
The role of naval aviation is to protect a nation’s fleet. Whether by attacking enemy ships or in air-to-air combat against enemy aircraft, naval aircraft are a critical item in a nation’s military inventory. In the late 1960s, Grumman Aircraft, the US Navy’s (USN) premier supplier of naval aircraft since the 1930s, designed and built the F-14 Tomcat – a fighter aircraft that could fire the Phoenix missile at targets at ranges of up to 100 miles. In this book, Helion’s *Middle East@War No. 29*, author Tom Cooper relates the combat career of this remarkable aircraft.

The F-14 was the largest and most well-armed fighter of its day. It was the leading edge of the USN from the 1970s to the end of its service in 2006. It was fast and maneuverable. Equipped with advanced avionics, it was the star of the movie, *Top Gun*, and had seen some aerial combat in 1981 and 1989 against Libyan Air Force fighters in the Mediterranean.

The area of the Tomcat’s greatest combat use, however, was in the Persian Gulf in the period 1987-1991. Overshadowed by the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the “Tanker War” of 1987-88 saw extensive use of USN assets – protecting tanker ships from attacks by Iranian ships and aircraft. The Tomcat participated in one aerial combat during this time – the F-14 fired at Iranian aircraft but no victories were confirmed.

Two years later came the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which resulted in an international response to Iraqi aggression. At first called Operation Desert Shield, then Operation Desert Storm in the USA, a US-led military coalition of many nations formed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Inevitably, the USN and its carrier fleet took part, and with it, the F-14 Tomcat.

The F-14 saw substantial combat air patrol duty in 1990-91 but it has been thought that the F-14 saw little actual combat. As Cooper’s book makes clear, this was not the case. USN Tomcats engaged opponents at often long ranges, participated in many aerial combats,
and succeeded in shooting down at least one and perhaps more Iraqi fighters. Only one Tomcat was lost to enemy action.

Cooper’s book is a valuable addition to the literature on the F-14. As an Austrian, Cooper had access to all sides – American, Iranian, and Iraqi – that used or confronted the F-14. Cooper starts by relating the design and development of the F-14, noting that the aircraft was originally intended to be powered by the TF-30 jet engine. That engine had numerous issues and it was not until the 1980s that a more reliable engine became available to the F-14s in service. Ironically, F-14 production was about to end in 1974 when the Shah of Iran—the then-ruler of Iran—ordered 80 F-14s for his air force. The Shah’s decision to purchase those F-14s kept the production line open. A loan from the Shah to Grumman also kept Grumman in business and enabled the USN to purchase additional F-14s. (The Iranian F-14s are still in service with the Islamic Iranian Air Force. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Iranian F-14s were very successful against their Iraqi opponents.) Cooper does not focus on the F-14 alone; he looks at the various aircraft opposing the F-14, primarily Iraqi Mirage fighters and the various Soviet fighters in the Iraqi Air Force inventory. Moreover, Cooper includes many photos of Iraqi personnel – controllers, pilots, and related equipment – which provides an overall picture of the forces opposing the F-14 in the air and ground.

The book is well-illustrated with many photographs of F-14s in action, Iraqi aircraft and ground equipment, maps showing the locations of Iraqi airfields, charts showing the various F-14 squadrons and the carriers on which they served, and a very useful colour centre section showing profiles of F-14s, an Iranian F-4 Phantom, and Iraqi Mirage fighters and MiG fighters. These profiles will be helpful to modellers and historians. The endnotes contain useful information and the bibliography is extensive and will be a resource for historians.

In short, this is a very useful work for the aviation historian and naval aircraft enthusiast. While the F-14 was phased out of American service in 2006, it remains an iconic aircraft, one that served the USN well in wartime. This book is a fine tribute to that aircraft.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This is another quality book by medical doctor and historian, Jon Diamond, in his Images of War Series. Diamond has produced over a dozen books concerning Second World War campaigns and battles in this series, using photographs from several sources as well as from his own collection gathered from various locations over many years.

The Japanese had been invincible in the first six months of the war, seizing Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and portions of northern New Guinea. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, where a combined US/Australian naval force turned back a Japanese invasion fleet bound for Port Moresby, was the first time that the Japanese advance had been stopped. While
tactically considered a draw in ships and aircraft lost on both sides, it was of great strategic importance, as it now forced the Japanese into attempting to take Port Moresby by land. The fighting which followed in New Guinea (and the Solomon Islands) in 1942-43 destroyed the myth of Japanese invincibility and, coupled with the US victory at the Battle of Midway, paved the way to victory in the Pacific three years later.

Diamond describes the events leading up to the Papua, New Guinea offensive and the subsequent fighting along the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay, where the mainly Australian forces halted the Japanese advance. As Field Marshall Sir William Slim is quoted, “we should never forget it was the Australians who finally broke the spell of invincibility of the Japanese with their victories at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Track.”

While this is true, the extremely harsh jungle conditions, for which the Japanese were completely unprepared, also seriously blunted their offensive. Rampant tropical disease and lack of adequate supplies forced them into a slow retreat while fresh Allied forces moved in and began to push them back towards the north coast. Unlike the previous fighting in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (with relatively flat jungle terrain, substantial roads and bridges), the almost complete lack of infrastructure in New Guinea with, at best, mud tracks and log bridges, over steep mountain ranges, fast flowing rivers, and torrential rain, came as a shock to Japanese forces. But it was a close-run matter; when the Japanese advance finally faltered at Imita Ridge, they were less than 25 miles from Port Moresby.

With the Japanese now falling back and the Australian forces exhausted, fresh United States troops from the US 32nd Infantry Division (later joined by the US 41st Infantry Division) then entered the fray. Along with two brigades from the Australian 7th Division they commenced the long, hard slog along the Kokoda Track to push the Japanese back to the north coast villages of Gona and Buna, which had been captured in early 1943. The fighting in the green hell of New Guinea is described in great detail and strongly supported by photos of the terrain and conditions in which the fighting took place. Diamond’s images of the haggard and gaunt faces of the Australian, American, and Japanese soldiers tell the story of the constant and difficult jungle fighting better than any words could.

The photos play a major role in this written history, including several from Japanese sources previously unseen in other books. Photos from the Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection and the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) are well used to explain the battle as well as the weather conditions, terrain and equipment used. The photos of the dead and wounded from both sides are as disconcerting now as they were when first published during the Second World War.

The author explores the political dimension as well, with Australian and US commanders being removed from their commands if deemed not ‘aggressive’ enough by their superiors (General Blamey for the Australians and General MacArthur for the United States). These were contentious events and seen by many as inappropriate actions by senior commanders who had scant knowledge of the actual conditions in which their troops were living and fighting.

Although well researched and written, the book’s references are generally secondary sources and quotes are un-cited. I would have liked to
have seen more use of both the Australian and US official histories of the war. Nonetheless, this is a very good book and a great first read for anyone wishing to learn about this campaign, which is often over-shadowed by the better-known fighting at Guadalcanal, the Philippines, and the island-hopping fight northwards. This campaign was the turning point in the war in the Pacific as it stopped the Japanese southerly advance and put the Allied forces well and truly on the offensive.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


In this critical new assessment, William Dudley, Director of the US Naval Historical Centre between 1995 and 2004 and founding editor of the essential *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, addresses the maritime dimension of a conflict that has long been at the centre of American naval identity, as visitors to the Naval Academy at Annapolis will have observed. Dudley shifts the focus of attention from combat to administration, from the high seas to Washington, DC, and the shore stations, coastal and lakeside, where ships were built, maintained, and equipped. The central figures are the three Secretaries of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, William Jones, and Benjamin Crowninshield, together with their small administrative staff, while shipwrights and naval architects are a critical resource. The US Navy did not enter the war with the manpower, ships or bases necessary for a conflict with the global naval hegemon, while the money needed to expand the fleet remained in short supply throughout the war. Successive Democratic and Republican administrations under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had failed to renew the sea-going fleet – no new frigates were built after 1800 – putting their faith in coastal defences and gunboats while cutting the budget. This policy left the United States without the power to influence British economic warfare policy – policy that had been critical to Britain’s war effort since 1803, when the Napoleonic conflict turned the Atlantic into the front line of a total war. By 1812, the American seagoing fleet was small and relatively old. Dudley’s examination of the supply of cannon and powder reveals the limits of American industrial production, and the significance of targeted British amphibious raiding in the Chesapeake, where an important cannon foundry was destroyed.

Despite long term under-funding and limited resources, the American Navy performed well in the War of 1812, far better than the American Army. US warships were worthy opponents, in contrast to those of the European powers. In 1812, naval victories boosted national morale; they secured the northern frontier in 1813 and 1814. On the open ocean, privateering, rather than naval cruiser warfare, took a heavy toll of British merchant shipping in 1812, but the introduction of an effective convoy system quickly reduced those losses, and increased the number of American sailors held as prisoners of war. In late 1814 there were 12,000 sailors in American naval service, 7,000 of them on the Lakes. At the same time 20,000 naval ratings and privateersmen were British prisoners of war, a striking figure that highlights the Royal Navy’s
success in securing the oceans. At the same time, the British blockade, which began in 1813, was hollowing out the American economy. Here Dudley exploits the latest British research, notably Brian Arthur’s *How Britain Won the War of 1812* (reviewed *TNM* XXII, no. 2, April 2012), to qualify old mythologies.

Across the three campaign seasons the focal point of the naval effort steadily shifted from oceanic raiding to coast defence, and finally to the Great Lakes, where the bulk of American sailors were stationed by the autumn of 1814. Sailors, shipwrights, and cannon were shifted from the coast to the Lakes, initially to support a succession of failed invasions of Canada, and then to secure the American frontier against the British counter-attack. As Mahan observed, Lake Erie and Lake Champlain were the Navy’s decisive battles, reflecting the reality of a conflict that ended with the economy in ruins, the capital destroyed, and parts of the country under British occupation. In contrast to operations on the ocean, the naval effort on the Lakes focused on moving and supplying armies. Command of the individual lakes enabled offensive operations; loss of command halted them. The victory on Lake Erie allowed American troops to cross into Canada, winning a key battle at the Thames: victory at Lake Champlain saw a British invasion abandoned. By denying the British command of Lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain the Navy helped stabilise the conflict, and encourage a *status quo ante* settlement.

Ironically, the War of 1812 ended because the downfall of Napoleon and a stabilisation of Europe allowed the British to demobilise the vast, costly warfare state after 21 years of almost continuous conflict. The peace they offered pointedly excluded any discussion of “Free Trade and Sailors Rights,” and the Madison administration, which had never cared for either issue, accepted. In essence, America chose the land over the sea. As Dudley concludes, the blockade worked: “had the war continued through another year, the United States might have had to sue for peace … the country had a narrow escape” (293-4). The United States did not win the War, nor was 1812 a second war of independence, outside the propaganda of the Madison administration. British war aims remained strikingly modest throughout: Europe, not North America, was the critical point.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


José L. Bolívar Fresnada, military historian and relative of two US Navy veterans, brings his considerable knowledge of Puerto Rican, American naval, and Caribbean history to bear in order to more fully share the unsung but pivotal Second World War struggle for the oil and ore supplies out of the Caribbean. Particularly with the *Neuland* (New Land) offensive in the spring of 1942, along with a flotilla of effective Italian attack submarines known as BetaSom from Bordeaux, the Germans under *Großadmiral* Karl Dönitz made a determined effort to sever the Allied lifeline of oil from Venezuela via the refineries in Aruba and Curacao, and also the ore and bauxite routes from northeastern South America. They very
nearly succeeded before the Allies, particularly the Americans, could organize a concerted defense by gaining effective anti-submarine warfare techniques from the air and developing intersecting convoy, defense, and counter-attack measures.

It was a near thing, with nearly 400 allied ships sunk between January 1942 and July 1943 alone. In retaliation, the Allies were able to sink 72 German U-boats, with the loss of 522 German sailors. Though the Italian submarines like Enrico Tazzoli were highly effective, only one penetrated the Caribbean Sea proper, cruising between Aruba and Jamaica without sinking any ships. Given the literally fluid nature of the battle, the forces, and geography of the region, Fresnada’s delineation of “Caribbean Sea” is expanded to include the north coast of Cuba, and to the southeast of Trinidad, along the South American coast, as well as the Gulf of Mexico, or the US Gulf. Given the convoy routes from Trinidad to Key West, Panama and New Orleans, this is understandable.

Like Trinidadian Gaylord TM Kelshall, who wrote the first book The U-Boat War in the Caribbean in 1988, published by Naval Institute Press, Fresnada utilizes German, French, American, Puerto Rican and myriad other resources to carry on where Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, the US Navy’s historian during the Second World War, left off. And what a story it is. U-boat historian Michael Gannon (Operation Drumbeat) has emphasized the need to tell both sides of the story, and Clay Blair (Hitler’s U-Boat War) and Guðmundur Helgason (Uboat.net) bring the highest standards of data dissemination to the field. The challenge to those of us documenting these watery battlefields is where to stop, and what not to leave out. If an Allied defensive measure never influenced the battle, does it merit inclusion? Does a reported attack on a submarine when no U-boats were actually in the area deserve a mention? These questions are not so easy to answer in the context of a 275-page book covering dozens of nations and well over a million square miles, yet author Fresnada handles the material adroitly and keeps readers engaged.

Like Key West, Puerto Rico is described as the Gibraltar of the Caribbean: US Navy publicists had quite free reign within widespread censorship, creating zingers like “sighted sub, sank same,” and at one point in 1942 claiming to have sunk more U-boats than had actually arrived in the Americas. Fresnada covers the German assaults by U-boat patrol, and then wisely, rather than covering all 400 attacks, he focuses on 50 or fewer, some of them, like the Maldonado, closer to Bermuda than the Caribbean. Since Castro’s time, Cuba, with Havana being the largest city in the Caribbean, has received less attention for its Second World War support of the Allies, yet its contributions along with air bases like Borinquen in Puerto Rico, must be recognized, with the Naval Operating Base (NOB) Guantanamo protecting the most used gateway to the Caribbean serving as a centerpiece of Allied defense.

Unfortunately, Cuba can also serve as a large geographic magnet; in this case, the attacks on Michael Jebson, Standella, and Empire Corporal by U-598 under Gottfried Holtorf on 14 August 1942 occurred as close to Ragged Island, in the Bahamas, as to Cuba, but were attributed to being off Cuba, a not-uncommon error in the narrow Old Bahama Channel. Placing the sinking of U-176 by Cuban forces with US air support on 15 May 1943 “South of Haiti,” when it is confirmed to have been sunk between Cuba and Cay Sal Bank, Bahamas, was an error of wider margin.
Reporting the shelling of Mona Island, between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, is more understandable, given that the Grey Lady herself (*The New York Times*) printed a report the next day, as it arrived from Rexford G. Tugwell, the US Governor of Puerto Rico and highest law in the land. Tugwell received a report from Remberto Casaba, of the National Youth Administration, that on the evening of 3 March 1942, 170 young witnesses camping on the island with their adult supervisors witnessed and heard some 30 shells slamming into the cliffs of the islet, considered by most to be uninhabited.

Of course, this “attack” was immediately attributed to German U-boats roaming the area. While there is no doubt that someone shelled Mona that night, a close, mile-by-mile, hour-by-hour study of every German and Italian U-boat and *sommergibile* proves that there was simply no Axis submarine anywhere near Mona at that time, and that not one of them logged deck gun practice. Almost certainly, therefore, it was a live-fire exercise by an Allied warship which, having been detected and immediately reported to the Governor, was as quickly hushed up and the German enemy made to take the blame.

Fresnada admirably covers an impressive range of topics, which prove that this polyglot region, which provided so many essential supplies to the Allies, was much more of a linchpin than most of us realize. From the Caribbean, cargos went to Burma (on aircraft via Bahamas, Guyana and Brazil); to Africa, for the battle against Rommel in North Africa; as part of the southern aircraft supply line to the UK when U-boats and the Luftwaffe made the northern route untenable. For example, if the Germans could sink the shuttle tankers from Maracaibo to Aruba, it would take the Allies over a year to replace the specialist craft. In fact, they nearly succeeded, but in a critical attack the U-boat gunners left a plug in the muzzle of a gun, killing a crewman. Then, when they were starting to shell a refinery, a bunch of Dutch and expatriate boarding school children excitedly ran out to watch. Their screaming led the Germans to believe they were under counter-attack.

The author expounds on the expropriations in Puerto Rico, rum consumption, revenues, segregation amongst the military, the war economy, espionage. (Most of it imagined, since the Germans, with Milk-Cow supply boats and the upper hand, really never needed local complicity to attack, and would not normally go near enemy shores without a military necessity. They were, however, known to destroy inter-island schooners to obtain protein, chickens, and fresh fruit and disrupt regional trade.) He covers oil, airbases, rationing, base negotiation and diplomacy, women in the military, base construction and employment, the sugar industry and the awkward and resource-draining crisis of French forces under Admiral Georges Robert bottled up on the island of Martinique, which were left in limbo by the Germans over-running Vichy France, and the scuttling of 77 French Navy vessels in the Mediterranean. He even covers the issue of Jewish and other refugees aboard ships like the *Capitaine Paul-Lemarle*, and how some of them settled in Sosua, near Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic.

Finally, Fresnada gets it right with respect to the loss of U-153 under Wilfried Reichmann, whereas even leading lights in the genre, like Clay Blair, “fell” for mistaken post-war attribution by Navy publicists for the loss of this sub. In an effort to spread credit and medals, the USN awarded the 6 July
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

1942 sinking of U-153 to both a single pilot off Aruba (A-20A Havoc under Dr. Marshall Groover, which Fresnada correctly confirms), and, a week or so later, to a veritable panoply of American minelayers, aircraft, destroyers, etc. who were actually bombing a well-known freighter still spewing oil. While the German experts, including Dr. Axel Niestlé, concur, the US Navy is more intractable. Having spent years re-attributing the loss of U-84 in 2019, not everyone is willing to take up the case with Naval Heritage Command.

For taking on this task and succeeding so well in researching and explaining the many facets of this aquatic, sub-sea, and airborne battlefield, Dr. José Bolívar Fresnada should be congratulated. He has done an exemplary job of delivering lively details involving the little-known Caribbean Front of the Second World War.

Eric Wiberg
Boston, Massachusetts


Antarctic history, and in particular Antarctic maritime history, is too often understood only as the history of the expeditions during the so-called heroic age of Antarctic exploration between the late nineteenth century and the years shortly after the end of the First World War. Earlier expeditions to the Southern Ocean and the search for Antarctica itself are a topic about which even most professional Antarctic historians have only slight knowledge. British explorer and Royal Navy Captain James Cook, on the other hand, is mainly renowned today for his work in the Pacific, and in particular, his exploration of the South Sea, Hawaii, the Australian east coast and the first circumnavigation of New Zealand. Nevertheless, during each of his three major voyages in the years 1768–71, 1772–75, and 1776–79, Cook sailed substantial regions of the Southern Ocean, explored the shorelines of a number of islands that are today considered as sub-Antarctic islands, and tried to solve the riddle of whether the mythical southern continent, terra australis incognita, really existed. Although he did not reach the Antarctic continent and came to the conclusion that terra australis incognita (Antarctica) did not exist, Cook needs to be understood as the first systematic and serious explorer of the Antarctic.

Captain Cook and the Search for Antarctica is the first book that is exclusively dedicated to the history of Captain James Cook as an Antarctic explorer. As such, Hamilton not only closes a long existing gap but showcases the fact that Cook was much more than just the main early explorer of the South Sea. He is also proof that exploration of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean actually began well before the heroes of the heroic age of Antarctic exploration arrived on the continent.

Divided into five main sections, the book combines a chronological with a thematic approach. Hamilton presents an introduction to Cook’s voyages, including detailed information on the ships he used, followed by a discussion of his visits to Tierra del Fuego and Cape Horn in 1769, the three crossings of the Antarctic Circle, the exploration of the sub-Antarctic islands, a discussion of Cook’s contributions to natural and Antarctic science and finally, a chapter devoted to the impact of
Cook’s journeys on Antarctic exploration throughout the following centuries. Two appendices complete the book, providing the Admiralty Instructions for Cook’s journeys and some information on the journals and logbooks from the three expeditions.

Overall, this organization succeeds in allowing the reader to understand Cook’s voyages, not only by reading a simple chronological narrative of the three journeys, but also by recognizing Cook’s role in the quest for *terra australis incognita* and his eventual realization that the mythical continent might not exist, as well as his actual contributions to charting large areas of the Southern Ocean as well as sub-Antarctic islands like South Georgia and Kerguelen. In particular, these chapters might be the most important ones for the professional Antarctic historian. Cook’s highly detailed descriptions of his activities during his visits to these extremely remote islands not only placed the islands on the map of the globe, but his meticulous research revealed the islands and their fauna which were virtually unknown to the world at this time.

One of the few criticisms on the book is related to the illustrations. Obviously, a book dealing with late-eighteenth century exploration would have very few contemporary images available. Thus, the comparatively few illustrations cannot be critiqued. Knowing that the author is not only a historian, but also a philatelist, it does not surprise that stamps are used to depict Cook’s activities in the Southern Ocean. What surprises the reviewer is a more or less random set of modern colour photographs of Southern Ocean and Antarctic animals. While attractive images, there remains a question about how they contribute to the book. While they may be of general interest to readers who have never seen these animals in the wild, as someone who has been lucky enough to have seen all of these animals many times, these photographs fall into the category of “filler.” Whenever there is a need to illustrate a book on the Southern Ocean or Antarctica, pictures of penguins, seals, and other animals are inserted, whether they are directly connected to the story or not.

Another minor criticism is that the book is overly compartmentalized. Divided into five main parts with a total of 16 chapters, each of the chapters is broken up into even shorter sections under individual subheadings. While organizing a book into small topical sections is not necessarily a negative, here it almost becomes an obstacle to the flow of reading. In the end, these are minor points and might reflect more of this reviewer’s personal taste than a substantial critique.

Hamilton’s *Captain Cook* needs to be recommended to every maritime historian with the slightest interest in Antarctic and Southern Ocean history, as well as to historians with an interest in late-eighteenth-century maritime history and exploration. When it comes to a general readership, the huge number of details resulting from thorough academic research might distract somewhat from the flow of the narrative. Although the book is not a page-turner, it will also appeal to the casual reader who has picked it up out of interest in one of Britain’s most famous explorers, or because of fascination with Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. For the very few readers who might be lucky enough to read the book while sailing the Southern Ocean on the way to Antarctica, the book will provide a cautious tale of how navigation of these waters might have looked 250 years ago and a deep appreciation for the explorers who put some of the places regularly visit-
ed by today’s expedition cruise ships on the charts. Whether you are reading the book in your study, in an armchair in your living room, or in the lounge of an expedition cruise ship, it will not disappoint. In fact, it will provide a deep inside look at how and why the quest for terra australis incognita began to take shape. With a moderate retail price for a hardcover book (also available as an e-book and to be released in a paperback edition within the near future), this book is a welcome addition to every library with a section on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, whether it is a library for professional purposes or a private collection.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


*Forging the Trident* is a biography focused on Theodore Roosevelt (TR), and the United States Navy; its readiness, training, armament, ship design, evolving materiel, administration, budget, public relations, and policies. The book’s eleven separately authored scholarly essays/chapters plus John Hattendorf’s erudite introduction cover Roosevelt’s career as a maritime historian, New York City police commissioner, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Army Rough Rider, Vice President, and President of the United States. Finally, it explores his influence on his successors – particularly TR’s fifth cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). The book’s authors, in general, are a quasi “Newport Chowder and Marching Society,” most of whom have a relationship with Newport, Rhode Island’s Naval War College or Salve Regina University. This seems appropriate since TR visited the lovely Rhode Island seaport in 1888, 1897, 1908, and 1913. The title, *Forging the Trident*, is prophetic in that Poseidon’s trident is a potent symbol, a robust weapon, and tool that also represents power and authority – Roosevelt’s metaphorical persona. One chapter’s title, “Checking the Wake While Looking Beyond the Horizon,” perhaps best describes the book’s overall thrust.

Several areas in *Forging the Trident* are unusual focal points in this TR biography. The first is Roosevelt’s southern roots as a decedent of Confederate Naval officers, Bulloch uncles (James and Irvine), and this branch of his family’s relationship with the Republican and Democratic politics of the reconstructionist south. Next, as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, TR saw the potential of naval aviation from an interest in Samuel P. Langley’s early, but unsuccessful, attempts at controlled flight in the late 1890s. President William McKinley gave Langley $50,000 from the War Department (roughly $1,600,000 today) to continue his aeronautical work, a fact not mentioned in the book. The inventor’s ideas were pioneering, but at the time unsuccessful, and later eclipsed by the Wright brothers’ successful powered flight in 1903. Still, the first aircraft carrier, completed in early 1922, was the USS Langley designated CV-1. Langley became the primary test platform for the USN’s nascent naval aviation program and its quest for air superiority over a battle fleet.

In another far-reaching innovation, Roosevelt encouraged his presidential successor, William Howard Taft, to switch from coal to oil as fuel for navy
ships, thus eliminating the need for coaling stations either owned by America or provided by friendly foreign countries. In 1910, the navy converted from coal- to oil-burning ships and Taft established three Naval Petroleum Reserves to assure an oil supply in the event of war or national emergency as provided for in the Pickett Act of 1910. It authorized the president to draw upon potential oil-bearing lands as sources of fuel for the Navy. It also made refueling navy vessels while underway at sea a reality. Finally, in 1905, Roosevelt’s interest in John Holland’s submarine torpedo boat led him to undertake a dive in the submarine Plunger. Afterwards, the president emerged like a child who had enjoyed an amusement park ride, but the press admonished him for taking this risk in then-precarious novel technology.

Perceiving the United States as a potential world power, Roosevelt orchestrated several political public relations maneuvers. The first was the recasting of a highly successful Revolutionary War officer into a hero. John Paul Jones had died many years before and was buried in an obscure, unmarked Parisian grave. Once his body was discovered and identified in 1905, the president ordered that it should be returned to the United States.

Aspiring national powers elevate military heroes to emulate desired military virtues, but some are more fable than fact. Most early-nineteenth-century depictions of John Paul Jones produced an image of a rumbustious Revolutionary War man of action. Unfortunately, his often-prickly personality was coupled with a violent temper. He was sexually promiscuous and some under his command saw him as more of a naval adventurer than as the prototypical professional officer. The author of the chapter about Roosevelt’s elevation of Jones as a much-needed national naval hero to be re-entombed under the chapel at the naval academy at Annapolis pointed out comparisons between Horatio Nelson and Jones noting that “both men were small in stature, assertive, vain, insecure, in love with military trappings, and brave to the point of recklessness” (96). Roosevelt reimagined the life and legacy of John Paul Jones, purposely creating what he thought the country needed. He gave the nation a reconstituted hero of the American naval service, elevated by way of military pomp and ceremony to finally rest in grandeur at the Naval Academy’s maritime campus – a clever scheme to reshape and add support for American naval power.

