The 1936-39 Spanish Civil War continues to attract historians and students of revolutions and military actions. The land and air campaigns have been well-documented, but not the naval aspects of the Spanish Civil War, at least in English. With Michael Alpert’s *The Spanish Civil War At Sea: Dark and Dangerous Waters*, an historian who has published several previous works on various aspects of the Spanish Civil War, fills that gap with a comprehensive narrative of that tragic war’s maritime aspects. (While Alpert uses the standard term “Republican(s)” for the forces loyal to the Spanish government in 1936, he describes the forces commanded by Francisco Franco that challenged the Spanish government as “Insurgent(s)” rather than the more familiar term “Nationalist(s).” This review will use Insurgent(s) for consistency with the text.)

Civil wars, by their nature, split a nation’s population into competing factions, including that nation’s military. The Spanish Civil War was no exception, splitting the Spanish Navy into Republican and Insurgent navies. It should be remembered that the Spanish fleet was relatively new in 1936, having had to be rebuilt after near total destruction by the US Navy in the 1898 Spanish-American War in the naval battles of Manila Bay and Santiago. Moreover, Spain endured years of internal turmoil prior to the outbreak of civil war. The Spanish Navy split along rank lines: the enlisted ranks and NCOs tended to side with the Republicans, while officers and the Naval General Staff sided with the Insurgents. The two sides split the combat vessels: the Republicans had one battleship, three cruisers, 13 destroyers plus three more destroyers that entered service during the war, 12 submarines (the entire Spanish submarine fleet), seven torpedo boats, one gunboat, and four armed Coast Guard cutters. The Insurgents commanded one battleship, four cruisers, three minelayers, five torpedo boats, three gunboats, and five Coast Guard Cutters. While the Republican Navy seemed to have a numerical advantage over the Insurgent Navy, the Republicans faced major difficulties. Their submarines were old and the torpedoes they fired were frequently unreliable (a fact which plagued the submarines of many navies in the Second World War). Also, the Republican naval leadership was lacking – the most competent...
naval leadership deserted to the Insurgents. Often, ships or departments were commanded by inexperienced Republican junior officers. The Insurgents, while lacking personnel for their ships, were often able to call seamen from the Spanish Merchant Marine or train sailors *ab initio* to a satisfactory level of performance.

Both sides in the Spanish Civil War were aided by other nations – on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. Soviet pilots and aircraft aided the Republicans in the air along with other foreign volunteers. On the ground, were Soviet armoured vehicles and foreign volunteers (the famous “International Brigades”), while officers from the Soviet Navy served at sea. The Insurgents were aided in the air by German and Italian pilots and aircraft, by German armored vehicles and military advisors plus Italian troops and tanks on the ground, and at sea by Italian submarines and German naval advisors.

The Spanish Civil War at sea is somewhat complicated to describe, as Spain essentially has three seacoasts – the Mediterranean, the Atlantic seacoast west of Gibraltar, and, separated by the nation of Portugal, the Cantabrian Sea on the northwest coast of Spain. Alpert relates the various naval actions in each area of operations. He describes the efforts of the various forces involved, the ship-versus-ship conflicts, as well as the success of Italian and German submarines in interdicting supplies to the Republicans which contributed significantly to the ultimate Insurgent victory.

The picture Alpert paints of both navies is a disappointing one. The Republicans had the majority of ships and crews but little leadership. The Insurgents had the naval leadership but lacked ships and crews. The advantage of the Insurgents in naval leadership mirrored their advantages in the air and on the ground. The Republicans were constantly plagued by infighting and rivalries. The Insurgent forces were more cohesive, a distinct factor in the war’s outcome.

Alpert describes the political background of Spain prior to the outbreak of hostilities in chapter one and in each succeeding chapter describes the naval war. He writes well and the narrative flows. Photographs of the ships and persons involved in the naval war give the reader visual connections to the text as does the cover photo of a dramatic painting of France superimposed on a Spanish destroyer. Appendices detail the specifications of Spanish ships and list the Soviet naval officers that were assigned to the Republicans. The notes and bibliography furnish ample material for further reading and study. The concluding chapter reviews the major points in the text and gives the reader food for thought. The only negative comment – and it is a minor one – is that the maps in this book appear to be hand-drawn and labeled, which takes away from the overall presentation of this book.

Most wars are won on the ground, and the Spanish Civil War was no
exception. The Republic started to disintegrate in winter, 1939. The remaining units of the Republican Navy sailed for neutral ports in French North Africa and were interned. In Spain itself, the Republican forces fought with each other. Republican leadership hoped, perhaps, to prolong the Civil War long enough for a broader European war to break out (which occurred when Germany invaded Poland 1 September 1939). A wider war would cause Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union to cease their respective involvements in Spain, leaving room for Republicans and Insurgents to come to some sort of settlement. That hope was dashed when Insurgent troops entered the Spanish capital of Madrid on 28 March 1939, ending the war.

Alpert’s book illuminates the least-known aspect of the Spanish Civil War. It is a good read, a valuable reference, and is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


In the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, the maritime commercial interests of New York City, which were vitally important to the well-being of the nation as a whole, were faced with a daunting navigational dilemma. The East River, along with the Hudson River, was a major waterway into New York Harbour, yet its waters were anything but ideal for the movement of ships, particularly as they grew in size and value with increasing commercial trade. Beset with numerous hindrances, particularly rocks and reefs, whirlpools driven by the turbulent currents, and vigorous tides, the river was a genuine ship breaker. Seeking to significantly curtail, if not entirely prevent future merchant marine deaths, as well as cargo and ship losses, General John Newton of the Army Corps of Engineers, was tasked with clearing the river. Over the next 19 years, Newton would tenaciously tackle this task, relying on a mixture of sheer manpower, developing technology, and his engineering prowess. This process would be finalized in 1885 when the massive nine-acre Flood Rock was demolished in front of tens of thousands of onlookers through the use of 282,730 pounds of high explosives.

While it was John Newton who was tasked with finally fully opening the East River to maritime trade and who was praised by the National Academy of Sciences for his work, the task was truly too large for any singular person. In recognition of this, this book is not a biography. Rather, Barthel uses Newton
as the nucleus around which the larger story takes shape. To begin, Newton was not the first man to whom the task of clearing the East River had been given – its dangerous nature having long vexed the merchant interests of New York. Between 1851 and 1853, Benjamin Maillefert (an underwater blasting specialist) was contracted to begin clearing the river through the use of explosives, a task which produced significant smoke, but little in actual results. In defense of Maillefert, however, Newton’s eventual success, while buoyed by his engineering prowess, was heavily predicated on technology that did not come into its own until he had taken over the project. Of particular importance were the advances in steam technology, underwater drilling and tunneling, and Newton’s use of nitroglycerin, which by 1867 had been stabilized in the form of dynamite. Of particular note, technologically, was the steam drilling scow which Newton had designed for underwater work in the harsh conditions of the East River’s currents. Capable of drilling multiple boreholes at once, this ship allowed for a steady pace when it came to removing underwater obstructions, with the debris from each detonation being removed by rock scows working in rotation.

While the General may have had the vision for how to attack the problem head-on, it was his numerous supervisors, miners, and divers who were immediately responsible for the day-to-day drilling, blasting, and hauling. Without the strength of their backs and their expertise, even the finest engineering schematics were worthless, and Barthel makes it very clear that Newton was well aware of this. Throughout the text, Newton is shown both directing and listening to those whom he employed, trusting them to aid him in achieving their common goal. Further, Newton was ever cautious to ensure the ongoing safety of his workers, constructing specialized sheds for the storage of explosives and consistently checking safety measures on both his diving and mining sites. While the book concludes the main narrative with a chapter titled “Newton’s violent triumph,” as is often the case, the great individual stands highest, but only through the health and society of others.

This text serves to shine a light on an interesting point in the history of the United States. The nation, still recovering from a terrible civil war, was growing both internally and internationally, and required modernized infrastructure to ensure that it could maintain such growth. To build this infrastructure, daring minds and bodies combined with the latest industrial technology toiled for years, often unseen, the results of their labours celebrated in their time but frequently forgotten as the years progressed. In a not insubstantial way, this book serves to memorialize the men who made the East River a little safer, and who helped to ensure the continued financial well-being of a growing nation. Further, it helps to provide an easily digestible story of the technological evolutions which were occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Of particular interest, and hopefully, of use to some readers, will be the appendix which lists the obstructions on the East River, allowing for a better understanding of exactly how unsafe the river was, and how monumental a task opening it truly was. A handy overview for a complex internal improvement project, this book will sit comfortably on most any bookshelf.

Michael Toth
Fort Worth, Texas


Few historians consider President Andrew Jackson a navalist. Claude Berube’s *On Wide Seas* advances the argument that Jackson was indeed a navalist and his executive stewardship of the United States Navy during his administration led to significant naval growth and professionalization. Berube’s critical work fills a gap in naval historiography and is the first book to solely examine the development and employment of the Navy from 1829-1837 under Jackson’s aegis from 1829-1837.

The central premise of *On Wide Seas* is that the US Navy developed into a premier instrument of national power throughout the 1830s as a consequence of a burgeoning naval culture. Not only did it promote America’s intellectual and social growth, it also manifested it through the creation of new policies and strategic and operational employment of the sea service. Despite Jackson’s background in the army, Berube argues that Jackson keenly understood executive power and the navy’s capability to promote national maritime growth globally.

Organized into six chapters, the first chapter explores the transformation of the navy during the Jacksonian era as an intellectual renaissance, enhanced by increasing literacy rates and proliferation of print media. This allowed new ideas to reach vast audiences transmitting the navy’s new scientific discoveries while symbiotically influencing fiction writing and literary boosterism via works by Edgar Allen Poe, James Fenimore Cooper, and Washington Irving. A robust print discourse in military-specific journals allowed naval officers to promote new ideas and challenge staid and entrenched orthodoxy that professionalized the naval officer corps. Organizations such as the Naval Lyceum and their Naval Magazine, along with half a dozen others, formed new strategic thinkers and enabled communication within the service and beyond with legislators, writers, and civilians. This Jacksonian democracy in
action drew broad attention to the US Navy and to its missions. Subsequent chapters explore Jackson’s vision for the navy as a shepherd of American commerce. Through advocacy for increasing the size of the navy, expanding the overseas station concept, and improving internal naval discipline, Jackson demonstrated his previously overlooked navalist credentials. His methodical choices for his three Secretaries of the Navy upheld financial accountability, promoted fleet repairs, improved governance within the navy, oversaw the nascent construction of steam powered warships, and dispensed global naval power. Meanwhile, a 270 percent increase in the naval budget gave the navy the financial backbone to oversee its growing global commitments. Compared to previous presidents who were staunch navy supporters like the Adamses, Jackson deserves similar lauding as an executive who maintained repair funding, built the first dry docks, and oversaw the largest naval buildup since the War of 1812, notably through the construction of new schooners and steamers, while establishing the East Indies Squadron in the western Pacific.

Berube forwards the notion that Jackson’s maritime strategy has been marginalized or ignored in favour of his land-based exploits. He argues that Jackson actually had a dynamic threefold strategy: to support favourable economic conditions globally, to support forward deployed squadrons, and to launch retaliatory expeditions as a last resort. Anti-piracy actions in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, off Africa, and operations in the Pacific promoted global commerce and gave a new generation of officers diplomatic and military experience. Berube perhaps over-credits Jackson’s tempered consideration with regards to punitive retaliation, arguing that Jackson’s strategic consideration of the Pacific islands where Americans were attacked were paramount, and attacks against Americans at far-flung outposts were not worth the effort to deploy naval forces for indemnity. Were the assertion true, Jackson should have dispatched the navy to return to Sumattra after its original 1832 retaliatory strike after subsequent attacks in 1834. That the navy did respond to an attack against the American whaleship Mentor in less-than-strategic Palau after public pleas to the Secretary of the Navy and Congress indicates that the responsiveness of the Jackson administration may have had less to do with strategy than with visibility and potential bad publicity. Nevertheless, Berube’s broader argument of Jackson’s commitment to American commercial protection in vital strategic and economic areas indeed indicates Jackson’s vision of maritime manifest destiny.

The final section of the book explores the professionalization within the US Navy through improved discipline, calls for a formal naval school, the creation of a medical corps, a formal chaplain corps, and a reorganized role for the Marine Corps. In Berube’s words, the navy had an “awakening” under Jackson that profoundly impacted the service and created the conditions
for its continued growth and influence in subsequent decades. Jackson’s recognizance of the navy as a vital element of national power and ongoing expansion were demonstrated by the organization’s revivification and his administration’s efforts to actualize and employ the sea service in pursuit of American expansion.

*On Wide Seas* is a carefully articulated and argued book, and advocates clearly for the key role Jackson played during the Navy’s transformation, and more broadly to a naval revitalization. Berube makes innovative use of complex primary source material such as court martial records to show Jackson’s perspective on organizational discipline, yet also manages a wide survey of naval and executive branch documents and secondary sources throughout the work. Any treatment of this often-ignored period would have been welcomed, yet Berube has penned a truly compelling volume that sets a high standard. For those interested in a revolutionary take on Jackson, students of naval history looking to bolster their knowledge, and lay readers alike, *On Wide Seas* merits a place on the must-read list.

Chris Costello
Annapolis, Maryland


Bingeman, Simpson, and Tomalin have written four narratives into one book. The volume covers the wrecks of two frigates, some 58 years apart, in roughly the same spot, the underwater archeological exploration and recovery of artifacts from the wrecks, and a biography of Sir Robert Barrie, who commanded the second lost ship. A slim volume at 141 pages, it does pack quite the information punch.

Work on the book really began in 1969 when the wreck of HM Frigate *Assurance* was discovered, resting in the waters at the base of the Needles, a three-peaked group of rock pillars standing out of the ocean, at the western end of the Isle of Wight. Local diver, Derek Williams, decided to locate and explore the wreck of HM Frigate *Assurance*, which he found on his first dive. As the *Assurance* wreckage was explored, it became apparent a second ship (*Pomone*) was spread across the same area. During the next forty years the site of both wrecks was thoroughly surveyed and artifacts collected.
The authors first describe the 24 April 1753 wreck of Assurance, caused by its striking the Goose Rock, which lay just north east of the Needles. Despite the fact that the rock was uncharted at the time, the ship’s master was still held responsible. Salvage had been done on the wreck in the days following its loss. Much was removed from the ship, but some material (mainly items below deck which was submerged and inaccessible) drifted to the bottom as the ship broke apart over the course of the following week. The cannons, shot, and iron ballast had interacted with the areas chalk rock creating a “ferrous concentration” of rock, iron, and coins. Coins from Mexico, Spanish-American coins, and half a grindstone were among the interesting finds displayed for twenty years in Portsmouth’s Royal Naval Museum. This section of the book holds an interesting description of the primitive diving device used to send men down to the wreck to salvage items, including the cannon barrels, weighing as much as 1½ tons each.

Assurance receives the least attention of any aspect covered in this book (just 17 pages), due largely to a lack of information on its commanding officer and the ship itself. Its role in the book seems to serve as the avenue to Pomone and Robert Barrie.

Though a lot was salvaged from the wreck of Pomone before it went to pieces, much was left along the seabed. The work of recovering items was conducted mainly by members of the Portsmouth Royal Sub-Aqua team. A series of detailed site surveys were done by the Maritime Archaeology Trust and three professors from the University of Southampton.

Among the items described in the text are the ship’s carronades, gunlocks for the guns, cannon balls, wadding, cooper’s tools, a custom-made lead apron to protect the gunlocks and powder on the carronades, grenades, fuses, copper sheathing for the hull and copper spikes, the ship’s rudder pintles, spikes, parts of Pomone’s chain pump, and a sheave and coat from one of the ship’s blocks for the running rigging. It is with this last artifact that the authors resort to numerous images of various sized and shaped sheaves and coats from other wrecks (most notably that of Invincible, 1785) to explain the nature of these mechanism. There are personal items as well, including artifacts from the ship’s surgeon and a clasp from an officer’s sword belt.

Archaeologists will appreciate the use of the buttons, military badges, and various coins to locate personal possession and secure the identity of the wreckage fragments. Dating the type of military badge, naval button and different nations’ coins facilitated the dating of wreckage found around the item. An ingenious technique, it also gave insight into the personal collecting of mementoes by the sailors as they travelled through the Mediterranean.

The story of Robert Barrie is covered in three unequal chapters (thirty-five, thirteen, and two pages respectively). The longest, most richly told first
chapter covers his early life and career through the command of *Pomone*, its loss, and his court martial. Barrie’s entry into the navy was typical for the era – patronage from his uncle Admiral Alan Gardner led to the beginning of his career. In those early years he used his patrons to move between ships. He nurtured relationships that could or would lead to stronger patronage throughout his career. One was the relationship he established with Thomas Pitt, 2nd Lord Camelford, the nephew of William Pitt, a very powerful ally to have. Camelford’s reckless and violent life matched Barrie’s own rebelliousness and financial carelessness. Camelfords’ death in a duel, appears to have shaken Barrie into reforming his life. Going forward, his career represents one of the finer naval careers, though not as illustrious as Sir Edward Pellew, Sir George Cockburn, or Sir Sydney Smith. Barrie played an active role in blockading the French at Toulon, protecting British merchant ships from French privateers, and capturing French merchant ships in the Mediterranean and off France’s Atlantic coast.

*Pomone* was wrecked due to an error by the ship’s master, who misread the lighthouse at the Needles as that of the mainland’s Hurst light. Steering a course south of the light put *Pomone* on a course to strike the west end of the Isle of Wight. Only at the last minute did Barrie perceive the error and attempt to weather the treacherous rocks, which failed as the ship’s hull was holed on the submerged Goose Rock. Firing guns and rockets the ship’s crew attracted the attention of Yarmouth’s pilot boats which reached the vessel in five hours. Most of the crew took to the ships’ boats while the officers and a few sailors stayed aboard the sinking frigate to salvage what could be saved. The ship broke in two and disappeared over the next month. The court martial ordered the master to be severely reprimanded and a drunk sailor lashed, while acquitting Robert Barrie. His next vessel was the 50-gun *Grampus*, a far slower vessel than *Pomone*, the ship and crew he would hold in the highest regard the remainder of his life.

The following chapter covers his career through the War of 1812, serving on the 74-gun *Dragon*. The only reason given for the war was the British blockade of American trade with Europe. The key issues of America’s rejection of the British pressing American sailors into their navy (“Sailors’ Rights”) and the American desire to quell the North American Indigenous tribes supported by the British to facilitate American westward expansion, are not mentioned. The authors rely on transcriptions of letters Barrie wrote to his mother, from the collection held at the David Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University Library, North Carolina and the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. There is no background given for the letters, which are allowed to speak for themselves. The context for the letters would have been helpful as many of the events Barrie mentions will only be meaningful to
a person knowledgeable about the Chesapeake Bay Campaign and the British assault on Cumberland Island. The authors could have drawn attention to Barrie’s significant role in receiving and then encouraging Blacks, enslaved in America, to obtain their freedom by fleeing to the British ships-of-war. Bingeman et al. overlook the point that Barrie thought he received command of the Dragon (intended as the flagship for the Leeward Islands station) because of a possible misdealing with a dozen American prizes he caught off the Strait of Gibraltar at the start of the War of 1812. The Gibraltar prize court freed the vessels (denying Barrie a good deal of prize money), a decision overturned upon appeal, after the ships had left.

The third chapter for Barrie is a mere two pages covering his time posted to the Royal Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes, 1817 through 1834, and his final years in England. Given the extensive details provided for his early life, it seems a bit of a missed opportunity, given that the information exists for this time in equal, if not more accessible documents.

The numerous illustrations are essential to the authors’ explanation of the recovered artifacts. Various maps plot the location of shipwreck fragments and the underwater terrain, all very helpful in comprehending some of the challenges faced by the divers, and the intermingled dispersal of the wreckage. The three appendices contain the brief court martial for Assurance, Barrie’s report of the loss of Pomone, and the court martial for this loss.

This book ought to appeal across a wide spectrum of interests, from underwater archeology, to ship wrecks, through the early stages of a single officer’s naval career. It offers information and insights for both the professional and novice in these areas.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


The Falklands War of 1982 was the first post-Second World War conflict fought between near-peer defence forces in the missile age. Casualties on both sides were high and the British Task Force commander, Rear Admiral John ‘Sandy’ Woodward, later stated it was “a lot closer run than many would care to believe.”

Jorge Boveda has done a very good job in describing and analysing the Argentine naval operations during this short but bloody conflict. This book is part of the Latin America War series that examines various conflicts in Central
and South America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Boveda based this work on his Master’s thesis – through his naval-officer father he was able to access many former senior Argentine naval officers to gain their thoughts and recollections of the conflict. The Falkland Islands had been British territory since 1833 but Spain had claimed them prior to this, as the Islas Malvinas, and in turn Argentina inherited this claim.

The Argentine Navy was completely unprepared for the conflict in 1982 which was imposed on the country by the ruling military junta. In many cases, senior naval officers were only informed of the impending seizure of the Falklands a few weeks before the event occurred. Most of the navy’s ships were elderly vessels (some dating back to the Second World War) and in a poor materiel condition due to defence budget cuts. The Argentine fleet air arm aircraft were aged as well and spare parts were scarce. New ships, aircraft, and weapons were being procured but were still in build or, as in the case of the Super Étendard aircraft and Exocet missiles from France, in the initial delivery phase. A conflict with Chile over territorial issues was always expected but an invasion of the Falklands was literally beyond belief for the average Argentine naval officer – particularly as many had been trained by the Royal Navy and their newest ships were 1970s vintage British-sourced Type 42 destroyers.

To make matters worse, the three Argentine services were far from joint: they operated within their own stove-piped commands and frequently competed for the limited funding available to defence. Planning for the invasion was undertaken at the highest political level from late 1981 and much was based upon flawed diplomatic intelligence suggesting Great Britain would not act to recover the Falklands. That said, Britain had sent subtle messages that the Falklands was of minor concern and was intending to remove the Antarctic patrol vessel, HMS *Endurance*, reduce the size of the Royal Marine garrison at Port Stanley, and remove the scientific staff on South Georgia. The impending sale of the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible* to Australia and the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes* all sent a signal to the Argentines that April 1982 was the time to strike. A short victorious war to recover the Malvinas from Britain would take the minds of the average Argentine off the poor economy and the excesses of the ruling Junta.

The British government’s reaction to the invasion and the rapid dispatch of a task force to the South Atlantic, took the Argentine Junta by surprise. Suddenly, they were faced with fighting a world-class defence force with modern weaponry. The Argentine Navy suffered initial losses with the light cruiser *General Belgrano* sunk by the submarine HMS *Conqueror* and the submarine *Sante Fe* badly damaged and abandoned at South Georgia. At least four Argentine merchant ships were lost in the conflict as well; however, the British forces did not get off lightly. Although the Argentine aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* spent most of the war in port (as part of the fleet-in-being
The Argentine Fleet Air Arm A4 Skyhawk’s and Super Étendards conducted audacious low-level attacks, sinking the Type 42 destroyer HMS *Sheffield*, the frigate HMS *Ardent*, and the cargo vessel *Atlantic Conveyor*.

These attacks were pressed home with skill and determination by well-trained pilots and had the Argentine Navy possessed more serviceable aircraft and weapons, the British ship losses would have been more severe. The Argentine Air Force A4’s also sank and damaged a number of British warships. Overall, the Argentine aircrew (and their ground crews working around the clock to get aircraft serviceable for the next day’s sorties) inflicted losses on the British Task Force that were close to being unsustainable. Had the Argentines possessed more Exocet missiles and been able to potentially launch their fighter bombers from their aircraft carrier closer to the Falklands (thus giving them more time over the islands and being able to reach the British carriers operating well to the east), then the outcome of the war may have been different – hence the close run comment by Woodward.

Additionally, the Argentine Navy displayed an ability to think outside the box. Since they operated British Type 42 destroyers they knew the flaws in that type of weapons systems and exploited these during the sinking of *Sheffield*. They also took an Exocet launcher from one of their ships and secretly transported it to the Falklands where, after much trial and error, they created a land-based Exocet launcher which was used to attack the destroyer HMS *Glamorgan*, badly damaging it. British post-war performance analysis of their naval forces was scathing and many officers were chastised for the loss of their ships, with some deemed negligent for seriously under-estimating their enemy. (See *Abandon Ship – The real story of the sinking’s in the Falklands War* by Paul Brown reviewed in *The Northern Mariner* 31, no. 3 (Fall 2021).

The language used throughout (translated from Spanish to English) is a little clunky at times and some aspects of the conflict are glossed over, such as the initial amphibious landings at the Falklands using Argentine landing ships and the South Georgia operations. Excellent photographs and diagrams/drawing detail Argentine Navy capability, but there is some padding up front detailing the creation and ethos of the Argentine Navy in the nineteenth century and its pre-Falklands War history. That said, readers with a limited knowledge of the Argentine side of the Falklands War should use this as a primer to gain a better awareness of the conflict. My final takeaway is never under-estimate your enemy. The Argentine Navy (and Air Force), despite limited and outdated equipment, exacted a heavy toll on the British Task Force and increased the British effort and personnel casualties incurred to liberate the Falklands.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia

Stephen Bown has masterfully written a quasi-medical and maritime history of scurvy and the quest to diagnose this devastating disease, find its cure, and negotiate through deeply encrusted layers of bureaucracy. It focuses on the physical manifestations of the malady and the search to find its remedy largely through the work of three stalwart British mariners with no scientific training, but determined to solve the complex mystery.

Scurvy was largely an occupational disease of mariners who were at sea for long periods of time. The dreaded condition took the lives of the world’s sailors largely from about 1500 through 1800 and occasionally into the latter part of the nineteenth century. Otherwise healthy sailors died wretched deaths through the breakdown of their bodily tissues. Their gums bled and turned black, old once-healed wounds suddenly reopened, joints were painful, and bones became brittle. Fever and delirium were common sequela. The terrifying symptoms were made more horrific because there was no known cure. Although the clinical progression of scurvy was well known, its cause remained an enigma.

Unprincipled scientific imposters, as well as some established physicians and researchers peddled numerous quack cures. Sailors were told to smear a salve containing mercury on open sores, or drink seawater, diluted hydrochloric acid, or low-alcohol beer, as well as consume all manner of often expensive and useless potions, noxious distillates, and food supplements. Sailors’ workloads were vastly increased as was the employment of corporal punishment because one popular theory blamed the affliction on laziness.

“The Scurvy,” as it was called, festered for centuries, killing or disabling more sailors than storms, shipwreck, and combat combined. It altered the course of maritime commerce, exploration, and the outcome of naval battles. Commodore George Anson circumnavigated the globe but lost over ninety percent of his men to scurvy while accomplishing this mission. The cause and potential cure of this “plague of the sea” baffled learned physicians, ships’ surgeons, and the Admiralty’s bureaucracy. All were desperate to find anything that would halt its insidious progress. In telling the convoluted story of finding a cure, Bown’s narrative follows the lives of three maritime medical mavericks. Combined, they shifted the dialogue on disease in science itself in the course of their overlapping careers in the late-eighteenth century. Scottish surgeon James Lind discovered a remedy in 1747 after conducting clinical
trials in which he treated one group of scurvy victims with cider, one with
elixir of vitriol (diluted sulfuric acid), one with barley water and spices, one
with seawater, and the fifth with daily consumption of citrus fruits. The last
group recovered prompting Lind to publish his findings in 1753 recommending
lemon juice in the form of a rob (concentrated solution) as a preventive and
treatment for scurvy.

Later the well-known mariner/explorer James Cook led his first voyage
of exploration and defeated scurvy with citrus rob. Unfortunately, he was
unsure of the effectiveness of the cure he introduced. On his second voyage in
1772 he endorsed inexpensive and easily obtained wort of malt as an effective
antiscorbutic. This was largely due to Admiralty pundits who accepted David
MacBride’s intuitive but unscientific data about the benefits of consumption
of wort, even though both Lind and Cook had also written about the tangible
cure. Later an aristocratic physician Gilbert Blane became the physician to
Admiral George Brydges Rodney and helped keep Rodney’s sailors relatively
free of scurvy before Britain triumphed at the Battle of the Saints. Later Blane
introduced lemons and lime juice as a standard issue in the Royal Navy during
the Napoleonic Wars. Each had stumbled or reasoned out the “holy grail,” but
found it rejected in a morass of illogical bureaucratic bumptiousness.

From the eighteenth-century perspective, solving the scourge of scurvy was
far from simple. Physicians were convinced that an imbalance of four bodily
humours (so called black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood) caused disease
and medicine’s role was to reestablish humoral equilibrium. These medieval
teachings of Galen of Pergamum were still embraced by the eighteenth-century
medical establishment. A dietary deficiency was incompatible with their
accepted paradigm of disease etiology. The sailor’s diet contained sufficient
calories to provide energy to perform their varied duties but not enough
ascorbic-acid-containing fruit or vegetables. Establishment scholars were
hampered by sloppy reasoning and their tradition of viewing works published
by ancient sages as intellectual templates for understanding the present. They
were distrustful and resistant to change and the acceptance of new ideas.

The missing means was the application of the scientific method.
Scurvy is an example of the need to carefully link controlled steps to solve
a pathophysiological conundrum. What was unusual about this disease was
how debilitated so many sailors became for so long, its causation, how it was
misdiagnosed – that a cure was identified and rejected by both the scientific
officialdom and the admiralty establishment which in turn affected maritime
and world history.

Scurvy took its toll on the crews of the French and Spanish navies during
their wars with the British. The disease took the lives of thousands of captured
and incarcerated American merchant seamen, privateers, and sailors during the
As many as ten thousand died from disease and abuse, but especially malnutrition, while being imprisoned aboard rotting hulks moored in the East River. In writing about others who were pioneers in the treatment and public health measures contributing to shipboard illness, the author made one very minor error. Staunch vitamin C and sanitary conditions advocate American navy physician William P.C. Barton was the navy’s first Head of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery during 1842 rather than Navy Surgeon General. The latter titled position was created in 1871.

Stephen Bown’s work is a captivating narrative focused upon the history and scientific mystery concerning “The Scurvy.” It is reminiscent of an Albert Camus quote in “The Plague”: “I have no idea what’s awaiting me, or what will happen when this all ends. For the moment I know this: there are sick people and they need curing.”

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


One of those mysteries of North Atlantic exploration is: How far did the Vikings penetrate into North America? In “Norse America” author Gordon Campbell, Emeritus Professor and Fellow in Renaissance Studies at the University of Leicester and Fellow of the British Academy, draws on his research as he delves into claims made in sagas and supported by physical artifacts that pre-Columbian Norsemen explored the coast and settled in the heart of North America.

Campbell begins with known facts of Norse life in Iceland and Greenland, the lands from which Norse expansion into North America would likely have come. This seems to be the most factually certain portion of the book, although even here the connections between sagas and history are tenuous. Contrary to the image of Vikings as ruthless maritime marauders, he describes agricultural communities on those islands that were integrated into Christendom with bishops, churches, and trade. Church records were written in Latin. Augustinian Canons and Benedictine nuns connected medieval Greenland to the most ancient Christian orders. Accommodation of local conditions was required as the lack of bread compelled the translation of the Lord’s Prayer as “give us this day our daily seals.” Legendary figures, such as Erik the Red, are placed, as well as they can be, in context. Allegedly the son of Thorvald Asvaldsson,
who had been exiled from Norway in the 970s for manslaughter, the family had settled in the rugged Hornstrandir Peninsula in northwestern Iceland. The ruins of their homestead, from which Erik’s son, Leif Eriksson, may have traveled to America, have been discovered, and if not theirs, probably someone like them lived there. It is in villages like this and in L’Anse aux Meadows, Newfoundland, the most documented Norse settlement in North America, where artifacts, lore, and history meet. Reasons for the abandonment of remote settlements such as climate change, depletion of resources, disruption of trade, and the availability of better land in Europe in the wake of the Black Death are placed in the balance and assayed.

Campbell then examines maps, ruins of buildings, runestones, coins, swords, civic festivals, and anything else that people have latched onto to support purported Nordic exploration of the continent. Specific and detailed attention is directed to the Vinland Map that is cited to establish European knowledge of the North American coast, and Dighton Rock, Bourne Stone, and Norman’s Land Runestone of Massachusetts and Narragansett Runestone of Rhode Island, which contain inscriptions identified by some as Norse.

Much of the text is devoted to undermining the authenticity of artifacts. Campbell gives examples of engravings that have been interpreted by experts ascribing them to multiple languages. He compares places names to those found in literature or cartography and map inscriptions to the lexicon of the times. DNA of present populations is analyzed for the secrets it will reveal about ancestry, which is sometimes more diverse than would be found in an exclusively Norse sample.

The theme of the quest to find Norse origins of American settlement flows throughout the narrative. It is brought together at the end as a desire to weave a myth that America was founded by Northern Europeans, more closely associated with British culture who were predominantly Protestant by the time the Norse Founding Myth was established. The recognition of Spanish Catholics and Indigenous Peoples as contributors to American culture is correspondingly diminished.

“Norse America” is a short, relatively quick read, although readers are challenged to slow down and digest what they are reading. The glossary of Norse Terms, People, Peoples, Places, Sagas and Histories, and Languages aid the reader in staying on track. The maps and pictures are helpful supplements and the index facilitates finding specific references. The extensive bibliography provides guidance for further study.

Although taking on the Myth of Norsemen as a founding race of America, this tome is far from negative. Learning that real Vikings did not wear horned helmets and that their North American settlement was probably limited to a few isolated locales disperses some of the mists of past mystery, but there is much I
like about this work. It whetted my appetite to know more about these ancient peoples. I gained an appreciation for the Norse civilization that survived on harsh, northern isles and might, just might, have touched American shores.

Jim Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


Apart from a human tragedy, an economic and perhaps a cultural loss, the sinking of a vessel is an intrusion into a territory for which it was not designed. As every activity has to meet certain conditions before another state of being is reached, so does the loss of a ship. Most human interaction with the environment is carefully prepared, timed, and measured. The marine environment, however, is confronted with mostly accidental encounters when a ship has failed to stay afloat. Over the years maritime archaeology has evolved from the confines of a single wreck at an individual site to a broader view that includes the motivation to send a ship out to sea – market demands, economic necessity, war, etc – and the circumstances in which a vessel operates, such as rain, fog, storm, or with a dangerous cargo, in treacherous waters. Within that broader view, the transition of sites in the marine environment must also be taken into account, like the effect of natural transformation, such as the reaction with seawater or storm surges and cultural processes like salvage, fishing, blasting, and the removal from artefacts. This broader view is expressed in succeeding models that have been developed over the years by Keith Muckelroy in 1978, Schiffer’s cultural and natural transforms (1987), Ward on natural transformational process (1999) and Gibb’s (2006) stages in shipwreck and finds. Maritime archaeology is a dynamic discipline that requires an open eye for evaluation and refining, not only for science itself, but also for a better understanding of the interaction between nature and culture.

*Formation Processes of Maritime Archaeological Landscapes* presents an excellent perspective of current research in maritime archaeological landscape formation processes.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands.
The dramatic wreck of the modern and successful White Star Liner *Atlantic* in April 1873 was the worst in the history of North Atlantic steamers until the sinking of *Titanic* in 1912, but it has failed to attract the interest and scrutiny of researchers, writers, and filmmakers given to the latter disaster. Two of the three volumes in the last half-century examining the story of SS *Atlantic* are both from the pen of Halifax-based historian and diver Bob Chaulk. The first book, *S.S. Atlantic. The White Star Line’s First Disaster at Sea*, co-written with Greg Cochkanoff, was favourably reviewed in *The Northern Mariner* in 2010. As the two books cover the same incident, one might wonder why (aside from the earlier book being out of print) a second was warranted.

Although *Atlantic’s Last Stop* does, as one might expect, overlap on the earlier volume, there is enough new material and a shift in focus to make this volume an interesting, readable, and useful addition to the literature. Both books give very good coverage of the context of the competitive North Atlantic steamship business and the often-overlooked importance of the immigrant trade. As well, both books make use of the actual events of the wreck, gleaned, primarily from newspaper accounts and interviews of surviving passengers and crew and from rescuers, to tell the same story of inattention and mismanagement of the vessel which led to it being dangerously off-course as it approached port.

One difference between the two volumes is the inclusion of extensive information from a British enquiry held after the event which supplements a somewhat cursory official inquiry in Halifax. The British hearings looked specifically at the design of the vessel and the allegations of a shortage of coal aboard which led to *Atlantic*’s destination being tragically changed from New York to Halifax, a port with which the officers of the ship had no experience. Unfortunately, Chaulk incorrectly identifies this as a report of the Canadian House of Commons rather than of the parliament of the United Kingdom.

While the story of the wreck is gripping, Chaulk further explores what transpired after *Atlantic* crashed into the granite of the Nova Scotia shore. The response of the fisherfolk from isolated houses and tiny villages of the Prospect area resulted in a large proportion of those who survived the immediate aftermath of the wreck being rescued from surf-bound rocks and the remains of *Atlantic* as it quickly broke up. The design of the ship had placed accommodation for women and families with children in the stern of the vessel which rapidly filled with water and sank. Not a single one of the 184 women aboard could be rescued and only one of the 117 children survived. While confusion in records makes
an exact count impossible, after carefully assessing conflicting documentation, Chaulk concludes that there were 952 passengers and crew aboard the ship and that about 550, more than half, were lost. In the aftermath of the wreck, the search by the media and the public for heroes centred on Rev. William J. Ancient, who was lauded for his efforts to remove the last of the survivors clinging to the shrouds and masts of the vessel as it finally broke up. The author notes, however, that this dramatic rescue of one or two individuals was lauded, while the work of the boat crews from the nearby hamlets in saving hundreds of survivors was almost completely ignored.

One aspect of the wreck seldom mentioned in shipwreck narratives, the salvage of the valuable cargo, is covered in some detail in this volume. In addition to the recovery of flotsam from the wreck as it went to pieces, salvage companies engaged by the insurers used divers to scour the bottom and the hulk for anything that could be raised. When this harvest began to slow, the wreck was blown up to provide access to the holds, even though there were scores of bodies still trapped in the ship. Bodies that could be recovered were added to those thrown up by the sea or brought ashore by the fishermen searching for those still living. While a few bodies were dispatched to families in the United States or the United Kingdom, more than 425 bodies, most unidentified, were buried in two mass graves in communities near the wreck site.

Unlike the Titanic disaster, which led to significant changes in communication and life-saving requirements for trans-Atlantic passenger vessels, there seems to have been a willful decision at all levels to continue business as usual for the major firms engaged in the passenger trade in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. While Atlantic’s story may have served as a cautionary tale for liner officers and the companies involved there were no new legislative or regulatory demands placed on those companies. In an epilogue, Chaulk attempts to link the Atlantic wreck to the need for a lightship in the Halifax approaches but also concedes that this was a want that had been known for some time and that an order for a lightship had been placed by the Canadian government four months before the disaster and so is not a result but a coincidence.

Despite an unfortunate title which suggests that the book is about a suburban metro line, Atlantic’s Last Stop is a well-written and interesting story of an important aspect of Atlantic Canada’s maritime history. A cut above many shipwreck narratives, Chaulk manages to combine the usual personal stories of the passengers and members of the crew with insightful analysis of the disaster – scrutinizing both the how and why of the event, and the reasons why it has been forgotten for much of the past century and a half.

Harry T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island
War is an incredibly complex and all-encompassing experience. In the end, for most people, it often turns major historical moments into small focused studies, which become snapshots or windows through which we see the past. Given the vast scale of military operations, these windows can be incredibly fascinating, in part because there are so many areas that have not yet been studied in any depth. An excellent example of this is the myriad of air battles that occurred over the Solomon Islands. A hotbed of activity, the Solomon Islands group saw the first US invasion of the war and some of the most hotly contested airways as Japanese and American fighters and bombers engaged in almost constant combat. Australian diplomat, contributing editor for Flightpath magazine, and prolific author Michael Claringbould, in the fourth volume of his Pacific Adversaries series opens a number of windows into the air war of the South Pacific.

In 108 pages, Claringbould presents 15 different views of aerial operations in 1943-44 from both the Japanese and Allied sides of the conflict. Weaving together narrative and primary sources, Claringbould sheds light on the collective experience of war in the Pacific. An excellent example of this is his discussion of the loss of USS Chicago in the first chapter, aptly named “Especially Regrettable.” Chicago was lost in January 1943 south of Guadalcanal. Damaged and limping to base for repairs, the ship was attacked by Japanese aircraft and sunk. Lost due to errors on the American side, Chicago represented a significant naval asset and its loss was felt for some time. In this case, the author helps to fill in the Japanese side of the experience detailing issues like flight organization, aircraft limitations, and even modifications that were made after the battle to improve aspects of their aircraft, like turret performance.

Each succeeding chapter presents a surprising array of unique stories covering different aspect of the war. The realization that these are only fifteen of what are surely hundreds of thousands of windows into the war gives the reader a distinct sense of how much more work needs to be done. There are three major limitations in a text like this: first, is the brevity of each entry. While not as dramatic as the Battle of Midway, for example, individual events in the Solomon Islands campaign do not happen in a vacuum and the context around them is important if they are to be understood. While interesting, none of these chapters really provides enough context or detail to make it truly valuable. Second, many factors such as aircraft design, training, doctrine, etc.
are not discussed, further limiting the use of the chapters. Finally, there are no notes and they really do matter. When you are producing a history, the citations and the paper trail they provide for the reader are important, if not essential. Claringbould’s lack of footnotes leaves the reader without a link to his original sources, making it difficult to judge the validity and accuracy of his information.

The issues with brevity, lack of context, and an absence of citations makes this book an enjoyable read but of limited research value. I would not recommend this for anyone with a serious interest in the subject. It makes a useful “starter” book, but it should certainly be paired with additional research to produce a more complete history for the reader.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


*Chatham Historic Dockyard* covers the history, study, preservation, and repurposing of the Chatham Historic Dockyard district from the final closure of Royal Navy facilities in 1984 to the incarnation as a historic dockyard immediately after. It gives an overview of the dockyard’s history, covers the transition into an historic property, and demonstrates and explains how and why the dockyard continues to function. The work takes the form of an edited volume with contributions from experts in the various aspects of the Chatham, including its history, function, and present status.

One of the greatest strengths of this work is the expertise of the collected authors. Each chapter is written by one intimately familiar with the subject at hand. Prominent historians, like Andrew Lambert and Jonathan Coad, discuss the history of the dockyard and its place in the wider history. Paul Jardine is very familiar with the workings of historic preservation and the combined efforts of the private and public sectors of historic preservation. Richard Holdsworth, Neil Cossons, and Paul Hudson have all been active in the creation, maintenance, and growth of the Chatham Historic Dockyard. This collected base of expertise allows for unique and detailed insight into the events centred around the dockyard.

Chatham is a small space with a global historical impact. Ships constructed, repaired, or maintained here served across the world and had a direct impact on British, and global, history. The combination means that an English town,
somewhat removed from its country’s coast, had a disproportionate influence. A detailed history of its interactions with the larger fleet, and its functioning as a dockyard, speak directly to this story. The out-of-the-way location, then, allowed it to develop as a dockyard, but would ultimately spell its doom once it was unable to meet the demands of the modern navy. This slow decline of the dockyard, however, allowed for many of the original dockyard structures to survive intact into the modern day for preservation. When the naval base officially closed, heritage managers faced the enormous task of managing the largest surviving dockyard from the age of sail.

This work has a dual purpose. It functions not only as a history of the Chatham Dockyard, but also, perhaps inadvertently, as a handbook for public historians and heritage managers. The final chapters highlight the struggle to confirm Chatham’s status as an historic dockyard and the challenges of maintaining such an historic property. Several key themes emerge from this presentation. First, there is a clear need to cultivate the public’s interest and support. Local participation generated itself through the historic significance, as well as cultural and economic links between the dockyard and the local population. The naval dockyard was an economic driver for the region and helped shape local history. On a larger scale, regional engagement in the process needed to be cultivated and was actively pursued. This is best illustrated by the investment in larger attractions, like the historic ships HMS Cavalier, HMS Gannet, and HMS Ocelot. The addition of these attractions maintained Chatham’s relevancy and fostered the interest of a wider range of visitors.

Beyond promoting the continued cultivation of public interest, however, the chapters in this volume speak to another theme: innovation and reuse. The Chatham Historic Dockyard includes 47 Scheduled Monuments and covers 80 acres. In order to survive, the dockyard had to create new ways of operating and attracting attendance. One of the most interesting ways of accomplishing this was through the reconstruction of the interiors of several buildings, like the Joiner’s Shop and the chapel, to create modern office spaces that were rented out to local businesses or universities. The care taken in the conversion from historic building to modern space is emblematic of the inspiration needed to care for such a large historic property. It also demonstrates ingenuity in repurposing buildings while maintaining their historic status and allowing them to reintegrate with the local community outside of their original roles.

This book provides a clear overview of how to manage a large historic property, while also providing a detailed history of how Chatham Historic Dockyard became what it is today. Unique insights by those directly involved in the process allow readers a detailed view into the financing, thought processes, and images that tell the clearest story possible. Overall, this work
is definitely worth the read and provides a great deal of knowledge to any heritage manager or enthusiast.

Ivor Mollema
Tallahassee, Florida


This is a book that promises more than it delivers. In the preface, Christopher Dishman states his objective is to provide “a comprehensive study of the combat that took place along the US-Canadian border during the War of 1812” (xi). As part of this, he seeks both to “highlight the interdependencies between the many land and naval operations conducted on the border frontier during the war” and to “detail the importance of logistics in the frontier war” (xii). Each goal is laudable and the combination even more so. Most of the fine accounts that have been written about combat in the region favour one aspect of the fighting over the other, while histories of the conflict have only addressed the enormous logistical challenges faced by both sides in passing. Integrating warfare on both the land and the lakes into a single narrative, while offering a long overdue focus on the impact of logistical constraints would be a valuable achievement.

What Dishman has produced, however, is a fairly standard operational history of the fighting along the border that adds little that is new to our understanding of the war in that theatre. His book is particularly disappointing in its coverage of the logistics of the campaign, which offered him the greatest opportunity to break new ground. After a promising start in which he describes the local agricultural economy and the sparse network of roads in the region, Dishman lapses into the standard passing references to the logistical difficulties faced by the forces on both sides in the region. His declared intention at the start to exclude aspects of the war outside the US-Canadian border is particularly regrettable in this respect, as he undertakes no examination of the particular issues British forces faced in having a logistical chain that stretched across the Atlantic to Great Britain and the West Indies. While a decision not to go into detail about the relevant aspects of trade warfare and privateering is understandable, to exclude any consideration of it gives his book a lamentable tunnel vision. Instead, goods just seem to materialize in the theatre as though they were somehow teleported there to be hauled to the waiting men.

Dishman is more successful in his efforts to integrate the operations of
land and naval forces, yet here he again falls short of his stated goals. He notes that from the outset, both sides recognized the value of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario in terms of their lines of communication and they contested for control accordingly. Neither side possessed more than a small collection of vessels in the region when hostilities began, leading them to embark upon crash construction programs in an attempt to gain an advantage. Dishman recounts the shipbuilding race undertaken during the conflict and notes the common challenges faced by American and British constructors in terms of inadequate materials and a shortage of skilled personnel to build and crew these new vessels. Yet his coverage here takes a back seat to his focus on the campaigning, leaving only a partial exploration of one of the most prominent areas where logistics was a factor driving events.

Another factor was the interservice relationship between naval and military commanders on the various fronts. This is one of the strongest parts of Dishman’s book, as he describes how the oftentimes prickly and ambitious leaders cooperated or clashed with one another. Usually it was the latter, as naval officers were frustrated by their official subordination to their army counterparts in the theatre, especially given the limited understanding the generals often possessed of the possibilities and limitations of naval warfare. He cites the partnerships between Robert Barclay and Henry Procter on the British side and Oliver Hazard Perry and William Henry Harrison for the Americans as examples of what was possible when the two forces worked harmoniously. Dishman praises the relationship between Perry and Harrison in particular for its success, noting how Harrison “showed respect for Perry’s naval acumen and engaged him as a peer, not a subordinate” (161). This contrasted with the collaboration between James Yeo and George Prevost, that, after the second attack on Sackett’s Harbor in 1813, was characterized by an “animosity [that] hindered army-navy operations throughout the remainder of the war” (145).

Unfortunately, such valuable assessments are submerged in a narrative devoted primarily to recounting the ground campaigns waged in the region. Combined with insufficient coverage of the logistical issues, it makes for a book that is of limited interest for most readers of this journal. While it can be recommended to anyone seeking a useful introduction to the War of 1812 in the US-Canadian borderlands, serious students of the subject will find little that is new within its pages. Despite Dishman’s identifying the need for greater attention to the logistics of the conflict or joint military-naval operations, those books remain to be written.

Mark Klobas
Scottsdale, Arizona

In his latest book, Canadian historian Barry Gough brings us face to face with historical origins of modern environmental problems, involving the rights of Indigenous inhabitants of ancient lands as opposed to interests of private corporations, provinces, and the nation of Canada. Another theme running through his text is the impact of modern industries on forested environment and native habitats, as private and governmental interests exploit nature’s bounty and convert it to profitable and popular uses. The over-hunting of species to the point of extinction, such as the sea otter, and the clear-cutting of primeval forests that cannot be replaced are but two examples, as Gough shows in this fascinating study.

As explorers from foreign shores ventured to places such as Meares Island, British Columbia, the Indigenous inhabitants showed a willingness to enable the exploiters, whether they were from New England, Great Britain, Russia, or Spain. The trade in sea otter pelts, fish oil, and timber commenced during the eighteenth century. After Captain Cook’s discovery of the west coast of Vancouver Island, merchants from New England and Europe were quick to react, sending ships to participate in the sea otter trade with China. Royal Navy commander John Meares found the island now named for him in Clayoquot Sound. Over the next two centuries, the migration of settlers to the Pacific Coast brought an increasing exploitation of these natural species and raw materials to the point where the native inhabitants realized they were helping to deprive themselves of the ancient habitat, religion, and customs on which they depended.

Several small tribes of First Nations peoples inhabited Vancouver Island at the time the European traders arrived. Of primary interest here are those of Meares Island, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, and others of the Clayoquot, and Ahousaht-Kelsemaht nations. Over time, the steady incursion of logging corporations had made in-roads, to the point that in 1984, local tribal representatives, environmental activists, and First Nations lawyers gathered to resist any further logging of the old growth forest on Meares Island. In writing the history of Meares Island, Gough tells his own story of how a law firm asked him to participate in a legal suit as an expert witness on the history of Vancouver Island and its First Nations peoples. He and his anthropologist colleagues had three years to complete their research and to “make sure no stone is unturned.”

Gough raises the question and meaning of “possession” as he used the
term in the title, noting it has different meanings for different people. In the earliest times, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth people were in possession of their forested island. They had possessed the island as their sacred residence since pre-contact and were in continuing use of its flora and fauna. Europeans arrived with their own ideas about what possession meant – that they would trade woven goods and manufactures, including guns, copper, ammunition, and liquor, and make profits from the sale of sea otter skins and timber. When the logging industry arrived, its concept of possession was (and is) that they would purchase licenses not to own but to exploit the timberlands through legal transactions with the official possessors, the province of British Columbia and the sovereign nation of Canada. By the late twentieth century, the Nuu-Chah-Nulth and related Indigenous peoples asserted a concept, supported by oral history, unwritten traditions, and archeological research, that they had never given up Meares Island and its tall evergreen forest, had never abandoned or sold the island, and still depended on it in their belief system and for their own welfare. “Possessing” Meares Island in Gough’s terms changed depending on which culture and at what period of time. It is also a concept that can exist simultaneously in the minds of concerned people, whether they are Indigenous, white traders, modern logging corporations, environmentalists, historians, or tourists.

In 1984, a crisis arose because of the intent of a Canadian logging corporation to clear-cut the island’s forests. It began as a peaceful protest by First Nations representatives and their allies blockading the loggers’ access to Meares Island. The RCMP showed up and arrested many protesters. Some were jailed and gained criminal records for their trouble. The incident ended up in court as the two sides squared off. This produced a lawsuit entitled Moses Martin et. al. v. HM the Queen, et. al. that worked its way up to the Supreme Court and Appeals Court of British Columbia in 1991.

For historian Gough, this was a crucial event because, as he wrote, he was “not fond of being on the losing side” (xxii). The experience turned out to be a successful lesson in applied history. The result was a legal compromise, an accommodation that halted the logging operation. The private and provincial interests had to accept an injunction, a ruling that the First Nations, environmentalists, and naturalists also had rights of “possession” to protect this beautiful place of ancient human habitat, irreplaceable first growth forest, and significant economic value, subject to periodic regulatory review. Barry Gough’s important book is a personal, gracefully written, “historian’s meditation on matters of the past” (1).

William S. Dudley
Easton, Maryland

Matthias Gretzschel’s new book on the history of the Hamburg Süd is not only a visual feast for the reader, but a well-researched book published on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the shipping company originally established as Hamburg-Südamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft (HSDG).

Today a part of A.P. Møller-Mærsk, the company was once a major German shipping line focusing exclusively on the South America trade throughout its history. It was particularly known for its modern-design ship classes like the 1960s Cap-San Class, an example of which, the *Cap San Diego*, is now a popular museum ship in Hamburg. Although Hamburg Süd never reached the size of the HAPAG or NDL companies, it is without any doubt one of the most historically important German shipping lines. A new book focusing on the more recent history of this company is especially welcome, since any previous comprehensive histories were published decades ago and are probably long out of print. Of course, there is Hans Jürgen Witthöft’s 2008 book *Hamburg Süd – Eine Illustrierte Chronik der Ereignisse*, which might be the better book for the research-oriented historian, but even this book does not cover the most recent years, including the sale of the company to A.P. Møller-Mærsk that ended the history of Hamburg Süd as an independent actor on the global shipping stage.

Gretzschel organizes his book mainly chronologically, but also includes chapters on key characteristics that distinguished the Hamburg Süd from many other German and international shipping companies, such as the development of the reefer activities or the focus on combined passenger-cargo ships. This hybrid approach of a chronologically and thematically organized book is highly successful. It allows readers, on the one hand, to follow the development of the company through time, but on the other hand, to obtain highly detailed information on the developments and characteristics that made Hamburg Süd unique.

For example, the chapters on the combined cargo-passenger operations and the design of the ships showcase that Hamburg Süd did not follow the simple philosophy of the cheapest approach being the most economical, but that innovation in design and standards for passengers aboard cargo-ships could also contribute to the economic outcome. The company’s cooperation with the well-known architect Cäsar Pinnau resulted in some of their ships
being considered as elegant as yachts.

The book is beautifully produced. It is not only lavishly illustrated with a huge number of black and white as well as full-colour illustrations, but these images are so well selected one can understand the main lines of the story even without reading the text. Many of the illustrations are reproduced in full-page or even double-page format. While this is appropriate for historic advertising posters for South American passenger services during the first half of the twentieth century as these posters are pieces of art, it might be questioned if photographs of a container on a semi-truck really requires three consecutive double-pages, with each double page presenting only one photograph.

Many books commemorating anniversaries of German companies tend to brush over the Nazi period and the relations between the respective company and the Nazi government and institutions with a quick and broad brush. Fortunately, this is not the case for Hamburg Süd. Gretzschel not only describes how the luxurious interieur of Cap Arcona was used as a set for the filming of the infamous 1943 Nazi propaganda movie Titanic, he adds that Hamburg Süd was the company actually operating the ships of the Nazi organization Deutsche Arbeitsfront, even directly stating: “Business went well for Hamburg Süd, especially as its management had apparently no reservations about the new rulers” (112). During the Nazi period, Hamburg Süd came under control of the Oetker group, a company that was considered by many as a model National Socialist Company (114). While the influence of Rudolf Oetker might have prohibited or at least discouraged proper investigation into the history of the company during the Nazi period, this subject was taken seriously after Oetker’s death at age 90 in 2007, and Gretzschel’s book has benefitted from this research.

The concluding chapters on the years leading to and after the sale of the company to A.P. Møller-Mærsk are probably the only chapters where the author presents really new information. Unfortunately, parts of it read like something from the company’s public relations department. For example, stating that “In South America it is as well-known as Volkswagen, Allianz or Siemens” (215) is probably at least a slight exaggeration, especially away from the immediate coastal area. Nevertheless, this minor critique cannot distract from the fact that the book is one of the better festschriften written on the occasion of an anniversary in the maritime industries. As is customary from this publisher, the 288-page, large-format hard-cover book displays superior technical quality. While the reproduction quality of the colour illustrations is brilliant, many of the black and white reproductions are somewhat greyish leaving the reviewer wondering if this is a consequence of the printing process used for the book or the publisher following the wider trend to shy away from printing black as real black in photographs.
As a de-facto festschrift, I can recommend it to anybody with an interest in an easy-to-digest book about the 150-year history of a shipping company that was never among the prime actors in the market, but always a “great” shipping company. The original German title uses the term ‘groß’ which might refer to “great,” but also simply to “large,” which is true for the Hamburg Süd regardless of whether you agree with the adjective “great” or not. The lovely illustrations also make it a perfect “coffee-table” book. Would I recommend the book to fellow maritime historians? The answer is both yes and no. Due to the absence of a bibliography or footnotes, there are substantial limitations to using the book as a secondary source. Nevertheless, it is a solid overview of the history of a German shipping company that dominated the South America trade throughout most of its existence and that does not shy away from problematic aspects of that history. It provides accurate historical information about a shipping company that owned and/or operated many ships that remain prominent in public memory, whether recalling the catastrophe of a KDF-ship or visiting a memorable museum ship in the city of Hamburg.

The book is available in the original German edition as well as in an identical English edition published at the same time. Although this reviewer is a native German speaker, this review is based on the English edition, as this is the edition probably most relevant to the readers of this review. As expected for a book published on the occasion of the anniversary of an international shipping company, the English translation is of high quality, with only a few telltale instances where the reader might suspect that the book had not been originally published in English.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


D’entrée de jeu les objectifs de cet ouvrage sont clairs, puisqu’on aspire à y établir des relations entre histoire et archéologie sous-marine aux Petites-Antilles en utilisant l’exemple de la Guadeloupe. Il s’agit d’un exercice réussi démontrant l’importance des archives dans la localisation des épaves, leur provenance, leur cargaison, leurs équipages, leurs lieux de construction, leur tonnage, etc. La période couverte par l’étude s’étend de la fin du XVIIe jusqu’au milieu du XIXe siècle. Pour mener sa démarche a bien, l’auteur
établi une typologie des pertes en mer en étalant un outillage de recherche impressionnant comportant plusieurs fonds d’archives, une bibliographie élaborée et subdivisée en champs thématiques.

Le texte s’accompagne de 21 figures, 20 illustrations, 22 tableaux et 10 textes en annexes. L’auteur a bien compris que l’essence même de ce genre de recherche exige un appareil visuel efficace. Là où les lecteurs rencontreront un plus grand défi est au chapitre deux, puisque le texte devient très dense en raison de l’élaboration des résultats statistiques. L’on a parfois l’impression de s’y perdre et de rencontrer certaines redites. Mais l’on s’entend pour reconnaître que les chercheurs ayant à présenter des résultats de recherches quantitatives, doivent faire preuve d’un doigté qui n’est pas toujours à la portée de tous. Il s’entend que pour utiliser ces résultats au profit de l’archéologie sous-marine, cette étude quantitative fournit donc le nombre d’incidents maritimes, leur fréquence, leur localisation et leur répartition chronologique. Comme résultat global de cet exercice retenons un total de 550 naufrages qui, malgré tout, représente moins de 1% de la fréquentation maritime de la colonie. Ce terme signifie qu’à peine 1% des navires venus dans la colonie furent victime d’un incident maritime.

Toutefois l’ouvrage ne se limite pas à déplorer des pertes d’embarcations et aborde aussi les efforts pour accroître la sécurité maritime incluant la cartographie des côtes, les bouées, les phares et les protocoles de sauvetage. Les résultats de la recherche en archives sont étalés dans les cinq premiers chapitres avant d’aboutir à l’étude de cinq des quinze épaves explorées. Le livre se divise en six chapitres. Dans le premier, l’on s’attarde à une discussion éclairante sur les termes associés aux incidents maritimes afin de déterminer la perception du risque associé aux conditions de navigation et des conséquences climatiques. Il importe dès maintenant d’informer le lecteur sur les nuances à prendre en compte, lorsque vient le temps de classer les catégories d’incidents maritimes. Cela implique que chaque incident ne résulte pas toujours d’une seule cause, peut se produire à divers endroits et ne pas forcément résulter d’une perte du navire. Souvent, l’on parle d’un simple échouement se suivant d’un relèvement du navire et du sauvetage de son équipage et de sa cargaison.

Tel que mentionné plus haut, le chapitre deux est à teneur hautement quantitative et nous communique le nombre de naufrages en vertu d’un système de classification. Les questions posées aux sources sont celles que l’on retrouve dans la plupart des ouvrages de ce genre. Par exemple, chez les catégories de vaisseaux, l’on a des navires de commerce, de guerre, de cabotage, des chaloupes, des barques, etc. L’appareil cartographique de l’ouvrage nous permet de voir dans quels secteurs les incidents maritimes se produisent et l’on constate certaines tendances.
Au chapitre trois, l’auteur établit le ratio entre la fréquentation maritime et le nombre de naufrages mais en accordant davantage d’attention aux navires de guerre. Le chapitre quatre lui, aborde une question classique des études sur la navigation soit la compétition pouvant surgir entre les ports afin de s’approprier la part du lion dans le Traffic portuaire. Dans ce cas-ci il s’agit des ports de Basse-Terre et de Pointe-à-Pitre. Mais pour s’approprier du premier rang, un port doit sécuriser ses approches et reconnaître le besoin de maintenir des mouillages à proximité ou plus éloignés. L’auteur prend également soin d’identifier les ports secondaires de la colonie.

C’est dans le chapitre cinq que l’auteur effectue une véritable histoire de l’évolution des démarches de sécurisation de la navigation aux Petites Antilles. Il fallait donc sécuriser l’approche et les sorties des navires des ports, puisque la plupart des incidents se produisaient lors de ces manœuvres et les autorités coloniales s’impliquent de plus en plus dans l’implantation d’infrastructures à cet égard. Certaines embarcations coulaient dans les havres mais pouvaient souvent être renflouées. L’auteur explique que l’apprentissage des méthodes de sauvetage et de prévision des coups de vent, tempêtes ou même cyclones, était en fait une combinaison de connaissances locales traditionnelles et modernes. Par modernes, nous entendons par là les informations compilées par les relevés typographiques et les saisons plus tempêteuses. Elles émanaient souvent des démarches de spécialistes venant de la métropole.

Finalement, le chapitre 6 est l’aboutissement des résultats des recherches en archives. Mais l’auteur se limite à une description des rapports de fouilles pour cinq des quinze sites identifiés et jugés comme ayant le meilleur potentiel d’exploitation. C’est d’ailleurs le cœur du projet, puisque la recherche en archives permet de dresser un inventaire des lieux de naufrage et de reconstituer rétrospectivement le parcours de ces navires à partir de leur sortie du chantier navale. L’identification des cargaisons permet aussi de savoir à quoi s’attendre durant les fouilles.

En conclusion, répétons que la lecture de cet ouvrage exige parfois un retour sur certains passages denses et assujettis à des termes dont on doit connaître la signification. Autrement, l’on risque de mal saisir certains éléments essentiels à notre compréhension de l’ensemble de la démarche. N’empêche que ce livre constitue un modèle à suivre dans ce phénomène de convergences méthodologiques entre histoire et archéologie, en émergence depuis quelques années.

Nicholas Landry
Shippagan, New Brunswick
Officers attending the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, quickly discover that the College’s library is named in honor of Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, who retired in 1952. Eccles first came to the War College in 1948 to lead the Logistics Department. For more than thirty years, Eccles taught, wrote, lectured and advised those attending the College as well as its leaders, focusing on logistics, military strategy and theory, and civil-military issues. Eccles gained first-hand knowledge and experience with logistics and planning during the last two years of the Second World War in the Pacific, when he was tasked with leading the effort to develop advanced bases to support the US offensive against Japan. As Director, Advanced Base Section, for the entire Pacific Fleet, he was responsible for all aspects of advanced bases, including strategic planning, training, development, and support of the Navy’s efforts. “He was known around the world as a military intellectual and as an expert” on these topics (xvii). Not surprisingly, therefore, he is best remembered for his work in these subject areas.

Often-overlooked, however, is the fact that Eccles commanded the twenty-year-old destroyer USS *John D. Edwards* from October 1940 until March 1942, barely considered when Eccles’ naval career and life are recalled. Eccles was a combat veteran, twice decorated for gallantry and wounded in action. He fought in several major engagements in the early months of America’s involvement in the war in the waters of Southeast Asia, while part of the brief American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command, including the Battles of Badoeng Strait, Java Sea, and Sunda Strait. It is this lacuna in the historical knowledge about Eccles that *To the Java Sea* ably fills.

*To the Java Sea* is the twenty-eighth monograph in the series of historical monographs published by the Naval War College based on materials in its archives. Edited by Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History, John D. Hattendorf, and Pelham G. Boyer, a volunteer research assistant to the War College’s Hattendorf Historical Center, the book is based primarily on Eccles’ letters, diary, reports, and other materials from the College’s collection of his papers – with one significant exception. Eccles’ widow provided the letters used in the monograph to the editors with the request that they be returned to her. She indicated that the letters would be bequeathed to the College after her death. Although she died in 2000, the editors note that the letters have not been received and their whereabouts are unknown. Accordingly, *To the Java
Sea may represent the only source for Eccles’ letters as quoted in the volume. The book covers the period from 2 July 1940 to 27 March 1942. Eccles’ diary entries and letters “express unguarded attitudes and candid opinions that, if written by an American naval officer today, might be considered unacceptable, as particularly surprising in a man of Commander Eccles’s upbringing, education, and sensitivity” (xxiii). It begins with then-Lieutenant Commander Eccles sailing by passenger ship from New York City to Cape Town, South Africa, where he arrived on July 26. Eccles spent roughly three weeks sightseeing and traveling about, witnessing riots and engaging in discussion with local officials before departing for Manila in mid-August, again by passenger ship, to take command of John D. Edwards. Eccles took a circuitous route, stopping in Singapore, Calcutta (now Kolkata), Karachi, Dubai, and Bangkok, filling his diary and letters to his wife with candid observations. He finally reached Manila on 10 October 1940. Upon his arrival, Eccles sent a frank report to the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding the South Africa and Dutch governments’ likely ability to defend against Japanese aggression. In particular, Eccles described the views expressed to him by Dutch officials, that the islands most likely to be targeted by Japan had “no defenses worth mentioning … and … a few hundred troops could take practically unopposed position” of most of the Dutch East Indies (70). His report was prescient given Japan’s eventual conquest of the region.

The volume then moves to his command of the John D. Edwards, preparations for the likely coming war, and the sea battles in which Eccles’ ship participated. In letters to his wife, he provides his opinions on events occurring in Europe and the lack of affirmative action against the Axis powers by the US. His letters and diary entries reveal the uncertainties, stress, and strain of an individual commander and his warship preparing for battle. It also shows Eccles’ concern for his men, asking his wife in multiple letters to send “care packages” for the officers and sailors under his command.

After being attacked by Japanese bombers and multiple near-engagements, Eccles and Edwards fought their first surface action the night of 19-20 February 1942. He later told his wife it was “the most spectacular and terrific experience of my life” (236). He received the Navy Cross for his gallantry in the battle – a decoration he did not believe he deserved. The book culminates with the Battles of the Java Sea and of Sunda Straight, fought successively on February 27 to 28. In those battles, the ABDA forces were soundly defeated by the Japanese Imperial Navy. Using excerpts from Eccles’ reports, letters, diary, and ship’s log, the book paints a compelling picture of the intense and often-confused actions. He summarized the battles saying, “We had gotten the hell licked out of us” (255). Eccles bemoans the fact that his men have to fight the Japanese using old ships and weapons. The enemy uses American “ideas
on strategy and naval tactics” while the US has “thrown them to the winds and have borrowed others from God knows where—and they are not so hot.” Candidly, he tells his wife, “I felt like vomiting when I read the press reports from Batavia and London as to the situation in Java. I know, for I fought there. … [G]et rid of the smoothies and routine boys, dig in and fight” (259). While recovering from his wounds, Eccles is relieved of command of the John D. Edwards and sent back to the States. The book concludes on 27 March 1942, with a final brief line to his wife while he was still in Australia: “A fine golf game. All relaxed – moral high. Good luck!” (265)

As Professor Hattendorf states in his introduction, “The three-year span between 1940 and 1942 was critical in Henry Eccles’s life and career” (xxii). To the Java Sea fills the gap in the historical record for Eccles and provides new insights not only into his subsequent career focusing on logistics and strategic thinking, but also this essential period where command of an old warship taught him the importance of those topics during war. The volume should prove an essential addition to the naval history of the early ABDA command in Southeast Asia, American successes and failures in the early months of the war in the Pacific, as well as the life of the man for which the library at the Naval War College is named.

Alan M. Anderson
London, England


The SS City of Flint was just one of the many American ocean-going freighters that regularly plied the North Atlantic trade routes in the late 1930s calling on ports in Europe. It was not a particularly large or otherwise noteworthy ship, being rated at less than 5000 gross register tons (GRT). It had been ordered in May 1918 in the aftermath of the United States’ entry into the First World War, the vessel’s name commemorating the contributions of the residents of her namesake city toward the US Liberty Loans campaign. In fact, until 1939, City of Flint’s career was almost as unremarkable as the ship itself. It was, however, destined to become one of the most famous merchantmen of the early days of the Second World War.

First catapulted into international fame as a rescue ship, City of Flint was next a short-lived German prize vessel. Upon her release, it went on to sail in North Atlantic and Artic convoys, as well as in the Persian Gulf before
Magne Haugseng, a political scientist and historian with an interest in the naval history of the Second World War, tells its story in his first major publication in naval history. It should be noted that the book’s publisher, McFarland & Company Inc., is not a mainstream publishing house; but it does enjoy a solid reputation among professional librarians. Its eclectic and extensive catalogue seems to be filled with a large number of “direct to paperback” editions similar to this volume. In keeping with this heritage, it should be mentioned that despite being a paperback, it is a very sturdy volume and is well-suited for a library collection.

The author tells the story of this ill-starred vessel in sixteen chapters of disparate lengths that are presented in five main sections. The well-written text covers all the major aspects of City of Flint’s main wartime voyages, from its rescue of the passengers of the SS Athenia in September 1939 to its sinking in January 1943. Unfortunately, Flint’s role in rescuing the passengers of the ill-fated liner Athenia receives only cursory coverage in this volume. Not unsurprisingly, the vessel’s odyssey as a German prize vessel, which began when she was seized by the German “pocket battleship” Deutschland in October 1939, forms the bulk of the volume. It is interesting to note that once City of Flint was returned to American control, the German Navy was ordered in no uncertain terms to refrain from any further action against the vessel by Adolf Hitler himself. The vessel’s subsequent experiences on the Murmansk run, in the Persian Gulf, and its eventual sinking in the Atlantic by a German submarine are covered adequately, but again in a more fleeting fashion than that of her Norwegian adventure. The author maintains that his inspiration for writing City of Flint’s story was his meeting with a survivor of the Flint’s sinking in 1943, so it should come as no surprise that this topic is well-covered and forms one of the most poignant sections of this work.

Overall, the strong text is ably buttressed by a brief but more than adequate introduction and several tables and appendices. It is ably supported by detailed endnotes and a very comprehensive bibliography. There are a number of well-drawn and useful maps detailing City of Flint’s odyssey as a German prize vessel, but unfortunately, they are not summarized in a table. Overall, the photographs have been well-chosen and are quite clear given that they have not been reproduced on photo-quality paper. In general, this decision allowed the publisher to better intersperse them within the text, but as with the maps, a cumulative listing is lacking. Also missing are any images of the Norwegian vessels that seized the Flint from the Germans, or photos of it as a German prize. Even more striking, however, is that this volume does not include any schematic drawings or even a table outlining the more technical details of City of Flint’s specifications. It also strikes one as odd that there are no photos or drawings of Deutschland included in this work. It is intriguing that German
images depicting the vessel’s sinking were quickly “censured” through the removal of its name.

Haugseng’s treatment of the many personalities who were directly involved in the story of City of Flint is one of the highlights of this work. From the vessel’s captains and crews, the German prize crew and that of the submarine that sunk it, as well the diplomats of the nations that became entangled in its story, all of his portrayals are very informative and useful. The author’s critical depiction of Norway’s Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht’s role in City of Flint’s Norwegian odyssey is particularly unflattering. Haugseng’s representation of Lieutenant zur See Hans Pusback, the commander of the German prize crew aboard Flint, is very intriguing. His speculation that Pusback had a wartime exit strategy is certainly correct and deserves more study. One of the strengths of this account is that it provides us with a real and very rare glimpse into the world of German prize crews during this conflict.

In summary, Haugseng’s coverage of Flint’s adventures during the Second World War is well-written but, at best, uneven. The story is worthy of further research and the author has certainly provided us with a much better starting point than the vessel’s former captain’s now dated and perhaps deliberately limited 1940 autobiography. Few Second World War merchantmen could boast of such a varied war experience as City of Flint, and the author and publisher should be complimented for reminding us of the many roles the vessel played in this epic struggle. This study is definitely a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the naval history of the Second World War, especially from the perspective of the merchant marine.

Peter Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec


This work is the 293rd entry in Osprey Publishing’s New Vanguard Series and author Brian Lane Herder’s eighth work for various Osprey series. It can be viewed as a foil to his two earlier New Vanguard entries, which covered US Navy battleships from 1886-1908. Instead of focusing on the most famous and imposing ships of the era, Herder offers an examination of the evolution and service lives of the most diminutive of armed vessels, the humble gunboat. By means of a chronological study of the designs and deployment of steel-hulled gunboats in armed conflicts from the Spanish-American War of 1898 through
to the death of the Asiatic Fleet in 1942, Herder aims to offer a “succinct yet broad-ranging survey” of the “highlights” of gunboat service with the US Navy (5). The Spanish-American War era and Asiatic Fleet naturally make up a large portion of the discussion, with examinations into other designs and aspects as well. Period images and computer-generated renderings are used throughout the work to illustrate different vessels and important actions, with a selected bibliography and index following Herder’s concluding analysis.

The text’s introduction is twofold, with Herder’s initial explanations and basic delve into design paired with a two page insert detailing American gunboat development in the 1843-1883 period. He addresses the sometimes murky question of what constitutes a gunboat and the decision to include monitors, armed yachts, and flagships in the discussion due to the vessels being “gunboats in all but name” (5). From this point, the text is divided into overall chronology and selected engagements, with the former constituting the bulk of the work, at more than 20 of the 48 pages. Arranged in a largely linear format with monitors, yachts, and flagships inserted in the latter stages, this section details the design, funding, construction, and general service notes for the US Navy’s gunboats and gunboat prizes. Each sub-section concludes with a table of basic ship data, listing the relevant vessels’ names, build years, service years, tonnage draft, speed, and main armament. A total of 121 vessels are documented in this fashion, with the most notable or case study examples receiving further details in the text itself.

The second half of the work offers a more focused look at four selected periods of gunboat engagements. The combative actions off Cuba, Puerto Rico, and in Manila Bay against the Spanish is the natural starting point, with descriptions of the initial fighting followed by the capture and repurposing of Spanish prizes. A brief description of the 1899-1916 Banana Wars follows, detailing some of America’s actions in the Caribbean and relevant gunboat activities. The Asiatic Fleet receives the bulk of the allotted text, subdivided between coverage of activities during the 38 years prior to the Japanese sinking of USS Panay on 12 December 1937 and from Panay’s loss to the dissolution of the Asiatic Fleet on 6 May 1942. Surprisingly, the Atlantic Theatre in both World Wars is rarely touched upon, as is the Second World War Caribbean Theatre. Finally, Herder offers his conclusions on gunboat services with a summation of their post-Second World War disposal and his view that they were a formative piece of the American Navy via their ability to give future leaders their first seaborne command and their unique and independent nature amidst the more uniform designs of standard fleets of the time.

One criticism is that the digital profile renderings of selected gunboats, while appreciated, lack a simple scale marker to help illustrate the size of the vessels. Further, while a good deal of information is presented regarding the
captured Spanish gunboats reused by the American Navy, there is barely a mention of the 18 Flower class corvettes built in Canada during 1942-1943 and used by America as Temptress and Action class gunboats. More detail on these vessels, along with the Second World War Atlantic and Caribbean gunboat operations in general, would be a welcome addition.

*US Navy Gunboats* is a good introductory text into the gunboat, monitor, and armed yacht designs fielded by the United States from the Spanish-American War era through the Second World War. Herder is able to provide succinct summaries of the various design types and several of the key conflicts within the limited space afforded by Osprey’s New Vanguard format, coupled with a good selection of period images and an excellent cross-sectional rendering of the most famous gunboat, the *Panay*. While Herder’s Second World War coverage could doubtlessly be expanded upon with discussions of the Caribbean and Atlantic Theatres, or the *Flower* corvettes, he has provided a solid stepping stone for those seeking to learn of the different vessels employed in a gunboat role by the United States Navy in the days leading up to the Spanish-American War through the fall of the Asiatic Fleet in 1942.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Although the Second World War propelled the Canadian economy from its reliance on resources into a world of technology-based industry and innovation, that change still does not seem to have imprinted itself in the minds of much of Canadian society. It does not mean that Canadians are not innovative or technically competent, but all too often, Canadian technology and ideas are submerged or bought out by outsiders. Often, “made in Canada” breakthrough concepts are exploited by other nations’ industries while Canadian governments, industry, and consumers eagerly snap up their products. Either that, or Canadian success stories remain invisible, only to be recognized for what they are beyond Canada’s borders.

Vickie Jensen’s survey of British Columbia’s undersea technology industry exposes one of these success stories: not only as a chronicle of surmounting the challenging engineering problems of designing equipment that works reliably and safely in the forbidding environment of the deep ocean, but also of making the product a commercial success. Indeed, her own motivation for
writing this book illustrates the issue of an industry “hiding its light under a barrel.” After moving from the US Midwest to British Columbia, Jensen got a job as editor of *Westcoast Mariner* magazine, which led to spending months at sea on various coastal craft to write about the province’s coastal marine industry. Not until a reader prompted her to do so, however, did it occur to her to investigate the underwater component of that provincial industrial base. Just as ocean waters cover a myriad of wonders, so it seems, did they obscure an emerging industry.

Jensen’s journalism background is evident in her largely personality-based approach to the story. Her narrative begins in the late 1950s with the demands by commercial diving to extend beyond the (then) usual depth limit of 100 feet. This part of the story is based on the experience and drive of two pioneering BC divers and the challenges involved in the business of underwater salvage, bridge construction and rescue. Overcoming such problems as working in icy waters, river currents, and rough weather, at depths on the edge of the limitations of hard-hat diving at the time, prompted them to develop new techniques, update technology, and develop improved diving tables.

Their customer base, in particular the emerging offshore oil industry, demanded deeper dives and work on heavier structures, driving these early innovators to developing a mini-submarine capability to provide longer dives and safer working conditions. Again, Jensen focusses on the “characters” who chased the dream of developing a unique undersea intervention capability in BC and the mix of invention, engineering, and business sense necessary to pull it off. The result was the establishment of the International Hydrodynamics Company (or HYCO) which not only lived up to its international name, but spawned numerous corporations focussed on underwater operations and equipment. Perhaps even more important, HYCO provided the initial training and experience for many individuals who eventually became key players in the development, engineering, and business aspects of underwater technology. HYCO’s signature product was the Pisces series of minisubs, which extended diving operations to 2000 metres. This, in turn, expanded the nature of jobs that could be undertaken on behalf of offshore oil and gas exploration, research, torpedo recovery, and, in one instance, a very deep rescue operation. It also expanded BC’s reputation as the incubator for undersea technology development and its international customers (including to the Soviet Union, which even featured a Pisces craft on a postage stamp). Success brought its perils however. Expanding operations meant expanding capital requirements, which led to business partnerships and eventually, a public offering. The latter involved a new world of corporate management for which the founders were ill-suited and this, coupled with the ups and downs of its customer base, and competing advances in technology, saw the demise of HYCO in 1979.
HYCO may have collapsed but, as the author points out, it spawned a number of follow-on companies, both in the underwater intervention business itself and in support industries, as well as a new generation of entrepreneurs eager to get into the business. Can-Dive, Oceaneering, and Nuytco are major examples of BC enterprises that evolved from the late 1960s to the present day. Innovations in equipment and techniques came with an expanding international customer base and conditions that ranged from the Caribbean to the high Arctic. Oceaneering’s successful development of an Atmospheric Diving Suit permitted deep-diving operations (300m) without compression and decompression operations, the use of regular gas, and a smaller surface support system. Projects undertaken using diving suits and manned minisubs also included support to the film industry, ecological research, underwater survey and even training astronauts in a simulated zero-G environment.

As the world of underwater intervention and exploration evolved, demanding even deeper operating depths, the future lay in eliminating the human element (on the ocean floor) altogether. This led to the development of the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), leaving the human operator on the tender vessel above. Development of this technology generally favoured larger, well capitalized firms, but BC companies persevered with often surprising success. Ocean Works won a remotely-operated submarine rescue system contract (Pressurised Rescue Module System—PMRS) based on previous work done for the Australian navy. Subsequent projects by BC companies involved developing ROVs for pipeline route survey, semi-submersible remotely-operated vehicles for naval mine countermeasures, and one, the Remotely Operated Platform for Ocean Science (ROPOS) used in Canada and the US for research.

International Submarine Engineering (ISE) was a key player in these later developments, but the company realized that a major limitation of ROVs, namely the umbilical providing control, power and data communications to a surface tender, could be overcome. Tapping into emerging power, computer and sensor technology, they developed an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) suitable for long-range operations free of any surface link. AUVs represented a major capability improvement for long-range and long-duration projects hydrographic surveys under ice, oceanographic research, and mine countermeasures and was a major step forward in underwater work. Another innovation, outlined in the book, is the development by the University of Victoria’s Ocean Networks Canada of two instrumented undersea networks (VENUS and NEPTUNE) off the BC coast, designed to provide open and continuous geophysical, oceanographic, and biological monitoring of the sea floor on the Juan de Fuca plate.

There were other applications for undersea technologies as well, and
Jensen’s account includes sections on submarine tourism, underwater research, and even treasure hunting. She focusses on the people involved, providing bulleted career summaries of some of the key people in the various companies. The business background is also a key element of her account of the marriage of managing a growing business, a volatile customer demand and requirements, tight timelines with cutting edge technology, and innovation.

Depending on the reader’s bent, one might wish for a bit more detail on the technology side. For instance, more discussion of the technique and capabilities of Atmospheric Diving Suit technology and comparison with other systems might have been useful. While the emphasis is the author’s privilege, one wonders at times if Jensen had difficulty with some elements of it. For example, when discussing some early Pisces submersible employment, she describes work done recovering Mk 46 and Mk 48 torpedoes for the US Navy on the test range at Nanoose, BC. In describing the difficulty in extracting the larger Mk 48’s buried in the mud it might have been useful to have mentioned that these submarine-launched heavyweight weapons were some seven times heavier than the air and ship launched Mk 46 anti-submarine torpedoes. A trivial point perhaps, but she compounds it later in the book when she states that a former submarine commander used the Mk 46 torpedo with a “21-in hull diameter” as the inspiration for an AUV. (The Mk 46 is a 12.75-in design not used by submarines and the submariner would have used the much larger Mk 48 and Mk37C weapons.)

While ostensibly an account of the trials and tribulations of developing technology in a challenging and dangerous environment, Jensen’s book is really about the people involved and how they rose to meet those challenges. In fact, the final chapter largely focusses on advice on how to build a career in such a world with an explicit exhortation to women not to be afraid of getting involved in a technology-based career. The book, therefore, is well worth a read by career guidance counsellors at high schools and colleges. Similarly, its discussion of the difficulties of marrying the risk-taking and “get ‘er done” attitude of the early technology pioneers with the practicalities of managing a growing business and expanding one into a publicly traded corporation. Indeed, the work would not be out of place in the case studies section of a business school library. Jensen states up front that she chose the title *Deep, Dark and Dangerous* to underline the risks involved in deep-diving operations. The reader comes away with the impression that perhaps the title more accurately reflects the business environment in Canada when trying to establish a technology-based enterprise here.

Mark Tunnicliffe
Stittsville, Ontario
Recreational and competitive sailing engages hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of participants all over the world. The work of designers, builders, and sailors has its own body of literature which, although frequently of a very high quality, does not always result in peer-reviewed, academic presentation. Popular journals, such as the now-discontinued *Maritime Life and Traditions* and *WoodenBoat* are sources of well-researched and well-written historical articles but do not often appear in bibliographies. By the same token, non-academic monographs, especially those documenting the more recent period, are often overlooked as sources for nautical history.

Such may be the case with the recent publication of *The Bruce Kirby Story: From the River to the Sea*. Kirby, who died in 2021, was a Canadian yachtsman and competitive sailor who represented Canada in three Olympic Games. His greatest legacy, however, will probably be as a designer. The Laser sailing dinghy, which he developed in 1969, became an international class sailed in over 120 countries and well over 200,000 of the diminutive single-person racers have been produced. The boat is currently the Olympic single-hander class boat. In all, Kirby designed 62 boats during a 50-year period and these designs, which included America’s Cup challengers and custom yachts, account for another 8,000 boats. Kirby’s contribution to the sport of sailing was recognized by his appointment to the Order of Canada, the nation’s highest civilian honour, in 2019.

The Kirby story sheds a good deal of light on the development of recreational sailing and racing in the period of the second half of the twentieth century. Kirby was a practised writer who worked for many years as a journalist, initially in the newspaper world, and later in specialist sailing magazines. Written as a memoir the volume does not purport to be a definitive history of the period but rather, a very personal account of one individual’s encounters with the sailing world. As such, it is, by and large, a very readable and intriguing inside view of life within the yachting community, a community which spans local club recreational racing and cruising through to the highest levels of international match racing. The scope of Kirby’s involvement in all these areas both as a competitor and developer is remarkable.

Opening with an account of family sailing at Ottawa’s Britannia Yacht Club, Kirby recounts his beginning in competitive racing with the International 14 class in the late 1940s. This led to his first design efforts a decade later, improving the racing craft within the class-established limitations. The story
of the Laser began in 1969 and continued through a series of modifications which established it as one of the most popular small boats ever built. During the 1970s, he developed a wide range of designs for small yachts, such as the San Juan 24, the Kirby 25, and Kirby 30, and the Sonar, many examples of which are still being sailed competitively and recreationally nearly half a century later. Kirby designed the 12-Meter America’s Cup challenge boats Canada I and Canada II and the book gives Kirby’s take on the America’s Cup competition in the 12-Meter era. The book also sheds some light on the business of small-boat production and how the progression from design to marketing can spell success or failure. Sometimes, as Kirby observes with regard to the 14-foot Pixel, one of his favourite designs, the boat just does not catch on.

Originally begun as an autobiography, after several years Kirby’s health began to fail and he dictated several additional chapters to Mark Smith in the period before his death at age 92. He is a good story-teller and his wry take on things results in many good anecdotes of sailing life. To some extent, however, the volume appears incomplete as there are chapters in Kirby’s life that remained unwritten. The book was compiled by Mark Smith and the word “compiled” is used here with some justification. Smith identifies himself as a designer not as an editor and is careful to assert that he dared not edit Kirby’s work except for punctuation, spelling, or chronology. While this self-published book is well designed and presented with a pleasing selection of illustrations, it might well have benefitted from a firmer editorial hand as regards the contents.

Besides the memoir chapters, which are both entertaining and informative, the volume includes several sections or chapters which contribute to other aspects of the story. Among the more interesting are a listing of all of the Kirby designs and a selection of eight favourites with his detailed commentary. Some of these additions fit in less comfortably with the tone of the book and seem as if they may have been included to bulk up the volume. For example, the chapter on the popular Norwalk Island Sharpie design includes a lengthy 24-page account of an Australian sharpie adventure, which did not involve Kirby, reprinted from a sailing magazine. Short remembrances of several memorable figures in the sailing world such as Ted Turner, Uffa Fox, and Paul Elvstrøm are hung out as a separate chapter when they might better have been included within the narrative.

Overall, the book is an enjoyable and informative read, especially for someone who is involved in small-boat sailing. The book also gives us a window into the behind-the-scenes developments in international class racing and manufacturing – particularly interesting is Kirby’s account of how
the laser class design rights have been managed – or mismanaged – over the years. With more interest in the history of recreational and competitive sailing this volume will become an important resource.

Harry T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island


Angus Konstam sets out to cover 58 warships and their activities prior to and during the Spanish Civil War from April 1936 to July 1939. He condenses highly complex alliances and covers Spanish navies from centuries ago to their defeat in Cuba and Philippines in the 1898 Spanish-American War, from which the fleet never recovered. The early civil war played out from North Africa to Iberia, the Balearic Islands, even involving the North Sea and Adriatic. The final year of Spain’s naval war against itself was narrowed down to the Western Mediterranean, at which point Franco and his allies in Italy and Germany overwhelmed the Republicans, backed by the USSR and volunteers.

The strength of this book lies in being dispassionate, fully-illustrated and well-captioned. Konstam’s conclusion informs his thesis: “The naval war ended with a whimper rather than a bang. It had always been …secondary to the land campaign, but … without it, and the supplies it helped escort into the country, the Republic would have been hard-pressed to resist the Nationalists for so long” (34-35). It is a great relief that Konstam immediately steers readers through the minefields of politics and jargon and designates “communists, anarchists and trade unionists” as Republicans. Although they won an election, the Republicans managed to alienate the “Church, landowners, and monarchists, who along with the fascist-nationalist Falangists,” became Nationalists, firmly under General Franco. The Republicans started out with vastly more naval ships yet suffered from fewer officers, a diffuse command structure, and ship yard delays.

The timeline centres on Franco entering Peninsular Spain, breaking the coup’s stalemate with the Nationalist Army of Africa. The Republican failure to stop him, despite their having capital ships and he merely a few gunboats was probably the most critical error of the war, a war won by avoiding each other’s fleets rather than provoking pitched battles. The fleets included battleships, heavy cruisers, dreadnoughts, destroyers, submarines, and torpedo, hydrographic, sail-training, patrol, river, fishery protection, patrol, river, custom boats, as well as tugs and seaplane tenders.
The ships were “crewed from a pool of around 19,000 men, including 1,166 officers.” Another 1,000 served in the Navy Air Arm which was impressively modern and complex, even if they trained on biplanes. A cadre of Marines protected naval bases and ships and were self-administered. Many of the pivotal moments for both sides were self-inflicted failures: on Day One, the overall naval chief was killed and his chief of staff arrested. In part due to the class nature of the conflict, Republicans suffered acute crewing difficulties. Sailors revolted against officers, and officers who remained loyal had to consult with and abide by a Comite de Buque, or Ship’s Committee (15-16). They had insufficiently experienced officers, and many of those ships under construction; one reads often about ships “obsolete when delivered.”

The focus of the naval civil war often feels more about blockades and smuggling arms. The Balearic ships were critical to the Nationalists, who held them against attack and used them to convoy Italian supplies to various fronts. One ship began the war in Equatorial Guinea, another off Morocco, one was built in Mexico, but almost all were built to British designs in Spain. The Italians were proxy warriors for Franco, committing 58 submarines that sank and terrorized a number of Republicans ships. Mussolini also sold four destroyers to the Nationalists, who later intercepted and sank the Soviet Union ship *Komsomol*. This provoked an outrage, and hardened French and British patrols in the Straits of Gibraltar. Stalin sent at least four motor torpedo boats (MTBs).

Seven of the fleet were coal-fired, two were hybrid, and the balance of 49 ships used fuel oil or diesel oil; one was capable of 36 knots. Several lacked turret guns, some of which swept their own decks. Indeed, a battleship stuck fake wooden barrels on deck, while another, the heavy cruiser *Baleares*, borrowed turrets. Coal was a logistical supply problem, particularly for the Republicans.

The Republican destroyers sank *Baleares*, killing 790 sailors; 469 survivors were rescued by the British when *Baleares* accidently fired a star shell above themselves. The Nationalist battleship *Espana* sank in April 1937 by hitting its compadres’ mine off Santander. The Republican battleship *Jaime I* ran aground, then blew up at anchor. When the battle turned against them on the Biscay coast, Republican ships sailed to England and France. When, in 1939, their Mediterranean ports also fell, they were interned at Tunisia and Algeria, which were then controlled by France. Franco effectively forced the Republican fleet to flee to French North Africa in April 1939. When the war ended that July, there was no Republican fleet to evacuate its loyalists, forcing them to remain and suffer.

Konstam’s work is clear, well-researched, and easy to follow. Of his 17 primary resources, seven are Spanish and one focused on the Italian side.
The reader is left curious about how the German U-34 sank the Republican submarine C-3, or which Republican vessels were sunk by Italians or Germans. The most striking omission is lack of a single map or chart, offset by Konstam’s description of cities as in: Bilbao, in the northwest; this is a publisher error. Konstam delineates a fascinating and compelling battleground which, due to the lack of a single, cataclysmic event, most readers may not know of.

Eric T. Wiberg
Boston, Massachusetts


In this book, Franz Kurowski explores the career of U-48, the most successful German submarine of the Second World War. He also provides an interesting and somewhat unexplored perspective on German U-Boat operations in the early days of that conflict.

Kurowski opens with a brief exploration of the development and structure of the U-Boat arm of the German Navy. While this will be familiar territory for anyone aware of the German submarine force during this conflict, it does provide students, who are either new to the subject or not well versed in the structure of the German submarine arm, a much needed foundation from which to understand how things were structured and organized, particularly early in the war. He then explores the career of U-48, approaching each of the submarine’s 12 war patrols in chronological order. Throughout the book, Kurowski steps away from the exploration of his main subject to explore other events happening simultaneously, in order to provide context for what was happening elsewhere. While this helps provide a well-rounded and complete picture of U-48’s career in the context of the larger conflict, the author’s frequent transitions from a broad narrative, to an almost-first-hand account of the actions of a single crew can be somewhat disorienting. Once one adjusts to the alternating perspectives, however, Kurowski does an excellent job of putting readers into the shoes of a German U-boat crew in the early days of the Second World War.

The author’s focus on a single German submarine at the start of the war informs new students about the successes and challenges facing the first U-Boat crews. Others more familiar with the subject, will find the idea that German ships were fighting using prize rules in the early days of the conflict an eye-opener. While Germany’s later use of unrestricted submarine warfare is well
documented, the early days, when they were still playing by the acknowledged rules of war, are often overlooked. Kurowski also examines such problems as the reliability of German torpedoes, providing an interesting comparison for readers interested in how the US Navy responded to similar issues that plagued their fleet after their entrance into the Second World War. The book concludes with the winding down of U-48’s career, as newly developed sub-surface technologies and tactics required adjustments that rendered U-Boat practices from the beginning of the war less effective.

Anyone interested in the technical and tactical aspects of early Second World War submarine warfare will find this work interesting. Using U-48 as an example, Kurowski examines how U-Boats fought before the implementation of wolf packs, why wolf pack tactics emerged and how they evolved along with other combat techniques. This book should also appeal to students looking for basic statistics on early Second World War U-boats, and the performance of the German U-Boat navy, throughout the war. Drawing extensively from various primary and secondary German sources, Kurowski makes excellent use of research that might be otherwise unavailable to students outside Germany, affording new insights and information to broader scholarship.

Kurowski’s exploration of the technical and tactical limitations and problems of U-48, reveals Germany’s early wartime difficulties. Their lack of available submarines and ineffective torpedoes offers an interesting comparison with their Allied adversaries. As Kurowski notes, the declining effectiveness of single submarines in the face of evolving Allied technology and tactics as the war progressed, forced the Germany Navy to alter the way their submarines waged war. This period is often overlooked in conventional studies of both the Battle of the Atlantic and the Second World War. Viewing German U-Boat activity in the early days of the Second World War through the periscope of a single submarine allows Kurowski to introduce new students to the subject, and still provide something new for more experienced readers.

Michael Razer
Ward, Arkansas


This spectacular book exploits the format Brian Lavery employed for Nelson’s Navy and Churchill’s Navy, to provide a detailed examination of the ships and their fittings, officers and men, dockyards, fleets, commercial shipping, the
wider world, strategy and tactics, amphibious operations, and the overall impact of the mid-eighteenth-century Royal Navy. In contrast to both previous texts, Anson really did shape the service, which he led as a flag officer and First Lord of the Admiralty, the responsible Cabinet Minister. This post enabled him to improve the navy in wartime and during the brief peace between 1748 to 1756, when the estimates were reduced. Anson oversaw improved ship designs and conditions of service, helped shape national strategy, and the identity of the service, introducing uniforms for officers, while his patronage and use of the acting rank of Commodore raised the standard of naval command. What Anson began with was a large but out-dated force, focussed on European conflict, hidebound by formal rules and structures, and better equipped to fight battles than win wars. He transformed it into the imperial fleet that conquered the overseas empires of France and Spain, ending with great amphibious victories at Havana and Manilla, victories that Anson, the famed circumnavigator had planned, and his followers delivered.

Brian Lavery’s expertise on the mid-eighteenth-century Royal Navy is unequalled, and this book develops and integrates his work with other scholarship to produce a compelling study of the service in an age of transition that laid the foundations for *Nelson’s Navy*. Skilfully exploiting the rich collections of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich enhances and expands the text. The integration of word and text is almost seamless, nothing is described that can be better understood through an illustration. The compound timeline in the end papers, linking Anson, the Royal Navy, Britain, Europe, and the world, makes brilliant use of an often-neglected space, something that would have appealed to the architecturally-engaged Anson.

The only thing missing, as Lavery notes, is the man himself. Famously taciturn, and equally reluctant to write, it is hard to establish Anson’s role in key reforms. Nicholas Rodger’s essay in Harding and Le Fevre’s *Precursor of Nelson*, missing from the bibliography, remains the best assessment of his career, while stretching into contemporary politics and culture provides additional insight. A key element of Anson’s success lay in his willingness to engage in the political world as a responsible Minister, not a carping critic like Admiral Sir Edward Vernon. Well aware that his ability to shape the service would depend on political connections, Anson, the younger brother of Staffordshire gentleman, used the wealth and fame secured by his circumnavigation and naval success to enter the world of high politics and promote the interests of his family. Marrying Elizabeth Yorke in 1747, only months after his promotion to the peerage as Lord Anson, placed him at the heart of Georgian politics and society. His father-in-law, Lord Hardwicke, was the Lord Chancellor, a confidant of the King, and the key mid-century political fixer. In 1751, a major Cabinet reshuffle saw Anson replace his former ally
Lord Sandwich as First Lord of the Admiralty, an office he would hold, with one break, until his death in 1762. The combination of naval rank and a noble title made it possible for a sea officer to enter the cabinet. Being in the Cabinet enabled him to change the Navy. When the Duke of Newcastle’s government resigned in November 1756, largely on account of the Minorca debacle, many blamed Anson personally for the debacle, and the death of Admiral Sir John Byng. Despite this setback, Hardwicke’s intervention and the support of the King saw Anson return to the Admiralty in June 1757, as a key contributor to the success of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry that brought the war to a triumphant climax. Although Anson was out of office for almost a year, Lavery observes that his successors did not change his systems or methods.

Anson’s reforms reflected hard-won professional experience and a significant engagement with science, including astronomy, an enthusiasm he shared with his cousin George Parker, Second Earl of Macclesfield. While Macclesfield became the leading British astronomer of the era, Anson’s practical skill may explain his selection to command the circumnavigation, and the search for improved navigational methods under his Admiralty Board. Anson was a Fellow of the Royal Society on merit, he employed artillery expert and scientist Benjamin Robins FRS to turn his famous voyage into a pioneer official history, complete with coastal profiles and navigational information, ensuring the lessons learnt were available to inform future Pacific voyages.

Having little interest in London society, Anson used the wealth generated by the circumnavigation to promote his political career, buy a great House, Moor Park, in Rickmansworth, acquire suitable art, including naval pictures, by Samuel Scott and John Cleveley and enhance the family estate at Shugborough in Staffordshire. The Anson peerage would pass to his elder brother in 1762, establishing the family in the upper ranks of society.

A sophisticated and discerning architectural patron, his legacy includes three major structures at the Old Royal Naval Hospital in Greenwich, the Infirmary, the west elevation of the King Charles Building, and the spectacular Chapel, completed two decades after his death. All three were created by James “Athenian” Stuart, who Anson appointed as Surveyor of the Hospital in 1758. Stuart pioneered Greek Revival architecture, sponsorship from the Society of Dilettanti, co-founded by Anson’s elder brother Thomas, funded Stuart’s journey to Greece and the publication of his reports. The Anson brothers also employed Stuart to provide “Greek” monuments and other work at Shugborough. Both Anson and Lord Howe subscribed to the published edition of Stuart’s work.

Anson’s legacy to the Royal Navy endured long after his death, through ships and structures, methods, practices, and above all the inspiration of his example. While he helped shape many naval careers, Anson inspired his
cousins John Jervis and William Parker: both rose to be Admirals of the Fleet, and both served with Nelson. Anson’s Navy captures the contribution of an outstanding individual to the emergence of a dynamic, dominant fighting force, one that reflected his character, experience and aims. Perhaps the key to understanding Anson can be found in his works.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


Notwithstanding the subtitle, the years of endurance of the title span from just after the preliminary First World War mobilization of May 1914 until January 1917 when the author is posted as the medical officer in charge of Wei-hai-wei. Between these two brackets we are given a unique and varied perspective on the naval war as viewed from the perceptive and sympathetic vantage point of a Royal Navy Staff Surgeon. The variety runs the gamut from medical organizational matters, commentary on the ship and the ship’s company, through discourses on naval tactics, the mindset of “Jack at War,” and events ashore, to the core subject of action at sea. In some ways it is very much a book of its time in the style of writing and perspective of viewpoints expressed, and yet it reads well and, in particular sections, with such an immediacy that the reader almost forgets that these events occurred over a century ago and were written eighty-five years ago.

The story begins with medical preliminaries involving the tumultuous setting up of a temporary hospital following the results of a preliminary mobilization preceding the actual declaration of war. In the spirit of the first three Naval Toasts of the Day, Muir devotes separate chapters to Our Ship, Our Sailors (Jack at War), and Ourselves (Our Officers).

The ship was HMS Tiger, a battlecruiser of some 28,500 long tons standard displacement and 703 feet length overall. Muir joined the ship at John Brown’s, the builders yard, three days before the crew of 1500 arrived for the commissioning on 3 October 1914. He provides a fascinating glimpse into the chaos of taking a ship out of a builder’s yard, with the colossal effort of getting the ship operational with a huge, unfamiliar crew (including a wartime augment of 600) wedged into a ship that the shipyard had delivered in a highly unsanitary state. There are some moments of levity in his discussion of his
role as the ship’s censor, including one incident where he detects clandestine writing under the stamp and summons the sailor to explain the significance of SWALK or appear at Captain’s Defaulters. He recounts that the answer (“Sealed With A Loving Kiss”) occasioned much laughter and caused both the sailor and the censor embarrassment for a long time afterwards. More serious was the first real (not-for-exercise) experience of night-time action stations in which events led to a situation of panic. This then engenders some reflection on the part of the author regarding the nature of discipline, and the recall of this definition by one of his former senior officers: “discipline is intelligent obedience given to reasonable orders” – a rather modern definition for 1914.

The chapter “Jack at War” towards the end of the book is essentially a paean to the sailor, extolling his strengths, resilience, and resolve, but also sympathetically observing his weaknesses and prejudices. In fact, the sailor features large throughout the book, including an amusing sequence (59-69) in which a Stoker Second Class finds himself in front of a court martial for striking a superior, is discharged to the Depot for ten days in cells, and emerges re-incarnated as a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). This anecdote actually appears in the chapter “Our Officers,” which outlines the organization and routine of a ship, rank titles, and coloured cloth designations of the various specialist branches (although the p. 49 reference to the engineers’ colour being “chocolate” vice purple is in error). The role and hierarchy of the executive branch is explained, from the captain down to the senior commander, then the first lieutenant. In passing, it is noted that the term “salt horse” refers to a seaman officer with no specialty, and there are interesting and amusing anecdotes concerning personal servants (71), chaplains and church services (76-80), and a suitable extolling of the unique character and capabilities of the engineer commander (80-83).

A number of chapters specifically describe Tiger’s operations in the period concerned. The initial operations while Tiger was based at Scapa Flow give the author the occasion to discuss geographic and hydrographic issues relating to tactics and strategy. The lesson of the Scarborough raid – that the fleet was too far from the threatened northeastern coasts – led to battlecruisers being dispatched to and based at Rosyth for the remainder of the war. There follows a narration of the action on Dogger Bank. Interesting threads which run through the chapter are the effects on ship morale of ill-informed public perception of the inefficacy of fleet actions (Muir himself, in full naval uniform ashore, was mistaken on a train platform for a railway employee (110); the continuing presence onboard of dockyard workmen drawing “danger pay”; and the struggle to improve the social conditions of families when the sailors wages fell far short of unionized wages ashore. There was also the strain of contending with long periods of inaction and boredom.
The apogee of the narrative concerns Tiger’s participation in the Battle of Jutland. The prelude captures well the nervous tension and anticipation of imminent contact with the enemy, and the mock insouciance of pre-battle banter (150). The battle itself is told from two perspectives: first, the imagined or second-hand perspective of the lieutenant in the armoured conning-tower, 120 feet above the sea (151-161), a blow-by-blow account of spotting and salvos exchanged, including the sudden and shocking loss of the battlecruiser HMS Queen Mary, next ahead in line. The second perspective is the parallel, but more personal one, in the chapter “MO in Action.” This is, I think, the most interesting, natural, and gripping chapter of the book. There are not many narratives of naval surgeons, and fewer still that convey with such immediacy the stress, the din, the grinding fatigue, and the uncertainty of service in the medical officer’s “distributing station,” the modern counterpart of the orlop or cockpit of Nelson’s day. In the aftermath of the battle, there is the return to Rosyth, with inevitable operational post mortems. Muir himself, having had ten days leave in the preceding two and a half years, is posted ashore (against his own wishes to remain with the ship for the duration).

The meat of the book is bracketed by two seagoing vignettes. The first is an amazing evocation of HMS Tiger at sea in a North Sea storm, amazing in the sense of how wet the ship is, and the violence of motion, in spite of the ship’s size. The second vignette is of another night at sea, in a P&O liner headed east to his new posting. Muir is asked by an apprehensive passenger if he intends to turn in fully dressed (in consideration of the risk of being torpedoed). Muir answers in the negative, remarking, in a fitting epitaph to his experience in Tiger, “Look here! I’ve been so frightened for the past two and a half years that I cannot be frightened anymore. Good-night.”

John Muir completed his RN service as a Surgeon Rear-Admiral. Years of Endurance was his first book, followed in 1938 by Messing About in Boats (a brilliant account of his many adventures under sail, republished in 2016 by Lodestar Books). When war broke out in 1939, Muir was 67 and too old to be called up to active service. Undeterred, he secured a commission as a temporary sub-lieutenant, RNVR, and was lost when HM Yacht Campeador hit a mine in June 1940. Indeed, he could not be frightened any more. Years of Endurance is a most worthwhile read, and the new edition includes an introduction by retired RN Surgeon Rear Admiral Mike Farquharson-Roberts.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia

Major conflicts of a maritime nature require large numbers of ships for fighting and supporting roles, especially when long in duration. In response, belligerent nations with navies customarily requisition ships from trade or private interests and embark on crash programs of shipbuilding to meet immediate operational needs. Those types of ships are built quickly, mostly to less stringent mercantile standards rather than naval specifications. What to do with surplus ships not easily absorbed into reduced postwar navies once hostilities end poses a dilemma. Many are auctioned off for scrap value at bargain-basement prices to willing buyers, or others kept in the stasis of strategic reserves for a longer time period, when they might be needed again in another conflict. While construction and war service of these ships naturally receive much attention from historians and naval writers, their subsequent fate might only warrant a short line in a table or description, if considered at all. Nick Robins, author of the previous Wartime Standard Ships (Seaforth, 2017) sets out to address this omission with a focused study of how individual ships and classes of ships and landing craft have been recycled, reused, and repurposed, with a particular focus on the two world wars of the twentieth century.

As the title implies, a commercial rationale underpins the conversion of former naval vessels after conflict. Surplus ships saturate the market and find all sorts of innovative uses, sometimes far removed from their original warfighting intent. The book is divided into a short preface and fifteen distinct chapters. The first two chapters describe the general characteristics that make a warship amenable to conversion to commercial purposes and some of the challenges involved. The narrow beam, watertight bulkheads, and faster speeds of many warships prove uneconomical in the carriage of freight and passengers, without substantial modification. The third chapter describes some conversions from the nineteenth century, including the redundant fleet of the German Confederation put up for sale. The Royal Navy used aging and obsolete ships for exploration, harbour duties, and static hulks to provide accommodation and storage. The next three chapters detail conversions during the late stages and after the First World War. The protected cruiser HMS *Charybdis* was loaned to Bermuda as a converted merchant vessel, and wartime minesweepers found new lives as passenger ships and steamers. Likewise, fleet tugs, trawlers, drifters, and X lighter landing craft were sold to commercial interests in significant numbers. In Germany, larger coastal defence vessels, dated cruisers, and a couple of destroyers filled a shortage of available merchant shipping post-war. Diesel engines from scrapped German submarines were also in high demand for the generation of electricity in coastal towns in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The remaining chapters deal with various classes of ships and landing craft constructed during the Second World War amenable to conversion for commercial purposes. Convoy escorts under the guise of corvettes, frigates, and patrol craft were built to commercial standards and sought after by private owners for reuse in whaling fleets, ferry services, carriage of goods, and weather reporting. Ships previously provided to the Royal Navy under Lend-Lease arrangements were liquidated in locales and distributed to other European countries to help with rebuilding. Escort carriers consisting of fast merchant ship hulls with a flight deck were reconfigured for return to commercial trade and conversion to immigrant ships. Several types of landing ships and craft became ferries and motorized lighters. The landing ship tank (LST), in its many varieties, was converted into luxury cruise ships like the Caribbean Silverstar and more commonly, other general commercial purposes available under charter or direct ownership. Chapter 11 features some prominent former warships from the US Navy and Royal Canadian Navy such as John Wayne’s Wild Goose from a yard minesweeper (YMS) hull and Greek shipping tycoon Aristotle Onassis’ luxury yacht Christina, the former HMS Stormont, even though most wartime ships from those navies were scrapped altogether. Post-Second World War, fishing vessels, trawlers, and tugs built for naval service were in such high demand among private interests, that their availability actually impeded introduction of more modern, efficient designs for years to come. Chapter 13 devotes special attention to the wood constructed Fairmile motor launches, that due to their size and basic design, remained a favourite for conversions in many roles in commercial and private hands. Smaller minesweepers, motor launches, and other specialized craft found new uses. The last chapter shows the longstanding connections between the Royal Navy and the merchant navy for the conversion of ships either for wartime or back to peacetime. Only a declining number of wartime ships have been preserved for heritage purposes after sometimes varied commercial careers. Museum ships are notoriously expensive to maintain, especially by volunteers and charitable organizations.

Robins’ book presents an enormous amount of detail in a readable narrative. Sufficient background is given on the wartime construction of the various ship types, as well as their post-war conversion and employment. References are not provided, and the reader must settle for a general bibliography. The design lay-out is high quality in keeping with other Seaforth titles incorporating well-chosen, illustrative photographs on glossy paper and several very useful tables. The book is primarily geared toward a general rather than specialist audience interested in warships and landing craft from the two world wars and telling some of their post-war fortunes after conversion.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia

The purpose of the work is to tell the story of patrol craft in American service: to bring proper recognition to them and their crews and to dispel the perception of patrol craft as “homogeneous, colorless and unimpressive ships.” Patrol vessels are diverse: “At one end of the spectrum, some of these vessels were no bigger than 31 feet in length and eight tons in displacement, while at the other end some were over 300 feet long and 2,400 tons displacement” (11). The focus is to be on the individual vessel and the provenance of every hull is to be accounted for in each stage of its existence.

The bulk of the book is a directory arranged by category or official designation in US Navy service with historical notes on major classes and important vessels. *Jane’s Fighting Ships 1944/5*, describes the system for classification succinctly: “Every vessel on the Navy List is given a distinctive serial number, prefaced by initials denoting the category to which she belongs” (439). Categories are arranged alphabetically from PACV (Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle) and PBR (Patrol Boat River) through to SC (Submarine Chaser).

Each chapter presents information on the development and service of the major classes within the category. Under the heading “Roster,” each vessel is listed with its variety of names and notes on provenance throughout its lifetime. Coverage also includes vessels in civilian and foreign naval service before and after service in the USN and final disposition. “Specifications” includes basic information on dimensions, propulsion, and armament of important vessels. Detailed accounts of notable vessels are presented in a section of frequently personal histories headed “Selected Summary Histories.” It is through the stories of vessels like USS *Panay* and USS *Intensity* that the major events and currents of history are viewed.

In most cases, important categories or vessel types have a chapter devoted to them, within which succeeding classes are arranged chronologically. Gunboats and submarine-chasers merit more than a single chapter. The gunboats category, PG, is subdivided into separate chapters: “Prewar,” “World War II,” “Tempress-Class,” which includes Canadian-built modified Flower class corvettes. In many places the relationship between the US Coast Guard and the US Navy is touched upon but never described. As an example, the exploits of vessels like the cutter *Campbell* deserve mention at least.

In addition, there are chapters on “River Gunboats” and, curiously, “Nineteenth Century Gunboats,” some of which began as sailing vessels, predating use of USN-assigned categories. The Submarine Chaser category
shows the classification system under strain to include Second World War submarine chasers and Patrol Coastal ships of the modern Cyclone class, as does the use of SC for First World War submarine chasers.

There are good to excellent photographs all credited to US Navy. A glossary of terms and abbreviations, a bibliography, and an index help the reader navigate the book. In order to accommodate the huge detail related to provenance of individual vessels, the author uses a notation system employing a range of codes, for example, [ex] signifies “Built in US shipyard specifically for export to a foreign navy” and [tf], “Transferred, lent or sold to a foreign navy”. That the bibliography lists US sources only would not seem a problem with such an avowedly American work, but it would certainly would have benefitted from reference to international sources.

The difficulties of classification in the burgeoning field of small craft development become more pronounced travelling forward in time with rapidly advancing technologies for propulsion, armament, and specialization in roles. Notation is more complex, for example, PCC (Patrol Control Craft) and PCE (Control Escort) and PCER (Patrol Rescue Escorts). The re-awakening of American interest in littoral and riverine warfare in recent times has produced a luxuriant growth of patrol vessels. The chapter “Patrol Potpourri” includes a range of real and planned experimental small craft but also large, modern vessels like the 1,038-ton Badr class of four ships built for Saudi Arabia and four 960-ton vessels designated PFMM (Multi Mission Patrol Frigate) for Thailand. The bulk of mass-produced vessels built in modern times have been exported to allies, while single boat classes are usually for experimental or developmental purposes. PY (Patrol Yacht) is an entire category of one-of-kind vessels, some quite exotic, taken over from civilian service in an emergency.

The author succeeds in producing a focus on the vessel as an entity which has an existence of its own and demonstrating that successful vessels can have a life measured in decades performing a variety of roles. Two chapters, “US Patrol Vessels Built for Foreign Navies” and “Patrol Vessel Transfers”, add a lens through which US political alliances can be seen operating through history up to today. Transfers also include corvettes and frigates built in Canada and subsequently transferred to the US as part of “reverse Lend-Lease” during the Second World War. The readership is thereby widened from students of naval affairs to include libraries and information centres that service academic and other populations interested in world politics, foreign affairs and diplomacy. The inclusion of vessels that ended their careers before the First World War, including the chapter on nineteenth-century gunboats and Spanish vessels captured during the Spanish-American War of 1898 demonstrates the author’s attachment to patrol craft but detracts from the aim as stated in the title.

A fuller discussion of the definition of patrol craft would be useful.
Jane’s Fighting Ships 1960-61, claiming to be based on “official sources”, includes categories DE and DER, Escort Ship (Destroyer Escort) and Radar Picket Escort Ship (Destroyer Escort Radar). (301) While ships of the DE category were mass produced with run-of-the-mill characteristics; by contrast, DER would be presumably include ships like USS Liberty and Pueblo and interesting modern equivalents. By excluding DE-related ships, the author misses a big piece of the story of the Anglo-American relationship during the Second World War in terms of tonnage and large numbers of relatively large ships. The effectiveness of the common naval strategy was based on a degree of interconnectedness among Canadian, US and British shipyards producing a high degree of cooperation in building and transferring escort vessels among members of the Allies. This story is only told in a fragmentary way in this largely American-centric account, which misses the value of that effort and lessons for the future. In that sense, the book is isolationist and regressive. Inclusion of DE class would also have produced better coverage of Allied cooperation, which was the real story of war at sea in the late-twentieth century and which has lessons for the future.

Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


In Schnellbootwaffe, Hrovje Spajic explores the activities of the small boats used by the German Navy in the Second World War, largely in images, beginning with their precursors during the First World War. He follows this with the evolution of doctrine and application between the wars and then focuses on a detailed study of the organization and activities of S-Boats after 1939. A revolutionary design concept in the 1930s, the schnellboote (fast boat) was developed for a type of maritime guerilla warfare. Spajic also covers the reactions and countermeasures taken by the American and British navies against their hit-and-run tactics and how this affected encounters between small craft during the Second World War. He concludes with S-Boat attempts to interfere with Operation Overlord, as well as with merchant shipping, as the bases these boats used were gradually cut off and seized.

The introduction establishes a solid base from which to examine the Kriegsmarine’s successful use of small torpedo and gunboats in this sphere,
the Allied response to them, and the limitations they faced. It also covers the British attempts to counter the threat to shipping and trade. Spajic examines the construction and equipment of the various classes of S-Boat, paying particular attention to their use in missions like minelaying, a topic not often explored on its own. The end result is a good, entry-level book for readers unfamiliar with the topic and looking for an accessible place to start exploring. Students familiar with the subject might not find it as useful. While presenting a large quantity of research in a relatively short, well-illustrated volume, the compact format does not allow for a deeper exploration of specific events or technical matters that some readers might find useful.

This is the author’s first work in English, which may explain some of the flaws and inconsistencies present. Though competently written and informative, the book would have benefitted from further editing before publication. The inconsistent use of both metric and imperial measurements leads to a degree of confusion for the reader, especially without the presence of a conversion table. The author makes no distinction between short, long, or metric tons, and, in at least one location, he fails to properly convert between pounds and kilograms. Distance measurements also seem to switch between metric and imperial, sometimes using meters and kilometers and other times, feet and miles. Conversion tables would have reduced the need for mental math. A more complete glossary would have also clarified the author’s use of unexplained acronyms and abbreviations. Though there is an index, the author does not use footnotes, or endnotes, making further research more difficult. Finally, though it may be the result of a lack of accessible source material, the selected bibliography consists of less than a dozen sources and none of them are original documents. This further limits the value of the work for those seeking additional sources.

Despite its shortcomings, Schnellbootwaffe: Adolf Hitler’s Guerrilla War at Sea S-Boote 1939-1945 provides new readers with a useful starting point for exploring the activities of German torpedo boats during the Second World War. Serious researchers will need to look elsewhere. In comparing the role of these small, fast boats in the German Navy with that of the Allies and other forces at the time, the author sheds light on a lesser-known aspect of naval warfare during the period.

Michael Razer
Ward, Arkansas

Mark Stille, a retired USN Commander, has written a useful summary of America’s naval war with a focus on the warships involved. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on “America’s war against Japan” rather than the “two ocean war” that was in fact fought by the USN, aligning with the common perception in the United States that Japan was the main enemy notwithstanding the acceptance of the “Germany first” strategy agreed to with its allies. That war was overwhelmingly a naval war from the perspective of the Americans (Japan’s war in China does not come into play with this maritime account) and, as Stille’s narrative makes clear, was won by America’s vast economic and material resources for which Japan had no answer.

Stille’s book is organized into nine chapters plus an introduction. The first addresses US naval strategy and tactics during the Second World War, the second examines USN operations, and the last is an assessment as to the effectiveness of the USN throughout the conflict. The bulk of the book in the remaining six chapters explores the individual ship types that made up the USN: battleships, carriers, cruisers (heavy and light), destroyers, and submarines. As is common with Osprey Publishing in general, the illustrations, diagrams, and photographs are lavishly provided and to a very high quality.

The introduction sets the scene for the United States in terms of noting the armed neutrality period just ahead of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that drew the country into the maelstrom of the Second World War. The tit-for-tat period in the Atlantic where German U-boats and USN destroyers engaged in an undeclared war is useful to recall, as it largely explains Hitler’s “inexplicable” act of folly in declaring war on the US after Pearl Harbor, thereby simplifying the US President Roosevelt’s geopolitical difficulty with entering the European war. The introduction also touches on the interwar treaties and naval limitation agreements that constrained navalism and promoted disarmament. These restrictions had a material effect on USN preparations for war as it did for the RN and the other belligerents. The passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act in July 1941 was a key milestone in unleashing America’s latent material superiority, with the ships authorised under that act providing the instruments of victory over Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany.

The two chapters on USN strategies and tactics and on naval operations are useful guides as to America’s conduct of the war against Japan. Stille notes the early mindset of USN senior leadership that, unsurprisingly, was not always up to the strain of modern war and often lacked the imagination and insight necessary to conduct successful operations against Japan. War, however, is a stern teacher and very quickly the peacetime cobwebs and preconceptions were shaken off and the USN got down to business. Admiral Yamamoto’s declaration prior to the breakout of the war that he would have it all his way for six months but after that was unlikely proved all too true. After Midway
in June 1942, Japan was consistently on its back foot and was increasingly on the defensive and reactive to American initiatives. This is not to underestimate the difficulties the USN faced after Midway, which Stille summarizes well. Indeed, at one point later in 1942, the USN was down to one operational carrier, the USS Enterprise. Thereafter, however, the material potential of the United States was evident and, notwithstanding the bitter battles that followed, by early 1943 the outcome was not in doubt.

Stille’s summary of the campaigns and battles is well done with the only caveat being the limited discussion on the other ocean of the “two ocean war.” There is barely a mention of the Royal Navy side of that conflict, let alone any mention of any Royal Canadian Navy’s role in the Atlantic. The conclusion to the book with its assessment as to the USN role and effectiveness is by and large fair. Nevertheless, assigning the overall outcome of the war to the US Navy is perhaps too much. While the destruction of Japan was essentially an American affair with limited and unnecessary (and unwelcome) assistance from Britain, the defeat of Germany was at the hands of the Red Army with no more than “useful” assistance from the Western Allies, the most important component of which was supplies. These, to be sure, were largely supplied by sea, but the greater role in that regard was via the Royal Navy.

The chapters on the warship types are to the normal very high standard of the Osprey Publishing series. The reliance on earlier Osprey booklets on these vessel classes is noted in the publishing details at the front of the book and, if one has a complete collection of these, one likely does not need this compilation. That noted, it is an extremely useful compendium to have at hand in one place. Production standards are high, with numerous ship diagrams and contemporary photographs, accompanied by tables of basic performance data as well as dates of construction and final disposition. One is struck by the sheer scale of the USN as represented in these tables and the achievement of the American shipbuilding industry during the war. Major warships, as well as vast numbers of destroyers, untold quantities of landing craft, assault vessels, and auxiliary ships were churned out at an astonishing pace. All were essential for the conduct of the war by the Western Allies in both theatres – Europe and Pacific. The quality of most of the designs and construction standards were second to none.

Stille has delivered a fine book that is a good introduction to America’s maritime war as well as a top-notch discussion on warship types that fought that war. It is not an academic work per se, lacking the apparatus of notes and providing but a slender bibliography, albeit one that can certainly be explored for additional detail. It is also light on providing context with allies such as Great Britain and Commonwealth forces such as Canada, and skims over the
European Theatre in general. Notwithstanding these caveats, I unhesitatingly recommend it.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


When students, scholars, and naval professionals think of the ships of the Cold War, their minds often turn toward the capital ships of the navies of the world. The development of the Nimitz class “supercarriers” or the eventual mothballing of the Iowa class battleships might surface first for an American. Russians may think of the development of the Typhoon class ballistic missile submarines or the unique design of the Kiev class aircraft cruisers. British readers might think of the Invincibles, the French of the Clemenceaus. Focusing on the biggest and most expensive ships in the fleets of the world is not uncommon, and it still tends to dominate discussions of fleet design in the twenty-first century. Mark Stille’s short guide to the frigates that the US Navy deployed during the Cold War offers another view, reminding us that small ships bring balance and depth to fleets. Masterfully illustrated with photography and art by Paul Wright, *US Navy Frigates of the Cold War* offers an introduction and reference for students and professionals alike when considering the smaller ships of the American Cold War navy.

Across the decades of the Cold War, small combatants in the US Navy were focused on the Soviet submarine threat. Starting with the destroyer escorts which dominated the small ship fleet of the post-war years, Stille traces how the anti-submarine and convoy missions drove design and construction of American frigates, as well as how they were armed and equipped. Tracing from those initial DE’s, through the seven classes of frigates constructed across the decades between the end of the Second World War and the dawn of the post-Soviet era, the book offers good summaries of each class. These brief descriptions include the considerations driving their design and how the introduction of new sensors and weapons shifted construction and size.

All seven classes demonstrate the design tensions that small combatants have had, dating back even to the age of sail. On the one hand, navies want their small combatants to be survivable and have the latest weapons and technology, on the other hand, they want to design them for mass production and build them
in large numbers so cost savings is important. This tension leads to size and cost
constraints, which demand a secondary tension of endurance and detection or
sensor capabilities versus speed and firepower. In the twentieth century, larger
and more capable weapons and greater speed required more deck space and
larger engine rooms which small ships cannot provide. As Stille works through
the summaries of the frigate classes, these design tensions become apparent in
his descriptions as well as the fact that the tonnages of the ships continue to
rise, growing larger and larger as technology and threats advance.

But the history of how the weapons, sensors, and designs of the frigates
changed over time, focused on the anti-submarine mission and the Soviet
challenge, is contrasted with the operational history of the ships which never
engaged a Soviet submarine. Woven throughout the technological and design
discussion, Stille succinctly relates the operational experience of the Cold War-
era frigates and shows a variation between their intended use and their actual
employment. While the early frigates played important roles in the exercises
that would develop American anti-submarine doctrine, the combat operations
experienced by these ships were far more varied. They served as part of the
blockade or quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, conducted
maritime patrol operations as part of Operation Market Time on the coast of
Vietnam, participated in gunfire support missions to troops in South Vietnam,
and sailed on a myriad of patrol and presence missions through the decades.

The combat history of the Cold War frigates was capped in the second half
of the 1980s, not with the “Third World War” they had been designed, built,
and prepared for, but instead in the Persian Gulf in a limited maritime war
against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Conducting maritime security operations
and convoy escort to protect global oil trade and freedom of navigation, the
Perry Class frigates fought the Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps in Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis. This was the first
American naval combat of the missile age, and included the heroic damage
control efforts of the crews of the frigates Stark, when it was struck by Exocet
missiles, and the Samuel B. Roberts, when it hit an Iranian mine. Perry class
frigates made up the bulk of the American surface combatants in the subsequent
battles which resulted in the sinking of multiple Iranian ships and destruction
of oil platforms which were serving as stationary naval combat platforms.

US Navy Frigates of the Cold War offers a good introduction to the ships
which made up the “low” end of the American fleet from the 1940s to the
1990s. Stille’s summaries are clearly written and well organized, and Paul
Wright’s illustrations, using both his own artwork and photography from these
ships in action, offer clarity and help the reader both picture and understand
the ships and their missions. Seeing the roles that small combatants played
over the decades, from the development of anti-submarine doctrine, serving
as experimental platforms, showing the flag and conducting naval diplomacy around the world, and fighting America’s limited and maritime conflicts, demonstrates their importance to not only the smaller navies of the world, but also to the United States. In an era when the US Navy is de-commissioning small combatants faster than it is designing new ones, never mind building them, reading between the lines of this brief history raises some important questions for the future.

Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong
Annapolis, Maryland


This is a brand-new reference book that should be useful for model makers, anyone trying to identify a warship in a photograph, and those interested in general Royal Navy lore. Ben Warlow and Steve Bush both had careers in the Royal Navy before taking up second careers in publishing. Bush has been editor of two periodicals – *Warship World* and *World Pictorial Review* – as well as compiling several books about warships. Warlow has produced more than 20 books on Royal Navy history and is a consultant editor of *Warship World*. They have recently jointly produced the fifth edition of *Ships of the Royal Navy* (Seaforth, 2020) originally compiled by J.J. College and first published in 1987.

A note facing the introduction explains that oblong flags were originally referred to as “pendants” because they tended to hang down. The spelling changed to “pennant” because this is how the noun describing the flag has long been pronounced. Both spellings are correct; the authors have opted for the traditional “pendant.” Pendant numbers came into use in the Royal Navy early in the twentieth century, when many ships of the same class could be manoeuvring together. The first system tried was funnel bands of various colours (each squadron had a separate one) and thickness. This was soon replaced by an identification system combining alpha-numeric flags. A single alphabetic flag identified the warship type and was used with numerical pendants. The pendant number system was used originally as the warship’s visual call sign.

The authors include Canadian warships in service up to 1948 because Commonwealth navies used pendant numbers assigned by the Admiralty until
after the Second World War. In that year, NATO navies switched to using blocks of hull numbers for a particular type of ship (destroyers, frigates, etc.) allocated by the alliance. The RCN also switched to the USN practice of hull numbers without a letter in 1948 (xi).

By the 1930s, “H” was one of the letters used for destroyers. When the destroyer HMS *Comet* commissioned in 1931, she was allocated the first pendant number in the “H” series, H00 (which had been used by four previous destroyers going back to 1911). When *Comet* was bought by Canada and commissioned as *Restigouche* in 1938, she retained her H00 designation. “G” was another letter used for destroyers. HMCS *Haida* on commissioning in 1942 was designated G 63, which had been used by four earlier destroyers, most recently by HMS *Gurkha*, lost in the Mediterranean months earlier after being in service only 12 months. Corvettes were identified with the letter “K,” thus, *Sackville* was K 181.

Under the RN system, cruisers were assigned numbers but the ship type did not have a distinguishing flag. HMCS *Uganda*, on being transferred to the RCN in 1944, retained the pendant number 66 assigned to HMS *Uganda* in 1940. *Pendant Numbers* includes a listing of the visual call signs assigned by the US Navy to Allied ships operating in the Pacific starting in 1944. *Uganda* was now identified as “C 175” while part of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) in 1945. The BPF list is interesting as a curiosity because it shows the ships identified by Canada as part of its intended contribution to ending the war with Japan. It optimistically includes HMCS *Micmac*, the first Halifax-built Tribal which commissioned in September 1945.

The book is up to date with listings with a note clarifying the various pendant numbers published for the new *Astute* class submarines and listings for the new aircraft carriers *Prince of Wales* and *Queen Elizabeth* and the Offshore Patrol Vessel *Spey* commissioned in 2021.

Attractively produced, *Pendant Numbers* contains a clear arrangement of tabular information and nicely-spaced entries that make the book logical and easy to use. The captions under the excellent photographs add a welcome extra dimension by underscoring various points about how pendant numbers and other distinguishing devices have evolved. This new reference book is an interesting new venture that should appeal to warship aficionados.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia