
This work is the twenty-sixth entry in the ShipCraft modeling and visual reference series, and author Roger Branfill-Cook’s first contribution. A professional translator used to working with French documents, Branfill-Cook covers not only the American vessels of the Vietnam War, but French examples from the Indochina War as well. As is the pattern of the series, *Riverine Craft* consists of a main text, model products guide, and model showcase. These cover the historical background of vessel types, available kits for representing various vessels, and fully constructed example models respectively. A single page of Selected References listing finishes out the work.

The main text of the work is split roughly in half by the modeling section, with the first half covering the introduction and French vessel conversions and the second half covering South Vietnamese and American designs. The text is largely used to explain vessel details for modelers, and as such, there is no overt analysis beyond mentioning the effectiveness and service life of the individual designs. Ship types have their name bolded in the text when introduced, with technical information in a side bar listing date of launch, dimensions, crew, engine, speed, guns, and armour. Period black and white photographs illustrate full length and design details along with scale profile drawings for most ships. Those for smaller field-modified craft are naturally more rudimentary, and the paired profiles of original designs versus riverine modification provide the most interesting detail.

The Model Products section, located after the French conversions text, is divided into four different sections by scale, with a note on compatible figures at the end. Two vessels are listed as available under unusual ‘Box Scale’ sizes, fifteen for the combined 1:72 and 1:76 scale, five for 1:56, three for 1:48, and a final twelve for 1:35 scale. Most listings showcase either the kit’s box art or a completed example, accompanied by a short text on the model’s availability, accuracy, and necessary conversion notes. Some personal levity is introduced in this section as well, such as the author noting his rare 1:48 RAG Boat kit “had obviously detonated a VC mine beneath the engine compartment” due to being badly cracked inside the box (22).

The 21-page, full colour Modelmaker’s Showcase section is naturally the centerpiece of the work, offering multiple views of 19 different models constructed by nine different individuals. Some of these are stand-alone pieces, but many are shown in diorama format, either underway or carrying out an operation. Perhaps most impressive are...
the dioramas of Jan Vererstraeten and Jack Carrico, with the former being a highly detailed Riverine Patrol Boat and Command and Communications Boat diorama, and the latter being multiple detailed pieces created using kits from Masterpiece Models. Unsurprisingly, Branfill-Cook includes many of his own creations in this section, offering good examples of kit conversions to represent French and South Vietnamese craft as well as a variety of American vessels.

In terms of possible improvements, several come to mind. As this is a work primarily intended to help model builders, Branfill-Cook’s note that profile drawings of conversion type vessels are “highly speculative” and readers should reach out if they have plans should be located in the introduction rather than as an image caption (10). Additionally, at least two of the photographs have incorrect information. One of the 11-metre FOM pictures states that the visible weapon is “not a .50 cal Browning, and is probably a 20 mm Oerlikon,” when the weapon is quite clearly an M2 Browning with the early slotted barrel support of the pre-war Colt contracts (11). Another identifies the turret used for the LVT(A)-5 as coming from an M5 Light Tank, when it is actually from the M8 ‘Scott’ Howitzer Motor Gun Carriage (13). Statements like these could lead to unintentional inaccuracies by modelers. The former Japanese junks used by the French are also not covered in the main text, though model suggestions are provided in the availability section, and there is just a single stern photograph of an LSSC when many more profile and detail images exist. The main text also seems heavily broken up by photographs and drawings. This may be the style of the work, but it does affect the flow of information. Finally, all period photographs are in black and white, even though many colour images of American vessels exist. Said images would be helpful to readers by showing the period colour schemes and markings, rather than just relying on the models in the showcase section.

*Riverine Craft of the Vietnam Wars* is a decent primer on these vessels and a good reference guide for those seeking to model the Indochina and Vietnam Wars. While the text may be relatively minimal, there is a good selection of images and profiles, especially of the early French conversion efforts often overlooked in the historiography. For modelers, the products section offers a good rundown of available kits paired with commentary on their availability and accuracy, augmented by the standalone and diorama builds of the Showcase.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Overall, this is a very interesting book describing the history of the Captain-class frigates (destroyer escorts) in the Royal Navy during the latter part of the Second World War. The Battle of the Atlantic, and the U-boat peril, often has been described as the only event that really worried Winston Churchill during the war. Without the machinery of war, raw materials, food and troops from the United States and Canada, there was no way of defeating Nazi Germany and it all had to come via the Atlantic Ocean.
The Nazis equally knew that if they could stop this seaborne trade and troop movements, they could prevent a land war on two fronts. Without the Allies winning the battle at sea, there would have been no landings at Normandy and hence, no defeat of Nazi Germany.

Convoy escorts were, thus, a vital part of getting the convoys through and while Britain had the men to operate such ships, they did not have enough ships. Earlier in the war the United States had loaned 50 old destroyers to the Royal Navy to fill the gap, but by 1943, new and more capable ships were required—enter the USS Buckley and Evart class destroyer escorts (DEs) 78 of which eventually served in the Royal Navy. While classified as destroyer escorts by the US Navy they were ‘downgraded’ to frigates by the Royal Navy due to weapons fitted. The ships were classified as the Captain class by the British and took on the names of former Royal Navy captains from the Napoleonic Wars (but with a few from earlier campaigns).

Donald Collingwood’s book was first published in 1999 but recently republished in 2020. Collingwood served as an ordnance artificer in one of the DE’s (HMS Cubitt) during the war so had first-hand experience of these ships and easy access to many other ex-Captain-class men. This has its good and bad aspects throughout the book with rumours sometimes becoming fact.

The book is written in an easy-going, conversational style but at times assumes the reader has an in-depth knowledge of Royal Navy techniques, tactics, procedures, practices, equipment, ranks, history and customs. Collingwood’s writing, at times, is verbose and clumsy—using a dozen words or more to describe an event when five or six will do. The book lacks footnotes/endnotes which could have been used rather than lengthy in-paragraph information. These flaws aside, Collingwood has produced a readable and informative narrative of life at sea in the Captain-class ships on the Atlantic and Arctic convoy routes and the English Channel patrols during the Normandy landings and opening up of the port of Antwerp.

The author undertook extensive ‘hard copy’ archival research in the 1980s and 90s to put this history together but also uses first-hand information from other Captain-class personnel who were present at the many actions in which these ships took part. The story begins in early 1943 with the commencement of ship construction in US east coast shipyards and the overwhelming support provided by the US Navy in getting the ships ready for sea. Certainly, the high quality American food and the onboard living conditions, such as the use of bunks rather than hammocks, were commented on by all who commissioned the frigates. There were often Royal Navy crew shortfalls and some of the frigates were steamed to England by Royal Canadian Navy ‘delivery voyage only’ crews. Many of the ships conducted work-ups off Bermuda before arriving in England where they were assigned to various escort groups.

While U-boats were rarely seen in the mid-Atlantic by late 1943, they continued to attack Allied convoys right up until the end of the war and the Captains saw their fair share of action. On the plus side, the frigates sank at least 38 U-boats (with some wartime ‘probable’ kills not being confirmed until well after the war when German records were analysed). Some were individual ship efforts while others were a team effort and often including aircraft to locate and harass the enemy submarines. During the post D-Day channel patrols several Captain’s were involved...
in night-time running gun battles with German E-boatS but only one frigate (HMS Kingsmill) was ever credited with shooting down a German aircraft.

The frigates did not have it all their own way. U-boats, mines or enemy aircraft sank or badly damaged 17 of the frigates and while some returned to port, they were “written off” as a constructive total loss and scrapped. Many Captain’s suffered severe damage due to weather or enemy action but thanks to their very sturdy construction, stayed afloat and were taken back to port for repair. Others did their convoy escort duties with barely a shot fired. Fortunately, apart from actions with E-Boats, they managed to avoid action with German warships as the frigates’ three-inch guns, firing a 12-pound shell, were described by her gunners as next to useless with the shells often bouncing off the hull of surfaced U-boats.

At the end of the European war, some of the ships were prepared for service in the Pacific theatre but the Japanese surrender ended that plan. Most of the ships were returned to the United States in 1946-47 for scrapping under the Lend-Lease agreement. A few, however, were retained for use as floating power stations at various naval bases and one, HMS Affleck, was forgotten about and kept up this unsung duty at Tenerife until 1957 before finally being scrapped.

Of the many actions fought by the Captain-class during the war, there is one action that stands out for me and epitomizes the hard life at sea for the men serving in these ships. On 29 April 1945 HMS Goodall was part of the escort taking one of the last convoys to northern Russia when she was torpedoed by a U-boat in the Kola Inlet. The torpedo struck the frigate’s forward magazine and blew the entire bow off with the loss of 95 of her ship’s company; effectively half her crew. The ship, however, did not sink and she had to be sunk by gunfire, by the Colony-class frigate HMS Anguilla, the following day. A testimony to the rugged design and quality construction of the Captain-class—but equally sad as many of Goodall’s men died in the final days of the European war and thus did not live to see the victory that they had fought so hard to achieve.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


Mariners spend their lives on water—seas, lakes and rivers. Many see, but fewer actually observe the waters, their origins, their flow, their banks and the towns along them. The Chippewa chronicles author Richard D. Cornell’s exploration of the western Wisconsin waterway. Over several years he, along with his daughter, KC, and son Drew, canoed it from its headwaters to where it empties into the Mississippi. This is not a linear travelogue with a start, transit and finish. Cornell presents a series of floats that, when combined, encompass the whole river.

The headwaters were a riddle for Cornell to unravel. Glidden Enterprise reporter, Pat Bonney, led Cornell to the origin of West Fork, while the beginnings of East Fork are more obscure. What is clearer is that they merge in central Sawyer County. Like many waterways in this part of North America, the Chippewa was formed by the glaciers that crushed and scraped
the surface for thousands of years during the most recent Ice Age. The river emerged ten thousand years ago as small streams flowing under and toward the edge of the Chippewa Lobe of the great Laurentide Ice Sheet, which, along with the other lobes, the Superior, Wisconsin Valley, Langlade and Green Bay, shaped modern Wisconsin. As the glaciers melted during an earlier period of climate change, enormous rushes of meltwater, ice blocks and rocks carved the Chippewa Valley.

The Chippewa has provided sustenance and transport to a sequence of inhabitants. It watered woolly mammoths and musk ox as well as the nomads who followed and hunted them. It provided Ojibwe peoples with fish and brought French fur traders, led by explorer Pierre-Esprit Radisson. It saw the land divided into Indigenous reservations that still border its stream.

The Chippewa flows through lands where white pine was king and floated in its waters during the logging days. It runs alongside cities and towns, such as Glidden, the self-proclaimed Black Bear Capitol of Wisconsin; Eau Claire, where professional baseball met Henry Aaron; Chippewa Falls, the upstream limit of the steamboats; and Durand in Pepin County, that gave the world Laura Ingalls Wilder, author of the *Little House on the Prairie*.

Readers are introduced to people who live, or lived, along its banks including the Ojibwe whose habitation exceeds memory, Bill Nolte, owner of “The Joynt” that has continued Eau Claire’s tradition of fine music, and local historian Marge Hebbring, a descendant of Chippewa Valley trader Michel Cadotte. We become acquainted with the wild Chippewa between the Flambeau River to Jim Falls and the sections tamed by the dams astride it and the workers who control their floodgates.

Running water is a long-tapped source of renewable energy and the Chippewa has a series of hydro-electric dams. They not only power the valley, but give Xcel Energy the authority to “turn on the river”. Release of water through the dam generates electricity but also affects water temperature and erodes banks. Greg Haberman, manager of Winter Dam, balances his obligation to Xcel with government regulations and the demands of the local communities.

Like Sherlock Holmes, Richard Cornell observes:

“We paddled hard, through the last glimmer of day and into the gathering moonlight. Slivers of pink clouds reflected on the surface of the river. When I heard the small rapids, I got out of the canoe, grabbed a rope and prepared to guide us through the rocks. Water swirled around my legs as I picked my way through...At the end of the rapids the canoe dipped, and what seemed like a million mayflies surrounded her. KC shielded her eyes with her hands. I imagined her covered in fairy dust, though she doesn’t remember it that way. I felt the canoe push gently into the upper edge of the island...We explored the island under the sliver of moon and chose the lower end to pitch our camp” (37).

*The Chippewa* packs a lot into 231 pages. Its black and white pictures, contemporary and period, are visual aids to the text while the index directs you back to what you want to read again. The footnotes provide links to further research. This work is travelogue and history, exploration and discovery, river science and industry, virgin waters and managed use. You could read this quickly, but do not. Let it carry you at its own pace, like the river it chronicles. Savour it. It is a tale of a journey of man and daughter, one that the man ad-
mits “I didn’t want this to end.” Neither will you.

James M. Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


Turtles, particularly sea turtles, have played a significant role in the history of maritime communities the world over, and in many ways helped to enable prolonged exploration and fervent exploitative trade from the Age of Exploration into the end of the Late Modern Era. These large, slow-moving amphibiaans were prized by sailing crews for the large amounts of meat that could be harvested from their bodies—a taste for which spread to Europe itself, where increasing demand helped to spur multiple extirpations across various ocean biomes—along with the plentiful eggs that could be harvested from their clutch grounds. Further, the often-colourful shells, long used by Indigenous cultures, proved to be valuable trade items in and of themselves. In the case of the Caribbean, a limited turtling industry was able to continue to exploit native turtle populations until the mid-1960s when ecological, economic, and political pressures became significant enough to finally end it. It is the last century of this Caribbean turtling industry that Sharika Crawford focuses on in her consideration of how it served to shape the modern circum-Caribbean world.

Crawford finds that from the late-nineteenth-century on, Caribbean turtlemen were often in the middle of questions, and conflicts, relating to the exercise and boundaries of national sovereignties. In particular, as the turtle populations were depleted, turtlemen, who were largely from the Cayman Islands, were forced farther afield in their hunting voyages. This brought them into conflict with nations such as Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Colombia who felt that turtles off their shores were, by right, their natural resources. Those three nations, in particular, passed laws and increased enforcement aimed at protecting those resource rights, which raised questions about where national boundaries were and should be drawn. These debates Crawford argues were important for two major reasons; the first of which was that they served to push back against British Imperial arguments relating to maritime jurisdiction. The British Empire had long pushed for limited sea-based jurisdiction for any nation, preferring that the seas be kept open for the use of all nations, with minor concessions for national defense. As British Imperial power waned, however, Caribbean nations seeking to demark their sovereignty to a greater extent placed a premium on protecting their maritime resources—seeking to prevent total depletion, and ensure themselves a fair portion of any profit they generated.

More significant for the turtlemen, these arguments around maritime resources and national boundaries meant that they helped to define the modern boundaries of the Caribbean. While much of their contribution in this shaping was incidental, rather than directly intentional, it was still notable, and for Crawford’s study, it is a core tenet in arguing for their historical significance. Understanding this significance in her eyes will help to expand the historical
understanding of the Caribbean away from a region dominated by the European-focused sugar plantations into a fully complex zone of cultural and economic exchange. Notably, the sea trades, including turtling, drew heavily from the free and freed populations—few Cayman slaves participated in the maritime trades. Much as Skip Finley notes in *Whaling Captains of Color*, these trades opened doors to economic and social prosperity that would have been otherwise largely closed to those populations, thereby enabling some amount of advancement.

The historical significance of the Cayman turtlers can also be seen in the rise of modern conservation efforts, particularly those related to sea turtles. The notable and alarming depletion of sea turtle populations by the 1960s meant that preservation of those species was folded into the first international conservation movement—preventing even greater harm to be done before the need for help was noted. While the efforts of conservationists, along with the increasing hostility of various circum-Caribbean nations aimed at protecting their remaining natural maritime resources for themselves, served to end the Cayman turtlers’ industry, it is inarguable that they were able to be proactive rather than merely reactive. Thus, turtlers inadvertently can be credited in part with the preservation of the very species they primarily profited from the deaths of.

This illuminating and significant text has been assembled from a variety of sources including oral histories held at the Cayman Island National Archive, diplomatic correspondences, and the papers of Dr. Archie Carr, who was the leading sea turtle conservationist of his time. Marking the beginning of new roads for research and consideration in the history of the Caribbean world, this text certainly would have a spot in any environmental history course, as well as those focused on Atlantic and Caribbean world histories. Pushing away from the traditional plantation-based history of the Caribbean to consider the significances of its maritime world promises to be a major step in achieving a deeper and more profound history of the region as a whole. If nothing else, it is a vital reminder that the maritime world is the often-forgotten component of histories the world over and that as historians we would be well served to rectify those omissions.

Michael Toth
Fort Worth, Texas


We often think of smugglers as shady people lurking on the outskirts of society, driven by greed and a certain disregard for authority. Cromwell’s *The Smugglers’ World* convincingly flips that stereotype on its head by demonstrating that virtually everyone in eighteenth-century Venezuela had connections to the illicit world of smuggling. Government officials, religious leaders, merchants, ship captains, sailors, waterfront workers, and every-day consumers created a vast network of illegal trade that brought in foreign manufactured goods and foodstuffs in exchange for cacao, Venezuela’s cash crop. In other words, Venezuelan society and its economy could not function without
smugglers and smuggling. Through a combination of rigorous primary and secondary source research and academic argumentation, Cromwell effectively places smuggling at the centre of eighteenth-century Venezuelan society, while carefully negotiating the complexity of law enforcement efforts, inter-imperial struggles, and the vicissitudes of an unforgiving Atlantic economy.

Cromwell organizes The Smugglers’ World thematically, except for Chapter Eight. While allowing for a comprehensive analysis of each aspect of smuggling in Venezuelan society, this approach has a few drawbacks, which will be discussed below. The first three chapters also have a certain chronological coherency. The first chapter explains Spain’s closed system of Atlantic trade prior to 1700 and how that led to scarcity and large-scale smuggling operations in Venezuela. We consequently learn in Chapter Two that the Venezuelan consumer developed a cultural acceptance of and economic dependency on smuggling during the early eighteenth century, becoming, in effect, a smuggler society. The third chapter examines the creation of the Caracas Company in 1728 by imperial authorities to harness the growing profitability of cacao and to address the rise of illicit trade in Venezuela.

The next four chapters focus on the groups most active in Venezuelan smuggling, including foreign smugglers (Chapter Four), Venezuelan merchants and officials (Chapters Five and Six respectively), and free and enslaved people of colour (Chapter Seven). These chapters have little chronological awareness but rather seek to demonstrate continuities within the Venezuelan system of smuggling. Beginning with foreign smugglers, Cromwell explores how primarily Dutch and English seafarers navigated Spanish American waters to unload their illicit cargoes and retrieve precious cacao, tobacco, and hides. During this most treacherous leg of the smuggling journey, foreign seafarers confronted the possibility of death through combat with Spanish vessels, imprisonment, disease, and forced labour. Cromwell then moves ashore to examine merchant smuggling rings and the tactics employed to avoid detection. He presents the interesting case study of Luciano Luzardo and the merchant Nicolás Rodríguez, who found support and protection for their smuggling within religious circles. Unlike captured foreigners or lower-class Venezuelan smugglers, Luzardo’s smuggling network faced few, if any, consequences for their actions. Cromwell explains this discrepancy and leniency towards merchant elites by linking Venezuelan government officials to rampant smuggling in Chapter Six. The final thematic chapter explores the complex relationship of free and enslaved people of colour to the system of smuggling. Enslaved Africans participated in the system as both smugglers and smuggled. Meanwhile, Cromwell argues, free people of colour captured in the act of smuggling endured the added risk of potential enslavement.

Cromwell’s chapter on people of colour is not only informative, but it also best illustrates the organizational difficulties of The Smugglers’ World. Cromwell’s thematic approach dissects and compartmentalizes Venezuela’s system of smuggling. As a maritime historian, I was particularly interested in Chapter Four’s focus on the lives of smugglers at sea and the ships they sailed. Unfortunately, it left me dissatisfied, in part, because some stories and aspects of the maritime world had been placed in other chapters. For instance, both enslaved and free people of colour held important
roles on board smuggling vessels, especially enslaved seafarers hired out by their owners. Having no choice in their employment, they served an important role in filling out smuggler crews. This information, however, should have been included in Chapter Four to obtain a more complete understanding of “Foreign Smugglers” and their crews. I was also disappointed by the lack of specific stories about individual seafaring smugglers. Yet two chapters later, there was the excellent story of John White or “Juan Blanco,” a captured Irish smuggler, who could have added a human face to foreign seafarers (206-207).

This organizational critique can be extended to other themes and chapters. For example, in Chapter Six, we learn the fascinating story of Governor García de la Torre, who developed a web of friendships and obligations among smugglers due to his leniency. By regularly pardoning smugglers or overlooking their activities, he garnered respect from many Venezuelans who enjoyed increased access to European goods, alcohol, and food. His activities prompted the creation of the Caracas Company and led to his removal from office and incarceration. De la Torre’s story would probably have fit better in Cromwell’s analysis of the Caracas Company in Chapter Three rather than a hundred pages later. As historians, we often have to make difficult organizational decisions with material, but like Cromwell’s, placement can disjoint the narrative flow, impede analysis of important topics like maritime workers and the development of the Caracas Company, and create unnecessary redundancies.

The Smugglers’ World is a well-researched, informed, and academically-inclined study. Despite the efforts of talented smugglers to remain hidden from the historical record, the author has admirably discovered their networks, both at sea and on land, and told their stories. Organizational issues aside, Cromwell’s argument for placing smugglers and smuggling at the centre of Venezuelan society is an important contribution to our understanding of colonial Venezuela and its place in the Atlantic world.

Steven J. J. Pitt
West Falls, New York


Author Jim Crossley has written a new book about one of the lesser-known twentieth-century Royal Navy admirals, Roger John Brownlow Keyes. Born in 1872, Keyes’ career spans the first half of the twentieth century, coinciding with a period of British naval supremacy. Crossley’s account paints an ambivalent picture of Keyes as an admiral who was popular and well-recognized for his noteworthy accomplishments, yet someone who failed to reach the pinnacle of the career envisioned for him and whose accomplishments appear more lacklustre in hindsight.

Keyes’ life and service reflect the challenges and activities typical of other naval officers who rose to the senior ranks of the Royal Navy in the years bracketed by the two World Wars. Despite Keyes’ many accomplishments, he never became First Sea Lord when he was eligible for that top position of naval command in the 1930s, though he was later made an Admiral of the Fleet.
and awarded a peerage. His outspokenness and lack of political instincts irritated many who outranked him, as did his relentless opportunism.

The son of a well-connected officer in the British Indian army, Keyes always wanted to be a naval officer. As Crossley points out, the army in British India was larger than the total British home army and made a major contribution in the First World War. Keyes’ father used his numerous connections—and money—to send his son to the “right” schools to provide him with the education he needed as an aspiring naval officer.

He did not, however, excel in his studies. The author speculates that Keyes’ poor academic performance was not for want of intelligence, but because of a learning disability. Based on the letters that Keyes wrote to his mother, which were poorly written and rife with spelling errors, Crossley suspects that Keyes had dyslexia, a disability not at all understood in his time. Physically, Keyes was a small man, but Crossley does not credit his diminutive stature for his career shortcomings. In fact, the combination of having trouble reading and being smaller than other men may have spurred him to be more of a fighter than he might otherwise have been.

Keyes’ first assignment in the Royal Navy took him to eastern Africa as a midshipman, where for three years he helped to suppress the Arab slave trade around Zanzibar. Respected for his personal bravery and well-liked by his fellow naval officers, Keyes was regarded as an officer with a bright future. After 1889, the Royal Navy entered a period of rapid expansion and reforms as it increasingly feared rival naval powers, especially France and Russia. Keyes received a major promotion when he was posted to the Royal Yacht HMY Victoria and Albert, but as Crossley notes, Keyes did not admire Queen Victoria, impolitely terming her “an alarming old lady.” His outspoken personality did not serve him well in this post; he resented looking after the young royal princesses and, preferring his fighting role in the Royal Navy, found the social obligations boring. His service on the Royal Yacht did yield an unexpected boon—the friendship he formed with the future King George V, Queen Victoria’s grandson—which helped him later in his career.

Following his early assignments and before the First World War, Keyes’ global postings included Brazil, where he first encountered anti-British feeling; the German naval officers he met there did not hide their deep resentment of the British Empire and its widespread influence. After Brazil, Keyes served in China during the Boxer Rebellion, where he bravely fought alongside future admirals John Jellicoe, Christopher Craddock, and David Beatty. Although Keyes came into contact with Sir John Fisher and Lord Charles Beresford during his career, he avoided being caught up in their ongoing internal naval feud, despite the resulting pressure on him and his fellow officers to take sides. In fact, Keyes never earned the esteem of Admiral Fisher, who was volatile, opinionated, and headstrong.

With the advent of the First World War, Keyes assumed a senior command in the Dardanelles–Gallipoli campaign, where he came in close contact with First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. His friendship with Churchill was to last a lifetime, though it had periodic peaks and valleys, some of which Crossley describes. Among the lows: Keyes had little use for campaign planning (the opposite of Churchill). For example, Keyes had strongly opposed the withdrawal of British forces from Gallipoli and wished for a “Ger-
man Trafalgar” that would end German naval ambitions for all time. His preference was to “shoot from the hip,” which led to ongoing policy clashes with his senior commanders and the Lords of the Admiralty, and made Churchill’s job more difficult.

In April 1917, Keyes was promoted to Rear Admiral and took on the ill-equipped Dover Patrol, a separate Royal Navy command based at Dover and charged with protecting the English Channel and preventing German naval vessels from entering the Atlantic Ocean. To quash the German U-boat threats in the English Channel, Keyes planned and led raids on the German submarine pens in the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. Though the raids were a big morale boost to the British public, and Keyes was highly decorated for his services, Crossley views the raids as ultimately unsuccessful, since German submarines continued to sink British ships.

Elected to Parliament in 1934, Keyes joined Churchill as an anti-appeaser and an ultimate critic of Neville Chamberlain’s policies. Both men hated appeasement, believing it would lead to disaster. As Crossley notes, Keyes’ parliamentary career was not successful, due to his poor public speaking and his failure to acquire the necessary political skills, which may have been related to his learning disability and its impact on his ability to write well and deliver speeches. Yet despite his unimpressive oratory skills, at one point in 1940, Keyes appeared in the House of Commons in his full Admiral’s dress uniform to attack Chamberlain’s response following Germany’s invasion of Norway. At the end of the speech, he shouted, in unison with others, “In God’s name, go!”

With the advent of the Second World War, Churchill and others considered Keyes too old for senior naval commands (he was nearly 70), a view Keyes did not share. Instead, he became liaison to Leopold III, the King of the Belgians, who, much to British official displeasure, refused to go into exile and was later viewed as having cooperated with the German occupiers. Despite being tarnished by his association with Belgium’s king, Keyes was elevated to the peerage as Baron Keyes in 1943.

Crossley’s rather short book adds a missing element to Royal Navy literature, but it is not especially well-written or well-constructed. Written in a relaxed, non-academic style, and very much for the general reader, the book lacks notes, and the bibliography is dated. Churchill’s name in the book’s title does not reflect the book’s coverage; he is very much a side figure. The author, whose own father was a midshipman on the battleship HMS Resolution in 1916, can be frustratingly contradictory about Keyes. While claiming that the admiral never lived up to his potential because of his personality flaws and his confrontations with other senior commanders, Crossley also describes Keyes as well-liked and brave, making it difficult to ascertain Keyes’ rightful place in history. The author’s vacillation between praise and opprobrium for Keyes throughout the book makes his conclusion a surprise: “… his character and daring made him stand out as a beacon among naval officers of his time and as an example to future generations.” Surely this is not the last word on Keyes.

W. Mark Hamilton
Alexandria, Virginia

John Darwin is not a historian who thinks small. Over the past couple of decades he has cemented his reputation as one of the foremost annalists of imperialism, thanks to books that survey the global history of empire (After Tamerlane), the second era of British imperialism (The Empire Project), and the complexities and incoherence of Britain’s imperial development (Unfinished Empire). His latest book offers both a shift in focus and a more subtle examination of the dynamics that drove Western imperialism by examining the influence of port cities during the century-long “age of steam” that spanned from the growing application of steam technology in the early-nineteenth century to the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s.

These port cities, Darwin explains, played an extraordinarily important role in the process of globalization that unfolded in the nineteenth century. More than just places of commerce, ports were “gateway cities” that served as places of exchange between different economies and cultures. While gateway cities were not always ports, ports were especially suited to playing such roles and traditionally did so throughout human history. Darwin describes the network of ports that developed throughout Eurasia prior to the Columbian era, then how the addition of the Western Hemisphere disrupted this network by injecting new products and destinations into the mix. This was not a rapid process: though the Americas became a source of precious metals and plantation crops soon after their European discovery, the process of “Columbian globalization” was still incomplete when the impact of steam technology began to be felt.

While Darwin notes that “steam globalization was indelibly marked by its Columbian inheritance,” (83) it was also a marked departure in many respects. Steam power was key to the growing divergence between the West (specifically northwestern Europe and the United States) and the rest of the world. And while Darwin notes the use of steam power for manufacturing, he sees its most revolutionary effects in its application to transportation. This was most immediately evident in the application of steam power to river boats, with ocean-going steamships becoming viable only with the development of more efficient engines that provided greater propulsive power with lower coal consumption. Steam-powered land transportation also played a vital role in this process, as railway routes more closely tied the economies of the agrarian hinterlands to the developing global economy, making the port cities the crucibles in which the process of assimilation took place. Though steam transport took much of the period to become the dominant form of ocean travel, once it did so, its effects were truly revolutionary, as steam power freed vessels from dependency on the patterns of winds and currents, making possible very different patterns of commerce than ever before.

Darwin details the impact by means of over a half-dozen case histories of ports during this period. Using examples from the Northern Hemisphere, he includes a mix of ports with a long history (Calcutta, Shanghai, the metropole ports of Europe) and newer ones that boomed during the period (New Orleans, Montreal, Bombay, Hong Kong). All of them provide effective evidence of the supercharged commercial and urban growth brought about by steam globalization. For most, steam power opened up rivers that had hitherto been one-way routes, while railway lines ex-
tended the reach of their commercial activities further inland than ever before. While most of these ports served as cosmopolitan “bridgeheads” of a globalized culture, Darwin notes with the case of New Orleans their effects were not always dominant, as sometimes the concerns of the hinterland won out over the cosmopolitizing influence such ports usually exerted, particularly when economic interests were involved.

This proved increasingly the case after the First World War. Whereas most port cities until then enjoyed the benefits of minimal “inland” intervention, multilateral free trade policies and the gold standard, the postwar world was one of protectionism, managed currencies, and restricted investment. As producers geared towards a global market faced declining demand for their wares, many port cities experienced a drop in traffic and its consequences: declining revenues, increasing unemployment, and a diminished influence as inland polities treated the cosmopolitanism that port cities embodied with suspicion. What recovery these economies experienced came to an end with the onset of the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s, ending an era of increasing globalization and signaling the start of a different and more uncertain world.

To describe the role that ports played in the process of steam globalization, Darwin draws upon a considerable range of scholarly literature. His command of the research is truly impressive, supporting his arguments with some of the latest work in maritime history, technological history, and the insights drawn from several other fields of study. From this emerges an impressive survey that explains complex dynamics both clearly and insightfully. Though written more for a general rather than a scholarly audience, both groups will find this book worthwhile reading for the connections detailed and the processes described, especially given their relevance to the world in which we live today.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


Kenneth Goldman’s ambitious work attempts to chronicle an obscure but fascinating segment of American naval history. Goldman, a contributor to Navis Magazine, is quite knowledgeable about the construction, interior appointments and history of yachts and yachting in both North America and abroad. The first challenge one encounters in writing a book covering such a broad scope of nautical history is to define the vessel called a yacht, a Dutch term jacht scheeps meaning hunting ship. William Smyth’s nineteenth-century classic Sailor’s Word Book declares it a vessel of state for pleasure to convey great personages, while other authoritative references add light, fast vessels of various sizes, but used for leisure, sport or competition and as a conspicuous status symbol.

The first American yacht to be used during the Revolutionary War as a combatant (a privateer) was George Crowninshield’s sloop Jefferson. Others followed, increasing in number during the War of 1812 as mosquito fleets; swift vessels with men largely armed with muskets and sabres used to disrupt enemy logistics, and surveil and assist in dispatching troops where needed.
During the lull between conflicts, some yachts practised nefarious pursuits, for example; the fast-sailing topsail schooner *Wanderer*, that ended up on both sides of the political fence as a contraband smuggler and slaver. During the Civil War, the Union prohibited private armed warfare or privateering, but it thrived as a relatively successful business for the Confederate States. Southern yachts-turned-naval vessels were conscripted as blockade runners and cruisers. Both sides occasionally had ships with the same or similar name, but with totally different missions and different rigging or means of propulsion confusing their identity in the historical context.

As the country prospered and more people took up yachting for pleasure, some citizens sold or donated these prized possessions to the government. The best-known transferred yacht was the iconic *America*, the winner of the “100 Guineas Cup” that still bears its name. As *Camilla*, she served the Confederacy in the Civil War, deployed as a commerce raider and later served as a training vessel at the US Naval Academy. Under restoration for possible use in the Second World War, she was partly destroyed as the result of a blizzard on the naval academy’s grounds and finally stricken from naval duty in 1945. Another famous vessel was presidential yacht *Mayflower* from which Theodore Roosevelt reviewed the “Great White Fleet” of battleships setting out on their round-the-world voyage and their return. Converted yachts also took part in the short war with Spain, some distinguishing themselves in their roles as warriors. The purchase of private vessels for naval use goes back to the United States Code 46, section 57105 of 1936 with specific classifications of patrol gunboat (PG), patrol yacht (PY), coastal patrol yacht (PYc), yard patrol (YP), and miscellaneous unclassified (IX).

Next Goldman describes the colourful if not always celebrated crews that served in state naval militias and one group known as the “Hooligan Navy.” The latter were an assemblage “of college boys, adventurous legends of shore villages, Boy Scouts, beachcombers, ex-bootleggers, and rum runners, . . . almost everyone who declared he could reef and steer, and many who couldn’t” (115). Some vessels were ill-suited for their assignments, such as the one in which Ernest Borgnine served. Borgnine, best known for his role in TV’s *McHale’s Navy* served onboard the converted yacht USS *Sylph* during the Second World War. When depth charges were rolled off aft during a U-boat encounter, they failed to detonate. This turned out to be good fortune because the explosion would likely have torn the stern off the vulnerable, slow-moving wooden yacht. Upon laboriously chipping off paint from some remaining charges, their date of manufacture revealed that they were manufactured in 1917! Still, donated, purchased or confiscated, yachts played a role in both world wars, but their significance could be debated in spite of serving in harm’s way.

Inexplicably, Goldman did not include *Bowdoin* (IX 50) in his extensive list of Second World War yachts. This 88-foot, stoutly constructed schooner, built in 1921 for Arctic explorer Rear Admiral Donald MacMillan, participated in Op Sails 1986 tall ship parade. It is believed to be the oldest, American-built, Second World War veteran sailing ship still in service. From 1942-1945 she saw duty supplying naval and air bases in Greenland and performed hydrographic surveying off that island and Labrador. Currently the State of Maine’s flagship, the white-hulled
schooner with her distinctive crow’s nest atop her foremast is still active as a merchant marine training vessel.

Goldman includes an unusual number of broad quotes delivered by pivotal historic figures or within documents during consequential events. Unfortunately, *American Yachts in Naval Service* struggles to cover all of American naval history up to 1945 within a scant 143 pages of text, while identifying hundreds of yachts and other vessels and their contributions. This makes for a “choppy literary sea” that, at times, appears shallow, but occasionally produced striking graphic prose: “Even in wartime, mundane routine, tedious duties and, throbbing engines that seemingly counted out each passing idle second far outnumbered the adrenaline rush of the call to General Quarters, ... the excitement of spotting a thin periscope and its feather wake, or the near unbearable tension of navigating in a fog obscured convoy when one could barely see the bow of one’s own fragile yacht let alone the looming bulk of an escort freighter which might have zigged when it should have zagged” (94). The book’s subject matter is unique and its notes, three appendices, and extensive bibliography are quite scholarly. Therefore, this work is potentially useful to any student interested in following the wakes of some of the many historical yachts unmoored and set adrift that collided with maritime history.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

John D. Grainger’s book examines the naval history of the Hellenistic period, an often overshadowed element of that time. Beginning with Alexander the Great’s minimal use of naval power to support his conquests, Granger investigates the rise and deployment of naval warfare in places such as the Successor kingdoms in the eastern Mediterranean, the naval powers of the western Mediterranean (particularly Carthage and Syracuse), the entrance of Rome into the nautical world, and the emergence of Roman domination of the sea. He also surveys the activities of the lesser powers of the time, such as Rhodes, the Attalid kingdom of Asia Minor, and various Greek states.

While obviously focusing on naval aspects, the author does not neglect the relevant non-naval elements as well, thus providing as clear a picture as possible of the events and consequences of various conflicts. Grainger maintains a sympathetic view of those participants in the events who do not usually receive individual recognition—the oarsmen, sailors and shipwrights—frequently including statements such as; “As usual, the consul survived; thousands of his men died” (94). The very clear organization of the material by historic chronology and naval powers presents the information in a precise and comprehensible format; no mean feat for an extremely involved, and often confusing, age. Each significant player is addressed as they come to the fore, with a detailed analysis of the causes and means of their respective ascents and declines. While there is, by necessity, some chronological overlap from chapter to chapter, this transitional difficulty is effectively dealt with by means of brief references to and reminders of previously described elements.
Grainger considers political, geographical, and incidental factors in the naval developments and fates of each player, making extensive use of primary sources, both literary and epigraphic. In cases where there are conflicting or unclear sources, the author typically mentions all the relevant sources, while expressing his own views and impressions, accompanied by arguments explaining his interpretation.

The chronological organization is paralleled by a geographical organization. The events and the activities of the Hellenistic powers of eastern Mediterranean are examined in roughly the first third of the book. Grainger deftly weaves his way through the tangled politics and relations of the Hellenistic kingdoms with one another and with the other powers in the region.

The middle third of the book shifts the focus westward to Carthage and the emerging power of Rome. While the events described in this section are largely contemporaneous, there was minimal overlap between east and west, so the geographic transition is far more conducive to maintaining clarity than a strictly chronological format would be. This period in the west featured fewer significant powers, and in many cases more detailed sources regarding particular events; thus, the challenge of making an understandable presentation of the events is significantly reduced. This is not to say that Grainger’s work on this section is less skillfully wrought.

The final third brings east and west together, with Rome’s emergence as the dominant power, first in the western Mediterranean, and then in the entire region—a situation that would endure for the next three centuries. Notably, Grainger refutes the common view that the Romans paid little heed to naval matters, effectively showing that, while rarely spotlighted in the sources, the Romans certainly did not ignore the importance of the sea in exerting control over their interests.

While the work is, overall, quite successfully presented, there are a few areas of concern. One is the use of Hellenized forms of ancient names. Spelling conventions are often outlined in the introduction, and this work lacks that. The use of Hellenized forms is particularly problematic in the latter parts dealing with the western Mediterranean and Rome, as many of the names are far more familiar to readers in their Latinized form, e.g., Rhegium rather than Regin (used by the author). This also presents a problem with the maps, as some use Hellenized names and some Latinized names. Maps of the western Mediterranean and entirety of the Mediterranean would be worthwhile, as would a map of the harbour of Carthage, considering its mention as one of the “four particularly notable harbours” (xii). Lastly, conceptual diagrams and illustrations of the significant vessels would be highly useful.

The aforementioned concerns are not significant enough to affect the overall success of the work. The author does an excellent job of presenting one of the most involved and difficult-to-understand periods of Greco-Roman history, addressing a somewhat overlooked aspect of that history. The book is both accessible to the lay reader and thorough enough for students and academic readers, making it a welcome and important addition to the libraries of those interested in the ancient Mediterranean world.

Ronald Atchison
Pensacola, Florida

John Grehan and Martin Pace. Despatches from the Front: The Battle for Norway 1940-1942. (Originally pub-
Norway essentially played three different roles during the Second World War. It started as a stalwart neutral power, then a hapless victim of invasion and finally the scene of several key commando attacks led by its belated, and ultimately unsuccessful, former protectors. This paperback reprint focuses on the last two stages of Norway’s experience during the war. Compilers Grehan and Pace have selected a number of “dispatches” or reports that are intended to provide more information on how England tried to stem and then counter the German invasion and occupation of this neutral country. The authors have contributed to most, if not all, the books in this series that cover England’s various campaigns throughout its modern history, and their experience shines through.

As this volume shows, once England withdrew from Norway, it chose to mount several commando raids in the Norwegian archipelago. These kept Hitler’s forces off-guard and forced him to maintain fairly strong forces in that beleaguered country. Naturally, this slim volume doesn’t deviate from the well-established series format. Each of the chapters detail selected actions, focusing on both the relatively contemporaneous general summary reports that were filed by various commanders, as well as a selection of appendices that add additional commentary and observations from other officers and commands. The majority of the dispatches in this volume were penned by naval officers, which underscores the importance of Norway to the Royal Navy in this far-flung theatre of the war. Their scope includes military operations during the ill-fated attempt to counter the German invasion, reports on both the naval battles and land battles around Narvik, as well as commando and naval raids in Norwegian waters. The text is well-buttressed by a limited number of very well-chosen and relatively contemporary photographs. Given the type of paper chosen for this edition, the images are remarkably sharp. Additional support for the text is provided by a helpful list of abbreviations, plus indices of key persons and naval, military and air units.

Overall, the strength of this volume is found in the actual dispatches themselves. While many could argue that one or another operation had been overlooked, one cannot dismiss the ones that made the cut. Overall, they are presented in a highly readable fashion and have been faithfully reproduced from the originals. The only concession to modern publishing restraints is placing footnotes at the end of the dispatches. Perhaps the most disjointed attempt at historical accuracy is that the compilers’ insistence on using a capital “I” instead of a numeric “1” when citing times. The decision of the commander of the Lofoten Island raid of March 1941 to sink the German fish oil tanker Hamburg, instead of attempting to seize her as a prize vessel, is an example of the kind of situational operation information that is to be found in these dispatches. Given the nature of this work, it does not include a bibliography, but more casual readers might have been better served with a small list of suggested readings to investigate the story of these events further.

One thing that seems striking is that, apart from the Artic convoys and air-raids on German bases and warships, the Allies shied away undertaking any major raids or joint operations in Nor-
way after 1942. Nonetheless, the raids of 1941 did manage to persuade Hitler to greatly overvalue Norway’s importance during the Second World War. A rather significant event that is glossed over is the sinking of HMS Glorious by the German battlecruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. This omission is all the more striking because of recent revelations about the true cause of her rushed exit from Norwegian waters in June 1940. One unintended consequence of the Lofoten raid that could perhaps have been mentioned was its political repercussions within German-occupied Norway. Nevertheless, given the defined mission for volumes in this series, the compilers were perhaps wise to steer away from these issues.

Despite these very minor quibbles, the work stays true to its mission and the series format. Even now, its contents offer a valuable contribution to the growing literature of Norway’s role and importance during the Second World War. The dispatches presented provide a more “boots on the ground and on board” perspective on the Norwegian campaign and the sometimes cheeky antics of the British commandos who participated in these actions. This volume is definitely worth reading, or even a second read, by anyone interested in the conduct of the Second World War in this region.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Clare, Quebec

Until recent years, most books relating to the U-boat war in the Battle of the Atlantic suggested that the major threat was pretty well over after May 1943. By then, Admiral Dönitz temporarily withdrew most of his boats after suffering unacceptable losses. More recent, careful research, however, has shown that the battle was by no means over until the last days of May 1945. The continuing threat of submarine attack around Britain has become known as “The Inshore Campaign.” U-boats were still very much a threat. They even claimed HMCS *Clayoquot* on 24 December 1944 and HMCS *Esquimalt* on 16 April 1945 off the coast of Canada. These successes, in the Kriegsmarine’s view, were largely thanks to new equipment that is the subject of this excellent and carefully researched book.

As Royal Navy historian, Captain Stephen Roskill, commented; “We never gained a final mastery over the U-Boats” (*Darkest Before Dawn: The Sinking of the Empire Heritage*, 2011). Or, to quote the Duke of Wellington; “It was a near run thing!” Much of the delay in providing new technologies that were being developed for Germany’s U-boat arm should, in retrospect, be credited to the RAF and American bombing campaign. To reduce the serious destruction of the shipbuilding yards and technical production facilities located primarily in the northwest, Germany diversified production farther east and south, becoming experts in partial construction, including even U-boat hull sections and engines. But this forced them to depend on rail and river barge shipping, which the Allied air forces then demolished, slowing and too often destroying those critical supply lines—and cargoes.

While the Kriegsmarine did indeed get a few of their much-modified U-boats to sea, they were too little and too late to influence the final outcome.

It was that close. The author’s extensive 29-pages of appendix tables will prove valuable reference fodder for determining which U-boats were fitted with new equipment, and thus, assessing the threat.

Hamilton looks essentially at three factors that could have made allied anti-submarine efforts considerably more difficult from mid-1944 to May 1945: the development of a reliable snorkel air-supply system (for simplicity, he uses the American spelling almost throughout); the addition of anaerobic paint or other covering for the snorkel heads and conning towers to reduce radar detection; and most importantly, the development of the Walter engines, more streamlined boats and reliance on the snorkel, to increase underwater speed, an improvement of up to 30 per cent.

After a useful chapter to set the scene facing Admiral Dönitz in 1943, with the introduction of increased air cover as an anti-U-boat threat for convoys and passage routes, the author looks intensely at the development of an improved snorkel, with a number of illustrations and technical drawings. Although the Dutch had been experimenting with similar devices since before the war, as well as various designers as far back as the invention of a practical submarine around 1900, it was not until the Germans largely solved the mechanics of a folding, waterproof and speed-adaptable air intake unit that the snorkel became a practical and necessary addition to most of their U-boats. This was particularly important in the shallower waters around the UK and western Europe (the “Inshore Campaign”). For a more detailed look at that specific ‘war,’ see John White’s *Endgame–The U-boat Inshore Campaign* (2008), or Jak Mallmann Showell’s *Hitler’s ‘Wonder’ U-Boats* (2018). Hamilton explains how this reliable working snorkel was a device that could have put Germany in a possible bargaining position at the end of the war. His references to patrol or training exercise reports are interesting in themselves, revealing how rapidly the naval development office was able to modify and change fitting designs. It shows how the pressure of war compares to our current development of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) progress. While the Allied navies’ progress toward better anti-submarine weapons, like the ahead-thrown squid, kept them abreast, it did not provide much of a lead over Germany’s improved U-boats.

Chapter 7 evaluates the considerable benefits to crew habitability and thus, operating efficiencies, derived when snorkels could introduce fresh air more frequently. This is something rarely considered—perhaps because the author was never a submariner, accustomed to just accepting the fetid air in long-dived boats.

Germany also developed special paint and rubber-like coverings for the head of the snorkel protruding above the surface, which coincided with improved anti-radar detection for the conning towers, but both came too late to change the course of the war. Close-up photographs illustrate its use and the developing models required to close the intake when seas washed over the head.

The other main theme is the introduction of the higher speed ‘electro-boats’, Types XXI, XXIII and XXVI. Although few went operational, those that did proved their worth. In a final chapter, Hamilton assesses their problems, never fully resolved, how they were dealt with and advantages. Post-war, the RN also adapted the HPE (explosive hydrogen-peroxide) boats, and like their Kriegsmarine counterparts, did not find them advantageous enough to
pursue. They weren’t called “the Exploders” for nothing.

Hamilton’s table listing every boat that had snorkel fitted, from U-92 to U-1308, including those with anti-radar covering and hull modification, provides a useful reference. HMCS New Glasgow paid the price in March 1945, at night off Londonderry, when their bridge watch sweeping the area before her group went out on escort duty, heard a thrumming noise. They presumed it was a patrolling aircraft, when in fact it was U-1003’s new snorkel close alongside! Her commanding officer had misjudged his closing angle, and in fact hit New Glasgow, damaging both of them, to the extent the U-boat broke his snort and periscopes and had to be abandoned the next morning! Count it a dubious success for the RCN, since the ship had to return for major repairs, and a lesson too late for the Kriegsmarine.

Offering both detailed description of the trials, successes and engineering amendments, in text and illustrations, this is an important and well referenced book on Germany’s late war efforts to regain an advantage. Meanwhile, as Roskill noted, the Allies were just “keeping up.”

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Most of the US armada assembled in Tokyo Bay to accept the Japanese surrender in September 1945 had been commissioned since Pearl Harbor. Author Thomas Heinrich uses this diverse fleet of vessels, ranging from aircraft carriers to landing craft, as a vivid symbol of American wartime shipbuilding. This book is a comprehensive look at shipyards including their management and labour, the roles of the US Navy and government support programs, the impact of new technologies, and details of how certain building programs were achieved. The narrative shows how warship building differed from merchant ship construction and from the fabrication of other types of military equipment. Warships were, in fact, built in batches by skilled labour. Writers who have depicted US warship-building as analogous to the mass production of aircraft, tanks, or artillery or liberty ships, by recently-trained workers are incorrect. The book offers welcome comparisons in each chapter with practices in Britain, Germany, and Japan.

Thomas Heinrich is a German-American professor of business and naval history. His Ships for the Seven Seas: Philadelphia Shipbuilding in the Age of Industrial Capitalism (1997) examined the nexus of factors that produced a major shipbuilding conglomerate on the Delaware River. Warship Builders is the result of ten years of further research and thinking. The writing style is clear; the writer’s painstaking efforts to explain (and illustrate with drawings) points like the nature of arc and electric welding, propulsion rotors and the construction of turbine rotors perhaps reflect his teaching background. Extensive endnotes comprise one fifth of the book; they are followed by a 35-page bibliography.

When Congress approved a 70 percent expansion of naval tonnage under the Two-Ocean Navy Act in July 1940, America already had one of the world’s largest warship-building indus-
tries (7). The reader is reminded that in 1906, the boilers for HMS Dreadnought had been supplied by the UK branch of Babcock-Wilcox, a firm that had grown from its origins in Rhode Island to an international concern. The warship-shipbuilding sector, having been largely fallow in the 1920s, was steadily strengthened by the Roosevelt administration from 1933 onwards. The President had been involved with wartime shipbuilding during his eight years as Undersecretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration. Under the New Deal’s National Recovery Act of 1933, private and naval shipyards started receiving funds for facility improvements. The new administration also began approving larger warship-building programs, a trend that accelerated as the international climate, particularly in the Pacific, deteriorated. Heinrich notes that navy shipyards—whose workforce during the Second World War would represent one-third of warship-building labour—started receiving funds from Congress for facility improvements as early as 1928 (29). All four countries had developed the use of electric welding in warship construction in place of riveting. It was only in the United States and Germany, however, that large, overhead cranes enabled large modules, or in the case of U-boats, hull sections, to be first welded and moved into position on the hull.

Large private warship builders operated as cartels in the thirties in both the US and UK. In the late twenties, the only three American yards capable of building large warships had secretly coordinated bids for constructing a class of heavy cruisers to ensure that each received at least one contract. Their profits were 25, 35, and 37 percent of the contract price (25). The results of these insider arrangements were ultimately beneficial in that yards came to specialize in building certain types of warships. Newport News won the contract for the first American carrier to be built as such from the keel up, USS Ranger, in 1930, after the two other yards had agreed to submit higher bids. In fact, Newport News made a 23 percent profit on this ship, and this was the start of the yard’s specialization in carriers. It would build the three successful Yorktown class ships later in the thirties and then nine of the 24 powerful Essex class during the Second World War. The Two Ocean Navy Act instituted no-bid contracts negotiated between the navy and pre-selected builders. Wartime profits for private yards averaged 5 percent; the building of destroyers (9 percent for Bath Iron Works), submarines (8 percent) were more profitable than constructing heavy combatants (99). Seventy-five years later, both yards still specialize in building these warship types. The wartime profit figures do not factor in heavy investments by government in facility improvements that were written off after the war. Major British warship builders were more profitable than US and German yards in the 1930s (50); the yard on the Clyde that built the battleship Anson between 1937 and 1942 realized a 30 percent profit. Professor Heinrich provides a fascinating comparison of the costs in the late-thirties of battleship classes on page 51. The approximate cost per ton for a Yamato was $780, as against $790 for a King George V, $1,100 for a Bismarck, and $2,200 for a North Carolina.

Individual chapters discuss the role of navy yards, private shipyards, and internal reforms in the Navy Department. Heinrich cites the “unprecedented concentration of power” under Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the US Fleet (113). All four of the Iowa-class battleships were built in navy yards on
the east coast. Their construction is described in detail in the chapter on navy yards. Apparently, warship plans produced in the Bureau of Ships were more detailed than those provided to builders in Britain by the Naval Construction Department (150). During the design stage, the Brooklyn Navy Yard carpenters built full-scale mock-ups that helped resolve the internal arrangement of individual spaces and issues such as the positioning of machinery and piping. This yard built two Iowas and acted as the lead yard once construction started when there were regular conferences between the three yards involved. In 1941, the President had pushed to complete nine Cleveland-class light cruisers under construction by a single yard, New York Shipbuilding, as Independence-class fast light carriers. Admiral King supported this innovative proposal. There is a fluid and comprehensive narrative about this project in the chapter about private shipyards. It highlights various aspects of their propulsion systems and the role of sub-contractors and extensive supply chains in producing a complex warship. The Independence-class joined the Pacific war at roughly the same time starting in late 1943 as the powerful Essex-class fast carriers. The author notes that the “Two Ocean Navy” plans in 1940 lacked provision for ocean-going escorts (92). Later he covers the massive programs that produced 563 destroyer escorts which started entering service late in 1943.

*Warship Builders* is rich in detail. The narrative describes the prodigious scale of US wartime naval construction and cites numerous dollar figures. There are, however, few attempts to relate these to a total figure in a category (e.g., assistance for facility improvements to private/navy yards or expenditures on aircraft or other weapon production). The reader is not provided with a frame of reference to evaluate and compare various expenditures. An exception is a statistic on page 122 which shows that the total value of the 11 navy yards and industrial shore establishments in 1944 was $12 billion, “comparable to the combined assets of General Motors, US Steel, and American Telephone and Telegraph.”

*Warship Builders* includes well-chosen photographs, excellent diagrams, and useful graphs. It has been produced to the usual high US Naval Institute standard with sturdy binding and clear typeface. The text is jargon-free and covers a wide span of topics in a clear manner. This is an admirable book that describes the scale of US naval shipbuilding, how it was achieved and how it compared to parallel efforts in Britain, Japan, and Germany.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


At nearly 1,000 feet long and embarked with fifth generation F-35 aircraft, the HMS *Queen Elizabeth II* is the pride of the British Fleet. The aircrew of the F-35 is comprised of a joint and combined force of US Marine aviators and Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots flying beside Royal Navy (RN) aviators. This incredible feat of engineering and military might, however, almost did not happen. *The British Carrier Strike Fleet After 1945* covers the decline and atrophy of the British fleet after the
Second World War until present day in the face of an ever-changing maritime environment and tightening fiscal constraints.

After the war, the aircraft carrier emerged as the ultimate symbol of sea power. The advent and proliferation of nuclear weapons, however, left many policy makers convinced that the aircraft carrier was an anachronism from a bygone era. Throughout the book, however, the author provides examples where the British aircraft carriers fulfilled their roles ranging from providing humanitarian aid to strike capability, and clearly defines the case for the necessity of aircraft carriers in the Royal Navy. From the North Pacific to the South Atlantic and everywhere in between, there are examples of British aircraft carriers serving as tools of international diplomacy, whether just “showing the flag” or actively extinguishing “brushfire” conflicts and war. Despite the inarguable success of aircraft carriers for imposing British will and policy, policymakers continued to gut the British carrier force. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, however, served as a catalyst of change after nearly 40 years of atrophy and neglect and allowed aircraft carriers to prove their worth in the modern era.

The essence of the book is the decline of British sea power exemplified by the ill-fated CVA-01 project. Policymaking along with interservice tribalism between armed services would ultimately lead to the cancellation of the project. The CVA-01 was designed as a conventionally powered aircraft carrier that would have looked remarkably similar to any United States aircraft carrier today. Instead, shrinking pocketbooks and feuding between the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force served as a budgetary flashpoint; a flashpoint that continues to ignite today with the same intensity in the United States. The end result of this interservice rivalry and narrowminded policymaking resulted in the cancellation of CVA-01 and thus, any attempt by the Royal Navy to have a “true” carrier—that is, a carrier fitted with an arresting gear and catapults. The cancellation forced the Royal Navy to innovate and adapt new technologies for future carrier projects. They focused on developing smaller carriers and pioneered the development and implementation of the iconic “ski jump” seen on British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian aircraft carriers today. In addition to carrier strike capability, the book delves into the RN’s adoption and implementation of early air warning (AEW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), two fields of warfare that are becoming increasingly important in modern naval combat.

Hobbs presents his information objectively so that his personal biases are not apparent until the last chapter entitled “reflections,” where he explains what he hoped the British carrier fleet would have been in the modern era. Despite envisioning a different carrier fleet for modern day use, the author does not short change due credit and pride for Britain’s new-found embrace of aircraft carriers and its renewed emphasis on sea control.

While primarily about policymaking, the book does not disappoint aviation lovers. From the propeller-driven war heroes and Cold-War workhorses to the state-of-the-art fighter jets, the author covers the entire spectrum of naval aircraft and capabilities developed and used by the Royal Navy for aircraft carrier operations. For the rotor-heads out there, the book also covers British naval rotor aviation evolution and even offers a rare insight into how British helicopters perform the airborne search and surveillance control (ASaC), a role per-
formed by the fixed wing E-2 Hawkeye aircraft in the United States. Nor does the book skimp on technical details. While some readers may get lost in the litany of technical details along with the vast list of missions, ship names, aircraft, and weapon systems, the textbook style presentation of information provides a rich resource of information and case examples. Hobbs also covers several novel concepts in naval aviation, including examples where the RN landed jets without landing gear on an aircraft carrier equipped with a rubber deck and the proposal of carrier-borne rocket fighters designed to intercept and shoot down high-altitude Soviet bombers.

After decades of neglect, the Royal Navy’s adoption of the F-35 fighter jet and deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth II aircraft carrier indicate that policy makers have finally taken the lessons of sea power, especially through aircraft carriers, to heart and that the aircraft carrier is here to stay. This book is a must-read for those wondering if aircraft carriers are just expensive relics from the past or essential tools for international diplomacy, for now and into the future.

Dylan Phillips-Levine
Buenos Aires, Argentina


While the War of 1812 commemorations are now a long six years behind us, the subject matter continues (and will continue) to produce fertile ground for academic study. In particular, the single-ship actions between British and American frigates and brigs have persisted in fascinating the amateur and professional historian alike ever since the events themselves unfolded. Nicholas Kaizer, a young historian whose Master’s thesis for Dalhousie University forms the core of this book, attempts to bring a fresh view to these ship-on-ship actions. The result is a well-researched, thoughtful endeavour.

Single-ship actions at the start of the War of 1812 saw the loss of three British frigates and a brig, a stark contrast to Britain’s reputation of dominance over the French and Spanish fleets in European waters. This rough start continued throughout the war, but was somewhat offset by a handful of British victories. Kaizer takes each engagement and works through the action in some detail, comparing ship armament and handling. The aftermath and the letter home to the Admiralty explaining the defeat, plus the ensuing courts martial are all recounted. Kaizer holds that the defeats were a significant blow to the sense of professional and personal honour of the officers of the British navy. Common to all was an expressed eagerness to engage the enemy, the struggle to gain or maintain the weather gauge, the ship-shattering American gunnery supremacy, and fighting to the point where continuance would have spilt British blood with no hope of victory. All defeated officers felt they could have won if luck had favoured them rather than their foe. Though much has been made by other historians over the armament differences between the British and American vessels, the author points out that most ships carried more guns than they were rated for, often leading to a more equal number of guns, though overall superiority in weight of
broadside went to the Americans. Kaizer plays down the weight difference as a reason for the losses in the minds of the defeated officers.

For the British officers, after the first defeats, the drive to beat an American ship-of-war, of similar rate, in single-ship combat became a major motivating force, thus the title of the book “Revenge in the Name of Honour”. The three officers held up as models of this line of thinking are Philip Broke, Henry Napier, and Thomas Capel. Using personal letters, and journals, Kaizer paints these men as patriotic British officers in search of honour for themselves, their service and the country. Brooke is the one who realizes his goal by taking HMS Shannon against US frigate Chesapeake and defeating the American in 11 minutes of carnage. HMS Pelican versus the US Argus is another successful single-ship action. While the duel between HMS Endymion and the US frigate President is laid out as a single-ship action, the author reminds us that the presence of three other British vessels closing in on the American ship made this fight really about a squadron chasing down and capturing the heavy frigate.

Kaizer notes that this goal of individual honour through combat interfered at times with the overall goal of blockading the large American frigates in ports, to keep them from commerce raiding. Perceiving the British frigates as not an equal match to the Americans, in July 1813 the Admiralty banned officers from single-ship engagements, ordering ships to travel in pairs and work with large squadrons to capture and destroy elements of the United States Navy.

This book is more than just the recounting of the actions and the relationship with honour. It explores the impact on the public perspective of the navy and the Admiralty as well. Public papers (especially those critical of the government) tended to see the defeats with panicked shock and defeatist dismay as evidence of the navy’s inability to protect the nation. They played up armament differences, disadvantages faced by the British, and the failing heroic effort. The Admiralty’s failure to provide the North American Station with proper ships, and its uncertain response with razées (cut down from 64- or 75-gun ships), to be able to catch and overpower the American heavy frigates, were taken as signs of a corrupt unpreparedness that caused the defeats. Writers to the Naval Chronicle (a source used extensively by the author) were more forgiving, praising the naval officers, and offering excuses for the American victories, though some did clearly lay blame at the Admiralty’s door. The difference between British accounts and those in Nova Scotia, where support for the navy was strong, highlight the latter’s dependency on a successful naval outcome.

The role of honour is stressed throughout each of the chapters, to explain the motivation of officers to engage the enemy. Kaizer suggests this revealed the central driving force underpinning the professional culture among the British officers of the post-Nelson navy. One British officer declined an engagement when he chose, instead, to honour his duty to protect the half million pounds worth of gold aboard ship.

Overall this argument makes sense, but there are some spots of contention that need further exploration. First is Captain Philip Broke’s correspondence with his wife which reveals his strong sense of honour in defending the Royal Navy’s reputation and obtaining revenge for the defeats at the hands of the Americans. Broke’s letters invoke “honour” many times, but Kaizer fails to note the captain’s also frequently ex-
pressed desire for prize money to take him into retirement ashore, along with his wife and his honour. Many of the officers (if not all) were keenly aware that capturing an American frigate, or taking a loaded merchant ship, would provide a rich reward. Honour was not the only motivation.

Court martial testimony as to the honourable intentions and behaviour of the officers and men of His Majesty’s ships, as Kaizer draws out for each loss, was the standard line of defence. Without significant objection from junior officers, captains and commanders were acquitted of responsibility for the defeat. The officers were found to have done all they could, that they did not shirk their duty in any manner, and that early battle damage and superior armament favoured the Americans. These ‘legal’ results were published, defending the honour of the service, and the government. Privately, however, the Admiralty tended to not re-employ those who were defeated. Such losses even tainted the careers of their junior officers, as Kaizer so ably demonstrates. Thus, honour and outcome collide in deciding the continued careers of the officers involved, an incongruity that is not dealt with sufficiently by the author. For the navy, doing everything to protect your honour was not enough; you had to win.

Not all commanding officers were that honourable. Captain John Carden, of HMS Macedonian, was acquitted by the court, despite being challenged for keeping his distance at the start of the fight. Criticized in the press, he wrote a book defending his actions, blaming a large portion of the loss on his wretched seamen. Captain Thomas Laugharne, HMS Alert, threw his lieutenant, Andrew Duncan, under the “boat” (per se) as the court asked questions about gunnery practice. Duncan had a severe hearing loss and was sacrificed by the captain to redirect the court’s attention. No further questions were asked about gunnery as all attention focused on Duncan’s failure to adequately rouse the crew to fight on. Less than an honourable deed on Laugharne’s part, since he had not brought the point up in previous correspondence on the loss. Captain Wales, HMS Epervier, and his officers complained to the court of the inferior nature of the crew, overlooking their own failure to check the repairs to their ship’s guns after it had been driven under water during the hurricane at Halifax, in November 1813.

Kaizer has purposefully concentrated on the single-ship actions of the war to determine the place of the sense of honour in motivating Royal Navy officers, attributing it to underpinning the professional culture of the British navy’s officer corp. Missing in the discussion of honour is its relationship to coastal raiding, attacks on specific communities (not just Washington) around Chesapeake Bay, the interdiction of coastal trade and the capture of merchant ships. The other element that certainly influenced the officers on the ocean were the defeats, or indecision, of British naval forces on the Great Lakes. This wider view might yield a more nuanced view of the issue, but that is for future work.

There are six illustrations, mainly of the officers mentioned, spread across the text, and 16 coloured ship profile drawings in the centre of the book, the work of Florian Richter. The four large maps are clear and helpful in situating the various actions under discussion. The first of two appendices contains information pertaining to the careers of the commanding officers and lieutenants on the British ships that were defeated, or victorious, which are discussed in the book. The second shows the disposition of frigates, by rated ar-
mament, for 1813. The second appendix seems less useful than the first. The book, sadly, lacks an index.

Even with my minor reservations, I recommend this book to those interested in the naval side of the War of 1812, those studying command and naval culture, and people examining the influence of war on local press and the role of the press in shaping the understanding of future historians of the events of the war. Nicholas Kaizer has written a volume that is enjoyable to read and will give one much on which to think. I look forward to his next publication.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Every book, no matter the subject, presents a unique glimpse into an area of history. It may reveal totally new sources or research, different approaches, or methodologies, or even philosophies of history. Often, it reveals the subject in unique and exciting ways. Whatever the length, readers can appreciate it for what it is, a unique and valuable window into history. The Osprey books offer very simple and straightforward accounts that offer a clear narrative and accuracy.

Angus Konstam’s North Cape 1943: The Sinking of the Scharnhorst (2020) certainly provides the latter. A relatively small book at only 96 pages, North Cape examines the final sortie of the KM Scharnhorst at the end of December 1943 in Operation Ostfront (Eastern Front) and its vain attempt to interfere with Allied convoys on the way to the Soviet Union. The resulting one-sided battle that ensued ended with the destruction of the Scharnhorst off the North Cape of Norway. Over eight chapters, Konstam breaks down the operation from the perspective of both the British and German sides. Starting with a strategic assessment of the conditions that set up the campaign, Konstam provides a clear and concise chronology of the operation. What follows is a succinct discussion of the key elements of the battle. Chapter three focuses on the opposing commanders and their experience and training. Chapters four and five examine the order of battle for both sides and their plans, respectively. What follows is, despite its brevity, a crisp and clear-cut discussion of the campaign. Lavishly illustrated with maps providing an effective reference for ship movements, this chapter is really the heart of the text. Like most naval engagements, the battle developed over time in stages. In this case the author breaks it up into eight sections based on ship movements and actions. The final two chapters deal specifically with the aftermath of the battle and the discovery of the wreck of the Scharnhorst in September 2000. Resting in 290 meters of water, the wreck is the final resting place for some 1,932 men. The author also provides a section for further reading on the subject and index.

The biggest limitation for the text is its brevity. While most texts have the space to provide the reader with a great more context and understanding, a brief text like this one tends to produce a very bare-bones assessment of the events. Do not be confused by this. Konstam packs a lot of information into this small text, and I salute him for the work. To do that is never easy by any stretch of the imagination. When augmented by detailed charts and photos, North Cape provides its reader
with a clear understanding of the battle with far more depth than most would expect. The reader comes away with a good sense of the events and the incredible challenges of operating in this environment. Operating off of Norway at the end of December puts ships and men really at the edge of capability and often beyond it. Even today that kind of climate is a killer of men and ships. Adding a war with U-boats, aerial and surface threats and the result is one of the most hostile situations anyone could face. Discussion of the light conditions and the storms facing both sides leaves the reader with a sense of shock that the operation could even go forward let alone lead to a successful conclusion.

At the same time, the complexity of operations does appear here as well. From the British side, the need to provide escorts for convoys and larger forces in the critical areas to protect a stronger surface force in case of German capital ships presented the admirals with unique challenges. Augmented by ULTRA based on the enigma cypher machine, the British were able to have a more complete intelligence picture of the German threat and were able to plan accordingly. Aware that the Germans wanted to put a major surface unit against the convoys, British planning provided for heavier capital ships in this case HMS Duke of York supported by one heavy and three light cruisers and multiple destroyers and smaller vessels. This force was also a multinational force including three Canadian destroyers. In the end the Royal Navy clearly had superior forces at their disposal. In comparison the German navy could field only Scharnhorst and five destroyers due to damage to the KM Tirpitz which rendered her inoperable. Yet despite the numerical advantages, the ability to read German codes and the expectation of action, the Royal Navy almost missed the opportunity to sink Scharnhorst. Bad weather and equally bad luck can conspire to steal victory from anyone, and it was far closer than most think.

Overall, North Cape provides an interesting and fascinating read into the last battle of the Scharnhorst. It provides enough information to not only wet the appetite of the reader but a good consensus of the operations without overwhelming the reader. The greatest limitation is that this subject really needs a more in-depth discussion and assessment. This was a dramatic moment that had a huge impact on many things not just the people who fought it. As such it really deserves a larger study. That should not detract anyone interested in this from picking up the book. I think this will be an interesting read for anyone interested in naval history during this period and the little discussed northern convoy operations especially in 1943.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario.


John G. Langley, author of a well-reviewed biography of Samuel Cunard, has written a very readable volume about an important and overlooked vessel in Canadian history. Introduced by the author as a compendium of stories, the book centres on the steamer Queen Victoria but he provides extensive details surrounding the ship and the events, making this more of a “life and times” volume.
In the 1850s the port of Quebec often depended on steam tugs to assist vessels negotiating the strong currents and dangerous channels between the port and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. At the same time, Trinity House of Quebec, charged with controlling and improving navigation of the river, needed assistance in building and supplying lighthouses along the route as well as providing salvage services. François Baby, a member of the Upper Canada elite, had developed a towing business and when the government called for lighthouse and buoy tenders which could also handle towing, passenger, and freight services he proposed two new vessels. These ships, built in the Napier yard on the Clyde, were the Napoleon III and the Queen Victoria, twin ships 173 feet long and 30 in breadth with displacement of 494 tons. Both vessels were successful and took advantage of government subsidies as well as funds advanced to Baby to cover the building costs. By 1859, however, accumulated debt against which the ships were mortgage collateral resulted in their transfer from Baby to the government.

Both ships performed a variety of tasks in their role as tug steamers, but as the largest vessels in the provincial fleet, they also carried dignitaries on official tours in the area. In 1866 the Queen Victoria sank in a storm off the Carolina coast while returning from an unsuccessful expedition to create direct trade between Canada and Cuba.

Langley covers the vessel’s relatively short life in a workmanlike manner but, with the exception of participating in the royal visit of the Prince of Wales in 1860, and carrying delegates to the 1864 confederation conference in Charlottetown, the ship’s story is not a particularly stirring one. While these two events inspired reportage, the normal working life of the vessel did not. The problem is compounded by a dearth of information about the ship. No plans, drawings, photographs or particularly good descriptions of the Queen Victoria are known to exist. The handsome illustration gracing the cover of the book is a marine painting of the sister ship, the Napoleon III. An illustration labeled as a “Blueprints of the steamer Queen Victoria” turns out to be a conjectural drawing based on a 2015 technical report used to construct a model of the vessel.

Langley acknowledges the research of Rear Admiral H.F. Pullen, who located sources related to the building of the vessel including the specifications. Although lacking source notes, the volume does have a “Selected Bibliography” as well as a “Bibliography.” The former is distinguished from the latter primarily by the inclusion of a list of newspaper references. Although the list is lengthy, the lack of Quebec sources, especially French-language publications, is noteworthy, and may have caused Langley to miss important details. For example, in portraying the captain as a hero, Langley appears to be unaware of one eyewitness account of the sinking of the vessel which mentions the captain as conspicuously absent, “during the time the storm lasted, the reflection even, of his benign countenance was not seen on deck.” The sinking also involved a strange incident. While the captain of a rescue vessel, which itself was running out of provisions, pleaded with the crew of the Queen Victoria to bring supplies for the more than 40 men being transferred from the sinking vessel, the captain of the sinking ship elected to bring in the lifeboats a silver tea service and the 100-pound brass ship’s bell. Passengers and crew were saved with only the clothes on their backs.

The story of this bell makes up the last third of the book. The artifact
passed through the family of the captain of the rescue ship to the village of Prospect Harbor, Maine. Attempts to repatriate the bell were made from the 1960s on. It was finally loaned for temporary display in Canada, in exchange for a replica bell being made, a model of the *Queen Victoria* produced and a rental fee of more than $10,000 paid. While this might ordinarily serve as footnote to the history of the *Queen Victoria*, the negotiations dwarf the story of the vessel itself. There are other diversions as well, such as a full chapter dedicated to the story of the Confederate raider *Tallahassee* which was in Halifax in 1864. The volume is further padded out by an appendix with brief biographies of Canada’s Fathers of Confederation.

Langley cannot resist the temptation to over-dramatize the narrative; the tug steamer *Queen Victoria* becomes a “Royal Yacht” (and later an “imperial” yacht) when the Prince of Wales or the Governor-General, step aboard, and the ship’s bell is described as “Canada’s Liberty Bell” and a symbol of nationhood. The vessel itself, owing to its role in transporting delegates for the confederation conference, is the “flagship of the emerging nation.” The somewhat confusing title of the volume is credited to a Charlottetown press account of the ship, although no source is given. The phrase most likely appears in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek report from the Saint John *Morning Telegraph*.

The resulting volume is somewhat unsatisfying from a nautical research perspective. The problem may be that the subject and the available sources have enough content for an article, but perhaps not a book, and it has been lengthened by including a good deal of contextual information of marginal value. Nevertheless, it contributes to the literature by shining a light on the important role that support vessels, precursors to the Canadian Coast Guard, played in assisting commercial nautical operations and as mechanisms for advancing government maritime policy.

H.T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island


Entering an oversaturated market, books about the Civil War need to fit into a particular niche. In *Gunboats, Muskets, and Torpedoes: Coastal North Carolina, 1861-1865*, author Michael Laramie traces naval and coastal battles that defined the Tar Heel State’s role in the Civil War. His book follows the war from the seizure of Cape Hatteras to the official surrender of the Confederate soldiers under the command of Joseph E. Johnston to the Union Army and William T. Sherman. The author demonstrates North Carolina’s importance in the Civil War, particularly by serving as a breeding ground for new tactics and technologies. Although not a historian by trade, Laramie has a degree in engineering and his experience in the United States armed forces provides him with a unique perspective on military history. He presents a persuasive argument for North Carolina’s role in the Civil War that sheds new light on the conflict.

Despite being nearly 300 pages, the book moves at a good pace with chapters roughly 10- to 15-pages long. The author provides thorough and detailed maps and pictures of the places and actors that he describes in each chapter,
helping the reader to imagine how each battle would have unfolded. Laramie connects and blends the coastal battles with the naval battles while showing the importance of both. In chapter five, when Laramie examines the Battle of Roanoke Island, he explains how the Confederate troops at Fort Bartow saw 12 Union gunboats approaching the shore in support of the Union troops closing in by land. The description illustrates just how vital the ships were to the protection of the attacking Union army.

Another strong point of Laramie’s work is his glossary and terms section at the back of the book, providing readers with a handy definition of words they might not recognize. More than that, he also offers a brief background on the terms and their origin. For instance, a “barbette” is a cannon designed to fire over a parapet. It is not meant to protect the crew, but it does allow them greater firing distance throughout the field. This glossary makes it convenient for both novice and expert readers to appreciate the text.

There are, however, some problems with the book. While Laramie cites many primary sources such as the Southern Historical Society Papers and histories of North Carolina regiments, the majority of his secondary sources are almost 50-years old. For example, when describing the blockade around the Carolina coast, he cites an article by Marcus Price written in 1948, but fails to mention a more modern take by Bern Anderson, whose 1989 book is devoted to the naval history of the Civil War and features the blockade. Laramie also overlooks more modern works by authors who expand on the Civil War era, such as James McPherson, Edward Ayers, and Peter Carmichael. He even ignores historians who wrote directly about North Carolina, such as Elem Warren, whose 2011 article describes the fall of Fort Fisher, and Ron Soodalter, who describes the battle and occupation of Fort Hatteras at the start of the war in North Carolina.

Laramie’s book also needs better editing. Grammatical errors appear throughout the book, but perhaps even worse, is the presence of incorrect historical facts. One of the most glaring omissions is his description of Confederate naval officer Benjamin Loyall. His name is not only spelt as both “Loyal” and “Loyall” in the text, but there are separate entries for him under each name in the index. Laramie describes the USS Sasacus as weighing 750 tons, when in reality, it weighed 974 tons. When discussing the battle at Cape Fear and the bombardment of Fort Buchanan, Laramie states that it was later dubbed the “Malakoff of the South” in reference to the Russian fort that withstood attacks from both the French and British. In fact, it was only the French that attacked Malakoff. The British attacked simultaneously further south at Redan. He also fails to introduce people consistently. In some cases, Laramie introduces his characters using their full name, such as General James Longstreet. On other occasions only a last name appears. For example, he first introduces General John Foster as simply Foster. Only several pages later does the reader find out that it is General John Foster.

While Laramie’s work proceeds in chronological order, making it easy for any reader to follow, it cannot be included in the Pantheon of Civil War books due to its errors. Nevertheless, it does introduce the reader to the many different battles that took place along the coastline of North Carolina during the war and draws attention to North Carolina’s role in the conflict. A novice would enjoy the book; however, an ex-
pert in Civil War history would be left unimpressed after reading it.

Charles Cox
Pensacola, Florida


Few eras in history have garnered quite the attention from naval historians than the great age of fighting sail. With the release of Mark Lardas’ *The Glorious First of June 1794*, one of the most pivotal engagements of the eighteenth century is made accessible to a broad spectrum of maritime history enthusiasts.

The epic sea battle that culminated on 1 June 1794 was a direct result of the global upheaval occasioned by the French Revolution. By the spring of that year, the egalitarian promises of the Revolution had been lost in the Reign of Terror, and an increasingly isolated France was forced to wage war on multiple fronts.

An unexpected famine would only make matters worse. Portions of western France experienced drought beginning in 1793; hostile European powers were unwilling to make up the agricultural shortfalls through trade. In order to ameliorate the food shortages, French authorities launched an ambitious plan to purchase immense quantities of grain from the United States. But in order to successfully cross the Atlantic, the grain convoy would be forced to run the gauntlet of a British blockade.

The grain convoy which mustered in the Chesapeake Bay was estimated at over one hundred vessels. Rather than split the convoy into smaller contingents, French authorities opted to consolidate the ships. Although the vast fleet would consequently create a single large footprint at sea, it was justifiably hoped that the convoy would nonetheless lessen the opportunity for British vessels to locate and pick off individual ships.

The convoy would face a grim opponent in the form of legendary Admiral Richard “Black Dick” Howe. Commander of Britain’s imposing Channel Fleet, Howe hoped to intercept the convoy, although his primary focus was the destruction of France’s Grand Fleet, which sailed out of Brest.

That fleet was commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse. An aristocrat who had survived the Revolution with his head, Villaret-Joyeuse was also a competent career officer. When he was ordered to escort the grain convoy into French ports, Villaret-Joyeuse opted to largely ignore his orders, deciding instead to lure the English fleet away from the convoy, allowing the merchantmen to slip to safety while using his own Grand Fleet as the bait.

Howe, an aggressive combat commander who preferred climactic contests between ships of the line, was only too happy to accommodate. Locating the French, naturally, was his greatest obstacle. The two fleets miraculously passed each other within hailing distance on the evening of 17 May, but due to the presence of a dense fog bank, the two sides never made contact.

British lookouts finally spotted the French fleet on 28 May. The French held the weather gauge, but Howe characteristically ordered his ships to give chase. Although Villaret-Joyeuse hoped to avoid a general engagement, the French three-decker *Révolutionnaire* sought battle, and found it. During an afternoon of epic fighting, the French
ship grappled with five English 74’s. Though dismasted, Revolutionaire succeeded in slipping away under cover of darkness.

On the following day, the two fleets sparred and jockeyed for position. Still struggling against the wind, Howe finally ordered a general engagement. But due to confused signals and the inevitable fog of war, only a handful of ships engaged. Howe personally led the attack, which degenerated into a disorganized melee. The fight largely resulted in a tactical draw, although Howe succeeded in securing the weather gauge for the next day’s fighting.

By 1 June, Howe finally succeeded in bringing his fleet to bear in a classic line-of-battle naval action. After intense fighting, Howe, commanding from the quarterdeck of the Queen Charlotte, succeeded in crossing the French line. By end of day, Villaret-Joyeuse’s fleet had been badly battered, forcing him to disengage.

Ultimately, both sides would claim victory: the French for having ensured the safe passage of the grain convoy, the British for having badly mauled the enemy fleet. But Britain was clearly in a superior position for the continuing war at sea. The Revolution’s frenzied political assault on the French navy, which included the purges of both experienced officers and trained gunners, had badly crippled her maritime capabilities. As the Napoleonic Wars unfolded over the succeeding decade, France was left at a decided disadvantage.

In addition to an engaging account of the fleet actions that took place between 28 May and 1 June 1794, Lardas’ Glorious First of June constitutes a worthy reference volume on the battle. The book includes an exhaustive order of battle for both fleets, as well as excellent two- and three-dimensional maps that help clarify the chaos that erupted when the two sides clashed.

This book follows the traditional Osprey template, and includes chapters on opposing commanders, opposing navies, opposing plans, the campaign, and its aftermath. Although Osprey books can’t be strictly classified as academic volumes, that caveat by no means detracts from the author’s research.

Mark Lardas is a lifelong maritime history enthusiast, prolific author, and knowledgeable authority on life at sea during the eighteenth century. He offers a concise and gripping account of one of the most pivotal, if unheralded, naval engagements during the wars of Revolutionary France.

Joshua Shepherd
Union City, Indiana


After Henry Grinnell’s first expedition to locate Sir John Franklin in 1850, the United States began to direct part of their expansionist interests toward the extreme northern part of the American continent. Most of the daring adventures that characterize the expeditions toward the North Pole during the latter part of the nineteenth century have featured American military officials. Relatively little attention within the mainstream narrative of Arctic exploration has been reserved for people from other countries. The story of George Rice, a Canadian photographer who joined the Lady Franklin Bay expedition in 1881, is a refreshing example.

Jim Lotz, a Fellow of the Arctic In-
stitute of North America and author of 24 books, sheds light on the life of this heroic Canadian in his book *Canada’s Forgotten Hero: George Rice and the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, 1881-1884*. The book is enriched by a series of George Rice’s Arctic photos.

This book is mainly based on Rice’s diary, dating from 7 July 1881, the day the expedition left the port of St. John’s, Newfoundland, until 2 August 1883, when all members decided to leave Fort Conger in Lady Franklin Bay (Ellesmere Island) in a tragic attempt to save themselves from starvation.

The Lady Franklin Bay expedition, led by US Army Lieutenant Adolphus Greely, was organized as a scientific expedition for the third International Polar Year. The official purpose of this expedition, promoted by Captain William Henry Howgate of the US Army Signal Corps, was to establish a temporary station near Lady Franklin Bay, to serve as a base for scientific observations and explorations. In reality, as Lotz asserts in his book, the expedition’s main purpose was part of Howgate’s ambitious scheme for colonizing the Arctic.

George Rice joined the other 21 members of the expedition as a volunteer, and during the various extreme missions around Ellesmere Island, he proved to have all the necessary qualities of a good leader.

After reaching the western coast of Greenland, where two Inuit joined the expedition, the *Proteus* got to Cape Frazer, Ellesmere Island, on 4 August, and finally arrived at Discovery Harbour, on 18 August, where the carpenters started to build the Fort, named after Michigan Senator Omar D. Conger, who had supported the expedition.

Three members of Greely’s expedition were able to reach the highest latitude ever attained at that time, setting off from the northern coast of Greenland, while Rice reached the northern part of Ellesmere Island, after a dramatic journey that represents one of the most interesting parts of Rice’s diary.

In particular, when Rice and his companions reached Cape Hecla, they found that the ice floe on which they stood was delimited by the open Arctic Sea, the existence of which was only supposed by previous expeditions. The crew felt lost when they realized that the floe was turning around by itself, leaving them at the mercy of the sea. Thanks to Rice’s readiness and leadership skills, the men saved themselves, reaching the mainland.

Rice also proved himself to be a good sailor, further earning the respect of expedition members, as supported by their private diaries. The commander, Greely, was one of his strongest admirers, and on many occasions, he showed his confidence in Rice’s skills, giving him responsibility for many important missions, such as asking Rice to conduct a launch into Sun Bay, in order to prepare the retreat journey. On another occasion, Greely chose Rice to lead a party to rescue a boat in Greenland, left by the Nares expedition in 1876.

Lotz’s book represents an important document, opening a window for readers to discover many aspects of daily life in the Arctic and the difficulties that people had to face there in the nineteenth century. Another important feature of this book is its depiction of the difficulty involved in organizing a rescue expedition, partly due to the inefficiency of the technology of the era, but also to the disorganization of both the expedition crew and of the military authorities.

The tragedy of the Lady Franklin Bay expedition was determined by a series of poor command decisions by Greely, who decided to conduct his crew towards the southern part of Ellesmere Island, where the expedition was finally abandoned.
Island, after having waited two years for a relief vessel. As Lotz highlights in his book, Greely was ambitious but also “a rigid authoritarian, widely disliked by all the men of his expedition” (1). In fact, the US had tried to send the *Neptune* to Fort Conger in the summer of 1882, but the ice forced the members of the expedition to leave 250 rations at Cape Sabine, before heading back to civilization.

After two years, the men of the Franklin Bay Expedition left Fort Conger and started their last, dramatic journey towards the south, in the hope of meeting a relief vessel. The US sent out the *Proteus* again, but its sinking drastically reduced the hope of rescuing Greely’s party. In February 1884, the first two members of the expedition died, quickly followed by other men. Rice’s turn came on 9 April, in a courageous attempt to retrieve some rations left at Baird Inlet by previous expeditions.

On 22 June, the *Bear* and the *Thetis* reached Cape Sabine, saving Greely and the last five men who remained and consigning them to history, while the life of people such as George Rice had to wait more than a century to be unearthed.

Fabrizio Martino
Prachatipat, Thailand


*Sisters of the Ice* is an unusual book for a number of reasons: first of all, it is a biography of not one ship but two; second, both of these vessels played an important role in Canadian and Arctic history; third, both ships are still extant—one as a museum ship, and the other as a still-active sailing vessel; and finally, because the author is unashamedly biased when it comes to the subject of the book as he is the owner of one of the ships. The two ships are the *St. Roch*, the famous British Columbian Arctic patrol vessel, today presented at the Vancouver Maritime Museum, and the lesser-known but equally interesting *North Star of Herschel Island*.

Given the numerous publications already available on the *St. Roch*, a patrol vessel owned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that made the first circumnavigation of North America, and the fact that the author himself owns the *North Star of Herschel Island*, it is no wonder that there is a certain focus on the latter vessel. What is much more interesting than the portraits of the two ships is the way the author frames their biographies by focusing on their respective contributions to securing Canadian sovereignty over the area today known as Arctic Canada.

Consequently, the book does not begin with the construction history of the ships, but with a broad introduction to the Canadian Arctic, in particular Herschel Island, and the issue of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago. While some of the topics are oversimplified, for example the discussion of the end of Arctic whaling does not even mention the rapid development of Antarctic whaling, they provide a good introduction to a complex topic and most important the role of individual traders and their interactions with the Indigenous population in this context.

In the following sections it becomes obvious how a very small number of ships could secure sovereignty over
an extreme vast area and how even the RCMP’s role in the context of securing sovereignty was often more the effort of a few individuals than the effort of the institution at large.

The discussion of the design and construction of the North Star of Herschel Island clearly shows that building the “ultimate” Arctic vessel was not something that could be achieved at the drawing board. Rather, it was an evolutionary process with the experiences of the St. Roch serving as a solid base for the new ship, even if it were built for a different purpose (private trading ship instead of government patrol vessel).

When the St. Roch left the Arctic for the last time in 1948, the question of sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic was effectively no longer an issue, but with the beginning of the Cold War, it could have become an issue again as both the US and the Soviet Union were eyeing the region. Now it was North Star of Herschel Island’s turn to secure sovereignty at least indirectly by continuing to trade with the local population and more importantly, by returning to Banks Island to establish a permanent settlement on the island, thus supporting the Canadian claim for sovereignty over the whole area. While other parts of the book might be interesting, this section is probably the most important for any historian with an interest in Arctic regions, as it clearly showcases that sovereignty in the high latitudes was often much more an issue of small scale civilian settlements and trading activities, than the application of formal power and the establishment of official institutions. In such remote areas, non-government players have often been much more influential in this context than official government activities.

The remaining chapters of the book reveal how North Star of Herschel Island survived until the present day and how its owners are not only devoted to the preservation of the ship, but also devoted to the preservation of the northern environment in which the ship served and ensuring her survival. Whether you are visiting the Vancouver Maritime Museum to view the St. Roch or you are lucky enough to see North Star of Herschel Island in a port, you may find it hard to believe that these modest craft had been so instrumental in securing Canadian Arctic sovereignty. After reading this book, however, you will immediately understand that in the Arctic, the question of sovereignty is not always decided by a large armed naval vessel, but is much more often an issue of a permanent presence, good relations with local populations, the ability to deal with the hostile conditions of nature in the high latitudes and many other small details. In the end, the story of the two sisters, St. Roch and North Star of Herschel Island, is evidence for the historical fact that gunboat diplomacy is not and never was the most successful concept for the high latitudes.

Comprising less than 150 pages, the book is a quick read, but this should not distract from its value for those interested in the maritime history of Arctic Canada and the issue of sovereignty over this region, as well as in the history of small ships operating in more or less extreme conditions. Meticulously researched, well referenced and provided with an index as well as a useful bibliography, the book is a welcome addition to the bookshelves of any professional historian with an interest in Arctic Canada. More than 125 black and white illustrations make the book easily accessible to the non-specialist reader. Unfortunately, the reproductions are comparatively poor quality, replacing crisp black and white with various shades of grey. This is perhaps accept-
able for a paperback with a retail price of less than CDN $20.00. Overall, the book can easily be commended to both casual and professional readers. While McDonald’s bias can be felt throughout the entire book, if it is viewed as evidence of his devotion to and love of the subject, it becomes not a weakness but a strength.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


Shipyards on the Pacific coast of North America produced merchant vessels and warships in significant numbers and record times during the Second World War. Shipbuilding there went from very modest levels out of economic depression and limited rearmament to volume delivery under war conditions in short order, in response to operational demands against the Axis powers of Japan, Germany, and Italy. West-Coast-built ships carried vital war supplies across the Atlantic to keep Great Britain in the fight and enabled large fleets on the other side of the Pacific and Indian Ocean to sustain themselves and undertake major amphibious landings on Japanese-held territories. Although numerous West Coast cities, companies, and individuals contributed to this effort, Kaiser’s emergency shipyards in Oregon and Washington State received special attention from Larry Barber, marine editor of a local newspaper *The Oregonian*, after 1940. Peter Marsh, who inherited a collection of photographs, clippings, and jottings after Barber’s death, has put together a tribute to those shipyards and the ships constructed in them.

The book is divided into three parts covering the three principal shipyards—Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Kaiser Vancouver, and Kaiser Swan Island; production techniques and employment in those shipyards; and descriptions of other related Portland area industrial concerns engaged in wartime production on behalf of the United States Navy, Maritime Commission, and Royal Navy. The numbers and scale were impressive by any measure of industrial achievement, and the Kaiser corporate culture introduced innovations to speed production by applying existing construction and management experience in other fields. Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation constructed the British-inspired Liberty ship, then switched to the faster Victory design and naval auxiliaries; Kaiser Vancouver built a mix of Victory ships, landing ship tank, escort carriers, attack transports, and troop transports; and Kaiser Swan Island exclusively concentrated on T2 tankers. The wartime population of Portland grew by nearly a third, with the influx of shipyard workers from other parts of the United States, which put pressure on housing, transportation, and city planning, the Kaiser corporation being somewhat of an entity unto itself. It paid high wages, brought women and African Americans into the shipyards against the wishes of the dominant American Federation of Labor boilermakers union, offered access to free food in centralized cafeterias, and set up scientifically-based subsidized daycare centres. In spite of the focus on Henry Kaiser, the real architect of success in shipbuilding was his son Edgar Kaiser, who oversaw operations in the Portland and Vancouver shipyards as vice
Liberty Factory is primarily an illustrated rather than scholarly book. Marsh provides a general narrative, without references, on general events and figures related or unrelated to shipbuilding in Portland and summarizes chronologically entries from Barber’s journal and coverage in The Oregonian. Consequently, much is provided in regard to technical details of individual ship types, launching ceremonies, and special interest stories, common to a journalist with public access to information. Reference is also made to the Kaiser corporate serial periodical The Bo's’n’s Whistle, distributed in the wartime shipyards for the information of workers and now available digitally through the Oregon Historical Society. Such sources have limitations and stay close to the corporate brand, though do provide certain details on workers and life in the shipyards otherwise forgotten. By far, previously unpublished original photographs from Barber’s collection and additional information in the accompanying captions are the real strength of the book. Surprisingly, the annotated list of further reading at the back does not include Christopher Tassava’s Launching a Thousand Ships, completed as a PhD dissertation at Northwestern University in 2003 and digested in the journal Enterprise & Society (December 2005). Tassava has also published articles on such issues as welding cracks in Kaiser-built ships that are addressed in the book. Beyond generalized statements, Marsh makes only passing mention to shipbuilding in California, Puget Sound, and British Columbia and elsewhere in the United States and Great Britain, to put the Portland and Kaiser contribution into context. Agency shipyards, such as Calship and Marinship, reached comparable levels of productivity and volume in producing standardized ships and experienced similar problems in mass production using newly recruited and semi-trained workforces.

Henry Kaiser’s achievements in wartime shipbuilding are popularly well-known and somewhat over-exaggerated, in keeping with his own propaganda. The true untold story was Edgar Kaiser’s Oregon shipyards, if the sub-title was slightly varied. Marsh has missed an opportunity to provide a biography of Edgar Kaiser and really delve into the operation, management, and demographics of workers in the three Kaiser shipyards located in the Portland area. Edgar, who studied economics and left the last year of university to work his way up the Kaiser corporate hierarchy to greater positions of responsibility, provided the know-how and quiet confidence to make wartime shipbuilding successful. Authorities in the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission quickly recognized that Edgar Kaiser, rather than Henry Kaiser, was the steadying influence in management and implemented the creative ideas. In that sense, the story of Edgar Kaiser’s Oregon shipyards still remains untold.

Liberty Factory is a nicely illustrated large-format book that will appeal to readers interested in wartime shipbuilding and local history, particularly on the west coast of the United States and in Oregon. Seaforth has done a very fine job on lay-out and the black-and-white photographs that grace the pages. For that reason alone, it is well worth the cover price.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia

In an age when new titles seem to be released in a seemingly endless torrent, issuing a reprint of a relatively recent work seems to be a questionable publishing tactic. Nonetheless, reprint editions have proven to be very popular among both publishers and their audience. The author of this particular reprint, Martin Middlebrook, needs no special introduction, being a military historian of the first rank. He has written extensively on all aspects of both the world wars of the early twentieth century—including aviation, military and naval history. Consequently, he is fully aware that battles are never fought in a vacuum. This volume focusses on the Battle of the Atlantic and a bitter convoy battle that was fought at the very fringe of what is commonly seen as the turning point of this epic struggle.

He tells the compelling story of two convoys that ran the North Atlantic gauntlet against German submarines (U-boats) in March 1943 in seventeen well-written chapters. Ably supporting his detailed text are an insightful introduction, six comprehensive appendices, several maps and situational diagrams and over 30 well-chosen illustrations. After providing the requisite back story of the war situation in early 1943, the weapons used, and more importantly, the nature of the military and civilian crews involved, the pace of the volume quickly picks up. The author describes the formation of these convoys and their organization from the moment when their ships and escorts first gathered until their eventual sailing. He also provides information on the intelligence available to each side regarding the composition and intentions of their opponents before they sailed, and then introduces several of the key and some “incidental” characters and ships that would participate in the coming test of wills that mark this story. These brief “introductions” really help to flesh out his narrative and provide readers with some insights as to why so many sailors and a few intrepid passengers dared to sail the North Atlantic in this period.

Subsequent chapters discuss their voyages. While some have seen the convoys’ individual struggles as a shared joint “experience,” as Middlebrook points out, the two convoys were never closer than roughly 90 nautical miles from each other. In fact, the Admiralty failed to take advantage of this distance to order a redistribution of escorts from the less threatened convoy to the more beleaguered one. Their relative proximity also misled Admiral Dönitz’s U-boat command, which had difficulty in determining which convoy was being attacked when. The result was a condensed U-boat action summary combining two separate attacks into one struggle against a very large convoy. The author uses their experiences to expose several weaknesses in their defences, including appallingly weak escort and aerial support. Middlebrook also argues that far more long range aircraft were available than those that were actually assigned to closing the North Atlantic “Air Gap” during their voyages. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the few aircraft that actually supported these convoys made an impressive number of attacks on U-boats forcing them to dive.

Nor are his criticisms and observations limited to the Allies. He also
points out that the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) should have made better use of their specialized, albeit limited in number, supply U-boats. While critical of the Allies’ failure to fully exploit their intelligence, Middlebrook notes that Admiral Dönitz and his staff never took full advantage of theirs either. Moreover, he notes, the Germans never realized the extent to which their communications had been compromised. This failure is all the more inexcusable because several German U-boat officers were to voice their suspicions of this throughout the last half of the war. The author could have also mentioned that German U-boat commanders were actually more hampered by a lack of aerial reconnaissance than their counterparts. In the end, convoys SC122 and HX229 suffered serious losses—22 merchant vessels lost as against one U-boat. Nonetheless, given that 42 U-boats actually operated against these convoys, their success seems relatively small and is a good indicator of the declining effectiveness of German U-boats.

Middlebrook is not content to leave the story here. His account concludes with a recap of the careers and subsequent history of many of the individuals and ships featured in his text. This is perhaps the strongest element of the story, as readers are given an even better grounding in the consequences of this struggle, in regard to the war itself as well as the personal histories of some of the individuals who appear in this volume. The six appendices are of great value to the reader as well, all but the last of them focusing on these two convoys. Based primarily on countless interviews with participants in these events, the lack of detailed notes and bibliography are at best a very minor quibble. Overall, this volume is still a worthwhile read.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Clare, Quebec


In this fine monograph, Nicholas Papastratigakis has delivered to the maritime history community an important account of a much-neglected aspect of the pre-Great War world, that of Russia’s late-nineteenth century imperialist ambitions and the role played by its navy in securing them. In contrast, albeit not notably rich, accounts of Russia’s far east foe, Japan, enjoy significant attention and regard. Admiration abounds for Japan’s pluck and its well-earned triumphs during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, tinged perhaps with reservations regarding the future course of history in the middle decades of the twentieth century. For Russia, the received view tends towards contempt for a declining autocracy that set new standards for ineptitude and incompetence. That both perspectives are a little unbalanced is largely due to the historiography, which is decidedly thin, particularly in English. Papastratigakis has provided a needed addition to accounts in English from Russia’s perspective on this entire subject. It is an excellent contribution to the history of both the preliminaries to the Russo-Japanese War itself, as well as providing important insights into a largely unstudied aspect of the pre-Great War diplomacy and strategic calculus.

To set the context, Papastratigakis commences his account with two chapters that summarize the role of naval power in relation to Russia’s imperial ambition and its influence on national
policy. Some might not need such a review, but it is welcome as it provides the Russian understandings in contrast to the comparatively well-known perspectives of Great Britain, France, and Germany in the same period. The useful point is made that imperial rivalry certainly resulted in tensions and the potential for conflict, but as the vital interests of the European powers were not at stake, with the territories in question far off, there was habitually room for negotiation and compromise. This state of affairs did not apply with respect to northeast China and the antagonistic ambitions of both Russia and Japan for gains at China’s expense. The connection with rival objectives in China to the European confrontation on Russia’s western borders with Austria-Hungary and Germany, as well as endemic conflict with the Ottoman Empire, is well sketched out. Despite its vast size and enormous economic potential, Russia was hard pressed to maintain its interests and project its power due to its relative immaturity in technological, infrastructural, administrative and, particularly, governance terms. Fielding a top-notch army and navy in these circumstances was beyond Russia’s capacity as both the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War were to demonstrate. Papastratigakis is particularly strong in his analysis of the decision-making and governance of the Russian Empire, which overwhelmingly relied on the character and strong hand of the tsar. Absent such oversight and capacity, Russia was prone to infighting, rival cliques, paralysis, and indecision.

With this introduction to the fundamentals, Papastratigakis then explores the development of Russia’s naval policy in the last decades of the nineteenth century over the balance of his account. The analysis of Russia’s naval problems is thoroughly and well described. The sprawling nature of the Russian Empire has two important factors that did not apply to its European rivals. Firstly, the contiguous nature of the Russian Empire and the fact that its imperialist ambitions were solidly aimed at territories on its borders was unique. This was entirely different from other empires of the period, with the two exceptions of a moribund China that was scarcely able to defend itself let alone embark on aggressive actions elsewhere, and the increasingly ramshackle and ineffective Austro-Hungarian Empire. In contrast, Russia was aggressive and feared as a result. The second factor applies to its navy more directly in that Russia really needed three navies as it operated in three distinct maritime theatres, with separate threats, none of which enjoyed even remotely convenient geographical connections. Combining naval forces from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Far East was an enormously difficult undertaking and was anything but speedy given the complete absence of connecting bases such as enjoyed by the Royal Navy and its global network of stations and bases. Complicating matters further is that two of its fleets were iced in for the winter. The fact that Russia stumbled in trying to resolve its difficulties is not in many respects surprising and Papastratigakis does a good job analysing this reality. He also addresses the interplay with wider political issues within the Russian state that stymied the best laid plans and intentions of the shambolic Russian administration of Tsar Nicholas II.

Papastratigakis has conducted impressive research from recently opened archives in Russia, as well as from the relevant sources in Britain and France. His secondary sources are extensive and provide a useful guide for anyone conducting research on naval and maritime affairs in the period in question. His
ability to link thinking in Great Britain, France, and Japan as well as Russia is noteworthy and indicative of a comprehensive approach to his topic. His use of Russian language sources is impressive and represents ground-breaking research. The book is blessed with extensive notes and references, which are of great benefit to any who wish to explore the issues raised further. Lastly, there are maps provided that usefully identify sites of significance to the narrative, rather than simply providing generic maps dotted with irrelevant notations and obscuring detail. The clarity significantly assists in comprehending the points made in Papastratigakis’ narrative.

I can heartily recommend this book to readers interested in Russian maritime history in general, as well as all engaged in research in the pre-Great War period and the rivalry between the European imperial powers.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Nicholas Rogers’s Murder on the Middle Passage: The Trial of Captain Kimber benefits transatlantic, abolitionist, maritime, and English historiographies. This six-chapter work seeks to explain a trial often footnoted in the abolition movement literature, yet not fully analyzed until this work. The author’s extensive and detailed research in the Bristol, UK archives is undoubtable. The information obtained in the archives is enhanced by Rogers’s depth of knowledge as a career political and social historian.

This work highlights the societal and financial aspects of the slave trade and the consequences of abolition. Via Reverend Thomas Clarkson, the reader is immersed into Bristol, England, as the work chronicles his efforts to recruit crew members to testify in open court to the atrocities of the slave trade. The social dynamics both at sea and in a port city are quickly made clear. Though Clarkson’s collar allowed him more accessibility to interview sailors in privacy, he quickly learned why previous attempts to have crew members come forward have failed. His interviews reveal the stories of several different crew members, from common labourers to the ship’s doctor, yielding a greater insight into routine ship activities. Rogers expertly weaves the financial implications into the reader’s consciousness, not only by direct conversations about crew member wages, but also by exploring why those who were against slavery, as port city members, did not work to abolish it.

This work will benefit the field for years to come. The amount of detail affords the reader an understanding not only of the trial itself, but further, English society in a port town, the town’s inter-political workings, the atmosphere crew experienced while at sea, the expectations of sailors while in a port city, and the financial implications of all involved. It is an example of a well-done microhistory that enhances a reader’s knowledge of a familiar topic.

Rogers includes 10 illustrations and an appendix: “Newspaper advertisements for the trials of Captain John Kimber and Stephen Devereux 1792-3.” While he lists specific bibliographic information and notes what is included in each newspaper entry in this sec-
tion, the actual excerpts are not included. Without the excerpts, the appendix is unnecessary, as the information could have been included in a detailed endnote or cited as needed. The “Afterthoughts” chapter is a particularly well-done conclusion, as the author ties the entire work together neatly. Unfortunately, due to the organization of the work, as a whole, it is not until the conclusion that some of the author’s context is fully comprehensible.

A restructuring of the chapters, namely adding a dedicated introduction would enhance the general reader’s comprehension. If an introduction were to be added, some information from the “Afterthoughts” chapter could clarify. For example, moving sections from “Afterthoughts,” to an earlier part of the work, could provide less well-versed readers with context relevant to the Kimber trial. Some of the information examined in the “Afterthoughts” that could benefit the reader if introduced earlier includes detailed background about previous trials and their resulting legal implications.

Whereas the work does not really benefit from the appendix, an introduction would have improved readers’ general understanding. Though the work does include a preface, due to the work depth and wealth of knowledge, having a general outline in an introduction would have guided the development and readers gauge of the work, similar to the way the “Afterthoughts” chapter tied together the lingering aspects of this microhistory.

The author consistently presents a logical sequence of events that enables the reader to understand the foundations of slavery in a dock town such as Bristol, at the same time showing the reoccurring implications of slavery and the correlating horrors, relayed as witnessed by the crew. By presenting a social micro-history, the author displays not only why most crew members refused to be involved publicly with the trials, or even recorded regular mistreatment they witnessed, at the same time revealing why some strategic crew, ultimately key trial participants, eventually chose to take the risk and be openly involved. The presentation of this microhistory exceeds its timeframe as Rogers references well-known slave events and people such as the two princes of Calabar, thereby placing this microhistory into a larger perspective of the Atlantic Slave Trade.

Chapter Six, “Afterthoughts,” opens with the quote: “Micro-histories zoom into the historical canvas. They focus intensely on particular events or places in order to capture the texture and social dynamic of human relationships and assess, as neatly as possible, the creative agency of ordinary people” (149). Rogers has, without a doubt, accomplished this goal. This microhistory allows readers a deeper understanding of not only the horrors of the transatlantic slave trade, but further of how a ship’s crew was held to ship’s standards even within the perimeter of a port city. By doing so, Rogers demonstrates a glimpse into the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.

Jane Plummer
Fort Worth, Texas


Harry Spiller’s *Pearl Harbor Survivors* serves as a primary source reader featuring the accounts of men who survived the attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawai‘i,
on 7 December 1941. This book aims to honour the reflections of the servicemen and provide a humanistic approach to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the surrounding area. The book is organized by location, such as ship or base. Spiller provides some supplementary information about the attack and the history of different ships before each reflection; however, the servicemen’s words make up the bulk of the story.

Spiller combines interviews from Pearl Harbor survivors with their personal documents, military records from the National Archives, and the US Department of the Navy to illustrate the experiences of those who suffered through and withstood the attack. By means of these diverse sources, *Pearl Harbor Survivors* achieves its goal of adding a human aspect to a military event, interspersing non-naval perspectives, like those from the Army, Marines, Army Air Force, and Coast Guard. Each reflection ranges in content to provide a well-rounded perspective. Additionally, some men describe the same event quite differently, which allows the reader to analyze the attack on Pearl Harbor through different eyes and memories, to understand the full extent of what occurred on that day. The book also contributes to a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, as it does not solely focus on high ranking officers. *Pearl Harbor Survivors* features essays from the highest ranks, to some of the lowest, across all branches of service.

This anthology showcases the stories of 24 servicemen and dives deeply into the gruesome sights of war. This book is not for the faint of heart, as it describes the retrieval of scattered human remains, swimming in burning oil, and the intense pressure of escaping a sinking ship. Over 2,400 military personnel died on 7 December, and these stories represent 24 reminders of the immensity of war. There are, however, some moments of lightness, such as recollections of playful conversations or explanations of day-to-day life in the armed services. These accounts invoke the readers’ sensations as well. For example, many men remembered the breakfast they were eating, as the attack occurred right before 8 AM. Others spoke of the smells of burning flesh, the sounds of alarms blaring, and the looks of their perishing companions. Besides the five senses, these accounts show meaningful coping methods through poetry, songs, and prayers.

Spiller does not reveal his interview methods, leaving the reader to wonder who recorded the interviews, when they took place, and how they occurred. The book strays from traditional oral histories because there is no question and answer format, just reflections. Knowing when an interview occurred, and the context of the interview drastically changes its sentiment. An interview that took place a year after the attack is reflected upon differently than one that took place fifty years after the event. Knowing when these accounts were collected could help the reader understand the servicemen’s reflection better based on the freshness of the memory. Also, some sentences appear to be a bit out of place and make the reader question if the author introduced some dramatic one-liners for added effect. For example: “I knew for sure that this was ‘no drill’. The day of infamy had arrived” (42). The final sentence of this quotation looks as though it came straight from a fiction novel or movie. If the methods of the process were more apparent to the reader, there would be no doubt of legitimacy. The ambiguity of collecting and pasting different records together does not strengthen the book’s contribution to the greater historical narrative.
Nonetheless, *Pearl Harbor Survivors* is an excellent resource for studying the Second World War or military history. Beyond the 24 accounts is an appendix that consists of the ships present during the attack, names of those who died, military rankings, and President Roosevelt’s speech after the attack. The accumulation of sources in this book is why it should be added to any researcher’s arsenal. The book’s conciseness makes it an easier read, as it does not bore the reader with lengthy analysis or disorganization. Besides historians, this book would be an excellent read for the general public interested in the Second World War or Pearl Harbor.

Overall, Harry Spiller’s *Pearl Harbor Survivors: An Oral History of 24 Servicemen* is a fresh take on a heavily written subject. Adding a human dimension to a highly technical event allows the reader to comprehend what the men experienced on the morning of 7 December 1941. It is inclusive of all branches present, not just the Navy, and recounts the experiences of those ranked both high and low. While that day will continue to live in infamy, we now have the opportunity to explore new, first-hand accounts of how the survivors themselves experienced Pearl Harbor.

Sydnee Hammond
Pensacola, Florida


It has long been believed that close ties between the United States and its wartime allies were severed at the end of the Second World War, cutting wartime connections between the anglophone navies. These naval links were then rebuilt during the Korean War as the Cold War threatened to become hot. In this excellent book, Corbin Williamson demonstrates that this assessment may be accurate as far as intergovernmental links were concerned, where the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was sacrificed to a war-weary American populace, and the time-honoured American aversion to ‘binding alliances’, but it was not the case for navy-to-navy links, exercises, intelligence sharing, doctrine development and weapons procurement. The highly effective operations of anglophone navies off Korea from 1950 to 1953 reflected post-1945 links, joint exercises, information sharing and access to US Navy practices that equipped British, Canadian and Australian forces to work seamlessly with the Americans. All three navies used standard American procedures during this conflict, because they were fitting into American-led forces. The reverse was true when the British were the larger force. Curiously the American decision to deny the British access to the US Naval War College was driven by a desire to avoid any connection with France, which was viewed as unreliable, a security risk and potentially communist.

The book is based on a rich and thorough range of sources, including public and private archives in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States, and several recent PhD theses and related publications that track key elements of the relationship, with Malcom Llewellyn-Jones’ work on the dawn of modern anti-submarine warfare an obvious highlight.

Whatever American politicians might have hoped, and their public expected, the end of the Second World War did not lead to a return to pre-war norms at sea.
The USN found itself drawn into new regions and missions by the rapid demobilisation of the Royal Navies. The war had ruined the British economy, there was no possibility of resuming pre-1939 deployment levels. The USN was dragged into the resulting vacuum. Twice in the late 1940s American capital ships had to be sent to Istanbul, to deter Soviet aggression. For much of the previous 150 years that mission, linked to command of the Mediterranean, had been a British task. Roosevelt’s fateful choice to work with Stalin had not succeeded, and the Soviet regime was rapidly consolidating its dominion over eastern Europe. Anglophone naval intelligence agencies assessed Soviet naval capabilities would be enhanced by captured German equipment and technology, notably the fast submarines of the Type XXI and Walter types. This was a field in which the USN had relatively limited experience. The British and Canadian navies had dominated the Battle of the Atlantic, so early moves were made to share analysis of captured German submarines.

Along with anti-submarine warfare, the USN recognised the Royal Navies had an edge in key aspects of naval activity: ship-handling, seamanship, personnel, use of sensors and communications, if not in their design. On the other hand, American carrier operations and aircraft, logistics and resources were a standard that the others could not match. The example was powerful: off Korea, British and Australian carriers generated very high sortie rates, while British afloat support moved to a new level. They waged war as equals based on established practices, and recent interaction.

The biggest problem facing attempts to integrate the Royal and US Navies was cultural, a largely Pacific-focused war experience of carrier operations, fleet battle, and Navy-Marine amphibious warfare meant the USN saw itself as a stand-alone force, rather than an important component in a tri-service approach to war that ultimately delivered effect on land. Furthermore, the tortuous history of post-1945 American defence reform and the emergence of the US Air Force focussed a lot of Navy attention on the real battle, over budgets and status in Washington. Having strong, effective allies might weaken the case for the US Navy. Predictably, officers in all four navies found aspects of the continuing co-operation a challenge, but those who had worked closely with allies in wartime were better informed and made fewer assumptions.

Wartime experience and ingrained command cultures meant American operational orders, developed for large, complex and necessarily pre-programmed carrier-strike missions, were, by British standards, overly detailed and unduly restrictive. The Royal Navy had emphasised, and expected initiative. Giving junior level leaders responsibility and agency helped select the best senior officers.

In a book that comprehensively over-turns accepted wisdom, Williamson stresses that the modern relationships between the anglophone navies were built during the Second World War, and continued at the intelligence and operational level through the 1940s, before being formally re-established in the 1950s. Working with allies became the norm for all four navies, all four nations have benefitted enormously, achieving economies of effort that pre-1939 fleets could only have dreamt of—without standardization.

Andrew Lambert
London, United Kingdom