includes an index of ships, which gives one a convenient way
to identify all known officers attached to Royal Navy vessels during the fifteen
years covered by the book. It is easy to imagine the service this provides to
researchers. To identify the officers – particularly lieutenants – serving on any
one ship at a particular time, one must scour Admiralty records for postings. It is time-consuming enough if you can get to Kew and prohibitively expensive if you cannot. Here, however, you can easily identify that thirty-eight of the officers included in the book served on HMS Britannia, one of the Royal Navy’s first rates which served in the conflict. By examining the dates of appointments indicated, it is easy enough to determine the ship’s captain and lieutenants (as well as the seniority among them) for any particular date.

The only limitations which a reader should be aware of are not the fault of the author nor the work itself, only of the sources underpinning them. Some information has, sadly, been lost to history. Not every officer will have a full entry; some will have no dates of death, for instance. There are doubtless some officers whose information was lost entirely. Some of the more obscure officers, those who never reached the rank of master and commander, cannot be found in the National Archives’ Royal Navy Service Records collection. As a result, there are some individuals not accounted for in the book, through no fault of the author.

Some may know of a much older Navy Records Society publication: David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo, The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815 (Aldershot: Scholar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1994), which is similar to Harrison’s work, though it encompasses the whole of the “Second Hundred Years War.” Doubtless, most or all of the officers here are included in Syrett and DiNardo’s NRS volume. Harrison’s work, however, is an excellent demonstration of the merits of quality over quantity: the NRS volume only includes the dates of birth, promotions, honours, retirement, and death. By focusing on one conflict of the period, Harrison is allowed the space to include much more detail. This is a must-have for any researchers of the Royal Navy of the Seven Years War and those of us who study the RN in later conflicts can hope that more reference works will follow.

Nicholas James Kaizer
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Unlike Anything That Ever Floated approaches the classic Battle of Hampton Roads between the Monitor and Virginia from two perspectives. It goes into great detail about the engineering and mechanical features of each vessel as well as the events of the battle itself. I presume that Northern Mariner’s
readership includes devotees of both perspectives.

Although not the world’s first ironclad vessels, their iconic battle is widely considered to be a turning point in the history of naval warfare. Their development is a classic example of an underdog attempting to employ advanced technology to compensate for inferiority in resources and the predictable response.

Descriptions of the features of each vessel extend far beyond those found in most naval histories. Though frequently referred to in history as the Merrimac(k,) the famous wooden vessel that had been the pride of the US Navy during the 1850s had been transformed into the Confederate ironclad Virginia. Above the Merrimac’s hull, Confederates had constructed an armoured vessel presumed to be impregnable to the ordnance of the day.

Monitor, by contrast, was a new design intended to meet the rebel challenge. Of metal construction with two guns in a turret, it was unwieldy, slow to reload but also impregnable.

By supplanting the open-air decks of the Age of Sail and even the sail/steam propulsion against which they contended, the Virginia and Monitor presaged a new era, particularly in submarines, in which sailors worked in hot, cramped, sealed interior spaces.

Author Hughes provides verbal descriptions along with drawings and photos to illustrate the devices that powered these vessels. Some photos are of the original vessels and others are of later models that had similar features.

The advent of the Virginia threatened havoc in the North. The specter of an ironclad leviathan marauding waterfronts from Washington to Boston spawned panic throughout the North, particularly in its political leadership. Her existence dominated Hampton Roads for weeks, blocked Union operations toward Norfolk, Portsmouth and Richmond and hampered naval support of McClellan’s Peninsular campaign. Like the Bismarck 79 years later, Virginia incited an “at all costs” counter.

On 8 March 1862, Virginia had its day against the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Relying on shot and ramming, it sunk Cumberland, destroyed Congress, and forced Minnesota aground.

Having barely survived rough seas, the USS Monitor arrived to confront Virginia on 9 March. Through hours of manoeuvre, shot, and attempted boarding, Monitor and Virginia fought to a draw, inflicting dents on each other’s armour and shock on their crews until Virginia withdrew from the contest. Neither could claim clear victory, but Virginia would never again mount an existential threat to the Union or its navy. Throughout their lives, crewmen of both vessels could boast “I fought at Hampton Roads.” The sentiment was, according to Confederate Army Cpt. William Norris, “open sesame to the
hearts and minds of our own countrymen. Ah! The thrilling moments of those halcyon days.’(143)

Both Monitor and Virginia became models for their respective navies. Iron-armoured rams built on existing hulls would be the formula followed by Confederate naval architects seeking to overcome by technology their inferiority in numbers, while swarms of monitors would overwhelm Confederate forces.

Time was unkind to both vessels, neither of which would survive 1862. After being forced up the James River and being lightened to the extent that its wooden hull was exposed, Virginia was blown up to prevent its capture on 11 May 1862. Monitor floundered in a squall off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, on New Year’s Eve.

This book is chronologically organized into chapters that cover the events of a few hours or days. The text is supplemented by pictures of individuals referenced, battle scenes and ships, including their blueprints and machinery. The images and the author’s note of their inaccuracies aid the reader to visualize the tales being told. The Suggested Reading is more detailed than most bibliographies in that it provides both the identification of the book but also a descriptive paragraph and a picture. The appendices on Touring the Battlefield, Civil War Ironclads and The US Monitor Center at The Mariners’ Museum and Park aid those desiring to explore the vessels’ legacies. The Order of Battle is a valuable addition but an index would be helpful.

Overall, Unlike Anything That Ever Floated is a short but informative read for anyone interested in that moment in history when wood gave way to iron as the standard in naval construction or in the Civil War in which it occurred.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


Bold statements require bold measures or evidence to support them, especially in the face of contradictory data. Regarding privateers during the American Revolution, Kylie Hulbert writes, “Nevertheless, these seafarers’ story remains largely untold, eclipsed by the Continental army and navy, militias and minutemen, Founding Fathers and mythical heroes of the Revolution, until now” (3) (author’s emphasis). A bold statement indeed for a monograph that is an addition to a not unsubstantial list of maritime, naval, and privateering literature.
Privateering, the procedure that allows individual citizens on privately armed and supplied vessels to make war at sea against an enemy of a nation, has been a feature of maritime peoples since the rise of the early modern state. The mixture of capitalism and patriotism created the potential to build a fortune without the requirements of military hierarchy, discipline, or long service contracts. Contrarily, those who participated in such risky ventures could potentially find themselves in positions where the state had no means to protect them, leading to their ultimate demise. Privateers were both predator and prey. American mariners had to navigate such tricky waters balancing risk and reward during the Revolution.

Five chapters sandwiched between a short introduction and shorter conclusion make up this book. The first chapter deals with the political background of privateering as well as the steps to commission, fit-out, and crew a vessel. The second chapter examines the life of a privateer on the wider Atlantic. The next chapter moves on to the chase for prizes and the issues involved with keeping them. This theme is juxtaposed with the idea of becoming prizes themselves, that is to say, prisoners. The fourth chapter concerns the legalistic aspects of a prize that could either confirm or strip privateers of the fruits of their labours. While the final chapter explores the perceptions and legacy of privateers, who were both praised and pilloried in their time and after. This seems a fairly standard treatment of the subject.

Hulbert’s text is well written, eminently readable, and confined to a manageable 182 pages. There are seven black and white images – three portraits and four historic documents – that should be familiar to any student of privateering. Copious notes, a healthy bibliography, and a solid index will be of assistance to any reader that wishes to dive deeper into the subject. The research is well documented in this volume. As the subject of this book spans the wider Atlantic world, a map to assist orienting the reader to the multiple places referenced might be appreciated.

Much of the information presented comes from logs of privateers and letters of those concerned with the activity. These sources add an immediacy to the subject that allows readers to view those who participated in privateering as they were. This visceral connection to the past is occasionally juxtaposed, however, with such anachronisms as discussing “African-Americans” (52) and their habitations on Martinique. More suitable and historically accurate terminology is used elsewhere in the text.

In presenting the apparent negative legacy and perceptions of American privateering by foreigners, this reviewer found it an interesting choice to supply the British point of view. It is unsurprising that the British would not think highly of these brave Americans. Words of condemnation from the French and Spanish are another matter. Instead, the material presented from
these foreign powers is generally from before they joined the war against
the British, at which time their damnations magically disappeared. Lack of
recognition of this evident political reality diminishes the sub-thesis that
privateers’ legacy was damaged in the post-war period. Although that may be
the case, more appropriate evidence should be offered to make that argument.
These limitations may not be readily apparent to a casual reader, but to those
with knowledge of the subject they may be irritants. Then again, better editing
may have caught such marked concerns.

Does Hulbert expose the reader to “untold,” stories or new ways to view
privateering during the Revolution as intimated in the introduction? On that
account, this reviewer would tend to report on the negative side of the ledger
considering the quantity of literature available on the subject. That said The
Untold War at Sea is a workman-like monograph that is well written, easy to
digest, and informative. This book should make a fine introduction to those
with an initial curiosity about privateers or maritime aspects of the American
Revolution. Readers who are familiar with the subject may wish to tuck into
something more substantial. I am, however, keeping a copy on my book shelf.

Michael Tuttle
Clarksville, Tennessee

John Johnson-Allen. ‘Rosy’ Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet. The Man
whittlespublishing.com, 2021. 256 pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography,

This is an interesting, but odd, biography concerning the life of Admiral
of the Fleet Rosslyn ‘Rosy’ Wemyss (pronounced Weems), who played a
significant, but often forgotten role, as a senior British naval officer during the
First World War. The content and context is blatant hagiography; bordering on
sycophantic hero worship which at times becomes annoying due to the book’s
one-sided use of sources (including books written by Wemyss himself and
his wife), and heavy over-reliance on quotations from others. Even the title
is misleading — while Wemyss was the Allied Naval Representative, at the
Armistice deliberations in early November 1918, to state he created Armistice
Day is a very long bow to draw indeed!

Wemyss certainly had a distinguished naval career commencing in 1877
as a 13-year-old cadet at Britannia Royal Naval College. He was of Scottish
ancestry (Clan Wemyss) from Fife and part of the Scottish aristocracy. As luck
would have it, Prince George (later King George V) was one of his friends at
the college and they later served together in HMS Bacchante as midshipmen.
This linkage to the royal family certainly assisted Wemyss’ career and he
served frequently in the Royal Yacht HMY *Victoria and Albert* and also on royal tours in HM Ships *Ophir* and *Balmoral Castle*. He was seen by many of his peers as a court officer who progressed rapidly through the ranks due solely to his Royal connections.

This is partly true, but Wemyss was also an intelligent and highly motivated officer who was equally capable at sea, in command, and in leadership roles where a level of tact and diplomacy were required. Prime Minister Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) is said to have stated: “If I had a difficult bit of diplomacy on hand, I’d send for a naval officer” and Wemyss would prove to be the right man for these tasks.

In 1911 Wemyss was promoted rear admiral, well ahead of many of his peers, and at the outbreak of war in 1914, he was commanding a cruiser squadron in the Channel Fleet. By early 1915 he had been sent to the Mediterranean to create the naval and logistics base at Mudros (on the Greek island of Lemnos) to support the forthcoming Dardanelles campaign. While Mudros had a suitable harbour and fresh water sources, the rest of the island’s infrastructure was quite basic and it was also neutral Greek territory; thus, the need for a capable and diplomatic senior naval officer to set up and manage this forward operating base. The logistics support to the campaign was rife with problems, but without Wemyss’ calm leadership and management, it would have been much worse.

Following the withdrawal of Allied forces from the Gallipoli peninsula in late 1915/early 1916, Wemyss was appointed as Commander-in-Chief East Indies Station stretching from Egypt to Singapore, with the vital Suez Canal/Red Sea line of communication under his control as well the Persian Gulf and it seaborne oil supplies. Wemyss ensured his forces took an active naval role in ensuring Turkish forces were pushed back from these vital sea routes and providing sea transport and logistics support to T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) and Emir Feisal in their actions against the Turks. He also made attempts to re-open the Tigris/Euphrates River supply lines to the besieged British forces at Kut-al-Amara but these actions failed.

The supporting documents throughout the biography are exceptionally one-sided and there is excessive padding, using many pages of direct quotes with little, if any, real analysis. Much of the ‘biography’ describes Wemyss private and social life, particularly holidays with family and lunches attended that, while initially interesting, become quite boring; but it does show the lifestyle of the upper-class officers of that period.

In mid-1917, Wemyss returned to Britain becoming Deputy First Sea Lord and, following the abrupt dismissal of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in December 1917, he stepped into the role of First Sea Lord. Wemyss subsequently became the Allied Naval Representative at the November 1918 Armistice negotiations.
This event is well described as are the subsequent peace negotiations, and the bitter disputes between Wemyss and British Prime Minister Lloyd George (Wemyss openly despised most Allied politicians) and US Admiral William Benson regarding the disposal of the German fleet then interned at Scapa Flow. Germany actually did the British a great service by scuttling their capital ships at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919, as it defused what could have been a difficult situation between the Allies. The citing of Wemyss as the “creator of Armistice Day” negates the role played by many others in the November 1918 negotiations and the first Armistice commemoration was not until 11 November 1919, by which time Wemyss had retired.

“Rosy” Wemyss relinquished his position as First Sea Lord in late 1919 following more bitter in-fighting within the upper echelons in the Royal Navy, and British politicians, which saw Admiral Sir David Beatty, who had commanded the battlecruiser squadrons at Jutland, appointed as First Sea Lord. Wemyss then retired quietly to France, with his wife and daughter, where he died in 1933. Wemyss appears to have been popular within the Royal Navy, but descriptions of a “dark side” detailed in other sources are conveniently omitted or glossed over in this biography.

*Rosy Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet* is still a good read and his contribution to the Royal Navy, the successful prosecution of the 1914-18 war and its conclusion, via the Armistice, is note-worthy. Johnson-Allen’s biography of Wemyss is a heavily, positively biased piece but the true story of this quite interesting admiral has yet to be written.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


This work is a sequel to Jordan’s 2011 *Warships After Washington* and continues his analysis of the building and modernization programs carried out by the world’s five major navies during the second half of the Treaty Era. Building upon his previous work and utilizing the same style for continuity, Jordan examines the six main types of vessels affected by the London Treaty’s design limitations. Each nation’s rationale and design process is well covered, showcasing the advancement of technology, the reactionary elements to foreign design, and the comparative results. Standardized charts, simplified blueprints, and photographs are located throughout for increased understanding, bolstered by an acronym and abbreviation glossary and unit conversion tables. A
postscript on the failed 1936 treaty, an appendix transcribing the 1930 treaty, endnotes, bibliography, and an index compliment Jordan’s analysis to round out the text.

The book begins with an introductory examination of the 1930 London Treaty, the participant nations, and the implications of its acceptance (or in the case of France and Italy, partial acceptance) on the existing and planned vessels of each country. To avoid retreading his earlier examination, the ramifications of the Washington Treaty are briefly spoken of when necessary, with parenthetical references to relevant chapters in *Warships After Washington* placed where readers may desire a more detailed analysis. This is followed by the core six chapters of his work, essentially self-contained studies on Capital Ships, Aircraft Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines, and Small Combatant and Auxiliary Vessels of the London Treaty Era.

Each section follows a pattern of brief introduction to the constraints and patterns imposed by the treaty before delving into each nation’s resultant actions. This usually consists of initial ship designs by the countries, with reactionary actions discussed in chronologically placed subsections. The delicate balancing act of creating effective designs within the bounds of allowed tonnage and stipulations is thoroughly covered, to include proposed designs that were ultimately rejected such as America’s plans for a subcategory (b) Flying Deck Cruiser (135-138). Funding is often exposed as the general limiter of each nation’s ambitions, with additional constraints unique to each nation coming into play. The two-ocean nature of America’s navy saw vessel beam and displacement additionally constrained by the width of the Panama Canal, while tensions between France and Italy centered around the former’s “perceived need to police … overseas territories” leading to both a refusal to accept full parity and a miniature naval arms race (264).

Technological advancement is often touched upon within the work, as its evolution greatly affected vessel design and rebuilding. The section on battleship modernization is particularly impressive in this regard, showing how reduced numbers of more modern propulsion systems could result in faster, more efficient ships all while freeing tonnage for increased armour and armament. The dangers of trying to fit too much armour, armament, and equipment on too small a hull are also made clear, as some of the built designs were clearly “over-gunned and overweight” (185). This was particularly true for the interwar destroyers of America and Japan, where disproportionately heavy armament on small hulls led not only to gross over-tonnage, but structural weakness as well.

Each chapter contains its own conclusions subsection, where Jordan analyzes the overall logic and goal of the chapter’s ship designs, with discussion of their eventual practicality and evolution under the treaty-free
restraints of the Second World War. His postscript acts as a conclusion to the era, examining the world events that put a strain on the treaty system, and its eventual collapse with America’s March 1937 invocation of the escalator clause against Japan and the June 1938 raising of battleship displacements by Britain and France (290). Jordan’s well-reasoned arguments and insights paint a clear picture throughout the work of ship design, counter-design, and the strains of diplomatic planning verses technological reality.

There are one or two typos in the work, which are negligible in nature. Jordan has provided an excellent examination of the interwar naval vessels of Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. His concise, easy-to-read style and subdivision of the work into vessel types has created a convenient comparative study for those interested in ship design, interwar international agreements, and treaty vessels’ service before or during the Second World War. His efforts to standardize profile drawings and data have created a greater level of accessibility for foreign designs than previously available, making Warships after London a welcome addition to the historiography of international naval ship design.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Over the last twenty or so years the progressive improvement in the quality and clarity of published colour photograph reproduction has led to a plethora of books show-casing the prized holdings of various museums around the world. This has embraced not only an astonishing variety of subjects, but has also included (most gratifyingly for a nautically-minded audience) generous samplings of the ship model collections of many maritime museums (including the Glasgow Museum, the National Maritime Museum, and the Musée de la Marine, to name but a few). There are also a number of books featuring the ship model collections of private collectors (the Thompson Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, the Rodgers Collection of Dockyard Models at the US Naval Academy Museum (2 volumes), and the Kriegstein Collection, the subject of the current review).

This book is notable in that, while most of its ilk are penned by professional curatorial staff, this one is written by the collectors themselves, Arnold and Henry Kriegstein, identical twins (and doctors, both) with a synchronized
passion for collecting historic ship models. Thus, this book affords a fascinating
glimpse into the motivation and sensitivity of the private collector as an agent
of preservation of these historical artifacts. That this is (effectively) a third
edition of this title, being preceded by 2007 and 2010 editions (Pier Books and
SeaWatch Books respectively) indicates both the evolution of the collection,
and that there is clearly a demand for the sharing of this passion ... an historic
collector passion reflected in the anecdote (198-99) that Peter Pett (shipwright
at Chatham in 1667, at the time of the Dutch fireship raid on the Medway) was
criticized publicly (and sent to the Tower) for having diverted boats to saving
his model collection when it was thought his efforts might have been better
spent rescuing the ships they represented!

The book is organized in 35 chapters (and one appendix), 30 of them
dealing specifically with one model each, and within each, the discussion
proceeding through sections addressing (in order) acquisition, provenance,
description (condition and construction), literature (previous citations of each
model), historical perspective, and references.

The “acquisition” and “provenance” sections in particular give us a unique
insight into collectors’ ethos regarding the valuation and preservation of
models. The description of the pursuit of collecting highlights the combination
of knowledge, and the sheer persistence/patience of detective work necessary
to secure a specific model. In some cases, this entailed years of sleuthing to
identify the model as both authentically contemporary and of a named ship
with a known construction date (the unique value of ‘named’ ship models
being that they serve to establish the timetable of design changes). Sometimes
this identification is made easier (if only after purchase and restoration) by
the discovery of concealed notes from the modelmaker himself, as in the
case of two models built by George Stockwell at Sheerness, Bristol in 1774
and Leopard in 1787 (204). In one other model, a hidden note in the base
of a capstan provided details of a 1936 restoration effort (21-23). All this
knowledge and persistence is shown to effect in an account of the mechanics
of navigating the shoals of export license hearings for artifacts of national
importance (767-79).

The book features many interesting and curious details, such as the
widespread change in figurehead fashion at the beginning of the eighteenth
century from lions without tails to lions with tails (17), and the fashion for
chinoiserie in model decoration. This latter involved the extensive use of
intricate red, black, and gold lacquer finishes (‘Japanning’) with Chinese
decorative motifs, even extending to painting the undersides of raised gunports
red with unique leonine faces, each with a different expression (110-120; 131-
139). There is also discussion of some oddities, such as a model of HMS
Victory’s foremast, made with wood from that ship (with simulated cannon-
ball splintering from her most notable battle), and a 300-year old skeletal cardboard pop-up model of a pair of ships (1720 and 1723) in launch-day livery. Two other chapters of especial interest (28 & 29) feature the detail of figureheads: the first is of an unfinished carving, demonstrating a work-in-progress; the second is a comparison of the figureheads of three different models of the same ship (Queen Charlotte, c. 1784), illustrating the evolution of the design of the figurehead.

Interestingly (shocking, to a naval architect!) the exquisite actual draughts of ships were not as popular, and King George, when offered one, rejected it in favour of a perspective painting of ships represented in the distinctive Admiralty Board configuration (open frames below the main wale to emphasize the shape). Chapter 31 includes a number of examples of these (as well as what may have been the rejected draught). The Kriegstein collection (and this book) also includes a number of van de Velde paintings and drawings (characterized as the ‘photo-journalism’ of the day). Of course, the heart and soul (raison d’être!) of any such book is the pictures, and the photographs (mostly taken by the authors themselves) are stunning. This comment applies throughout, but most particularly to the pictures of figureheads and other details, illustrating the truly exceptional artistry and craftsmanship of the model builders and carvers. Of the ships, it is hard to pick a favourite, but the pictures of the Diamond, a 4th rate of 1708, stand out as an epitome of the type, featuring a largely unpainted pear-wood construction that has aged the characteristic honey-gold colour, with exquisite carvings around the stern gallery.

Overall, this is a marvellous volume. It is not an alternative to Ball & Stephens’ more thorough and scholarly work (Navy Board Ship Models, 2018, reviewed in this journal (Issue No. 2, Summer 2019, p. 159) but is rather, a perfect complement to it, being the labour of love describing what those authors acknowledge is “by far the largest collection (of Navy Board models) in private hands.” The only criticism would be of the binding which, as per the review of a previous, similarly weighty, Seaforth publication, is definitely not up to repeated handling.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


In his foreword to Warrior to Dreadnought, the first of his volumes on the evolution of British warship design, the accomplished naval constructor and
author D.K. Brown notes that ship design is a team sport and conjugates the irregular verb “To Design” as follows:

- I create,
- You interfere,
- He gets in the way,
- We cooperate,
- You obstruct,
- They conspire.

*Shaping the Royal Navy* tells the story of the most significant period in the evolution of ship design in the Royal Navy, and of naval architecture as a discipline, and features all of the grammatical persons suggested above. It is a tale that, while inseparable from technological developments, is not about these developments per se, but rather about how they influenced changes in the understanding of the ship design process and of the various roles, authorities, and responsibilities within it.

The broad trajectory of technological development through the era is well-known: sail to steam, paddle to screw, wood to iron construction, broadside armament to turrets, armour, coal-fired reciprocating steam to oil-fired turbines, man-powered ship operations to machine-powered, etc. For those interested in the topic and the period, the list of dramatis personae is also reasonably familiar: Seppings, Symonds, Coles, Reed, Russell, Froude, Thomson/Kelvin, Barnaby, White, Watts, and Fisher, to name but a few. What this book adds significantly to the literature is the mapping of how the interaction of these personalities – with each other and with the technological opportunities – redefined the very nature and concept of the warship design process.

The book is an outcropping of the author’s PhD dissertation but is not as dryly academic as one might expect of that provenance. Rather it is a lively narrative with plenty of colour-commentary provided by ample and well-chosen quotations from contemporary writings. They convey with immediacy the opposed viewpoints, anxieties, and social/cultural prejudices of the period. Indeed, the tenor of the discussions put this reviewer in mind of what was by some termed the naval-officer debating style: vigorous exchange of strongly-held opinions, followed by robust personal invective.

The academic focus of the work is the “role of human actors in technological change,” the “wider contexts which shaped technological change,” and “technologies in the making, which involve networks of actors negotiating risk, speculation, anxiety, fragile credibility, and competing interest groups.” This approach is contrasted with technological determinism which sees technology more as an independent galvanic force. The aim of the actor-driven approach to the history of technology is not to question the importance of any particular new technology, but “to reveal the contingencies
on which their success or failure depended” (4-6). Thus, in many ways, this is as much social history as technological history, and the social/class dimension looms large in the underlying question of who should exercise authority, based on what source of informed judgement, and how acquired. Through the arc of this eighty years, this manifested as a contest between the relative credibility of experience versus science. The lack of distinction between authority (as knowledge) in technical matters and authority (as executive license) to make decisions led one member of the Board of Admiralty (1859-1866) to confide to his journal the need for a First Lord who would “abstain from that which appears hereditary with first lords, namely, the vanity of supposing, after they have been a few years, or even months at the Admiralty, that they can build and arm a ship” (16).

The volume is structured in nine parts: an introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion. Each of the core chapters treats a specific issue and contemporary controversy, generally associated with a particular protagonist and exemplified by a particular vessel. The tale stretches from the “sailor-designer” Captain William Symonds and his HMS Vernon, through Baldwin Walker and the introduction of steam and screw; John Scott Russell and the introduction of iron; Captain Cowper Coles and the HMS Captain disaster; Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and William Froude addressing concerns with the seaworthiness of HMS Devastation; William White’s management of the design of HMS Inflexible/Royal Sovereign and the issue of balance in ship design; and finally Admiral Sir John Fisher and HMS Dreadnought, with the commitment to steam turbines.

The discussion and contemporary debates through these chapters tack back and forth between a number of key recurring themes: the role of experience versus expertise, or as it emerges, the clash between cultures of judgement and of observation; the nature and role of science in design; and the required qualities and background of individuals exercising authority.

Captain William Symonds’ tenure as surveyor represented the epitome of the culture of judgement, igniting debates on what skills a ship designer should have, and how the merits of ship design should be judged. Symonds was neither a shipbuilder, graduate of the School of Naval Architecture (1811-32), nor a member of the Naval Board. On the incoming Whig government’s abolition of the Tory-controlled Naval Board in 1830, however, he was appointed to oversee many of its duties. His claim to expertise was rooted in his repute as a naval officer and yacht designer (well connected with the Royal Yacht Club (RYC)) and his appointment was defended based on the prevailing notion that “institutionalized study was not necessary for advancement within a technical profession” (46). Interestingly, Symonds was presented as a “scientific man” and the qualities of his ships were demonstrated through “experimental
cruises.” Even at the time there was criticism of Symonds’ “guess and test” approach, “a form of empirical art rather than of science,” mobilizing “often aged Admirals’ to command squadrons of under-manned ships, and conducted in a ‘spirit of rivalry’, even to extent of recruiting ‘good jockeys.” It was noted that there was little repeatability of results and no systemic analysis of contributing design factors. More critically, as these were effectively yacht races conducted in the relatively benign summer months, experimental cruises were not properly indicative of the range of performance qualities a warship should have. As an example, the sharp-formed Symondite hulls were notorious for rolling in a seaway with lower gunports awash.

The advent of steam was the subject of much polemic in the popular and technical press. As the author notes, the introduction of steam may be more productively examined as a history of steam advocates. Resistance was stiff – the RYC threatened to expel any members using steam. There was push-back also in this period on the experimental cruises, a critique of the time (1845) noting that the poor performance of many ships on their first trials “only affords lamentable proof of want of a governing principle” (76). The succession of Baldwin Walker following Symonds featured a restructuring of the surveyor’s office, with the actual design out of the surveyor’s hands and with his technical staff, and the surveyor’s role limited to directing and managing the work of the Royal Dockyards, ensuring the proper application of the navy estimates. This period also saw the second of several attempts to establish a professional development scheme, with the Central School of Mathematics and Naval Construction short-lived (1848-1853) because “the state did not perceive a significant advantage from giving a small group of the dockyard workforce a specialized education” (83). This period also saw the creation of a Committee of Reference (later Council of Science) to advise independently on questions of design.

The debate on design management intensified through the era of introduction of iron in shipbuilding. The homogeneity of French ships as a result of the French government’s “meritocratic bureaucracy” was contrasted with the disorder in British shipbuilding as a symptom of aristocratic patronage. Questions were raised of how best to effectively manage the Navy’s shipbuilding programme: what ships, by whom designed, by whom executed. John Scott Russell emphasized the need for naval architects who used experiments to generate new knowledge (105), noting that there was “no surer way to become unpopular than to insist on having right things done for right reasons” (113) and that “what must govern the ship is the object, aim, and purpose” (118). This period saw yet another re-organization of the surveyor’s office, taking the style of controller. It also saw a number of steps of progress in professionalization with the creation of the Institution of Naval Architects...
(INA, 1860), and the (3rd) School of Naval Architecture at South Kensington (1864), later moving to RNC Greenwich (1872) as the Royal School of Naval Architecture. Debate on the ship design and ship science question was lively at gatherings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the INA, and Royal United Service Institution (RUSI). Between the latter two in particular there was polarization on the issue of qualifications for exercising authority on design matters. Design was not yet considered a matter of the application of science, but rather a contest of “science and mathematics” versus “common sense and empiricism.” The author notes that “parliamentary debates reveal the deep tensions between MPs about whether science added anything to the craft practice of ship design” (120). The apogee of confident ignorance is represented by a Hansard debate as late as 1874 in which Henry Watkin, MP and railway speculator, denied the requirement for specialized skills and knowledge to become a naval architect, noting (on the basis of childhood acquaintance with toy boats) that “in one sense we have all been naval architects” and concluding his contribution by urging that the Commons legislate on where the centre of gravity (CG) of a ship should be placed (186).

It is particularly striking that this opinion was rendered after the HMS Captain disaster of September 1870 in which a new turret ship capsized in the Bay of Biscay with the loss of 509 lives. In a reprise of Symonds’ route to ship design authority, Captain had been designed and built under the direction of Captain Cowper Coles, a well-connected Royal Navy gunnery expert who had distinguished himself innovating with gunnery rafts in the Crimean War. The ship was designed and built against the objections of the Admiralty naval architects and was delivered with both lower freeboard and higher CG than as designed (and already of concern). Captain Coles had derived his authority from arguments for turret ships that “rested on the perception that US Civil War engagements portended the future of naval warfare” (144). In the aftermath, debates began to acknowledge that, in the earlier words of Chief Constructor Sir Edward Reed “the form of her battery, however important, is but one of many features of a warship…” (152). Reed argued that only naval architects could bring the various components and tensions within ship design into balance. Meanwhile, Russell weighed in with the acidic comment “is it patriotism or want of patriotism that makes English citizens elevated to the rank of legislators dabble most earnestly and pertinaciously in those matters of public safety of which they understand least” (160), while an anonymous article of 1875 saw the inception of the Captain disaster in “the vain idea of a man who did nor know a single iota of mathematics, and who endeavoured to link the possible to the impossible, by building a ship which at the same time should prove an efficient cruiser and a floating battery of unrivalled power.” The same source also noted that an officer in the senior ranks of the service
was heard to voice the sentiment “thank God he did not know what the curve of stability meant.” While this loss fed the debate about the role of science, it also inspired a parallel debate on balance and fitness for purpose in ship design, the strategic role of ships (control of the oceans vs defence of coastal regions), and whether such ships should have the full top-hamper of the previous sail era.

In the debates and writings throughout this transition era, one can appreciate the sense almost of cultural anguish and visceral reaction to the transformation of ships from a beloved animate object into a machine of war, with the cognitive dissonance of encountering a monstrosity, presenting “as if she were a ship, instead of being a sort of infernal machine, created by some tremendous engineering mind, when in a state of nightmare” (167). The discussion in chapter 5, entitled “A Scientific Problem of the Highest Order,” deals with the deep unease regarding seaworthiness of such creations. As the author notes, much of the debate concerning HMS Devastation really concerned strategic thinking, although it manifested as a technical debate with questions of trust in professional groups. The successful resolution of this unease was the joint work of two successive Chief Constructors/Directors of Naval Construction, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Sir William White, and the engineer/scientist William Froude. The author notes that the first two had a different approach than their predecessor, Sir Edward Reed, a conciliatory approach aimed at establishing legitimacy rather than Reed’s more antagonistic approach seeking recognition.

This project of generating trust in scientific and engineering expertise was also supported by Froude’s work establishing the utility of model experiments, validated by full-scale trials. In discussing the interactions between specialists and non-specialists (generalists) in ship design, the author makes an important point regarding the recognition of Froude’s personal and scientific credibility: that effective engineering required the patronage of authority that rested within institutions (and whose gift was often highly political) even as the Admiralty required the support of scientists and engineers in restoring public faith in safety of warships following concerns regarding HMS Devastation. Thus, this debate redrew the map of authority whereby science became analogous with efficiency, safety, and power (274).

The last two chapters (“The Politics of Management and Design” and “Re-engineering Naval Power”) cover two significant steps in ship design in terms of the artifact itself: White’s design for Royal Sovereign switched the design emphasis from defensive strength to seakeeping “speed and fighting power at sea” (225), while Philip Watts’ Dreadnought featured a commitment to steam turbines (as well as, of course, the all big-gun armament). The period featured a lively public interest in naval debate, fanned by Stead & Brassey, and tension between quantitative and qualitative measures of warship merit.
As the author comments, consensus required “conscious thought about what a battleship’s qualities were and how it was to be used. The absence of such discussion, however, revealed a serious problem in the British techno-military sphere: very few naval officers thought about engineering and naval power in a connected sense” (221). Admiral Sir John Fisher did not lack for articulate opinions on the requirements hierarchy, observing that there was “very little connected discussion between the naval officer, naval architect, and administrator concerning how ship design affected tactics and vice versa” and that “[s]trategy should govern the types of ships to be designed. Ship design as dictated by strategy should govern tactics. Tactics should govern details of armaments” (251). While Dreadnought is often viewed as Fisher’s baby, it was rather the product of his establishment of a Committee on Designs (1905) with instructions for “naval officers to use their ‘experience’ to ‘propose the tactical and fighting requirements’ for the ship and civilian members to state ‘the limits within which these requirements are capable of being fulfilled’” (267).

But what these two chapters also narrate is the change in social attitudes toward participants and their roles in an increasingly technical endeavour. The Royal Dockyards were the largest state engineering enterprise of the time and there were arguments for naval officers to be in charge due to their social status and acknowledgement of superiority through possession of important qualities such as “common sense, sound judgement, and self command” (206). At the same time there was a shift from apprentices in a craft-oriented system to naval college graduates in a scientific-management scheme and a professionalization of the Royal Navy’s design cadre (the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC) was established 23 August 1883). Fisher was intolerant of class prejudice impeding progress and instituted the Selbourne scheme to improve the acceptance and status of RN engineer officers, commenting caustically “the decline and fall of England will not ... be due to the upper classes leaving the Navy but it will be due to their effeteness in failing to recognize what a great ‘leveller’ is education...” (262).

This review has only scratched the surface of the many valuable insights in this excellent book. It is a fascinating tale of the evolution in the interaction of personalities in a highly complex technical field – an evolution that accomplished the techno-strategic (almost diplomatic) feat of establishing effective, mutually-beneficial spheres of influence between the operational and engineering/design realms, whereby the warriors stepped back from attempting to assert their experience in designing the ship, but rather applied it more strategically and effectively to “designing the requirement.” This is the story not so much of the technological changes in this period of transition from artisanal design to modern technical design, but rather of the evolution of roles and parsing of authority within the design enterprise. Thus, it is a very
important contribution to the history of warship design and is most highly recommended.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


After the first controlled heavier-than-air flight by the Wright brothers in 1903, navies slowly appreciated and embraced the possibilities for aircraft as a new technology in conducting naval warfare. Aircraft quickly evolved from flimsy prototypes with flyers perched precariously in the open air to more substantial, enclosed models used for reconnaissance, surveillance, gunnery spotting, and communication purposes. On 28 March 1910, the French inventor and manufacturer Jean-Henri Fabre flew the world’s first floatplane, taking off from the water under its own power. The idea of matching up aircraft with torpedoes, another technology changing the nature of naval combat, was broached and taken more seriously after the start of the First World War. Britain proved the concept with successful air-launched torpedo attacks against Turkish ships in August 1915 by aircraft operating from a seaplane tender. Subsequent years and decades saw the development of new types of land-based and shipborne torpedo bombers dedicated to the specialized role of sinking ships in the maritime environment. The experimentation of the interwar period gave way to large-scale employment in combat during the Second World War and predominance of carrier aviation in the vast Pacific Ocean. The torpedo bomber’s days, however, were numbered with improved anti-aircraft defences, the advent of missiles, and eventual introduction of the helicopter, another vertical air platform capable of carrying torpedoes and operating off ships. Jean-Denis Lepage, a Dutch-based author and illustrator, takes on the weighty task of documenting the evolution of the torpedo bomber up to the mid-twentieth century in its many varieties.

The book is divided into six chronologically structured parts, comprising forty distinct chapters focused on general developments and specific countries. Further headings within chapters places the focus squarely on the individual aircraft, with paragraphs of various lengths giving background and technical details and accompanied by illustrations. Though references are not provided, the entries are very detailed and comprehensive, drawing upon available secondary literature and trade sources. Lepage covers both torpedo bombers
that entered into manufacture and operational service in various countries, as well as those that either never went beyond the design stage, or were turned down by navies for various reasons, most commonly cost, poor design, or inferior performance against stated requirements. It is interesting that the most used and beloved torpedo bombers, such as the venerable Fairey Swordfish or Heinkel 111, were not necessarily the most advanced designs and obsolete by the time war came.

The torpedo, a favourite of the Jeune École, was already an established naval weapon by the time it was married up with aircraft, gaining in design and performance. The Sopwith Short 184 was probably the most active and successful float biplane put into the torpedo bomber role during the First World War, capable of carrying one 14-inch torpedo underneath its fuselage. German and by extension, Austro-Hungarian (the country had no aviation industry to speak of), types tended to be larger and employed for multi-purpose functions. Trials showed that aircraft could be hoisted or flown off ships and landed on flight decks, that gave rise to converted seaplane and aircraft carriers. Interwar naval treaties put limits on new construction and allowed certain battleship and battlecruiser hulls otherwise slated for scrapping to be completed as aircraft carriers in the American, Japanese, British, and French navies. The 1920s- and 1930s-era torpedo bombers were intended to fill out squadrons manning those carriers in wheeled varieties, be carried aboard warships and tenders as seaplanes for catapult and recovery, and larger high-performance land-based aircraft with sufficient range to operate over adjoining seas. The Farman F.160 was a converted heavy bomber and civilian airliner that was made into a successful torpedo-carrying seaplane for France’s Aéronavale until superseded by rival company offerings in the Levasseur PL.15 and Latécoère 290. The British and American navies, taking the lead in nascent carrier aviation, could choose from a number of types put forward by established companies such as Blackburn, Fairey, Douglas, and Glenn Martin eager to get contracts and start production. The Mitsubishi B1M and B2M were standard interwar carrier-based torpedo bombers deployed by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Monoplane designs with more powerful engines and stressed metal skins gradually superseded the biplane. Lepage includes interesting chapters on torpedo bombers in the Netherlands, Soviet Union, and Poland in that section.

During the Second World War, fast, land-based, two-engine bombers represented by the outstanding Bristol Beaufighter and Junkers 88 proved to be deadly torpedo bombers in European waters sinking a fair share of shipping, as well as the very capable Tupolev Tu-2 whose creator was released from a Stalin prison and rehabilitated for the war effort. The Heinkel 115, like most bulky twin-engine seaplanes, was soon outmatched by high-performance fighters within range of land, and the Junkers 87T Stuka was modified for naval
service carrying torpedoes on the never-finished carrier Graf Zeppelin. The Italians favoured three-engine torpedo bombers which incorporated several advanced features, though lack of industrial capacity meant a chronic shortage of torpedoes. The obsolete Fairey Swordfish outlived its intended replacement by the same company’s Albacore and Barracuda torpedo bombers. The Royal Navy in due course adopted American-type fighter and torpedo bomber aircraft from North American production.

Naval operations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean theatres featured widespread use of torpedo bombers flying from carriers in fleets and from land. Japan’s Nakajima B5N (Kate) was the favourite carrier-based torpedo bomber used in the attack on the American naval anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the 1942 Battle of Midway, when the Imperial Japanese Navy lost its fast carriers to strikes from US Navy dive and torpedo bombers. Planned upgrades with the Nakajima B6N Tenzan (Jill) and Aichi B7A (Grace) came too late. The Japanese also boasted several good extended range land-based bombers capable of carrying torpedoes, including the Mitsubishi G4M (Betty). On the American side, the aging Douglas Devastator and Dauntless were replaced by the more powerful Grumman Avenger, the versatile and arguably amongst the best-suited carrier-borne torpedo bombers produced in quantity during the war. The Douglas Helldiver and Consolidated TBY Sea Wolf played second fiddle. In a pinch, the workhorse Consolidated PBY Catalina, a long-range flying boat, could carry torpedoes on racks under the wings, as could the British Short Sunderland flying boat nicknamed the “flying porcupine.”

After 1945, defence and aircraft manufacturing industries were capable of producing advanced designs, though the torpedo bomber had already reached its zenith and the capability was incorporated into long-range maritime patrol aircraft with the onset of the Cold War. The lighter weight American Mark 43 torpedo, and later Mark 46, were specifically produced for launching from aircraft. The Canadair CP-107 Argus, up to that time the largest aircraft entirely built in Canada, was a mainstay in the Royal Canadian Air Force’s anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol functions, able to carry a dizzying array of sensors and weaponry that included torpedoes, bombs, depth charges, and air-to-surface missiles as a counter to Soviet SSN and SSBN submarines. A European consortium similarly designed the Bréguet Br.1150 Atlantique that entered service in France and other countries and an updated version that carried torpedoes, Exocet AM39 and Harpoon air-to-surface missiles, mines, and depth charges. The Soviets produced the Ilyushin IL-28 jet bomber post-war in large numbers and later the Tupolev Tu-142 (Bear) four-engine maritime reconnaissance aircraft able to carry a dozen torpedoes and other munitions.

The book is marketed as an illustrated history, incorporating artwork done by Lepage instead of photographs and other graphic materials. First
impressions should not be off-putting when picking up the book. The drawings are cartoonish in appearance, more suited to a child’s colouring book. Nonetheless, the drawings are seriously rendered and accurately depict the aircraft, ships, and weapons under discussion. In effect, each aircraft has its own picture, even those less known or that never made it beyond prototype. That ensures a certain uniformity throughout the book. The French aircraft carrier Béarne, despite its inherent limitations in design and propulsion as a naval treaty conversion, is shown from a very pleasing front angle. Lepage invested considerable time and effort in the illustrations, which are as much of the book as the text. Torpedo Bombers 1900-1950 is recommended for readers interested in twentieth-century naval warfare, aviation, and scale modelling.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


Number 231 in the Images of War series, this is a photographic history of the twenty-four completed Essex-class aircraft carriers of the United States Navy from their introduction in 1943 to the final decommissioning of USS Lexington in 1991. Arranged chronologically, the text and photographs trace the development of the Essex design, describe life aboard the vessels, and detail a near-half-century of service. A brief abbreviation guide and bibliography bookend the primary contents, with the majority of the space depicting various carriers through half-page black and white photographs.

Author Marriott begins his work with a brief introduction, accompanied by a table of the planned Essex carriers, their builders, and the key dates in their construction. This leads into a chapter on pre-Essex carrier development in the United States, including a brief background on American Naval Aviation, the effects of the international interwar naval treaties on carrier designs, and the situation America found itself in leading up to the commissioning of the Essex on 31 December 1942. The next four chapters cover the construction, deployment, and operation of the wartime Essex carriers from 1943 through 1945. Following the format of the Image of War series, independent textual information takes a backseat to selected period images and their detailed captions. Of particular interest are the images of below-deck activities and operations in chapter four, a perspective often overlooked in favour of the more iconic exterior views of the massive carriers or on-deck operations.

Chapters six through eight cover the post-war evolution of Essex carriers, showcasing periods of mothballing and decommissioning, the modification of
vessels to accommodate the advent of jet aircraft, and combat operations in the Pacific during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Essex-class carriers also participated in the US space program, recovering astronaut capsules. One of the most interesting images is a 1961 drawing of a proposed Essex conversion into a mobile Atlas rocket launch pad (146). Depiction of several carriers in the final stages of their service as helicopter laden amphibious assault ships is an interesting addition that is not often seen in general histories on the subject and is appreciated.

The postscript offers a rather brief glance into the late service history of the last active Essex, USS *Lexington*, from 1976 to 1991. This section also addresses surviving museum ships of the Essex-class, illustrated with relatively recent black and white photographs. Finally, a useful table of ‘Fates’ documents the decommissioning and striking dates of all hulls. When a ship was scrapped, preserved, or, in the case of the *Oriskany*, sunk as an artificial reef, that is also noted.

In common with the rest of the Images of War series, photographs are all rendered in black and white, even several that were originally in colour (25, 143). Given the prevailing use of colour photography throughout the entire Essex time period, and the way it would have improved the visual understanding of applied camouflage patterns, for example, the inclusion of coloured images would have greatly increase the work’s effectiveness. An index would facilitate referencing images for a specific carrier. Although the nominal time period covered is 1943 to 1991, it appears to largely taper off at 1976. The USS *Lexington*’s 1976 to 1991 career as the sole remaining commissioned Essex carrier is briefly mentioned in the postscript chapter accompanied by only two images before Marriott delves into the locations of the four surviving museum ships. Given the *Lexington*’s nearly two decades of unique service as a training carrier for a score of naval aviators, this section deserves to be expanded. Finally, some of the non-caption text seems to run on, with a lack of punctuation and spacing to help delineate thoughts. Better editing would improve this situation in a future edition.

Nevertheless, this is an interesting image repository, particularly for those interested the Essex class ships at the end of the Second World War and the early Cold War. The accompanying text offers a decent summation of key points in the carriers’ service lives along with both the typical equipment and experiences of the crews. While improvements can be made, the work operates well within the constraints of the Images of War format and does offer a range of imagery for carriers, crews, and aircraft. As such, it makes for a good introductory resource into photographic archives and sources for further research.

In his book, *Emergency Deep. Cold War Missions of a Submarine Commander*, author McLaren provides an overview of both his time as a submarine commander and various submarine missions and activities during the Cold War. He balances the tension of dangerous missions with the mundane day-to-day issues that submarine commanders had to deal with in the course of their duties. Students of Cold War history should consider this an introductory text, but readers unfamiliar with the subject will also find it useful.

McLaren’s memoir explores his time as commanding officer of the USS *Queenfish*. He also discusses the full cycle involved in preparing for, executing, and recovering from a submarine mission during this period. This includes crew training related to the mission at hand as well as other training necessary for conducting regular operations on a submarine. He also mentions the maintenance activities and duties of the crew while the submarine is in port, as well as at sea. Finally, he addresses disciplinary issues and the consequences of an assignment that is poorly handled or a job not properly executed. This provides the reader with a realistic view of a submariner’s life during the Cold War, both the humdrum and the dramatic. Those familiar with submarine activities during this period might not find it particularly ground-breaking, but the less-informed should view this work as a solid introduction to the subject and investigate the author’s suggestions for further reading.

While specific missions are not explicitly described, McLaren does cover the full spectrum of submarine activity. Since it is primarily a personal memoir, some topics are more fully discussed in his other books. This time, the author focuses on ordinary missions that some might consider less strategic, such as environmental surveys and the mapping of ice flows or the ocean floor. While not as glamorous as some more well-known missions, they were useful and necessary during the Cold War era. Readers looking for an in-depth explanation of the technical aspects of submarines, tactics or the technology used to accomplish their missions should look elsewhere.

McLaren explains what was expected of submariners and points out that not everybody was suited to working in submarines. He avoids deep technical discussions, and any issues that he feels might violate or compromise security, including referring to some of his fellow sailors only by name and last initial. While extensively referenced, the work does pull a considerable amount of
source material from the author’s personal archive and recollections, rather than primary sources. This may make it difficult for those hoping to use the work for academic research.

Emergency Deep. Cold War Missions of a Submarine Commander is an exploration of the full spectrum of life and activities on a submarine and the issues that accompany it. While exploring submarine missions during the Cold War era, the author does it from a very personal perspective, which makes it more accessible to the casual reader. Rather than opening up new lines of research, McLaren’s work provides a solid foundation for individuals looking for an entry point into the subject. His recommendations for further reading allow students at all levels to explore specific topics in greater depth.

Michael Razer  
Ward, Arkansas


John McCown covers the business and enterprise aspects of the maritime transportation realm, loosely known as the shipping industry, from inception to the pandemic admirably well in Giants of the Sea. In a sector necessarily driven by trust, reputation and the offshoot cult of personality, McCown judiciously selects nine visionaries of the last century, and follows their stories of innovation and risk with the nuts and bolts of ship finance, manning, environment, and regulation. His access to source material like Bloomberg and other databases allows him to break it down by global ship-types and cargo movement trends and provide a genuine utility to readers. One always appreciates authors who obtain original material rather than dragging it from unvetted websites.

McCown treads a narrow edge and adroitly achieves a readable book which informs without drowning the reader in jargon or anecdote. An interesting flourish is his recap of what the nine luminaries gave back to society. As a shipping executive who worked closely with some of his subjects, McCown should be admired for what he had to leave out to achieve a pragmatic narrative flow. He recognizes the loss of almost all blue-water market share by the US fleet, from 60% in 1947 to about 1.5% today. The book’s themes include the classics of supply and demand, economies of scale, ton miles, emissions reductions, barriers to market entry, the high cost to aggregate tonnage, the leadership bloodline conundrum, private versus public funding, opacity
versus transparency, and the long-term, multi-generational aspect to accrue critical mass and market share. Going into the pandemic, the cruise sector was a financial darling, which illustrates the fickle winds facing all waterborne business.

Not only does McCown stress the art of the deal, such as Maersk buying up Sea Land, he also addresses the volatility owing to weather politics, vanity of princes, tsunamis, strikes, floods, and droughts. World trade is challenged with many chokepoints, whether Gibraltar, Panama, Suez, Magellan Straits, the English Channel, the Straits of Bosporus, and many others, including the St. Lawrence Seaway. In the wrong hands, chokepoints can become purgatories where princes could, as least in theory, hold a ship until payment is made, as in the Barbary Pirates of yore, or the Somali version still extant. In fact, Malcom McLean was famously delayed in his truck at Hoboken, New Jersey, until he greased the palms of stevedores to have access to delivering cargo to a ship, which was then hand-carried and pilfered from.

Each man had a nose for certain opportunities, and a toughness to survive failures; sometimes by over-insuring their assets. It was said that his enemies thought they would knock Onassis off his pedestal by arresting a substantial fishing fleet of his off Chile; however, the timing and a seismic shift in the fisheries benefited the Greek tycoon immensely. Niarchos’ secret of success was to “buy cheap and buy big,” and to use credit, which contrasts with the more conservative, less leveraged long-term-contract approach employed by his father-in-law, the patriarch Livanos, or Mr. Pao in Asia. It did not hurt that Niarchos also insured some ships in wartime for many times their market value, and those 36,387 ships out of over 105,000 aggregate tons were sunk during the Second World War.

McCown chose to feature Henry Kaiser (Liberty ship construction), Malcom McLean (container shipping), D.K. Ludwig (tanker financing), Ole Skaarup (drybulk ship design), Stavros Niarchos (drybulk finance and supply chain integration), Aristotle Onassis (risk/reward, tankers, and market adaptation), Y.K. Pao, in post-war China (shipbuilding, market-creation), C.Y. Tung (container innovation) in Hong Kong and beyond, and finally Maersk McKinney Moller (fleets and service aggregator). Each risked adapting to new technologies, whether steam, diesel, engineering, cargo handling, expanding economies of scale, or financing to meet a market which often did not even exist at the time.

His thesis is that shipping is “the basic enabler of world trade” and “is fundamentally an arbitrage. The extraordinarily efficient sea conveyance system that developed after the Second World War is the lubricant that moved world trade into high gear.” China’s shipping leverage is growing, with state ship-owning entities like China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO),
growing to the second-largest shipowner in the world, and also with staggering expansion into port infrastructure large and small in developing nations in South America, Africa, and beyond. China has been developing its belt and road initiative system of linking economies to its own. Mariners, of course, recognize that the ocean is as hostile and dangerous today as ever. In the nine years to 2020, 876 ships were lost at sea. Oceans constitute 97% of all water on earth, as McCown points out, noting “big oceans, big ships, big numbers.” And he gives us a big picture, macro coverage – 17,546 cargo ships over 600’ long, and from 300-600’ another 13,699, with two added daily.

He challenges us to ask: when did all this shipping begin? Under Queen Hatshepsut, Egypt’s only female pharaoh, who ruled for two decades to 1458 BC: she had barges of 200’ to 300’, 97’ long and 350 tons, built to carry stones. If ports like LA/Long Beach refuse to operate at night, the way ports around the world have been doing for decades, or if a significant portion of ships slow steam to save their biggest expense, fuel, or are kept at anchor due to port congestion due to other inefficiencies, it depletes the active fleet size, and reduces the global fleet supply numbers, even if temporarily.

Today we believe that when a mega-container ship like Ever Given blocks the Suez Canal for six days, as in March 2021, it is an economic calamity. The 1956 closure of the same canal by the president of Egypt, however, lasted five months, and the 1967 closure for the Six-Day War lasted for an excruciating record of eight years. This event turned both wet and dry bulk shipping on its head, and encouraged mammoth risk-takers like the Tungs in Hong Kong, Onassis in Greece, and Norwegians as well, to build the largest moving human-made objects ever built; ULCCs, or Ultra Large Crude Carriers, a few of which are still afloat.

McCown puts aside geopolitics to point out the interdependencies created by trade have brought world economies – even peace – closer within grasp. “The million crewmembers … often acted as goodwill ambassadors [to] dispel myths and highlight the common values shared by all people. They played a constructive role in maintaining world peace in addition to their primary role of keeping the ships that underpin the world economy moving.”

No book can encompass every aspect of an industry alleged in some circles to carry as much as 90% of world trade at some point in its life cycle, not forgetting that scrap is the largest export from the US by volume and weight. Nor can one book describe all the major sectors. This volume does admirably well to provide a cogent presentation of where shipping has been going for the past 75 years, and those, particularly in the US in the last century, who helped to move it there.

In a book of nearly 320 pages covering over 2,500 years from reed rafts to reefer (refrigerated) ships, and which is ambitiously global, there are bound
to be minor errata. For example, Stavros Niarchos’ ship, SS Bayou, was sunk by U-129 on 28 February 1942, not “in” the Caribbean as stated, but rather over 400 nautical miles east-southeast of Trinidad. Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s name had a letter omitted, with condolences for the typesetter. Inevitably coverage of the lives and careers of Niarchos and Onassis have a bit of overlap – they did both marry Tina Livanos and they did both profit from the 1956 Suez Canal closure.

The text is highly informed, buttressed by solid, innovative, and original research from primary source material. The analysis is based on extensive, first-hand executive shipping and travel experience. Neither “sea stories” nor “data displays,” Giants of the Seas is a well-cogitated and surprisingly humanistic, descriptive, and readable account. This is the product of the very global, globalized, interdependent and financially and electronically complex world that the shipping industry helped create.

One of McCown’s points is that shipping seeks efficiencies; it always has, and the men and women who allow and encourage those efficiencies will sail furthest over ruffled seas. “Despite playing a more central role in economies than ever before, ironically [the shipping industry] has receded from public view, and is now a largely invisible network to the public.” Shipping has often been opaque, and through history this was often intentional, so perhaps it only has itself to blame if not everyone recognizes its contribution.

John McCown founded Blue Alpha Capital in 2015 and is an expert on the container shipping industry. He is primarily focused on developing entrepreneurial opportunities in maritime space, including a Jones Act turbine installation vessel and a digital product for container shippers. He worked with the father of the container ship, Malcom McLean, for whom he served as executor. He also co-founded and took public an integrated US flag shipping/trucking company and led shipping and transportation investments at a $20 billion hedge fund. John is an inventor with two patents and an MBA from Harvard University; he graduated from Marion Military Institute and LSU.

Eric Wiberg
Boston, Massachusetts


Eminent historian N.A.M. Roger recently noted that Atlantic history too often contains “a hole in the middle” (The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 71). Most Atlantic history leaves out the ocean itself, Roger contends, a
paradoxical state of affairs given that the emergence of an Atlantic world would never have happened without ships, seafarers, and key nautical tools. Alida Metcalf, a professor of history at Rice University, shares Roger’s underlying sentiment and has crafted a short, informative book that helps fill this hole. She does so by exploring the moment in time when map and chartmakers conceptualized the idea of an Atlantic world.

Historians have never arrived at a consensus as to when, precisely, Europeans formulated the concept of an Atlantic world. Some scholars place the emergence of the idea in the mid-fifteenth century, others date its origins to 1492, and still others claim that Europeans failed to see the Atlantic world as an integrated space until the mid-to-late-sixteenth century. Metcalf boldly enters this historiographic debate, positing that the notion of an Atlantic world emerged in the first decade of the sixteenth century. She argues that influential charts and maps made during that decade moved the Atlantic Ocean from the periphery to the centre, thereby creating a new way of seeing the world. Chartmakers and their brethren portrayed the Atlantic not just as a geographic entity, but also as a navigable space that invited exploration, trade, and colonization.

Metcalf’s foray into debates surrounding the intellectual origins of the Atlantic world is complemented by engagement with a second historiographic tradition, that of historical cartography. Metcalf embraces both internalist and contextualist approaches to the historical study of maps and charts, focusing not only the details of individual pieces but also on the political and cultural messages contained within them. Borrowing ideas from the field of persuasive cartography, she argues that the charts and maps made after 1500 portrayed the possibilities of an interconnected Atlantic Ocean. The message these visual artifacts conveyed was that of an Atlantic world in which accessible, exotic lands offered plentiful opportunities to those willing to take advantage of them.

*Mapping an Atlantic World* is organized into three chapter pairs situated between a succinct introduction and a thought-provoking conclusion. The first chapter pair looks at depictions of the Atlantic Ocean in *mappaemundi* from before and immediately after 1500. Those created in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, such as the Catalan Atlas (1375) and the Fra Mauro map (ca. 1450), place the Atlantic on the world’s periphery. Depictions of the Atlantic changed dramatically around 1500, when Castilian navigator Juan de la Cosa returned from his third transatlantic voyage and produced a world map. La Cosa’s *Carta Universal* (ca. 1500) was followed by the Cantino planisphere (1502) and Nicolay de Caverio’s *Planisphere nautique* (ca. 1506). Contemporaneous with these manuscript charts were printed *mappaemundi*, notably the Contarini-Roselli map (1506) and *Universalis Cosmographia* (1507) of Martin
Waldseemüller. Metcalf argues these innovative *mappaemundi* conveyed a dramatic new sense of the size and importance of the Atlantic Ocean.

Metcalf’s second chapter pair explores the chartmakers and printers who brought the Atlantic to the forefront of European cosmography. By analyzing extant charts, as well as key mid-sixteenth century texts penned by Pedro Nunes, Alonso de Chaves, and Martin Cortés, Metcalf reveals how chartmakers drew on the heritage of portolan charts to emphasize the navigability of the Atlantic. Yet manuscript charts, for all their beauty, had relatively small circles of viewers. This situation changed with the emergence of the printed map, which became ubiquitous in Europe over the course of the sixteenth century. Metcalf devotes much ink to one map in particular, the *Universalis Cosmographia*, which was accompanied by a book and small globe. She argues that Martin Waldseemüller and his collaborators – a group that included artists, printers, and other humanist scholars – wanted Europeans to contemplate more intently the new “Fourth Part of the World.” In creating methods for so doing, these individuals helped transform how Europeans both visualized and perceived the world.

The book’s final chapter pair examines three of the visual images adopted by map and chartmakers to symbolize the New World: parrots, trees, and scenes of cannibalism. Parrots were “exotic animals … glamorous and astonishing to Europeans” (96), while trees highlighted the commercial potential of the Americas. According to Metcalf, parrots and trees rapidly became accepted visual codes for the New World, inviting viewers to contemplate a novel and distinctive place. Scenes of cannibalism were less prevalent, but important nonetheless. The first such scene appeared on a manuscript chart produced between 1502 and 1506, but not on a printed *mappamundi* until 1516. Images of cannibalism supported written accounts of anthropophagous practices in the New World, helping to justify European efforts to claim and civilize the Americas.

Metcalf concludes her book by considering the importance of ephemera in the practice of history. Relatively few *mappaemundi* have survived, in large part because they were discarded as new information became available, and their ephemeral nature tends to obscure the historical significance of these artifacts. Such an oversight would be a mistake, says Metcalf, who argues that the influence of medieval and early modern charts and maps of the Atlantic was both profound and long lasting. Through vivid artistry and recurring tropes, imagery presented in this genre of ephemera became part of Europe’s broader socio-cultural milieu. Map and chartmakers left their imprint on history by creating a new way of seeing the world, one that portrayed “transatlantic connections, interactions, and exchanges” as “not only possible but desirable”
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

(142). Well-illustrated throughout, *Mapping an Atlantic World* is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on the emergence of an Atlantic world.

Timothy S. Wolters
Ames, Iowa


In this brilliant work, Naomi Oreskes carefully assesses how American naval funding in the Second World War and Cold War influenced oceanography as a science. During this period, the blossoming field of oceanography became essential to North American defence. The United States Navy (USN) funded and supported research of the world’s oceans, fueling major scientific re-interpretations of vast amounts of data, often gathered by naval warships or by research vessels supported by naval funds. Yet, as the author points out, at times, naval priorities conflicted with purely scientific goals, impeding creativity and sharing. Such impediments led to at least one maritime disaster. Oreskes carefully examines the diverse positive and negative effects of defence funding, sometimes within an international context, but mostly focused squarely upon the American picture.

As she notes in her conclusion, some people might be tempted to dismiss assorted oceanographic conflicts as “personal or sociological, but they had epistemic consequences.” (469). Despite that conclusion, she does not ignore the personal, national, sociological, economic, philosophical, and other factors in her disciplined analysis. For example, she opens her book by demonstrating how personal animosity masqueraded as security concerns in bitter attacks against Norwegian oceanographer Harold Sverdrup during the Second World War, effectively preventing him from contributing to American breakthroughs in defence-related oceanographic research during that conflict and resulting in his post-war decision to return to Norway. That episode and others are based upon thorough documentation, a careful weighing of alternative explanations, and a demonstration of the interplay of complicated factors.

Her research includes consideration of the long battle to establish the theory of continental drifts, the extended debates over how data supported that and other theories, and how naval funding, security concerns, nationalism, fear of ridicule, organizational rivalries, and personalities affected the analysis of new data emerging from early Cold War oceanographic research. These are complex matters. Oreskes includes the philosophy of science, the science itself, and some modelling methodologies; it was sometimes difficult for a non-
scientist like me to follow all the threads, but well worth an attempt to do so. While her arguments are clear, the volume contains references to geophysical research which will be especially appealing to scientists, historians of science, and other specialists. Cold War historians, naval historians, and maritime historians will benefit from reading her work, but like me, they may not fully comprehend all aspects of her scientific discussions and become occasionally frustrated.

This work adds to what has already been written by Jacob Hamblin, *Oceanographers and The Cold War: Disciples of Marine Science* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005) and Gary Weir, *An Ocean in Common: Naval Officers, Scientists and the Ocean Environment*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004). Apart from learning a great deal more about oceanography as a science, *Science on a Mission* reinforced my perceptions about how much security measures impede research, analysis, and understanding with respect to historical processes. Canadians might well envy Americans with several outstanding scholarly volumes when we have far fewer resources about the inter-relationships between oceanography and the Royal Canadian Navy.

The best work to date is undoubtedly Eric Mill’s *The Fluid Envelop of our Planet: How the Study of Ocean Currents became a Science* (Toronto: UTP, 2011) which includes an earlier era and some Canadian information. Mills, however, did not gain access to many still-classified defence studies – the continued classification of defence documents plagues both official and unofficial work. Without access to classified databases and lacking a systematic declassification of older oceanographic and naval operational intelligence records (such as those derived from the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and high frequency direction finding and intercept stations), Canadian analysis of the early Cold War remains incomplete and, at times, misleading.

This situation makes volumes like *Science on a Mission* all the more valuable because Canadian and other allied Cold War oceanographic work intertwined tightly with American developments. Canadian historians should read this work, although Canada receives little attention in it. For example, the notable Canadian geophysicist, Tuzo Wilson, is mentioned only once (232). British scientists fare much better with P.M.S. Blackett (and others) rightly credited with their crucial contributions to re-opening the debate over continental drift in the 1960s (190, 192). These are minor quibbles. Oreskes’ conclusion mentions the mismanagement of the Canadian fisheries (496) without any detailed analysis of this vital topic. Nonetheless, the basic argument about how defence funding channels research into particular areas at the expense of others is an important topic for Canadians as well as Americans and others. Perhaps one day, historians of Canada may be able to attempt a
similar study when our classified oceanographic research is released. In the meantime, this volume is highly recommended for anyone interested in the broad topics of geophysics, the history of the oceans, and how American naval spending influenced the shape of modern oceanography.

Isabel Campbell
Ottawa, Ontario


*Nuclear Folly* is a thoroughly researched, excellently written account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Drawing on archives unavailable to earlier historians, author Serhii Plokhy takes readers into the hearts of the White House and the Kremlin, offices in which emissaries gave and accepted messages from and for their principles, the steamy jungles of Cuba, reporters’ lairs and any other stage on which the now-tragedy, now-triumph was played out.

The story line unwoven by Plokhy varies, in some respects, from that posited by some other authors. Rather than the brilliant handling by Kennedy that safely reversed a Soviet thrust into the Western Hemisphere, he posits a series of miscalculations and misunderstandings that brought the world perilously close to the nuclear Armageddon before the fear shared by the two principal antagonists compelled a solution.

Khrushchev’s initial plan is presented as a response to weakness, the Soviets’ inability to deliver nuclear warheads to the United States when the US could have hit the USSR. Successful deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba would have served as a counterweight against a first strike by the US and a guarantor against an invasion of Cuba. Planning did not take into account the lack of tree cover under which to hide the missiles. Khrushchev had problems with rogue commanders, who shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane and rebellion by Fidel Castro that almost scuttled the settlement, reminiscent of later American difficulties with its South Vietnamese clients.

In Kennedy’s orbit, the President fluctuated between the hawks and the doves. Several times air strikes were planned and invasions were contemplated before the less confrontational blockade was imposed. Robert Kennedy’s suggestions that a US Navy ship be sunk or an attack on Guantanamo Naval Base be staged to justify a retaliatory attack illustrate just how desperate the situation had become.

*Northern Mariner* readers will be particularly interested in the maritime and naval aspects of the crisis. Missiles and other military equipment, as
well as personnel, were transported on cargo ships, defended by Soviet naval vessels and the blockade, while the military response chosen was carried out by the US Navy on the high seas.

The six-year-old Ilia Mechnikov, fresh from transporting cattle to Russia from India and Bulgaria, was loaded with military equipment, troops, and false documents when it left Feodosia in the Crimea. Its secrecy threatened by an appendicitis attack and botched appendectomy on a crew member, it successfully concluded its delivery at Santiago de Cuba on 21 August 1962.

Much of the naval action involved Soviet Foxtrot class submarines sent to the region. Conditions were often horrendous. Boats built for the Baltic became infernos in the tropics. Perhaps mistaken by the Soviet Admiralty for nuclear-powered vessels, diesel submarines ran behind schedule and were observed when forced to surface in order to recharge their batteries. Fatigue and frazzled nerves mingled with overflights and other harassment by US forces to form a toxic stew.

Foxtrot submarines on this mission were armed with 22 torpedoes, including, for reasons unclear, one which had a nuclear warhead with a charge equal to ten kilotons of TNT, two-thirds the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb.

On 25 October, three USN destroyers began a hunt for the Russian submarine B-59 off Bermuda. Action became more intense two days later. As temperatures in the sub ranged from 40-60° Celsius (104-140° F), the destroyers attempted to get the submarine’s attention, first by sonar, then by practice depth charges, and finally by hand grenades. Out of contact with their admiralty, fearing that they were under attack, and speculating that war may have broken out on the surface, Captain Valentin Savitsky maneuvered for four hours in an unsuccessful attempt to shake the pursuers before giving orders for the nuclear torpedo to be readied for firing against a harassing destroyer. Accounts differ, but after discussions with the brigade commander and the political officer, both on board, B-59 surfaced and the torpedo was not fired.

Tense moments in the White House and the Kremlin occurred when Soviet cargo ships stopped and started their reversal courses back toward Russia, the moment when “the other fellow just blinked.” With settlement reached, Soviet merchant ships returning home loaded with the missiles and other equipment faced verification challenges as they passed through the blockade.

Sixty-two pages of footnotes provide supporting data and the index facilitates memory checking. From a historical standpoint, Plokhy has crafted a harrowing and eye-opening account, made only slightly less gripping by pre-knowledge of the ending. He draws attention to the crucial maritime segments of this drama, taking readers into the ships that carried the instruments of war far from Soviet shores and back again. Beyond the mere historical examination,
Plokhy asserts a relevance for today when nuclear limitation treaties are being cancelled and the world may be spiraling into a danger zone more treacherous than that of 1962. “Nuclear Folly” is great history and a warning for our time.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 deftly divided the right of possession of newly discovered lands outside of Europe between Spain and Portugal along a line to the west of the Cape Verde Islands. The Treaty of Zaragoza 1529 would extend it into the Pacific long its antemeridian, thereby, allowing Spanish vessels definitive protected entrance into the Asia trade which the Portuguese had previously entered by rounding Africa and crossing the Indian Ocean. Before they could begin to exploit these claims, Spanish mariners had to figure out how to cross the vast expanse of the Pacific going west from their holdings in the Americas and then return eastward. Multiple attempts were made, and multiple attempts failed before Andrés de Urdaneta and the San Pedro successfully arrived in Acapulco on 8 October 1565, having sailed east from the Philippines. Urdaneta was surprised to discover, however, that the small San Lucas under Alonso de Arellano, which had set sail from Mexico in 1564 with the San Pedro, had already completed such a voyage a few months earlier. Not wanting to lose the prestige of being the first to complete such a voyage, and incredulous that a dispatch boat could truly cross the Pacific twice, Urdaneta used his political connections (including Miguel López de Legazpi, the expedition leader) to embroil Arellano in an inquiry into his behaviour. While the inquiry was never conclusive, the controversy combined with Urdaneta’s superior maps and charts ensured that historians have traditionally ignored the voyage of the San Lucas and her Afro-Portuguese navigator, Lope Martín.

Reséndez ambitiously seeks to not only restore the rightful place of Arellano, Martin, and the San Lucas alongside their more lauded compatriots, but provides an overview of the wider history leading up to the Spanish “conquering” of the Pacific. To achieve this broad goal, he begins the book with a detailed history of the development of the Pacific region as a whole, including not only the Americas, but the innumerable islands which lie within
its vast space, and the slow migrations of flora and fauna across the waters of the Pacific and the Atlantic. This is followed by a general history of Spanish-Portuguese relations, particularly how they initially divided the explorable world from the perspective of the Atlantic, before eventually finding themselves needing to expand those demarcations across the Pacific as well. Of particular prolonged concern for the Spanish, he notes, was their frustration in trying to find the paths of currents that would allow them to return from Asia to the Americas, thereby, allowing them to remain on their side of the boundary lines.

Once they determined that the best course of action would be to make an attempt from the western shores of Mexico, it took approximately half a decade for a fleet of four ships to be assembled secretly in the small port of La Navidad. Their crews were intentionally drawn from the far corners of the Spanish Empire, instead of being hired locally, and included not only the Portuguese Martin, but sailors of Spanish, French, and Italian origin. This multinational crew highlights not only Spain’s vast empire at this time, but the mercenary nature of many sailors during the Age of Discovery. Further, it foreshadows the eventual opening of the ‘Spanish Lake’ as the knowledge which was gathered during this voyage and countless others like it could not long be contained by even the most powerful of states.

In recovering the story of Lope Martin and the San Lucas for a broader audience, Reséndez has done a distinct service, not only for the history of the Pacific and the Maritime World, but for the history of minorities in the sciences. Lope Martin’s story of struggling to master the artful science of seamanship and navigation before proving his worth by successfully guiding his small ship back across uncharted routes can be said to be nothing but a triumph. While he most certainly was not the only person of colour who was engaged in the navigation of the Pacific for European powers, his was still an important contribution which now cannot be denied.

While the general flow of the book might drag at times, particularly when going into stringent detail on the history of the study of currents, or the migration of flora and fauna, the author’s thorough research must be commended. Reséndez is demonstrably passionate about the story of this “Last Great Voyage of the Age of Discovery” and his enthusiasm is often more than sufficient to get the reader through any slow points. Readers of both the scholarly and general bent will find the central story of this book to be compelling, while the mysterious lack of a definitive end for Martin is nothing if not tantalizing for those who enjoy the potential of future research topics. Regardless of how they approach this book, readers will be unable to avoid a growing realization that much of the Age of Exploration was not about what an explorer knew, and when, but whom they knew, as the power of perception often could outweigh basic fact.

This work is the new Osprey reprinting of John Robert’s revised 2001 edition of his 1982 entry into the Anatomy of the Ship book series, covering the famed Royal Navy Battlecruiser HMS *Hood*. Etched into public memory as the ship that exploded with a near total loss of life during the hunt for *Bismarck*, *Hood*’s construction occurred before the full breadth of knowledge gained from the Battle of Jutland was fully understood, leaving her flawed, despite several revisions to her design. Her relative newness also lowered her position on the queue for reconstruction and overhaul, seeing the ship serve “without major improvement despite her known defects” (7). Robert’s technical drawings and detailed rendering of ship spaces allows for a visualization of *Hood* on a level often not achieved, allowing for a better understanding of her construction and arrangement in the decades leading up to her eventual destruction.

The work is nominally divided into three sections, with the ‘Introduction’ serving as the primary textual analysis section, covering the origins of the *Hood*’s design, the changes made during construction, a service- history timeline, her loss, and relevant analysis for each of the later drawing sections. Tables are included with proposed and actual design particulars, along with data on displacement, stability, protection, armament, fire control, and equipped boats. Some interesting comparative analysis is laid out in the drawing-related texts, such as comparing the unique modifications of the 15-inch MK II guns compared to their Mk I forbearers, the armor effectiveness of the *Hood* versus the earlier *Queen Elizabeth* class, and the functionality of the non-standard geared Browns Curtis turbines installed aboard the *Hood* (12, 13, 16). Finally, a detailed listing of 1920 to 1941 modifications to the *Hood* rounds out the analysis. This is followed by a brief photographic section with exterior shots and some interior views of ship, with notes in the descriptions pointing out details and modifications visible in the images.

The main body of the work is naturally the drawings. Covering 93 out of 127 pages, these scale renderings are subdivided into 12 sections, descending in level of detail from the overall general ship arrangement to individual pieces of machinery, armament, and fittings. As stated on the section’s opening page, the scale of the drawings varies based on what is being depicted, primarily in divisible scales from the General Arrangement’s 1:600 to offer the best
visualization possible, with the scale choice often noted in the headings (35). Most impressive of all, is Robert’s three-dimensional perspective work, which reveals ship construction not seen on the original Admiralty drafts. His views of the double bottom hull are strikingly accurate compared to the most recent imagery from the wreck, and the detailed amidships structure cross-section is possibly one of the most impressive and concise depictions of the Hood’s armour layout and protective measures (51, 60). Humanizing features such as typical mess and quarters arrangements are just as fascinating as the detailed treatment of ship machinery and armament. While these are all strictly black and white drawings, the absence of colour in no way affects their effectiveness, and the inclusion of colour profiles on the back cover to illustrate vessel paint schemes in 1939 is appreciated.

Given that this edition was published after the 2012 and 2015 expeditions to the wreck, the “Loss of the Hood” section could be expanded and redressed to reflect the findings of the survey teams. The introduction’s tables are all concentrated in and after the General Arrangement and Hull Structure section, while Tables 1-4 on proposed designs and construction legends would be best served by appearing earlier in the sections on design and construction. Finally, the inclusion of higher resolution photographs, wreck images, and more surviving interior photographs, such as the RPPCs of the sick bay, fore-engine room controls, chapel, or images held by the HMS Hood Association would lend another level of visual information to the ship’s layout and appearance. Citing the pages of drawings related to each photo in the captions would also help with their effectiveness. These are minor possible additions, however, and in no way detract from the impressive nature of the work as it currently stands.

The Battlecruiser Hood remains an impressive and insightful study into one of the most famous casualties of the modern Royal Navy. The Hood’s high pre-war profile, much like that of the USS Arizona, increased the devastation of her loss and ensured continuous debate as to what exactly went wrong to ensure such a quick and violent demise. Roberts’ extensive work on transforming the data from assorted documentation and official blueprints into accurate two- and three-dimensional drawings is a commendable guide to the vessel’s construction and internal components, making this a valuable resource for scholars and hobbyists interested in the Hood’s design, sinking, and wreckage remains.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia
Given that several different civilizations throughout history have flourished around the Mediterranean Sea, it is not difficult to imagine that region at the centre of a number of naval conflicts between nations; from the ancient Greeks against the Persians to the terrors of the Second World War, the Mediterranean has been the stage of the most interesting clashes at sea. The struggle for sea power and dominance is, in fact, deeply connected to the development of nations in human history, yet very few books present this struggle, especially in the case of the Mediterranean. One of the few studies is the classic A History of Sea Power written by William Stevens and Allan Wescott published in the 1940s. It was a pleasant surprise to read Mediterranean Naval Battles that Changed the World, Russell’s perspective on six naval battles set in the Mediterranean Sea that affected not only the balance of power between the nations involved, but also the world (or what was known as world at the time of the narratives.)

The author presents an extremely detailed analysis of naval strategy of the period, the ships, contemporary naval technological advancements, and also the events surrounding the battles, that makes their stories even more interesting. Six different conflicts are examined: the Battle of Salamis (480 BC), the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks that ushered in the Golden Age of Athens; the Battle of Actium (31 BC), which pitted the forces of Mark Antony and Cleopatra against the Roman naval forces on the coast of Greece; the Battle of Lepanto (1571) where an obstinate Ottoman fleet fought a Catholic Alliance for dominance of the Mediterranean; the Battle of Aboukir Bay (1798) between the British and the French naval forces in Egypt; the Battle of Navarino (1827) where again the Ottoman forces fought for control in the Mediterranean against a coalition of British, French, and Russian naval forces defending the independence of Greece; and the last, Cape Matapan and the Battle for Malta (1940-1942) during the Second World War; a narrative featuring the ambition and movements of Italian naval forces in the region during the war. Those who are anxious to know more about ancient warfare will enjoy reading this book as much as the Horatio Nelson and Second World War enthusiasts. Whether naval historians or not, I believe readers will highly appreciate the quality of Russell’s writing.

The strongest aspect of the book is Russell’s ability to humanize his narrative, bringing out the human aspects behind the major naval battles and technological advancements of very different eras. This is particularly important today, as science struggles with negationist and other retrograde and
negative concepts of society. Readers can expect a humanistic, but also deeply researched analysis of naval battles. For example, the study of the Battle of Actium (31 BC) recounts the relationships and dramas between Mark Antony, Cleopatra, Cesar Augustus, and Rome that surrounded the battle. This was the story that captured the attention of another author named Shakespeare in another time, prompting him to dramatize the history for theatre.

Russell also depicts the struggles of a young Commodore Nelson, a rising naval star, who, at 41 years old, had already sacrificed an eye and an arm fighting for the Royal Navy. He draws brilliantly from the life of Nelson and his mission of “search and destroy,” revealing the intrinsic anxiety of the endless “search” while emphasizing his genius, his insecurities, his bravery and his little note to Lady Hamilton. The reader can find these subtle, peculiar and delicate details on every page.

The weaker aspects of the book are, firstly, the maps that are located in the initial pages and not among the narratives, which forces the reader to flip back and forth. Secondly, this is not an introductory book: beginners in the naval strategy/history field may find some difficulty with the prolonged details of battles and historical contexts. This, however, makes the book perfect for researchers, especially those in search of more material about ancient naval battles.

Andrea L. F. Resende de Souza
Belo Horizonte, Brazil.


On 12 February 1942, Vice Admiral James Somerville assumed command of the Eastern Fleet, the designation for the Allied naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The vessels under his command consisted of the greatest agglomeration of British naval power in the Second World War up to that point, including three aircraft carriers, five battleships, seven cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and over a hundred aircraft. Yet when the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a raid in the Indian Ocean just two months later, Somerville ultimately chose not to engage the enemy and instead withdrew his forces, granting a strategic victory to his opponents.

Though Somerville’s decision has received far less attention than the more dramatic fall of Singapore, it was no less momentous a demonstration of the decline of British power in the region. As Charles Stephenson explains,
it was a consequence of a series of decisions, some made decades earlier, which left the Royal Navy poorly prepared to defend its longstanding naval supremacy from the aircraft of the Kidō Butai. His book offers a description of the developments that led to such a humiliating decision, and how the Eastern Fleet rebounded from its nadir to challenge Japanese domination in southeast Asia.

Stephenson underscores the extent of this fall by opening his narrative with the Grand Fleet’s triumphant acceptance of Germany’s High Seas Fleet’s surrender at the end of the First World War. Though the Royal Navy had maintained Britain’s naval supremacy in yet another global conflict, no sooner had it done so than it faced the prospect of a new and financially ruinous naval arms race, this time with its wartime allies. Yet the successful post-war effort to restrain capital ship construction through arms limitation treaties was offset by the growing role played by new technologies, in particular the airplane. Here Stephenson highlights the irony of the Semphill Mission’s all-too-successful efforts to lay the groundwork for Japanese naval aviation, one that the Royal Navy would soon have cause to regret.

This might have mattered less had Great Britain developed naval aviation into the powerful arm it became for the Japanese in the Second World War. Instead, the combination of the centralization of military aviation in the Royal Air Force and the decision to employ aircraft carriers as a component of the battle fleet instead of its centerpiece ensured that the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was well behind its Japanese and American counterparts in this area by the end of the 1930s. Though the limits of British carrier aviation were soon evident in the war against Nazi Germany, it was not until Japanese aviators sank the capital ships of Force Z in December 1941 that the consequences of this became clear. As a result, when Somerville faced the Japanese in April 1942, it was with a fleet that was gravely outmatched by the strike power of their aircraft carriers. Given these circumstances, Stephenson regards Somerville’s decision to withdraw as the correct one, even though it conceded much of the Indian Ocean to the Japanese.

It would be over a year and a half before Somerville attempted to challenge their presence in its waters. With many of the capital ships reassigned to the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic, the remaining vessels were occupied with training, escort duties, and providing support for amphibious landings. While the wide-ranging scope of Stephenson’s narrative in these chapters turns his book into more of a general account of the entire Indian Ocean theatre during the Second World War, he never loses sight completely of the activities of the diminished Eastern Fleet, much of which involved adapting to the new model of naval warfare pioneered by the Japanese and the Americans in the Pacific. The main obstacle the fleet faced in doing so was with their
planes, as the inadequacy of British models made the use of American carrier aircraft in the region essential for success. This put the Royal Navy in direct competition with the United States Navy for available production, however, which constrained operations until the spring of 1944.

The test of the reconstituted Eastern Fleet came that April. With the assistance of an American carrier, the fleet attacked military and industrial targets at Sabang and Surabaya in the Dutch East Indies. Intended as diversions, their impact on the war was minimal given the ongoing degradation of the Japanese air and naval forces further east. Nevertheless, the strikes provided valuable experience for the newly trained personnel, preparing them for their subsequent employment in the final campaigns against Japan as part of the British Pacific Fleet.

In his introduction, Stephenson states that his goal with this book is to provide a narrative history of the Eastern Fleet. He makes no claims to advance any radical thesis, and his work relies exclusively upon published sources and the secondary literature familiar to specialists in the field. Yet this undersells his success in describing a major factor in the eclipse of British naval power in the twentieth century. While his digressions into such tangential topics as espionage activities in Goa can distract from this, the book overall serves as a good introduction to British naval operations that are far too often given scant coverage in general accounts of the naval history of the Second World War.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


In Osprey *New Vanguard No. 292, Italian Destroyers of World War II*, Mark Stille completes his trilogy on the surface units of the Regis Marina (RM-Italian Royal Navy) in that great world conflict.

The RM went to war in 1940 with 59 destroyers; an additional 5 destroyers were added to the RM inventory during the war for a total of 64 destroyers. For its time, the RM had one of the largest destroyer fleets in the world. Naturally, the RM destroyers were built for service in the Mediterranean with the emphasis on speed, not endurance. The destroyers were intended for duty on the relatively short Italy-to-Albania run and the somewhat longer but still short Italy-Sicily-Libya run. That duty meant that the RM destroyers had a relatively short range and were not capable of penetrating the eastern or western Mediterranean. Moreover, the RM had 12 classes of destroyers, some
with sub-classes and a few of the destroyers dated back to the First World War. Some of the destroyers were large, built to challenge their potential rival, the French Navy. The remainder of the destroyers was medium-sized and some dated to the First World War. The variety of classes made for difficulties in logistics, maintenance, and service.

Moreover, the RM destroyers, in addition to lacking range, had other faults; very few RM destroyers had radar and most carried only a light battery of torpedoes. Most critically, the guns of the RM destroyers were sited closely together, causing the shock waves from fired shells to interfere with simultaneously-fired shells and, therefore, causing salvo dispersion. Anti-aircraft and antisubmarine capabilities were likewise lacking in the RM destroyers. Further, the RM High Command was reluctant to risk RM ships in combat as Italy had little prospect of replacing ship losses. Overall, the story of the RM destroyers in the Second World War is not a happy one.

The RM destroyers and their crews fought the vital convoy war in the Mediterranean. Since the 1911-1912 Italo-Turkish War, Italy had Libya as a colony, with most of its population against the Mediterranean coast. Thus, the need to protect convoys supplying Libya from mainland Italy was paramount. Added to that was the need to attack British Royal Navy convoys supplying the island of Malta. The RM destroyer fleet appeared in every major Mediterranean Sea battle. Further, the RM had seven destroyers based at Eritrea in the Red Sea. This small force posed a problem to the British, as the seven RM destroyers could have interdicted British shipping going through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal. While those destroyers did no damage to the Royal Navy, they did force the Royal Navy to allocate some resources for approximately a year. (When it became clear that Italian East Africa would fall to the British, the seven RM destroyers undertook various sorties and their crews then scuttled their ships to avoid capture.)

Stille’s work follows in the style of his previous two works on the RM, *Osprey New Vanguard #182: Italian Battleships of World War II*, and *Osprey New Vanguard #258, Italian Cruisers of World War II*. The latter was reviewed in *TNM/LMN* XVIII, no, 3 (2018). He begins with a description of the design and development of the RM destroyers, their weaponry and radar, and then descriptions of the major RM destroyer actions—the Battle of Calabria, the Battle of Cape Spartiviento, the sea battle of Matapan (which Stille titles as a “debacle,”) convoy battles, the First and Second Battles of Sirte, the last period of RM actions, and the actions of the seven RM destroyers in the Red Sea.

The book then proceeds to delineate each class of the RM destroyers. A table shows the destroyers in that class, when each destroyer in that class was built, when the keel was laid down, when it was launched, when it was commissioned, and its eventual fate. Following that table are brief narratives
of that class’s armament and operational history. A final table shows the specifications for that class—displacement, dimensions, propulsion, range, and crew. A final section entitled “Analysis and Conclusion,” followed by a very useful bibliography and index, completes the work.

Stille writes well and his narrative keeps the reader focused. The many photographs add to the narrative and give the reader many visual connections to the subject. Several colour side view plates, two colour plates of RM destroyers in action, plus a good centerspread colour plate of the RM destroyer, *Da Verazzano*, help keep the reader’s interest in the narrative.

This book, when taken with Stille’s two earlier works on RM ships (mentioned above) bring life to a lesser-known aspect of the Second World War at sea. They can be a useful quick reference for the expert in the field, while the reader unfamiliar with the RM will find these a good introduction to this naval service. While this book on RM destroyers and Stille’s other works cannot be considered revisionist history of the RM, they do help to refute the often-held belief that the Regia Marina was of little consequence in the Second World War. *Italian Destroyers of World War II* is a work recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Bottom line up front – this book has flashes of brilliance but could have been much better. Verbose and repetitive, as well as being padded out with barely relevant information, it is only the first-hand accounts that save it from being merely pulp history.

That said, the authors have produced a reasonable history of the Royal Naval Patrol Service and the thousands of men and the many hundreds of ships involved. These include assorted trawlers and other vessels taken up from trade during the war to operate as minesweepers, convoy escorts, anti-submarine vessels, stores carriers, and whatever other random tasks the Admiralty could come up with. The service replicated in many ways its First World War forebears who also get a lengthy (perhaps too lengthy) description.

When war came in 1939, the Royal Navy lacked sufficient vessels particularly for mine-sweeping and convoy escort duties. Formed in 1939 at HMS *Europa* near Lowestoft, England the Patrol Service Headquarters, known as the “Sparrows Nest” quickly recruited many fishermen and their
vessels to fill this void. The effect this had on reducing the fish catch for the British population is barely mentioned; and this would have been an interesting side story to explore, noting the reduction in available fishing vessels and the severe food rationing in Britain throughout the war.

Casualties amongst the patrol service crews were high with many ships lost to mines, aircraft attack, torpedoed while on convoy escort duties and bad weather also took its toll. As the war progressed more and more men with little sea experience were recruited as “Hostilities Only” officers and seaman to fill the gaps. Many seamen from occupied European countries also found their way in the patrol service as well. With this hodge-podge of ships and men, the service became known as Harry Tate’s Navy after a bumbling Scottish comedian, although the men themselves preferred to be known as Churchill’s Pirates.

These small ships served throughout the Atlantic campaign, in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, on convoys to North Russia and in British home waters. They were present at the ill-fated Norwegian campaign where the crew of HMS Arab distinguished themselves in several harrowing days of intense air attack and which earned the ships commanding officer a Victoria Cross. The patrol service vessels also played their part in evacuating British and French troops from Dunkirk, and other French ports, in the dark days of June 1940, and then went back in June 1944 as part of Operation Overlord to support the landings at Normandy.

Many served as convoy escorts in the Atlantic and on the Artic run to Murmansk with several U-Boats sunk; but often at a high cost in patrol service ships and men. In British coastal waters the endless minesweeping took its toll on men and ships and one small patrol vessel swept nearly 200 German mines in its long career. Others had shorter service and perpetuated the old saying that “every ship can be a minesweeper – once.”

The book has some handy appendices concerning ships lost and awards for minesweeping, but I was frequently reaching for other books or trawling websites to confirm data due to a complete lack of end notes to justify many comments and assumptions. The authors can be quite verbose, using 20 or more words to describe a very basic activity and at times, the story becomes overly repetitive.

In other cases, the story line is scant and the reader will need to do more research to find out what really happened. The saving grace is the firsthand accounts, from several men, of the actions they fought, but again, there are no end notes to explain where this data came from and some portions of the book provide hear-say as fact.

It is not a bad book, but it is a basic history of the patrol service. For those who know nothing of this part of the Royal Navy, it is a good starting point to
gain a basic appreciation; but for those wanting a more in-depth analysis, they will have to look elsewhere.

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This work is Williams’ latest detailed Second World War naval compendium in which he seeks to document the American Navy’s organization and actions during Operation Neptune, June 6-24, 1944. Utilizing official reports, ship histories, and unofficial personal recollections, Williams provides readers with a detailed understanding of not only the Normandy Landings, but the preparation, planning, and post-attack supply efforts as well. As with his earlier work, the detached nature of ship names and statistics is humanized with the inclusion of personal information on surviving crewmen, casualties, and fatalities in addition to first-hand accounts. The work is arranged in fifteen chapters, each with its own subsection, followed by a brief epilogue noting overall participation figures, a summary of one D-Day Navy fatality, and the auction of a D-Day-flown flag.

The initial eleven chapters cover the lead-up to Operation Neptune, the composition of the various units involved, and the assorted types of ships composing the formidable D-Day armada. This latter point is focused on the less glamourous vessels of the fleet, such as LCIs, LSTs, Rhino Ferries, or minesweepers, rather than the larger cruisers and battleships of the fleets. These early chapters provide excellent background information on the various events that preceded Neptune, including an accounting of the disastrous German E-Boat attack on the unprepared LSTs of Exercise Tiger. Western Task Force Command units, groups, and naval squadrons are broken down extremely well in chapter nine, with each unit having some form of summary information paired with ship names and commanding officers when available. As usual, Williams documents the crew casualties aboard various vessels listing name, rank, and home address. The next two chapters see a similar treatment given to the main assault forces, follow-up convoys, and American units assisting the British and Canadians in the eastern sectors to round out the extensive background information.

The documentation of D-Day itself takes place over the 85 pages of chapter thirteen, followed by 113 pages on the post-D-Day actions of Neptune, including
the capture of the port of Cherbourg. Appreciably, the oft-neglected initial landing at Saint-Marcouf by troops aboard Task Unit 125.15.4 is covered early in this section, followed by transcribed accountings from the various vessels of the American fleet (210-211). The length of these transcriptions varies greatly depending on the sources, as does Williams’ accompanying text, though all shed their own light on the activities usually relegated to the background of other D-Day and Normandy Campaign books or films. Post D-Day incidents with mines, glide bombs, and other attacks are well documented alongside casualty evacuations and supply offloading efforts. Williams’ human touch extends from the listing of wounded or killed men to the account of a chief petty officer running back aboard the sinking USS Meredith to rescue “Larky … our pet cat [the captain] never knew had been onboard” (316). The taking of Cherbourg and the preparatory bombardments carried out on the surrounding areas have their own small chapter, with this more purely combative action separated from the chronological narrative of the rest of Operation Neptune rather than being interwoven with the other landing-site-focused activities.

One improvement would be combining some extremely short chapters (between two and four pages in length) with adjacent chapters under already-existing subheadings for smoother reading. While there are useful images of vessels and offloading tactics, there are, surprisingly, no maps of the invasion beach sectors and task force assignment areas. Maps would help illustrate the position and relationship between naval vessels at various key points in the D-Day operation, or even earlier, such as the attack on Exercise Tiger on 28 April 1944 or the transatlantic crossing of Task Force 67 in March of the same year. Footnotes or endnotes would be appreciated and, as with his earlier work on the Asiatic Fleet, there is no definite conclusion. Rather than the current two anecdotes in the epilogue, some overall analysis of the Navy’s effectiveness during Neptune, perhaps even a comparison with landing operations in the Pacific Theatre would be useful.

*The US Navy at Normandy* is an admirable addition to the historiography of Operation Neptune and the D-Day Campaign as a whole. Williams offers a unique compilation of first-hand accounts and official reports to allow a sea level view of the invasion of western France in what was a complex and arduous undertaking, the fruit of which is an excellent resource for scholars, historians, and those interested in naval personnel wounded or killed during the operation. Williams’ adherence to the placing of names and personal details alongside ships and events personalizes an often analytical or tangentially mentioned subject, preserving the raw human cost of one part of the liberation of Europe amid a fine chronicling of the logistical headache that was D-Day and its aftermath.

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Throughout history, numerous passenger liners have been sunk in circumstances that were noteworthy and tragic, both in peacetime and armed conflict. The loss of the RMS *Titanic* in 1912 still resonates today and will probably continue to exercise its hold on our imagination for decades to come. Other tragedies, like the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* at the end of the Second World War are less well-known, but have still garnered their share of writers who highlighted the circumstances behind their losses. The author of this volume has decided to bring the loss of a lesser-known victim of the Second World War to our attention. Serving the Allied cause as a troopship, the HMT *Lancastria* was sunk during the hectic Allied 1940 evacuation along France’s Atlantic coast in the face of Germany’s successful attack on that nation. Author, Stephen Wynn, is a retired police officer who has previously published a work on his reaction to the service of his sons in the more recent Afghanistan conflict.

Wynn tells the *Lancastria’s* story in eleven chapters of disparate length, and has added a thoughtful introduction and conclusion. There is a helpful index and a very brief list of internet sources. The text is ably buttressed by eight pages of photographs which span the gamut of the ship, the survivors and victims of its loss, and a few more miscellaneous images. At least two of them, however, seem to be very similar to each other. Unfortunately, a line drawing of the *Lancastria* is not included. Strangely, the bulk of Chapter 10 comprises a very long list of evacuated military personnel and others who are known to have been lost when the ship went down. This ruins the flow of the text and one must ask why this information was not provided in the form of an Appendix. Overall, the text is poignant, and the tales of the survivors are well told. In many cases, the author has included very lengthy first-hand accounts of their experiences. He notes that we will probably never know the full extent of the loss of human life from her sinking, as even the sailors who were charged with making the head count of persons boarding her were overwhelmed by the numbers of would-be passengers seeking to escape Hitler’s forces. Another positive point is that he reminds us that the Allied evacuation efforts of that fateful summer of 1940 were not limited to the port of Dunkirk. The actual story of the attack that led to her loss is riveting. Wynn discusses how the *Lancastria* came to be impressed as a troop ship and her brief service in the Royal Navy. He also notes that, in a rare tribute, the government of Scotland minted and distributed a medal commemorating her loss to her known survivors and their families.
Strangely, the then-newly installed government of Sir Winston Churchill decided to issue a “D” notice which restricted press coverage of its loss, leading to wartime and post-war speculation of a political-military “cover-up”. Despite this measure, however, the Lancastria’s loss could not be hidden from the public for long, especially once the news of her sinking was reported in American newspapers. Unfortunately, it here that Wynn’s narrative falls short. While this work promises to be an exposé, all that Wynn offers is a repetition of the hackneyed reasons that could have prompted Churchill’s government’s attempt to suppress the news of the ship’s loss. In spite of his research, he has failed to identify any “mystery” cargo, “shadowy” characters or otherwise notable passengers that were aboard her or any “secret mission” with which she may have been tasked. In effect, all he has accomplished is to re-raise the question of why Churchill tried to restrict the news of her loss. If there were a political or military cover-up, we will have to await the scheduled 2040 release of the documents regarding this ship and its loss. Nevertheless, Wynn does offer some details regarding the frantic nature of the Allied evacuation of France in 1940. Hopefully, he will be able to return to this story in 2040 and offer us a more definitive work on the loss of the Lancastria. While this is still a striking and poignant story and worth reading, it falls short of meeting the expectations its title raises.

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