The second public relations move of major importance was assembling and dispatching the Great White Fleet for its round-the-world voyage in 1907-1909. Maritime historian Roosevelt, having written the now-classic The Naval War of 1812 as a Harvard undergraduate, romanticized the gallantry of its nineteenth-century officers, sailors, and ships. This voyage was his attempt to demonstrate America’s naval prowess to the world at the dawn of the twentieth century. The colourful pageantry during the departure and return of the Great White Fleet amply illustrates Roosevelt’s propensity for public spectacle – to be “the bride at every wedding, the corpse at every funeral, the baby at every christening … the admiral at every naval review or the lieutenant at every boarding party” (249). Speculation regarding its real justification and impact is the subject of several chapters, but basically this was Roosevelt’s blatant display of military mobility and might; his manifest “big stick diplomacy.” It was also his attempt to keep Japan, the winner of the Russo-Japanese war, at bay. While effective, it certainly pre-
saged the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Similar prolonged efforts by his successors through the Franklin Delano Roosevelt presidency were for naught and not surprising.

Editing chapters by different authors involves creating an over-all storyline, threading each together and at the same time blending each author’s distinctive writing style into a cohesive text. This was largely accomplished, except perhaps for unavoidable redundancies where topics overlapped occurring during the same historic episode(s). At a gathering of the American Historical Association, TR emphasized the importance of using “vision and imagination” in historical writings. “It is good to hear the sound of trumpet and horn … put flesh and blood on the dry bones to make dead men living before your eyes…. Great thoughts match and inspire heroic deeds.” Hattendorf and Leeman’s *Forging the Trident* succeeds in organizing a fascinating glimpse into how Theodore Roosevelt, by his idiosyncratic intelligence and personality, largely steered America’s “ship of state” into the era of the modern navy.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Matthew Heaslip is a lecturer at the University of Portsmouth and this fine monograph is based on his PhD dissertation. His study on the China Station in the decade after the Great War fills a gap in the historiography of the Royal Navy and demonstrates convincingly both the importance of the station as well as the difficulties faced in overcoming the many, many challenges endemic to the region at that time.

The China Station was one of the Royal Navy’s “areas” into which it divided the world, appointed an admiral, assigned a number of warships, and thereby, kept the peace for mercantile interests. The China Station grew out of the two nineteenth century Opium Wars that had resulted in the forceable opening of the Chinese market to British commercial enterprise. In this endeavour it was followed by the French, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, and somewhat later the Americans, the Germans, and the Japanese. This period of Chinese history marks their “century of humiliations” (roughly 1840s to 1940s), when its national sovereignty was respected by no one. China was not, unlike say India, ruled directly or indirectly by the European powers; rather, access to Chinese markets was forced on a weak central administration in then-called Peking. The physical reality of this dominance was seen on the Chinese littoral, most famously Hong Kong and Shanghai, and deep into the country by way of navigable rivers (essentially the Yellow, the Yangtze, and the Pearl Rivers). After the turn of the twentieth century, marked by the Boxer Rebellion, circumstances in China grew increasingly difficult for the imperial powers. The collapse of the Chinese imperial dynasty in 1911 and its replacement by a republic of most uncertain foundations increased the insecurity and tension in the country. Consequently, maintaining some level of peace conducive to commercial activity was difficult and getting more so as the Great War approached. The decade after that conflict witnessed a return of the (victorious) imperial powers, but the unrest and instability endemic to China
had increased.

Heaslip well describes these difficulties that faced the often quite junior RN officers in command of the gunboats that patrolled the Chinese littoral and the inland water routes. Complicating matters further were the various warlords and their local campaigns designed to secure portions of the fracturing Chinese polity, which a hapless central government in Peking was utterly unable to influence. Life was no easier for the RN admirals headquartered at Hong Kong or Shanghai. The blessing of rapid and effective communication links provided by radio and cable meant that the days of a nervous Foreign Office providing rough guidelines and relying on the sound judgement of those on the spot were truly over. Now admirals were required to seek and receive direction from London. In turn, the admirals could direct the activities of ship captains in real time. This clipping of naval wings was the new reality, making a difficult situation worse for those on the station. Finally, as Heaslip analyses clearly, the power of Great Britain was both relatively and absolutely far less in 1925 than it had been in 1914. This placed a premium on firstly, not rocking the boat in Chinese waters, as well as needing to liaise and cooperate with the other imperial powers which all too often, from the British perspective, had their own contrary or unhelpful interests to consider. It was approaching impossible to fulfill the mandate of maintaining peaceable conditions in China for the benefit of British commercial enterprise.

Indeed, the geopolitical circumstances facing Great Britain in the interwar period were daunting and would have strained the capacities of any nation at that time. Britain, however, was of the view that it was the preeminent power, even if it no longer had the armed forces, the diplomatic clout, the economy or the financial resources that such a title rather implied. Maintaining its position and seeing off threats to the status quo was viewed as critical by London, but the resources provided as well as the narrow authority conceded to China Station admirals during this period made a problematic situation infeasible.

There is not the space in a short review to touch on the many tentacles of complexity troubling British authorities, but Heaslip nicely encapsulates them and engagingly lays out the troubles in a clear fashion that will enlighten anyone who is vague as to what the China Station actually was, why it existed, and the role it played. He also thoroughly discusses the importance of the 1927 Nanjing Incident (and other similar episodes around this date) that is almost unknown currently and yet resulted in the largest peacetime deployment of the RN in all the interwar period. It also represented the belated comprehension that the inherent bluff of gunboat diplomacy was increasingly ineffective as China embarked on its modernization, passed the turmoil of the previous eighty years, and started to assert its sovereignty more effectively. Finally, the role of China in British foreign policy, in particular the powerful strain of anti-communism, is well brought out in Heaslip’s account, with Britain’s determination to demonstrate its great power pretensions globally. The importance of Singapore, Hong Kong, and the growing rivalry and enmity with Japan are interwoven with accounts of how British naval officers of all ranks dealt with their immediate and difficult operational challenges on the station as they countered pirates, unrest, and the effects of China’s civil strife.

Finally, Heaslip considers and analyses RN officer training, culture, and
attitudes that affected their outlook as they conducted themselves on the China station. He notes the racism that was part of the intellectual assumption of many, but not all, personnel at the time and how this factor influenced behaviour. Heaslip also does not shy away from the inherent violence in which imperial policy was conducted, condoned, and expected in China and elsewhere. Wiser officers well understood the criticality of resorting to violence sparingly as a last resort and to the minimum possible degree. Not all were wise.

All in all, Heaslip has provided an important account of the interwar Royal Navy’s China Station. He has filled a significant gap in the historiography, while identifying areas that would benefit from additional research. It is hoped that he will seek to follow his own guidance in this regard. He has made excellent use of primary sources in various archives, principally in Britain, but also in China. Also of obvious value were the articles written by those on the spot and published in the Naval Review. The listing of secondary sources is extensive and will serve as an excellent introduction to any who wish to explore further. The book includes some photographs that illuminate the narrative, as well as a few useful maps and diagrams. Two short appendices provide lists of the senior RN officers on the station and the particulars of the typical warships assigned to Chinese waters. I happily recommend this book to all interested in the period. The only negative is the price. As is common with such monographs, the cost is over $100.00, which many will find beyond their purse.

Ian Yeates, Regina, Saskatchewan


The Sonarman’s War is H.G. Jones’ personal journey through the Second World War. Although the cover touts his tale as “A Memoir of Submarine Chasing and Mine Sweeping,” his story focuses on the latter. Occasional teases of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are strewn throughout the book, but readers with an appetite for ASW will be left hungry.

H.G. Jones served aboard Submarine Chaser 525, which he affectionately named Cinq-Deux-Cinq. During his time aboard, he would serve in some of the most infamous military operations during the Second World War, including Anzio and Okinawa. He does not tell his story from the beaches or a foxhole, but from the sea, where he, along with his crew, earned their place in history.

The Sonar Man’s War recounts in detail the excitement and dreariness endured by those at sea in war. Despite his impressive credentials as a PhD and historian, Jones’ book captures his pride serving as a young, enlisted man during the formative years of his adult life. Instead of a monologue based on possibly faulty memory, Jones carefully details his experiences through diaries, archived records, personal photos, and letters from his time abroad. He occasionally sprinkles in his less-than-flattering opinion about officers, although he writes with reverence about the officers under whom he served.

The book objectively lays out his growth from a boy from a small farm to a seasoned veteran over the course of the war. He does not try to polish or sanitize any part of his story. For every
admiral that left his indelible mark on history, like Chester Nimitz or William Halsey Jr., thousands of lesser-ranking naval officers and countless enlisted personnel served behind the scenes, never telling their stories. Jones’ is one of those untold stories. The author offers a rare glimpse into minesweepers and submarine chasers, the small-unheralded workhorses of naval combat; most uniquely, he tells the story from an enlisted sailor’s perspective. Although not a Second World War classic in the conventional sense of leadership lessons enlivened with spurts of bravery and self-sacrifice, each detailed ship’s log is a window into the life that not only Jones, but countless other sailors, lived. From detailing his favorite meals to destroying mines, each log entry was dutifully recovered from naval archives and personal journal entries in order to tell his story.

The author tells his story as a crewmember aboard a small, 110-foot wooden submarine chaser and later, as a crewmember aboard the USS Speed and USS Strive, both 221-foot minesweepers. Built to be expendable, ships like the ones Jones deployed and fought with, served like canaries in a coal mine, warning the fleet of dangers that lurked ahead. In one recollection, Jones speculated that the large capital ships encouraged them to open fire on the enemy regardless of how ineffective it was, in an attempt at self-preservation. He recalls how he and his crew, along with numerous other small boats, dutifully swept the enemy waters of mines and threats at infamous locations such as Anzio and Okinawa. The sailors of these small boats were proud to boast, “Where the fleet goes, we’ve already been.”

Perhaps the most famous of these small boats is PT-109 where John F. Kennedy served as Captain. The harrowing stories while serving on PT-109 ultimately helped propel him to the US Presidency. For those who want to go beyond the immortalized tales and legendary feats of PT-109, The Sonarman’s War offers a window into the other, unglamorous, side of naval combat. Gear adrift in rough seas, inedible food, cramped living quarters, and a single, cold shower shared among enlisted sailors offers only a small glimpse into what the crews of these small boats, referred to as Small Boys, endured day after day over the course of the Second World War. Today, Small Boy is a term reserved for the steel hulled 509-foot destroyers and 567-foot cruisers that sail with the modern naval flight fleet – a far cry from the Cinq-Deux-Cinq’s 110-foot length and wooden hull. Jones served at a time when ships were made of wood and men were made of steel.

For every operation in which the Cinq-Deux-Cinq participated, Jones painstakingly lists each ship and its personnel from naval archives and his personal journals. Although readers may gloss over the long list of crew and ship names, each vessel and crewmember mentioned has their own untold stories. Each name mentioned is both homage and attempt to ensure that none of their stories are lost.

Readers looking for insight on sonar operations and anti-submarine tactics used in the Second World War will be disappointed. Although it briefly covers the origin of the Sonarman rating and some technical details of how sonar worked, the book is a compendium of mine-hunting, escort duties, and colourful port visits. There are no heroics or hyperbole in Jones’ story telling. The raison d’être of this book is to share the fear, monotony, and excitement as it was, not how it could be. It is raw and uninhibited, constituting a personal journey that would have otherwise been
lost to the waters of time. This book is a testament to those who did not tell their stories but performed their duty faithfully.

Dylan Phillips-Levine
Buenos Aires, Argentina


For over a century, the debate over the 1915-16 Dardanelles offensive has been shaped by a series of assumptions that took hold even before it had ended. The first is that the campaign was launched because Winston Churchill, the ebullient First Lord of the Admiralty, singlehandedly persuaded HH Asquith’s Liberal government to launch an attack on Turkish positions guarding the mouth of the Dardanelles Straits. The second is that this offensive was inspired by purely military considerations and sought mainly military goals: specifically, to force the Ottoman government to surrender and to open a route to Russia’s Black Sea ports in order to facilitate arms shipments for their under-equipped armies. In this book, Lambert challenges both of these premises by developing arguments made in his previous book on British economic warfare during the First World War, *Planning Armageddon.* To that end, he re-examines the debates within the government in the months leading up to the campaign and draws from them the broader political, financial, and economic motivations that led them to support it.

To Lambert, what is missing from the traditional narrative of the origins of the Dardanelles offensive is the role played in the cabinet’s deliberations by concerns over food security. This was a novel problem for British policymakers in wartime, as during the last global war waged a century before, the United Kingdom was able on its own to produce enough wheat to feed its populace. This changed over the course of the nineteenth century thanks to the accelerating globalization of trade. Within forty years of Napoleon’s defeat, Britain imported approximately one quarter of the grains consumed by their populace; by the end of the century, that number rose to 80%. While this global trade made possible the cheaper foodstuffs enjoyed by British workers, it left their economy dependent on the ability of the new international grain market to supply them. Cognizant of this problem, the government took steps to control the food supply virtually from the moment they entered the conflict in August 1914, by prohibiting the export of foodstuffs and monitoring agricultural production and supply. While sugar was the most immediate concern, wheat was the more important commodity, and in the months that followed, rising global wheat prices became a source of anxiety at the highest levels.

The most important factor driving up wheat prices in the futures markets in the last months of 1914 was the loss of access to Russian wheat once Ottoman Turkey closed the Dardanelles at the end of September. Not only did this cut off the global market from an important producer of wheat exports, it also denied the cash-strapped Russians a critical means of earning much-needed foreign currency for munitions purchases abroad. With Russia’s offensive capacity crippled in part by the lack of munitions, the supreme commander of
the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, sent a telegram to the British on 2 January 1915 requesting a military demonstration to relieve the pressure on Russian forces in the Caucasus region. Here Lambert launches into a meticulous reconstruction of the debates throughout January and into February over the available options. While Churchill’s advocacy of a naval operation to force the Dardanelles was part of this, it was only one of several proposals considered, each of which had their advocates within the cabinet. As the various options foundered because of political obstacles, Churchill’s proposal of a “low-risk, high-reward” operation became more tantalizing, especially as the “wheat problem” stoked the cabinet’s anxiety. Churchill’s communiqué on 20 February announcing the Admiralty’s intention to force the Dardanelles helped to reverse the market’s direction, bringing prices down in expectation of renewed access to Russian wheat. Yet this decline also exposed the government’s effort to manipulate wheat prices through third-party purchases. The infeasibility of price controls or other options meant that the only way left to continue lowering prices was through reopening the Dardanelles. With the failure of the naval effort on 18 March, Britain had no other choice but to use land troops.

By the summer, efforts to regain access to Russian wheat became unnecessary, as the reports in May of bumper crops by farmers in both the United States and Canada collapsed prices and ended the wheat crisis. In that respect Lambert’s book adds another layer of tragedy to the already lamentable tale of disaster on the Gallipoli peninsula. It is a remarkable piece of historical scholarship, one that finds an important new perspective about a subject seemingly explored to exhaustion. Doing so required a formidable amount of research in over two dozen archives on three continents, from which Lambert uncovered the scattered details that he then pieced together patiently in order to make his case. Thanks to his efforts, we have a better understanding of one of the defining events of the First World War, one that enhances our appreciation of the myriad factors behind it. Though some scholars may take issue with Lambert’s interpretations, it is a book that nobody concerned with the Dardanelles campaign, the First World War more generally, or the complex history of globalization can afford to ignore.

Mark Klobas
Phoenix, Arizona


The mystique of the Spanish Main, treasure fleets, and galleons has long held appeal for students of maritime history. The era of the late-sixteenth century has been, and continues to be, covered in depth by academic historians. But in an age when reading in general, and history in particular, faces shrinking cultural appeal, an easily digested introductory volume on the age of galleons is of particular worth.

With the release of *Spanish Galleon vs English Galleon*, author and historian Mark Lardas has capably filled that niche. The latest installment in Osprey Publishing’s *Duel* series of books, this modestly-sized volume serves equally well as a primer for those with casual interest in the topic, or as a refresher volume for those more knowledgeable
on the era.

Like other Osprey books in this series, Lardas’ work takes an in-depth look at vessels and combatants. Both Spanish and English galleons are described in detail: their design, capabilities, and tactical efficacy for their respective nations.

The very mention of a galleon generally conjures up the vessel’s association with Spain, and for good reason. At one time possessing the largest merchant fleet in the world, Spain and her kings would rely on the galleon in the crucial trans-Atlantic trade that funneled the riches of the New World into the coffers of the empire.

For that reason, Spanish galleons tended to be large, relatively ungainly vessels, designed more for cargo capacity than maneuverability. Those converted to naval use, however, could be tactically imposing. Large Spanish galleons were designed for close-quarters action and consequently carried large contingents of heavily armed boarding parties. Moreover, Spanish vessels were designed with towering sterncastles, affording naval commanders the tactically vital advantage of “high ground” during close engagements.

England, the expanding economic upstart of the Elizabethan age, responded with galleons which were designed to exploit Spanish maritime vulnerabilities. English galleons were built for speed and were much smaller compared to their Spanish counterparts. Possessing sleeker hulls and greatly shortened sterncastles, the vessels were fast and highly maneuverable. These nimble English galleons, including the technologically advanced “race built galleons,” were considered state-of-the-art naval technology during their heyday.

Perhaps more importantly, the rapidly expanding Protestant economy of England had made great strides in artillery development during the sixteenth century. English gun founders had grown skilled in the art of cast brass (actually bronze) gun tubes, as well as perfecting the design of the culverin, the most fearsome ordnance available at the time. Although generally smaller in calibre than Spanish guns, the culverin’s greater range ensured that English captains could keep their ships at a safe distance while hammering the enemy.

England’s decided superiority in technology, gunnery, and basic seamen ship would play to the island kingdom’s advantage. While England’s naval and merchant fleet pursued a policy of innovation and original thinking, Spain stubbornly maintained an outdated naval tool chest. With better guns, better ships, and highly professional mariners, England was well positioned for the high-stakes game of naval dominance.

In detailed looks at three crucial naval engagements, the author explores that basic theme. Lardas initially describes Francis Drake’s legendary capture of the Spanish treasure ship Nuestra Señora de la Concepción. At the helm of Golden Hind, Drake famously made use of skilled seamanship, sheer audacity, and outright deception to capture the Spanish vessel. By a brazen use of the English galleon’s capabilities, Drake succeeded in negating the advantages of a much larger enemy ship.

In his brief description of the Battle of Gravelines, Lardas explores the last fight of the Spanish ship San Mateo. One of the crown jewels of the Spanish Armada, San Mateo made a bold effort to defend Spanish transports but was assailed by a swarm of smaller, faster English galleons. During a day-long exchange of artillery fire, San Mateo was battered by superior English gunnery, run aground, and finally forced to strike her colours.

Lardas likewise describes the last
fight of the English galleon *Revenge* off the Azores in 1591. The vessel’s commander, Richard Grenville, made a bold move to evade a greatly superior Spanish force, but was quickly beset by unexpectedly swift enemy ships, which ultimately forced his surrender. Far from sticking with inferior technology, Spain finally began copying English ship designs, an unexpected development in the Elizabethan naval arms race which led to the demise of *Revenge*.

Part of the appeal of Osprey books is lavish illustration, and this volume is no exception. Thanks to a heavy dose of period woodcuts, cutaway diagrams of galleon cross-sections, detailed paintings of naval arms and armaments, and portraits of the era’s most legendary players, this volume offers a rich visual feast of Elizabethan naval history.

*Spanish Galleon vs. English Galleon* promises to be a pleasant volume for maritime history enthusiasts and will find appeal to a broad cross-section of readers. It is well suited for young naval history enthusiasts but is also appropriate for seasoned academics who might enjoy a refreshing read on a familiar topic.

Joshua Shepherd
Union City, Indiana


This work is the third reprinting of Eric Leon and John Asmussen’s 2014 examination of the camouflage patterns employed by the Kriegsmarine for their surface fleet during the more chaotic and tumultuous second half of the Second World War. Utilizing an extensive collection of photographic evidence, first-hand accounts, secondary sources, and modern computer programs, the authors have created profile and top-down illustrations with as accurate as possible renderings of ship camouflages at various key points in the service lives of German battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. The markings and paint schemes of shipboard aircraft are also covered in an appendix, along with corrections and additional information for Volume I of the series.

The introductory text offers a good examination of the authors’ sources and methodology. While the visual sources are mainly discussed rather than shown due to the sheer volume of reference photographs, the methodology is extremely well documented, covering digital techniques and showcasing the analytical and rendering process. The scope of the work and concessions are also covered here. The former notes the decision to omit pre-dreadnoughts, most First World War-era ships, and vessels below torpedo boat size “in the interest of timely completion,” while the latter includes concessions made for the sake of visibility, such as the omission of rigging from top-down views and the scaling up of wood decking to prevent data loss in rendering (13, 16). All of the processes and choices laid out provide a good background for the main body of the work.

Following the introduction, the work is subdivided into five sections: battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats, moving from the largest tonnage ships on down. The larger capital ships often have more variant of camouflage rendered due to the nature of their size and service lives, and ships of cruiser or battleship size each have an intro-
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

Inductive page with the vessel name and several period photographs on display. In instances where only partial solid understanding of the ship’s camouflage scheme could be ascertained, a two-tone ship outline is rendered above the profile showing areas of “less certainty” and “better certainty” based on the authors’ research and photographic archives (38, 51, 61). In the event that the pattern of only one side of a vessel is identified, a notation regarding this is provided below the rendering. Vessel insignia, turret details, and other points of interest are sometimes rendered alongside the image at a different scale or angle to allow for better understanding of the ship’s details.

The destroyers and torpedo boat sections are arranged similarly to those of the larger capital ships, with the main difference being that there are no individual ship introduction pages. Instead, the ship types have a general introductory section, addressing standard camouflage practices for the ship type, showcasing the evolution of typical patterns before moving on to specific vessels. These subsections also point out that many of the vessels in use during the late war were actually foreign-built craft, and that the research into their appearance was still an ongoing effort. Several examples of former Greek and Italian ships are shown, including the cruiser Niobe, first built in 1899 by Germany and repossessed from the Italian navy in 1943. The torpedo boat section also includes earlier camouflage schemes as well, even covering some pre-war patterns. Impressively, the post-war “war prize” appearances of several vessels are included as well, showcasing the final appearances of those few Kriegsmarine warships to continue on after 1945. This includes larger vessels, such as the Prinz Eugen under American control in 1946 and the Nürnberg as the Soviet cruiser Admiral Makarov from 1947 to 1955, down to the use of captured destroyers and torpedo boats by the Soviet and French navies (82, 96). Finally, there is a three-page appendix section devoted to the Arado Ar-196 floatplanes operated aboard Kriegsmarine vessels during the late war, 14 pages of alterations and additions to Volume I, and a short biography to round out the work.

In terms of possible improvements, a few come to mind. The colour renderings have either no copyright indication, a copyright indication located near the image, or one placed within the camouflage scheme rendering itself. If the latter form could be replaced with an exterior type marking it would be appreciated, so as to present a full, clear view of the renderings. Additionally, only the Ar-196 profiles are rendered with a scale present. The inclusion of a small scale with the ship profiles could further help illustrate the scale of the camouflage patterns and the level of detail the German sailors went to in some of their designs. Lastly, it would be appreciated if the introduction of each vessel included a brief commentary on their service history or a list of their assignments prior to the camouflage renderings, so as to add further background information and detail to the presentation beyond the rendering captions. These are minor comments, however, and in no way take away from the value of the work as a whole.

German Naval Camouflage Volume II is an excellent visual resource regarding an often-understudied facet of the Kriegsmarine during the Second World War. The incredibly detailed renderings offer a level of examination not achieved before, creating an invaluable resource for naval historians, archivists, and modelers seeking to identify vessels and time periods from images, visualize the appearance of ships during various
points of the war, or craft a more accurate representation of a vessel than was previously possible.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Started in 1955, and lasting more than 19 years, the Vietnam War is considered one of the most expensive wars ever fought, both in economic and human terms. It represented one of the most controversial moments in American society, and numerous Vietnam veterans’ stories have enriched American cinema and literature.

David H. Lyman reports his memories of service at Seabee 71 battalion in Vietnam in 1967. His *Memoir of a Navy Journalist with a Mobile Construction Battalion* is important as a document about the life of American shore-based sailors and their activities, rather than a classic war diary. Although the author is a professional photographer, the pictures included in this book do not relate to any combat operation in Vietnam. Lyman’s point of view is based on a genuine curiosity for many aspects of Vietnamese society and on his admiration for all infrastructure works built by Navy Seabees, a battalion founded by Ben Moreell in 1942, with the purpose of creating infrastructure and facilities for US forces in war zones.

During the Vietnam War, many young Americans were anxious to be sent to Vietnam to fight on the front lines. For this reason, Lyman, twenty-two and freshly graduated in journalism from Boston University, decided to anticipate the upcoming draft by enlisting in the Naval Reserve. After four years, he was sent to Chu Lai, in the south of Vietnam, with Seabee Battalion 71 as a photojournalist. During this time, Lyman proved his photographic skill and caught the attention of *Life* magazine. They bought his iconic photo of Yeoman Chris Johnson while fishing, who was misidentified, ironically, as US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, due to his striking resemblance.

Lyman’s book is an interesting document about Navy Seabees, and gives many details about their history, structure, and activities in Vietnam. Battalion 71, to which Lyman belonged, was divided into five companies, with different functions. Alpha company was comprised of truck drivers, rock drillers and cement plant operators, whose task involved building roads, landing strips for planes, drainage systems, and foundations for structures. Bravo, Charlie, and Delta companies were made up of builders and steel workers. Their task was to erect buildings, while H company operated in the administrative sector.

Lyman’s main task in Chu Lai was to manage the battalion’s newspaper *The Transit*, collecting all the most interesting stories from Chu Lai camp, taking pictures, and writing most of the articles. Further duties involved laying out the newspaper and proposing stories to the censorship commission, located at the MACV Press Center, in Da Nang, 87 kilometers north of Chu Lai. He summarizes his role as: “We were not real journalists. We were more like public relations flunkies, restricted to producing positive stories and photographs that showed the military in a good light for the folks back home” (152).

After editing, the newspaper was printed in Japan, and Lyman had the
opportunity to visit Tokyo many times and discover many aspects of Japanese culture that are well documented in this book.

Although he does not report on any wartime operations, Lyman records two interesting and dangerous encounters he shared with his comrades. The first was the explosion of a land mine as a convoy of cars he was in was travelling south on dusty Highway One. The lead truck passed over a mine, and Lyman’s driver quickly swerved his jeep off the road. As the author reports, the explosion killed two young marines, who were found in a rice field. The second dramatic event occurred during a rescue operation to recover a lost squad in the Tra Bong River, using a special floating tank. Lyman’s group was soon under fire, but after the Americans fought back, the enemy ceased shooting.

Other significant passages describe local villages, where groups of children used to surround the soldiers and try to sell them something. The US forces in Vietnam understood that to reduce the local population’s distrust, they had to give them a hand through Civic Action projects, such as building schools, churches, and orphanages or providing villagers with health care. Many soldiers were involved in these projects, but one figure who stands out is John Murphy, a former construction company owner, who spent most of his time in Vietnam helping the Vietnamese rebuild what the war had destroyed.

Unlike other war diaries, Lyman’s memoirs do not express any negative judgement towards the enemy or the local population. The common thread of this book is the sense of friendship among many young soldiers, sent to a previously unknown part of the world, to fight a war no one wanted, and the curiosity and sorrow for the Vietnamese people involved in what is now considered a Cold War era proxy-war. In Lyman’s words: “I felt we could do more for these people, or less – if we’d just give them the money the military was spending on this war effort and let the Vietnamese sort their differences themselves” (167).

Fabrizio Martino
Pathum Thani, Thailand


The Anglo-Dutch conflict of 1652 through 1682 was the high-water mark of Dutch naval power and global influence. For the English, it was an era of great internal political upheaval from Cromwell to the arrival of William III of Orange. For the English navy, it was a period of slow awakening as the result of Dutch victories. David Ormrod and Gijs Rommelse edited and contributed to this collection of papers that explore in depth the financial, naval, political, and diplomatic developments during this period. This book is the result of two conferences in 2017, held in Amsterdam and Chatham, to mark the 350th anniversary of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665-67, and the Dutch raid on the Medway, 1667. It provides a deeper understanding of the changing context during the period and the impact of the wars on England and the Netherlands.

There were three Anglo-Dutch wars, 1652-54, 1665-67 and 1673-74. The first war began largely over English ambitions to destroy Dutch superiority
in trade and ended with both countries financially exhausted. The second war was centred on trade and the attempt by the recently returned King Charles II to place his nephew, William III of Orange, in charge of the Dutch. It ended with the successful Dutch raid of the Medway. Admiral De Ruyter, employing a plan by Johan and Cornelis de Witt attacked the English anchorage at Chatham and made off with the flagship Royal Charles, a humiliating defeat for the King whose control over England was still precarious. The third war saw an allied France and England attack the Dutch. It ended after four naval victories by the Dutch under Admiral De Ruyter persuaded the English Parliament to force Charles II to seek peace. The end to Anglo-Dutch conflict in the seventeenth century came with the Dutch invasion that served to place William of Orange and his wife Mary on the English throne in 1688.

The second section contains six articles focusing on the war in the North Sea. Rommelse and Roger Downing set the stage with a view of the European context in which the three Anglo-Dutch conflicts occurred. While the wars began with English desires to counter the financial and trade advantages of the Dutch and the Dutch to challenge the English claim over the North Sea, others saw it as either a financial war only, or a series of unfortunate conflicts between two Protestant states. As for the other European countries, they either jumped in whenever an advantage to their own national political or financial interests arose, or kept a safe, circumspect distance.

John Hattendorf describes the impact of the naval rivalry between the English and Dutch. The three naval wars and the intervening years of competitive trade and colonization are portrayed as an ongoing “naval arms race.” The conflicts helped to establish permanent naval forces in major European nations and altered the tactical aspects of sea battles, leading to navies adopting a line of battle approach rather than swarming a single enemy ship with several ships. It also affected ship design, creating the line of battle, convoy escort, and coastal defence ships. The Dutch mastered the ability to quickly assemble and deploy an invading force both in 1667, and for the transporting of William III to England in 1688. The English came to understand the need to secure ongoing, adequate financial support for the navy.

Ann Coats and Alan Lemmers write about the dockyards and coastal defences of the two belligerents. With a heavy use of images, the authors explore the differences between English and Dutch ability “to support their navies.” At mid-century the Dutch held the upper hand, in both financial and
organizational areas, but by 1700, the English had reversed the situation. The Dutch created a fleet, professionalized their naval officers, and employed taxes to support the effort. This served to bring about social changes beyond their intentions and weakened the traditional five regional Dutch admiralties. England had faced humiliating defeat in the second war largely due to a failure to complete planned defences, and properly pay dock workers and sailors, caused in part by financial problems. Fiscal reform under Charles II brought order to tax collection and distribution of funds, while the appearance of a strong, stable Bank of England, capable of backing loans, led to completion of shore defences and improved funding of the navy.

The English and Dutch colonial empires in North America and Asia are dealt with in the third section. Nuala Zahedieh reviews the Anglo-Dutch struggles around the Atlantic rim. The Second Anglo-Dutch war was the most critical, leaving England with the east coast of North America, and the Dutch in charge of English slave trading posts in Africa and with access to Spanish markets through the slave trade. As for the West Indies, the treaty returned conquests to pre-war owners. Overseas possessions and their defence, and the capture of the other country’s distant colonies proved an expensive endeavour, in both coin and lives.

In Asia, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had developed into a near independent state power, staking claims and waging war to support them. Erik Odegard explains the interaction between the VOC and the English East India Company (EIC) during the periods of war and peace in the seventeenth century. With its extensive resources and government support, the VOC was able to exert its trade control over areas of Asia the Dutch had colonized and influence surrounding nations. The EIC just managed to survive the period, learning the lesson that “company-state” status was the only road to flourishing in the east.

Jaap Jacobs examines the use of treaties, land claims, and diplomacy in the rivalry between the English and Dutch in North America, while Martine van Ittersum does the same for the contest over the Banda Islands in Indonesia. In both cases we see each side using nuanced interpretations and application of treaties and international law to upload their own claims over desired areas and trade. State and mercantile interests overlapped throughout the era, with either party calling the other to support their positions and enforce trade and land possession claims. Treaties with Indigenous people were an important part of the exertion of rights by the European states. Government charter and “just war” claims to Dutch areas of North America were used by the English to justify territorial possession.

The fourth section has two chapters which examine the historical remembrance of the wars and the multiple portrayals of Dutch hero Admiral Michiel De Ruyter. Remmelt Daalder examines De Ruyter’s afterlife as a national hero in the “collective imagination,” representing the nation’s naval prowess, as symbol of political reform, a spark for the heroic deeds of a later generation’s naval officers, military recruitment icon, and the stable face on Dutch currency. Admiral De Ruyter was perfect for the role – intelligent, daring, loyal, and a reminder of an age when the Dutch were more powerful and influential. His biography could be easily massaged to fit the contemporary national conditions, to suit the purposes of the group employing his image. David Ormrod reports on the British and Dutch efforts
to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in 2017. The celebrations had more public salience and higher political acknowledgement for the Dutch than the British, the latter having little success to celebrate and no hero on which to focus. Prioritizing of entertainment over historical fact guided the preparation of activities along the Medway.

Each of the four groupings of chapters begins with a half-page illustration relevant to that section’s topic. There are 41 illustrations within several of the chapters, 20 alone in Coats’ and Lemmers’ study of dockyards and coastal defences. There are seven easy-to-read statistical tables. Four maps are grouped together to orient the reader to the Dutch and English colonies discussed within the text. Unfortunately, only the first is properly labelled, while the captions for the other three are placed with the wrong map.

This book is for those with a background knowledge of Anglo-Dutch relationships in the seventeenth century, the details of the three wars, as well as some command of European political dynamics. It contributes a rich layer of new scholarly analysis of the contextual landscape of the Anglo-Dutch aggression between 1652 and 1689. As noted above, the final two contributions explore how history is told in light of political and cultural forces.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


France and the United Kingdom have been partners and allies on the defence side since the Entente Cordiale in 1904. These former enemies and competitors put aside differences to build a close relationship that stood up to the Second World War. The nadir came after France’s capitulation and the Royal Navy’s attacks on warships of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar in 1940. Its military power restored and expanded for a nuclear age, France was a contributing member to NATO during the Cold War, although French President Charles De Gaulle withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. After France formally returned to the fold 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, French and British political leaders met in 2010 to sign the landmark Lancaster House agreements that set out the scope of a renewed bilateral relationship between the two countries in certain military and defence fields. Alice Pannier, a political scientist and assistant professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, has revised a prize-winning doctoral dissertation completed jointly through King’s College University of London and Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris, into a book that examines the nature of the evolving Anglo-French relationship since 2010 in the context of the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the European Union, popularly known as Brexit. She was a postdoctoral fellow at the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) within France’s Ministry of Defence and secretary-general of the Association pour les Études sur la Guerre et la Stratégie (AEGES).

Pannier argues that France and the United Kingdom have a special rela-
tionship of a bilateral nature that has stood the test of time and become closer than ever as the latter leaves the European Union. The book, largely based on her field research of over a hundred interviews of French and British individuals in the defence and diplomatic fields, is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters provide a theoretical basis for understanding bilateral relationships pertaining to security and defence in the European context, as opposed to much more studied multilateral relationships on which much IR theory focuses. Bilateral relationships are common and come in many varieties, and occasionally can be characterized as special, if relations are particularly cordial and mutually beneficial. The next three chapters comprise case studies on the deployment of military forces during the Libyan campaign in 2011 in which France and the United Kingdom took on a leading role together, the aspiration and creation of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) drawing on forces from the two countries and available for high intensity operations, and integration of national defence industries with a focus on a joint program for development of an anti-ship missile, the Sea Venom/Anti-Navire Léger (ANL). The last chapter and conclusion assess the strength of the bilateral relationship and the ability to adapt and learn in the face of change and the impact of Brexit on an enduring special relationship. The defence relationship between France and the United Kingdom largely works on the basis of constant negotiation, trade-offs, and interest agents sharing a common narrative that suits political purposes. France enjoys equally close relations with Germany, both still primary members in the European Union, and the drift of the United Kingdom away into the most likely greater military influence of the United States, opens the possibility of a shift in emphasis and priorities. The French and British bilateral relationship has gone through ups and downs, and no doubt shall continue in some form, as one country sticks with Europe and the other absconds.

In terms of navies, the slightly larger Marine nationale has significant capabilities and growing qualitative advantage compared to the Royal Navy. Both France and the United Kingdom, as former colonial and imperial powers, still maintain robust expeditionary forces for regional and global deployment and count as the two European nuclear powers within NATO with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and helicopter carriers during the Libyan operations presented a significant show of force and facilitated air strikes on land targets. The French and British navies provide nuclear deterrence for their respective countries, in the form of nuclear ballistic missile submarines kept on station at sea. Collaboration in the nuclear field, one of the Lancaster House agreements, has met some measure of success, and according to Pannier, is easier done than the conventional military because the communities are smaller and closer in views. Nuclear propulsion and classified information sharing are still areas where France and the United Kingdom could cooperate better. France has its own system of strategic surveillance satellites, while the United Kingdom relies on the Five Eyes and the Americans. Both navies are replacing SSNs, and France has marketed a conventional version of its Barracuda nuclear attack submarine for export, besides the proven and affordable Scorpene diesel-electric design. The Marine nationale and Royal Navy are each limited by budgetary concerns and the escalat-
ing cost of new technology, which has meant reductions in actual force levels and readiness.

Having a publisher that could work in both English and French no doubt factored into Pannier’s choice of Canada’s McGill-Queen’s University Press. *Rivals in Arms* fits nicely into its Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies series, which focuses on contemporary topics. Pannier has also co-authored *French Defence Policy Since the End of the Cold War* published by Routledge in December 2020. Many of the same themes are covered in more detail on the French side. *Rivals in Arms* is recommended for a primarily academic audience with an interest in IR theory, contemporary military affairs, and European politics and diplomacy.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


The subtitle of this book is *Continuity and Innovation in a Key Technology*, which leads one (reasonably) to expect that the book will be largely concerned with the tension between change and inertia over the indicated two-century period and have something significant to say in conclusion.

In the introduction, the author implies that this key technology has remained peripheral in British Atlantic history: “Archaeologists have worked on it, as have a few ship historians concerned with technical matters, but a scholarly appreciation of this central technology has not yet taken its place upon the shelf.” While this would seem (to this reviewer) to do a disservice to the works of Greenhill and McGregor (to cite only two authors who have written on the subject), in attempting to be scholarly, the author falls short of his (assumed) objective of saying something new and interesting.

Reid starts well, mapping his argument through the structure of nine recognizably suitable chapter headings: Introduction; The Ship: A Primer and Field Guide; From the Stocks to the Ways: Building a Ship from Contract to Launch; The Mysterious Art of the Shipwright: Deciphering the Merchant Ship Design; Merchant Venturers and Merchant Ships; Sailing and Surviving: People and Labour Abroad; Working the Ship: the Technology of Operation; Conclusion: The Merchant Ship in the British Atlantic, 1600-1800; and Epilogue: *Ann & Hope* in Canton—Beyond the British Atlantic.

Through these chapters he makes a number of points which relate to what an engineer might characterize as recognition of a system, with the inescapable corollary that all design is a compromise. Thus, in various places we hear the arguments that relate the evolution of merchant ship design to the wider milieu of geo-political risks (wars, privateering, the requirement for self-defence versus convoying), of economic risks (cargo capacity, economies of scale either via ship-size or distribution of risk via fleet-size, etc.), and of operational costs (manning and evolution of rigs in terms of numbers and sizes of sails and masts, and of configurations of fore-and-aft and square sails). There are many tantalizing mentions of the research possibilities of “experimental archaeology,” the build-
ing and operation of authentic replicas as a means of understanding design intent, but disappointingly little in the way of clear conclusions regarding insight gained therefrom. There are also numerous mentions (21, 129, 224, 235) of the possible Dutch influence on English and French merchant ship design, in terms of wider beam and shallower draft, but it is not clear that this was the result of any performance edge rather than just the (typically-Dutch) operational imperative of serving shoal-draft ports in colonial rivers and estuaries.

Throughout the book, the author has an annoying habit of repeatedly posing a series of questions and then suggesting that some other research might answer this. A typical example is from the Conclusion (228): “Did the adaptations to rigs that we know occurred decrease or increase crew workload? … Comparative experimental archaeology, using replicas of both earlier and later vessels, should help us answer that question…. Did the increased use of fore-and-aft sails, even on primarily square-rigged vessels, allow the same crew to work a larger ship with the same expenditure of effort? … We need to determine the comparative workloads on similar vessels with different ratios of square to fore-and-aft sails, as well as comparative downwind and upwind performance, to determine the cost-benefit relationship of all three…. [C]ontinuing work in the archives, in the papers of ship’s masters especially, may get us closer to a clear sense of that elusive primary causality.” This technique occurs so often that the book reads more like a prospectus for where the research should have gone than a report on what the research has uncovered.

Ultimately, the book suffers from inadequate editing in its transition from a PhD thesis to a volume in the series *Technology and Change in History*. For example, there are four passing references to the “Baconian Project” but no index entry or explanation of the term. One might argue that anyone interested in the history of technology should recognize and understand the reference, but it would also suggest that someone interested in the merchant ships of this era would not need to be told “The tiller is the handle used to turn the rudder to steer the ship. When the rudder was turned, all the force of the water flowing under the ship was applied to one side of the rudder, encouraging the ship to turn in that direction” (94). The addition of an 18-page glossary should have made such simplistic in-text explanations superfluous. On the one hand, there are numerous rather pedestrian technical explanations, such as “The less resistance presented to the water, the faster the ship will move under a given amount of sail power” (52), but when the author attempts to advance a more technical argument, he is quickly out of his depth: thus, his suggestion that flatter bottoms have greater initial stability but lesser ultimate stability. (134, footnote). He misses the point that the greater initial stability is a result of the cargo being carried lower in a flatter-bottomed hull, while ultimate stability is more a factor of freeboard (that is, above-water shape). Accepting that this is a historical work rather than a naval architectural one, if one is trying to explain the experiential insights of contemporary ship design expertise using modern terms (like metacentre), then those terms should be better understood. The book has a number of illustrations, including some from Chapman and pictures of various replica ships), but none were really needed. When Reid attempts to explain the geometric forming of the bends of a ship, the average reader would have been greatly assisted by the addition of an appropriate
figure from one of the many contemporary shipbuilding treatises mentioned.

In conclusion, while a promising title and subject, this is a very disappointing book and I can in no way recommend its purchase at the steep price indicated.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


Military officers sometimes find themselves serving political masters whose political and ideological points of view differ radically from their own. In these cases, the struggle to find a personal “balance” between the duty to serve your country and your political and social ideology is often difficult, morally tumultuous, and potentially dangerous – especially in a state like Hitler’s Germany. This is the story of one man who faced this dilemma, and whose choice cost him his life. His story is all the more alluring because he was a U-boat commander in the German Navy, or *Kriegsmarine*, a service not known to harbour criticism of Hitler’s regime. Its author, Eric C. Rust, has previously published a critically acclaimed collective biography on one class of its Officer Cadets. This time, he has migrated from the macro to the micro, focusing on the career of one hapless German naval officer from that era. Like many academic works, Rust’s story had a long gestation from an initial idea to a published work. This explains why its thoughtful foreword was written by a famous U-boat commander who passed away long before the book was finally published. This story is presented in 11 chapters of varying lengths, and the text is supported by a list of mostly *Kriegsmarine* abbreviations and a list of key individuals. Rust also provides a detailed index, notes, and an extensive bibliography. His primary focus is on the evolution of Oskar Kusch’s negative opinion of – and even aversion to – Hitler’s regime and the *Kriegsmarine*’s ultimate decision to execute him for voicing it.

Oskar Kusch had been an avid sailor and athlete from a middle class Protestant family with a good education with an artistic bent. With perhaps the exception of the latter, he was an ideal officer candidate for a *Kriegsmarine* that was in the midst of rapid expansion. Although he had some initial misgivings about Hitler’s regime, Kusch was not initially opposed to it because it seemed to have brought a semblance of order to a previously unsettled Germany. By all accounts, he was a professional officer who was genuinely concerned with the welfare and survival of his crew. He did not, however, shy away from sharing his increasingly negative opinion of the Hitler regime with his crew. In 1944, Kusch was brought up on charges because of a report filed by a former junior officer from his own crew. During his trial, Kusch adamantly refused to deny his anti-regime statements or offer any defence that could have alleviated their impact. Surprisingly, he was found innocent of all charges, except those regarding his “negative” opinions of the Hitler regime and its hopeless war, and was sentenced to death. The harshness of his sentence is the most striking aspect of his case because the Kriegsmarine’s Naval Court had only recommended a ten-year prison term.

The origins of the report that led to Kusch’s trial are well covered in the
text and most readers will find Rust’s description of the German Naval Court Judicial procedures enlightening. Rust maintains that this report was motivated as much by a personal vendetta as a “patriotic and selfless act.” Apparently, it was filed outside of “normal channels” and should have been squelched on the spot. Now, however, the German navy was under Admiral Karl Dönitz, who had begun to campaign ardently against all signs of political non-conformity and “defeatism” within its ranks. The men who could have intervened on Kusch’s behalf either failed to act or were unavailable to head off the eventual trial. It is perhaps unfortunate that Kusch’s case did not fall under the purview of the circle of officers around the German Naval Magistrate Berthold Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the brother of Hitler’s would-be assassin and a member of the July 20 plot. In general, at this stage of the war, German military and civil courts were under growing political and military pressure to root out “defeatists” and “dissenters” within the Third Reich. Post-war attitudes did not change much and it took two separate trials to clear Kusch’s name to a limited degree. Even the former naval judge who insisted on Kusch’s execution was only given a “severe” reprimand for choosing to impose the harshest possible sentence without any compelling legal justification.

This story is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, Dönitz, the self-proclaimed protector of his U-boat commanders, refused to help one of his own, despite a verbal promise to do so. Secondly, Kusch was one of the few officers of the Kriegsmarine to be executed for voicing his negative opinions about the Nazi regime and its leadership. It should not be forgotten that Hitler’s regime had no qualms about spilling the blood of German officers or civilians who in any way voiced opposition or even merely disparaged the regime. In fact, Germany executed almost 33,000 of its own sorely needed military personnel during the Second World War, many for ‘crimes’ like Kusch’s. It is also notable that Kusch was not a member of the German resistance to Hitler’s regime, and he was not known to even the small cadre of Kriegsmarine officers who were involved in the German resistance movement. Overall, this is a definitely recommended reading for those who are interested in Kriegsmarine’s “muddied” relationship with Hitler and the Nazi regime. It reminds us that even some of those who served under Hitler could recognize the evil of his regime – and were often were severely punished for voicing their dissent.

Rust and the US Naval Institute Press should be acknowledged for bringing this riveting and well-written account to our attention.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec


One of the most prolific topics in military history must be the Battle of the Atlantic, arguably the most critical of campaigns for victory in Europe. The lengthy bibliography on the subject seems perpetually growing as more books and articles are added every year. It is also due, in part, to the fact that there is something about submarines that captures the imagination. These small boats, designed to sink and come
back up, and the men that go to sea in them, capture the imagination, producing a kind of romanticism that captivates the reader. The arrival of a new submarine book like *Hitler's Attack U-Boats* naturally draws the attention of those interested in the subject. Jak Showell is a well-known author having published more than 20 titles in the field. His first book, *U-boats Under the Swastika* has the distinction of being one of the longest selling naval books in Germany. His second book, *The German Navy in World War Two* was named one of the outstanding books of the year by the United States Naval Institute. His research and publications have also drawn him into the production of both radio and television programs as well.

In *Hitler's Attack U-Boats*, the author provides the reader with a study of U-boat development from the First World War forward across ten chapters. Backed up by four appendices, the text traces the development of German U-boat designs over the course of the war, detailing developments in deck armament, torpedo design, and both the internal and external features of the Type VIIc and the key crew positions and rolls. Starting with a general chapter about “attack U-boats” in the Second World War, Showell spends the next three chapters breaking down the lessons learned from the First World War, the consequences of the war for U-boat development, and the interwar development of submarine designs in Germany. While he specifically focuses on the Type VII and IX, he does discuss the earlier designs as well. Chapters five through nine examine the boats themselves looking at the new generation of submarines in general before going into their external features, internal design elements, and crew. Lastly, he examines the Operational Command set up for the fleet.

While an intriguing book at so many levels, it is also a study of ship design that is lavishly illustrated with unique and fascinating photographs and drawings. I find this incredible because, so often, books tend to use and reuse the same type of images. Showell’s unique photos can be as revealing as his text in describing ship features, stations, and operations, and are a definite advantage to the reader. The author also provides the reader with a wealth of information in his descriptions of the boats and the challenges of operating them. He addresses everything from battery gas venting into the hull through the difficulties of functioning in the engine room due to noise and vibration, to the challenges of torpedo maintenance and operation. Combined, they provide a vivid image of the incredible challenges faced by the U-boats. In the process, Showell gives the reader a sense of the command structure aboard and the way the Germans exercised control within the boat for almost everything.

Sadly, the book also has some serious problems. The author’s discussion of issues like HF/DF and radar seems to have a problem of chronology and understanding. HF/DF has a long history but the way the author presents it makes him seem unaware of the technology or how it was even used. This is similar to his discussion about the Wolfpack doctrine and how Operational Command exhibited control over the boats from the rear. Often this seems to contradict what is known in the literature. The problem is Showell does not back up his statements. The lack of citation and supporting evidence is a critical problem. Incredibly detailed technological discussions, charts, graphs, and statements regarding the operational doctrine and control need to be verified and substantiated by documentary proof. Despite his previous competent use of
interviews and documents, also used in this book, he is missing the evidence of a paper trail, which decreases the value of the text considerably. The fact that the author even points out errors made by other historians in these issues is not missed. But again, he fails to cite specific authors, books, or articles, to give credence to either the problems or the sources of his evidence. He does not even indicate which authors are in question. If you are going to criticize someone’s work, you must back up the point you are making. And Showell fails to do that. Even the illustrations are problematic. An almost identical font is used for both the text and the captions for photographs. With so many photos interspersed within the text, it is often difficult to determine where the text ends and an image description begins. This is frustrating, as there are some incredible descriptions and they just lead to the entire text washing out.

While I enjoyed the book, and I can appreciate the author’s attention to detail, I find myself frustrated with the text size and the absence of citations in a history. Making statements about highly technical information and doctrine/training that challenge the accepted wisdom is an important part of research and publication, but they need to be reinforced with citations. It is essential for credibility and to make the text a valuable tool for research and study. Hitler’s Attack U-Boats struck me as a glorified coffee table book, good looking and interesting, but not something of substance. That does the author a disservice for all the incredible effort and work he has put into it and limits the book’s value for anyone in an academic pursuit.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


North Carolina is a southeastern state facing the Atlantic Ocean, between Virginia in the north and South Carolina to the south. Its nearly three thousand miles of coastline, estuaries, and waterways are well known for their natural beauty and hazards. A combination of geography and prevailing weather patterns, that include constantly shifting shoals, hurricanes, and tropical storms, has earned North Carolina the reputation for ships as the “Graveyard of the Atlantic.” Consequently, major ports and related maritime industries developed elsewhere, and previous historians and writers have assumed that shipbuilding done in North Carolina remained only limited and small-scale, except during times of emergency such as the two world wars. This book, based on a half-century of research in national and state archives, ship registers, census records, and a wide range of other sources, dispels this notion with a deep narrative and a database of ships built in North Carolina up to 1914. William Still Jr., known for his scholarly work over many decades on the Confederate Navy and armour-clads, wrote most of the text, while Richard Stephenson provided the tables, statistical analysis, and numerical data. Still and Stephenson are each professor emeritus from East Carolina University in Greenville and its well-regarded maritime studies and underwater archaeology graduate program. Given the long gestation of the book, publication was made possi-
ble through official channels to bring awareness to North Carolina’s maritime heritage and museums.

The chapters follow a chronological framework divided into six distinct time periods: Colonial and Revolutionary (1585-1783); Federal (1784-1815); Antebellum (1816-1860); Civil War (1861-1865); Expansion (1866-1892); and Industrial (1893-1914). Each chapter is further subdivided by thematic headings and has endnotes with extensive references to source materials. The level of detail provided is almost encyclopedic, though carefully handled and integrated into the general narrative. The chosen methodology puts importance on understanding place, context, political economy, and the ships and those who built them.

North Carolina shipbuilding involved predominantly wood construction catering to local needs and some exports. Availability of suitable timber reserves, in particular pine, live oak, and white cedar – better known as juniper, was a factor in location of makeshift shipyard sites along rivers and waterways. Immigrants brought shipbuilding skills into the state and the labour force comprised free and Black slave workers. Shipyards were smallish in nature and often transitory depending upon ownership and related shipping and sawmill interests. The centerboard became a key feature in sailing vessels built to navigate North Carolina’s shallow coastal and riverine waters. Sloops gave way to schooners as the most favoured form of commercial maritime transportation of goods.

Participation in the American Civil War on the side of the Confederacy revealed the limitations of ramping up the North Carolina shipbuilding industry to build ironclads and gunboats. Union forces occupied most of the coastal areas and principal ports, chronic shortages of plates and engines impeded progress on construction, and those ships launched and made operational proved defective in design and performance. The decades following the war saw commercial business resume and the advent of steamboats and flats propelled by engines. Shipyards became more concentrated at key points along the coast and a smattering of inland locations. The process of shipbuilding drew more on formalized plans and specialized facilities.

Penetration of railways into hinterlands marked the decline of canals and uncompetitive coastal shipping and riverine traffic, and therefore, overall demand for smaller boats; though railways also furnished easier access to other sources of supply for basic materials and propulsion components from other parts of the country because North Carolina manufacturing was not self-sufficient. Shipyards increasingly focused on pleasure craft for recreational purposes, fishing boats, floating theatre showboats, and repairs to stay in business. Enterprises remained small and wood construction still predominated. Brief mention is made in the last chapter of North Carolina’s contributions to shipbuilding during the First World War.

The back half of the book includes comprehensive lists of documented and undocumented ships built in North Carolina, arranged alphabetically and consecutively by year, as well as place names for shipbuilding locations. The compiled data on these ships make North Carolina Shipbuilding an essential reference source for further regional and maritime research, presented in a standard and easy format. The book provides explanation for many wider shipbuilding trends and a model for other regional studies at the state or provincial levels. It will be hard, howev-
er, to replicate the depth of knowledge and effort that has gone into this book by two seasoned and respected academic scholars. The one minor criticism is some repetition that exists from chapter to chapter that might have been addressed by more careful editing.

The large format paperback book, which is distributed through North Carolina University Press, has a reasonable retail price and will appeal to historians and researchers interested in shipbuilding, particularly in the American South and North Carolina, up to the early twentieth century.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


This autobiography of a Royal Navy (RN) submarine engineer and electrical officer is of interest from several perspectives. Firstly, it is well and entertainingly written and thus, easy to keep on with, as well as informative of a submariner’s career. Secondly, Thompson’s service, from joining Dartmouth as a Cadet in 1961 until his retirement in 1998 as Base Commander at the RN/USN nuclear submarine facility at Faslane, Scotland, covers in its earlier pages a similar progress to many RCN submariners, in RN A and O class submarines in preparation for their acquisition in 1968 and on. Stories of life as a cadet, a mid, and sub-lieutenant will be familiar to any who followed that route.

Of value in an autobiography is the author’s brief inclusion of naval, and indeed political winds of change and international events that shaped the progress of not only his Royal Navy submarine career development into their current nuclear-only field, but also the progress of world peace among the major powers at any rate. Short-sightedness prevented Thompson (in those early days) from being a seaman officer as planned. But as an engineer officer, he gives us a valuable look into the world “at the other end of the voicepipe.” His stories of dangerous machinery break-downs, irascible commanders and companions, frightening and utterly silent patrols off Russian operating areas, in both diesel and nuclear boats, are told with a wry sense of humour.

His career in submarines was interrupted, as usual, by spells ashore in staff appointments. One of his more interesting and illustrative roles was as a torpedo development and trials officer, where he was assigned responsibility for correcting the poor performance of Tigerfish torpedoes, the primary weapon of Britain’s growing nuclear squadrons. The boats were nearly perfect in both design and operation, but their only offensive weapon failed too frequently. Although Thompson’s experiments solved the cause, his solution would have required an expensive, and unacceptable, change in the submarines’ tube fittings design. Several times in Thompson’s advancing career, improvements in operating technology were thwarted by costs or political change at home, from Labour to Conservative governments and back. These difficulties will be familiar to all in similar defence roles.

The RN’s move into the ballistic missile nuclear role, influenced by their partners in the USN, and the malevolent American admiral, Hyman Rickover, makes for a fascinating look into outside bargaining and compromise that affected the world’s navies and attempts...
to maintain the delicate balance of power. Thompson was involved in all those negotiations, with increasing responsibilities, with his experiences already “at the sharp end.” This is a lighter, although very cognizant view of that esoteric world. (For a very detailed view of that world and progress of the RN into the acquisition of SSBN boats, see *The Silent Deep*, by Peter Hennessy & James Jinks; Penguin, 2019; reviewed TNM XXVI, no. 2, April 2016.) For those with only a general interest in those developments, Thompson provides an excellent overview, from a user’s perspective. The author, with his rather unusual background training perspective, gives the reader both a clear understanding as to why the RN has only a few nuclear boats while providing an interesting and wryly amusing tale to follow.

My only criticisms of the book, especially from a reviewer’s perspective, are its lack of any index and the somewhat casual and uninformative chapter headings – “Corporate Constipation,” “Walter Mitty,” “War and Peace,” which are not helpful. But it makes for enjoyable reading, which includes a bit of poetry and some looks at familiar naval life of appointments afloat and ashore. Much recommended.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Recently translated into English for the first time, this work is a photographic compendium of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) battleships and battle cruisers from the Meiji era through to the end of the Second World War. Translated by Robert D. Eldridge and Graham B. Leonard, this is a continuation of the Kure Naval Museum’s English rendition and expansion of Shizuo Fukui’s two-volume photographic compendium, *Japanese Naval Vessels, 1869-1945*. Sharing an identical preface and image note with the other volumes, *Battleships and Battle Cruisers* offers rare, large-scale views of vessels purchased, built, and captured by the Japanese during the aforementioned time period, and images of uncompleted ships and the *Kaga* prior to her conversion to an aircraft carrier. As part of the work’s expansion, all images are given a full page for increased clarity, with text kept largely to a minimum. Photograph labels follow the same format as previous volumes, listing the image’s identification number, ship’s name, and class (if applicable), and a one- or two-line caption containing the date and a short description. A standardized listing of ship specifications and a brief summary of the Kure Maritime Museum round out the work.

The photographs and vessels are divided into three distinct sections related to both the evolution of warship design and the geopolitical position of Japan. The first, “Until the Russo-Japanese Sea Battles,” documents the 14 capital ships of the Imperial Japanese fleet in service from 1878 to 1905 over the course of 42 pages. Despite the section’s title, this includes six ships of the Imperial Russian Navy captured during the Russo-Japanese War. These particular vessels actually provide some of the most interesting early images, with photographs of the battle-damaged ships as they were captured positioned immediately across
from their restored condition under the Japanese flag. Most of these early images are quite crisp and detailed, with one of the only ones to have a grainy quality actually being an image of the Japanese battle line engaged during the Battle of the Yalu River, which is quite understandable (21).

The second section, “Until the Building of the Dreadnoughts,” is the smallest, with 38 pages covering the ten capital ships placed in service from 1906 to 1912. As with the previous section, this includes not only pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers, but the semi-dreadnought Satsuma class and dreadnought Kawanishi class ships as well. There also are several shots of the vessels under construction, marking the shift from foreign construction yards to native Japanese shipyards. The foreign influence on design is still clearly visible at this point. Images include an impressive view of the Settsu delivering a test broadside in 1912, and the more humanizing elements of laundry day aboard the Hizen and Kurama, where the sheer volume of uniforms seen hanging on lines helps to illustrate the size of the crews better than mere numbers (45, 66, 84).

The final section, “The Peak of the Era of Battleships,” is where the work truly shines. The 14 capital ships completed between 1913 and 1942 are rendered across 120 pages, showcasing construction, trials, modernizations, and even the model of the Kaga’s original battleship design (186). Deck and superstructure close-up shots of several vessels are provided, usually in the context of a modernization or weapons test, which provide a high-quality view of many details not often discernible from the standard profile shot. The evolution of ship design away from the European pattern to a more distinctly Japanese design is also well documented, with the majority of these warships undergoing refits in the interwar period to acquire the now iconic Pagoda Mast superstructures and trunked funnels that became a hallmark of wartime IJN vessels. The battleships Yamato and Musashi, the only designs completed after the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, are documented even though they received a complete separate volume within this collection solely for themselves. Interestingly, the book includes shots of the construction of the Tosa and Kaga, as both were supposed to be built as battleships prior to the aforementioned Treaty. For the Kaga, destined for conversion to an aircraft carrier, this consists of a single image of the launched hull. For the doomed Tosa, there are four images of launching and towing operations for disposal as an armor testing target ship.

The final 15 pages comprise the vessels’ Technical Specifications and abbreviated service histories. Three ships are represented on each page, with their individual columns listing vessel name, type, length, beam, draught, displacement, speed, armament, propulsion, boilers, and power in an upper block. An asterisk is placed beside the names of those ships captured or taken as war prizes. This is followed by information regarding each ship’s planning date, builder, and major construction milestones. Finally, an extremely simplified timeline of primary events rounds out the section. Six ships, described but not illustrated are Amagi, Akagi, Takao, Atago, Shinano, and Warship No. 111. None of these vessels were completed as battleships or battle cruisers, with the majority being scrapped and two being converted to aircraft carriers.

A few possible improvements come to mind. There appears to be one or two translation errors and photographs out of chronological order, most notable being a statement that the Mikasa is vis-
ible “sinking” in a photograph taken ten months after she had sunk at her moorings (22). Photographs of said sinking are also not documented in this work save for the heavily obscured view in the aforementioned photograph, which is surprising. The lack of images for the six partially completed or converted vessels in the Specifications section also appears to be an oversight, as several images do exist, such as the Amagi in her slip after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1925. Finally, a note about the naming conventions of the ships would be appreciated, as all battleships were named after either Japan or a specific province, and battle cruisers after specific Japanese mountains.

Battleships and Battle Cruisers is an excellent continuation of this series of Imperial Japanese Navy image repositories, characterized by impressive clear and detailed photographs not often encountered in English language sources. The inclusion of early vessels and modernization images clearly showcases the origins and evolutions of Japanese naval design from beginning to end, from foreign-built warships to the iconic IJN Yamato and her sister ship Musashi. This work is a welcome addition for scholarly researchers, naval historians, and detail-oriented ship modelers alike.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia

Part of the recent effort by the Kure Naval Museum to translate and expand Shizuo Fukui’s two-volume photographic compendium, Japanese Naval Vessels, 1869-1945 into a more delineated English language format, this work is a visual record of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s destroyers, escort ships, torpedo boats, submarine chasers, and patrol boats from the turn of the century to the end of the Second World War. Paired with captions and tables translated by Robert D. Eldridge and Graham B. Leonard, Destroyers provides full page images of the aforementioned vessels, often taken in profile. There are a small number of images that share pages, but these are unusual. The minimalist labels follow the same format as other volumes, listing the image’s identification number, ship’s name and class (if applicable), and a one- or two-line caption containing the date and possibly a short description. Standardized ship and class specifications followed by a brief summary of the Kure Maritime Museum conclude the work.

The photographs are divided into five subsections by ship type, with a vast majority of images naturally consisting of destroyers. The first subsection of the work covers 104 First Class Destroyers, while the second subsection covers 12 Second Class and seven Third Class vessels. Given the sheer volume of ships covered, most are represented by a single profile image, with just 21 of the 123 destroyers having multiple views. This limits the views largely to profile shots, with few images of construction, modifications, or improvements. The Fubuki and Shiranui have some of the more interesting dockyard images, with highly detailed sectional views of work on the vessels’ decks during 1936 and 1942, respectively (46, 94-95). Three detail shots of the Harutsuki at the end of the war are collected.
on a single page as well, showing design reconfigurations for use as “a special transport ship” (123). Precious few Second World War combat images are included, but there are some interesting views of Russian vessels taken during the Russo-Japanese War showcasing battle damage and conditions from that conflict.

As previously mentioned, the work depicts vessels beyond its title focus as well. It includes 16 ocean defense/escort ships, eight pre-London Naval Treaty torpedo ships, five post-treaty “new” torpedo ships, eight submarine chasers, and four patrol boats. Less commonly encountered than destroyers, these vessels are also often reduced to a single image, but their often-unique nature contrasts starkly with the earlier sections. The pre-London Naval Treaty torpedo ships, for example, offer some of the oldest images of almost archaic boat design, while two of the selected Patrol Ships, No. 101 (formerly HMS Thracean) and No. 102 (formerly USS Stewart), offer views of captured allied vessels modified and impressed into Japanese service (204-205).

As with the other volumes of this series, a Technical Specifications section serves as the primary text. Due to the number of vessels involved, however, it requires 22 pages divided into three columns per page to cover 55 ship classes rather than individual vessels. Each class is described by ship type, length, beam, draught, displacement, speed, armament, propulsion, boilers, and power. Following this, a table lists all vessels of the class, detailing name, completion date, shipyard, and brief service notes, the latter often listing dates of decommissioning or combat loss. War prize vessels are also listed in tables after each vessel type, expanding the standard class table to include country of origin, original name and class, displacement, Japanese refitter, and refitting completion date. There are no photographs for a number of vessels, primarily in the non-destroyer sections.

There are a few possible improvements. As is common in this series, image captions are kept to a minimum, which leads to unnecessary omissions. For example, the caption of the Third Class Destroyer Akatsuki fails to mention that it was originally the Russian destroyer Ryetsitelnii, and two photos of the Shiranui in dry dock with the hull forward of the main funnel missing merely refer to the vessel as being in “for repairs” (94-95, 157). Given the minimal use of images for each vessel, expanded captions could greatly improve effectiveness. With so many vessels under discussion, the use of only one image is likely due to the need to keep the series’ page count under 200 pages per volume. Expanding this allowance would allow the authors to showcase more vessels and more fully illustrate modifications to certain ships throughout their service lives.

Like the rest of the Kure Maritime Museum series, Destroyers is a solid visual guide to the majority of destroyers fielded by Japan during the early- to mid-twentieth century, along with a good representation of select early torpedo vessels, late Second World War escorts, and patrol vessels. The clear profile views offered make the work quite useful as a recognition manual when dealing with images of Imperial Japanese support craft and the specifications sections offer good introductory information for both general classes and individual ships.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia

Milan Vego. General Naval Tactics: Theory and Practice. Annapolis, MD:
Professor Milan Vego is a well-known name in the field of naval/maritime studies. Currently teaching at the US Naval War College, Professor Vego has extensive experience as both a naval officer and academic, which informs all his works, but especially his current book *General Naval Tactics*. According to the information from the Naval War College, Professor Vego is a native of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he served as an officer in the former Yugoslavian Navy between 1961 and 1973, and where he graduated as a torpedo specialist and obtained a degree in Naval Science. In 1973, he earned a master’s degree in US/Latin American History at the Belgrade University, and later, in 1976, worked in the West German Merchant Marine. After obtaining political asylum in the United States, he concluded a PhD in Modern European History at George Washington University in 1981. His many books and articles have been very influential, and it is no surprise that this new work follows the elegance and substance of his former works, such as *Naval Operations in Narrow Seas*, published in 2003 by Routledge (reviewed in *TNM* XV, no. 3, 138-139).

Yet, *General Naval Tactics* is a very particular book for it captures the interest of both naval officers and naval scholars at the same time. It highlights the fundamental importance of the conjunction of theory and practice to the naval/maritime field of study. In this latest work, Vego ultimately presents a brilliant compilation of his perceptions on all aspects of naval tactics – theory and practice. The reader cannot help but feel the weight of his experience and knowledge on the elaboration and development of every concept throughout the book. Certainly, his ideas in this volume will be further studied and explored for years to come.

The book is divided into 12 chapters, each one dealing with one aspect of naval tactics. The first four chapters are more introductory and explain the concepts of naval tactics, while the following chapters deal with more complex subjects such as combat support, tactical doctrine, and tactical leadership. There is no concluding chapter to wrap up the book, which is the weak point of the volume. This reader hopes, however, that the work does not stop here, and that there may be more on this aspect of naval tactics in forthcoming works.

Throughout the book, Vego presents complex subjects in a comprehensive way that can be understood by all audiences, whether they have a military background or an academic one. In each chapter, he systematically details his ideas and main concepts illustrating them with factual examples in a very delightful manner. Anyone eager to understand better the tactical and strategical implications of historical naval battles and modern naval operations will enjoy his insights and conceptualizations.

Another merit of the book is the discussion of tactical perspectives from Clausewitz and Jomini, as well as Mahan and Corbett, without dragging the reader into the endless elaboration of which one is the better, pitting one author against the other. Instead, Vego combines the best of both worlds, highlighting the key aspects of each one’s ideas for understanding the tactics of naval warfare. He also references the perspectives of forgotten thinkers, like René Daveluy, an early-twentieth-century French Admiral who fought in the First World War and published a series
of books about naval strategy and tactics. His work has been largely overlooked, although it was used by great authors like Bernard Brodie.

The influence of Clausewitz is readily observable as Vego elaborates on his core arguments. For example, in Chapter 4, Elements of Naval Tactical Actions, the author brings the concept “center of gravity” to the discussion, examining the origins and meaning of the term as he explains the “tactical center of gravity” in naval action. It is very refreshing to see Vego apply Clausewitian concepts with objectivity and clearness, while creating his own approach to naval tactics.

This is a must-have book for anyone who is interested in or more deeply researching the topic. It might, however, require several readings to absorb the ideas Vego presents in order to comprehend the full picture. This is a book to lean on, study, and explore. Naval tactics are an art, requiring years of comprehensive reading to command and depth of experience to execute. General Naval Tactics contributes to the never-ending mission of improving naval thought, while also providing the tools for enhancing experience at sea.

Andrea L. F. Resende de Souza
Belo Horizonte, Brazil


Shipwrecked presents several new perspectives on the changing history of the American east coast, focusing on the mainly sand shorelines between the Carolinas and Cape Cod. Chapters are devoted to telling a story of the taming of the American beach in the nineteenth century and presenting a fresh application of the frontier thesis to the area of contact between land and sea, far from the standard view of a steadily westward moving border between the settled and the wild.

Identified by the publisher as “Environmental History,” this is indeed a volume about place but is environmental only in as much as the human action takes place in a defined locale. In reality, most of the chapters are about very specific activities in defined parts of the coastline. The approach allows for a detailed treatment of marine and near-marine activities over time which Wells then generalizes across the whole area. An overview of the history of the coast opens the volume with a view of the shore as “an isolated, parochial, pre-industrial space on the margins....” (36). The rest of the book deals with how and why that view changed over the century. The first of the stories to be examined is the history of wreckers and wreck law on the Jersey Shore which looks at the perceptions, and more importantly, the reality of shipwreck and salvage through the first half of the century. Wells traces the pragmatic and gradual application of regulation to balance private and community interests. The theme of transformation carries over to the examination and development of lifesaving mechanisms on the shoreline of Rhode Island and it is in this chapter that the idea of coastal tourism and its association with wrecks is more fully explored.

However, rather than looking at the rise of the seaside resort, the linkage here is to the federal presence of the US Life Saving Service. A chapter on the salvage activities in the coastal areas adjacent to the Port of New York extending from Cape Cod to Cape May concentrates on the gradual shift away
from wreck so that the disappearance of debris and wrecks from the shore results in a pristine playground devoid of shipwreck. By the end of the century the once common phenomena of the wrecked ship had become a rare event seldom seen by the shoreside visitor. The rarity of shipwreck and emergence of the disaster tourist is the subject of another chapter in which shipwreck becomes spectacle as Wells recounts the activities surrounding the 1896 grounding of the steamship *St. Paul* at a seaside resort in New Jersey. The event became an intense and short-lived attraction near enough to cities for special tourist trains to run, but when the vessel was successfully hauled off the sands after ten days it was soon forgotten.

The volume rises from Wells’ PhD thesis and large sections of three of the five main chapters have been previously published (one of these, on changing perceptions of marine salvage, appeared in *The Northern Mariner* in 2007). The individual chapters are extremely useful in presenting the history of their subjects, be it disaster tourism, lifesaving responsibilities, or the development of wreck and salvage operations. The book is less successful in gathering these threads together to support the assertion that shipwrecks and their associated infrastructure and management were responsible in great measure for the development of coastal tourism. Wells skillfully shines a light on factors which have not been previously considered such as regulation of salvage responsibilities throughout the nineteenth century. The William Saunders papers in the Mystic Seaport Museum play a similar role in setting the scene for the chapter linking lifesaving activities and tourism.

As behooves a study which began as a thesis, the volume is extremely well-researched. A full one-fifth of the volume consists of notes and bibliography. Wells has made extensive use of primary archival sources to ground richly detailed case studies as the basis for more general observations across the region. For example, the Forman Family Papers from New Jersey’s Monmouth County Historical Association give in-depth information about the role of the local commissioners of wrecks on the Jersey Shore which introduces the discussion of the changes in regulation of salvage responsibilities throughout the nineteenth century. The volume, overall, is successful in its parts, less so in the whole. The reader will have access to excellent summaries of the background to, and effectiveness of, the interventions of local, state, and federal governments in preventing shipwrecks, and in managing the human and economic consequences when they did occur. Wells enlivens what could be a dry administrative history treatment by telling the stories of fascinating individuals engaged in the process. The chapters, which are more like a series of linked essays, will stimulate the reader to further ponder the question Wells considers in the book: how did human factors change America’s nineteenth century perception of the beach from a place of peril to a place of pleasure? The volume is recommended for anyone interested in the human history of coastal regions.

H.T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island

There are many silences that exist in historical research and writing. Among them is that of Icelandic seawomen and the role they played, and continue to play, in both society and the fishing industry. Anthropologist Margaret Willson breaks the silence with *Survival on the Edge: Seawomen of Iceland*. She brilliantly interweaves her personal and professional experiences as she researched and wrote the book. Her narrative is broken into seven chapters offering readers a thematic breakdown with some chronology. Arguing the importance of seawomen and the way their stories have been systematically removed from Icelandic society, Willson blends gender, class, labour, and generational relationships to support her argument, thus creating an interdisciplinary study.

In the twenty-first century, Iceland has become known as one of the most gender equal nations in the world. This has not always been the case, however, especially when it comes to fishing. Men held leadership roles on the boat while many women began in menial positions. They needed to prove that they could work as hard, or harder, than the men on board. As Willson notes, many women also had to deal with harassment from some of the crew. Over time, however, these women gained the respect of seamen. Willson outlines the complicated relationships between men and women that existed on the small fishing boats.

Icelandic history is laden with sagas focusing on heroics tied to the settlement of the island nation. These sagas remained important in society and have been tightly bound to how some Icelanders live their lives. Willson connects twenty-first century Icelanders to those of earlier centuries through fishing the same fjords, making modern seawomen the descendants of earlier ones. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, women regularly appeared on fishing ships but were required to wear long, woolen skirts. In perilous seas, this often proved treacherous. Although today’s seawomen do not face this or other issues like their early sisters, there are still gender issues that arise aboard modern fishing boats.

*Seawomen’s* final chapter continues the gender study but introduces the new facet of generational differences. Understandably, Willson notes, younger generations of women place more emphasis on education and working in the cities. Based on her analysis and interviews, older generations perceive this focus on the cities as damaging to Icelandic society and history. This chapter is somewhat weaker than the others. Though Willson brings her history into the modern era and discusses the younger generation’s focus on education versus going to sea, she offers little in the way of a conclusion. Perhaps if she had begun by presenting a direct thesis, she could have offered readers a stronger conclusion.

As many readers will not be well versed in Icelandic history, Willson thoughtfully decided to use the Roman alphabet for Icelandic names. She felt this would help non-Icelandic readers to remember, pronounce, and recognize names. Two maps of Iceland help readers locate the places seawomen lived and worked. Along with details and information provided in the beginning of the book, there is an appendix of pre-1900 seawomen. Willson also explains Icelandic names: in addition to their
given name, children’s surnames consist of their father’s first name followed by “son” or “dóttir” to denote a son or daughter. All of these author’s additions were welcomed by this reader.

Willson’s experiences, while researching seawomen, contribute to her description of the island nation and its people. She outlines the danger inherent in going to sea over the last few centuries. She describes the ominous sky and unruly ocean waves as she makes her way through and around Iceland’s many fiords. Over time, women sought to find their place on fishing boats, either because they crewed their family’s boat, or they employed their skill with commercial boat skippers. No matter their reason, fishing allowed women an opportunity to earn a wage well beyond anything that could be made on land.

Willson’s training as an anthropologist allowed her to gain an understanding of how and why women had been revered in earlier centuries for serving as everything from deckhands to skippering their own ship. She connects to the past through meeting and interviewing modern seawomen, making good use of her contacts throughout the nation. As well as diving deeply into the Icelandic archives, she also makes use of oral histories of early seawomen that have been passed down through the generations. In breaking the silence on Icelandic seawomen, Willson employs sources currently available. Should she or others continue the study, one hopes more sources will be found.

This book is an interesting read and difficult to put down. Willson’s writing and storytelling is engaging and stirring. Those interested in women’s history, gender studies, or maritime history will find Seawomen of Iceland: Survival on the Edge a worthy addition to their reading list.

Tracie Grube-Gaurkee
Shorewood, Wisconsin


The word “pirates” immediately catches the reader’s imagination. I think all of us have a secret fascination with these irascible characters of history. Whether we remember the epic tales of pirates that we read as kids, or the blockbuster movies that we all watch with rapt attention, pirates carry an air of mystery and fascination. Yet most of us know very little about piracy as a historical process. We tend to be caught up with the image of the pirate but not the practical realities of piracy. Piracy, or perhaps more importantly, the ability of the Royal Navy to crush piracy, has been taken as a historical truth. After all, with the most powerful navy in the world by the early eighteenth century, it makes sense that Britain was the one nation capable of suppressing piracy at the time.

David Wilson’s Suppressing Piracy in the Early Eighteenth Century represents the latest word on the subject of piracy in the eighteenth century and fundamentally challenges the role of the Royal Navy in its elimination. The author’s subject is not really pirates, but their victims, the various groups and individuals engaged in the vast British enterprise of “Empire” as it spread across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. It is these individuals who sought to suppress the threat of piracy. Wilson argues that between 1716 and 1726, a large proportion of the people who relied on maritime trade turned to piracy along the fringes of empire where there was no effective enforcement of the rule of law. In the process, the antag-
onism these pirates produced led to the creation of an ad hoc solution to piracy that was entirely organic to the colonies. Utilizing naval, administrative, and legal resources as needed, the various colonial leaderships scattered across vast areas of the empire produced their own solution to the problem of piracy. They protected key trade routes and waterways and conducted an effective anti-piracy campaign. By changing the perspective from a discussion of piracy to a discussion of this anti-piracy effort, Wilson demonstrates that it was not a single planned and organized campaign that ended piracy. Rather it was an ongoing series of distinctive campaigns. These efforts were often fragmented and shaped by the individual local colonial needs of the moment. They were certainly not the product of a concerted and focused effort led and organized by the powers in London. As the imperial framework became more coherent and beneficial to the various colonial players, and the legal regime became more pronounced, it was the colonies that squeezed out piracy through the elimination of markets and safe harbours.

Broken up into seven chapters with an introduction and conclusion, Wilson examines piracy as a function of colonial relationships in the eighteenth century. Chapter one examines the events that led to piracy through the isolation of large numbers of mariners and the rise of local colonial and inter-imperial conflicts that swirled around the muddy legal realities of the time, as well as ongoing activity in the Caribbean. Chapter two examines the protection of trade in the Caribbean and the failure of the British to rise to the challenge presented by piracy. The next chapter examines the Woodes Rogers expedition, Rogers being a sea captain, privateer and, latterly, first Royal Governor of the Bahamas. Chapters four through six examine the impact of piracy outside the Caribbean and the efforts of the Royal Navy to protect key colonial trade routes in response to the pressure of lobby groups within England. Chapter seven examines the decreasing impact of piracy after 1722.

One of the most compelling aspects of this work is its incredible detail and depth of research. The author has clearly produced one of the most thorough studies of colonial political, economic, and legal issues possible. In the process, he has also produced an important study of some of the personalities involved and how power struggles within colonial leaderships shaped decisions and events. Particularly interesting is Wilson’s description of colonial participation in piracy, including America’s Thirteen Colonies. While it is already known that some piracy was supported by key players in the Thirteen Colonies, the scale of these operations has not been well described. Clearly, almost every colony in the Caribbean seems to have been involved in some form of piracy or the support of piracy.

The scale of the research certainly is impressive. Unfortunately, it also produces the key criticism of the text. It is incredibly dense, packed as it is with so much information. This means that for someone who has less experience in colonial history or the history of the period, the text might be a bit of a struggle. In this regard, Wilson’s work promises to produce new pieces of information with every reading. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject of British colonial history, the history of colonial America, or the history of piracy. Student, layman, or professor, this book is worth the effort.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario