Most maps depicting the Bay of Fundy lying between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick suggest a seemingly benign and interestingly shaped body of water north of the Gulf of Maine. The funnel-shaped area’s chief claim to fame is the height of its tides, reportedly the highest in the world. More detailed charts of the area, however, tell the story of a much more dangerous bay, especially at its eastern end where islands, ridges, outcrops and isolated “sunkers” abound, and where the bottom can rise up from fathoms deep to inches in the length of a steamship or on a change of the tide. In addition, the huge tidal flows create cross-currents which can carry a vessel off a safe course, a danger exacerbated by frequent fogs and storm conditions. In early years, this was compounded by the absence of navigation aids, making for a dangerous passage. The port of Saint John, New Brunswick, on the north side of the bay has historically been one of Canada’s major ports, ice-free and linked by rail to central Canada and the American mid-west, so sail and steamer traffic through the bay has been high.

It is this area, and in particular the mouth of the Bay of Fundy between Yarmouth and the island of Grand Manan, where Eric Allaby sets the stage for a series of shipwreck accounts. The volume covers the stories of some forty wrecks covering the period from 1741 to 1976 but only four are before 1840. Marine archaeologists will shudder at Allaby’s accounts of his early diving explorations, blowing up wrecks in order to recover brass and copper from the wreck sites. By the 1970s, however, he had taken training and was recognized as an underwater archaeologist, and for several years worked with the New Brunswick Museum on a project funded by the National Museums of Canada surveying wrecks in the Fundy region. It appears that he began much of his research for this volume in this period and has continued for decades. Allaby was one of a group of marine scholars and researchers who met in Maine in 1971 and became a founding member of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH). He has written a number of volumes of local
history and was formerly the curator of the Grand Manan Museum.

Aside from the personal accounts of the author’s diving (and dynamiting) visits to the vessel remains, most of the information appears to have been gleaned from contemporary newspaper coverage and from secondary sources concerning the wrecks. A thin listing of endnotes is included, but only when direct quotations are used, and for the most part, the sources are unidentified. The tales told do not constitute an inventory but more of a miscellany. Allaby writes for a popular audience in an engaging style making the demise of every ship, sail as well as steam, a fascinating story. Collectively they cover a wide range of marine disasters which horrify the reader with the varieties of ways by which ships, crews and passengers have met their end. Overall, Allaby does an excellent job of recounting what is obviously the subject of a life-long passion. His direct involvement in finding and visiting the wrecks over decades of research is both informative and entertaining.

That being said, the author might have been better served by his publisher as the volume tempers the fascination of the events with frustration stemming from the way the volume is arranged and presented. In trying to give the forty-odd episodes some order, they have been grouped into somewhat arbitrary chapters with a multitude of subject approaches. Some chapters are chronological, others are arranged around specific hazards such as named reefs. Some wrecks are linked by their possible causes – such as fog, incompetence, or currents. While a full index may not have been necessary, it would have been useful to have a listing of the names of the vessels whose stories have been told.

The book is illustrated with photographs, a number of the author’s skillful drawings, and by maps showing some of the area’s many rocks, islands and ledges. Unfortunately, the maps do not have the scale noted which reduces their value for those unfamiliar with the area. There is an appendix of nautical words and phrases for land-based readers, while additional definitions are scattered, almost at random, throughout the text. The rationale is not apparent – for instance, “deals” is in the former, “scantling” in the latter.

While the volume deals with a specific geographical area possessing several unique characteristics and hazards, it is also a stimulating introduction to the nature of threats to sea transport in the eras of both sail and steam. Despite being somewhat moderated by improvements in aids to navigation and larger and more powerful vessels, the threat of tides, currents, and rocks in the areas where sea meets shore remains. In giving dimension to these powerful forces, Allaby’s book rises above being simply a local history. For this reason, I would recommend it for anyone interested in exploring how and why ships come be cast ashore and lost on reefs and ledges.

Harry T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island

Today, the clash between the Italian and Austrian navies off of the island of Lissa (modern day Vis) in July 1866 is best remembered for its role in enshrining one of the great technological dead ends in modern naval warfare. At a time when armour enjoyed a temporary ascendancy over the gun in their ongoing struggle for supremacy, the future of tactics seemed to sink into the past, as steam propulsion made it possible once more to use a ship’s hull to sink an enemy vessel. First demonstrated in the American Civil War, at Lissa, the Austrians successfully attacked the Italian fleet by ramming, thus ensuring that for the next half-century, warships would be designed with ram bows jutting outward, even if these ended up sinking more friendly ships by accident than they ever would against the enemy in combat.

Despite Lissa’s outsized influence on naval tactics and design, however, only a handful of books have been written about it. Of these few, Quintin Barry’s is the first English-language book dedicated primarily to the battle, which on this basis alone makes it a noteworthy achievement. His approach to describing the battle is also interesting, as he situates it within the ongoing developments in naval technology during the era. In doing so, he broadens his focus from the ways in which Lissa influenced naval warfare to how the battle embodied the vast array of changes that were taking place in during the mid-nineteenth century, all of which contributed to the unique nature of the clash.

The examination of the technological context for the battle takes up over half of the book. He begins with a brief description of the less-famous battle of Lissa that took place in 1811, between a British frigate squadron and a mixed force of French and Italian vessels, using the ships and tactics that were hallmarks of the age of sail. This would prove one of the last such battles, however, as experiments with steam-powered vessels were already underway in Great Britain and elsewhere. Barry presents the technological innovations and the arms race that followed primarily as a competition between Great Britain and France, who from the 1820s onward introduced steam power, screw propulsion, armour-plating, and more powerful ordnance to the designs of their warships. While ships bearing a mix of some or all of these innovations were in commission by the end of the 1850s, it was not until the American Civil War that the navies of the world had the opportunity to witness the full impact of this new technology. The steam-powered Confederate ironclad *Virginia* made short work of the more traditional warships it faced, only to be stalemated in battle by the similarly equipped USS *Monitor*. The lessons
were clear, and by 1866 the number of steam-powered ironclad warships in European navies rose rapidly.

Among those hurriedly acquiring these new warships were the Italian and Austrian navies. It is here that Barry narrows his focus to the combatants in the battle, showing how both of them were adapting to a variety of changed circumstances. His presentation of the Regia Maria, a product of the recent merger of the kingdoms of Piedmont-Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, is not a flattering one. The Italian Navy suffered from irregular political attention and petty infighting among its leading officers. In this respect, the Austrian Navy was much better off. Though it had also undergone recent transformations with its shift from a force staffed by Italians to one based more heavily on Austrians, it enjoyed the support of Emperor Francis Joseph’s younger son, Archduke Ferdinand Max (the future ill-fated Emperor Maximilian I of Mexico), who threw himself into developing the navy. Among Ferdinand Max’s contributions was his patronage of the dynamic Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, who was appointed commander of the Austrian fleet on the eve of the Austro-Prussian War.

Six weeks later, Tegetthoff was confronted with Italy’s declaration of war. Though the Austrian Navy was ill-prepared for war, the Italians were not in much better shape. The differences began with their respective responses. Whereas the commander of the Italian fleet, Carlo di Persano, was content with inactivity, Tegetthoff threw himself into preparing his fleet, setting an example for the men in his command. While Barry is sympathetic to Persano’s situation, ultimately he cannot excuse the admiral’s poor leadership, which contributed to the tactical disorganization displayed in the battle. Pressured to attack Lissa so as to maximize Austrian concessions in the peace negotiations, Persano’s mixed force of ironclads and wooden vessels conducted an ineffective bombardment of the Austrian fortifications for two days. The arrival of Tegetthoff’s fleet on 20 July forced a confrontation that resulted in the loss of two Italian ironclads, both of which were sunk by ramming.

For all of the lessons that Lissa supposedly offered, Barry notes that many of them would soon be rendered obsolete by continuing innovations in naval weaponry and warship design. It is a conclusion that underscores the accelerating pace of change that navies faced over the course of the nineteenth century and supports nicely his approach to his subject. It is not an original work, nor does Barry make any pretense to having written one. Yet while specialists will find little information within its pages that they do not already possess on their shelves, it is nonetheless, a useful account of the battle of Lissa, and one that, hopefully, will inspire further English-language studies that draw upon the materials in the Austrian and Italian archives to give it its proper due.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona

In 1845, under the command of Sir John Franklin and with 128 crew, HM Ships *Terror* and *Erebus* sailed in search of a navigable Northwest Passage – and never returned. Death and speculation somewhat explained the fate of the crew, but both ships have since been found. Through his detailed journey to reconstruct the ships’ design and capabilities, Betts hints that perhaps their technological advancements contributed to the loss of the crew.

A modeling enthusiast, Betts states that “no accurate models of the [*Terror*] in her final 1845 configuration existed, because no plans had ever been drafted for her final refit” (13). To get the plans, Betts had to draft them himself, an undertaking that led him to multiple sources over many years. This book replicates significant artwork as well as ships architectural drawings, making it also very much a visual story. In his closing remarks, he suggests that as yet undiscovered materials would still be preserved onboard the ships and that they will continue to reveal precisely what occurred during the fateful journey.

Both *Terror* and *Erebus* were originally designed around their primary ordnance of two large mortars, eight carronades and two brass cannons. Being bomb vessels, both had poor sailing qualities. Nevertheless, what contributed to their poor sailing qualities was ultimately what made them such capable polar discovery vessels. Their conversion was no small feat. It involved removal of the mortars and carronades, changes to the ships’ configuration to incorporate more ballast, and adjustments for incorporating saluting guns and gunpowder. These were the kinds of details necessary for Betts to ensure accuracy of his model of the *Terror* in her current configuration, even as it sits at the bottom of the Arctic. He was drawn further into the stories of the vessels as his networks expanded.

Betts’ offering is an excellent contribution to maritime studies. It does indeed cover the design, fitting, and voyages of the ship and moreover it does so through an historical narrative. The detailed ships drawings in the book offer modelers insight and instruction which cannot otherwise be found so readily. These also include a personal photo-essay to document the techniques used and invented to replicate the *Terror*; for example, he case-studies the propeller which was uncommon on pre-1850s sailing vessels. Accordingly, Betts’ research into the fitting and engineering requirements for the proposed Arctic voyage is particularly insightful and he offers a comparative analysis of the dimension and scantling list as designed and as modified for polar service. In fact, he was an historical advisor on the major historical drama *The Terror*. 
Betts’ discussion on the use of watertight bulkheads offers early insights into something commonplace in modern ship design. Illumination, heating and cooking, and pumping systems are given detailed consideration with a particularly entertaining addition of a bread oven to Fraser’s Patent Stove. Use of terminology such as “ice-worthiness,” speaks to a design requirement of the time which remains as relevant today. It is these capabilities which Betts alludes to as contributing to the loss of the crew. While the ships were made to withstand the harsh arctic environment and entrapment in pack ice, there was only so much contingency for the crew. Provisions to sustain them beyond the nineteen months they were beset, were not anticipated.

Betts’ writing style is easy to follow, even for a novice to maritime language. Notes to the text and the bibliography demonstrate Betts’ range of research from historical to contemporary, primary and secondary sources. Additionally, any unfamiliar terminology may be researched, with an index available for easy return. The book is also logically structured, with each part building on the one before.

Potential buyers for a book like this may be wide-ranging. During review, it was shared with children, teenagers, and retirees alike, all of whom remarked on how fascinating it was. Such a book has a place in the reference library and on the coffee table of a modeling enthusiast as well as in the reference section of a library or museum. It offers a fascinating insight to marine engineering and wooden shipbuilding of the 1800s, from increase in size of the moulded orlop and lower deck beams, as well as strengthening of the transoms and deadwood to perform Arctic service. This book also offers insight into social and political history topics, such as why Sir John Franklin was chosen as expedition commander, why finding a navigable Northwest Passage was so important to Great Britain, and why the crew ultimately abandoned their ships.

Amy Blacker
Canberra, Australia


Contemporary critics lament the extent of corporate power, but author Stephen Bown recalls the day when there truly were *Merchant Kings*. This book chronicles the lives of six men who, in the course of building their commercial kingdoms on foreign continents, made their own fame and fortune, and expanded the empires of their home nations. They organized enterprises, raised armies, assembled fleets, conquered peoples, encouraged migrations,
and sought confirmation of their monopolies from their home governments. This book meshes economic, political, and demographic developments.

Bown first shines his light on Jan Pieterszoon Coen and the Dutch East Indian Company. Living during the Dutch Golden Age, Coen spearheaded the effort of his company to corner the nutmeg supply emanating from the Spice Islands of the Moluccas, now Indonesia. Arriving in the Spice Islands in 1609 with 13 ships and 1000 soldiers plus Japanese mercenaries, Coen began his campaign to divert trade from British to Dutch interests. His efforts would continue until his death on 20 September 1629, but the Dutch East Indian company would not go bankrupt until 1799 and Dutch rule over its East Indies territory would persist until 1949.

The next figure from the twilight of the Dutch Golden Age is Peter Stuyvesant of the Dutch West India Company. Familiar to many as the purchaser of Manhattan Island, Stuyvesant is presented as a lifetime employee of the West India Company whose silver banded wooden right pegleg evidenced his sacrifice for the company. In 1644, he led a fleet of twelve battleships against Spain in the Caribbean before assuming the director generalship of New Netherland in 1647. In that position he established municipal services for New Amsterdam (modern New York) and a monetary system, before being forced to surrender to the British under the Duke of York in 1665. Though its best days were behind it, the Dutch West India Company survived for another century.

Rather than leaving the Dutch alone in the East, the tale of Sir Robert Clive of the English East India Company may have more enduring significance than the preceding characters. Lured to the Indian subcontinent by the abundance of saltpetre, a crucial ingredient of eighteenth-century explosives, Clive directed armies and navies, made treaties with local rulers and waged war against colonial powers and corporations. From his arrival at Madras in 1744 until his suicide in London in 1774, Clive was a leading architect of British domination in India. English East India’s authority would wane as that of the British government waxed, and the company was dissolved in 1874.

Turning to the northwest of the American continent, the tale of Aleksandr Baranov and the Russian American Company is the next subject. Sailing to Alaska in 1790, Baranov’s tasks were different from those of other Merchant Kings. Not drawn by high value minerals or competition against other powers, the “Lord of Alaska” drudgingly built his kingdom on islands inhabited by First Nations, settled by Russian emigrés and financed by the export of furs. Officially founded in 1799, the Russian American Company’s reign would extend until Baranov’s death in 1819, followed by naval administration until Alaska’s sale to the United States in 1867.

Of perhaps most interest to Northern Mariner readers is the fifth chapter,
“Empire of the Beaver: Sir George Simpson and The Hudson’s Bay Company.” A merger of the North West Company and Hudson’s Bay Company in 1821 created the vehicle with which the Scottish Simpson competed (until his death in 1860) with American interests for the fur trade and sovereignty of a continent from Hudson Bay to the Pacific. Though its territory became part of the Dominion of Canada in 1870, its influence endured. The Company’s Fort Garry became Winnipeg, Manitoba, Fort Edmonton became Edmonton, Alberta, and Fort Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia. The Canadian-American border reflects the Hudson Bay Company’s shadow.

The final Merchant King is Cecil John Rhodes of the British South Africa Company. From his arrival in southern Africa in 1879, Rhodes consolidated diamond and gold mines, encouraged settlements and served as prime minister of Cape Province. His mineral enterprises fuel and racial policies plague a subcontinent to this day. His Rhodes Scholarships remain a prestigious award and supporter of academic excellence.

Bown’s text captures and holds the reader’s attention. Most chapters commence with a quote from their principal personalities. An index facilitates reference and the bibliography encourages further study. Pictures add faces and scenes to the text and the maps and “Timeline For The Age Of Heroic Commerce” are valuable supplements.

I find Merchant Kings to be a very interesting work. It teaches us that for three centuries, 1600-1900, policy and development was often led, not by politicians and generals, but by businessmen who assumed many of the powers normally associated with governments. The “Kings” featured were flawed men of accomplishment. Industries and nations are built on foundations they laid. Some of their means are no longer acceptable, but, as Bown posits, were even controversial in their own days and not necessarily inevitable. This is an excellent read for anyone interested in history of commercial and colonial development or pondering how so much of our world came to be.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


If one wanted to invent a name for the author of a book about navigating a replica frontier flatboat down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, one could hardly do better than Rinker Buck. As it turns out, there is a real Rinker Buck,
who has written just such a book, as well as (pardon the pun) a raft of others. At 71 years of age, Buck owns just the kind of resumé one would imagine—pilot, logger, shoe-leather reporter, determined do-it-yourselfer, and history-minded adventurer—who recently retraced the 2000-mile Oregon Trail by covered wagon and wrote beautifully about it.

In Life on the Mississippi, Buck deftly braids the broad-shouldered story of the American flatboat with his own twenty-first-century river odyssey. Friends, family, and river dwellers predicted that he would die on his improbable voyage. The most lurid of their scenarios involved him being sucked into a whirlpool that would drag him along the silty bottom until his underwear was stripped away and his raw, broken body spit to the surface. During the course of the journey, Buck realized that the doomsayers were sharing imagined dangers rather than real knowledge. With every river mile that gurgled beneath his stern and every hair-raising episode met and mastered, his confidence grew, and he took justifiable pride in his hard-won river skills.

But his first challenge was to find someone who could help him build an authentic flatboat, or mostly authentic, since it needed a good engine and lots of gadgetry. This led him to John Cooper in Gallatin, Tenn., one of many quirky characters Buck encountered. Cooper, “folksy and hospitable” (42) but also contrary and prone to conservative political rants, managed to bang together a passable replica with Buck’s help, “a gorgeous code violation” (52) named Patience. The vessel was so heavy that trailering her north blew out a dozen tires. Eventually they launched the vessel into the Monongahela River, which meets the Allegheny River at Pittsburgh to form the Ohio. Sitting atop his contraption on water at last, Buck gloried in the river breezes, “a kind of visual and emotive bellows” (69), while he contemplated industrial vistas “so gritty they seem divine” (69).

Buck’s attempt to assemble a competent crew presented its own difficulties and entailed several bad choices. Not surprisingly, his plans attracted nineteenth-century re-enactors like flies to honey. These individuals adored foppish hats, trivial pontification, and parading river-town streets. One man insisted that everyone use period language on the boat and irritated passing commercial traffic with his superfluous radio chatter. Potentially more dangerous was his excitability. Eventually these types weeded themselves out, and Buck had a capable mix of men and women who knew how to work hard together.

Patience does not even enter the Mississippi River until page 263 of this book. Until then it threads the Ohio, a river defined by dams and slack pools where there is little current. It is, Buck laments, “a softened, predictable space” (104). The surrounding landscape alternates between rustbelt relics and scenic bluffs. A Cincinnati holiday weekend proved memorable thanks to drunken boaters clogging the river. Buck travelled the Ohio because it is actually
considered part of the Mississippi’s main stem.

Running the Mississippi proper below Cairo, Ill. required constant vigilance reinforced by keen instincts and strong navigational skills. The Corps of Engineers, every river lover’s favorite villain, has significantly altered the Father of Waters during the last century and a half. The river is now essentially a giant channelized ditch disciplined by towering levees, underwater riprap, and wing dams (large rock jetties that jut into the stream, funneling the current and reducing the need to dredge). There is heavy commercial traffic—giant towboats pushing long barge strings that carry the cargo equivalent of a thousand semi-trucks, scurrying switch-boats that ferry barges back and forth between strings, and ocean-going ships from Baton Rouge south. Buck understandably devotes considerable ink to his manoeuvres among these hazards, and the trip’s tone becomes less riverine idyll than white-knuckled obstacle course. He quickly mastered riverboat radio lingo, kept out of the way, and gained the respect of the passing towboat captains, a no-nonsense bunch. Thankfully, Patience’s light draft enabled her to hug the river margins when necessary. It only ran onto a sand bar once and was easily refloated. Furthermore, her bulk defeated the deadheads and snags that imperil light craft, not that there were many of the latter. In fact, Buck writes, “I passed a total of four pleasure boats on the river” (271).

Buck’s forays into flatboat history are interesting, and his emphasis on the vessels’ role in displacing indigenous peoples and spreading slavery will doubtless surprise general readers schooled on positive versions of Manifest Destiny. Of greater interest, to this reviewer at least, are his observations on modern America. He found river people to be unfailingly generous and curious, but like so many folks across the fruited plain, siloed into their respective communities. For example, he did not bring a gun, to the consternation of many of his interlocutors. The “tragicomedy of America” (356) manifested itself in the rednecks who told him that the Blacks in Baton Rouge and Vicksburg were going to rob the boat, and the Black kids who insisted the Louisiana Cajuns were going to “murda your ass” (356). Buck concludes, “The race-blind solution for all was the same: America get guns” (356).

Life on the Mississippi is a fun and informative read that definitely belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the pageant of America’s rivers. Buck has done a fine job of telling the flatboat’s story and introducing readers to an America many of them may not even know exists.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama

Pearl Harbor holds a unique place in both American and military history. A perfect example of the concept of strategic surprise, it represents a pivotal moment in the history of the Second World War and, of course, a dramatic and shocking moment for the United States. For the survivors, it is a tragedy that shaped not only their lives but the lives of many. Pearl Harbor also represents thousands of moments of drama and terror, of courage and sacrifice. As such, it has really captivated the minds of many, including historians. One of the latest additions to our understanding of Pearl Harbor is Daniel Butler’s *Pearl: December 7, 1941*.

Butler’s book provides a chronology of the events of Pearl Harbor on that fateful day in twelve chapters supported by a prologue, epilogue, and appendices that provide the order of battle of both the Japanese and American forces at that time at Pearl Harbor. Tracing the attack from the planning through execution, the text provides an excellent chronology of events providing an incredibly readable account for the next generation fascinated with that day. Several chapters stand out in the material provided. Chapter four “MAGIC and the Color Purple” for example examines the issue of code breaking and the road to Pearl Harbor. It discusses the origin of codebreaking in the United States and the unique problems of codes and ciphers. It traces the development of the organizations within the US from the Black Chamber through OP-20-G and the importance of the United States Navy’s taking on the task of breaking Japanese codes. The key of course was the work of William Friedman and his breaking of the PURPLE diplomatic code in the years leading up to the Second World War. PURPLE and the material it produced, given the code name MAGIC, were political codes, but in the years leading to Pearl, they provided America with invaluable information.

Similarly chapters five and six, “Climb Mount Niitaka” and “To-ra! To-ra! To-ra!” respectively, discuss the Japanese advance on Pearl and the attack itself. The author provides an excellent understanding of the Japanese side of the attack. Planning, strategic thinking, and the debates between the various Japanese decision makers provide an essential backdrop for understanding why the attack had to happen. The planning of Commander Minoru Genda and the challenges of getting the Imperial Japanese Navy leadership to agree to the plan, as well as the difficulties in overcoming the problems associated with operations at such a distance from home waters provide a fascinating read. It also provides important context for the reader to understand just how
remarkable the attack was and the massive difficulties that the Japanese had to overcome to not just try, but to succeed so dramatically. When matched with the political/foreign policy decisions that set the context for the war, it presents the reader with a good understanding of the road to war.

Unfortunately, there are some problems with the text. Discussion of the preparation for the attack on 7 December is remarkable. Butler provides incredible detail regarding the routine of many of the key players from prayers at the Shinto shrines on board the ships to what they ate for breakfast and the spotting of planes on the carrier decks. But such detail is not common knowledge and should be backed up with some form of attribution. Citation is an important aspect of every historical work, yet its spottiness imposes a limitation on the text. Sadly, it also means that the text needs to be used very carefully.

The account that Butler lays out is very clear and easy to follow. It provides a series of dramatic moments and hits all the key elements of the story of Pearl Harbor that have appeared in the existing literature. As such it is a useful text for anyone interested in the subject, especially if they are only starting to come to the subject. Unfortunately, the text does not provide a great deal of new information for readers already familiar with the history of Pearl Harbor. For example, Gordon Prange’s more detailed 1981 study At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor is recommended. Clear and concise, Butler’s text is a valuable account and as such is highly recommended. The citations and bibliography provide an excellent start for research purposes and would definitely be an asset to any student of Pearl Harbor. I would recommend it for not only the fan of American and military history, but for anyone working in the area. A valuable research tool to be sure.

Robert Dienesch
Belle River, Ontario


This work is a chronological history and technical data compendium for the Imperial German Navy’s “small cruisers” and their predecessors dating from the empire’s founding in 1871, through its dissolution in 1918, to the scrapping of the last vessel in 1954. Intended to tell the story of the Imperial German Navy “through the lens of a particular group of warships,” authors Aidan Dodson and Dirk Nottelmann both draw and expand on their earlier
works to address a noticeable gap in the historiography and technical history of the *Kaiserliche Marine* (6). The inclusion of both political and strategic narrative allows for the authors to contextualize different design choices and schools of thought via the changing of emperors and key members of the naval staff over time. The influence these forces had on the evolution of the German cruiser in the decades leading up to the First World War is well covered, as is the combat performance of said vessels during the war years. The second half of the work consists of a detailed career and technical data repository for the Germany’s cruisers, formatted in the style used by Dodson in earlier works. An impressive assortment of supplementary materials, such as a “Conventions, Abbreviations, and Glossary” section, appendices on Fleet Laws, post-1884 yearly organizational structures, standard armaments tables, shipyard construction lists, losses, and a thorough bibliography supports the work. Even the endpapers have been put to good use, offering a quick reference ship timeline for the service lives of 110 different warships.

The primary text offers both a contextual history of Imperial Germany’s policies, designs, and use of small cruisers and their predecessors along with concisely detailed service histories of the various vessels, presented in chronological order based on their class introduction. The early organic nature of vessels under Kaiser Wilhelm I is well covered, as are the more rigid choices for the evolution of cruisers under his grandson, Wilhelm II. The combined coverage of political influences and the shifting of both naval strategy and command organization in the critical early years of Wilhelm II’s reign aid greatly in the examination of cruiser design development, with such discussions often leading into the coverage of affected designs. Classes and individual vessels are discussed chronologically from their authorization, with each vessel’s information and service life being documented. An impressive array of original period photographs and design blueprints accompanies this text, allowing one to visualize the steady evolution of German cruisers from pre-empire ships and former Confederate blockade runners, to the standard vessels of the Fleet Laws era that would see combat action in the First World War. The authors also cover overlooked topics, such as vessels built for export, with solid documentation on the vessels built for China, Russia, and Uruguay along with their final fates. The mine-steamers *Nautilus*, *Albatross*, *Brummer*, and *Bremse* are included due to the fact that “the last pair…were almost exclusively operated as ordinary fleet cruisers during the First World War” (185).

The discussion of the First World War takes place across 36 pages, with an initial chapter covering mobilization, ongoing cruiser construction, the requisition of vessels under contract for foreign navies, and initial engagements at Heligoland Bight. Foreign waters engagements are then discussed, with
actions in the Mediterranean, Western Atlantic, Far East, the Falklands, and Africa all receiving subsections. The famous voyage of the *Emden* and her fellow cruiser *Geier* occupies its own section, with the ships’ voyage denoted on one of the maps at the beginning of the work. The second half of the discussion focuses on the “War in Home Waters,” primarily dealing with Baltic operations, 1915 alterations to cruiser armaments, the famous Battle of Jutland (30 May-1 June 1916) and post-Jutland engagements. Battle damage and repair photographs are used throughout this section, offering an excellent visual understanding of the damage inflicted in some of these naval operations in a way that is more visceral than mere words. Finally, the post-Armistice fate of the various cruisers is discussed in a chapter rightly titled “Afterglow.”

The survival of several ships in the Weimar, Yugoslavian, French, and Italian interwar and Second World War navies is well documented, with accompanying images to show the modification of several vessels into floating anti-aircraft batteries and accommodation hulks (243-244). In a final retrospective, the authors examine the evolution of the cruisers for a final time, coming to the conclusion that while growth of the ship type was initially organic, it truly was the hands and minds of Admiral Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II that dictated the formation of their final generations.

The second half of the work following the main text consists of technical, career, legal, and logistical data, arranged in both main body charts and appendices. The “Ships of the German Navy” section is an excellent reference section in and of itself, with the various stand-alone and ship classes of vessels that fell within the authors’ range of coverage represented in a succinct, standardized format. Displacement, dimensions, machinery, armament, complement, key construction dates, and service-life history accompany vessel renderings. Normally, these consist of a simplified inboard profile highlighting deck arrangement, armour placement, and the location of both engine and boiler rooms. This is also often paired with outboard or waterline profiles rendered to scale, with multiple renderings illustrating changing appearances, such as SMS *Charlotte*’s five different appearances from 1890 to 1910 and the evolution of the *Magdeburg* class from initial construction through the post-war period (261, 277). This, paired with the Summary of Small Cruiser Authorizations, full English translation of the 1898 Fleet Laws, listing of yearly ship organization from 1884 to 1918, basic armament information, shipyard data, and losses make the work’s end matter an invaluable quick reference guide. The efforts of Dodson and Nottlemann to compile such a concise summation of what was doubtlessly a vast array of German language sources is to be commended.

A few small suggestions involve adding an introductory statement or date notation to the maps section at the beginning, as their minimalist captions
are not fully clear upon initial reading. Some expansion on the fate of the accommodation-hulked SMS *Amazone* in the Afterglow chapter might be warranted, as her transfer to the American Navy is largely reduced to a photographic caption, with no real discussion of her status as the last non-wrecked Imperial German cruiser to survive into the 1950s (243). Finally, an appendix showing colour profiles of some of the vessels, or perhaps some examples of period naval art as seen on the dust jacket, would better illustrate the various paint schemes used by the Empire and in post-Imperial service. Some mention of the patterns are present in photograph captions, but the black and white images preclude a true visualization of the changes in ship coloration. These are just minor suggestions, however, and would only aid in increasing the work’s already impressive nature.

*The Kaiser’s Cruisers* is an excellent resource for those interested in the Imperial German Navy’s cruiser forces, both in design and service history. Dodson and Nottlemann provide a strong core of basic information paired with an excellent standardized data guide, creating a solid research tool for historians, scholars, and those generally interested in the time-frame. This work not only fills a hole in the historiography of German naval history, but also provides English-language readers with one of the first proper dives into the subject of Imperial small cruisers and their predecessors.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


This is the second volume of the story of Canadian naval officer John Crispo Edwards (1896-1978) by his daughter-in-law. Edwards was a member of the second class at the Royal Naval College of Canada, which graduated just as the First World War started. They spent their war years with the Royal Navy, doing sea training, and then gaining experience in operational ships. By 1939, they were in their early forties and would become part of the small professional core around which the Canadian Navy expanded in the Second World War. They would fill senior positions in the war and early post-war years. Most of J.C. Edwards’ wartime service was in command of shore bases on both coasts, drawing on his interwar executive and administrative experience. His most notable contribution was as the first commanding officer of a large new
training base, created from scratch in the Annapolis Valley, Nova Scotia, and named HMCS *Cornwallis*. Edwards also spent a year at sea in command of an armed merchant cruiser, including a role as part of the Canadian contribution to the little-known amphibious campaign with US forces in 1942 to recapture the Aleutians.

In the earlier volume, Helen Edwards used Edwards’ diaries which, while terse, conveyed a picture of his daily activities and of what was important to him. This volume is different because Edwards did not leave a similar record after 1930. The only section of *Dutchy’s Diaries* based on written diaries is the chapter covering the years 1946-50, the phase of his career when Edwards was a commodore in charge of the training and manning base in Esquimalt. The section on the decade from 1930 to 1940 is based largely on contemporary newspapers. “Dutchy” (he earned the nick-name because of a penchant for being tight-fisted on dates) was an accomplished tennis player, as was his wife, and the focus of this chapter is on various tennis tournaments. During this decade Edwards served in the naval barracks in Halifax and Esquimalt, which were responsible for training schools and shore accommodation. Between 1939 and 1941 Edwards, then in the rank of commander, was responsible for the East Coast manning and training establishment in Halifax. This was a critical time when the RCN was expanding rapidly with limited numbers of experienced trainers. To provide context for this period, the author has inserted a section on HMCS *Renard*, an armed yacht assigned to the Halifax Local Defence Force used to train sailors from Edwards’ schools ashore. For the wartime parts of the Edwards story, the author has written chapters based on newspaper articles, and in the case of 1943-45 (Edward’s years in *Cornwallis*), the narrative also cites a few official letters that her father-in-law kept.

*Dutchy’s Decades*, like its predecessor, *Dutchy’s Diaries* (2020), is a nicely produced softcover edition. The many photographs are clearly reproduced. The table of contents is accompanied by a striking photo of the heavy cruiser HMS *Exeter* in Esquimalt during a visit in 1937. Appendices describe ships and places mentioned in the text. “Dutchy” Edwards left only sketchy and fragmentary first-hand records about his experiences after 1930. Helen Edwards has created a narrative using largely secondary sources, and because of a lack of basic information on Edwards, many of these are episodic reports about sports and social events.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia

Alan Forrest has made a timely contribution to the growing field of the Atlantic World with his book *The Death of the French Atlantic: Trade, War, and Slavery in the Age of Revolution*. Known for his robust scholarship on the French Revolution and Napoleonic era, Forrest steps off the European continent to explore the decline of French Atlantic seaports and imperial trade with the West Indies. By focusing on the slave ports of Nantes and Bordeaux, he demonstrates how intertwined French Revolutionary practices and policies – including the government’s “political neglect” and “ambivalence” toward merchant communities, intensifying conflict in the West Indies, and emergent antislavery movements – facilitated a decline in the nation’s maritime power (xii). The result is a blend of recent scholarship and archival work, emphasizing entangled empires and the movement of people and information during the Age of Revolution.

Forrest opens by examining the rise of French port cities and the politics of important merchant families. In doing so, he reveals the slave trade’s prominence before the revolution in France’s major Atlantic ports, Nantes, and Bordeaux. Merchants embraced and depended on the slave trade, tightly linking them with France’s colonial possessions, especially Saint Domingue. Forrest is correct to look to Saint Domingue as a critical element in the French economy, exploring how events in the colony reverberate back to the metropole. While Saint Domingue was undoubtedly one of the most essential French colonial possessions, one wonders about other French Atlantic colonies and their complex relationships with both merchants in France and other islands in the West Indies. In this way, one is left with a narrow view of what the French Atlantic was.

In part two, Forrest explores the French Revolution as it reverberated around the Atlantic. In the first years of the revolution, trade remained prosperous. With the outbreak of revolution in Saint Domingue in 1791 (or the Haitian Revolution), however, the tides of fortune started shifting for merchant trade in the West Indies. Unleashed by revolution in France, the rhetoric of liberty and abolition took hold in both France and the West Indies. Combined with the outbreak of war with Britain in 1793, maritime conflict and privateering, as well as widespread violence in the West Indies, the Atlantic destabilized in ways France was unprepared for, and too disunited to combat politically, economically, or militarily. Thus, as France declined as a military power in the West Indies, its merchants deteriorated as an economic power both in the islands and at its Atlantic seaports back on the continent.

Part three is the book’s most robust section, taking the reader into the
chaotic aftermath of the French Revolutionary era as it transitioned into Napoleon’s rule. As Britain and the United States moved to outlaw the transatlantic slave trade and Saint Domingue gained independence, French merchants failed to adjust to changing Atlantic economic and political currents. Forrest demonstrates that what was once a region of lucrative business for the French, was now a place of lost fortunes. Unfortunately, by focusing on the merchants in France, Forrest loses sight of how the French residing in the West Indies adjusted to the new environment. If Forrest’s intention is to illuminate the French Atlantic, these actors played a pivotal role in its rise and eventual decline. Enticed by the Spanish Empire’s offer of free land to populate their colonial possessions throughout the 1790s and early-1800s, many French West Indies residents seized the offer. In this, Forrest missed an opportunity to explore how the French Atlantic entangled itself with the Spanish Atlantic. Does the presence of these transimperial actors reveal the short-comings of historical categories such as a French, Spanish, or British Atlantic? Current scholarship would suggest so.

In taking French history into Atlantic studies, Forrest acknowledges that historiography has been somewhat “late to the game” in the turn toward Atlantic studies. Initially led by Americanists and later joined by British and Spanish scholars, Atlantic studies has strived to place national and imperial histories into broader conversations with the events and people outside of traditional political borders. Doing so demonstrates the Atlantic’s entangled and complex histories, as people, commodities, and information crisscrossed unstable and fluid boundaries. It is within this context that Forrest slightly falters with the Atlantic framework. What exactly was the French Atlantic, and who was included in it, contemporarily and historically? And what was the French Atlantic’s relationship to other “Atlantics,” such as the British or Spanish?

With that said, overall, The Death of the French Atlantic: Trade, War, and Slavery in the Age of Revolution is a good book for those looking for an introduction to the French Atlantic. Forrest’s writing style makes his work equally approachable to academic and general audiences alike. Combining economic, political, and intellectual history, Forrest crafts a compelling narrative. Those interested in a purely maritime history may be disappointed. Still, anyone intrigued by the idea of the French Atlantic and a work that addresses the era’s complexities will not be. Jumping between the French Atlantic seaports and the West Indies, Forrest succeeds in weaving an illuminating and informative narrative.

Brendon Gray Floyd
Columbia, Missouri, USA

Most of us have heard of the wartime convoy PQ-17 to Archangel, Russia in July 1942 and the fact that many of the ships in the convoy were sunk after the convoy was ordered to scatter because of the perceived threat of being attacked by the *Tirpitz* and/or other major units of the German Navy. As much as this book deals with that decision – taken in London – it is not the *raison d’être* of the book. Rather, the book provides the personal accounts of sailors who survived that event, their experiences while in Russia, and their trip home.

In the first chapter, after introducing the reader to some of the major interviewees, Geroux explains the history behind the need for Arctic convoys and the general war situation. In chapter two, the reader meets most of the other interviewees and starts hearing about the make-up of the convoy, the weather and sea conditions (even in July), the seaworthiness of the merchant ships, the cargo, the financial incentives for crewing, and life on board. As much as there were shadowing capital ships and a nearby cruiser force to oppose the major German ships, the convoy’s close escort comprised six Royal Navy destroyers, four corvettes, four armed trawlers, two anti-aircraft ships, three rescue ships, three minesweepers, and two submarines. The convoy departed Hvalfjord, Iceland, on 27 June 1942 with 36 merchant ships flying the flags of at least five nations and carrying roughly three-quarters of a billion dollars’ worth of war supplies – more than $11.2 billion in today’s dollars (31). Ice, not an enemy attack, was the first thing to damage three ships, which left the convoy to return to Iceland. A German long-range reconnaissance aircraft spotted the convoy about noon on 1 July. Torpedo-carrying seaplanes (Heinkel 115s) made the first enemy attack 24-hours later, but it was not until 3 July that the *Christopher Newport* became the first victim – sunk by an aerial torpedo attack. As the convoy passed Bear Island the next day, Heinkel 111 and Junker 88 bombers came within range to deliver bombs and torpedoes.

The *Tirpitz* also was on the move, but only along the Norwegian coast and not out to sea. The British didn’t know where the *Tirpitz* was, and the Germans weren’t about to risk her until they knew for certain that there were no British aircraft carriers guarding the convoy. But the English feared that the *Tirpitz* was at sea and first ordered the nearby cruisers to withdraw once they were 150 miles east of Bear Island. After much deliberation, on 4 July at 9:11 pm, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, in London, sent a message to the cruiser force to withdraw westward at high speed. The order to all escorting ships for the convoy to disperse and proceed to Russian ports came 22 minutes later.
Then at 9:36 pm (13 minutes after the second signal), the fateful and most criticized “Most Immediate” signal for the convoy to scatter! “Scattering” and “dispersing” were not synonymous!

With that signal, most escorts turned about and abandoned the near-defenseless freighters. The latter headed in all directions – those that headed more or less directly to Russia were picked off by U-boats and aircraft, while those that headed north into the icefield fared better. The armed trawler *Ayrshire* and three ships (*Troubadour*, *Ironclad*, and *Silver Sword*) painted themselves white and became ghosts (hence the title of the book), practically invisible in the icefield. The story line of the book, as seen through the eyes of their sailors, tells of their exploits in the ice and along the coast of Novaya Zemlya, a dash to Archangel with a few other ships which had found their way to that island, and then their experiences in the Russian port.

I recommend this book because, not only does it tell the full story of PQ-17, but also provides the human element of wartime experiences and of life on board ships and in Russia. The “Notes on Sources” is not just “end notes” but a much fuller rendering of information and *obiter dicta*. The book concludes with a chapter called “The Reckoning.” Need I say more?

David H. Gray
Ottawa, Ontario


France’s Marine nationale is the largest and most capable navy in the European Union post-Brexit that by default has assumed a clear leadership role in common defence and naval matters, minus the Royal Navy. It operates a modern naval force comprised of nuclear submarines, the nuclear aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*, state-of-the-art surface combatant ships, support ships and auxiliaries, and significant naval aviation assets, deployed close to home and abroad. French defence industries and companies produce amongst the most technologically advanced military and defence wares in the world, marketed for domestic usage as well as export to other countries that brings considerable prestige, foreign business, and self-sufficiency to the French state. In its existing structure and organization, the Marine nationale also has a longstanding track record of operationalizing platforms and weapons systems as a contemporary navy with outstanding training, tactical doctrine, and operational command. Henri-Pierre Grolleau is a photojournalist specializing in naval and military aviation subjects, with insider access authorized by the
French Ministry of Defence. An author of some twenty French-language picture books (including one on US naval aviation and carriers), he turns his attention again to the French Navy’s naval aviation arm, the Aéronavale or Aéronautique navale, for the first time in English.

This lavishly coloured photograph book is divided into six chapters, covering the basic purpose and organization of French naval aviation, aircrew selection and training, carrier-borne aviation, helicopters put into naval roles, maritime patrol and surveillance performed by mostly land-based aircraft under naval direction and control, and search and rescue missions in the maritime environment. Procurement of new aircraft types reflects the Marine nationale’s adjustment from a highly specialized but aging Cold War navy capable of delivering conventional and nuclear effects, to one more agile and suited to the complex world in which France finds itself, both nationally and with her allies. In recent decades, French pilots and aircrews have accrued considerable combat experience in Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and other places, the older F-8P Crusader and Super Étendard giving way to the navalized Rafale “omnirole” fighter and the Super Frelon and Lynx helicopters replaced by the newer NH90 Caiman, interim SA365 Dauphin, and eventually, the planned H160M Guépard. The E-2C Hawkeye, a carrier-borne surveillance and early warning plane, will also be replaced one-for-one by the E-2-D Advanced Hawkeye from production in the United States within the next decade.

The French Navy has existing training relationships with the US Navy and standardizes in many areas of equipment and communications. Only the United States, Great Britain, and France operate nuclear submarines in the western alliance at the present time, and operational nuclear aircraft carriers compose an even smaller group of two. The Marine nationale also boasts several unique public-private partnerships in the provision of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft operated and maintained by civilian contractors, available for military use in training and day-to-day operations. The Dauphin helicopter, for example, is a civilian commercial airframe, customized for naval usage, painted in military patterns, and flown by regular naval personnel. The versatile Falcon 50 used for surveillance and other general duties derives from a business jet, and is set to be replaced by the Alabatros, another bigger commercial business jet type. In contrast, the Br. 1150 Atlantique 2, considerably improved in sensors, weapons, and display interfaces since entering service some thirty years ago, is a proven dedicated maritime patrol aircraft used over the sea and land. Its traditional anti-submarine warfare role has expanded into wide area surveillance and strike roles, the bay accommodating sonobuoys, the latest MU90 torpedoes, anti-ship Exocet missiles, and precision-guided munitions like the GBU-12. Twenty-two aircraft produced by Dassault Aviation are in service in Flotille 21F and 23F near Lorient in Brittany, scheduled to remain operational until
at least 2035. The commercial-sourced fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters provide the backbone to the Marine nationale’s contribution in the field of search and rescue along the coasts of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, important to the fishing fleets, commercial shipping, and civilian recreation.

The real focus of the book is the stunning close-up photographs, taken from chase planes and on the ground. The main objects of attention are the varieties of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft serving in the Marine nationale. Other photographs highlight the payloads carried on the aircraft, aircrew, and engineering and maintenance spaces aboard ships and on land. A great deal of detailed relevant information is conveyed in the captions of the photographs, as well as the main text that includes large block quotes of commentary from interviews with serving French personnel, both identified and anonymous, translated into English. The book has neither references nor index, so the sources of information must be taken on trust. Since the obvious focus is on the aircraft and developments in the recent and near-term future, little is learned about any debates over the policy and costs related to the French navy’s procurement programs in the naval aviation field, especially in the context of other priorities within the larger armed forces, though the common basic flight training arrangements with the army and air force are mentioned. France’s coming replacement of the Le Triomphant-class strategic ballistic missile submarines by a third-generation boat design and Charles de Gaulle with a nearly twice as large next-generation nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the 82,000-tonne range, each requiring new-design ship-size reactors, entails considerable investment for the Marine nationale and French government. Inevitably, cost-savings will be sought in the rest of the fleet which may affect or delay procurement of more helicopters and another next-generation maritime patrol aircraft, no doubt the largest ask after newer generation fighter jets once the Atlantique 2 ages out.

The publisher of French Naval Aviation has produced a high-quality book at a modest price point, drawing upon its long experience with aviation-related magazines in Europe, including Flypast, focused on heritage war-era aircraft. Grolleau captures a snapshot in time inside a present-day modern navy, some of the description written six months before publication and already overtaken by events in the field and decisions on procurement. But the photographs are still spectacular. The book is recommended for readers interested in contemporary naval aviation and naval matters in the European context, maritime uses of fighting aircraft and their ordnance, and the technical equipment aspects of search and rescue over the sea from a French perspective.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia

Colin Helling puts forward the position that the Royal Navy and its responsibilities to both Scotland and England under the regal union of 1608 contributed to the parliamentary union of 1707. The Royal Navy, in being the Crown’s navy, and the single Crown ruling in both nations, was the single force common to both countries. Helling acknowledges, however, that it was not a typically shared institution, since the navy’s materiel and monetary resources and overall control resided in England. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the realization of the navy’s importance in shielding Scotland, to prevent invasion of England via the Scottish borders, came into clear focus, playing an important role in the political union.

In the first portion of this story, from 1608 through to 1640, England and Scotland struggled to sort out jurisdictional issues under the royal union. Scotland did not have the resources for a permanent navy, nor the tariff base to help support the English navy. What they did have was an extensive fishing ground to which they allowed England access in return for naval protection. The Dutch maritime strength, both in naval and fishing fleets, drove this development forward. Yet here, as throughout the century, Helling notes that English shores always drew the bulk of the navy’s attention.

Charles I’s effort to bring religious union to the two countries resulted in two Bishop’s Wars, 1639 and 1640. Though the English navy underperformed, their ability to enforce a blockade did serve to undermine Scottish security. Scottish army success against the English led, in part, to a revolt in Ireland in 1641. At peace with England, Scotland offered to have its army deal with the Irish rebels, if the English provided naval protection for the convoy. The Scottish parliament could not afford transport and naval protection. England sent two ships. Over the next two years, the two countries negotiated a Scots guard, consisting of English ships to protect the Scottish coast and shipping.

Scotland’s reliance on English naval power proved catastrophic as Cromwell invaded the northern country in 1650-51. English ships supported the army allowing for its concentration and victories. The Scots were even unable to muster privateers to harass English shipping. Helling suggests that at the point of Restoration the Scottish elite had realized the importance of naval defence. The First and Second Dutch Wars further underlined the need for a single navy to protect the two countries. In mid-century, battle tactics shifted from pell mell to line of battle. Larger ships with more powerful guns were involved, increasing the capital outlay, maintenance costs, and harbour facilities. Scotland could never afford these expenditures, making it ever more
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

Negotiations redefining the union, moving towards a political union began in 1670. Among the many issues were security of fisheries and merchant shipping, and thus a navy. The reign of James VII saw the navy play a crucial role in defeating the Earl of Argyll’s rebellion, though the lack of local Scottish support for the earl’s invasion from the United Provinces, certainly helped. Incidents of seizing Scottish merchant vessels trading with England’s enemies and the sorting out of saluting protocol when Scottish and English ships met in each other’s waters, dominated the 1790s. This raised the idea of a separate Scottish navy, but the costs were simply impossible. The decade ended with the Scottish government at Holyrood, realizing that to have access to the superior English navy, concessions had to be made.

Continued Anglo-Scottish tensions over governance resulted in Scotland re-establishing a small naval element. War with various factions in Europe, the presence of French privateers and continued threats of invasions served to ensure English naval ships plied the waters off Scotland. This co-operative thrust was cemented by the Act of Union in 1707, in which one British navy was created for the protection of the entire island (and Ireland), its trade, and colonies.

Scots had served aboard English ships throughout the century, though never under impressment. Scottish officers commanded ships and Scots had served in the various Privy Councils and Admiralties governing naval affairs. But as Helling suggests, a British navy had never really been on the minds of the typical Scottish citizen; the Scots never saw themselves on equal footing with the English when it came to creating and maintaining a naval force. So how did the navy become so important in the political union of Scotland and England? How was it a shared institution leading to union? The land border between England and Scotland was the most significant threat to England’s security. Shifting to parliamentary union was seen as securing that frontier. As part of the union, the British Navy would move resources to Scotland from the south of England for permanent protection of northern Britain. Thus, the navy’s security role for both England and Scotland was the shared factor.

This is a complex story stretching over a century of wars and political upheaval. As the Scots tried to keep their political independence, they never negotiated for an integrated Royal Navy, with significant Scottish investment and presence, nor did the English. The Scots negotiated their army and fishing rights to gain English naval protection. The English sent ships north to either invade a rebellious Scotland or protect the northern access to England from a foreign invasion. Once Parliament in London included Scottish representatives, the navy was then cast as British. Helling’s evidence leaves this reviewer seeing the British navy as a result of the union, more so than the Royal Navy
serving as a cause of the union. The navy was really the English navy, upon which the Scottish government called for protection.

The notes and bibliography reflect Helling’s extensive research. A map of Scotland and a table of the number of ships entering Leith in 1639 are the only illustrations. The book has a thorough index.

This is not a book for anyone without a background in the long seventeenth-century history shared by Scotland and England and to some degree, their neighbours. It will appeal to those focused on the roots of the British navy, Scottish involvement in that navy and the interplay between naval decisions, economic trade, politics and state formation.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


This work is number 375 in Osprey’s Campaign Series and the author’s ninth contribution to the Osprey catalogue. In less than 100 pages, Herder expands on earlier works in the series covering the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa by delving into “the epic air-sea actions that raged both in support and defiance of the American landings” (5). The book follows the usual Osprey Campaign format, with examinations of opposing commanders, force dispositions, operational plans, and the campaign itself. For Herder, this latter section covers three operations, Detachment, Iceberg, and Ten-go, all of which were intertwined in their execution and intersection. An impressive number of original colour photographs are integrated with the text, along with maps and graphics to illustrate battle plans and attack tactics. A short selected bibliography and quick reference index round out the work.

The pre-campaign sections of the text offer a solid background to the commanders, their mindsets, morale, and logistical situations faced by both the Americans and Japanese in the lead-up to Operation Detachment. In addition to basic information, Herder offers some insight into the personalities of the various leaders, including the post-campaign fates of several Japanese officers wracked by guilt over the lives loss. The order of battle for Operation Iceberg and relevant Ten-go forces is suitably impressive, clearly demonstrating the overwhelming might of the Allied naval forces in the late war compared to Japanese defenders. Japan’s final realization of the need for inter-service cooperation is noted from surviving documentation, as is the opposition to
suicide attacks by officers who remained powerless to stop them. In contrast, American Admiral Raymond A. Spruance’s simultaneous planning of Detachment and Iceberg highlights the logistical strain placed on the carriers and capital ships of his task force, requiring the methodical suppression of any possible naval or air threat to the landing operations while maintaining the safety of vessels involved. The fact that much of this action would require naval assets to remain well within range of multiple hostile airbases acts as a foreboding transition to the coverage of the campaign itself.

Encapsulating the bulk of the main text, the Campaign chapter has a heavy focus on Operation Iceberg and the various Kikisui missions launched as part of Ten-go. Detachment and the securing of Iwo Jima are covered as well, but they serve as more of a preliminary action to the main event. Within this section, Herder presents a straightforward accounting of the various “kamikaze” attacks on American and British forces, noting the types of aircraft involved in each incident, the ship hit, and casualties incurred. The primary attack on 6 April is well covered, as is the final suicidal deployment of the IJN Yamato and her task force. The postulation that a more coordinated air-sea attack by the Japanese might have been more effective is well illustrated via the devastating attacks carried out by American air crews against the world’s largest battleship amid her lack of defensive air cover. This is backed up with an interesting rendering of American tactics, which can be contrasted against a similar sketch of the suicide attacks against the beleaguered American destroyer USS Laffey nine days later. As with Iwo Jima, the final securing of Okinawa and Japan’s last-ditch efforts to dislodge the Americans precede the concluding analysis of the overall operation. Herder points out America’s difficult paradox of adaptable junior officers operating within the confines laid out by inflexible upper echelons who favored “reduced … risk by implicitly accepting increased American casualties” while the Japanese expended countless men in tenacious attacked that ultimately failed to break either American morale or their superior industrial might (93). Finally, an aftermath paragraph notes surviving museum ships that were present for the various engagements discussed, and details gleaned from the wreck of the Yamato regarding the long-debated veracity of American claims to torpedo-hits.

An increased level of quote citation would help improve the work. Most instances are attributed within the text to a specific person, but there are several under vague labels like “USN officer,” “US officers,” and “a later USN report” (11, 24). The acronyms and abbreviation section at the end of the text could also be moved to the beginning next to the Key to Military Symbols tables, to prepare those unfamiliar with such terms before encountering them within the text. These are relatively minor suggestions, however, and would merely improve future editions.
East China Sea 1945 is an excellent introductory text into the late air-sea actions of the Second World War’s Pacific Theatre. Herder has done an admirable job of condensing the historical perspectives of both sides into the constraints of the Campaign Series format, touching on major facets, as well as smaller details and eyewitness accounts. For those interested in Allied carrier operations, late-war Japanese naval and aviation actions, and learning more about the often overlooked yet vitally important operations that dovetailed with some of the most iconic battles in the closing days of the Pacific Theatre, this text would be a welcome resource.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Whether looking at the wreck of the Titanic or the recently discovered Endurance, shipwrecks are arguably among the most public attention-grabbing objects within the realm of maritime history. Each one not only provides a time capsule from the past, but also a story of technological success and failure, a tale of humankind’s struggle against the powers of nature, and finally, an often highly dramatic and tragic story of the people aboard.

With Out of the Depths: A History of Shipwrecks, Canadian researcher Alan G. Jamieson provides an overview of shipwrecks around the globe that were lost at sea between the early beginnings of ocean navigation and the present day. Organized chronologically by date of loss of the respective vessels, the book provides a plethora of information. In the first of the two main sections, we learn about each ship, the circumstances of its loss, and occasionally, the history of the identification of the wreck site and recovery of the ship. Among the wrecks covered are well known ships like the Bremen Cog, the Mary Rose, the USS Monitor, and the RMS Titanic, as well as hundreds of ships normally only known to a small group of highly-specialized maritime historians and/or underwater archaeologists.

The second part of the book provides a somewhat brief overview of the development of maritime/underwater archaeology as an academic discipline, followed by a discussion of the development of commercial shipwreck-hunting companies and finally, a chapter on supertanker wrecks, clearly showcasing that wrecks are not only historical artefacts that may contain historical and/or monetary treasure, but might also present substantial risks and threats to entire
ecosystems. The book concludes with a brief apparatus consisting mainly out of a bibliography and an index.

Assembling information on hundreds of shipwrecks from all around the globe into one comprehensive and easily readable volume is without any doubt a major achievement, as recognized by leading experts in the field like James P. Delgado, Vic Mastone, and Warren Riess on the dust-cover of the book. Nevertheless, it needs to be asked if simply listing the shipwrecks in a single narrative reaching from pre-historic times to the present is really the best way to organize such a comprehensive overview, especially as the only finding aid provided within the book is a standard index organized by names, including ship’s names. Some additional finding aids organized by chronology and geography would have been most beneficial to make the book not only an overview, but a truly usable reference book that works for the general public as an introduction to the topic, but also as a tool for the professional historian. Furthermore, while the book includes a limited selection of photographs and illustrations of individual shipwrecks, it does not include any maps or charts. This seems to the reviewer at least somewhat problematic, as most readers will not be familiar with the locations of the respective shipwrecks. Simple charts would have been an easy tool to illustrate that wrecks are not spread evenly over the ocean floor, but rather congregate in certain parts of the seabed leaving other spaces more or less empty.

Despite its limited use as a reference book, professional readers may find the second part of the book most illuminating. Besides providing a brief but good overview on the development of maritime/underwater archaeology, the section on the rise of shipwreck-hunting companies is probably the most interesting section of the whole book. Jamieson traces the development of this commercial, “ugly twin” of academic research on shipwrecks. He includes an analysis of the motives behind such activities and more importantly, the complex relationships and interactions between such companies and entrepreneurs and various national and state governments. While he successfully debunks the idea that shipwreck-hunting and underwater archaeology are basically the same, he demonstrates in his final conclusion at least some sympathy for the idea of recovery of whatever can be recovered by arguing to a certain degree against the main principle of the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Resources, means to keep shipwrecks in-situ as the preferred option.

Regardless of whether you agree with the author’s position, or adhere to the principles of the UNESCO Convention, the discussion on shipwreck hunting vs maritime/underwater archaeology will make you think about this dichotomy, and hopefully, help reach a better understanding of the complexities involved with shipwrecks of all periods and geographical regions.

To whom should this book be recommended? On one hand, it can easily be
Book Reviews

recommended to general readers with an interest in shipwrecks, as it provides a comprehensive overview of shipwrecks around the globe, the development of the related academic discipline of underwater archaeology and the difference between it and commercial shipwreck-hunting. It can also be recommended as a textbook for any introductory university class on underwater archaeology or maybe even maritime history at large, basically for the same reasons. Recommending it to professional underwater archaeologists or maritime historians may be problematic as it does not include all the tools that would constitute a real reference book. The two chapters on the development of underwater archaeology and shipwreck hunting might be intellectual stimulating reads, but is that enough?

Given a suggested retail price of US $35.00 the answer to this question might still be a “yes”. I would suggest purchasing the book, reading the two chapters, and then giving the book to one of your students or friends who might be interested in an introduction to the topic.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


The ShipCraft series provides modelers and those interested in the design and construction of various vessels of war with a wealth of detailed information on historical background, variations within type or class, and changes over time in appearance, equipment, and fittings. Traditionally, ShipCraft volumes present material on a class or vessel type from the Second World War or less-commonly, the First World War, the Vietnam War, or the years between wars. Series 29 is a departure from this approach, focusing for the first time on a period ship, Horatio Nelson’s famous and beloved HMS Victory.

Those familiar with the series will recognize the content and organization. A concise but well-researched history lesson is provided in the opening chapters, followed by a review of various model kits available on the market, a Model Maker’s showcase, and chapters dealing with appearance and paint schemes. The book concludes with a brief listing of print and on-line references, as well as sources for acquiring model kits of the Victory and related accessories.

Author Kerry Jang, an accomplished ship modeler, has previously published paperback books on kits and scratch-builts, as well as detailed kit reviews on-line. This series highlights his emphasis on thorough research and
proper use of this research during the build process. The slim book is crammed with invaluable and interesting events and details relevant to understanding how Victory was built, used, modified, and maintained over her long lifetime. Accompanying the text are numerous images of plans, paintings, photographs (of Victory and of representative models), and cross-section drawings. Detailed sidebars and image captions provide additional details and tips.

The introductory section entitled Design and Construction places the birth of this venerable warship within the context of contemporary shipbuilding design philosophy and conventions. The ship was of mostly unremarkable and standardized design and build – innovations, repairs, and at times, experimental modifications would come at various times during her long life. The Career Highlights piece details her first commission and her actions at Gibraltar, during the French Revolution, at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent and, of course, Trafalgar and its aftermath. Also included are her various latter-day repair and restoration adventures, providing the reader with a thorough and well-written synopsis of the major events that influenced the appearance of the ship as it exists today. A handy Service History table offers an at-a-glance reference to these major events by month and year, which will be useful to any modeler wanting to depict a particular period, alteration, or event.

The Model Products section reviews thirteen model kits of metal, resin, plastic, paper or wood with comments on their strengths and weaknesses and suggestions on how to overcome some of the problems in each kit or material type. To this end, this section also includes a summary of kit accessories and paints one might consider in order to enhance their model’s appearance. This section leads into the Modelmaker’s Showcase section, with numerous high-quality photographs of beautifully constructed scratch- and kit-built models. These are impressive and they depict a level of detail and attention to scale that the rest of us can, in vain, strive towards.

Similar to the earlier history sections, the Appearance and the Colour Schemes sections are comprehensive. The author depicts changes of major and minor components of the ship over time in an organized and logical fashion. These include stem to stern, topside, interior, rig, paint schemes, and masting and, to a lesser extent, rigging.

Minor editorial or design quibbles do not detract from this otherwise fine book; Jang ensures that the reader understands certain bits of seafaring jargon, such as wearing, tacking, weather gauge, in Ordinary and others by placing certain term in italics and following these with a layperson definition in parentheses. On occasion, the italics are dropped, the order of the term and definition is reversed (sometime perhaps because of sentence structure), or a term that would otherwise be expected to follow this convention is left unexplained (lee, jury rig, and a few others). As for layout, the inclusion of
numerous and very useful photos, particularly in the Model Products section, results in a breaking up of the text in a way that is sometimes mildly difficult to follow.

Not necessarily a shortcoming, but possibly bias from a reviewer who prefers wooden builds over plastics, metal, or resin: the Model Products section represents plastic kits, metal kits, and kits for tabletop gaming in abundance, with only limited discussion of wooden kits. Jang provides a short description of a few of the strengths and weakness of Caldercraft’s offering, and a paragraph on Amati’s not-yet-released (as of the date of Series 29’s printing) Victory model but little else beyond tabular information: 16 wooden kits manufactured by 11 companies are represented by scale, the type of build (solid hull, plank on bulkhead, etc.), with one to four sentences commenting on content, accuracy, materials, and general quality. The emphasis on plastics and metals would be expected in a book covering the ShipCraft series’ typical fare of both World Wars or later craft, but it is mildly curious for a period ship. In his introduction to the wooden model segment, the author even comments that one might expect a wooden ship to be modeled in wood. He then cautions the reader that most wooden kits are decorative before discussing ways that various shortcomings can be overcome.

Victory: 100-Gun First Rate 1765 is a trove of information invaluable to anyone interested in creating a model of this famous vessel that is true to her built history and correct to the time during which the ship is being represented. Both the Model Products section and the Appearance section offer plenty of guidance to the modeler seeking a high level of accuracy. Whether commenting on the accurateness of the signal flags provided in certain kits meant to depict Nelson’s orders, discussing changes to the size of Victory’s name on her stern over time, or teasing out in exactly which period it boasted a squared beakhead bulkhead or a rounded bow, this book provides a wealth of details that sticklers for accuracy are sure to appreciate.

Jim Hughey
Houston, Texas


Maritime Strike: The Untold Story of the Royal Navy Task Group of Libya in 2011 is a must read for all naval officers and operational planning staff. Rear Admiral John Kingwell commanded the Royal Navy Task Group that
operated off the Libyan Coast during the latter half of 2011 in support of the anti-Gaddafi forces that eventually succeeded in toppling that regime as part of the Arab Spring.

Kingwell starts the narrative by describing his journey from midshipman, in 1984, to task group commander in 2011. The son of a dustman (garbage collector) his rise to this position is extraordinary, noting the British class system that lurks just below the surface of the Royal Navy’s officer corps. His early career was unremarkable, with service in the Atlantic and command of HMS Pursuer (a small coastal patrol vessel) in 1992. This was followed by Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) training in 1994, service in the frigate HMS Monmouth and then, early promotion to commander and assuming command of the frigate HMS Argyll in 2001.

Argyll deployed to the Arabian Gulf in mid-2002 and Kingwell learned some valuable lessons regarding operating in a coalition force where legal issues regarding rules of engagement created some temporary tension between the British and US forces. Following this command, he undertook service in the Admiralty, in the Directorate of Naval Resources and Plans, which introduced him to the machinations of defence funding that drives capability acquisitions (or not) depending on the money available. In 2004 he was promoted to captain and served as senior naval advisor to the Iraqi Navy for six months. Again, this tasking enabled him to see coalition operations at close hand and the political injects that drive military decisions.

On his return to the United Kingdom, he was appointed to Fleet Headquarters at Portsmouth, and dealt with difficult issues such as the deployment of Royal Marines to Afghanistan, due to the over-stretching of army units in that theatre. Kingwell also became embroiled in the future of fixed-wing aviation in the Royal Navy which saw the Sea Harriers retired from service in 2006. The RAF Harriers were to be deployed to the British aircraft carriers for ongoing training but, again, the commitment of these aircraft to the Afghanistan campaign curtailed much of this activity – it later saw much disharmony between the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.

In 2006, Kingwell was appointed to the Ministry of Defence as the military assistant to the Vice Chief of Defence and the Second Permanent Under Secretary. This enabled him to observe, at close quarters, the higher management of Defence and the competing priorities for resources (time, people and money). Here again he observed the friction between the navy and air force, particularly regarding fixed-wing aviation assets operating from the British aircraft carriers.

After nearly two years in this high-pressure role, Kingwell was appointed to command the assault ship HMS Albion in April 2009. Albion, and her sister ship, Bulwark, were key command and power projection platforms for the
Royal Navy, with the ability to put up to 600 Royal Marines ashore by landing craft or helicopter. His time in command was short as he was promoted to commodore in late 2010. His next role was as Commander United Kingdom Task Group – but with funding short, some ships and capabilities had to go. The aircraft carrier HMS *Ark Royal* was paid off, one of the assault ships was placed in reserve and four Bay-class landing ship docks were sold (which was good for the Royal Australian Navy who purchased RFA *Largs Bay* at a bargain basement price and renamed it HMAS *Choules* – still in service in 2023). Four Type 22 frigates also got the chop as there was now only one RN task group to protect!

With a strong a command background and experience in the higher levels of defence planning and capability, Kingwell prepared his task group for NATO exercises in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. In February 2011, however, the Arab Spring arrived. Preparations were then made to deploy to the Mediterranean for what would become Operation Cougar and finally, on 7 April, the Royal Navy task group (HMS *Ocean*, Landing Platform Helicopter, HMS *Albion*, Amphibious Transport Dock, and the frigate HMS *Sutherland*) sailed. They were to be supported by Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and the submarine HMS *Triumph* which had already been deployed to the region. Kingwell and his staff were embarked in *Ocean*. The bulk of the book then deals with the 170 days of the task group’s operations in the Mediterranean, where his aircraft conducted offensive operations against pro-Gaddafi forces. Much of this was undertaken by British Army Apache helicopters flying from HMS *Ocean*.

Kingwell describes clearly the planning requirements, battle rhythm, Go-No Go requirements to launch attacks and his own personal thoughts on his command of the task group. He recalls one young officer in the Go-No Go briefs waffling on about risks and issues and unable to make a decision. Kingwell reminded his team that he needed competent advice and not yes-men and if a staff officer said No-Go, it was Kingwell, on the basis of their advice, who would make the ultimate decision. The C2 structure involving NATO Headquarters and the United Kingdom Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood is well described, as are the many relationships fostered with senior officers in various NATO nations to get things done. This again proves you cannot surge trust and strong relationships between senior officers in allied nations need to be created and maintained to ensure better understanding and smoother operations. Equally important to Kingwell was keeping the men and women in his task group informed about the mission. He conducted regular visits to his ships and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels to keep them up to date on the operation and their part in it.

At one point in the operation, however, the bitterness of the removal of
fixed-wing aviation from the aircraft carriers reared its ugly head following a misconstrued comment by Kingwell during a media interview. RAF staff at Northward called for his immediate removal from command of the task group and a signal was sent to Kingwell directing him to return to the United Kingdom. Pragmatically Kingwell remained with his task group waiting for his replacement to arrive; but as none did, he continued on in command!

Kingwell’s narrative remains polite throughout the book and those who caused him angst are not identified by name. Those considered as capable personnel or mentors are readily identified and praised – perhaps a later version will be more candid. Additionally, the publication seems to have been rushed out as there are a number of spelling mistakes, incorrect usage of words, and overuse of acronyms without explanations – these are minor, but do detract from the overall high quality of the book’s content.

I highly recommend this book to all – especially operational planners and those naval officers seeking higher command. If you happen to be commanding a naval task group, either for training or operations, then this is a must read.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


Every war has its scholars and its protagonists. Sometimes, however, the best scholars of each battle are the people who lived, fought, and survived it. Their perspective is often one of the most valuable tools scholarship can have, especially when these authors delve into the nuts and bolts of their war experience, mixing military analysis and memoir. Commodore Kirtley’s book perfectly represents this tradition and provides an incredible new addition to the literature on naval operations during the Vietnam War.

Despite the relative brevity of his volume, Kirtley manages to exceed the brightest expectations with an intimate portrayal of a war that still looms over American hearts and minds. The book follows an intriguing pattern. Throughout the chapters, Kirtley reconstructs the evolution of the Vietnam War and intersects it with his progressive involvement in the conflict, from midshipman at the US Naval Academy to ensign, and finally, senior advisor to the Vietnamese forces with the brown water navy. Kirtley employs an intimate, at times ironic, and thoroughly genuine style to convey the intertwining themes of the war and his career. His writing is sometimes informal and confidential,
which is the product of his experience as a motivational speaker. Far from decreasing the importance of his contribution to the study of the Vietnam War, the swing between military jargon and relatable story-telling renders the book even more genuine and truthful to its premise as a memoir. Although Kirtley declares this book is a “personal assessment” (3), he retains an extraordinary and consistent degree of intellectual honesty, which makes the reader reflect on the consequences of the strategic choice of “Vietnamization” of the conflict. Likewise, his introspective analysis of his perception of that strategy and its effects on the American war effort and society adds a layer of realism to the historical account of how the United States intended to pull back from the quicksand of the Vietnam War slowly. In this respect, the last two chapters are crucial to understanding the full development of Kirtley’s position and the genesis of his oeuvre. Revolving around a pivotal career turnabout, Kirtley guides the reader through the highs and downs of his experience as a combatant first and then a veteran in a candid and sincere conversation that seems to be taking place around the friendly halo of a bonfire.

The context of the Vietnam War may trick the reader into thinking this is just a memoir of a dedicated officer during a difficult historical period. Yet, Kirtley’s perspective makes it possible to perceive the actuality of his writings. More than a year after the dramatic Afghanistan pullout, Kirtley’s experience rings as an unheard warning bell. He describes a situation of strategic confusion and on-field frustration that eventually drove the best efforts of people at every level turning into a burning defeat. In this respect, Kirtley’s voice is a reminder that veterans’ perspectives have the fundamental value of experienced insight. While critics of military analysis through memoir could easily dismiss Kirtley’s personal assessment as a lack of objectivity, his thorough description of how the war went down and the bitter aftertaste serve as a powerful reminder of an old truth in military operations. There is no substitute for experience, even in defeat.

Someone who wants to learn about the past in an entertaining and engaging manner, will find The US Naval Advisory Effort in Vietnam the right book. Should one want to learn not to repeat history in a cyclic continuation of strategic mistakes with no end in sight, then Kirtley is the ideal author, and his personal assessment should become the effective witness statement of a stale American approach to foreign irregular wars and upending counterinsurgency.

On a last note, I would like to recognize Kirtley’s touching tribute to his US Naval Academy fellows who never made it home. There could not have been a better conclusion to this intimate and honest portrayal of the first American taboo war.

Anna Matilde Bassoli
Lombardy, Italy
The Yamato and its sister ship, Musashi, were the largest battleships ever created and put to sea during wartime. Neither vessel, however, was employed for the purpose for which it had been designed: to engage and destroy the principally intended targets – American battleships. The two were built in secrecy by the Japanese in late 1937 and 1938 respectively, using sophisticated domestic naval construction. American naval experts repeatedly dismissed accurate information about the two ships that proved the Japanese had mastered innovative technologies. There was widespread assumption in the US Navy that Japanese workmanship was inferior to that of the United States. This was the result of racial and cultural prejudice combined with strict Japanese concealment that thwarted American naval intelligence leading up to the Second World War. In many ways, this makes Knowles’s book an international, maritime ghost story. The plans for Yamato were drafted in strictest secrecy and few photographs were taken of the completed vessel, either at anchor or underway. Upon sinking, Yamato’s remains lay hidden under 1,120 feet (340 metres) of water until 1985, when her broken hull with its Imperial chrysanthemum bow ornament was discovered. After the war, her blueprints and pictorial documents were destroyed by the defeated Japanese government.

Yamato was known as battleship number one and the model of the Yamato-class. Its keel was laid at the Kure Naval Arsenal on 4 November 1937, and her commissioning occurred on 16 December 1941, just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Asian empire had won a decisive naval victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905 by applying the tenets put forth in Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. Thayer argued that naval dominance was achieved through the employment of a fleet of powerful battleships. The last great battleship clash among these powerful vessels was the 1916 Battle of Jutland near the end of the First World War. The Japanese hierarchy was content to use the old but successful naval engagement playbook.

The rise of airpower over heavily armoured battleships was in the development stage shortly after that conflict. United States Senator William Borah proposed an international conference at which major naval powers might agree to cut their fleets and save much of their national treasures. Delegations from Japan, Great Britain, British commonwealth nations, Italy, Germany, and France assembled in Washington, D.C., to discuss a possible reduction of
a naval arms race, the first such disarmament conference in history. Various formulas were debated, and, in time, one was agreed to. This lasted for more than a decade before reinterpretation of the treaty’s rules was overtaken by perceived political needs, gaining military advantage if another war ensued.

Japan saw the United States as an imminent threat in the Pacific that sought to dominate the region and control its natural resources. The Japanese reasoned that if they built huge battleships, too large to fit through the Panama Canal, the Americans were unlikely to match them in size because their east coast shipyards were the main battle-shipwrights. Deploying them it would necessitate sailing around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, plus creating a resupply logistical nightmare. Also, the *Yamato* class vessels were to be equipped with superior armour and possess greater fire power than the United States could reasonably muster. It was believed that this would enable the Imperial Japanese government to dominate the western Pacific. They gambled that, although the United States was far more industrialized and had greater access to more natural resources, they were strategically vulnerable because they were heavily engaged in an Atlantic War front.

The 71,659-ton *Yamato* and *Musashi* were 862 feet 10 inches in length overall with “pagoda” masted towers. Their beams were 127 feet, 7 inches and each drew about 36 feet when loaded. Their range was 8,300 miles cruising at 26 knots, but with a top speed of 27 knots. Yamato was manned by 2,767 officers and men. Both battleships were fitted with two catapults located on the stern and could accommodate up to seven aircraft. Their most formidable arms were nine 18.1-inch guns covered with 26-inch armour casement that fired 3,200lb (1452kg) 6-foot-long, armour-piercing shells with a range of up to 27 miles. They also used Sanshikidan shells that, when detonated, release an incendiary 20-degree cone designed to thwart incoming aircraft. Each firing required spotter seaplanes down range to report back to the fire direction centre to adjust their elevation and aim-bearing. The flight time to impact a target fired at 45⁰ took just under 100 seconds. Each was also equipped with 6.1-inch guns, 5-inch guns and 40 mm Vickers “pom” anti-aircraft weapons. For comparison American battleships fired 16-inch guns that weighed between 1,100 to 2,700-lbs with a maximum range of approximately 22 miles. Therefore, there was a five-mile range difference, but speed of aim adjustment, accuracy and rate of salvo delivery were arguably the most important factors in a sea battle.

Each battleship met its end about six months apart. *Musashi* was sunk on 24 October 1944 in the battle of Leyte Gulf. *Yamato* met her demise during Operation Ten-Go after being struck by two torpedo hits and many aircraft bombs on 7 April 1945. Both vessels were destroyed valiantly in battle, but not due to a slug fest of big guns fired from huge ships. Their demise was a quasi-metaphor for the emergence of the new age of naval warfare. “The imperatives
of the war brought a technical efficiency and capability to naval air power that rapidly eclipsed the awesome, traditional power of the battleship. The aircraft carrier had emerged as the new capital ship. Nevertheless, as a visual manifestation of sheer power, the battleship had an aura of omnipotence which the carrier could never quite match” (136).

Yamato is a slim book with an abundance of excellent illustrations. Knowles provides an assortment of technical information about the ship assembled in a coherent way and background data to place the Pacific conflict in its historical perspective. The author vividly narrates the battles of Leyte Gulf and Ten-Go mostly from the Japanese standpoint, but also integrating it with the American counter-narrative or viewpoint. This is different from the classic Samuel Eliot Morrison Pacific Theatre Second World War book and the more recent and similarly compelling trilogy by Ian Toll. A major problem is the use of only one confusing map to illustrate the locations of the warship manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres in the naval battles among the participants. Still, Daniel Knowles’s book is a valuable addition to the library of maritime historians, especially those interested in the design, building, and demise of the largest and most powerful battleship(s) to ever put to sea.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Air warfare in the Pacific in the Second World War is often thought of as US Navy (USN) aircraft taking off from aircraft carriers to do battle with Japanese aircraft, both land- and carrier- based. Less well-known are the accomplishments of the US Army Air Force (USAAF) in the Pacific—particularly in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. In B-25 Mitchell vs. Japanese Destroyer: Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Mark Lardas relates one critical engagement between the USAAF (and aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force) and destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).

The battle of the Bismarck Sea was a series of encounters between Allied aircraft and Japanese destroyers and convoy ships. In a three-day battle, USAAF B-25 Mitchell medium bombers, RAAF Beaufort torpedo bombers, and RAAF Beaufighter fighter bombers engaged and sank 75 percent of the destroyers and transports. The key to the successful outcome of the battle was the USAAF’s adoption of skip bombing and mast-top bombing. Early in
the Second World War, it was thought that a bomber at higher altitude could sink an enemy ship; experience showed that success using that approach was doubtful at best. The USAAF developed skip-bombing—flying a bomber at low-level, releasing its bombs which would then skip over the water into or near an enemy ship (a similar technique to skipping a flat stone over a pond or lake). Mast-top bombing involved a bomber flying just overhead of an enemy ship and dropping bombs on it. Both skip-bombing and mast-top bombing proved very effective tactics.

The B-25 Mitchell was a medium bomber—a class of aircraft that was meant to attack targets such as railroad yards, enemy emplacements, and the like. The medium bomber was speedy, fairly lightly armed, and carried a payload of 3000 pounds. Experience showed that the Mitchell’s defensive armament was inadequate for strafing. Accordingly, the USAAF in the Southwest Pacific modified B-25s (and another medium bomber, the A-20) with up to eight added .50 caliber machine guns in the aircraft’s nose and sides. Future versions of the B-25 carried a 75 mm cannon in the nose, as well as the eight machine guns. The result was an effective anti-ship armament that could clear the decks of most enemy ships and their anti-aircraft gun crews.

The B-25’s adversary in the Bismarck Sea battle was the Japanese destroyer. The IJN put priority on its destroyer fleet—with heavy main guns and torpedo tubes. Japan had three classes of destroyers in the Bismarck Sea battle, but all had similar characteristics in size, speed, and weaponry. Due to their heavy armament, IJN destroyers were effective in battles in the Solomons (especially in night actions against the USN). But the destroyers had a fatal flaw; the IJN’s emphasis on offensive armament in destroyers meant that anti-aircraft weaponry was neglected, both in hitting power and gun crew protection. Both types of IJN anti-aircraft guns—a 13 mm machine gun and a 25 mm cannon—were too light in hitting power to bring down enemy aircraft. IJN destroyers also lacked central fire control, so anti-aircraft fire was not concentrated. Further, skip-bombing and mast-top bombing proved almost impossible for the IJN to counter—the bombs struck the ships before the destroyer could manoeuvre, while the machine guns in the nose of the B-25s suppressed anti-aircraft fire.

In late February/early March 1943, the Imperial Japanese Army needed to transport troops and supplies to the Japanese base at Rabaul. Eight IJN destroyers escorted eight IJN transports, all loaded with troops and supplies. On 1 March, USAAF aircraft spotted the convoy. B-17 and B-24 bombers attacked the convoy but only sank one transport. On 3 March 1943, the USAAF and RAAF attacked the remaining ships in the convoy. By the time the battle ended that night, four of the IJN destroyers and all seven remaining transports had been sunk or put out of action. The following day, USN PT Boats sank
the on-fire hulk of one transport. On 5 March, the PT Boats and USAAF and RAAF aircraft shot at and strafed Japanese soldiers and sailors still afloat – an activity that continued for two more days.

This book is part of Osprey Publishing’s *Duel* series, and it follows the series format. The narrative starts with an introduction, followed by a chronology of the Bismarck Sea battle, analysis of the design and development of the B-25 and IJN destroyers; technical specifications for the B-25 and the IJN destroyers, the strategic situation pertinent to the Bismarck Sea battle, analysis of the combatants (the USAAF aircrew were well-trained while the IJN ships’ crews were made up of conscripts and not well-trained in their duties), the battle itself, statistics and analysis, and the aftermath of the battle. The book contains many germane photographs, a map, excellent drawings of the B-25 nose armament, and the bombs used. Lardas writes well and the narrative flows.

This is a good book for those studying the Pacific War. This reviewer has one comment – Lardas describes the B-25 Mitchell as “a run-of-the-mill medium bomber with an unimpressive record” (78). While the USAAF modifications turned the Mitchell into a superior weapon of war, American, British/Commonwealth, and Soviet aircrew, who had flown the Mitchell prior to the Bismarck Sea battle, might disagree with Lardas’ judgment. Still, students of the Pacific War will enjoy this volume.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


In exploring the design, construction, and role of the Fubuki-class destroyers, authors Lengere and Ahlberg provide a solid and comprehensible technical analysis of an important class of destroyers within the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Second World War. This class of destroyers was once considered to be the most powerful in the world and the first “modern” destroyers. Japan originally built 24 of the Fubuki-class and all but one fought in the Pacific War. The authors systematically take apart these destroyers discussing a myriad of aspects that can be applied to the design of any number of warships.

The book opens with a discussion of the design requirements and considerations that went into a warship that had to meet the unique needs of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1920s. They then explore the construction,
general design, protection, machinery, armament, and complement of these warships and their role within the navy by means of technical specifications and photos of each variant of the class discussed. For those looking for a technical reference this provides an excellent entry point, illustrating how these ships were built without getting thoroughly absorbed in the construction and function of each individual system. Those already familiar with the engineering and construction principles involved in warship design will remain interested, while newcomers will find the detailed presentation a useful and comfortable introduction.

What is not included in this work is a detailed examination of the various ships’ career histories, especially the battles they participated in during the Second World War. There is a brief description of each ship, along with its construction timeline, but the summary of each ship and its wartime role constitutes a brief paragraph at best. Though thin on operational details, the descriptions do encourage curious readers to research individual battles and engagements, and examine the contribution that these ships made to Japan’s role in the Second World War and when and how each ship was either lost or disposed of at the end of the war. Each ship is extensively photographed, offering readers an opportunity to appreciate the final product visually.

Students of warship design will find a great deal of useful information here, even though there is not much new or novel research involved for those of a more academic interest. While endnotes are provided for each chapter, there is neither an index or a bibliography. Although endnotes do reference additional reading, that information might better have been consolidated into a selected bibliography. In fact, the notes themselves need more clarification to make them useful academic resources. As a technical analysis, however, the work fulfills its role in describing the technical design and construction of Fubuki-class destroyers. Certainly, students unfamiliar with warship design, and particularly Japanese warships, will find this book a valuable introduction and explanation of the subject.

Michael Razer
Ward, Arkansas

“Satterday about 2. a clock in the after noone I took water at Billingsgate ... [there was] a great Quantity of Ice in the River in so much that our boate stuck....” Thus begins the sea journal of John Looker, a man in his twenties, who served as surgeon on the second voyage of the recently-built *Blackham Galley* from London to the Levant. This would last fifteen months from that cold December day in 1696, spanning two of the worst winters of the Little Ice Age. Looker’s is the first English account of a later-seventeenth-century sea voyage in the form of a daily diary to be published. It is unvarnished, raw as he wrote it, and is a unique account of life aboard in the early modern Mediterranean. Heywood (Smith’s role in the enterprise was belated) – who has written prolifically about the English in the Ottoman Mediterranean and is the foremost scholar of the Constantinople embassy of Lord Paget during whose tenure the *Blackham Galley* sailed east – has meticulously deciphered its content and commented on it in forensic detail.

The *Blackham Galley* was a three-masted merchantman of 250 tons burthen, a typical ship for the Levant trade at the time. It had been built at Deptford in 1694, carried 26 guns, and a crew of 60. Whereas those sections of the journal written at sea are, for the most part, a record of the frequently foul weather conditions: the various occasions when the *Blackham* made landfall saw Looker penning what the editors describe as “startling, visceral accounts” of his own experiences, of those of his crew, and of the local people he came across. On the outward voyage to Istanbul, the *Blackham* called in at, inter alia, Messina and Smyrna (today, İzmir). On the return journey, the vessel was held by the Ottoman authorities at Smyrna for over eight months, and once headed home, docked at Messina, Malaga, and Cadiz. The *Blackham* was at sea for 129 out of 440 days and, although a “sea journal,” Looker’s account of his months away also falls within the significant body of literature on early modern travel in the Levant.

The *Blackham Galley*’s voyage to Istanbul was undertaken in the heat of the Nine Years’ War. The Ottomans were aligned with France, and although the vessels used by French and other, predominantly North African, corsairs were an annoyance, they were too small to cause much anxiety. The ship’s detention on the homeward voyage arose from the *Blackham*’s captain’s decision to fire at a French-flagged vessel out of Alexandria, and with some Ottoman soldiers and a high-ranking official aboard, then run it aground. The vessel was captured and towed into Tenedos (today, Bozcaada), from where the official was allowed to continue by sea to Istanbul with his goods – the rest of the cargo (coffee, rice, cloth, hemp, and wool) being the *Blackham*’s prize. The captured goods were certified by the commander of Tenedos fortress as a “Lawfull Prize,” the captured vessel was sold back to its captain (88), and the *Blackham* sailed on to Smyrna.
The seizure of the French-flagged vessel had ramifications, however, and the French had the upper hand in the ensuing diplomatic spat. Their consul in Smyrna demanded the return of the goods that had been aboard as well as compensation, and the *Blackham Galley* was forbidden to leave port. Looker records the ins and outs of the dispute, along with the day-by-day happenings during the months of immobility. Immobile but not dull: ships of various nations came and went, bringing news from far and wide; plague spread in the city; those on board were struck by illness and death – being Looker’s professional concern, these misfortunes are related in intimate detail. When on shore leave, the *Blackham*’s crew got drunk and disorderly, and eventually mutinied owing to unpaid wages. A Dutch sailor was eaten by a “shirke.” The idle ship required maintenance and, eventually, preparation for its long-delayed departure. This included the lading of a variety of cargo, including boxwood, cotton, silk, galls, sponges and gum arabic, that Heywood has helpfully tabulated, as well as supplies for the return voyage, among which were fruit, wine and fowl.

News of the progress of the European war in which the Ottomans were embroiled was of over-riding interest to the *Blackham Galley*’s men. More than once it seemed that the ship might be released to return home, but this hope was quashed when it became clear that only the sultan or grand vizier, both of whom were on campaign, could grant leave to depart. At one point, news came that clearance would not be given until Ambassador Paget had “an answear from his Majesties of Great Britain.” It must have seemed to Looker that he would never see his native soil again. The Ottoman defeat at Zenta and the death of the grand vizier, however, brought about a regime change at the Porte at the same time that the Peace of Ryswick concluded the Nine Years’ War in autumn 1697, and the sultan and a new Anglophile grand vizier returned to court. French influence at the Porte was (for a time) at an end, and the *Blackham Galley* was finally granted clearance to depart.

Looker’s description of his long months in Smyrna gives us close insight into the life of a port-bound ship and its crew in this flourishing centre of international trade. Unlike his day-by-day account of the *Blackham*’s detention in Smyrna, his time in Istanbul during the holy month of Ramadan is written as a single block of text. Looker describes Istanbul’s mosques, the city, sultanic governance, and Lord Paget’s visit to the *Blackham*, which was followed the day after by the arrest of an Englishman on another ship, who was accused of conspiring to murder King William and was clapped in irons for a week before the case was resolved in his favour.

Looker’s journal is supplemented in this volume by documents drawn from UK archives that add further detail and colour to events culminating in the detention of the *Blackham Galley* by the Ottoman authorities. Both Paget and the Levant Company bigwigs who financed the voyage, and who
included Sir Richard Blackham, the eponymous “chiefe owner” of the ship, were disquieted by its captain’s actions – the ambassador reminding the latter that he had little power to influence Ottoman decision-making in the matter. Meanwhile, the Levant Company feared for the future of their lucrative trade with the empire as regulated by the so-called Capitulations, in which the Porte was the superior partner. The appendix also contains wills drawn up by members of the Blackham’s crew who died during the voyage, two at Smyrna, one at Malaga, and a fourth who drowned in the Thames within sight of home. One of the four left a small bequest to Looker, who attended him during his last days.

The historian’s job is never done – as Heywood observes, much valuable material of similar character still awaits discovery. Looker’s journal was thought to be anonymous when it first came to his attention, and its somewhat impenetrable content remained to be revealed to the reader unversed in the arcane language of the time. Heywood’s commentary and notes range widely and greatly enhance the value of the work under review, that would otherwise leave most readers baffled. Colour images of the journal and of contemporary scenes complete this fine volume.

Caroline Finkel
London, England and Istanbul, Turkey


This is the story of Great Britain and Russia’s naval co-operation in the heyday of their shared period of greatest imperial expansion in the eighteenth century. The ebb and flow of the alliance is traced from the reign of Peter the Great through to the Crimean War. The major themes are the interplay of trade and diplomacy and resulting naval warfare in the waters of the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas. The study focuses on the two-way trade: from Russia, of the naval stores required to support mercantilism and the largest merchant marine in the world and the navy needed to protect it, and from Britain, the flow of technical information and trained people needed to build a navy capable of facilitating Russian expansion in European waters and simultaneously, into the Pacific via Siberia.

The preface gives the scale of the trade: “Throughout much of the eighteenth century the quantity of trade transmitted between Britain and Russia
was so immense that it totally eclipsed all trade and commerce conducted with any competitor, with Britain, during the 1730s, gaining from Russia the status of ‘most favoured nation’”. (xiii) The political story focuses on individual Russian tsars, emperors and empresses, and their contacts among the British politicians, aristocrats, merchants, and naval officers who made up the trade. It also includes the working out of the alliance in the form of longstanding co-operation at the strategic and tactical level at sea to keep the trade of naval stores flowing, whatever the state of the formal alliance. Cooperation culminated in joint operations and virtual interoperability of Russian and British fleets during the Napoleonic wars.

Densely-packed information on the economics of the trade and associated tariffs alternates with diplomacy and warfare. The most detailed information is presented in the form of tables showing the yearly totals of commodities flowing into Britain from Russia and other northern nations, especially hemp, flax, pitch, bar iron and lumber. Of special interest were the trees (‘sticks’) that become small, medium, and, most especially, the largest masts for naval and mercantile ships. Over the period, the military and resulting political situation in northern Europe was a factor that swung in favour of Russia at the expense of Sweden, especially as it conquered more and more of the east coast of the Baltic Sea, whereby Russia added to the land base with its forests and farms, and developed ports, like St. Petersburg, Reval and Kronstadt to facilitate the naval stores trade and the expeditions needed to expand territory.

The author succeeds in putting the reader into the political dynamics of the period with Europe as a patchwork of contending states relating to the two main actors. Trade is shown as symbiotic in a number of respects. For Britain, the “naval stores” imported were used to enable the huge navy to protect a burgeoning mercantile fleet, which in turn generated the wealth needed to finance the navy. For Russia, the currency brought in by a lopsided balance of trade was instrumental in financing the wars of expansion, specifically importing the technology and people needed to build and fight the ships. The trade ends with Canada supplanting Russia as a source for trees suitable for masts by 1812 and with the two main actors in contact increasingly as adversaries up to the outbreak into open hostility in the Crimean War.

Because most statistics and the bulk of information available to the author are British, the trade of naval stores into Britain is much more complete than information on the returning trade in information and expertise in naval technology from Britain to Russia. That return trade is much less well-defined because it was often clandestine, being at times, either not sanctioned or in opposition to official foreign policy. This makes for an incomplete documentary record based on correspondence and second-hand reports. The author traces the special place of Jacobites in Russian history and of Scottish officers in
the Russian navy, like John Paul Jones, who was contemporary with Samuel Bentham, fighting in the same naval campaign and in particular, the friction involved between them created by having them in the same command. Use of existing Bentham family papers could have expanded the author’s discussions of naval science being used to develop ordnance and explosives. More could have been made of other Bentham family members such as brother Jeremy’s larger role as inventor and contractor. Trained as an officer and shipwright, he was a conduit for new technology with the know-how and muscle to execute.

Some of the best features of the book are detailed descriptions of the systems for purchasing, importing, and manufacturing the raw material of naval stores into finished products. The processes of turning logs into masts; hemp into cables, hawsers, warps, and cordage; flax into sails; pitch and tar into preservatives; and iron into anchors, structural members and fittings, are described down to the level of the individual vessel. The constant need to regularly replace rigging and all the other parts due to deterioration is described, as well as the requirements for fitting out newly-constructed ships.

This book succeeds in throwing light onto a little-known chapter in the history of both countries and provides insights into the functioning of a pre-industrial arboreal economy of resource-extraction in contact with an advanced industrial and mercantile nation and its empire founded upon use of the sea. It provides an important illustration of how naval power can project military power on land in littoral warfare.

Although recommended, the book has a few shortcomings. It is produced on acid-free paper but in a small typeface. Notes are even smaller. Black and white, low resolution photographs are dark, and some are only marginally connected to the story. Photo credits are fragmentary or missing. The bibliography contains minimal information, which will make checking sources more difficult than a fuller, more conventional format. “Newspapers and periodicals” consist of the title alone. “Printed Sources” are contemporary books, journals, and pamphlets and “Secondary Works”, modern works. Also “electronic sources” are a separate minor subdivision, when, in fact, virtually all recent titles would have an electronic version. Particularly curious among these “electronic works” is the presence of Jeremy Bentham’s Works, published in 1838-43 and edited by John Bowring. These have been re-edited, augmented and republished in all forms (including electronic) by University College of London Press up to 2019. Despite a sense that the book is expanded from a thesis on eighteenth-century maritime economics, it might have benefited from a few more modern references to the trade in technology; for example, in 1947, when copies of Roll-Royce jet engines exported to the Soviet Union showed up in the MiG15 in Korea.
Nevertheless, this book should be in any academic collection of naval and Russian history and read by anyone studying European history, politics, and diplomacy.

Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


A Vietnam War veteran himself, Edward Marolda has produced an excellent analysis of the US Navy during that war, as seen through the lens of the five Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNO) who led the navy from 1958 to 1978, and thus, encompassing the entire period of the conflict from its most early days to the very bitter end.

Admiral’s Harry Felt, Ulysses Sharp, Thomas Moorer, Elmo Zumwalt and James Holloway each undertook four year terms as the CNO. Their service also corresponded closely with the terms of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter. The naval-political relationship was often very difficult – hence the title of the book.

Marolda’s in-depth analysis of the US Navy’s roles and tasks during the war stretches chronologically from the grand strategic to the tactical and provides a candid view of each admiral’s strengths and weaknesses. Felt and Sharp appear too stuck in a Second World War/Korean War view of the world and the way the war should be fought. Moorer was more realistic, seeing Vietnam as a side show, with the real threat being the rise of Soviet naval power, but he was also focused on becoming the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Zumwalt also saw the growth of the Russian Navy as more important than Vietnam and sought to improve ship numbers and capability. This was a difficult task with funding shortages meaning many elderly vessels were retained and shipbuilding reduced.

Zumwalt also undertook several reforms to improve discipline, in the face of increased drug usage in the US Navy, as well improving morale and retention of junior personnel – particularly among minority personnel, such as African-Americans, Hispanics and women. His Z-Grams to the fleet became famous (and in some cases, infamous) and alienated him from many within the Navy’s leadership. In 1974 Holloway inherited a navy struggling for numbers of effective ships and personnel; but he saw the method in some of Zumwalt’s perceived madness and modified the reforms, which later saw increased
personnel retention and more officers among the Navy’s minorities.

Unlike the Second World War, where the operational and tactical commanders were generally ‘left alone’ to get on with the fight, the Vietnam War saw what is now often termed “the 10,000 mile screwdriver” where politicians and senior officers played an active role in the tactical activity. The political selection of targets and imposing restrictions on what targets could be bombed in North Vietnam is an example of this – but this was a necessary evil. Both the USSR and Communist China were providing direct military support to the North Vietnamese Government and there was a valid concern that the localized war could expand. At one point, China had deployed over 23,000 troops into North Vietnam to conduct logistics tasks and operate anti-aircraft systems/weapons. Successive US administrations strove to keep the war contained. This, of course, created friction with the various US naval and military commanders who struggled to fight the war with ‘one arm tied behind their back’.

The political influences are quite Machiavellian with Sharp literally side-lined by Johnson, and Zumwalt similarly side-lined by President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Equally Nixon and Kissinger treated Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird with contempt! Moorer, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1970-74 (after his time as CNO) also often kept the service chiefs in the dark until after decisions had been made at the highest level. Holloway is seen as the “white knight to the rescue” in 1974 and Felt is basically forgotten; even though he opposed becoming embroiled in a land war in Asia. Also behind the scenes lurked Admiral Hyman Rickover, as director of the US Naval Reactors Office, who sought to increase the number of nuclear submarines, vice surface ships especially aircraft carriers, until he was forcibly retired in 1981.

The analysis of the various operations in Vietnam and Cambodia are excellent and detail the various strengths and weakness of the US Navy involvement. I will not comment on whether the war was a waste of lives and resources and will leave that up to the reader. Personally I would have liked to have seen some more description, and analysis, of the role of naval gunfire support (including integration of the Australian destroyers into this role) and the part played by the logistics support ships operating in the theatre; based out of Subic Bay. A list of abbreviations would also have also assisted; but these are very minor comments on what is an excellent book regarding the US Navy in the Vietnam War. Very Highly Recommended.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia
Knowledge of their surroundings has always been important for seafarers, be it the weather, the state of the sea, sailing tracks or destinations. In fact, even without help, most sailors are able to predict the weather for the next twenty-four hours. Information on sea lanes, ports, depths and prevailing winds, for example, are less variable and more valuable to compile for future voyages. Once Sweden had taken control of the Baltic in 1658, it was considered an inner sea, from Atlantic Norway to Finland’s Bothnian Bay. Sweden decided that the existing knowledge of the coast, rivers, and ports, till then only known by pilots and fishermen, was to be gathered and made available for the Admiralty and its officers. Naval officer Johan Månsson had been working for the Swedish Admiralty in Stockholm, rising through the lower ranks from 1632 until in 1643, he was ordered to collect information on the shipping routes and coasts of the Balticum, and to share his information on ports, landmarks, river mouths, water depths, etc. He was given command of the pinnace Phoenix and in August 1643, he set sail for present-day Germany and the south coast of Sweden. In 1644, in Stockholm, Månsson published his Seebuch, with all the hallmarks of a nautical almanac. The collected information was not only for merchant shipping purposes, but the Swedish Navy also greatly benefitted from Månsson’s work. Between 1664 and 1786, the Ostsee Seebuch was published in 23 issues in four languages; Swedish, German, Russian and Danish. The foreign-language books and charts of the Baltic at that time were not flawless, however, since the use of different languages could easily lead to errors in the nautical publications. The necessity for clear guidance and direction was obvious. The 121-page book is a facsimile reprint in German of the 1759 Seebuchs der ganzen Ostsee by Johan Månsson, including texts on religion and their rituals at sea. The authors, Boye Meyer-Friese and Albrecht Sauer, show the interconnection between the natural circumstances of the Baltic and the mariners that contributed to maritime culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands
While the title of Nagle’s biography of Eber Brock Ward emphasizes his role in the mid-nineteenth century iron industry, in a review for a journal focused on maritime history the focus here will be on Ward’s role in shipping on the Great Lakes, a role that dominates two chapters, and is in the background in others.

In broad strokes, Eber Brock Ward (or E.B. as Nagle and some contemporaries called him, to distinguish him from the father, son and cousin who shared his first name), was raised in “modest” circumstances, but at 21 was taken into his uncle’s thriving shipping business, becoming the principal heir of what was reaching towards a million dollar business. From this foundation, E.B. invested in some of the earliest iron making businesses in the Great Lakes region, along with acquiring railroad, mining and lumber properties. A late venture into glass-making rounded out his portfolio. The connections between the resource extraction, transportation and industrial production leads Nagle on more than one occasion to argue that Ward should be considered among the pioneers of vertical integration in the United States. Ward, he claims, had his “finger firmly on the pulse” of the range of businesses which he controlled by the early 1870s. A businessman first and always, Ward had supported the Whigs early (he had commanded his uncle Samuel’s schooner General Harrison, named for the prominent Whig who was briefly president of the US) and by the 1850s was a committed Republican. Among his closest friends politically was Republican Senator, B. F. Wade (the namesake of a Ward steamboat). When Senator Wade was in line to succeed President Andrew Johnson had he been impeached, Ward was rumoured to be a candidate for Secretary of the Treasury (148). Among the things that united the two men was their unwavering opposition to slavery, which included orders to Ward’s captains to assist escaping slaves across the border to Canada.

While E. B. Ward is quoted as reviling Washington as the “seat of corruption” (82), he certainly spent time there as president of the American Iron and Steel Association during and in the years immediately following the American Civil War. Other lobbying included a successful effort to prevent legislation requiring twelve or more additional lifeboats to be carried by larger passenger vessels, like his Atlantic, running in co-operation with the Michigan Central Rail Road.

The loss of the Atlantic provides some valuable insights into how Ward conducted business in the years following his uncle’s death. While Nagle
supplies a narrative focused on the newspaper reporting of the incident, the case law reports make interesting on their own. The initial trial between Ward and the owners of the *Ogdensburgh* placed all the blame and liability on Ward’s vessel. He fought that decision all the way to the US Supreme Court, to ensure that liability was divided evenly. Given the disparity in the value of the two vessels, the owners of the much less valuable *Ogdensburgh* were then required to pay Ward over $40,000 for the loss of the *Atlantic*. Efforts to collect this brought Ward back to the US Supreme Court two more times to extract the maximum recompense from his soon bankrupted rivals. Cross Ward and suffer the consequences.

Of this character trait Nagle does, however, provide other instances. One is inclined to suspect that Ward had fewer friends than simply people with whom he had not yet quarreled. Certainly, he would not have numbered James Ludington among them. Negotiations having stalled over a mill site near Pere Marquette (now named for James Ludington), Ward had Ludington thrown in a Detroit jail charged with stealing Ward’s timber and trespassing on lands controlled by the Flint & Pere Marquette Railway (of which Ward was president). Shortly after his release from jail, Ludington signed over what Ward wanted and then disposed of his lumbering operations to other parties (178). There are a number of references to Ward as a Robber Baron in the volume. The label is a good fit.

There are a wide range of references to Ward’s extended family, although the volume desperately needs one or more family trees to keep them all straight. The most useful connections came via his Uncle Samuel Ward’s wife, Elizabeth. Her nephews included William Gallagher and Jacob Wolverton, who ran the shipyard where most of the steamboats were built (74). His brothers-in-law, B. F. Owen and Stephen Clement, served as captains, and the latter with some of Ward’s ventures in the iron and steel industry. Beyond these few, Ward seems to have despised most of his and the next generation of his family. In some instances their sanity (or at least their mental competence) is questioned; in others it is their intemperance. Most were cut out of the major share of his uncle Samuel Ward’s will. At best most of them got an allowance from E.B. Ward’s estate.

Nagle questions why Ward is not well remembered as an industrialist and then provides the answer. Ward’s investments were in individual, albeit complementary, enterprises and his will largely required those investments to be liquidated. Whatever vertical integration there was quickly disintegrated. His timber holdings were passed intact and free of debt to his young, second wife, whose brothers made another fortune buying up Ward’s debts at a discount. A few years later, she married a Canadian and moved to Toronto. While the last chapter is “A will and a princess,” the less scandalous of Ward’s
descendants are quickly pushed from the stage by the “dollar princess,” her Hungarian lover and some risqué photographs. Any discussion of the Ward legacy moved from the business pages to the gossip columns.

As with most volumes which demand this much original research (the footnotes run 61 pages), the author is occasionally let down by his sources. The source that claimed Ward was born in “New Hamborough” near Toronto (6) probably was unaware that New Hamburg is closer to half way between Toronto and Detroit. The steamboat London is noted among the vessels built and operated by Samuel and EB Ward in the mid-1840s (75). It was not. London was built in Upper Canada, but seized by US Customs agents in Detroit on grounds subsequently protested by the Canadian government and then quickly sold to Ward. Canada, which appears a couple of pages later, was seized on equally specious grounds and as quickly acquired by Ward.

Nagle’s volume depends on a dispersed collection of Ward papers, along with a wide range of primary printed sources to bring this narrative together. If there is more to be said, especially regarding Samuel Ward’s efforts to actually create the fortune to which E. B. contributed and succeeded, this remains a foundational work on one of the key figures in the history of nineteenth-century business in the Great Lakes region. Eber Brock Ward may be the Forgotten Iron King, but in the history of Great Lakes shipping his name certainly had not been forgotten, and will be even more prominent in the studies that build on Nagle’s work.

Walter Lewis
Grafton, Ontario


A niche field of study in the Second World War’s broader maritime struggle is that of the coastal forces that contested the narrow waters of the English Channel and the southern half of the North Sea. That there was a struggle is perhaps known, but the details are vague, particularly after the Dunkirk evacuation in May-June 1940, with attention of most tending to the U-boat war in the broad Atlantic, or to more momentous strategic questions dominating the counsels of the Admiralty and its political masters. There is no doubt, however, that denying the free passage of the Channel to enemy coastal convoys, dominating that crucial waterway, and defending similar British convoys was of crucial
importance, notwithstanding the limited profile of this arena of the maritime war. Captain Chris O’Flaherty’s account of the distinguished small boat career of Commander ‘Jake’ Wright, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), is overdue, given Wright’s outstanding war record—no fewer than three DSCs and a Mentioned in Despatches citation.

This account of Cdr Wright’s naval life was occasioned by the 2019 initiative of the National Museum of the Royal Navy to commemorate the contribution of the coastal forces during the Second World War at a new Coastal Forces Museum at Gosport. During the work involved in creating the Museum, it was noted that the original commanding officer of the restored Motor Torpedo Boat 331 was Commander Wright (a lieutenant at the time), who was one of the most decorated officers in the coastal forces. Hence, O’Flaherty took on the task of writing this engaging biography.

Wright was a typical RNVR officer who was called up on the outbreak of war in 1939. His civilian background was in the tea trade—the family business—involving brokerage work as well as living in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) at a tea plantation. Wright had joined the RNVR in the mid-1930s, acquired the nickname Jake, and been accepted as an officer on the outbreak of war. Given his private, small boat experience and knowledge of the French littoral, “Jake” found himself serving in the coastal forces by the summer of 1940. The interwar years had not left the RN in particularly good shape for conducting a second global maritime war with the coastal forces being no exception. Wright’s early days were, therefore, ones of preparation, re-equipping and more pedestrian operations involving training, convoy protection, mining expeditions and patrols. He did well and was appointed to his first command, MTB 331, in October 1941. Thereafter, the narrative proceeds to detail his ‘Boys Own’ adventures as Wright commanded a series of MTBs against German shipping. It is an account of irregular maritime warfare that is a compelling, and hitherto little told, story and a tribute to a relatively small component of the RN during the Second World War.

O’Flaherty’s narrative covers in appropriate detail the various operations with which Wright was engaged, including his role at more senior ranks towards the end of the war. There are also a pair of chapters on Wright’s post-war life. He, like so many of his contemporaries, was a ‘hostilities only’ officer in the RN and was speedily demobilised at the conclusion of the war, along with most of the MTB force. Throughout the account, the author regularly refers to tea shipments and U-boat successes against those shipments, as well as Wright’s pre-war and post-war career in the business. The one caveat is that these connections are strained in that Wright had little to do, or war experience, with either the shipments themselves or with protecting merchant shipping against the U-boats. The rounding out of Wright’s biography with these details
is useful in terms of the pre- and post-war chapters of his life, but the insertion of these unrelated elements in the main narrative of his naval life is less so. That aside, this is an engaging and most interesting book about an aspect of naval warfare that is not well addressed in standard accounts. It is evident that Wright himself was a prominent figure within the RN’s coastal forces, who has been virtually invisible in the years since the war. This omission has been suitably rectified by O’Flaherty, and now his story is available to contemporary audiences. This book will be of value to any who study coastal forces as well as those interested in naval biographies.

While the author does acknowledge the book’s lack of academic citation apparatus, there is some limited footnoting and a comprehensive bibliography that will be of value to researchers. Unfortunately, there is no index. The account is peppered with suitable diagrams of the more significant actions with which Wright was involved, as well as family photographs and images from the Coastal Forces archive.

Anyone who may be interested in exploring further the RN Coastal Forces Museum in Gosport is encouraged to check their website. (The Coastal Forces Heritage Trust (coastal-forces.org.uk)

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Technology and its resulting innovations have played an ever-increasingly important role in modern naval warfare but, strangely, we still seem to lack a comprehensive evaluation of the process of innovation itself. While neither of the authors are well-known military scientists, they are accomplished naval historians. Of the two, Vincent O’Hara, author of several historical studies, is perhaps the best known. His co-author, Leonard Heinz, who has written articles on naval history, is a noted naval war game developer. The publisher, the US Naval Institute Press, is a reputable publisher that has never shied away from printing titles that challenge our understanding of naval and military history.

This limited study attempts to elucidate the process of innovation by examining the evolution of six carefully chosen aspects of naval warfare. To do so, it focusses on selected technological innovations from three major conflicts
between 1905 and 1945. Two of the three conflicts that form the backdrop for this study, the First and Second World Wars, are both obvious choices and relatively well-known. Including the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 may strike some readers as an odd choice. It did, however, feature the dawn of radio use and naval mines in wartime, so it is quite fitting. Choosing these distinct conflicts also allows the authors to trace the featured military innovations throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Having selected the wars, the authors then focus on three different pairs of naval technologies, namely “weapons”, “tools” and “platforms”. The weapons pair consists of perhaps the oldest naval technologies that are still extant today, mines and torpedoes. Tools are represented by radio and radar while weapon platforms are represented by aircraft and submarines.

Naturally, not all of these came to the fore in every conflict; however, they do represent how ever-evolving technologies led to new technical innovations. The processes by which the various naval forces sought, sponsored and adopted technological innovations were certainly prevalent in all three conflicts and are adequately covered in the volume. Indeed, the three selected pairs of sub-topics are representative of the overall process for all of the major naval powers. As expected, weapon innovations were not usually limited to one player, so the authors discuss how different navies attempted to innovate and the divergent choices they made. They also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the new developments and emphasize the benefits and hazards each one presented to combatants. Every subsection comprises a relatively detailed essay which clearly outlines why this particular innovation came to be desired and, where applicable, how other powers adopted or countered it. For example, while long-range wireless radios made it possible for naval commands to communicate with their occasionally far-flung naval assets, using radios actually put warships at risk of exposing their position. Strangely, during the Battle of the Atlantic, the Kriegsmarine chose to disregard this danger and continued to communicate with its U-boats by radio. Once the Allies developed ways of detecting these radio signals, the U-boats found themselves at a severe disadvantage. Another example is use of radar in during the Second World War. While the Kriegsmarine was a major player in the early development of naval radar technology, they quickly lost their technological lead. Among other reasons, the authors suggest that the German navy had also recognized early on that radar transmissions could be tracked. Consequently, they devoted more effort to detection rather than improvement, making them less prone to use their radar proactively. This reluctance may partially explain why during the Battle of North Cape, the Royal Navy caught the Scharnhorst by surprise on at least two occasions. An earlier example is when the Germans deployed their new magnetic mines prematurely, enabling the RN to devise
effective counter-measures before the mines could be fully deployed. When the Germans eventually developed an effective acoustic mine, they were so afraid of using it prematurely, that they never fully deployed it prior to D-Day. This paralysis deprived Germany of the opportunity to inflict potentially crippling losses on the Allied invasion fleet. According to the authors, another issue that delayed or hindered the introduction of new technical innovations is the inert conservatism that was a hallmark of most naval services, partially fueled by the budgetary restraints that are often placed on navies in times of peace. In general, they preferred to invest their limited funding on existing, rather than new, technologies. Finally, as the section on the pair of weapons platforms shows, both submarines and aircraft only came to the fore once they received better weapons.

Overall, the authors have succeeded in detailing how technological innovations dramatically improved the effectiveness of military weapons in these three conflicts.

They have provided a highly readable account of this process and their success is all the more remarkable given their non-technical background. Moreover, their observations can be easily applied to other weapons systems from all the military branches.

Consequently, this book is highly recommended to anyone with an interest in the process of applying new technology to meet military needs.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec


For many secondary and undergraduate students and cable TV/armchair history enthusiasts, early American wars are understood as a series of temporally- and spatially-bound battles fought by the professional armies and navies of combatant countries, scattered across the North American landscape. For the War of 1812, fought between the United States and Great Britain between 1812 and 1815, relatively contained battles punctuate its beginning, such as the Battle of York (27 April 1813) and its end, the Battle of New Orleans (8 January 1815). Other famous War of 1812 battles include the Battle of Lake Erie (10 September 1813), the burning of Washington City [D.C.] (24 August 1814), and the Battle of Baltimore (13 September 1814) for which the Star-Spangled Banner was written. No early American war fought on the
home front, however, was experienced by its residents or combatants in such a discrete way. Nor was the war a uniform experience across individual regions or states. The outcome of the war had widely different impacts across the country – for Maine, it culminated in independence from Massachusetts and statehood.

In *Making Maine: Statehood and the War of 1812*, Joshua Smith explores the variable experiences of Maine’s communities and citizens and their search for identity before, during, and immediately after the War of 1812, along with the enduring effects the war had on their lives in the following decades. The discussion is set within in the context of three explicit themes: the changing relationship between regional and national identities; the misery of war; and Maine’s post-war statehood movement. Smith aims to remove the “rose-coloured glasses” and heroic hagiography so often applied to history and its participants. The interwar period in Maine included invasion and occupation, famine, high-taxation, loss of commerce, an ever-growing disabled veteran population, divided communities, destroyed families, and leadership motivated by public office and personal ambition.

The War of 1812 was instigated, ostensibly, by American opposition to Britain’s illegal impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy to serve in the Napoleonic Wars. Maine became an ideological battleground between President Madison’s pro-war Republican administration and the strong opposition supported by Federalist-controlled Massachusetts. Maine was not uniform in its support of Massachusetts’s leadership; pre-war, coastal communities tended to be pro-Boston and opposed to war, which significantly curtailed the state economy and established relationships with Canada, while the backcountry resisted Boston’s control.

Smith demonstrates that support of, or opposition to, the war was highly partisan, but also practical. Many Maine coastal and border towns viewed their local issues as of greater import than regional or national concerns – British citizens lived within these communities, cross-border economic and social relationships were foundational, etc. Maine relied heavily on British markets, and the war brought stagnation. Smuggling and other illicit activities that ultimately stymied the war effort were crucial to meet the basic needs of the communities.

The American fighting force in the war was never uniform. In Maine, combatants included volunteer units and sanctioned privateers, state-supported militia, and regular army and navy federal military. The identity of volunteer and militia members as active participants was fluid. The relationships between the three groups were contentious at best; a lack of clear leadership and direction produced inefficiencies rife in fighting and the building, maintenance, and manning of defense infrastructure. Military action was rarely,
if ever, consigned to a “battlefield” or restricted to identified combatants, but was status quo within coastal communities and against private citizens. The fluidity of soldier/civilian identity blurred the lines between acceptable action as warfare, e.g., British soldiers raiding and looting coastal towns or privateers targeting military, commercial, or private vessels at will. The war in Maine was less a series of battles than a state of constant harassment. In occupied towns, treatment of the community by the British varied from peaceful occupation to physical destruction, but in all cases, the British endeavoured to strip communities of their resources to support their own war effort. Throughout the war, neither Maine residents nor the volunteer, militia, or military forces stationed or fighting there, ever felt that they were sufficiently supported in terms of leadership, materiel, pay, etc. by either the Madison Administration (who could not) or Boston (who would not).

With the signing of the Treaty of Ghent (24 December 1814), the war ended in what was generally considered a political draw; however, it had profound, lasting effects on Maine. The British continued to pursue payment for prizes and to legally enforce material capture held within Maine communities, and it took several decades to determine the final border between Maine and Canada. After the war, Maine Republicans actively pursued statehood, which Boston, for the most part, did not oppose. Maine became the 23rd state in the United States on 15 March 1820.

Smith’s meticulous research is evident through the sheer number of participants, ships, events, military and civilian actions, etc. he describe to support his analyses and argument. The prose shines best when it diverts from, at times, “laundry lists” of information and provides longer discussions of specific events and the recorded experiences of the people involved; for example, the Penobscot Invasion in late summer, 1814. There are so many affective individuals in the text that this reviewer kept a list of primary actors and their occupation(s), origin, places of residence, political affiliation, religion, etc. to keep them straight! One significant critique is not of the content, but the design of the book itself. Included figures, primarily maps, are well-drawn and contain detailed information pertinent to the discussion; however, they are rarely given more than half a page. The reader requires a magnifying glass to read the text and symbology. Otherwise, this book is highly recommended as an important, new contribution to our understanding of the War of 1812 in Maine and its impact on its communities and citizenry.

Alicia Caporaso
Mankato, Minnesota