
*From the Cold War to ISIL. One Marine's Journey* by Jason Q. Bohm is part memoir, part introduction to the Marine Corps and also a surprisingly complete modern history of the Marine Corps. Bohm is now a Brigadier General serving as the Chief of Staff to Naval Striking and Support Forces, NATO, in Portugal and he wrote the book while he was still a colonel. Bohm is refreshingly humble and his book is strikingly free of the pretension and self-importance that sometimes clouds the self-authored stories of senior officers. The book follows his career from Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at the University of Illinois through his successful tour as the first commander of the US Central Command Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Crisis Response Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC).

*From the Cold War to ISIL* is a smooth and easy read. Bohm clearly explains all of the Marine Corps-isms and terminology along the way. In fact, it is an ideal introductory book on the Marine Corps itself. The breadth of Bohm’s assignments during his career and his lucid prose allow him to showcase the varied capabilities of the Marine Corps and their purpose without deviating from his own story.

An infantryman by trade, Bohm started his career leading an 81-millimeter mortar platoon. Bohm is clear that this first tour was a disappointment—he has missed the generation-defining Persian Gulf War. This sentiment would not be out of place among today’s generation of Marines—many of whom, like Bohm, joined operational units just as the United States was drawing down forces and shifting away from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. After his tour as a platoon commander in an infantry battalion, Bohm again served as a platoon commander for a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST), a unit used to reinforce embassies and critical US infrastructure.
abroad. Here, Bohm has a unique perspective—he had to work directly with the ambassador and liaise with the potential Haitian invasion force. Many of Bohm’s other experiences in Iraq, Somalia, Okinawa and at a recruiting station in West Virginia, while interesting, are far more common and have been shared by thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Marines.

Despite Bohm’s modesty, make no mistake that the career he narrates is an exceptional one. He joined the small ranks of the Corps’ general officers—at less than half of one percent of the active duty force. His assignments tell the same story. Bohm is repeatedly given command of Marines in independent and uncertain environments. While there is always a degree of change in officer assignments, there should be little doubt that at almost every stage of his career, Bohm would have been chosen from among his peers for duties and responsibilities that were especially challenging, or high profile. At the same time, it is striking the calibre of Marines Bohm has had the privilege of serving alongside, including a future Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps who served as Bohm’s senior enlisted advisor when he was a company commander. Bohm never disparages any other Marines or officers in the book and, in fact, usually notes their current job or the future rank they attained. Since Bohm is still serving on active duty, this is no tell-all or airing of dirty laundry.

The story peaks with description of Bohm’s time leading SPMAGTC-CR-CC. This is not a standing unit, but rather a purpose-built task force, designed by Bohm to deploy to the Middle East. The flexibility and adaptability of the SPMAGTC-CR-CC is a testament to the organizational nature of the Marine Corps, something that Bohm clearly explains. The unit arrives in Iraq roughly at the high water mark of ISIL (also known as ISIS and Daesh) in Iraq and Syria and is immediately part of the action. Here, the story becomes more technical and Bohm is forced to use more jargon to describe the complicated US and coalition operations in Iraq, but this is a point where readers who are new to the Marine Corps and familiar with it will learn something. Bohm had not only a front row seat, but the driver’s seat—in the fight against ISIL in Iraq.

The story ends when Bohm returns to the US and he leaves the reader with concluding remarks, but without a concluding chapter to round out the book. This, and the lack of discussion about the future of the Marine Corps, leave the book feeling somewhat incomplete. But this may have been a conscious choice because of Bohm’s active-duty status, and the fact it was written before the ongoing changes to the Marine Corps were made public.

From the Cold War to ISIL is, in the end, exactly how Bohm describes it in the title and introduction. It is his personal journey through the Marine Corps. On the way, he includes shore lessons about the Marine Corps and ties his own story to the changes in the Marines Corps in recent decades. Unlike other memoirs of service, Bohm has not written a treatise on leadership, or lessons learned. This book is an excellent introduction or familiarization with the Marine Corps through the story of one exceptional Marine.

Walker D. Mills
Cartagena, Colombia

Despite their current division into many states, the insular countries of the South-Asia Archipelago share a common history, along which spread out a common set of cultural and linguistic elements, that gave origin to “Nusantaria”. This term was firstly used during the thirteenth century to define the region that was under the Majapahit rule, based in the eastern part of Java. The word, deriving from the Sanskrit root “nusa”, means archipelago, but it was also used by many archeologists to describe the Austronesian-speaking people that gave origin to the ancient trading network in the region. Today we would know it as Maritime South East Asia, but it once included a much broader reach.

As Philip Bowring reports in this interesting book, the common cultural and linguistic background is proof that approximately 17,000 years ago, all lands of the Nusantarian Archipelago were linked together to form what has been identified as “Sundaland”, a huge peninsula that was heavily affected by climate change that occurred between 20,000 and 7,000 years ago.

At this stage, the islands of the Philippines, even if merged into one land, were separated from the mainland, while Sulawesi and the other eastern islands were already detached from other lands.

At a first sight, it may seem that Nusantaria’s history embraces only the insular Asian countries, but several linguistic and cultural aspects prove the link between Nusantaria and Madagascar. In fact, over 50 per cent of Magalasy people share a common gene pool with Nusantarian people. Many researchers also think that the Nusantarian merchants established commercial relationships with some ports on the eastern coasts of Africa, introducing rice to the local diet. The commercial relationships between Nusantaria and the other parts of the world were mediated by Indian ports, where there is evidence for the presence of Chinese merchants since the first century CE. Even the Roman Empire established an indirect commercial relation with Nusantaria through Indian ports. The common denominator for all this Nusantaria trade is the sea and the wind. The cyclical monsoon system allowed the Nusantarian people to travel in a northwestern direction during the period April-September and in a southeastern direction from October to March.

Among the first civilizations in the region, the Funan people also seem to be the first people to have had contact with the Indian Brahmins, who reached the eastern coast of Vietnam for commercial purposes, bringing the first writing system, the religion and the kingship system. These elements represent the base of Cham culture, that emerged in this zone around 300 CE. There is evidence of Buddhism in Java in a report written in the fifth century CE, and an early Indian influence is also present in the islands of the Philippines.

China’s limited role in the region at the time was due to the strong influence of Confucianism, which undervalued the importance of commerce. This, in turn, inhibited the naval development of the Empire, reducing its influence to the acceptance of tributes, regularly payed by all Nusantarian rulers.

One interesting aspect of Nusantarian history is the presence of the Indonesian Srivijaya Empire, whose capital, Palembang, was based in western Sumatra. Despite its importance in the region and the influence it exercised in the area for over a thousand years, the Srivijaya Empire was not “discovered”
by western historians until the 1930s. The culture, organization and strength of this Empire represent the base for the Malay identity that unites all Nusantarian islands. Its governing system allowed local rulers to maintain their autonomy while following common interests.

The unity of the Srivijaya Empire, which stimulated the development of many important ports, was compromised around 850 by a schism with the Sailendra dynasty, based in Java. This led to an increased Empire presence on the mainland, the defeat of the Khmer people and the founding Siam Reap in Cambodia.

The only example of an active Indian presence in the region is the Chola dynasty, responsible for the first external invasion of Nusantaria, the attack and sacking of Palembang in 1025. Nusantaria was again invaded during the reign of China’s Ming dynasty following its invasion of northern Vietnam.

The arrival of the Portuguese fleet, commanded by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, followed by the Dutch, Spanish, French, British and American ships, signaled the gradual disintegration of Malay culture and the decline of Nusantarian naval power. The author includes an interesting reference to the naval construction skills of the Nusantarians, which impressed the Europeans with their strength. His example is the Javanese juncos which were considered as giants of the sea. They were constructed using many layers of planks, making them able to resist Portuguese cannons.

Colonialism, especially in the Philippines, negatively affected the local communities, forcing them to embrace the Catholic religion and creating a situation of instability between the Islamic and the Christian zones of the region. On the other hand, Islam, introduced pacifically by Arab merchants around the twelfth century, was adopted in a moderate version, through which the local communities were able to syncretize ancient traditional values, such as the parity of genders.

The author’s choice of focusing on the common cultural background of the Nusantarian islands, instead of analyzing in detail the history of each country, makes this book a valuable compendium of maritime history of Nusantarian archipelago. It offers an important introduction and resource for all scholars who want to study the history and culture of South-East Asia.

Fabrizio Martino
Pathum Thani, Thailand


This classic reference source revises and updates a book that has appeared in many editions since first publication by Cornell Maritime Press in 1973 under Lane C. Kendall, an author with practical knowledge and experience in the commercial side of American shipping. Felix Cornell opened the maritime press that bore his name in 1939 in New York City to provide textbooks for seafarers and the new United States Merchant Marine Academy located at nearby Kings Point, Long Island. Cornell Maritime Press established a good reputation for its maritime offerings over several decades under Cornell’s management and after 1978, under new owner Arthur Kudner, who moved the business to Centreville, Maryland. The eighth edition of the book was pub-
lished in 2008 with James Buckley, Jr., of the California Maritime Academy, and Lane Kendall listed as coauthors. In June 2009, family-run Pennsylvania publisher Schiffer acquired Cornell Maritime Press and its back catalogue from liquidation of Kudner’s estate and entered the maritime field by keeping the imprint. Ira Breskin, a former business journalist working in Canada and the United States, adjunct faculty at the US Merchant Marine Academy and the Webb Institute at Glen Cove, and professor at the Maritime College State University of New York in the Bronx, teaching courses in related fields and programs, has reinvigorated the text with a complete rewrite and addition of new materials and topics. The ninth edition of the book remains true to its roots, while embarking on directions suited to contemporary concerns with tentative speculation about future trends.

Breathing new life into the chapters of an existing work, especially one so beloved as *The Business of Shipping*, represents a serious undertaking. The marine transportation and shipping sectors in domestic and international contexts are by nature complex and subject to changes in technology, business practice, and trade patterns. Even the last decade since the previous edition featured both dramatic transformations as well as incremental movement that have to be accounted for. The ninth edition, at 25 chapters, follows generally the basic structure and topics of the original 24-chapter book conceived by Kendall. Some subjects have been reordered, consolidated, or moved for better sequencing, whereas other parts introduced for the first time.

Before turning to liner and tramp shipping and types of charter which received emphasis in previous editions by Kendall and Buckley, chapters explain the significance of marine transportation in theory and from an American perspective, supply-chain software systems, government regulation and international oversight, and marine security measures. Chapters on conferences, passenger vessels, tanker management, bunkering, ship husbandry, and scheduling appear earlier and with newer illustrations and referenced material. Air, land, and sea environmental rules and regulations are succinctly treated in one chapter. The focus then shifts to shore-side operations. Single chapters on terminal ownership, management, and operations and containerization replace several separate ones from before, while keeping one on the stevedoring contract and longshore work. Intermodal transportation concepts that combine rail and trucking from ports and marshalling of containers and goods at central sites far inland and land-bridge transfer across continents to ports beyond are covered in another chapter. Useful chapters from previous editions on how freight rates are made, the ocean bill of lading, the traffic study, and planning and calculations behind new build ship construction are retained and expanded upon. The final chapter titled “The Future” offers some insights into where the marine and shipping industry might be headed in the decades to come based on current trends and opinions expressed by such recognized figures as maritime economist Martin Stopford and Rear Admiral Paul Thomas of the U.S. Coast Guard.

As the discussion makes clear, time and cost constitute the overriding considerations that inform the conduct of maritime transportation and shipping, both historically and in the contemporary world. Movement of goods or people from one destination to another across bodies of water as efficiently, expeditiously, and cheaply as possible
drives profits and the continued viability of entire business models, individual enterprises, and companies. Technological developments, such as increased automation and bigger ships, has signified greater capital investment in infrastructure while reducing overall labour, personnel, and fuel expenditures, which represent the largest proportion in operating costs. Carriers carefully choose cost-effective and efficient routes suited to market demands and needs of shippers, hopefully to get a reasonable return or at least not lose too much money. Competition lies at the heart of the system, though monopoly and association are also prevalent to regulate the sharing of available business and set consistent rates and fees. Recent high profile bankruptcies, poor investment schemes, and diversification toward more third-party management and service underscore the risks inherent in the business of maritime transportation and shipping. The range of profits to be made is relatively modest because continual pressure to drive costs down keeps transport by sea still the most economical way to transport goods and materials in volume across distances.

The book includes a number of useful features, including a glossary of terms and abbreviations and an uncomplicated index. A couple dozen photographs, many taken by Breskin himself, grace the pages. As with other Schiffer books, this one is printed in China and no doubt shipped by conventional shipping means, in a container. The Business of Shipping is recommended for students at maritime academies, those engaged or interested in the commercial side of maritime affairs, and anyone looking for a single, readable reference source on the subject. The tenth edition is still some years away if Breskin has the inspiration and Schiffer the pocketbooks to continue.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


Lincoln Paine’s essay titled “The Environmental Turn in Maritime History” in a recent number of this society’s newsletter highlighted the increasing importance of environmental writing in nautical literature. While often focusing on large scope “ocean history,” studies of the littoral interface also are increasingly featuring the environment in a starring role. A recent collection with contributors from both marine and terrestrial backgrounds shows how multi-faceted and stimulating this approach can be.

The Gulf of St. Lawrence laps on the shores of five former British colonies, now provinces of Canada. This volume promises to explore “The Greater Gulf,” an area less defined by geography and more by environment. The framework is an interesting construct with inclusion not just of the physical environment but also of political, trade and economic relationships which push out the geographical boundaries of the Gulf area to the Grand Banks and the North Atlantic, the St. Lawrence River basin, and New England. In spite of a persuasive introductory article by Matthew McKenzie favouring the expanded horizon as a central theme of the area, most of the essays, however, restrict themselves to the lesser and more familiar Gulf.

Although titled as a volume of en-
vironmental history, the authors struggle with varying degrees of success as they try to shelter under that tent. Several of the chapters could be easily characterized as excellent works under older identifiers—economic history, military history, historical geography, nautical history and other, now less fashionable, schools. The term environmental history seems in this collection to be somewhat elastic, and although all of the chapters pay lip service to the environment, the connection is not always apparent.

The majority of the essays highlight the importance of the fishery in the area but often with a non-traditional approach. For example, Daniel Soucier rescues the campaign of the British land and naval forces against fishing ports in the western Gulf following the fall of Louisburg in 1758 from the ignominious role assigned them by earlier historians by showing what had been termed harassment was, in fact, a well-considered and executed program of control of resources which contributed to the fall of Quebec and the end of France in Canada the following year.

Two other chapters in this section also deal with the relationships in, using the editors’ term, ‘a contested geopolitical space’ dealing with relationships both among the European nations exploiting the Gulf resources and between these fishers and forces, and the traditional inhabitants of the area.

A set of three papers explores the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth century development of specific segments of the industry. These species-centred case studies of mackerel and herring, lobster, and the oyster deal with fisheries which developed later in the region’s history, the latter two primarily after 1870. While all three studies are well-researched introductions to these niche fisheries, the more important similarity is the extent to which they throw light on the how the resources were developed and managed. In the case of mackerel and lobster, it was the Americans who exploited a resource that residents of the region were either unable to, or uninterested in getting to markets outside the Gulf itself. From early in the 1800s, the Gulf was visited each year by hundreds of American ships, using new approaches and technology to get the catches to the New England market and beyond. The issue became one of international agreements to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. In the case of lobster, which did not develop as a significant fishery until effective canning methods made it viable, it was the fact that the Americans had capital, expertise, and technology that enabled the industry to develop. By the 1890s, lobster was the most valuable fishery in the Gulf. Although the American firms dominated the industry, because of their greater investment stake, they also played a leadership role in the move for conservation efforts of the stocks.

The oyster industry did not have the same American presence and its initial markets were elsewhere in Canada and across the Atlantic. It is here that the lines between the environment and the fishery are most successfully drawn. Various Canadian levels of government attempted to manage the fishery, initially without success, as it tried to balance several interests. Author Ed MacDonald points to “science mobilized in the service of the state and the state mobilized in pursuit of capital” as part of the story. (193)

The final section, “The Gulf in Imagination and Identity” contains three essays concerning observations by New England travel writers, the works of author Lucy Maud Montgomery, and short story writer Albert Hickman. Of the three, Claire Campbell’s article on
The Montgomery writings is the one which is best aligned with the overall environmental thrust of the collection. The others seem to simply conflate the environment with landscape.

Unusually for a collection of essays, the editors’ introduction and conclusion are among the high points of the volume. The chapters are diverse but the editors have successfully demonstrated a unity and have provided a thoughtful overview, not merely justifying, but celebrating, the deeper study of the Gulf, no matter how defined. Rather than being the last word in the environmental history of a region, these essays should stimulate research of other locations where the contact between land and sea combines natural and human history to create a unique narrative.

H.T. Holman
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Apart from a human tragedy, an economic, or perhaps a cultural loss, the sinking of a vessel is an intrusion into a territory for which it was not designed. As every activity has to meet certain conditions before another state of being is reached, so does the loss of a ship. Most human interaction with the environment is carefully prepared, timed and measured. The marine environment, however, is confronted with mostly accidental encounters, as in the case of a ship losing the ability to stay afloat. Over the years, maritime archaeology has evolved from the confines of the study of a single wreck at an individual site to embrace a broader view that takes into account the various motivations that send a ship out to sea, such as market demands, economic necessity or war; as well as the circumstances in which a vessel operates, like rain, fog, storm, with a dangerous cargo, in treacherous waters. In that broader view, the transition of sites in the marine environment is also taken into account; for example, the effect of natural transformation, like the reaction with seawater or storm surges on a site, and the impact of cultural processes like salvage, fishing, blasting and the removal of artefacts. This broader view is expressed in subsequent models that have been development over the years by Keith Muckelroy in 1978, Michael Brian Schiffer’s cultural and natural transformations (1987), William Ward on natural transformational process (1999) and James G. Gibb’s (2006) stages in shipwreck and finds. Maritime archaeology is a dynamic discipline that requires an open eye for evaluation and refining, not only for scientific purposes, but also for a better understanding of the interaction between nature and culture.

Caporaso’s study of the *Formation Processes of Maritime Archaeological Landscapes* presents an excellent perspective of current research in maritime archaeological landscape formation processes.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands

Jesse Cromwell. *The Smugglers’ World: Illicit Trade and Atlantic Communities in Eighteenth-Century Venezuela*. Williamsburg and Chapel Hill, NC: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture and University of
We often think of smugglers as shady people lurking on the outskirts of society, driven by greed and a certain disregard for authority. Jesse Cromwell's *The Smugglers' World* convincingly flips that stereotype on its head by demonstrating that virtually everyone in eighteenth-century Venezuela had connections to the illicit world of smuggling. Government officials, religious leaders, merchants, ship captains, sailors, waterfront workers, and everyday consumers created a vast network of illegal trade that brought in foreign manufactured goods and foodstuffs in exchange for cacao, Venezuela's cash crop. In other words, Venezuelan society and economy could not function without smugglers and smuggling. Through a combination of rigorous primary and secondary source research and academic argumentation, Cromwell effectively places smuggling at the centre of eighteenth-century Venezuelan society, while carefully negotiating the complexity of law enforcement efforts, inter-imperial struggles, and the vicissitudes of an unforgiving Atlantic economy.

Cromwell organizes *The Smugglers' World* thematically, except for Chapter Eight. This approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of each aspect of smuggling in Venezuelan society although it has a few drawbacks, which will be discussed below. Despite the thematic approach, the first three chapters have a certain chronological coherency. The first chapter explains Spain’s closed system of Atlantic trade prior to 1700, and how that led to scarcity in Venezuela and large-scale smuggling operations. We consequently learn in the next chapter that the Venezuelan consumer developed a cultural acceptance of, and economic dependency on, smuggling during the early eighteenth century. In effect, Venezuela became a smuggler society. Finally, Chapter Three examines the creation of the Caracas Company in 1728 by imperial authorities to harness the growing profitability of cacao and to address the rise of illicit trade in Venezuela.

The next four chapters focus on the groups most active in Venezuelan smuggling, including foreign smugglers (Chapter Four), Venezuelan merchants and officials (Chapters Five and Six respectively), and free and enslaved people of colour (Chapter Seven). These chapters have little chronological awareness but rather seek to demonstrate continuities within the Venezuelan system of smuggling. Beginning with foreign smugglers, Cromwell explores how primarily Dutch and English seafarers navigated Spanish American waters to unload their illicit cargoes and retrieve precious cacao, tobacco, and hides. During this most treacherous leg of the smuggling journey, foreign seafarers confronted the possibility of death through combat with Spanish vessels, imprisonment, disease, and forced labour. Cromwell then moves ashore to examine merchant smuggling rings and the tactics employed to avoid detection. To do so, he provides the interesting case study of Luciano Luzardo and the merchant Nicolás Rodríguez who found support and protection for their smuggling within religious circles. Unlike captured foreigners or lower-class Venezuelan smugglers, Luzardo’s smuggling network received few, if any, consequences as a result of their actions. Cromwell explains this discrepancy and leniency towards merchant elites in Chapter Six by linking Venezuelan gov-
ernment officials to rampant smuggling. The final thematic chapter explores the complex relationship of free and enslaved people of colour to the system of smuggling. Enslaved Africans participated in the system as both smugglers and smuggled. Meanwhile, Cromwell argues, free people of colour captured in the act of smuggling endured the added risk of potential enslavement.

On its own, Cromwell’s chapter on people of colour is informative, but it also best illustrates the organizational difficulties of The Smugglers’ World. Cromwell’s thematic approach dissects and compartmentalizes Venezuela’s system of smuggling. As a maritime historian, I was particularly interested in learning about the lives of smugglers at sea and the ships they sailed. Chapter Four left me unsatisfied, in part, because some stories and aspects of the maritime world had been torn out and placed in other chapters. For instance, people of colour, both enslaved and free, had important roles on board smuggling vessels, especially enslaved seafarers hired out by their owners. These seafarers had no choice in their employment and, therefore, served an important role in filling out smuggler crews. To gain a complete understanding of “Foreign Smugglers” and their crews, this needed to be included Chapter Four. The chapter also disappointed by lacking specific stories about individual seafaring smugglers. Chapter Six, however, had the excellent story of John White or “Juan Blanco,” a captured Irish smuggler, which could have provided a human face to foreign seafarers (206-207).

This organizational critique can be extended to other themes and chapters. For example, in Chapter Six, we learn the fascinating story of Governor García de la Torre, who developed a web of friendships and obligations among smugglers due to his leniency. He regularly pardoned smugglers or overlooked their activities. In return, he garnered respect from many Venezuelan’s who enjoyed increased access to European goods, alcohol, and food. De la Torre’s activities proved critical to the creation of the Caracas Company and it led to his removal from office and incarceration. In many ways, De la Torre’s story fit better in Cromwell’s analysis of the Caracas Company in Chapter Three, but we don’t learn about it until a little over a hundred pages later. As historians, we often make difficult organizational decisions with material. Cromwell’s decisions, at times, hurt the narrative flow through disjointed chronologies, impeded analysis of important topics like maritime workers and the development of the Caracas Company, and created some unnecessary redundancies.

The Smugglers’ World is a well-research, informed, and academically inclined study. Talented smugglers endeavoured to remain hidden from the historical record, but Cromwell has admirably discovered their networks, both at sea and on land, and told their stories.

Organizational issues aside, Cromwell’s argument placing smugglers and smuggling at the center of Venezuelan society is an important contribution to our understanding of colonial Venezuela and its place in the Atlantic world.

Steven J. J. Pitt
West Falls, New York

Who in their right mind, we moderns incredulously ask, would have voluntarily joined the eighteenth-century British navy? Thanks to lurid stories, paintings, prints, poems, Winston Churchill’s famous quote about “rum, sodomy, and the lash,” and Hollywood (recall Captain Bligh), we can only assume none but a fool. Hence, the outsized reputation of the press gang, a roving band of hard-bitten sailors led by a junior officer to the staccato beat of a snare drum. This ruthless squad approached civilian men and compelled them to take the king’s shilling, by force, if necessary. Honest labourers were kidnapped from job sites, husbands ripped from pleading wives, drunkards yanked from taverns, and all carried off to the looming silhouette of a seventy-four mid-river. Historians have perpetuated this dramatic scenario, arguing that pressed men comprised between 50 and 75 percent of the British Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars.

Enter J. Ross Dancy, director of graduate studies in history and assistant professor of history at Sam Houston State University, who convincingly explodes this assumption in his remarkable study The Myth of the Press Gang. Dancy is the first scholar to apply cliometrics (a term inspired by the Muse of history indicating mathematical and statistical analysis of the past) to a study of press gangs, and the results are eye-opening. Happily, as a Marine Corps veteran with extensive sea service, Dancy also brings a personal dimension to his work that both enlivens and deepens it. Not for him the officer class, but rather the men of the lower deck, who “captured my interest most.”

Dancy’s research rests on Royal Navy ships’ muster books kept between 1793 and 1801. These extraordinary records include men’s ages, dates of entry, ratings, forms of recruitment, birthplaces, and discharge dates. In order to manageably handle this material, Dancy selected ships commissioned and manned at the ports of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, “three ships from each port in each year,” for a total of 81 vessels “over the nine years of the sample.” They include ships-of-the-line like the Minotaur (74 guns) and Leviathan (80 guns), frigates like the Janus (32 guns) and the Seahorse (38 guns), and sloops like the Pheasant (16 guns) and the Raileur (14 guns). Dancy then crunched his numbers for 22 weeks to obtain a database of 27,174 men, roughly 10 percent of the navy’s manpower recruited during the period.

Cliometrics means figures and tables, and The Myth of the Press Gang has these in abundance. There are pie charts on seaman recruitment, bar graphs on pressed men’s ratings, and tables on volunteer nationality, to pluck only three examples. Similarly, the text is seeded with more statistics than an American political poll. All of this leads to some remarkable conclusions. “Press gangs were not the brutal force that has generally been written about,” Dancy writes. In fact, statistics show that between 1738 and 1805, a broad time-frame to be sure, 602 “affrays” (140) were noted. That averages one scuffle for every 750 men pressed, a figure that hardly fits the popular image.

Dancy carefully examines the British navy’s manpower problems, exacerbated by competition with merchant vessels for skilled seamen. Britain had tens of thousands of men schooled before the mast, but not enough to fully crew both a wartime navy and a functional merchant marine. Press gangs were expected to make up the difference, but when they took to the cobble-stoned byways, it was in search of experienced mariners rather than innocent
farmers or barkeeps. Surprisingly, Dancy demonstrates that, press gangs aside, the navy always had volunteers. To begin with, life on land was difficult, and the navy offered recruitment bonuses, camaraderie (too often underestimated by historians, the veteran Dancy declares), advancement, regular meals, a rum ration, a structured work routine, and prize money shares. Sadistic officers were the exception. “Tyrannical officers did not rule sailors of the Royal Navy,” Dancy writes, “and those that did exist in naval service were often not promoted to command. The men of the lower deck disliked officers who treated them poorly, and the fact that well-known and successful officers were highly respected by their men goes to show the difference in efficiency between a happy and a miserable crew.” (100) So how many men were pressed? By Dancy’s calculations, it was only one in five. The rest were motivated young volunteers.

*The Myth of the Press Gang* is best digested in small doses. It is certainly not a beach read, but for sheer power of statistical persuasion, it represents one of the most impressive maritime history arguments in years. Hopefully, other researchers will consider Dancy’s methods and apply them to different historical problems. The possibilities are endless.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


The fate of the warships of the defeated nations of the First and Second World Wars is perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of modern naval history, as their destinies rarely receive more than an afterthought. It is an abyss that this book attempts to cover. Author Aidan Dodson needs little introduction, as several of his works have already been published by Seaforth. Although not a professional naval historian, he has established an excellent reputation—especially on the First World War era. His co-author, Serena Cant, is well known as a specialist in shipwreck documentation for the early twentieth century and has previously published works in this field. This volume finds both of them boldly straying from their previous eras of expertise to the Second World War.

This work is divided into two major parts, fittingly devoted to each of the world wars, and it is generously illustrated with well-chosen photographs. Part I is presented in three sections, while Part II is broken down into five sections. Each part is presented in three distinct segments, i.e. *Endgame*, *Under New Management* and *Appendices*. These are buttressed by a brief preface, an even more concise introduction and supplemented by a very short concluding essay entitled *Retrospect* in Section 9. The appendices are conveniently located in three locations. The first is presented before Part I, in the form of a helpful Table of Conventions and Abbreviations, while the others are to be found at the end of each Part. While this is unorthodox, it is effective, because it places the various tables and appendices closer to their subject periods. Nonetheless, one wonders if the book was originally planned as a two-volume set.

The *Endgame* chapter in Part I details the road to the defeat of the Cen-
entral Powers and the surrender details and schedules for their warships. The sub-sections for each of the Central Powers detail the surrender and the ultimate disposal of their individual vessels. The next section explains the actual process and rationales that dictated the final dispositions of these ships. The subsequent history and fate of those that went on to serve in any navy—including the soon-to-be-recreated German Navy—are highlighted. The last section is a full blown collection of appendices that describes the fate of even the most minor warship. Strangely, in Part II, each of the major Axis Powers is given a more individual Endgame section, but the one on Italy includes the minor Axis powers of Romania, Bulgaria and Finland as well. The rest of this part mirrors the structure of Part I.

In general, the transition from final battles and surrender of the warships in both parts is swift—akin to boarding a high-speed moving train. Overall, the amount of information provided is very concentrated yet detailed. Surprisingly, most of these warships were destined to be scrapped, while a precious few, mostly submarines, were retained for experiments, construction analysis or museums. Additionally, the authors have tried to correct many errors regarding the fates of the surrendered ships, and explain why vessels that were allocated to one power were scrapped or otherwise disposed of by a nation other than the one they were allocated to. They have also attempted to clear up many of the misidentifications that seem to plague the extant documents of the period.

A minor problem with this volume is that it is finely focused on the fates of vessels belonging to the defeated powers. In Part I, the Russian ships that were surrendered to Germany after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk are ignored. Part II also offers little or no coverage of the various vessels obtained by Germany from other fleets, except for those that were surrendered in 1945. An anomaly in Part I is that the authors do not adequately discuss why Turkey was allowed to retain the Yavuz, the former German battlecruiser Goeben. Another issue with this volume is that the authors really do not adequately address the Allies’ “pre-Scapa Flow scuttling” disposal plans for the first generation of German dreadnoughts that were not originally interned. It is also interesting to note that France advocated that Germany be allowed to retain some light cruisers that were built in 1912, in an attempt to delay her building ships of this type until 1932. In Part II, efforts by the Western Allies to ensure that the USSR would not receive many modern units stand out. For example, the Italian Vittorio Veneto class battleships were intentionally rendered permanently inoperable. The Americans also rapidly disposed of the Japanese type I401 submarines for identical reasons. The Western Allies tried to ensure that the German Walther type U-boats were not transferred to their former ally. For their part, it is clear that the Soviets withheld knowledge of some captured German vessels from their Allies.

Overall, this volume offers a fascinating survey of problems of integrating these ships into relatively modern navies as indicated by the experiences of the Soviet and the French navies which were the primary operational users of surrendered warships. It also provides a valuable glimpse into what the Allies of both World Wars learned from these vessels. The authors, however, fail to fully explain why Great Britain ultimately decided against incorporating the Vittorio Veneto into its Pacific fleet. Nor do they adequately explain why most of these warships were not offered to other nations that were either neutral.
or only nominally involved in either conflict. Despite these minor quibbles, this is a well-written and heavily researched work that deserves to be on the shelf of anyone with a strong interest in naval history and warship design.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec


Historical memoirs transport modern readers across time and space into the lives of people from another age. Revolutionary-War-era mariner, Nathaniel Fanning, produced an account of his years at sea and his fight against the British. His version, written in the early-nineteenth century, was published by a family member posthumously shortly thereafter. Fanning is most memorable for sailing with John Paul Jones during the epic battle between the *Bonhomme Richard* and HMS *Serapis*. Fanning’s *Narrative* has been republished on several occasions. Louis A. Norton, professor emeritus from the University of Connecticut, takes his turn at the wheel to navigate readers through the story with this edition.

Editors have license to massage the material they choose to focus on. They shape the nature of the narrative through their choice of words, what to add or cut, how to (re)arrange material, and other literary devices. Great license indeed! Norton’s preface notes that, “This present edition is an attempt to make more accessible for contemporary readers an eyewitness account of events during a notable moment in American history”(1). He also states that Fanning’s “… writing can be challenging to understand…”(2) To overcome the temporal linguistic artifacts and conventions, as well as the author’s self-proclaimed lack of education, the editor modernizes language, undertakes some textural reorganization, constructs chapters, and corrects spelling and grammar. Comparisons of Norton’s manuscript with other editions, including a well-known 1912 version by Barnes, confirms his declaration to update for the modern reader. In addition to alterations of text, Norton offers a short overview of Fanning’s career, as well as presenting a list of naval vessels named after Fanning in a short postscript. He also inserts notes and an index. Thus, editing’s double edged sword; we lose a fragment of Fanning’s essence and era through the filtering of an editor, but gain depth of understanding by the addition of material that assists in creating historical context.

Firsthand narratives of Revolutionary War participants at sea are rare. Michael Crawford, in one of his edited works, puts the number at twenty-nine. Thus, Fanning’s story contributes a unique perspective to the times, and as such, is an important contribution to the historiography of the war. Fanning sailed as a midshipman with Jones, who he has much to say about. And from his telling, Fanning had a particular impression that may not have accorded with the contemporary hagiographic view of the American naval hero. In addition to his association with Jones, Fanning’s life during the Revolution is a fascinating porthole into the perspective of an American mariner and patriot. As well as being taken prisoner by the British on several occasions, he also traveled the coast of France and presents a firsthand description of it, rarely expressed.
Several black and white illustrations are inserted and are appropriate to the times. They are of significant people mentioned in the text or related to the *Bonhomme Richard-Serapis* battle. A map could have been an instructive addition for those who are unfamiliar with the British Isles and the coast of France, both of which are featured in some detail by Fanning during his adventures.

*Sailing Under John Paul Jones* is a good read. Unfortunately, the title choice does not fully describe the content of the manuscript. There are 153 pages of text, 58 of which describe Fanning’s association with Jones. The remainder, a vast majority, is an amazing story in itself. Here is where the uniqueness of Fanning’s experience shines! The link with Jones may get people to buy the book, but there is so much more of the period exposed. The memoir should appeal to a wide audience that enjoys both maritime and Revolutionary-era history, or just a good adventure. A scholar of the age may find an original copy of more interest, but the casual reader will be able to understand and contextualize the significance of the book, due to the editorial additions. Norton has succeeded in his goal making an early-nineteenth-century memoir more accessible to a modern audience.

Michael Tuttle
Clarksville, Tennessee


For anyone with an interest in the naval battles, events, losses and dispositions throughout the world during the First World War, this book entirely of track charts of the ships involved and deployment graphics would be almost essential, as well as fascinating. It includes not only the major conflicts such as the Falklands, Heligoland Bight, Jutland (4 charts), the Dardanelles, the Otranto Straits, and such, but also less familiar operations: the hunt for SMS Dresden, British submarine operations in the Baltic, the German 1916 and 1917 raids on the Dover Strait, destroyers protecting the mine barrage, and so forth. Detailed route charts trace the voyages of SMS *Emden*, *Wolfe*, *Meteor*, *Möwe*, *See Adler* and others. There are area charts of operations that are valuable and rare; for example, mining operations by both sides, operations in the German Bight, 1915-1916, at Dover in 1916-1917, in the Black Sea Theatre, 1916-1918, and in the Red Sea, as well as efforts by the United States Navy in Europe, 1917-1918. Red dot charts show Allied shipping losses in the Mediterranean, February-June, 1917, in August-October, 1917 and May-July, 1918 and a dozen more. Of much interest is a chart of the U-boat campaign, 1915-1918 and operations in American (and Canadian) waters, late June-September, 1918. Some, like those, are sweeping in time: the Pacific Theatre, 1914, British submarine operations in the Baltic. Others cover raids lasting a few hours—the German raids in 1914 on Yarmouth, Scarborough and Whitby, in 1916 on Lowestoft, their cruiser action off Norway in October, 1917, that destroyed an Allied convoy; the British Cuxhaven Raid in December, 1914, the Zeebrugge Raid in 1918.

For each chart there is anything from a short paragraph to a page of narrative to offer context and import at the
time for its inclusion. There is a key or
legend to each chart identifying by co-

lour Allied and Central Powers’ ships’

movements, miniscule but clear vessel

shapes, and a scale, not at all difficult to

follow. Apart from an occasional city

or town appropriate to the action cov-

ered, land mass is simply coloured by
country—concentration is focussed on

the actions at sea.

The whole is laid out in strict
chronological order, except for the
area campaigns, which makes for easy
location by raid or operation. The in-
dex is detailed. A count shows tracks
for 23 naval battles and operations, 35
area campaigns and dispositions, such
as mining; 15 ‘events’ such as the na-

val bombardments of the Belgian coast,
and Operation Albion by eight German
squadrons in the Gulf of Riga in Octo-
ber, 1917; seven world-wide cruises by
German armed merchantmen.

For example, the chart for the Ger-
man high-speed raid on the Dover Strait
patrol between 2200 and midnight on
25 February 1917 by two German forc-
es, places five destroyers to the nor-
thern section, off the Thames estuary,
and five more attacking the four RN
destroyers patrolling the mine barrage
buoys off Dover. The area shown is
from the British coast to France at Cal-
ais, track charts for the German forc-
es and RN ships, plus others sent out
in support. Yellow shaded areas show
movement-limiting sandbanks; there
are lists of ships involved and poten-
tial (RN) support nearby, the Squadron
commanders were Korvettenkapitans
Tillessen and Albrecht, Captain Henry
for the RN at Deal.

A unique world map shows the
Strategic Communications coverages,
by cable and radio, for Germany and
Britain in 1915, a first to allow for stra-
tegic controls, good or evil, in naval
warfare.

This volume can be used as a valu-
able reference or, especially for the un-
usual actions, it can be examined out of
fascination with the almost unknown—
The Battle of the Åland Islands on 2
July 1915, or of the Strait of Otranto (to
prevent the exodus of the major Austra-
lian squadrons) 14-15 May 1917, or even
the surrender of the High Seas Fleet, 21
June 1916 - the last in the book. A most
enjoyable volume.

Physically, this is a large format
publication (32 x 24 cm), printed in
China, similar in quality to the US Na-
val Institute series on warships, such
as their ‘German Capital Ships of the
Second World War, (Breyer & Skwiot,
2012, USNIP) reviewed here previous-
ly.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Larrie D. Ferreiro. Bridging the Seas.
The Rise of Naval Architecture in the
Industrial Age, 1800-2000. Cambridge,
edu, 2020. xviii+386 pp., illustrations,
notes, bibliography, index. US $50.00,

A certain professor of naval architecture
at MIT, Captain Corky Graham USN,
used to teach a course on Ship Design
(emaslized as “Big-S, Big-D”) of
which the central tenet was that “the
best ship is the one that gets built”. This
was a statement of the realpolitik of
ship production, that recognized all the
disparate factors and compromises that
went into the successful introduction of
a new ship into a fleet (either merchant
or naval). It particularly distinguished
between the contributions of the three
associated disciplines of ship design,
ship theory, and naval architecture in
juggling the project management trinity
of cost, schedule and performance. In this emphasis, ‘Big-S, Big-D’ focused not on science and technology as the prime determinants of the outcome, but rather on the human activity which reconciled many conflicting influences and constraints; technical, economic, and political.

In this book, the second in a pair tracing the history of naval architecture from 1600-2000, Ferreiro takes a similar tack, telling the story not principally in traditional terms of the evolution of equipment, but rather in terms of the intertwined development of ship theory, ship design methods, and the evolving status and education of the ship designers themselves. As in the first volume, Ships and Science (MIT, 2007), it is the history of a craft, in the sense of a creative activity, which (while increasingly technological) shows distinct traces of the many varied personalities involved.

The author tells the tale of this evolution through the intertwined themes of predictability, standardization, and professionalization. First, he expounds on how the introduction of steam, iron and steel obviated the tradition of knowledge from centuries of wooden shipbuilding, providing a motivation for the embrace of science in attempting to calculate and predict ship characteristics, such as strength and powering. Subsequently, the advent of vertically integrated shipyards (responding to the increasing cost of ships, and hence, the owners’ need for tighter control of costs, performance, and risk) led to the increasing development of standards for engineering and production, and the rise of ship classification societies.

This, in turn, led to the professionalization of the design function and the associated development of dedicated education paths outside of the traditional shipyard apprenticeship model. As in the previous volume, the interplay between the development of ship theory and its practical application plays a large part in the story. In the modern world it is often (and mistakenly) taken for granted that engineers can calculate no-matter-what, and that safety and performance is absolutely determinate. The history of the development of ship stability calculations and standards through the 1800s (and to the mid-1900s) is a prime illustration of the three general elements necessary to achieve this determinacy: first, an adequate theoretical basis for calculation; then, a sufficient and economic means of computation; and finally, an appropriate criterion of acceptance (or safety). The loss of the innovative and controversial warship HMS Captain in 1870 is the classic cautionary tale in this respect: although large-angle stability theory had been developed by Atwood and Vial du Clairbois in 1798, and an effective means of computation had been developed by Barnes by 1861, the lack of an established and agreed criterion of safety to apply to the results precluded a compelling demonstration of the risk to the vessel before she sailed on her third (and last) voyage. Indeed, the significant labour involved was a disincentive to performing the calculation at all. The author quotes the British naval constructor William White, who acknowledged in 1871 that “naval architects had simply to decide whether or not it was worth the trouble to perform an elaborate calculation in order to ascertain the variations in stability of any ship designed by them.” (282). [This reviewer can attest to this labour from personal experience; even using a ‘fast’ method (developed in 1884 and still in use until the computer age, employing the Amsler integrator and tabular hand-calculation) developing a full set of stability curves for a single ship was a full week’s concentrated effort.]
And even then, having calculated the variation of stability, came the question of what did it mean: as late as the 1914 SOLAS Convention, it could still be said “It is not practicable to determine the amount of stability which a ship ought to have in order to be safe” (179). Ship stability criteria remains today an active and debated field of research...

Ferreiro outlines the development of naval architecture as a profession, evolving from its master-shipwright origins in the late 1700s, through the term draughtsman embodying both the drawing and calculation function by the 1880s, and then on to the status of an engineering discipline. He notes the domino sequence of world-wide development of schools of naval architecture and associated learned societies, development of national systems of governance of standards, and the development by world navies of professional Corps of Naval Constructors (naval architects). He also draws attention to the differences in national ship design culture and practice—it will be amusing to naval architects trained in the US/UK tradition (189) that French naval architects use in their calculations the absolute density of water compared with a vacuum (vice air) and hence, include in their weight estimates, a line item for the amount of air in the hull! The difference in national naval architectural cultures spawned the research field of comparative naval architecture, particularly active in the 1970-80s, assessing the difference in US and Soviet warships (the latter showing the influence of Italian design practices on Russian ship design, p. 296).

Running through the book are examples of the influence of ship design tools on the design process. First, the need to support calculations drove the ship design process into the drawing office. In the twentieth century, the advent of computers enabled the development of ‘ship synthesis’ programs that allowed wider exploration of the ‘design space’, although this capacity for advanced analysis did beget increasing demand for yet more studies to justify the expense of shipbuilding programs (inspiring a reference to Parkinson’s Law “work expands ...” . 295). This development of tools, in turn, fostered innovation in how the design process was conceived, progressing from cautious evolution from known results, to a progressive spiral approximation to a balance solution, through optimization, system-engineering, and open-architecture interface-specification. Even in this more sophisticated incarnation of the design process, there are echoes of the earlier dilemma of calculation: what are the criteria of success, the figure-of-merit for adjudicating the result? Another important modern-era tool of the ship design process is the model towing tank, as well as other assorted experimental basins. Ferreiro details both the world-wide proliferation of towing tanks (by tradition, all baptized with a vial of water from Froude’s original tank) and the development of international scientific collaboration in the development of towing tank methods and standardization benchmarks. It is noted that the scientific rigour of the experimental facilities was not always well-respected, as when in 1919 the Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard (which hosted the USN’s first tank) declared the tank available for the swimming pleasure of officers and their families!

The above examples give only a flavour of the many interesting twists and turns in the history of the practice of naval architecture. This book is very highly recommended. It is plentifully footnoted with many interesting and obscure references for the specialist
reader, but well-written and accessible for the non-specialist. As a minor quibble, for a volume which purports to give the designers of ships “their place in history” (310), the book could have benefitted from an appendix of ‘Personages’ similar to that in the predecessor volume. A larger criticism would be of the publisher for not seeing fit to publish this important volume in a similar hardback format.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


Skip Finley uses a wide range of sources, including log books and historical records from seafaring towns, as the wellspring for his fascinating and unusual story about the largely forgotten whalers of colour, some of whom rose to command and own whaling vessels. Lasting slightly over two hundred years, the American whaling industry was an enormously complex and evolving enterprise consisting of more than 2,700 ships of various types, sizes and capabilities. Whaling was vulnerable to weather, war, faulty management, errors in judgement, disease and, perhaps most importantly, depletion of a non-renewable resource. The industry attracted slavers, pirates, deserters, renegades, thieves and murderers, as well as investors, gamblers, con-men and, fortuitously, some clever inventors. This activity, largely based in New England and Long Island and Quaker administered, was one of the first to apply meritocracy to its workforce with little regard to ethnic and racial diversity, especially as applied to men of colour. The sources of labour for these two centuries were first Native Americans, then local residents and vagabond white mariners, slaves and former slaves, and later, an influx of men from Cape Verde, a ten-island archipelago off the west African coast.

Slavery was abolished in Massachusetts by 1776. All the Northern states followed suit by 1805, although the last slave received manumission in New York in 1827. It was legal to keep an owned slave in Connecticut until 1848. Rhode Island was the capital of the slave trade at the time of the Revolutionary War and but, by 1840, the number of slaves in the state’s census totalled five. These four states had significant whaling fleets. Inter-marriage took place between former slaves and Native Americans and soon the Black-Native American “Mustee” offspring population grew. Some white politicians saw interracial marriage as a method for gradually diminishing Indian blood, thus fostering the disappearance of the aboriginal population. Native Americans, however, were granted rights by Congress that caused this scheme to backfire. Indians had rights to Native lands, but Blacks could not legally be landowners. Being tribal members by marriage provided potential land ownership for impoverished Blacks. Many males from these families, as well as their native “brothers-in-law”, opted to go to sea onboard whalers.

Whaling life has been written about in many books highlighting mutinies, desertions, floggings, drunkenness, scurvy, fire at sea, falls from aloft aboard ship, stove boats, drownings, lightning strikes, hulls crushed in ice and occasional deaths by a sea creature like a shark or sperm whale attacks.
The occupation of whaling allegedly appealed “only to three classes of men: those who had been compelled to leave the land to avoid gaol or starvation, those who thought they were going to see the world and gain adventures, and those who were determined to work their way up until they owned a whale ship of their own.” (66) For the latter, competent performance at the various aspects of whaling was the determining factor for promotion. Those who ascended to high rank, however, often had to manage unskilled and sometimes resistant men.

These leviathan hunter ship captains had to know navigation and vessel safety, how to conduct business, plan for untoward events, find prey, and gain enough respect to maintain unquestioned authority as master of the ship that was “a cross between working in an oil refinery and a slaughter house, with the chance of drowning thrown in.” (31)

By the eighteenth century, many dark-skinned men who worked the ships were Cape Verdeans, immigrants from the then-Portuguese colony 350 miles off the African coast. The Portuguese generally distanced themselves from the darker skinned Cape Verdeans of African descent, but these colonials were generally fluent in at least one European tongue and were in accord with the Iberian culture and religion. Arriving in the New England area, most settled in the New Bedford, Massachusetts and Providence, Rhode Island, areas. They soon formed close-knit communities interwoven with family units and started a variety of businesses, often related to maritime pursuits. Unfortunately, the dark-complexioned Cape Verdean immigrants discovered “black” and “white” prejudice in America. Despite being classified as Black by most of their neighbours, they did not consider themselves African Americans, the descendants of slaves. They felt that their Portuguese heritage was as much a part of their ancestry as their African blood. Because their faith was Roman Catholic, they closely identified with white Catholics rather than Protestant Blacks. Because of their colour, they were forced to live in Black neighbourhoods, but generally maintained their own identity separate from other African Americans. Over time, however, intermarriages resulted in descendants of slavers, slave holders and slaves integrating into an unanticipated coloured minority.

With this recurring background, the book’s thrust is identifying and telling the stories of whalers and whaling captains of colour and their maritime exploits. Most of the more than fifty sailors mentioned were obscure, but some became famous such as Paul Cuffe, Valentina Rosa, John Henry Gonzales, and Paul Wainer, to name just few. As Finley states, “These men led whaling voyages to every part of the globe, indeed, several contributed to the mapping of the world’s oceans. They were adventurous, tenacious, fearless, and ruthless; their skills were honed before the mast. . . in [a very] dangerous enterprise. . .” (206.)

Whaling Captains of Color—America’s First Meritocracy is a comprehensive yet unusual view of a storied fishery that was especially hazardous. It was partly manned by men of colour who braved their way into positions of leadership and responsibility. This narrative is a guidepost into a welcome aspect of whaling literature, one that has received little attention. The author’s many tables, appendices and bibliography should be particularly useful to scholars of this industry and maritime historian in general. I highly recommend Finley’s latest work to all readers of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord.

Richard Frank is well known to students of the Second World War. An attorney by trade, he made his name as a historian of the conflict in 1990, with the publication of his first book on the battle of Guadalcanal, which, three decades later, remains the definitive history of its subject. He followed that up with *Downfall*, which examined the denouement of the U.S. war against Japan. Now Frank has embarked upon an even more formidable project: a three-volume history of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific that Frank claims is the first work in any language “that takes as its fundamental perspective on World War II the whole canvas of Asia and the Pacific Region.”

This claim ignores Peter Harmsen’s own ongoing trilogy about the wars during that period: *Storm Clouds over the Pacific* (Casemate, 2018) and *Japan Runs Wild* (Casemate 2020). Given the longstanding tendency of historians to survey the war from the perspective of Japan’s opponents, Frank’s approach is nonetheless welcome. For while the Chinese, the Americans, the British, and the Soviets might have viewed their war against Japan primarily from their own perspective, for the Japanese, these were all various fronts in a single conflict that stretched from 1937 until their surrender in 1945.

Frank emphasizes this point by noting how events occurring in various regions played a role in shaping Japanese policymaking. This emerges early on in the book with chapters on the early stages of Japan’s war against China. What began as a minor incident at the Marco Polo (Lugouqiao) Bridge on the night of 7-8 July, quickly escalated thanks to the aggressive response of Japanese commanders in the region, who anticipated a quick victory instead of the quagmire that followed. Frank gives considerable credit here to the Nationalist Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who despite the varying quality of his forces, and the fractured political situation in his country, nonetheless committed his best units to slow the Japanese advance, giving the Chinese time to withdraw and regroup. As a result, Japan found itself in a war that made an unsustainable demand on her resources and lacked a clear path to achieving victory.

For many in Japan’s military hierarchy, the war was especially worrisome because it distracted people from the country that many in the Imperial Army saw as their primary foe: the Soviet Union. This was soon underscored by a brief border war in 1938-9 that ended in an embarrassing defeat for the Japanese. Yet Germany’s victories in Western Europe in the spring of 1940 opened up a tantalizing opportunity for Japan to seize strategically valuable British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions in the Far East. Frank places particular weight on the Tripartite Pact, which, while giving Japan new allies at a point when their victory seemed certain, also “served even more to acquire vehement enemies” by turning Japan’s ongoing war with China into part of a larger global conflict. It also contrib-
uted to their inability to come to terms with the United States, which in 1941 began supplying Chiang’s Nationalists with Lend-Lease aid while embargoing oil exports to Japan. Though the Japanese government wanted to reach a settlement with the Roosevelt administration, neither side could accept the other’s terms to begin negotiations. For the Japanese, this made war the more acceptable alternative, even if the odds of victory were long.

Roughly half of Frank’s book is devoted to the period between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the fall of the American outpost on Corregidor five months later. These were the months when Japanese forces dominated the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, sweeping all before them. Frank details all of the major land and naval battles, including the sinking of the HMS *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, the Battle of the Java Sea, and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s raid into the Indian Ocean. In the process, he debunks many longstanding misconceptions about the war, including the speculation that the Japanese could have destroyed the oil farms and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor in a third wave of attacks. Frank dismisses this argument by pointing out that the time it would have taken to prepare and launch such an attack would have meant that the returning strike force could not have made it back to their carriers before nightfall.

Such sound analysis is just one hallmark of Frank’s fine study. Though limited to English-language sources and translated works, he has mined archival resources on three continents and benefited greatly from recent studies on the war in China and India. Taking these materials together, he has brought about a long-overdue corrective to the more limited approaches adopted in previous accounts of the Second World War in the region. The result is revisionist history of the highest order, one that hopefully will alter how students of the era interpret the conflict. If the later volumes measure up to the standard set by this one, the series will likely serve as essential reading on the Second World War for decades to come. Hopefully, we will not have to wait long for Frank to follow through on the promise of this truly excellent book.
as chapter after chapter explores this in infinite detail. There is gold in the book but you have to sift a lot of gravel to find it!

So what is it all about? The classes at the college in 1946-47 were composed of naval commanders and captains (or US Marine Corps, Army and Army Air Corps equivalents). All of them had extensive real-war experience in the recent Second World War. There were no civilians, females or foreign officers at this stage of the College’s history. The 1946-47 war-game, chosen by Admiral Raymond Spruance (President of the War College during 1946-1948), was War Plan Purple (with the Soviet Union as the adversary in the Pacific) and also later, a re-run of War Plan Orange (with a resurgent Japan as the enemy) in 1947-48. Both were effectively a repetition of the Pacific War 1941-45.

In his conclusion, Hal Friedman finally questions the validity of these war games when the bulk of US focus, at the time, was on the threat posed by the Soviet Union in Europe, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The ‘War’ starts in 1950 with the Soviet Union invading the island of Attu in the Bering Strait (a re-run of Japanese operations in mid-1942 when Attu and Kiska were invaded), along with an invasion of South Korea, northern China, Manchuria and an attempt to invade Japan. It assumes (although not stated) that the Nationalist Chinese have defeated the Communists in the Chinese Civil War (vice the actual Communist victory in early 1950). The Russians are provided with a fictitious naval order of battle including aircraft carriers, battleships, heavy cruisers, destroyers, submarines and fast attack craft. The reality is the Russians possessed no aircraft carriers until the 1970s, had only two battleships (both in European waters) and few cruisers. The Soviet Navy was secondary to its land and air forces and was rather a ‘sea denial’ navy of destroyers, submarines and fast attack craft.

Why the Soviet Union attacks is unclear and the potential reason for it — to tie down US forces in the Pacific while the major conflict occurs in the Atlantic and Europe is never really explored. Team Purple is always fearful that the US will attack first to seize the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin in order to isolate the main Soviet base at Vladivostok and that the US will use atomic weapons; which they do in the war game, but to stop Japan being invaded. Ultimately, the Soviet attacks appear to be generated by a desire to expand their ‘empire’.

Strangely, the war games make no reference to US allies in the Pacific; Australia, Canada, the Philippines, New Zealand or the United Kingdom, who operated land, sea and air forces in the region (some as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan). Canadian naval forces from Esquimalt, British naval forces in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore or the use of bases in the Philippines are equally ignored. Despite the fact that the Second World War was fought by a ‘coalition’ in the Pacific and the Korean War fought by a UN ‘Coalition’, this new Pacific War is, oddly, a purely American problem.

In addition to their participation in the war games, the students were required to write two theses; firstly, Relations between Russia and the United States and their influence on US Foreign Policy and secondly, The Influence of the Atomic bomb on Future Naval Warfare. While these were linked to the later war games the benefit of this study and analysis on the thinking of both the Purple and Blue teams is rarely stated, although students were reminded that, if they used classified data, their wives
or paid typists were not to produce the
final typed submission!

The doctrine used throughout the
war game was a mixture of inter-war
doctrine (big-gun battleships and heavy
surface units have primacy) and war-
time doctrine stressing the importance
of aircraft carriers and submarines. The
destruction of the enemy via a ‘decisive
battle’ vice attrition was key for the
US forces, while for the weaker Purple
force, the goal was to avoid action and
attrite the enemy by use of land-based
aircraft and submarines.

In the end, the Soviet forces are
defeated, and I am sure the students
learned (or re-learned) valuable tactical
and operational lessons concerning em-
ploying naval, land and air forces in a
war in the Pacific. Some key aspects of
maritime operations were discovered,
or strengthened, such as aircraft carrier
operations in Arctic conditions are very
difficult if not impossible, logistics sup-
port in the vast Pacific Ocean is vital as
are forward operating bases, that an en-
emy with a large submarine force will
cause significant losses (regardless of
having a weaker surface fleet) and that
airpower remains a vital part of gaining
sea control.

But what about the ‘strategic’ pic-
ture? This is somewhat unclear as the
author skirts around the issue for most
of the book and what data, if any, was
provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
unknown. Did Spruance deliberately
choose a Pacific Ocean war game to re-
mind the Joint Chiefs that the post war
reduction of the US Navy, particularly
in the Pacific, was a dangerous move?
In 1946 the Soviet Union was weak in
the Pacific, while Western Europe, the
Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Persian
Gulf were seen as the ‘main game’; but
once bitten–twice shy.

Interestingly, part of the war game
actually predicts the Korean War (1950-
53) but it’s the Communist Chinese
forces who support North Korea in this
venture. Stalin was asked, by Mao Tse
Tung in 1951, to commit land and sea
forces to the conflict but he refused
as he did not want to give the United
States, and her allies, any opportunity to
expand the conflict beyond the Korean
Peninsula.

Finally, was the use of inter-war
doctrine deliberate to prove it was weak
compared to the wartime reality of car-
rrier aviation and submarines having a
major effect on the outcome of hostil-
ities? That the US Navy continued to
push ahead, post-Second World War,
with a substantial aircraft carrier fleet,
submarines and anti-submarine assets
might be linked to these war games.
The author finally starts to pulls some
very loose threads together in the con-
clusion, but I am not sure many who
pick up this book will ever make it to
page 405 to find out.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia

Norman Friedman (ed.) British Naval
Weapons of World War Two. The John
Lambert Collection. Volume II: Escort
Barnsley, S.Yorks: Seaforth Publish-
ing; www.seaforthpublishing.com and
Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press,
www.usni.org 240 pp., illustrations,
index. UK £40.00, US $59.95, cloth;

Hugh John Lambert (1937-2016) was
a trained draughtsman and Royal Navy
veteran who became a prolific author
of magazine articles and a collabora-
tor on books about modern warships.
Although most of his output covered
Second World War British warships, he
also illustrated systems produced for
other navies. His forte was producing
detailed but clear technical drawings based on prodigious research of weapons systems and ship fittings. His work was prized by both readers looking for details of how warships were equipped and how their armament functioned, and model builders. He was working on a compendium of drawings about naval weapons in Second World War British warships of destroyer size and smaller when he died aged 79. This handsome volume publishes Lambert’s unique drawings of systems in escorts and minesweepers plus a few miscellaneous items not included in a companion volume about destroyer systems. As John Lambert had not been able to write up descriptions of the systems he had illustrated, the American naval analyst, Dr. Norman Friedman, has provided an introduction that occupies about a quarter of the book.

The drawings start with profile views of several classes of anti-submarine escorts and minesweepers. There are six drawings of Flower-class corvettes that trace their evolution from 1939 to 1944. These reflect the research behind Flower Class Corvettes (2008) which John Lambert had produced with Les Brown. There are no drawings of the other classes described in Friedman’s introduction: the River-, Loch- and Bay-class frigates, Castle-class corvettes or the US-built escorts—the Four Stack destroyers transferred in 1940, or the later Captain- and Colony-class frigates. There is a cramped profile drawing of a Bangor class minesweeper and a dense one (too small to be useful) of an Algerine class sweeper. These are followed by many pages of detailed drawings of guns of 4-inch calibre and smaller, along with other weapons systems including anti-submarine projectile launchers and minesweeping devices. The drawings are a real treasure trove for model builders as they include minesweeping deck equipment, depth-charge rails, signal projectors and type 271 radar. Finally, there are drawings of several other weapons fitted in capital ships and cruisers. Each drawing is crammed with distilled information gathered by Lambert. Several include a concise informative “History” which outlines their origins and where fitted. Some have three-dimensional views of details or cutaway diagrams that illustrate how a system like ammunition-feed functions. The John Lambert drawings are interpretive and convey far more than a standard blueprint-type plan can.

The best feature of the introductory text is the almost 50 excellent photographs with particularly useful generous captions in the trademark Friedman style. Rather than describing weapons systems individually by groupings, the 45-page text is a discussion starting in the Great War of how British minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare ships and systems evolved. It is dense with details apparently based on a synthesis of official records. The introduction covers much of the same ground as David Brown’s Atlantic Escorts: Ships, Weapons & Tactics in World War II (2007) and Peter Elliot’s Allied Escort Ships of World War II (1977).

There are no footnotes and no bibliography. The narrative is dependable when discussing numbers and programs but its reliability on wider issues is undermined by assertions based on questionable assumptions. On page 13, for instance, the Grand Fleet is said to have sometimes lacked enough destroyers to go to sea during the Great War because of the danger posed by German submarines. This is probably an extrapolation from a post-war statement by Admiral Jellicoe that in early 1915 it was “desirable to keep the Battle Feet in harbour except in an emergency” (The Grand
Another dubious assertion occurs on page 19 during a discussion of interwar thinking about the threat posed to ocean commerce by surface raiders, which, the reader is told, might be armed, high-speed merchant ships. Because their guns would have to be hand-served, rather than seated on elaborate gun mountings, the calibre would be limited to 6 inches since a shell of this size, weighing 100 pounds, was the limit of what a seaman could lift when loading a mounting. After explaining that this is why so many British merchant ships were armed with 6-inch guns, the text goes on to assert that this must also be the reason why the Admiralty considered that 6-inch guns were sufficient in interwar cruisers whose main role would be trade protection. In fact, the Royal Navy interwar cruisers were built after the London Naval Treaty of 1930 which limited the total tonnage but not the number of 6-inch-gun cruisers that Britain could construct.

A statement on page 53 that the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy were largely responsible for Atlantic convoys when the USN entered the war is correct, but it is incorrect in asserting that the RCN was under British operational control. This had been exercised in the western Atlantic since August 1941 by the USN “Support Force”, later TF 24, under Anglo-American agreements made at the Argentia Conference. British Naval Weapons of World War II. The John Lambert Collection Volume II has been produced in an attractive large size that shows Lambert’s unique drawings with their rich detailed interpretive notes clearly. The numerous excellent photographs and their comprehensive captions are a pleasure to study. This project by Seaforth Publishing and the US Naval Institute Press to make John Lambert’s painstaking re-search available is commendable.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Historical echoes can be eerie. As I prepared to write this book review, cities across the United States erupted in protest over the violent murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis and the systemic injustices African Americans regularly encounter. Protestors demand change. They demand their voices be heard. Similarly, repressed cries from the seventeenth century can be heard in the voices of the convicts, sailors, indentured servants, and the enslaved examined in Johan Heinsen’s Mutiny in the Danish Atlantic World. They, too, acted. They mutinied, deserted, and turned pirate. They resisted and challenged an exploitative imperial and economic system meant to exert control over their lives and labour through violence. In this creative book, Heinsen attempts to recapture “the voices of those men and women whose labours built and shaped empires” (177) through the “echoes” ignored by generations of historians (Chapter Two: “Echoes”). This study reminds us of the need to listen to oppressed voices.

The study of convicts and seafarers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has many challenges, not least the shortage of first-hand accounts and the dominance of elite narratives. Heinsen identifies this problem early, asking readers to join him on a journey through
the archives and historiography to learn how to listen for subaltern voices. To construct this narrative, Heinsen centralizes a mutiny on board the *Havmanden*, a Danish West India and Guinea Company vessel voyaging to St. Thomas in the Caribbean, in 1683. This mutiny serves as both an historical catalyst and a means of exploring the broader grievances of exploited groups in the Danish Atlantic world. He imaginatively organizes the book into two parts with carefully planned and interwoven threads. The first part dissects the mutiny on the *Havmanden* in detail, closely examining the archival record to extract the motivations, experiences, and, most importantly, voices of the convicts and sailors who participated in the mutiny. The second part casts those experiences, motivations, and voices out into the wider Danish Atlantic world both spatially and chronologically. The reader enters the brutal world of early modern prisons, Caribbean plantations, and shipboard life—the world that shaped the men and women who mutinied on the *Havmanden*.

Individual and collective stories, rumours, and knowledge knit together the first three chapters of *Mutiny in the Danish Atlantic World*. Heinsen utilizes stories about the mutiny, often told by elites or legal institutions, to understand why and how the mutiny occurred on board the *Havmanden*. Chapter One provides an excellent example of Heinsen's method. Why, he asks, did crew members like boatswain’s mate Hans Biermand and the convicts target Governor Jørgen Iversen, throwing him overboard first? According to accounts, Iversen had recently confronted the captain, Jan Blom, about poor conditions on the vessel and the need to find a harbour for water, provisions, and repairs, a major concern for all on board the *Havmanden*. To answer this question, Heinsen posits the historian “must interrogate these writings [the accounts] and read them against their grain” (24). He proceeds to analyze the ship’s supercargo, Simon Braad’s account of the mutiny in conjunction with knowledge of Iversen’s first stint as governor of St. Thomas from 1672 to 1680. Apparently, Iversen made quite a few enemies during this time and accusations of murder, rape, and indiscriminate abuse towards workers, especially unfree workers, followed him home to Denmark. Heinsen finds concrete evidence that rumours of Iversen’s reign of terror circulated Copenhagen’s waterfront well before the *Havmanden* set sail. Fear of Iversen, and visions of a brutal life on St. Thomas under his rule, prompted the mutineers to toss the governor into the sea. Heinsen continues to read against the grain to answer similar questions like how did Jokum Gulliksen, a seafaring convict, earn the captaincy after the mutiny and what transpired under his leadership that led to the dismemberment of nine mutineers, including Gulliksen and Biermand, in Copenhagen?

The gruesome scene of dismembered bodies in Copenhagen served as warning to convicts and sailors alike to maintain their proper place in society but the damage to the Danish West India and Guinea Company had already been accomplished. In Chapter Six, Heinsen demonstrates that the mutiny on the *Havmanden* helped create a lawless space on St. Thomas where smugglers, maroons, and pirates could thrive. Dreams of a mercantilist Danish empire collapsed before this motley crew. In 1697, the Company reformed its expectations and slowly regained control of its West Indian possessions, primarily through the labour of enslaved Africans. After the *Havmanden* mutiny, white convicts were seen as potenti-
al instigators of rebellion and, similar to the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion (1676-77) in Virginia, racialized enslavement became the norm in the Danish Caribbean.

Heinsen’s approach to the Havmanden’s mutiny takes courage. He notes in the conclusion, “to make it all the way to the lower deck, we [historians] need to put our own imaginations at work” for “we cannot listen in on the worlds of convicts and sailors without taking a leap of interpretation” (177). In light of George Floyd’s appalling murder and the groundswell of resistance and protest, I cannot help but postulate that this way of listening to oppressed people in the past can open our ears and eyes to the injustices of today. Heinsen’s Mutiny in the Danish Atlantic World demonstrates that great historical writing resonates, and it deserves a wide readership.

Steven J. J. Pitt
West Falls, New York


The maritime history of northern Spain, and in particular of Galicia, is strictly connected to the government decision to establish the naval arsenal in Ferrol in 1724, making it the most important Spanish port overlooking the Atlantic Ocean. Before that, Ferrol was only a small fishing village. The establishment of the arsenal of the Spanish Armada also determined the urban growth of other cities in Galicia, such as Vigo and La Coruña, the latter of which became the main port connected to the Americas and Asia, after the establishment of commercial maritime routes in 1763.

This interesting book is a collection of articles, written in French, Portuguese and Spanish, by professors and scholars from France, Poland, Portugal and Spain. Their main objective is to investigate the economic and social dynamics that characterized the northwestern part of the Iberian Peninsula during the Modern Age, including the northern provinces of Portugal and the Spanish region of Asturias.

As the editor asserts in the introduction, Spain’s maritime history is not as rich as that of France or England, and until the 1980s, the scope of national maritime studies was limited to foreign policy, without considering the economic and social implications of nautical history. Further research was complicated by a failure to fully catalogue documents collected by the General Archive of the Spanish Navy, rendering the work of historians and researchers more difficult.

The thirteen essays can be grouped into seven main areas: the geographic description of the North Atlantic coast of Spain considered in this book; commercial relations between Spain and Portugal, based mainly on the salt trade; the role of harbour captains; contraband in goods and precious metals; the figure of the corsair; Spain’s foreign policy adopted during the eighteenth century of acquiring wood from the Baltic area for its ships; the religious practices connected to fishing activities; and, the system of public communication during the Modern Age.

The maritime history of a country is always related to commerce of goods and natural resources. For centuries, salt has represented one of the most important trade goods for the Iberian Pen-
insula, and the displacement of salt pits has determined the development of nearby locations. Two essays in this book are based on the study of the commerce of salt, covering a lengthy historical period that begins in the Middle Age and concludes with the commercial relationship between Galicia and Portugal during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the Middle Ages, the salt trade drove the re-foundation of the city of La Coruña by Alfonso IX and contributed to maintaining a strong relationship between Galician cities and Portugal.

The friendship between these two territories is another feature characterizing the maritime history of northern Spain. For example, the article by Jorge Martins Ribiero, explains the role of corsairs, who were always present in zones with low economic development. The activity of Galician corsairs, operating on the Atlantic coasts between Galicia and Northern Portugal, relied on the complicity of the Portuguese villagers, who suffered under the monopolistic role played by the city of Porto in the importation of goods.

Historical events, such as wars and invasions, played a key role in the strategic development of Galician ports, generating a huge variation in the attention paid by royal authorities to certain coastal towns. Research into the development and strengthening of some ports in the region of Asturias reveals the critical importance of local fishermen’s guilds in drawing the attention of the royal authorities to the local communities’ needs. Pressure from these groups prompted the development (or, as in some situations, in the repair) of a safer pier for all local fishermen. On the other hand, some local communities in such Asturian coastal towns as Cudillero or Lastres had to wait decades to see their port issues corrected, not to mention bearing all the attendant costs.

The book also addresses the social and cultural changes in Galicia after the Council of Trent (1545-1563), a transformation that occurred simultaneously elsewhere in the south of Europe, especially in all main coastal localities. The Counter-Reformation drove the attention of the ecclesiastical class in displaying Catholic dogmas in a spectacular way, through processions and religious events, in which both the population and the urban environment played an active role. In this period, the so-called baroque liturgy developed in four interesting aspects: the economic, the symbolic, the socio-political and the aesthetic one.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many sanctuaries sprung up throughout Galicia, dedicated to the figure of the Virgin Mary under different names. In Pontevedra, the Madonna was called “Divina Peregri-ná” (divine pilgrim), in La Coruña, the cult was dedicated to “A Pastoriza” (the shepherd), while in Muxía, there was the “Nuestra Señora da Barca” (Our Lady of the Boat), revealing the strict connection between the economic and the religious dimension of local communities.

The value of this book lies in its interesting multi-dimensional view of life in all of the main coastal localities in Northwestern Spain. It also includes a good number of maps, which help the reader to better understand the geographical context. This book represents an important resource for all scholars and people interested in the maritime history of Galicia and Asturias, and it contributes to the revival of Galicia’s maritime history and identity, a region strongly connected to the Atlantic Ocean.

Fabrizio Martino
Pathum Thani, Thailand
Admiral Sir Albert Markham is not a name well known to many. He led, in some ways, the quintessential naval life of the late Victorian era, but his distinction was the misfortune of being a lead participant of a collision between the ship in which he flew his flag (as Rear-Admiral), HMS Camperdown, and that of his superior, Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, in HMS Victoria on 22 June 1893. The sinking of the latter, involving the death of Tryon, shook the Royal Navy profoundly. The subsequent court martial of the captain of Victoria returned an acquittal and assigned responsibility to Tryon’s misconceived formation manoeuvre preparatory to coming to anchorage off the now-coast of Syria (then the Ottoman Empire). This verdict was considered deeply unsatisfactory by many within the RN and opinions split between those who blamed Tryon and those who condemned Markham and his flag captain for failing to take appropriate action on receipt of an impossible signal. The controversy swirled around Markham for the balance of his life, and he, in the event, never had a seagoing command again. His last appointment, prior to retirement at age 65 in 1906, was as Commander-in-Chief, at the Nore.

Frank Jastrzembski has previously written about Valentine Baker, a Victorian army hero with blots on his copybook. This volume is his second. There is clearly something that Jastrzembski finds attractive about individuals with colourful, but flawed, life narratives. (Baker was a LCol of cavalry who distinguished himself in the Crimea, but on conviction for sexual assault in the 1870s, was imprisoned for a year and dismissed in disgrace. He later took up with the Ottoman Empire’s army, winning a rearguard action as commander of a division.) In the case of Markham, the trajectory of his career is both typical and uncommon. He joined the RN as a midshipman in 1856 at age 15 (rather later than normal), and spent eight years on the China Station. The activities of piracy suppression, dealing with the Taiping Rebellion and showing the flag were eventful as were his later times on the Australia Station where he was involved in interrupting the near-slave trade (‘blackbirding’) of Pacific islanders, who were forcibly brought to Australia as plantation workers. He was promoted to commander in 1872, essentially on time, after which he devoted himself to Arctic exploration for the next six years. Markham displayed considerable courage in the 1876 expedition in HMS Alert and was subsequently awarded promotion to captain (1878). He commanded the flagship, HMS Triumph, from 1879-82, then in shore postings at HMS Vernon (the torpedo school), albeit being involved in a collision between the school’s tender, HMS Hecla, and a schooner in 1885. Thereafter, he was commodore of the training squadron out of Portsmouth, then on promotion to rear-admiral in 1891, was appointed second-in-command of the Mediterranean squadron. In between all these postings, Markham was involved in significant travel, taking him to Hudson’s Bay, the American mid-west, as an observer of the Peru-Chile War of 1879-83, and explorations of the Russian Arctic in the vicinity of the island of Novaya Zemlya. His services were not sought during the
Great War and he died just before its conclusion in October 1918. Unquestionably Markham led an eventful and remarkable life.

It was not, it must be said, one replete with extraordinary professional success. He was a prim and sanctimonious man, rarely partaking in normal wardroom life, with many of his postings marked by setbacks or misjudgements that were to dog, yet not derail, his career. The catastrophe of the sinking of the *Victoria* was merely the most spectacular. He lacked self-confidence regarding his mastery of the complexities of naval life, and was consequently diffident, prone to second guessing his decisions, and terrified of making mistakes. Indeed, in an earlier episode, Markham had been humiliated in an exercise where he was supposed to blockade Tryon’s force in port or at least shadow his progress at sea. He failed at both, with Tryon’s triumphant exposure of British naval vulnerabilities as a result—leading, it must be said, to the 1889 Naval Defence Act and the Two Power Standard. He was also a reluctant naval officer, embarking on the career on a *faute de mieux* basis and looked to the experiences of an older cousin, Sir Clements Markham, whose exploits in terms of exploration, freemasonry, and membership of the Royal Geographical Society served as a model for his real passion. Markham was a prolific writer and a steady stream of volumes describing his exploits punctuated his life, although with remarkably little on his naval activities.

Jastrzembski’s purpose is to bring to life a colourful Victorian RN officer, who is underserved in the historiography. In fact, the last biography devoted to Markham was published in 1927. And, it is conceded, the story of Markham’s life and his highly varied career is certainly an interesting one at the time of the *Pax Britannica*’s zenith. The book’s strength is in recounting the unconventional aspects of Markham’s career and rather less on its significance. The chief event of Markham’s life, by his account, was the Arctic expedition of 1875, which failed in its objective of reaching the North Pole. For others, that pinnacle was certainly the *Victoria* disaster. In important ways, Markham was a poor choice for his post in the Mediterranean and that reflects badly on the Admiralty. As well, the conduct of the court martial after the incident was a sham, designed to minimize publicity and fuss, rather than apportion blame appropriately. Indeed, its unwillingness to censure either Markham or his flag captain for failing to take necessary action to avoid the collision bore unhappy consequences that were manifest in the RN’s uneven performance throughout the Great War. Andrew Gordon’s important exploration of this theme in *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (1996) is absent from the thin, final chapter of Jastrzembski’s book, which is consequently, inadequate. Strangely not included in the bibliography is Richard Hough’s *Admiral’s in Collision*, which provides a book length account of the incident and could have been profitably referenced notwithstanding its 1959 publication.

The jacket blurb indicates that Jastrzembski has sought to rescue Markham from the tarnish to his reputation of the *Victoria* sinking. This has not been achieved. What has been accomplished, however, is an account of the most fascinating career of a man who did not find his métier in his workaday life. Many are they who have similar experiences—all of whom surely live in fear of being found out, and when the day of trial comes, found wanting. This is a hard thing and worth pondering. With that reflection, I am of the view
that much can be learned from Jastrzembski’s book on Albert Markham, even if the tarnish must remain.

Ian Yeates, Regina, Saskatchewan


Osprey Publishing is well known for its wide ranging illustrated aviation, naval and military history books that have been produced since the late 1960s. There are now literally thousands of titles covering all manner of subjects. While this could lead to some mediocrity—the X-Craft midget submarine attack on the *Tirpitz* is not one of them.

Angus Konstam, one of Osprey’s more prolific writers, has done a good job in detailing the raid from beginning to end. While not perfect, nor as in-depth as some of the many works previously written on the topic, it is not meant to be. Like so many of Osprey’s works, this is a primer that allows the reader, especially school children and young adults, to gain a reasonable insight into a topic and thus, let them decide if more in-depth reading is required. Many distinguished military historians have ‘cut their teeth’ on Osprey books and then moved onto more ‘weighty tomes’.

*Tirpitz in Norway* describes why the ship was there and the risk it posed to the Allied convoys resupplying the Soviet Union via the Arctic Convoys. (The weighty tome for those interested in exploring this further is Richard Woodman’s *Arctic Convoys 1941-1945* reprinted for the seventh time in 2019.) Thus, *Tirpitz* was a classic example of the ‘fleet - in -being’ doctrine; even anchored in a fjord, she was a risk to Allied shipping and tied down Allied forces fearing what she might or might not do. The risk to Allied merchant shipping was real, as shown by the actions of *Graf Spee* in 1939, the *Admiral Scheer* sortie into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in 1940-41, and *Scharnhorst’s* attacks on Atlantic convoys in 1941.

After attempts to destroy *Tirpitz* by air attack had failed, the British sought a new method to bring about the ship’s demise. This was the midget submarine or X-Craft. Midget submarines were not a new concept—they had been employed by the Italians and Japanese with some success in penetrating Allied harbours and ports. Konstam describes the creation of the X-Craft from concept to reality, the training of the crews and their deployment in September 1943 to attack *Tirpitz* in Kaafjord, Norway.

Konstam clearly describes the difficulties encountered by the X-Craft crews, including bad weather, German defences and the poor construction of the midget submarines. The litany of defects that affected the X-Craft during the operation shows both poor workmanship in the British shipyards, but also potentially a paucity of rugged training in the lead-up to the attack that may have better identified the submarine’s many mechanical and electrical short-comings. Only three of the six X-Craft deployed actually entered Kaafjord due to engineering failures in the others. Due to ongoing technical failures in their vessels, he three mini-subs that did make it struggled to lay their explosive charges. That two crews successfully laid their charges underneath *Tirpitz* is a testimony to the courage and the resilience of their crews.
The raid was ultimately a success, as *Tirpitz* was badly damaged and out of action for several months (in fact, the damage to some sections of the ship was never repaired) and this allowed her to become an easier target for RAF bombers which sank the battleship in November 1944.

The book is well illustrated and the maps are useful in describing the attack. A cut-away diagram of an X-Craft, showing the layout of the vessel, should have been included to assist the reader identify the X-Craft design and equipment described in the book. Equally, a side and plan view of *Tirpitz* would have been useful as well to complement the written descriptions of the ship.

Additionally, I would have liked to have seen a bit more on the honours and awards bestowed on X-Craft crew-members. The Victoria Crosses awarded to Donald Cameron (X-6) and Godfrey Place (X-7) are well described but the other awards, less so. The author is incorrect in stating that the crew of X-5 (commanded by Australian-born Lieutenant Henty-Creer) received no posthumous awards. X-5 was seen near *Tirpitz* but sunk by German forces, possibly after she had laid her charges, but this has so far been unconfirmed. Henty-Creer and his crew were all awarded a posthumous mention in dispatches (*London Gazette* 1 August 1944) as having lost their lives. The honours and awards rulings of the day could only authorize the award of the Victoria Cross or a mention in dispatches. For those interested in more on X-5 the book *The Mystery of X-5: Lieutenant H. Henty-Creer's attack on the Tirpitz* by Frank Walker (1988) should be consulted.

Overall, Konstam has done a good job in describing the why, when, where, who, what and how of the 1943 X-Craft attack on *Tirpitz* in Norway.

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*Book Reviews* 99

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


This is an inspiring and harrowing tale crisply told. In fact, author Levy’s spare prose and straight chronological retelling of the Greely Expedition of 1881-1884 amplify the history’s emotional punch. There are no dramatic flourishes here; none are needed. *Labyrinth of Ice* recounts the story of a maritime venture carried out by a ground force, the U.S. Army. In the brief Arctic summer of 1881, a multinational company of soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Adolphus Greely steamed northward from St. John’s to Lady Franklin Bay, an inlet along the east coast of Ellesmere Island. Ellesmere lies west of northern Greenland across a narrow sea.

There the adventurers constructed Ft. Conger, the northernmost encampment in the world at the time. Their chief goal was scientific research. Commander Greely’s ulterior goal, or personal “grail,” was to plant the U.S. flag “Farthest North,” breaking a centuries-old British record (44). If possible, he wanted to reach the North Pole. The explorers indeed eclipsed the British record by a few miles. They mapped much of the region for the first time and conducted painstaking scientific observations. They also endured sunless winters lasting over 130 days, fraught with almost unimaginable cold and hardship. During November 1881, for example—before the worst of the long night set in—temperatures averaged -24⁰ F.
The Greely Expedition’s accomplishments and derring-do at Ft. Conger constitute the inspiring part of the story. The back half of the book relates the harrowing part. The summer of 1881 was mild by Arctic standards, permitting the expedition to reach Lady Franklin Bay with little trouble. The summers of 1882 and 1883 were unusually severe. Ice kept resupply ships planned for each summer from getting through. The lead vessel, *Proteus*, found itself icebound and was crushed in 1882. Greely opted to evacuate Ft. Conger in 1883 rather than try to wait out another long night. His orders directed him to retreat south that summer, while stores were starting to run low. The party managed to reach a designated rendezvous point at Cape Sabine, far to the south, yet was forced to improvise shelter to await a third relief expedition that might never come. The soldiers’ plight dismayed.

Salvation did come—for some of Greely’s party—in June 1884. By then eighteen soldiers had succumbed to starvation or the elements. Seven survived, including Greely himself. Barely: physicians on scene testified that the rest would have perished within a day or two had ships not anchored off Cape Sabine when they did. Such a nick-of-time rescue would never pass muster in Hollywood. Afterward Greely and fellow survivors heatedly denied speculation that members of the party had cannibalized fallen comrades. While press sensationalism tarnished the expedition’s reputation to a degree, Congress eventually awarded Greely a seldom-seen peacetime Medal of Honour, the U.S. armed forces’ supreme decoration for valour.

Levy leaves the lessons from the Greely Expedition mostly implicit, but they stand out for all that. First and foremost, to describe the far north as forbidding operating grounds constitutes an epic understatement. Natural barriers obstruct human movement on a colossal scale. For instance, Greely’s band encountered one ice floe that was a full fifteen miles long. It took nine hours to pass while drifting southward. The icy north’s fickle dynamism is likewise striking. Ice floes were perpetually in motion. Seafarers watched for “leads,” or narrow sea lanes, to open as bergs jostled against one another. Sometimes a lane would open, then—as with the luckless *Proteus*—close around a ship to fatal effect. On one occasion the soldiers confronted a seemingly impassable iceberg, only to discover a fortuitous narrow cleft through the berg and make their getaway.

Second, Levy’s account arouses historical vertigo. For instance, the late nineteenth century was not that long ago, yet cartographers speculated that an “open polar sea” lay beyond a rim of ice (31). The top of the world was a tropical paradise! The Greely Expedition helped dispel such fancies. The book shows that the past is a foreign country, in earth science as in so many disciplines.

Third, logistics, bureaucracy, and politics were pivotal and intermingled. The expedition was an army affair, but Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln saw Arctic exploration as a waste. Lincoln dithered constantly, delaying the 1882 and 1883 relief missions while encumbering their prospects for success. Levy casts Henrietta Greely, Adolphus’ well-connected San Diego wife, as a hero of the story. Working through press and government contacts, Mrs. Greely shamed the U.S. government into mounting a third relief effort—an effort orchestrated by the U.S. Navy when many thought hope for rescuing Greely and his men was forlorn. Professional mariners took great trouble to outfit ships capable of withstand-
ing pressure from ice floes. And they got moving. The navy flotilla set out in time to reach Cape Sabine early in the summer of 1884, helped by Queen Victoria’s loan of a suitable Royal Navy ship. No more dawdling.

And lastly, some years ago the U.S. Navy’s chief oceanographer forecast that warming temperatures will cause the polar icepack to advance and recede with the seasons. Warming will open Arctic sea routes to shipping on a more regular basis, but it could accent the geophysical dynamism Buddy Levy documents so vividly. Labyrinth of Ice, then, furnishes a historical baseline for seafarers to think about northern operations in the coming years and decades. This reader profited.

James R. Holmes
Newport, Rhode Island


This work is a chronological compendium of surviving first-hand accounts detailing the often overlooked aftermath of the HMS Bounty Mutiny. Drawing from letters, journals, official reports, and poetry, editor Donald A. Maxton has created an objective accounting of the voyages of the Porcupine Class post ship HMS Pandora, sent to hunt down the mutineers, and of the Matavy, a 30-ton sailing vessel built by some of the mutineers on Tahiti to sail back to civilization. For possibly the first time, the perspectives of captured mutineers and their Royal Navy jailors are presented side-by-side, detailing the days before the crew’s capture, the exploration of uncharted islands, the conditions inside the Pandora’s makeshift jail, the loss of said ship, and the largely forgotten independent journey of the Matavy. Images and maps of both period and contemporary vintage are interspersed throughout the work to aid in visualization, along with scans of excerpts from the original source materials from the assorted eyewitnesses. The texts are presented as they were written, with letters having a smaller font size than that used for published works. In his introductory note, Maxton discusses the condition of the sources and the type of corrections made to both earlier and new transcriptions. A useful glossary of period terms is provided at the end of the work to help modern readers with various idioms and archaic phrases found throughout.

Maxton keeps his analysis to a minimum, with his own text concentrated within the introduction and several lead-in paragraphs for some of the chapters and appendices. Despite the brief nature of these sections, they offer a great deal of context in a succinct, well thought out manner. He covers the public fascination with the Bounty mutiny and the relative dearth of historiography on the subsequent mission of HMS Pandora, along with the backgrounds of the text authors and the circumstances around the publication/preservation of their works. It is this background material that is of special note, providing context for the actions of those involved. The treatment of the captured Bounty crewmen by Captain Edwards of the Pandora comes across as cruel, bordering on sadistic, but Maxton’s introduction reminds us that Edwards had previously survived a mutiny and attempted assassination on HMS Narcissus in 1782 (5). While not excusing his conduct,
this explains a possible reason for such behaviour not visible in the transcribed texts. The chapter lead-ins are present to introduce a new narrative, providing details on the eyewitnesses, the origin of transcribed documents, and original publication histories.

The main body of the work begins, fittingly, with the 1791 recounting of the Bounty Mutiny by “silent spectator” Peter Heywood, before shifting to the journal of Bounty boatswain’s mate James Morrison, documenting the eight-month-long construction of a 35-foot schooner on Tahiti to ferry men back to an English port (16). Morrison also provides insight into the mixing of native and European cultures, such as church services, construction practices, and the blessing of the aforementioned vessel by a native holy man. His account includes the official report of the Pandora’s Captain Edwards and the later publication by surgeon George Hamilton, recording the orders of the vessel in regard to locating and detaining the Bounty mutineers long with the account of the voyage into the South Pacific. As Maxton suggests, the narrative voices of Edwards and Hamilton are perhaps the starkest in the work. While Edwards offers geographical information and basic facts for the journey, Hamilton presents a more human element, describing the visited islands and outposts in more lurid detail. Hamilton is also surprisingly sympathetic to the mutineers, noting that he hoped Fletcher Christian would at least spread British ideals and help civilize the natives, a stark contrast towards Edwards’ monotonous description of the men as “Pirates” (70).

The surrender and capture of the Bounty mutineers on Tahiti is offered from the perspective of both hunter and hunted, with the accounts of the resulting journey prior to the loss of the Pandora shifting primarily to the reports of Edwards and Hamilton. These passages offer an interesting insight regarding the influence of European exploration amidst the backdrop of the hunt for the Bounty, detailing the process of charting and naming new islands, showing the wide spread veneration of Captain James Cook among native populations years after his visits, the oral traditions of cultures regarding their first encounters with Dutch explorers, and even the prostitution of native daughters by their mothers in exchange for prized metal trading goods. First-contact scenarios are also described, with documentation made of villages, ship construction styles, and trade goods left as signs of peace.

Naturally, the loss of the Pandora in the Torres Strait is one of the more harrowing sections, and an example of where the use of multiple sources truly shines. Edwards’ official reporting of the sinking is relatively short and perfunctory, with Hamilton offering more detail largely along similar lines. Morrison and Heywood paint a different, crueler picture; one of a cold captain refusing to release imprisoned men to help try to save the ship, a twisted Master at Arms threatening to fire on the restrained men and declaring “we’ll all go to Hell together” when they begged to be set free, the brave actions of William Moulter, Pandora’s boatswain’s mate, to release the prisoners as the ship sank, and men drowning while shackled as they tried to swim for their lives (103). The accounting of the voyage across the South Pacific by the surviving Pandora crew and prisoners on the remaining boats is a fascinating tale of survival. Their slow return to ‘civilization’ and the encounters in the Dutch East Indies are well documented. In this section, both Edwards and Hamilton provide coordinates for the various places visited by the Pandora and her
crew, with Edwards providing a further listing of prisoners and casualties. The final chapter contains an account of the three-month long, independent voyage of the Matavy, written by Midshipman David Thomas Renouard. The men of the Matavy underwent their own series of challenges, crossing dangerous reefs, running low on supplies, encountering native populations, and becoming the first Europeans to unknowingly reach the islands of Fiji.

The three appendices serve as continuations of the work, with the first, a poem recounting of the voyage by an unidentified Pandora crewman. While offering an enlisted man’s take on the voyage, it could not be inserted into the narrative chronology as easily as the other works. Edwards’ more detailed statement on Pandora’s loss made in anticipation of his court martial is likewise difficult to fit in the narrative, but provides an excellent window into his final summation of the incident for his superiors. The final appendix essentially serves as the work’s conclusion, detailing Edwards’ court martial, the fates of Edwards, Hamilton, and Renouard, followed by the Bounty court martial and the later Royal Navy careers of Heywood and Morrison.

In terms of possible improvements, very few come to mind. The shift in font size between certain sources was unexpected, and the standardization of type would be appreciated. Additionally, some of the grey-scale-rendered images were originally colour paintings, with a resulting loss of detail due to the lack of pigmentation. The inclusion of colour renderings would greatly improve the impact of some of these images. Both of these suggestions are not crucial, however, and in no way diminish the work’s effectiveness.

Chasing the Bounty is an excellent addition to the historiography of the Bounty mutiny, its often-overshadowed aftermath, and the exploration of the South Pacific in the late-eighteenth century. Maxton skillfully integrates the unique surviving accounts from the voyage into a chronological timeline, offering a chance for scholars to compare official reports, Pandora crew recollections, and Bounty mutineer accounts of the same events side-by-side. This unique combination of perspective helps create a more detailed and objective accounting of the voyage of Captain Edwards and his men, making it a worthy read for those interested in the Bounty or the South Pacific in the early years of European exploration.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The Catastrophe at Spithead concerns the capsizing of the first rate British 100-gun HMS Royal George, flagship of Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, that met with disaster while undergoing victualling, maintenance and minor repair off Portsmouth’s naval base. In August 1782, the admiral and about 900 other souls lost their lives during the waning days of Britain’s campaign against the American War of Independence. Rubinstein painstakingly recounts nearly every aspect of this and surrounding events.

The book is roughly divided into five parts: the rise and naval life of Kempenfelt; a detailed description of what happened around and during
the capsizing episode; the subsequent court-martial, its verdict and the possible cause or causes of the disaster; the subsequent maritime legacies resulting from the calamity; and finally, the clearing of the wreckage hazardous to navigation and the fate of the survivors.

Of Swedish descent, Richard Kempenfelt was a polymath, a successful commander and a thoughtful student of war. Because he was not born into the British aristocracy, his rise in the Navy was slow. During the war of American independence, he served as chief of staff to three leading admirals and was finally given charge of the home fleet at a time when few officers of first-rate ability were willing to serve in an unpopular administration. He was nearly 60 years old before he received his admiral’s flag. Unmarried and deeply religious, Kempenfelt was a student of naval strategy, gunnery, fleet dispositions, and tactical principles. He was instrumental in simplifying the British naval signal code system of pennants, an important improvement because it was difficult to discern a distant complex array of multi-coloured and patterned flags through comparatively primitive optics, especially on rolling, pitching ships and often through the smoke of battle.

In the summer of 1782, he flew his admiral’s broad pennant on the Royal George. Launched at Woolrich in 1756, she had the tallest masts (114 feet, 3 inches) of any ship built in England. She participated in the battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759, but the warship based at Spithead was already 16 years old when ordered to take a fleet to join operations under Lord Richard Howe, headquartered in Gibraltar. Then calamity struck.

Rubinstein describes the capsizing in detail with many human dramas. The alarm sounded during a card game below deck. All but one gambler scrambled. He pocketed the abandoned stakes on the deck, escaped with his loot and, after being rescued, went on to a life of crime leading to his exile in Botany Bay, Australia. A little boy, attempting to avoid drowning, clung to the necks of two sheep from the ship’s livestock. The animals swam to a nearby island and all three were saved. Especially sad was the drowning of five or six shipmates found clasped in each other’s arms futilely trying to save each other. The exact fate of Admiral Kempenfelt is unknown, but it was assumed that he drowned trapped in his cabin, unable to open its door against the sea’s onslaught.

Following the tragedy, a court-martial ensued during which survivors and witnesses in nearby vessels gave very detailed accounts of what they saw. The verdict exonerated the Royal George’s captain, Martin Waghorn, but then Rubinstein systematically scrutinizes a variety of possible reasons to explain why the ship was lost. First, the vessel was taking on a large supply of food for their impending re-deployment. The ship’s carpenter had undertaken a minor repair below the ship’s starboard waterline which required heeling the ship to accomplish the task. Were all the starboard gun ports closed and watertight, the scuppers blocked, the cannon on the port side secured, the weather truly serene, was the ship in such disrepair that some rotten hull planking gave way, etc.? When the ship’s first lieutenant ordered the Royal George’s drummer to beat the alarm, did the scrambling of some 600 crewmen upset a delicate balance of equilibrium and permit the laws of physics to take their toll? The answers to these many questions are unknown, but each likely contributed in varying degrees.

The last chapters focus on how sal-
vors removed the wreck of the *Royal George* over time, as it became a hazard to navigation. They employed a simple diving bell, a helmeted diver’s suit, and cables in an attempt to lift the damaged hull and move it closer to shore. Finally, the gun powder used to decimate what remained produced several underwater explosions and a spectacular geyser. Another chapter addresses the ship’s legacy in British maritime history and concludes with a summary of what became of many of the survivors. A William Cowper poem about the tragedy became incorporated in the Victorian and Edwardian school books and popular anthologies, thereby enshrining the story of *The Sinking of the Royal George* in British naval annals. Rubinstein’s book brilliantly covers the multitude of events on many levels. Well-written in clear prose, it is an excellent resource for any maritime historian.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Anyone born after, say, 1960, totally at home with the advanced intelligence and communications technologies of our time and unfamiliar with the details of Second World War naval history will find Robert C. Stern’s estimable account of the Battle of the Coral Sea perplexing, to say the least. Although occurring less than eighty years ago, *Coral Sea* belongs to a time seemingly as remote as the Napoleonic Age.

For several weeks in the spring of 1942, specifically between May 4 and May 8, Japanese and American naval task forces built around the still-relatively new weapon system called the aircraft carrier, hunted each other around the Coral Sea and related ocean spaces immediately north and somewhat west of Australia. The Japanese with two heavy and one light carrier were charged with ultimately impossible dual tasks, the first of which was to escort and protect an invasion force charged with taking the strategically important town of Port Moresby on the southwestern coast of what is now Papua, New Guinea. The second was to find and destroy any enemy carrier task forces in the area, whose presence in fact the Japanese were not absolutely certain of until enemy war planes struck the island of Tulagi which Japanese forces had just seized as a shield for their invasion activities far to the west.

Thereafter, both sides, bereft of any precise technical aid beyond the small, crude and relatively slow carrier aircraft of the time, blundered about looking for each other for over 72 hours, coming within fifty miles or so, and ultimately finding the enemy almost simultaneously. Burdened with fragmentary information at best, commanders on both sides made erroneous calculations and reached erroneous conclusions. Stern is generally understanding, if occasionally scathing, in his assessments of opportunities missed, of poor decisions and timidity, and of frustration too readily indulged.

Consider this: having earlier sunk the Japanese light carrier *Shoho*, American scout planes discovered the two-carrier Japanese task force literally within minutes of *Yorktown* and her companion carrier *Lexington* being sighted by a Japanese scout. The American sighting report read as follows. “2 V S 2 0820 BT Contact 2 Carriers 4
Cruisers many DD [Destroyers] bearing 006 120 speed 15.” As the author emphasizes, this seemingly comprehensive message obscured more than it illuminated. “It failed to mention whether the ‘120’ referred to the enemy’s course or his distance from the reference point. It also did not explicitly mention what reference point was being used, the actual known location of Lexington when Smith [the pilot] launched or the Point Zed reference point he was supposed to use to confuse the enemy (In this instance, Point Zed was approximately 65 miles northeast of the launching point).” (218)

Modern positioning and communications satellites are not subject to the stresses that Second World War combatants were under as they sought to transmit enemy strength and positions as tersely as possible while always under threat of detection and fiery death.

Once battle was joined over both Japanese and American task forces shortly before noon on May 8, Stern’s account shifts from the tedium of hunt and search to the gut-wrenching ordeal of naval combat. Much of it makes painful reading from an American perspective as the Combat Air Patrol comprised of woefully inadequate Douglas SBD scout-dive bombers and poorly positioned fighters was simply outmaneuvered by the initial incoming Japanese formations from carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku. Thereafter, the Americans redressed the balance in their attack on the enemy force, sinking no carriers in exchange for the loss of Lexington, but badly mauling Shokaku and badly weakening Zuikaku’s air group.

While the subject of quite a number of books, the Battle of the Coral Sea has found in Stern, this generation’s master story teller. His research into sources on both sides is exhaustive and he has used Japanese translators where necessary and appropriate to best illuminate materials. The photographs and diagrams he has included add to an impressive you-are-there effect. As the above quoted passage suggests, he has placed us back in 1942 on every page, the best kind of history. His effort has taken years of meticulous scholarship and it shows. At the same time, the general reader will enjoy and benefit from this account of the U.S. Navy’s first serious battle of the Pacific War as much as the professional scholar.

At a time when future naval combat is envisaged in terms of hyper-advanced technologies—Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, robotics and the like—it is good to be reminded that there was a time within the living memories of a declining number of us when mass, ignorant armies clashed by day and night, vast air armadas dumped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs on hapless civilians in often indiscriminate “area” bombings, and admirals flung their young fliers out into the void with nothing in hand save their own eyesight in chancy hopes of finding an elusive enemy.

Highly recommended.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


This volume describes naval officer development in seven different nations. Of these, Britain, France, Spain and the Dutch Republic are the four which have the deepest stamp on previous
Historiography. Chapters on Sweden, Denmark and Russia extend the book into less-charted seas. While discussing all commissioned officers, the book does shine a bit more of its light on the lieutenants within each navy. As part of the Palgrave Macmillan War, Culture and Society series, the book examines the period from 1750 to 1850, though the content focuses largely on 1680 to 1815.

The editors’ goal was to place in one text, descriptions of various European navies that went to sea, in order to exert their nation’s political and economic ends, during the long eighteenth-century. Each deals with the education and employment of officers and the growth of professionalism within each nation’s navy during the period. The authors make an effort to compare their country of focus to others described in the collection, and Evan Wilson provides more comparison in a short, concluding chapter.

Wilson authors the first chapter which focuses on British naval officers, their background, entry, training and service within the navy. It is a summary of much that was included in his previous book, *A Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775-1815*. He focuses here on how officers were trained, selected for promotion and taught to view combat. Wilson credits the necessity of passing a lieutenant’s exam as setting the bar for midshipman and master’s mates who wanted to become commissioned officers. This process required six years of training at sea in all aspects of the ship and sailing. The vast majority who passed the test were qualified to proceed to learning how to command a ship.

Drawn mainly from the middle class, British officers depended on relatives, or patronage, to get to sea, and patronage to assist in their promotion into the right ship, on the right station. Middle- and upper-class officers were promoted at the same rate across the century, a bit different from the Swedish navy, and the French up to 1763. A strong sense of duty, along with public and government expectations led to the Royal Navy’s aggressiveness in battle.

Olivier Chaline examines the French navy, finding it to be unique among European navies in how its officers experienced their careers. France entered the eighteenth century with a strong navy, but within twenty years, it had collapsed. The Crown’s attitude towards the navy’s cost, and failure of naval administrators to convince the King of its vital need, were at the root of the fall. The mid-century War of the Austrian Succession provided a turning point, increasing the navy’s size. The Seven Years War only increased the need for officers, as France’s navy grew again. Prior to the 1760s, most naval officers were recruited from among the nobility. They entered into one of three naval cadet units, and as gentleman, were taught math, hydrography, fortification, small arms, cannon drills, and dancing. Sea experience was gained aboard a frigate, during summer cruises.

French officers changed ships after every cruise. When going to sea, they assembled their own junior officers and crew. With the American War of Independence, the demand for officers required enlisting outside of the nobility, breaking their previous hold on commissioned ranks. By the late-1780s, French naval officers were drawn from the middle and upper classes.

The Spanish naval officer’s career path is described by Pablo Ortega-del-Cerro. The modern Spanish navy began as the Bourbons assumed the throne after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Successive monarchs and naval administrators
constantly tinkered with naval reforms. This chapter examines the context of those reforms, the career of midshipmen, officer promotion and evaluation, and finally the officers’ interaction with the larger Spanish society. Between 1766 and 1793, a series of new regulations served to solidify “institutional effectiveness and administrative coherence.” To become an officer one had to be of noble birth. By mid-century there were three academies to study at, and most candidates entered as Guardiamarina (midshipmen). Mainly lower nobility sought these posts with the patronage of senior members of the nobility, or the church. Theoretical education was followed by sea training, much like the French system. Promotions were, by mid-century, based largely on seniority, service rendered, and “person circumstances.” A complex method of evaluation of officers, along multiple dimensions, was in place from 1793 through 1813. Spanish naval officers conducted research, exploration and mapping of colonial possessions. They held positions among the intellectual community, promoted trade and were connected to local political power sources.

Gils Romelse surveys the Dutch Republic’s navy noting how its prowess, “its political identity, and its naval officer corps” were intertwined creating a unique context within which naval officers developed and served. In the late seventeenth century the Dutch navy had become the realm of a professional seaman, who saw the service as a life commitment. It attracted noblemen from inland, seeking positions in the national service. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch Republic was in financial straits, and remained in a state of peace until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84). A downsized navy performed convoy duty protecting the Baltic and overseas trade. Many officers sought employment in the navies of other countries. By mid-century, the Dutch had established two training colleges where theory was taught, with practical sailing skills gained at sea. When war with Britain erupted in 1780, the Dutch navy was in need of officers, as many of those in the upper ranks were not fit to go to sea. In the years following the war, many of the officers not promoted during the conflict left the Dutch service. Rommelse gives three case studies demonstrating the influence of peace, war, and state fiscal conditions on the careers of Dutch officers. Stiff competition among officers for positions and patronage led to some brutal reviews of officers’ performance.

Sweden’s naval officer development is discussed by AnnaSara Hammar. The Swedish navy had peaked in the 1500s, declining to a low point by 1700. Three wars with Russia, the Seven Years War, and war with Denmark stimulated naval reforms across the century, but the Swedish navy’s efforts left much to be desired. The only notable success was in the third war with Russia (1788-90), with a major Swedish victory by its inshore squadron. Swedish naval officers were part of a highly valued military class in society. Sailors were recruited by the farmers and burghers. Captains were responsible for the training of their junior and warrant officers. Naval officers were encouraged to read and explore new scientific ideas on navigation, ship construction, and exploration. Many first went to sea in merchant ships, gaining invaluable experience. The Swedes formed a cadet school in 1756 for theoretical education but like the British, most officer development occurred at sea. Throughout the century, many Swedish officers served in the navies of other countries. Officers were judged largely on their
merit, thus the navy “attracted ambitious” middle-class men. A dearth of nobility (who were to hold flag ranks) led to some of these middle-class men being raised to nobility.

Jakob Seerup focuses on the Danish navy’s unique set of contextual factors influencing officer development. In order to rid itself of foreign officers, Denmark established a naval academy, and from 1701 onward it was the single entrance route into the navy. Academic work was followed by summer sea training cruises. The nobility and middle class sent their sons to the academy. Education often continued after graduation as officers were encouraged to develop more knowledge in the sciences.

Copenhagen served as the country’s main naval base and construction yard. Ideally located, Denmark held a key position at the narrowest point of the vital Baltic trade route. The ironic twist was that it experienced a tense but stable peace for eighty years of the century. Instead of advancement based on war-time experience, Danish officers were promoted based on seniority and the number of positions available in the shore divisions in Copenhagen’s dockyard, moving from the dockyard to a ship posting when a cruise was required. At the beginning of an officer’s career (especially for lieutenants) foreign service was typical.

While all the other navies discussed had a lengthy history, the Russian navy literally began on the eve of the eighteenth century. As Brian Davis states, the Great Northern War saw the first service of the Baltic Fleet, contributing to the Russian victory. Dutch influence was essential in creating and commanding the ships, as the Russians depended on foreign officers for the first half of the century. Russia established a naval school early in the century, but students were sent to the Dutch Republic and England for sea experience. Fiscal problems, a line of monarchs with varying degrees of interest in the navy, little merchant shipping, and the fact that Russia was predominantly a land-based power, resulted in an unstable path of naval development. With little combat experience, officers rose based on patronage and “technical-administration skills.” Some officers, such as Vitus Bering, gained important experience and notoriety by engaging in exploration. Empress Catherine the Great took interest in reforming the navy, an effort that culminated in Russian naval victories in the Russo-Turkish War (1768-74), in the Mediterranean.

Wilson concludes that eighteenth-century officers created a line of quasi-inheritance where their sons entered the service and rose through commissions, in a form of self-regeneration for the officer corps. For France and Spain, nobility played a role in shaping those nations’ officer corps, while the Danes and British relied more on officers from the middle class. Young men went to sea in the British, Dutch, and Swedish navies to learn their profession, while France, Spain, Denmark and Russia sent theirs first to an academy to learn the theory, before heading out to sea. In preparation for war, Denmark created the most efficient, highly structured naval organization during eight decades of peace. Wilson offers an additional comparison of the nations addressed in the book to the naval officers of the Ottoman and American navies, although a chapter comparing each of these to the various European nations would have been more profitable for the reader.

The book also demonstrates how a navy’s essential role in empire-building fostered martial experience, exposed officers to the technology and ideas of other nations, and to opportunities for
promotion. Across the seven examples, each nation saw the development of state centralization of control over entry, education and advancement of its naval officers. The creation and reforming of rules and regulations governing the officers played a central role in this gradual professionalization.

Two maps appear in chapter four, concerning Spanish naval bases. Nine figures and twelve tables appear throughout the book detailing demographic elements of the officer group under discussion, including their pay, political affiliation, and promotion possibilities. Endnotes follow each article, with no overall bibliography. The index is comprehensive. The volume reveals that there are marvelous sources in various national archives, ready for data-mining for demographic and career-path information for officers (see Sweden’s merit lists, and the Danish records).

This book will appeal to those interested in naval officer development, in the context of growing centralized state control. Social historians will appreciate the effort to explore the social background of officers, their path within each nation’s navy, and their standing in society.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


Espionage has been part of world history since ancient times. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, Imperial Japan came to see the United States as its principal foe in future wars. In that light, Japan maintained an extensive espionage system in North America, including radio interception posts in Baja California, Mexico. Since there is no substitute for first-hand observation of one’s enemy, the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, in the then-American territory of Hawaii, was an extremely important base for intelligence on the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Navy (USN), based in Pearl Harbor. Among the Consulate staff was a clerk named Takeo Yoshikawa, in reality a spy for the Imperial Japanese Navy. His memoir, Japan’s Spy at Pearl Harbor. Memoir of an Imperial Japanese Navy Secret Agent, appears in English translation for the first time.

Yoshikawa was born in 1912; he entered the Etajima Naval Academy in 1930 and graduated from there. A perhaps promising navy career was cut short by ill-health; he was retired at a very young age but then assigned to work in intelligence with the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (IJN). In that role, he analyzed intelligence reports and advised the IJN of the capabilities of its potential adversaries—the British Royal Navy, the Dutch East Indies Navy, and the USN. In early 1941 Yoshikawa was posted to the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. His ostensible duties were to deal with applications from Japanese citizens wanting to relinquish their nationality and become American citizens. This was hardly an onerous task, allowing Yoshikawa ample time to travel around Hawaii and see for himself the various military installations and civilian airfields throughout the Hawaiian Islands. His findings were duly transmitted to the IJN.

Yoshikawa turned out to be very good at espionage; he often penetrated
military bases, talked with many Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, monitored the comings and goings of USN vessels, especially the warships. In one famous act, ordered to determine whether anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets were present, he climbed into the waters of Pearl Harbor, swam to mid-channel, and stayed there. He held onto a rock to keep submerged and breathed through a bamboo pole. At one point, a sentry nearly saw him. But Yoshikawa emerged unnoticed and reported to his superiors that he was unable to determine the presence of anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets.

The IJN attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 (local calendar) came as no surprise to Yoshikawa and his co-workers; many knew that some kind of action against the USA was imminent. About two hours after the initial attack on Pearl Harbor, local police entered the Japanese consulate and arrested all present, including Yoshikawa. While American authorities strongly suspected Yoshikawa of being far more than a mere consulate clerk, nothing was ever proven against him. As part of the consulate staff, he had diplomatic privileges. Instead of being imprisoned, the Japanese consulate staff was isolated in a hotel room, then taken to the American mainland where all concerned spent several months in a ranch in rural Arizona. Then, as arrangements were completed for the exchange of American diplomats in Japan and Japanese diplomats in America, Yoshikawa and his colleagues traveled by train to New York City. The long train trip gave Yoshikawa a chance to see the vastness of America and its economic potential. The Japanese diplomats were placed on a Swedish liner, which sailed across the South Atlantic, around the southern tip of Africa, and finally landed at Lourenço Marques in then-Portuguese East Africa. There Yoshikawa saw the American diplomats returning to the USA; they carried cheap leather or cloth bags, while the Japanese diplomats carried leather suitcases. From that incident, Yoshikawa began to sense that perhaps, Japan had acted rashly in attacking the USA.

After his return to Japan, Yoshikawa spent the rest of the war as a technician at the IJN General Staff. He compiled reports, interrogated prisoners of war, and even found the time to get married. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Yoshikawa spent time “on the run,” as he feared he would be exposed as the spy he had been. Eventually, he returned to his family, opened a gasoline station, and became a member of his town council. He even took part in an American television program in 1961 which commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. He died in 1993.

A recent article on Yoshikawa (Brian Walsh, “In Plain Sight,” World War 2, November, 2017, pp. 38-45) states that Yoshikawa’s memoirs have appeared three times: in 1963 (which is this translation), in 1985, and a revised version published posthumously in 2015, as well as in magazine and newspaper articles and various interviews. It is, therefore, difficult to know which version of his memoirs is the most accurate one.

Nevertheless, this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Pacific War and also espionage. It gives an in-depth glimpse into espionage techniques, some of which are still valuable today. Yoshikawa reprinted many of his cables to the IJN and these add to the value of this book. The translation, by Andrew Mitchell of Toronto, is excellent and the narrative reads in a conversational, easy-to-follow style. In addition, Mitchell added endnotes
which explain many concepts Yoshikawa mentioned which are unfamiliar to those not versed in Japanese history and culture.

In Yoshikawa’s opinion “[T]he U.S. was the underlying cause of this war [the Pacific War.]” (163) While this could be attributed to Japanese patriotism, a revisionist school of history places the blame for the Pacific War on inept American diplomacy. Although that point is debatable, it is worth considering. In any case, this book is a good read and is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

BACK LIST


The history of oceanography presented in Soundings and Crossings as a collection of essays—written with a wide-reaching historical imagination—that is as varied in subject as it is in the background of the authors. Topics like the production of nautical charts, the existence of marine stations, international and national science, ocean biology, marine meteorology, the practicalities of scientific diving, and the representation in art of the marine environment and its organisms. On occasion the stories are interesting to read, but sometimes they are just too, to put it mildly, mechanical and formal to arouse any curiosity whatsoever.

In spite of some weaknesses, the idea behind the book is good. Not everyone will appreciate all the essays, but most readers will find something to draw their attention.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands