Books by contemporary ocean-going mariners are hard to find, and descriptions of seafaring in Canadian waters, including the Arctic, are rarer still. Time and Tides is a first-person account of over forty years at sea by a master mariner now living on Vancouver Island. Captain John Anderson started his seagoing career in the UK as an apprentice in cargo ships trading to the Far East. He first signed on with the legendary Blue Funnel Line operated by Alfred Holt’s, a firm that traced its history back almost 100 years, designed its own distinctive vessels, and maintained them to the highest of standards. The way of life he describes in the early 60s—long voyages with leisurely stays in exotic ports while cargo was loaded and unloaded laboriously, and the staid culture of the firm (he was termed a midshipman rather than apprentice) was in its twilight years. By the end of the decade container traffic was booming; Alfred Holt and Company went out of business in 1988.

Once qualified as a mate, John Anderson moved on and, after winter voyages to Finland from Britain, did several voyages in breakbulk and bulk freighters operated by Canadian Pacific Shipping in the late 60s. These included hauling lumber from Vancouver Island to Japan and returning with automobiles; other voyages involved transporting BC forest products to the UK. John Anderson spent 18 months in CP ships crossing the Atlantic, mostly in smart-looking smallish white-hulled freighters with Beaver names trading up through the Seaway.

The author began his Canadian-based seafaring on the west coast in the large weather ship Quadra; this was followed by time in 96-foot Coast Guard Rescue Cutters. Feeling that his opportunities to captain his own ship were limited in the Coast Guard at the time, Anderson embarked in six years of towing with BC companies, initial-
ly long deep-sea voyages and then in coastal waters and then as far as the Columbia River. The narrative about these years provides a look at the variety of work done by towboats—and the decrepit condition of several. The early 70s brought an explosion of oil exploration in the Beaufort Sea by Dome Petroleum. John Anderson spent a decade working in the north, and outlines with a seamen’s eye the operational challenges of drilling in the Arctic and the innovative solutions devised by Canadian industry.

Captain Anderson’s final two decades at sea starting in the mid-80s were with the Canadian government in survey ships and finally, in the light icebreaker Sir Wilfred Laurier. He writes ruefully that under both Liberal and Conservative governments, there was a constant drumbeat of reducing funding. He eventually became master of several ships and has much to say about what it was like to serve in and handle the survey ships Parizeau and John P Tully, and Wilfred Laurier. He also writes in detail about the work these ships were doing including voyages to the western Arctic. His accounts of scientific surveys carefully describe instrumentation, what was being investigated and advances in navigational technology. John Anderson became a keen observer of marine birds and other life; an entire chapter is devoted to his observations of whales and porpoises in the North Pacific.

Time and Tides is illustrated by interesting photos taken over the years by the author. This is a straightforward account of a seagoing career spent in several types of vessel and a welcome record of time operating out of the Canadian west coast.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


To many people, the word “yachting” evokes a rarified world of wealth and indolence, enjoyed aboard extravagant floating palaces. While such decadence is certainly part of the yachting tradition, it does not define it. Mike Bender seeks to broaden our knowledge of both what yachting is, and why it matters.

Despite the all-encompassing nature of its title, *A New History of Yachting* is really a history of yachting in Great Britain. The formation of yacht clubs in the colonies is mentioned, and the New York Yacht Club makes a brief appearance in connection with the America’s Cup race; otherwise, the author essentially restricts himself to developments within the United Kingdom. Such insularity is both dated—the time when Britannia ruled the waves has long passed—and limits his potential audience.

The book’s coverage is otherwise comprehensive. Unlike previous histories that have related only the story of aristocratic sailing, Bender chronicles all aspects: from amateur boat-building to women sailors, and everything in between. This includes ocean racing, adult dinghy sailing (which, as he correctly points out, is often considered *infra dig* but has brought much low-cost pleasure to many people, both one-design racers and cruisers), family circumnavigations, and recreational therapy for the physically and mentally challenged. All of these subsets are described in their social context: e.g., ‘Corinthian’ yachting (adventurous cruising in small, simple boats, without the assistance of paid ‘hands’) devel-
oped as the mercantile and professional classes flourished in the late Victorian era, while the Second World War resulted in an appetite for risk that led some veterans to engage in long-distance voyages that would previously have been considered unduly hazardous.

To a large extent, *A New History of Yachting* is about yacht clubs: their foundations, their customs and traditions, whether they serve a purpose, and whether they will survive. One recurring theme that reappears numerous times is club members’ social climbing, encouraged by the longstanding involvement of the monarchy (a tradition that Bender regrets has now come to an end: “The Royal Family, with the exception of Princess Anne, does not sail…. The portrait of the young, tiara-ed Queen on the wall is almost the only reminder of this once powerful sentiment” (378). A less innocent side-effect has been a snobbish desire for exclusivity: women, ‘working men’ and professional sailors have all been the subjects of discrimination, which is richly catalogued complete with an 11-point list of “Means of Excluding ‘Unsuitable’ Persons”. Published individual club histories often tend towards the hagiographic, but Bender does not shy away from legitimate criticism.

The text is accompanied by colour reproductions of seven paintings, two etchings, and 15 photographs (the great majority in black and white). While these serve to illustrate different periods and styles of yachting, they form a tiny part of the book and the emphasis is very much on the written word. The latter is supported by copious footnotes and an extensive bibliography. Bender discusses a great number of yachting textbooks, novels and biographies, and it is apparent that he has a genuine love for his subject matter. As an experienced yachtsman—he has logged over 40,000 miles at sea, and holds the Royal Yachting Association’s Yachtmaster Ocean certificate—he is well qualified to provide an expert perspective on recent developments.

The concluding chapter, “After the Crash”, attempts to predict yachting’s future. While the discussion makes for rather depressing reading—some participation numbers are shrinking, the cost of ownership is increasing, a few clubs are struggling—Bender makes a better historian than social scientist. He postulates that “the economic script has been rewritten” by the 2008-2009 recession (369), but provides no real evidence for that sweeping statement. Further, his assertion that Britons’ ability to engage in yachting has been curtailed by shrinking leisure time ignores 2007 and 2009 increases in statutory leave entitlement.

An encouraging trend is increased interest in foreign charter vacations. Also noteworthy are the acquisition by several prominent clubs of fleets of small keelboats available for their members’ use and interclub regattas. Such ‘pay to play’ business models are well suited to contemporary tastes of the younger generations, and bode well for the future. In any event, the healthy numbers of competitors at the annual Round the Island Race, the routinely oversubscribed Rolex Fastnet Race, and the creation of new regattas like the RORC Caribbean 600 suggest that yachting’s appeal is far from waning. While it may not be a recreation for the masses, it never really has been.

This book contains a wealth of informed commentary, attractively presented. It would make an excellent gift for any Anglophilic armchair sailor. A more cosmopolitan history remains to be written.

Roger Harris
Etobicoke, Ontario
Mine warfare receives all too scant attention by North American navies—in peacetime. It is considered secondary to fighting a real maritime war. At present, the RCN has no mine warfare vessels, although their MCDVs (Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels) were designed, in part, for such duties. They can be so fitted easily, and have done some mine-searching trials. Yet in wartime, by necessity, mine warfare involves a major portion of naval forces, efforts and personnel, largely from the Reserves. This volume is a carefully balanced operational study by two well experienced ex-mine war officers. It is a rare and valuable addition to the corpus of Second War naval history, covering mining and minesweeping on ‘both sides of the hill,’ in considerable detail. Although listed as a paperback, its quality is superior. The hundreds of photographs, maps and diagrams are, unusually, very clearly reproduced and suitable. They alone cover the whole subject of that Second World War’s mine warfare. Apart from its operational history of ships, laying and sweeping flotillas, ship classes and crews, there is a useful review of equipment, sweeping methodology, mining aircraft, by both allied and opposing forces. The book extends from supporting background, post-war memorials, to even minor connections like ships’ badges and a Toron-
‘even warn’), required the acquisition of make-do civilian fishing vessels and such; for example, the use of fast civilian small liners as minelayers off North Sea coasts. For the Falklands war, these ships were known as ‘STUFT’—‘ships taken up from trade’—an all-too-clear example of lack of preparedness. Then came the development of specialized ‘sweepers for magnetic and acoustic mines of ever-increasing complexity. The authors cover problems associated with discovering how the enemy mines worked without becoming tediously technical. Valuable tables are included of the predominantly used mines, by both enemies and the allies. Diagrams of sweeping methods and close-up photographs of equipment are helpful for those not technically au fait with the minesweeping world.

Off enemy ports or sea routes, from the north of Norway to the Adriatic, the book covers a multitude of operations to offensively mine enemy routes and ports by air, submarines and large, fast minelayers. Also addressed are Allied sweeping efforts to combat German and Italian counter-efforts. Where possible from accessible records, results are noted. Here the authors use a multitude of short tables: ships involved, with their C.O.s, casualties from ships lost due to mining or enemy attack during these operations. For enemy mining off Trobruk and for the massive sweeping plans and actual efforts for the Normandy invasion, several pages, even whole chapters, are included.

Any gaps in the story would require a massive series of volumes to fill. For instance, in the mid-1960s, this reviewer was in touch with Air Chief Marshall Philip Joubert de la Ferte, who in late 1940 flew the first trials of aerial magnetic minesweeping by Wellingtons, trying to cope with the newly discovered German magnetic ground mines in U.K. estuaries, which were sinking too many vessels. The technique involved an aircraft carrying a diesel generator and a 50-foot circular ring of cable through which passed an electric pulse designed to trigger shallow-laid mines. Typical of the type of problem, trials and errors, and eventual successes of a large segment of the Allied and enemy navies. In most cases, as the authors show, it was a matter of discovering what the enemy were doing through unacceptable sinkings, recovering a mine, swiftly developing a counter, then getting it into use by the minesweeping fleet. The German use of combined and pressure mines was a major late-war problem, never fully solved.

For an assessment of the political and strategic assessment of mine warfare in general, the review of Captain Chris O’Flaherty’s book ‘Naval Minewarfare – Politics To Practicalities’ is the essential and valuable addition to the topic.

Authors Bruhn and Hoole are well versed in their subject, only marginally venturing into fields of assessing the over-all national strategic war results of either operational or defensive minelaying. The tables of forces and ships involved alone will prove valuable for anyone interested in further research into the various historical aspects and threats of minewarfare. The very detailed and useful index, bibliography and chapter index notes run to some 32 pages each.

A declaration of personal association: I was one of those asked to write one of the book’s three forewords. Highly recommended, despite that!

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Following on the publication of two earlier major works on shipping on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence: *Le Saint-Laurent et les Grands Lacs au temps de la voile, 1608-1850* (Montreal 1996), and *Le Saint-Laurent et les Grand Lacs au temps de la vapeur, 1850-1950* (Montreal 2005) this volume continues the themes of the earlier books but centres on the growth of a single enterprise, best known as the Richelieu and Ontario Navigation Company. The author is a distinguished economist, geographer and scholar whose work has explored the development of agriculture, industry, and trade centred on the St. Lawrence basin and *La Flotte Blanche* (The White Fleet) is an important contribution to the history of shipping in Canada.

The history of the company is explored in a conventional chronological fashion with the volume divided into three sections. The introductory chapter is the one that best demonstrates the author’s interest in geography and economics. He details the territory which formed the catchment basin for trade which the company sought; defining it as the areas in the St. Lawrence valley where the density of population reached a threshold of 20 to 30 persons per square kilometre. He discusses population change, agricultural production, shipping tonnage and other changes brought about by, and contributing to, industrialization and urbanization. He then moves to the modest beginnings of the venture, dealing with the founding of La Société de Navigation du Richelieu in 1846 with a single, small, paddle-steamer serving communities in the Richelieu valley and linking the region with the port of Montreal. Within ten years, the focus of the company had shifted to the river ports between Montreal and Quebec.

The second section of the book deals with the outcome of the merger with the Canadian Navigation Company in 1875 which extended the territory of the company, now renamed the Richelieu and Ontario Navigation Company, from the Lake Ontario ports of Hamilton and Niagara to the Saguenay, with extensive services in the Toronto-Quebec corridor. Here too, Camu provides considerable background on the geography and economy of the territories served (including up-state New York ports) and the changing demographics of the region. While there is no shortage of charts and tables this contextual information creates an expectation of discussion of how the development of the company related to these changes. Unfortunately there are few links between the statistics and the company’s activities. For example, there are extensive statistics on number of vessels, tonnage, cargo and passengers for each year between 1875 and 1915 but no indication of the proportion of these which relate to the Richelieu and Ontario vessels. There is also only cursory mention of any of the competitors for the shipping business in the St. Lawrence region so it is difficult to determine the extent to which the company was the dominant player or whether it was one of a large number of companies competing for business.

The final section of the book covers the period 1910-1913, “la grande fusion des sociétés de navigation intérieure”, a period in which more than 22 companies came together in a series of acquisitions, mergers, and take-
overs which eventually resulted in the formation of Canada Steamship Lines. These final chapters draw heavily on the work of Stephen Salmon including his essay “This Remarkable Growth: Investment in Canadian Great Lakes Shipping, 1900-1959” published in The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du Nord in 2005. Although the period covered is short in contrast to the other sections of the book it does introduce some of the other firms active in the region such as the Quebec and Gulf Ports Steamship Company, the Ontario and Quebec Steamship Company, Inland Lines, and the Northern Navigation Company which are barely mentioned elsewhere in the text.

During the almost 70 years of history of the company, it operated some 55 vessels which followed technological changes from wood to steel and paddles to propellers in ships which ranged from under 100 tons to over 4,200 tons. Almost all of the steamers were painted white which gave rise to the name “The White Fleet.” Camu provides details of the acquisition, service, and disposition of these ships. Remarkably, the first company vessel, the Richelieu, was still afloat more than a century after the company was founded, although under different names and different owners. Many of these steamers are shown in the volume and the images are properly treated as illustrations rather than decoration. Other illustrations show the routes of the vessels and newspaper advertisements of schedules and fares. The index is woefully inadequate and unfortunately, reduces the ease of access to what could be an extremely useful reference work as well as a narrative.

Any history of a business is reliant to great measure on the archival resources which have survived and Camu is fortunate that an extensive collection of the Canada Steamship Lines records was transferred to the Queen’s University Archives in 1973. The richness of these records, which includes an almost complete set of the minute books of the company, creates a dependence on the formal legalistic history of the company and underplays the social role the company played in the region. It is often the lack of corporate records which makes company histories seem uncritical with a tendency to focus on the larger-than-life personalities to inject interest in the story. It is refreshing to see how the skillful interweaving of corporate activity and the character of the company leaders can be enhanced by coverage of the geographical and economic context in which the action is carried out.

This history of the Richelieu and Ontario Navigation Company should be added to any listing of significant research into the history of North American shipping companies and underscores the need for more work on the history of similar concerns. La Flotte Blanche is well-researched, well-written, and well-presented and deserves to be better known as it sets a high standard for the history of shipping companies.

H.T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island


Author Phil Carradice is a journalist and broadcaster who has penned some 60 books and is a regular at the BBC. This particular book is a popular history account of the seminal naval battle of the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) involving ironclads, or, perhaps the more familiar term is pre-dreadnoughts. There is an anachronism here, of course, in that the battle was fought prior to the construction of HMS Dreadnought and consequently the term would have puzzled all participants. For them it was a battleship engagement, the first involving modern designs and hence, its importance to history.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was a momentous conflict that is significantly underplayed in the historiography. The dismissal of the war as not particularly relevant is largely a result of the far more momentous conflict of the Great War, involving all the major European powers, their empires, and many others. The dust up in the Far East has been eclipsed.

This neglect is unwarranted and the War of 1904-05 presaged in important ways the Great War itself, with many lessons for all militaries that would soon enough be engulfed in that world-changing conflagration. It also announced the arrival of Japan on the world stage, demonstrating that Europeans could indeed be resoundingly defeated by other races. In naval terms, it confirmed that the ranges at which naval battles would be fought were far greater than some had considered likely and brought to the fore the new technologies of wireless and cable communication systems. It notably provided fresh impetus to the Royal Navy’s great expectation of its own future ‘second Trafalgar’ as their hour hove into view.

The occasion for the war was competing national interests over northeastern China, while that empire was in the midst of its century of ‘humiliations’. The First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 had seen Japan seize Korea and Taiwan (then Formosa) and, in the aftermath, Russia moving into Manchuria to seize the warm-water port of Port Arthur at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. Thereafter, the abortive Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901 had been put down by a combination of European powers—accompanied by the United States, recently victorious over a declining Spanish empire and building its own. The Czar, Nicholas II, had ambitions to acquire Korea and Manchuria for Russia and pressure built accordingly. The Russians were quite confident that their significantly larger army and navy would have little trouble dealing with Japan.

Alas for Russia, this hubris was ill-founded, and it was humiliated by the surprise naval attack on the anchored Russian fleet at Port Arthur in January 1904. This setback was underlined by the subsequent defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the bottling up of the remaining Russian ships at either Port Arthur or Vladivostok. The land war was also not progressing well, with Port Arthur eventually besieged by the Japanese. To save the situation, relieve Port Arthur and restore Russian prestige, the Baltic Fleet, with four new battleships, sailed to their doom at the Battle of Tsushima in May of 1905. The voyage east, under the command of Admiral Rozhestvensky, was epic, with the troubling episode of the attack on British fishing boats at Dogger Bank, mistaken for Japanese torpedo boats, being but one of many setbacks, difficulties, and uncertain basic competence in naval skills. Russian courage was never lacking.

This tale is told from the perspective of both sides and moves along at an easy and good clip. The author’s asides as to the mental state of affairs of the principles serve to enliven the account. The brief summary as to the significance of the war and of the naval aspect related in the book is sound. The various attachés provided much material for their home governments to
digest, particularly the effect of modern weapons on the conduct of land campaigns, as well as the lessons involved with naval warfare. Britain’s Admiral Sir John Fisher, the contemporaneous First Sea Lord, took note of Japan’s naval success and out of that experience pushed on with the all big gun HMS Dreadnought and her fast battlecruiser near cousins HMS Invincible and her sisters. At the same time, the sheer incompetence of the Russian army and navy was well cemented in the minds of various European powers, notably Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II, and exerted a malign influence on the decision for war in 1914. The influence of the triumph at Tsushima on Japanese thinking involved concluding that they had nothing to fear regarding faraway European powers, as well as the emphatic global statement that their country was a force to be reckoned, which lingered into the middle decades of the new century, ending only with their gamble for Pacific Ocean domination in the 1930s and 1940s.

A few caveats should be noted with this book. First, it is written in an informal style, with invented conversations and presumed internal dialogue that some will find off-putting. Such an approach is often a feature of popular historical writing and so not entirely surprising. Second, the book would have benefited from a final edit as a number of infelicities remain. Slips such as these are distracting, unnecessary and suggest untoward speed in production. Third, the somewhat sparse resources quoted largely involve printed accounts by participants, including Admiral Togo’s battle report, and a small selection of secondary works, relatively few of which are up to date. Contemporary newspapers and some websites round out the research. Notwithstanding its objective as popular history, the book would have benefited from more recent explorations of the subject by, inter alia, Sydney Tyler’s The Russo-Japanese War (2018) or Larry Slawson’s The Russo-Japanese War: Political, Cultural and Military Consequences (2019). And last, the book lacks diagrams to illustrate the battle. The collection of quite excellent illustrations does include a pair a maps, one contemporary, to illustrate the area in which the war was fought, as well as Admiral Rozhestvensky’s route from the Baltic to the Japanese Sea, as it was then termed (rather than today’s Sea of Japan). Neither is particularly illuminating and there is no illustration of the various naval engagements, which is an unfortunate omission.

Any reader who wishes a high level, quick and engaging account of the Battle of Tsushima and the picaresque adventures of the Russian fleet leading up to that fateful day in May 1905, will be satisfied with Carridice’s account. Those that might prefer a more scholarly analysis, with the more typical academic apparatus, will be well advised to search elsewhere.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


My first thoughts were ‘surely not another book on Titanic—what more could there possibly be to write’?! Unlike many of the previous books on this subject, however, this one deals mostly with the ship’s crew and more importantly, their families.

Journalist Julie Cook, whose great-grandfather was fireman (stoker) William Bessant and lost with Titanic,
has produced a compelling social history concerning the crew members from Southampton who died during this famous tragedy. *Titanic* had a ships company (crew) of 908 men and women of whom 688 lost their lives. Among that 688, were 549 from Southampton; hence, the city of widows. Those who died ranged from 62 year old Captain Edward Smith, on his last voyage, through to 15-year-old Bell Boy 1st Class Arthur Barratt on his first venture to sea. Virtually no family in the city was untouched by the tragedy. Of the 23 female crew, two of the three who died were also from Southampton.

With her family connection, and the legend that her ancestor had given up his chance of survival by helping an elderly passenger to a lifeboat, the author sought out more information on what happened to the other families. Using social media to contact other ‘*Titanic*’ families and the Titanic Relief Fund archives, Julie Cook has provided a portal through which to look back over 100 years to a much different world. One can almost imagine the desperate scenes described in the days after the sinking; as panicking wives gathered around the White Star Line office, in Canute Road, Southampton, waiting desperately for information on husbands, brothers, uncles and sons.

175 of the 220 crew who survived were also from Southampton, but as Cook points out, for many, survival came at a cost. Several suffered from the then-unknown Post Traumatic Stress Disorder—as well as being called cowards for surviving while so many had died. Most of the survivors refused to talk about what they had experienced and were soon back at sea; not surprising as they still needed to earn a wage and while many at the time saw it as stoicism, it was more likely self-preservation for those struggling with ‘survivor’s guilt’. Cook also raises the issue of the ‘women and children first policy’ utilized during the sinking and the negative effect it had upon the burgeoning suffragette movement in Britain.

Previous books and films concerning *Titanic* have focused strongly on the passengers ranging from the wealthy elite such as Astor and Guggenheim through to third class passengers seeking a new life in the United States. When the crew are mentioned, it is mainly the officers; while the bulk of the stewards, cooks, boot boys and stokers are just extra’s in the book/film (such as the less than two minutes in the 1997 *Titanic* movie showing the boiler room with Jack and Rose running past startled stokers).

The effect of *Titanic*’s loss generated perhaps the world’s first ‘crowd funding’ with many thousands of pounds raised for the widows and children of those who lost their lives. The descriptions of the minutiae of the Titanic Relief Fund makes for very interesting reading ranging from regular payment to widows for food, clothing, education, etc. —but only as long as they behaved themselves in post-Victorian England. Widows who drank too much, or failed to keep their houses clean or had indiscrete liaisons had their funds stopped and the relief fund employed a ‘Lady Visitor’ to keep regular tabs on the Titanic widows.

The amounts paid to widows were tied to their late husband’s wage; the higher his wage, the more the fund paid the widow and children—regardless of their actual need. The widows of ‘black gang’ who toiled in the engine and boiler rooms received the lowest level of funding; despite often having the greatest need! This again proves the past is a foreign country—they do things differently there. Regardless, the relief fund ensured the bulk of the widows and
children were looked after and in some cases lifted them out of the abject poverty that would otherwise have ensued. Money was still being paid out in 1959 to the last of the widows—just before they turned 70 and the British old age pension took effect.

The little known strike by the engine room crew of RMS Olympic, that occurred less than a fortnight after Titanic’s loss, is also briefly mentioned. The men refused to steam the ship until sufficient and serviceable lifeboats were installed. While the men were arrested for ‘mutiny’, the lifeboats were fitted before the ship sailed. The advent of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requirements which flowed from the tragedy is also examined.

The book is not without its faults and at times it becomes glaringly repetitive—that children had their school shoes pawned by families so food could be provided starts to lose its effect after the tenth mention. As does the dampness of Southampton dwellings and the constant lack of ‘nourishing food’. While these are important to the story, they lose their effect by the unnecessary repeating of the hardships suffered by the working class families. The photos used are mainly effective but those of documents are virtually unreadable without a magnifying glass.

Overall Julie Cook has done a pretty good job of providing an insight into working class Britain in the early twentieth century; through the lens of the effect the Titanic sinking had on Southampton and its working class families. Well worth the read, even if a little bit ‘heavy going’ at times. It also proves the 1912 tragedy can still raise interest over 100 years after the ship plunged to its icy grave.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


This work is actually an single-volume reprint of a two-volume history that was first published in 1979 and 1983 respectively. In this omnibus edition, the story of the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is presented in three parts. The first part encompasses the complete first volume which traced the history of this office from its conception in 1865 to 1918. The second book, however, is split into two separate sections in this release, with Part II covering the years 1919 to 1938, while Part 3 covers the years 1939 to 1945. Overall, this breakdown is very logical and conventional.

It is based on a plethora of sources, including archival records, oral histories, memoirs, interviews and the works of other published authors. Despite the recent appearance of a semi-official history of the ONI, it still holds its own. Essentially, this is because Dorwart’s study is an academic study based on a wide range of published and unpublished sources. His central theme is that the ONI and its predecessors suffered from a split-personality. In general, it was torn between two often divergent missions—collecting data on foreign navy’s warships and weapons versus identifying internal and international threats to the United States. This central theme dominates this work, and combined with the usual “budget issues”, helps to tie everything together. Complicating this dual role is the fact that becoming the Director of the ONI was not typically a goal in itself for most naval officers who occupied this position.
Given that the ONI had its roots in the post-civil war US Navy’s quest for technical information on the warships of its contemporary’s national fleets, its evolution was remarkable. The office employed a range of naval officers and civilian experts throughout its existence. In the early period, it was manned most often by officers who were no longer able to assume sea-going duties. Recruiting officers with strong bureaucratic skills was especially difficult. Its first successes came with the establishment of naval attachés who were assigned to the various US diplomatic missions around the world. This allowed them to collect information on the naval construction of the nations to which they were attached, and led—indirectly—to ferreting out details concerning the naval ambitions of their host nations. Gradually, these missions drew the ONI into the realm of military intelligence and espionage.

The ONI rose to prominence during the Spanish-American war and its activities in this conflict fleshed out its mission within the US military establishment. An increased emphasis on domestic security was added during the First World War with mixed results as some “home security assignments” were given to less than savory characters. As the twentieth century progressed, naval attachés gradually lost their access to their traditional sources of information on naval construction and policy-makers as nations increased their security. Consequently, the ONI “engaged” many civilians whose positions within international corporations allowed them to travel throughout certain nations as agents. As for the “naval career” issue, in Dorwart’s opinion, only one officer who attained the position of Director of ONI actually saw the position as a career goal. Unfortunately, although he may have been the most gifted officer to hold the post, his reign was short-lived.

These themes with their highs and lows form the most interesting elements of this unique study. Also pertinent is what Dorwart calls, “The Failure of Intelligence Doctrine” i.e. inability to predict or detect the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This came about for a number of reasons. Despite trying to recruit more officers throughout 1941, particularly those with knowledge of other languages, i.e. Japanese, the ONI’s efforts were just beginning to bear fruit by the end of 1941. Like most American agencies, the ONI was focused on the Atlantic rather than the Pacific, and at the time, the office was just emerging from a bitter inter-office rivalry which only served to distract it further. Nonetheless, it did advise of the possibility of a Japanese attack on the USN’s Pacific fleet base. Dorwart maintains the ONI was the one office that should have detected and alerted the US administration to this impending attack. Having done, in his words, “two-thirds” of the task”, he unfortunately left it to other offices to complete. At this point, the threat was down-played and all US intelligence services received a black eye for this epic fail.

Given that it is, perhaps, harder to write a biography of a person, than an entity or an institution, one can say that Dorwart has accomplished this task very well. It is a very readable work that flows well. This well-written and researched tome should serve as the standard reference on its subject for the foreseeable future. The decision to publish it in this omnibus edition was indeed a very good one and it should be read by anyone with a strong interest in US naval history between 1865 and 1945.

Peter K H Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec

This work is an examination of the first four years of U-boat actions in the Atlantic through the microcosm of 14 chronological engagements. Drawing heavily from the records of surface vessels involved and official Kriegsmarine war diaries, author Bernard Edwards attempts to show the evolution of the war under the sea as changing tactics, technologies, and numbers gradually affected the U-boat’s attack profile and effectiveness. Individual mariners and their first-hand accounts are often used to illustrate attacks, chases, and sinkings, providing a human element to these battles between ships. A small collection of photographs is provided in the centre of the work to show some of the vessels, crews, and equipment discussed, with an epilogue, index, and brief bibliography rounding out the work.

Edwards begins his work with a brief three-page prologue that briefly covers the submarine restrictions imposed in Germany after the First World War, German pre-war submarine programs, and the arming of British merchants in the months prior to September 1939 before advancing into the main context of the work. The 14 chapters are largely presented as distinct individual narratives without overarching major analysis, and are divided into two parts. The first part, “In the Beginning,” recounts six engagements from 3 September 1939 to 19 March 1943. These showcase the evolution of U-boat tactics to their peak, from the early days of surfacing and giving warnings to crews prior to attacks through to the effective use of multiple Wolfpacks against non-air escorted convoys around three-and-a-half years later. Lone ships, either making their own runs across the Atlantic or straggling behind convoys, are discussed along with full convoy attacks, further showcasing how allied tactics changed in response to the U-boat threat.

Part Two, “The Turn of the Tide,” is larger in scale at eight chapters, but much narrower in focus, acting as a multi-chapter recount of Convoy ONS 5’s treacherous Atlantic crossing from 22 April through 12 May 1943. This last bloody major success of Wolfpack tactics nonetheless marked the end of open season for the Kriegsmarine, as Allied aircraft, detection equipment, and improved escort tactics led to the sinking of six U-boats and the further damaging of seven more. The strain and callousness developed on both sides during the prolonged engagements is clearly shown through actions such as the ordered abandoning of any search by the escort ships for any survivors of U-125 (171). The lower quality of new, inexperienced U-boat crews is also touched upon. A brief two-page epilogue discusses the acknowledged defeat and withdrawal of the Wolfpacks later in May of 1943, which could do with some expansion to better analyze the course of the Battle of the Atlantic and the true extent of ‘Black May.’

Throughout his work, Edwards often tries to place the reader aboard the ships being hunted by various U-boats, describing the creaks and groans of overstressed machinery, the wet conditions, and the often nervous nature of the crews. He does sometimes get hung up on tangents that break the flow of the narrative, such as diverting the account of the SS *Rockpool* for two pages to talk about Captain William H. Harland’s First World War convoy service,
or further following people from the narrative past the end of the case study event to another engagement or into the post-war years (54-56). If these sections were perhaps reduced and moved to an endnote format, it would help improve the work’s flow.

In terms of other possible improvements, several come to mind. The preface of the work could use an expansion along with a detailed introduction. There is currently no mention that this is a series of case studies except for on the book jacket, and there is no historiography or source discussion. This could be easily included in an introductory area. Edwards also has a tendency to make references to events or tactics that he does not explain elsewhere in the work. This includes offhand mentions such as using SS Athenia as the reasoning for a captain’s actions without explaining why that ship’s sinking was significant or SSS transmissions without explaining the significance of the three letter coding (24, 44). More pervasive is Edwards’ mentioning of ship locations within convoy columns with no discussion of convoy layout or escort positions and tactics. The addition of a timeline, glossary, and convoy layout illustrations could fix a majority of these deficiencies. Citations in the work are also almost non-existent except for in-text comments, and the bibliography is rather scant and its primary source list is incredibly vague. The addition of endnotes and the expansion of the bibliography’s “Other Sources” to have more detail beyond “The National Archives,” “U-boat Net,” and “U-boat Archive” would be greatly appreciated. Finally, given that each chapter is an engagement case study, maps of the battles would be helpful to illustrate the scope of various chases and convoy crossings.

*From Hunter to Hunted* is an interesting recounting of the U-boat war at the ground level, showcasing how ships and crews played a deadly cat-and-mouse game against the backdrop of evolving technology and tactics. While not without faults, Edwards’ case studies are a good introduction into the terrifying stresses and evolving situations of early to mid-war trans-Atlantic U-boat attacks. For those interested in merchant shipping, convoy attacks, and U-boat tactics, this work could act as a stepping stone to identifying ships and engagements for further study.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


In his first book, *The Restoration Warship*, Richard Endors distinguished himself as a talented illustrator and a meticulous historical researcher, documenting the approval, design, construction, and service-career of *Lenox*, a Third Rate of Charles II’s navy. In this successor volume, he outdoes his previous effort in documenting the business, the art, and the craft of the shipwrights who built the Restoration Navy. The link between the two books is through the Shish family of shipwrights (father and two sons) at the Deptford, Woolwich, and Sheerness yards. The ‘Secrets’ of the title refers to the contents of a small treatise that John Shish (the elder son of Jonas) sent to Samuel Pepys on 1 July 1674. This treatise, entitled *The Dimensions of the Modell of a 4th Rate Ship*, expounded on the method of
developing the ‘modell’ or draught of a ship.

To appreciate the element of mystery involved, it is necessary to understand the difference between the modern (pre-computer) system of determining ships’ lines, and the system in use in the Restoration period (and for some 150-odd years thereafter). Modern ship lines are defined by contours in three orthogonal (mutually perpendicular) planes. These contours (like the elevation contours on a topographical map) depict slices through the ship’s hull and are shown in three views: the Body Plan (hull cross-sections), the Half-Breadth Plan (waterlines), and the Sheer Plan (the profile, showing buttock lines). In the modern system, the curves in all three views are irregular, in the sense that they are not constrained to be of any particular mathematical form, and the only requirement is that they all be ‘fair’ and reconciled by projection from each view to the others. Before the computer age, ship lines were developed on paper, typically at the 1:48 scale and then offsets carefully ‘lifted’ and tabulated at full scale in triplet form of feet-inches-eighths. These offsets would then be used in the process of lofting (or full-scale plotting) and re-fairing to obtain the building patterns for the ship.

In contrast, in the period in question, the ship’s form at any section was defined by circular arcs which were tangent either to each other or to straight-line segments known as ‘flats’. This gave the apple-shaped cross-sections characteristic of wooden warships up until the early 1830s. The fore-and-aft fairness of the hull was governed by generating curves known as rising lines and narrowing lines which gave the critical arc radii and centres. Given the specification of rising and narrowing lines, the draughting of any particular ship’s section (or ‘bend’) was then an exercise in practical geometric construction (by compass arcs) and could be done both simply and accurately. It was in the specification of the rising and narrowing lines wherein lay the mystery, and the art of the Master Shipwright. The art and craft of projecting these curves not only determined the form, and hence, the performance of the vessel, but also was essential to the accurate lofting of the frame bends.

Shish is thought to have produced his treatise at the urging of Samuel Pepys to add to a collection of works on shipbuilding that he was amassing, a collection which also engendered the well-known *Doctrine of Naval Architecture* (1670) by Sir Anthony Deane, the Master Shipwright at Harwich. Shish’s document was distinguished from other works on the same subject (both within Pepys’ collection, and subsequent ones) in that it presented the form of the ship, that is the definition of the rising and narrowing lines, not in draught form but rather in tabular, numerical form. The author notes that this was quite rare, bordering on unique, but provided him with the opportunity to rediscover Shish’s likely mathematical method through a process of reverse-engineering, testing various schemes of projection against the tabulated numbers. A full two chapters discuss this effort, the comparison with other sources, and the development of a new draught of the Tyger, a 4th Rate launched in 1681.

A further full chapter is devoted to the construction of the ‘New Tyger’. The “new” consisted in King Charles having discovered a wonderful solution for his ship-financing troubles: while approval of funding for new ships was problematic, customs revenue was available (without excessive bureaucratic process) for the “repair” of existing ships. Thus Tyger, a 4th Rate launched in 1647...
and now laid up in ordinary (in reserve, or mothballed), could be “repaired”, even if in the end-result, only a few scraps of the original ship (and fewer of its dimensions) remained—such finessing of bureaucracy sounds very modern ... This chapter reveals further details of the shipwright’s craft, covering the process of lofting, and of the lifting and transference of moulds and bevels to the ship’s timbers. The author illustrates the process superbly through a sequence of 12 of his own drawings, as well as some reproductions of contemporary illustrations. In addition, the author presents a most interesting gantt chart, reconstructed from records, of the full build sequence over two years.

Whereas the illustrations in the previous volume (2009) are all in sepia tones (except eight pages of colour in the centre of the book), this volume is in glorious colour throughout, with numerous drawings and paintings by the author (including a dozen 1:72 scale fold-out plans), as well as a number of the Willem van de Velde drawings that are such a rich resource for ships of this period. This is a very handsome volume which complements well the author’s previous book and will be a valuable reference for ship-modellers and students of historical naval architectural practice.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


There has been an “excessive focus” on U-boat sinkings and convoy actions in studies of the long Atlantic campaign. That’s the view expressed by American academic Kevin Smith, one of the authors represented in this collection of ten papers. They set out to address this imbalance; most of them represent recent analyses of policy issues and the overall direction of the campaign from the perspective of the Allies. This is a rich collection of insights by recognized experts in Second World War naval warfare. Four are British, two each are American and Canadian, and there is a single Australian contribution.

The papers whose themes are the most removed from descriptions of operations are both by Kevin Smith. “Immobilitized by Reasons of Repair” provides an analysis of the impact caused by large numbers of British merchant ships out of action at any one time because they were undergoing repair due to weather, overloading, maritime accidents, and enemy attacks. He writes that “Contextualizing maritime management and diplomacy with reference to grand strategy is ... essential.” (48). Having ships out of service due to repairs seriously limited the tonnage available both for transporting cargoes of all types and for military operations. Smith notes that in February 1941, one quarter of the UK’s active importing fleet strategy was awaiting or under repair. (62) This was one of the reasons that Churchill convened the high-level Battle of the Atlantic Committee. The causes were due to inadequate repair capacity in UK yards and inefficient responses. The lack of shipping tied up under repair hastened the decline of British clout in grand strategy. In the author’s words, “...the premier maritime nation [was forced] inexorably toward a humiliating logistic dependence upon the United States.” (71).

Supported by statistical tables,
Smith amplifies themes introduced by C.B.A. Behrens in *Merchant Shipping and the Demand of War* (1955) and in his own *Conflict Over Convoys* (1996). The figures are arresting; at any given period between August 1941 and the end of summer 1943 at least seven times more shipping was immobilized out of service than was sunk by U-boats. (68) The problem was eventually solved by a combination of new construction from North America, which began to achieve prodigious levels in late 1942, and repairs abroad funded by Lend Lease. (“Throughout the war two-thirds of British-controlled tonnage immobilized for repairs lay in ports abroad.”) (64) Smith argues that topics such as the management of cargo shipping require further study: “These managerial issues must not be isolated from examination of combat; yet a comprehensive history of the Battle of the Atlantic that integrates its martial and managerial aspects still eludes historians.” (49) Kevin Smith contributes a second chapter that shows the byzantine wartime US government and a plodding Secretary of Agriculture who stymied plans to increase meat shipments to the UK, triggering a crisis in late 1942.

Two papers discuss British air resources allocated to the campaign. Dispassionate studies since the end of the war, including the Canadian and British official histories, have demonstrated that strategic bombing, which had starved resources allocated to the Atlantic campaign, was not as effective as Churchill and other senior leaders thought. A chapter by Tim Benbow concerns struggles between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. It criticizes the senior RAF leadership which was dominated by bombing advocates. Ben Jones writes about the role of the Fleet Air Arm in trade defence. His study includes a comprehensive discussion around the Royal Navy’s employment of escort carriers (CVEs). The story traces the delays in getting US-built CVEs into service due to modifications to improve their capability. The author does not mention that a special facility in Vancouver, British Columbia, which modified 19 CVEs built in nearby Tacoma, Washington, eventually became the solution. In addition to the issue of how the RN incurred criticism from the USN because it was using escort carriers for tasks other than the Atlantic campaign, Ben Jones presents some interesting comparisons between the operations of US and RN CVEs. It is not clear whether Jones’ figures, drawn from wartime studies, are comparing carriers known in the USN as the Bogue (Smiter in the RN) class and the larger Casablanca class, none of which were transferred. The RN operated their escort carriers with smaller crews, which meant that American CVEs operated continuously for 33-40 days as against 16-18 days. Because the US ships carried more aircraft, they managed more hours of flying per day, and “wastage” of aircraft was higher in the British carriers, in part because of undercarriage weaknesses in the RN ASW aircraft, the Swordfish. (146-7)

Christopher Bell, who has published extensively about Churchill and air power in the Atlantic campaign, contributes a carefully reasoned paper on Churchill, Grand Strategy, and the Atlantic campaign. He writes that Churchill’s overriding priority was managing an adequate level of imports. At times, he was willing to allocate resources to what he viewed as “offensive” purposes and to accept heavier-than-necessary shipping losses. (21) This chapter, informed by the author’s familiarity with both archival resources and Churchill’s role in wartime policy decisions, is a masterful discussion of the British
Prime Minister’s involvement in the Atlantic campaign. Bell concludes that the delay in closing the mid-Atlantic air gap with Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft might have delayed the defeat of the U-boats, but that this failure cannot be blamed on Churchill. (43)

The opening chapter by Marc Milner, the doyen of Battle of the Atlantic (BofA) scholars is subtitled “The Case for a New Paradigm”. Milner cites Corbett’s contention that the outcome of maritime campaign depends on sustained effort and “interfering” with the enemy, rather than on dramatic battles. The dramatic turn of events in the Atlantic in the spring of 1943 was, therefore, the culmination of several factors and did not decide the outcome of the long campaign to defend shipping. It was the system for the defence of trade organized by the British that ultimately won the campaign; “avoidance of the enemy” was the key to success. This rested on three factors (a) the main battle fleet which ensured that German heavy warships only sporadically attacked shipping early in the war (Milner reminds readers that enemy heavy units were an ongoing threat in French ports throughout 1941); (b) naval intelligence in its fullest sense including routing shipping away from the enemy using the Naval Control of Shipping organization; and (c) escorts He touches on problems in allied management of shipping but concludes that these did not adversely affect the development of allied strategy, citing the easing of tonnage in 1943. (18) The UK import crisis of 1942-43 (which features in the chapters by Kevin Smith and Christopher Bell) “was an issue of allocation.” (19)

James Goldrick writes about the training of RN and RCN escort groups. His central argument is that “The creation of a sophisticated learning and training system to prepare ships and men for the ASW war is one of the most significant but under-recognized elements of the Atlantic campaign.” (167). This absorbing paper covers a range of issues, such as how groups developed common procedures, the role of doctrinal publications and of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU) (whose influence is arguably underestimated), and the difference between having a group commander in command of his own ship or not. The article is obviously based on deep reading and includes comments on the alleged prewar “Cinderella” status of the RN’s Anti-Submarine Branch. It is all the more cogent because of Admiral Goldrick’s perspective as someone with seagoing experience of operational training and applying doctrine. The narrative is supported by extensive citations from writings by BofA participants. It’s a pity that the writer seems unaware of the wartime diaries of an RN officer who commanded an RCN escort group during the final eighteen months of the campaign: Commanding Canadians (2005), edited by Michael Whitby. Goldrick characterizes the two official history volumes produced by Alec Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael Whitby as “show[ing] just how official history can and should be done.” (153, fn. 9)

Marcus Faulkner underlines that recent examinations of wartime events at sea have linked operations by German U-boats, surface ships and aircraft in widely separated areas as elements in a single campaign in the wider context of British grand strategy. In a paper titled “A Most Disagreeable Problem,” he describes contemporary Admiralty assessments of the never-completed aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, launched at the end of 1938. He demonstrates that until the late summer of 1943, there was concern that Graf Zeppelin might
emerge as part of a carrier group. In addition to laying out intelligence available about the phantom carrier, this paper describes how the Admiralty saw the threat from surface forces in light of the changing composition of the Home Fleet. Fascinating.

By 1943, the size of coastal convoys along the UK’s south and east coasts had more than doubled as part of the buildup for a cross-Channel assault. “The Other Critical Convoy Battles of 1943” by G.H. Bennett covers the German motor torpedo boat (Schnellboot) threat to these shipping movements. This chapter is a thorough description of successive developments by both sides of motor attack boats and defensive measures by the British. Once the Schnellboot attacks were defeated in several hard-fought engagements at the end of 1943, the Germans lacked the industrial capacity to upgrade their boats in adequate numbers. This chapter is noteworthy in being the only one in Decision in the Atlantic based extensively on both Allied and German sources.

In “The Cruise of U-188: Special Intelligence and the “Liquidation” of Group Monsson 1943-1944”, David Kohen loosely uses a year-long deployment by U-188 to Penang and back in 1943-44 to discuss Allied cooperation in exploiting special intelligence. The writer covers many subjects in 36 pages. U-188 was a long-range type XD that successfully brought scarce raw materials back from Asia and sank several Allied ships in the Indian Ocean. Kohen corresponded with U-188’s First Lieutenant and interviewed another officer in the story 20 years ago, but his focus is the overall context of how the Allies were using intercepted signals. Along the way he mentions Lieutenant John B. MacDiarmid RCNVR and the Canadian Submarine Tracking Room in Ottawa. Kohen makes extensive use of contemporary exchanges between American and British U-boat trackers. The difference between how directly the Americans and British chose to use signals intelligence in ordering intercepts of U-boats is a theme that crops up repeatedly. In view of Marc Miner’s point elsewhere in this compendium (also made in the useful Introduction) that the British aim in protecting shipping was to avoid the enemy, it is arresting to read a direct statement in 1944 by US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King. He remarked that the Admiralty tactic of routing convoys on evasive courses “appears potentially one of the most dangerous operational uses of such intelligence in the Atlantic Theatre... consistently diverting North Atlantic convoys around his u/boat concentrations has caused the enemy grave concern [about the security of their communications].” (278) This was part of an exchange of messages with First Sea Lord Admiral Cunningham who had expressed caution about using special intelligence in hunter-killer operations against U-boats. The Germans had become suspicious about their communications after two of their tankers operating in the Indian Ocean to support U-188 and other U-boats had been located and sunk by the British. King’s view was “It is my opinion that continued use of special intelligence for operational purposes does not in itself involve undue risk.” (278)

Decision in the Atlantic has a good index and four interesting photos illustrating David Kohnen’s paper on special intelligence. This is a collection of outstanding papers by experts in their topics reflecting recent scholarship on the Atlantic campaign 75 years after it ended.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia
An entertaining and easy read about a ship’s cat and one of the world’s eminent cartographers. I was not sure what I would find inside this book but was pleasantly surprised by the content and style. Being a naval officer, the story of Matthew Flinders was not unknown to me (for a midshipman in Flinders Division at the Royal Australian Naval College in the 1980s, his biography was standard reading) but information concerning his cat ‘Trim’ was virtually unknown. This book does an excellent job in raising Trim from an obscure oddity to one of much greater importance in the early history of Australia.

Trim was born at sea onboard HMS Reliance in 1797 in which Flinders was serving; he was one of the ship’s cats kept onboard to catch the rats and mice that plagued all sailing vessels of the era. The cat’s task was simple—catch the rodents before they ate too much of the ships provisions; especially ships biscuits which were part of the staple diet of the seafarers.

In 1798 Flinders and George Bass circumnavigated Tasmania in the sloop Norfolk, proving it was an island and naming the water separating it from the mainland as Bass Strait. In 1799 Flinders sailed north exploring the Australian east coast and took Trim with him to ‘guard’ the ships bread. When Flinders returned to England in 1800, Trim accompanied him and lived at his home. Both Flinders and Trim, however, grew restless and returned to the southern continent for more exploration.

Arriving at the penal colony of Port Jackson in 1801 (not much more than a decade after it has been founded in 1788), Flinders took on the task of circumnavigating the entire continent in HMS Investigator; thus producing the first chart of the continent. Trim continued to endear himself to Flinders, and the crew, with his many antics and particularly, climbing into the rigging to observe the reefing of sails (but then needing to be carried down as cats are poorer at coming down from heights). The cat would also sit with the officers when they had their meals (as they had better food then the crew) and frequently stole portions of meat; often straight off their forks.

Trim survived storms, shipwreck and near starvation but it was while returning to England in 1804, with Flinders, that he met his demise while both were held as prisoners of the French on the island of Mauritius. Flinders was moved to write Trim’s story and this document (A Biographical Tribute to the Memory of Trim) survived and returned with Flinders to England and is now in the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich.

This quaint and quirky book tells the story of Trim from both Flinders’
and Trim’s point of view (crafted by Philippa Sandall and Gillian Dooley), while also enlightening the reader on the colonization and exploration of the Great Southern Land. *Trim–The Cartographers Cat* is a quality hard cover publication, very well illustrated and highly recommended.

Of note is that Flinders died on 19 July 1814—the day after his magnum opus, *A Voyage to Terra Australis*, was published. His memory, however, lives on in Australia with his name perpetuated by a mountain range, an island, a university, a hotel, a harbour pilot vessel and a former survey vessel of the Royal Australian Navy. His portrait has graced stamps, banknotes and Wedgewood plates and there are no less than six statues of him around the world—several of which have a statue of Trim close by.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


The subtitle of the *Trafalgar Chronicle* reads, *Dedicated to Naval History in the Nelson Era*. This is exacting what the ongoing series has provided to help fill in the larger context in which Nelson served. The events that influenced his experience, but in which he may have had only a tangential involvement, the officers influenced by Nelson, directly and indirectly, those who served in his ships, on other ships in squadrons he commanded, and those whom he never met. This edition continues this service with 21 articles.

The volume is dominated by a series of brief biographies of naval officers, some who served with Nelson, others who did not, constituting ten essays. They include Admiral George Augustus Westphal (by Tom S. Iampietro), and his brother Admiral Philip Westphal (by T. Jeremy Waters), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Provo Wallis (by Jeremy B. Utt), Lieutenant Richard Bulkeley (by Jack R Satterfield), Admiral Sir Manley Dixon and one on Rear-Admiral Thomas T Tucker (both by Andrew Z. Frederick), Captain William G. Rutherford (by Anna Kiefer), Rear-Admiral John Peyton (by Barry Jolly), Captain Conway Shipley (by Rui R. Filipe), and Captain John Perkins (by Douglas Hamilton). Some essays, such as the piece on Admiral of the Fleet Wallis, cover well-known ground, while others explore people who fell into obscurity in the shadows of contemporaries, the best example here is Philip Westphal, whose own brother George’s career eclipsed his own.

Of the ten biographies, this reviewer found Rui Ribolhos Filipe’s account of the short, yet full career of Captain Conway Shipley the most intriguing (“The Beach of the English Dead: Remembering Captain Conway Shipley”). A native of Denbighshire, a follower of Earl Spencer, he saw his first action at the Battle of the Glorious First of June. After serving as lieutenant on a variety of ships, he was made commander of the frigate *Nympe*, in 1807. On the night of 22/23 April 1807, while blockading the French and several Portuguese vessels in the Tagus, Shipley led a cutting-out party to seize the 54 gun *Princesa Carlota*. Things went terribly wrong, as the tide prevented them from reaching the Portuguese ship. Changing target to the brig *Gaiativa do Mar*, Shipley was killed as he scaled the side of the ship, throwing his men into some confusion. The attack failed, and Ship-
ley’s body was not recovered by his comrades in arms. The burial and later efforts at different memorials to the 26-year-old officer completes the article. Stories of officers like Shipley are usually ignored, but they have a clear and salient place in our understanding of serving afloat.

Only two of the remaining articles have Nelson as the focus around which the authors weave their tale. Des Grant briefly highlights the careers of 19 Irish officers, a surgeon and a purser, whose time afloat intersected with Nelson, in “Nelson was an Irishman.” Included are Captain George Farmer (Captain of HMS *Seahorse*, and midshipman Nelson), Sir Peter Parker (whose path intersected with Nelson’s in the West Indies), and Sir Thomas Graves, third in command at the Battle of Copenhagen, plus a number of officers who served in various capacities in HMS *Victory*, and other British ships at the Battle of Trafalgar, plus two who commanded Spanish vessels on that fateful 21st. Clearly, there was a significant cohort of Irish officers in the British navy, who served the crown well, an image that runs counter to the contemporarily much-maligned Irishmen taken into the navy as landsmen. The author’s single endnote unfortunately refers the reader to a forthcoming book on Irish Admirals for any references.

The other article is by Susan K. Smith, who writes about Benjamin Silliman, an American academic visiting England in the summer of 1805, to purchase scientific books and equipment for Yale. His diary describes England at war with Napoleon, everyday scenes of London and its elite, and of most interest, his sightings of Lord Nelson. Silliman saw him in London, noting the crowd that gathered around Nelson, cheering, and jostling to get a view of the man. He saw Nelson again at Portsmouth, as the Vice Admiral made his way to the beach to be rowed out to HMS *Victory*. The descriptions of both sightings are brief but detail rich. The excitement that perfused the crowds that gathered for Lord Nelson is tangible in Silliman’s account.

The interconnections between women and the navy is the subject of “The Role of Women in London’s Sailortown in the Eighteenth Century,” by Derek Morris and Ken Cozens. Morris and Cozens examine how women took care of themselves financially, when their husbands went to sea. Their occupations ranged from serving as agents for money lenders, to managing the investment in shipping and other businesses (such as compass-making) left to them by deceased husbands. Some were servants, or lodging-house keepers, while others entered the victualling trade. Many would have joined the ranks of the labouring poor to make ends meet. This informative piece broaches an area of maritime history that needs far more research.

The Reverend Lynda Sebbage discusses the chaplains aboard ships-of-war (“Sin Bo’suns in Nelson’s Ships”). Religion varied widely among the officers. Some Captains were evangelical, holding regular divine services and requiring their crew’s strict attendance to Christian morals. Others were less inclined, holding services if the spirit moved them. Not all ships had chaplains, and chaplains varied much in their education, experience and skill at delivering sermons. Sebbage describes the larger picture of chaplains within the navy, and touches on Nelson’s chaplains. Like the subject of women in the maritime world (afloat and ashore) religion and its chaplains offers a rich opportunity for investigation.

“The Russians on the Tagus,” by Mark West, is another gem in the col-
lection. This article ties diplomacy and naval action (or inaction) together to tell the tale of the Russian squadron under Vice-Admiral Dmitri Nikolaevich Seniavin, which found itself stranded in the Tagus River. Sent to the Mediterranean to reassert Russian control of the Adriatic in 1806, Seniavin defeated a Turkish squadron at the Battle of Athos, in 1807. The Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, formed an alliance between Russia and France. Returning to St Petersburg, Seniavin was forced to seek shelter from a storm, by reaching Lisbon on the Tagus River. This landed his ten ships into the dynamic situation between Britain, France and Portugal. The French had seized Portugal and thus, Lisbon. As an ally of France, the Russian squadron could stay. If it left, it would meet the British blockade, and being a French ally, would be attacked by the British force. Confusing the situation was the unstable peace between Russia and France, casting Seniavin as less than a fully supportive ally to the French, at Lisbon. Ultimately, the situation was resolved when the British army forced the French to leave Lisbon, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton worked out an arrangement with Seniavin to surrender his ships to the British, and be escorted to Portsmouth. The Russians stayed for months before the crews were sent home to Russia. By then, only two of the original ten ships were seaworthy enough to return to Russia in 1812, when Russia broke its alliance with France. Seniavin's crushed reputation, and posthumous rise to fame within Russia, are an interesting twist to the story.

This review, already too long, can only mention in passing the articles touching on seaports in North America (by Harold E 'Pete' Stark), the loyalist marines of the American Revolution (by Tom Allen), carronades (by Anthony Bruce), the use of hot air balloons by the French (by Anthony Cross), and the Battle of George's Cay (by Michael Harris).

A section containing nine coloured images appears towards the end of the volume, detailing events, people, and memorials discussed within some of the articles. Two images from the National Maritime Museum, one of the defeat of the French 74 Guillaume Tell (Plate 6) and the other of HMS Glatton after an engagement (Plate 7) are exceptional. There are 54 other black and white images of people, events, and memorials, and four maps are distributed throughout the volume.

The endnotes for each article appear at the end of the volume, after the author bio. They range drastically, from the one reference for Grant’s article (as noted above), the numerous but sparsely described list for the piece on Admiral Sir Provo Wallis, the handful cited by former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman for his contribution on the Decatures and Lehmans, to the amply detailed offering by Mark West.

The annual Trafalgar Chronicle is a unique publication, combining the writing of enthusiasts, students, specialist academics, and independent scholars on topics pertaining to the British Navy, largely between 1750 and 1820. This is Peter Hore’s last turn as editor, having produced solid volumes for each of his five years at the task. He has left the Trafalgar Chronicle in the hands of Dr Sean M. Heuval, a faculty member at Christopher Newport University, Virginia, who will have the assistance of Dr Judy Pearson, and Captain John Rodgaard, U.S.N. (Ret). They have a large pair of shoes to fill.

Thomas R. Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario
Eight states in the USA make up the Mountain West region: Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Those states have an arid climate and water is the most precious commodity. With the driest climate of all, Nevada is viewed as all desert, especially by the majority of visitors who only go to its principal city, Las Vegas. But most of northern and central Nevada is mountainous and is fed by rivers and streams, while western Nevada has several lakes. In *Historic Nevada Waters. Four Rivers, Three Lakes, Past and Present*, authors Hunt Janin and Ursula Carlson detail the laws, environment, and social history of the rivers and lakes that feed northern and central Nevada.

Some understanding of water law in the American mountain west is necessary to understand this book. Because of their arid climate, the water that enters each of the mountain west states belongs to that state. While state laws vary somewhat, in general, a landowner with property by a watercourse—for example, a stream—does not have the right to take water from that stream. Rather, that landowner must apply to the state for permission to use that water (a water right.) The key to obtaining a water right is, generally, beneficial use of the water (for example, irrigation is a beneficial use of that water whereas water used in a decorative fountain is not beneficial.) Equally important is “first in time, first in right,” meaning that water rights can be sold but priority in competing claims to water runs back to the first granted right to that water. Needless to say, water law in the American mountain west is VERY complicated and the subject of much litigation.

It is against this background of aridity, complicated laws, litigation, and history, that Janin and Carlson relate the stories of four Nevada rivers—the Walker, the Truckee, the Carson, and the Humboldt—and three Nevada lakes—Lake Tahoe (often featured in the famous 1960s western television show *Bonanza*), Pyramid Lake, and Walker Lake. The book starts out describing the rivers but then segues into Nevada history—the native tribes, exploration of the then-wilderness, transportation and communication, economic history of the famed Comstock Lode, which brought miners to the land, how the railroads brought immigrants from the east to what became Nevada, the contributions that Chinese immigrants made to creating Nevada, and a chapter on the more recent role of the Basque immigrants to Nevada who were renowned shepherders and enriched Nevada’s diversity. For example, the family of one Basque shepherd, Dominique Laxalt, is famous for one son, Robert, who became a renowned writer, including writing the American Bicentennial History of Nevada, and his brother Paul Laxalt, who served the state as Lieutenant Governor, Governor, and a U.S. Senator from Nevada.

A chapter on Nevada water law follows and this is sufficiently detailed to relate the major provisions of Nevada water law while not bogging the reader down in legalistic detail. After that, the authors describe the various water projects, legal challenges, government agencies established, legal agreements formed, descriptions of Pyramid Lake, Lake Tahoe, Walker Lake, and because of the dry climate that firms Nevada
soil, the occasional floods that these rivers cause in years of heavy snowpack runoff and some unusually high rainfall. The reader interested in climatology and environmental issues will find these chapters of interest.

Interspersed with the water narrative are biographies of the men and women who were famous in along the rivers and lakes described in this book: the famed American author, Mark Twain, spent time in the mining camps of Nevada; explorers such as Alexander von Humboldt, Kit Carson (for whom Nevada’s capitol, Carson City, is named) and John C. Fremont, a renowned native American basket maker, Dat Lo La Lee, Julia Bulette, a famed brothel owner, public servants such as William Sharon, Francis Newlands, and Paul Laxalt, all U.S. Senators from Nevada, and others, male and female, appear. The inclusion of these individuals adds a human dimension to the narrative.

The authors close with discussions of environmental issues, climate change and population growth, and what the future holds for these rivers and lakes. For many years Nevada has been a high population growth state, primarily in the Las Vegas area, but also in northern Nevada— the Reno-Sparks, Carson City and Lake Tahoe areas. Without more attention paid to the issues caused by excessive growth, the future for these rivers and lakes is not promising.

The authors clearly care about the state of Nevada and its water. The writing is easy to read, striking a balance between too much detail and not enough. The result is a surprisingly enjoyable and readable book about a seemingly narrow topic.

The authors themselves term this book, “multifaceted,” (4) and it certainly is that. Combining the history of Native Americans, exploration, economic history, legal history, hydrology, and environmental concerns, this book is for students of the American west and of Nevada particularly.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


This book describes the author’s graphical reconstruction of the seventeenth-century English warship Sovereign of the Seas. The ship was remarkable in that it was the first to mount 100 guns, was the largest of its kind at the time, was lavishly decorated, and was also extraordinarily expensive. These attributes attracted great attention during the ship’s life and after and this is certainly not the first attempt to render the vessel in graphic detail. The history and principal documentary and visual sources—often contradictory—are explained in the first three chapters before the author lays out the basis of his reconstruction more thoroughly. The following twelve chapters cover the hull design and construction, fittings and internal arrangements, decorations, masts, sails and rigging, ordnance and boats. Each of these chapters refers the reader to the appropriate plates showing the reconstruction and, while it is a big book, they are designed to be read concurrently. The graphical reconstruction itself is presented as 68 black and white plates taking up much of the latter half of the book and 10 full colour illustrations in a centre section. The drawings are superbly executed and demonstrate
a high degree of draughting expertise, as one might expect from this author. The principal visual sources are also included in generous full-page illustrations—two in colour and two others in black and white. The impression one gets from the book is fitting to the subject—large, detailed, lavishly decorated, and just a little controversial.

Some elements in McKay’s reconstruction will be debated and the shape of the stern is the first that becomes obvious, quite literally, as it is clear on the cover art. McKay justifies his choice of a square tuck stern based on the only image available showing the ship from astern and acknowledges that this interpretation is at variance with other modern sources (21–22). The extension of the flat plane of the stern almost to the keel results in an awkward afterbody shape that would have been quite inefficient, where a more pinched or narrow shape, even with a square tuck, may have been more likely. Hydrodynamic modelling and testing of the proposed hull shape, along with visual evidence of the afterbody section below the waterline on other contemporary ships, would add further credibility to this element of the reconstruction. While this and other interpretations are clearly offered as conjecture, some stated as fact are equally disputable. McKay’s claim that a round shot discharged from a smooth-bore gun by a powder charge “would travel at about a mile per second” (139)—a muzzle velocity over twice that achieved by modern rifled naval ordnance—serves as an example. Perhaps, in this case, feet were simply mistaken for yards or metres. Nevertheless, the potential for misinterpretation of dimensions is discussed (19–21), and McKay is careful to explain the sources for dimensions elsewhere.

The number and range of drawings are impressive and the linework is excellent. Outlining would have given a more three-dimensional aspect to the complex drawings, but McKay uses shading to good effect to represent the extensive decorations and carvings. The plates cover all external and internal aspects of the hull and rigging, and include detailed views of fittings, ordnance and boats. Scales are provided where appropriate, along with measurements in some large-scale views, and the drawings are conservatively but appropriately keyed. There are some smudges and scanning artefacts (e.g. plates 23 and 52), but they do not detract from the drawings in any way and lend delightfully authenticity to skilled draughtsmanship. Together, this graphical reconstruction could be used to make a complete model and will prove to be a valuable sourcebook for researchers.

All reconstructions of watercraft preserved in anything less than a pristine state are bound to be wrong, it is just a matter of how much so. If one acknowledges that notion, and McKay clearly accepts that some of his interpretations will be disputed (9), then this book may be enjoyed for its illustrative excellence and depth of research. The author should be commended for his meticulous approach to such a daunting subject, for justifying his choices and for offering up his interpretations for scrutiny in fine research tradition. Such comprehensive explanation of each element of a graphical reconstruction of this scope is indeed rare. The book is recommended for its extensive use of historical documentary and visual sources, as an important catalyst to debate and for the superb draughtsmanship. Enthusiasts and students of early modern warships will find this book thoroughly worthwhile.

Mick de Ruyter
Adelaide, South Australia

This fascinating, long overdue volume is written by an expert, Chris O’Flaherty, who is Captain, Maritime Warfare Centre at HMS Collingwood, and has spent much of his career involved with clearance diving and mine warfare. While the first 50 pages are a general review of the development of mines and mine warfare, the book concentrates on the principles of the threat and the use of this ‘pernicious’ device, a careful review of the rarely-observed legalities involved. These are surprisingly still measured by infractions to the Hague Convention of 1909. Among civilized nations, these regulations are conceived as applicable, at least in part, to major powers, just not from most of those currently employing mines.

There is a fascinating and educational recording of mining use on 24 tactical and operational occasions throughout the world since the end of the Second World War. It offers a sobering review of the actual recent and on-going use of sea mines. The problems faced by various warships and merchantmen, from the severe damage to two RN destroyers in the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a supposedly free passageway, through their use in the Indo-China war of 1965-1973, the Falklands in 1982, the Gulf War in 1991 (where Canada’s ships had to be cautious of them), and more recently, off Yemen in 2017. (Chapter 3, pp.57-161, plus 15 pages of reference notes to these events). Each is a tale of threatened or actual encounter with opposition mining, ranging from a few paragraphs to several pages. In itself, this section is a serious warning to those who may regard this ancient weapon as of little or easily handled concern: ‘just a threat.’

The major thrust of O’Flaherty’s work is to serve as that warning. Throughout, he makes the point that while publicised mining of sea passageways and harbour approaches may be covered, even complied with, by civilized major nations who at least notionally would be in adherence to those 1909 Hague Peace Conference Conventions, there are those who refuse to publish warnings but allow free passage to non-belligerent ships. The rise of minor inter-nation squabbles and outright wars by semi-rogue states has led to completely unregulated sea mining, costing many ships—and lives, thanks to the availability of some relatively simple mining devices, available to the smallest of non-state organizations. O’Flaherty describes and provides diagrams of increasing levels of possibility, threat and actuality. The correlation of effort to threat to measures of success is not necessarily related to ships sunk, too easy a measurement when the threat of mining is its major advantage, at almost nil cost.

The final chapter headings indicate the value of this text above the normal ‘this is what happened’ earlier books on minewarfare: ‘The Law of Naval Mining’ and ‘of Naval Mine Countermeasures,’ ‘The Statecraft of Naval Minewarfare,’ his conclusions in ‘Measures of Effect’ and his valuable actual ‘Conclusions (336-342)’. These chapters are what makes this volume so important and so different from earlier histories presenting the use of mines as a mere adjunct to wider naval warfare.

This text should not only be on the bookshelves of those navally responsible for preparations to meet the threat
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The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

of hostile mining of our harbours and passages, such as the St. Lawrence estuary, but available to those providing the funding for at least a minimal countermeasure. Here Captain O’Flaherty provides a close scrutiny of what is required in statecraft to meet the all-too-real threat alone. While he covers the possibility of mining opponents’ waters (after all, he leads an RN minewarefare school), the application of preparations to deal with the potential mining of ours, quite possibly by the most minor of groups—not even major powers—is where this volume is at its most valuable. An unusual, an essential, read for quite a range of leaders, apart from anyone with an interest in the subject.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


This is the second volume of author Lawrence Paterson’s examination into the history of Luftwaffe maritime units and operations during the Second World War. Primarily focused on the period of 1943 to 1945 with initial discussions of relevant 1942 events woven into combat theatre histories, Paterson narrowed the overall focus of the work to be predominantly on the bomber units repurposed for specialized maritime roles. Additional aircraft units and pilots are discussed when relevant, but the scope was specialized to prevent the need to create further volumes in what was initially intended to be a single book. As with his previous works on the Kriegsmarine, the author makes excellent use of primary sources from both the axis and allies to present a solid chronology of operations within several theaters of engagement. Contemporary quotes and images are spread throughout the work, and the main text is bookended by a lead-in glossary of terms and unit organizational structures and an appendix guide to relevant aircraft introduced from 1942 to 1945, followed by endnotes, bibliography, and an index.

While this book is the second volume of the author’s first foray into the airborne operations side of the naval war, his pattern of analysis bears a distinct similarity to his earlier work, Hitler’s Forgotten Flotillas: Kriegsmarine Security Forces, in which Paterson focuses each chapter on a specific theater of operation, covering the early dispositions of each theater in the first half of the work, followed by their late war situations in the latter half. For Eagles Over the Sea, he divides the treatment into three; France and the Atlantic, North Africa and the Mediterranean, and the Artic and Eastern Front. While the book title implies a focus solely on 1943 forward, the first half actually covers large portions of 1942 for the various theatres as well, providing context and background for the primary period of focus.

The first three chapters of the work set the stages for the various theatres of operation, covering assigned squadrons, equipment, situations and operations. In addition to Paterson’s stated focus on converted bombing units, there is a definite early emphasis on U-boat escort duty around the Bay of Biscay, with the Mediterranean operations more varied in nature to include sea rescue, supply transport, and reconnaissance. The northern units offer an interesting view
into effective Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine interactions, especially with the joint reconnaissance and attack operations of U-boats and diesel-powered Bv-138 flying boats. Worked into these narratives are analyses of the construction, training, and implementation of new airframes and technology as the war progressed, to include radar systems, RATO units, and guided munitions.

The seven remaining chapters trace the maritime operations of 1943 onwards, with the ebbing of Germany’s fortunes becoming more and more evident and its increased impact on the various units. Italy’s defection from the axis gains its own chapter, with detailed accounting of the anti-shipping operations undertaken by German forces against their former allies prior to the various amphibious invasion operations launched on the Italian mainland. Throughout the work Paterson offers a good accounting of such individual flight operations, many of which are often blow-by-blow in nature, including the He-177 on convoy KMF 26, resulting in the loss of HMT *Rohna* to a rocket powered Hs-293 in “the second worst disaster at sea for the United States” (251-253). The efforts of unit leaders and crews to continue their operations amidst ever dwindling supplies and increased allied military superiority is clearly seen in the listing of aircraft lost, the accounts of officers and men affected by the attrition of their units, and the constant consolidation of units due to losses and collapsing territorial control. The lack of sufficient numbers of aircraft then leads to airframes being run ragged without the time or proper facilities for maintenance, resulting in further strain and hampering of efforts to maintain a presence for U-boat escort or anti-shipping raids. Paterson also recounts evacuation efforts in various theatres which were to become more prevalent during the final months of the war. The final chapter covers the bastion of maritime units operating in Norway from 1944 onwards, beginning with convoy patrols and ending with the participation of KG26, the first dedicated torpedo bomber unit of the Luftwaffe, in the service’s final evacuation operation right up to the official surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. The appendix that follows offers information on five different airframes, each consisting of a short summary, general characteristics, performance, and armament.

The only suggested future improvement would be a slight expansion to the appendix. Paterson does cover a variety of aircraft types throughout the work and there are wartime photographs interspersed throughout, but there are no recognition style aircraft profiles in the work to offer a clean, standardized, comparable view of the different designs. If such images were added to the appendix entries for the aircraft types, it would help add a visual element to the technical data and allow for a rapid comparison of size, scale, and structure. The pre-1942 aircraft designs discussed could also be included this way. Such an inclusion would be minor in the grand scheme of the work, but might prove a useful supplement for future editions.

*Eagles Over the Sea* is an excellent addition to the often neglected historiography of Luftwaffe maritime operations in the mid- to late-war period. Paterson’s compilation of official reports, first-hand accounts, and insightful analysis weave together the various threads that made up each theatre of operation’s combat chronology. Human actions and errors, developing technologies, changing tactics, and the struggle to continue operations amidst the ever encroaching allied forces are all covered in a flowing, detailed style that provides
both technical details and humanizing elements at the same time. For those interested in German inter-service operations or the Luftwaffe’s maritime aircraft, equipment, and their operations, this work is a welcome addition to current scholarship.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


Robin L. Rielly gives a definitive history of an often-forgotten class of naval vessels in his 2013 book, *American Amphibious Gunboats in World War II*. The exhaustively researched book is an authoritative account of the vessels from their inception to “the last gunboat” which was turned into a museum in 2010. Rielly’s work is both well researched and eminently readable. Read in parts or from start to finish, it will broaden the understanding of amateur and professional historians alike.

Rielly’s story of what terms “LCI gunboats” begins in 1943—already years into the war. He notes that even though the boats debuted in the North Africa landings they did not really come into their own until they were used in the Pacific theatre where he focuses his work. After the early battles in the Solomon Islands, and the bloody assault on Tarawa the Navy realized that amphibious assaults needed to be supported by far more firepower during the landing itself. Early LCI gunboats were conversions of other landing craft modified by the addition of guns—usually 20 mm and 40 mm—with extra machine guns and many were converted in forward areas. But later versions carried 4.5” and then 5” rockets and mortars as more and more firepower was requested and new designs were put into production or converted from other boats. In the designations “LC” meant “Landing Craft” and the last letter usually designated the type of weapon carried (R) for rockets, (M) for mortars, and (G) for the heavy gunboats produced by the end of the war that carried a mix of rockets and guns.

Over the course of the war, the gunboats progressively increased their armament. Late war versions carried one 3” gun, two twin 40 mm guns, four 20 mm guns, rocket launchers that could salvo fire 120 rockets and as many as six .50-calibre machine guns—all on a ship that carried no more than 70 officers and men. This made the gunboats easily the most heavily armed ships of the war, man for man and ton for ton. One seaman put it “we were so cramped on deck side you could not go more than six feet from a gun... even the flag man had a machine gun attacked to his flag bag.”

One of the most interesting sections of *American Amphibious Gunboats* is the section on crew life. The gunboats were some of the smallest vessels able to make open water transits. Despite their small size—the largest were only 159 feet long and only 23 feet wide—they transited across the Pacific all the way to Okinawa and beyond. Rielly does not mince words here, telling the reader simply “Flat bottom boats are not comfortable in a seaway.” An understatement if there ever was one. Life aboard was cramped and uncomfortable.

Rielly chronicles the mundane part of crew life. Life was “Spartan” and uncomfortable. Crews loved ice cream and breakfast always caused problems because gunboats never had more than one toaster and the coffee was always
terrible. Rielly also talks briefly about race on the gunboats. African-American sailors were only allowed to serve as a Steward’s Mate, cooking and cleaning up after the officers, jobs deemed beneath other sailors aboard.

The gunboats were also dangerous—because they were heavily armed and considered expendable in defense of larger ships they were often used as picket ships or in more risky missions. The casualty rate of the gunboats was significantly higher than the theater average and in some operations nearly double. And the Ad hoc, almost Mad Max-esque nature of their construction meant that some were lost at sea because of design problems and other has a rocket misfire rate of over ten percent.

After introducing the gunboats, Rielly gives a broken, chronological history of their involvement in major combat operations in the Pacific. The breaks are intentional; Rielly makes clear in the introduction that he intends to focus on a few representative examples—among them the Central Pacific Campaign, the retaking the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Otherwise, the action would be both repetitive and overwhelming. If the reader does want to dive deeper into other Pacific operations Rielly includes reference and sources in his notes that would jump-start any research.

The book is illustrated with hundreds of photographs that bring the gunboats to life. Almost every version and conversion of the gunboats are pictured along with combat shots, training shot and snapshots of daily life. Maps (both original and some created for the book) help the reader understand the action and clarify the operations. The book is so well illustrated, in fact, that a reader could be forgiven for wishing it were printed in a larger format and hardbound. As it is, the book is a paperback and larger than standard size, but not so large as to be a display book.

In American Amphibious Gunboats in World War II Rielly has made a valuable and complete addition to the naval and amphibious history of the Second World War in the Pacific. His book should be of interest to casual and professional historians as well as military practitioners. The gunboats he chronicles do not exist in the force structure of modern navies—anyone who would seriously consider amphibious assault against a dug-in enemy would do well to understand the contributions these boats made in the Pacific.

Walker D. Mills
Cartagena, Colombia


In the summer of 1985, the Nova Scotia fishing community of Little Harbour came together to celebrate the launch of the fishing vessel Laura Elizabeth. Such gatherings had occurred countless times before, in Little Harbour and across Atlantic Canada, but as offshore draggers decimated stocks and undermined the inshore fishery, the sight of a newly-built boat had become increasingly rare. The struggle of inshore fishers to maintain their historic livelihoods in the face of industrial overfishing is the subject of Rough and Plenty: A Memorial, a passionate autoethnography written by the Laura Elizabeth’s owner, Raymond A. Rogers, and published as part of Wilfrid Laurier University Press’s Life Writing series.

Rogers, who grew up in Manitoba, decided to settle in Shelburne County’s
Little Harbour while exploring Nova Scotia on bicycle in the 1970s. He purchased a piece of land with a traveler's cheque, and soon after patched up a derelict fishing vessel “that wouldn’t float on a sea of tar” (30). Out of “neighbourly interest”, Rogers also began to investigate the grave site of Donald McDonald, a nineteenth-century Scottish settler from the Isle of Lewis, whose gravestone survived on the fringe of Rogers’ property (5). The McDonald family, Rogers found, were crofters who had been evicted from their land to make room for sheep, the staple commodity of England’s early industrial revolution and prime mover of the Highland clearances. Rogers began to identify with Donald’s experience as his own livelihood was undermined by industrialized offshore fishing, forcing him and thousands of other small-boat fishers to seek work on resources projects in the Canadian west. The parallel between the “clearances of the crofters in Scotland and the clearances of the inshore fishers in Atlantic Canada,” Rogers writes, “gives this book its imaginative shape…” (9).

The ‘rough and plenty,’ Rogers explains, is a way of life that was evident in both the crofter communities of nineteenth-century Scotland and the fishing communities of twentieth-century Atlantic Canada; a way of life defined by small-scale, family-centred units of production and informal patterns of land use. Industrialization, however, demanded large-scale efficiencies and private property law, and the labour-intensive farms and fisheries were vilified as obstacles to modernity. In Atlantic Canada, for example, the notion that ‘too many boats’ were chasing ‘too few fish’ had become orthodoxy by the late 1980s. What followed was not just a process of enclosure—the formalization of private property rights over common lands and resources—but the articulation of a colonial narrative that urged displaced workers and families to find new fortunes in the west. For Scottish crofters, that meant the Hudson Bay fur trade; for Atlantic Canadian fishers today, it is the oil sands of Alberta. Always, however, the promise of a better life came at the expense of Indigenous peoples, whose lands are themselves enclosed by hydroelectric reservoirs and open-pit mining.

Each chapter of Rough and Plenty is subdivided into an introductory ‘history from above,’ which provides historical and economic context, and a much lengthier ‘history from below,’ told from the perspective of people dispossessed of their homes and livelihoods. Using eyewitness accounts of Scottish crofters (largely gathered from the 1811 Napier Commission on crofter unrest) and his own experiences as an inshore fisher and labourer on Manitoba’s Long Spruce Rapids hydroelectric dam, Rogers recreates “representative” conversations of dispossessed crofters, fishers, and work camp labourers (276). These narratives serve an advocacy function by restoring agency and humanity to communities whose pain and dislocation has been abstracted and sanitized by colonial narratives of economic ‘progress’ and pioneering settlers.

Some of Rough and Plenty’s most compelling pages describe Rogers’ experience as an inshore fisher. His first-hand accounts provide an almost encyclopaedic description of inshore fishing in the 1980s—a “how-to manual of sorts” for a way of life that has largely ceased to exist (281). Rogers recounts a harrowing night on the water when his little boat narrowly escaped the giant propeller blades of a passing freighter, and he writes eloquently of the challenges of finding fish without the aid of modern electronics: “My technological
window is a compass and a watch and a flasher sounder. Between the swirl of experience and the murk of the deep, I make my way” (37).

The advantages of electronic aids could not reverse the decline of the inshore stocks, and in 1993, frustrated fishers in Shelburne fought back. A Russian freighter, the Pioneer Murmana, was surrounded at the Shelburne dock as inshore and federal fisheries officials were compelled to listen. During that “brief but intense time,” Rogers writes, “it felt as if fishers’ views were finally being heard... and social relations that were leaving the world were contending and in conversation with the forces that were strengthening their hold on that world” (229). While the inshore fishers gained some concessions, they did not seriously threaten the interests of the trawler industry. Collapse, Rogers notes, is now a “stable state” (264) and Nova Scotia has become a “sacrifice area” for new polluting industries such as aquaculture (264-5).

Rough and Plenty provides a novel contribution to our understanding of the relationship between ‘progress’ and technology in the Atlantic Canadian fisheries. Nevertheless, while industrial capitalism as a development strategy was disastrous for the coastal communities of eastern Canada, there was opportunity in the wreckage. By driving thousands of out-of-work Atlantic Canadian fishers west to the hydro projects and oil sands of Manitoba and Alberta, Rogers writes, “the staples economy solved one ecological crisis (the collapse of the fishery) by generating another (climate change)” (145).

John R. Matchim
Fredericton, New Brunswick


Since their first appearance in 1927, the role of fast aircraft carriers, such as the Lexington and the Saratoga, has raised many questions about the real power of battleships as compared to the air-battleship force. In reality, the demonstration test that took place off the Virginia coasts in June 1921 had already shown the vulnerability of the German battleship Ostfriedland, sunk in just 21 minutes by five bombs, dropped from Martin two-engine MB-2 bombers.

Between 1927 and 1932, the use of carriers in test demonstrations highlighted their potential and, during the test “Fleet Problem XIII”, the Lexington and the Saratoga launched a formidable attack, with their 152 planes, on the airfields of the island of Oahu, simulating a destruction of all planes on the ground.

David Lee Russell’s book is a valuable account of the first months of 1942, during which the U.S. had to react to the disastrous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, where the navy suffered 2008 deaths, the army lost 218 killed and the Marine dead numbered 218 men. A further 68 civilians lost their lives in the attack of 7 December 1941.

Russell, a retired Naval Air Intelligence Officer, has collected a large amount of information about the five operations that took place between 1 February and 18 April 1942, offering his readers a detail-rich description of each attack, illustrating at the same time the effectiveness of particular carrier strategies adopted for various operations.
The attack on Pearl Harbor, which cost the U.S. three battleships, the flagship *California*, which capsized, and four other ships that were seriously damaged, was the key impetus for subsequent US carrier strikes against the advancing Japanese forces on islands recently taken by invasion units. (2)

He examines five operations that took place in early 1942: the Marshalls and Gilberts Islands raid (1 February); the Rabaul raid (20 February); the Wake and Marcus islands raid (attacked on 24 February and 4 March, respectively); the attack on Lae and Salamaua (10 March); and the raid on Tokyo (18 March).

Rogers profiles the protagonists of the U.S. response to Pearl Harbor: Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz; Admiral Ernest J. King, who commanded U.S. Naval Operations during the Second World War; and Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, who commanded the raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Wake and Marcus Islands and on Tokyo. Other commanders noted are: Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who commanded the Task Force 17 on Marshall and Gilbert Islands raids and the carrier *Lexington* on the Lae-Salamaua raid, and Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, who led Rabaul and Lae-Salamaua operations.

The attack on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands was the first of a series of operations that changed America’s approach in the Pacific from a defensive to an offensive attitude. The carrier used in this attack was the *Enterprise*, from where the VS-6 planes strafed and bombed Roi-Namur, destroying many targets, including six planes, some buildings, one hangar and six storehouses. The damages inflicted to the Japanese fleet included a 2500-ton submarine and other three smaller submarines sunk, and the sinking of two large cargo ships. Other damages were inflicted on the Japanese by the Wotje, Taroa and Kwajalein raids.

The Rabaul operation didn’t send American planes to bomb Rabaul, because the Japanese intercepted the *Lexington* 460 miles away from Rabaul, but the U.S. demonstrated the power of their carriers and the efficiency of their attack strategies. The *Lexington* not only was able to defend itself, but inflicted significant damage on the Japanese air fleet, destroying 19 aircraft and some key flight leaders.

Halsey’s attack on Wake and Marcus Islands was considered one of the most successful operations in the Pacific, and it helped raise the morale of the U.S. Naval Force after Pearl Harbor. Air attacks based from the carrier *Enterprise* inflicted serious damage on the Japanese military facilities and destroyed two Japanese patrol seaplanes. The attack on Marcus came as a complete surprise to the Japanese, successfully damaging a number of buildings and the airfield.

The Lae and Salamaua operation showed the efficiency of an attack based on the use of two aircraft carriers, USS *Yorktown* and *Lexington*, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown. For the first time, the attacks required an aerial penetration through the southwestern part of Papua Peninsula and the passage over the 7,000 foot Mount Lanson. The success of this operation was the prelude to the riskiest attack by the U.S. Air Force against the Japanese: America’s first incursion into the heart of Japanese territory.

Captain Low’s idea of using different aircraft, with a longer range, on carriers, was the key point of the plan of attack against Tokyo. The plane chosen was the new B-25 Mitchell bomber, and the pilot was Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle, who directed the modifi-
cations necessary to allow B-25s to take-off from the *Enterprise*. The attack on Tokyo punctured Japan’s sense of invincibility and restored the naval supremacy of U.S. carriers.

Russell’s book is an important and detailed account of the Pacific War that would appeal to anyone interested in the history of the Second World War, particularly in the role of aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

**Fabrizio Martino**
Pathum Thani, Thailand


Bernard “Bernie” Webber is best known in popular culture as the main character in the 2016 film *The Finest Hours*, which tells the story of the 1952 Coast Guard rescue of over 30 sailors from the oil tanker SS *Pendleton* in a gale off the New England coast. Webber and his crew were awarded the Gold Life-saving Medal for the rescue operation. In 2012, the US Coast Guard cutter *Bernard C. Webber* was named in his honour. For Webber, the loss of *Pendleton* and the rescue of all but two of its crew was but one day of 45 years at sea. He became a Sea Scout at age 13, joined the US Maritime Service at age 16, and served with the US Merchant Marine in the Pacific and Atlantic during the Second World War. Webber then joined the US Coast Guard and served on cutters and lightships. In retirement, he owned a fishing boat and captained tug boats in Florida. Webber’s life experiences are fodder for all sorts of narrative histories, but of all his experiences at sea, he felt that the service of the United States’ lightships was the most misunderstood and historically ignored.

*Lightships, Lighthouses, & Lifeboats* is both a memoir of Webber’s experience in the lightship service and a memorial to him. Published posthumously six years after his death in 2009, this book presents a series of chaptered vignettes structured thematically and approximately sequentially that present Webber’s personal experiences and perception of his lightship service and its place within the hierarchy of the Coast Guard Service. Peppered throughout the book are interstitial historical notes, lists of random facts related to notable events or incidents that happened to a particular vessel or at a particular station, and even a poem.

Webber begins by stating that this book is the story of the Nantucket Lightship Station boat LV112/WAL534, but it is really Webber’s experience aboard the boat presented as an exemplar of the lightship service as a whole. Lightships functioned as floating lighthouses, visual and aural aids to navigation installed where building a lighthouse structure was impractical or impossible. They marked channel entrances and hazards such as shoals. The first lightship was installed in the United States at Chesapeake Bay in 1820. The last lightship in the US, *Nantucket I* (WLV-612), stationed at Nantucket Shoals, was decommissioned in 1985.

Webber describes the officers and sailors who served aboard lightships as “outsiders” in the US Coast Guard. The overarching impression within the military was that lightship service was degrading and that assignments to these vessels was used as punishment; it was below a guardsman’s standards. Is a man a sailor if his ship always remains moored in place? Those assigned to lightships faced isolation, loneliness,
and boredom, punctuated by episodes of fear and terror. Their primary purpose, after all, was to mark hazards in all conditions including fog and storms. Webber describes in detail the feeling of knowing a large ocean liner is approaching unseen and the threat of collision in foul weather. Depression and anxiety were common. Sailors developed coping mechanisms and behavioural patterns such as learning to time the cadence of speech to the periodicity of the fog horn. Webber also describes the bonding activities of the sailors that filled their leisure time such as collecting plants floating on the water and cultivating them on board for amusement.

Webber states, “The excitement of saving lives and property—the type of work that produces heroes—was not a part of lightship duty.” (32) This is an odd and surprising statement from a man who is famous for doing just that! But this quote zeroes in on Webber’s true assessment of the purpose of lightship service—to prevent accidents and preclude the need to be a hero.

While this book is not a historical treatment of the lightship service, its importance lies in situating service aboard these vessels from the perspective of a sailor and officer who was there. Someone who manned these vessels in times of calm and utter boredom in addition to a great feat of heroism for which he became famous. Someone for whom the act of rescuing the crew of Pendleton was just a part of his job.

We are not presented with an academic history of the lightships, but told what Webber himself considered important to know and why we should know it. This book puts Webber and the people who “sailed” the lightships at the centre of their history.

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In the fall of 1942, three Atlantic convoys were lost for lack of adequate escort. One of them, SC 107, heading east from Sydney, Cape Breton Island, was under the protection of then-LCdr Desmond “Debby” Piers, RCN, in HMCS Restigouche. Its story has been told several times before by Marc Milner and others. Those of RB 1 from St. John’s, Newfoundland, and SL 125, out of Freetown, Sierra Leone, will be less well known. This brings up my only real criticism of the book, the lack of even a basic track chart or layout of the three convoys and other ships that Edwards follows for almost all of the book. Unless one is reasonably familiar with the detailed arrangement of convoys in the North Atlantic and Western Mediterranean and their all-too-frequently scarce escorts and air cover, it is difficult to keep track of what is happening, and for this story, why.

The end of November was a desperate time for these three passages. The timing overlapped with Operation TORCH, an Allied thrust into French North Africa involving massive troop and equipment convoys. Ten British convoys and four from the US were heading for the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the Mediterranean coast at Oran and Algiers. The need to prioritize the protection of 70,000 troops in 600 ships required the support of almost every convoy escort ship available from battleships and aircraft carriers to destroyers and even corvettes. While the author found no actual reference to the three trade convoys being used as “decoys” for Operation TORCH, to some extent that was how they served.

At this point in the war, Germany had broken the British convoy escort codes and were well aware of where these three convoys were at sea, disposing Donitz’s U-boat lines and individual boats accordingly. Meanwhile, thanks to excellent Allied radio security, the Germans had no idea whatsoever of the TORCH plans. That attack came as an almost complete surprise, while the U-boats savaged each of Edward’s convoys. Although the German B-Dientz decrypting service suspected something was afoot, they presumed it was probable an intent to force another relief convoy through to beleaguered Malta.

The three convoys of this story were all bound for the usual British ports. RB 1 left Newfoundland 21 September, consisting of eight ships defended by two elderly V & W RN destroyers; SC 107, from New York, had 25 ships, plus 14 more from Halifax and 5 from St. John’s as it passed, defended eventually by LCdr Pier’s destroyer Restigouche, three RCN and one RN corvette; and SL 125 departed Freetown on 16 October with 37 ships, defended by four RN corvettes. Within two weeks RB 1 had lost 3 merchantmen and one of the destroyers, SC 107 lost fifteen ships, and SL 125 eleven ships—29 valuable merchantmen and crews, or 24% of those that set out. In contrast, not one of the TORCH invasion ships was lost to U-boats at sea.

The story gives us a very good picture of the Battle of the Atlantic at its most difficult. Knowing the broader circumstances in retrospect, one suspects that the various merchant convoys were just assigned in the normal rotation, continuing their efforts to supply the United Kingdom with goods—food,
industrial and war equipment—with even fewer than the usually scant escorts due to TORCH. The evidence that they served to occupy the U-Boats’ attentions despite not being planned as ‘decoys’ was circumstantial. Edwards makes frequent use of direct quotations from those who survived to craft a very well told story. He focuses, convoy by convoy, on their all-too-slow progress, eastward and northward (out around the Azores) and the often-elderly and therefore, slow tramps. Frequent descriptions of torpedo hits, abandonments in major fall gales, poor discipline in convoy by over-use of ‘snowflake’ in ships next to those hit. The insoluble coverage protection problems of the young escort commanders (LCdr Piers was 30), most only fitted with early asdic and HF/DF, few of the escorts equipped with radar, and with still-to-be-learned experience.

Decoys offers an excellent picture of what convoying was really like, night-by-night, even hour-by-hour, as part of the crucial mid-war Atlantic battle, reminding me of Jimmy Lamb’s The Corvette Navy. What is missing is perhaps a wider understanding of how such convoys were organized. Why were they compelled to sail them, after three years of the battle, with so few, slow and ill-equipped escorts? Could not three or four more a/s warships not have been found, somewhere? Or was the need just not appreciated, at that organizing level? Unfortunately, the action occurred at a time when the Allies at Bletchley Park had lost most of their ability to read the German’s ‘Enigma’ codes, revealing where the waiting U-Boats were. Nevertheless, it is worth the addition to any Battle of the Atlantic bookshelf.

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Only after reading this book did I realize that Ian Yeates had reviewed it for *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* in 2004. (See https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol14/tnm_14_4_73-116.pdf.) I recommend his review to readers, but would like to offer a second review because this book is still relevant 16 years after publication.

Adm. Jeffrey Brock reports in *The Dark Broad Seas (Vol. 1)* that John Diefenbaker said: “A service or country without traditions is like a man without a memory.” Britain is certainly a country with traditions steeped in time, as is the Royal Navy. *To Rule the Waves* delves into both naval history and traditions.

Herman is the author of *How the Scots Invented the Modern World*—another very popular book which this reviewer, and Ian Yeates, have read and enjoyed. In this book, Herman addresses the history of Britain and its involvement with the rest of the world through the activities of its navy, roughly from the early 1500s to the Falklands War (1982). As Yeates points out, Herman has had to rely on secondary sources so there are simplifications, omissions and errors as he glosses over so many events. As with biographies where the writer tries to convince the reader that the whole world revolved around that person, so too here with the British (I prefer Royal) Navy. Herman tries to convince the reader that five centuries of world history are all the result of actions by the Royal Navy.

Personally, I hated history as a
school subject. Yet now in later life, I read naval and maritime history almost constantly. This book, with all its little faults, would have made high school history much more meaningful for me. It provides the supplementary information that gathers all those meaningless dates and personages, which students are required to memorize, into a coherent entity.

The book opens in 1568 with an incident at San Juan de Ulloa, in present-day Mexico, with Englishman John Hawkins attacking the Spanish fort and silver- and gold-laden ships. He and Francis Drake made off with 25,000 gold pesos at the cost of four of their six ships. The book describes how the British beat the Spanish and then the French and became the international police force during *Pax Britannica* (1815-1914). After the Napoleonic Wars (ca. 1815), the Royal Navy changed its emphasis to scientific endeavours (e.g., Darwin, Franklin, HMS *Challenger*, hydrography.) This occupied many of its ships as well as a vast work-force of otherwise-unemployed officers and over 100,000 seamen. The RN next revived to meet the twentieth century and naval competition from the United States, Germany and Japan. Sadly, post-Second World War budget cuts reduced the Royal Navy to a mere shadow of its former self. One example is the number of aircraft carriers on inventory: 52 in 1945, 12 in 1950 and 3 by 1970. The last chapter of the book describes a small meeting at the British Prime Minister’s office where those attending were wondering what they could possibly do as Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The meeting was interrupted when the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach (an uninvited attendee) burst into the room to say that the Royal Navy could get a task force off in 72 hours. The torpedoing of the Argentinian cruiser *General Belgrano* effectively took the Argentinian navy out of the picture. (561). True Royal Navy spirit! But two days later, HMS *Sheffield* was hit by an Exocet missile, burned, and sank showing that this was truly a high-tech war.

In Herman’s opinion, the Spanish Armada was never going to invade Britain because the Duke of Parma, the Spanish general waiting at Calais to be transported across the Strait of Dover, had already called off the invasion. So it really wasn’t a British victory but a Spanish relinquishment. His descriptions of various battles in the days of sail are hard to follow (and I sail boats!) and would be enhanced by maps which include wind direction. Herman’s notes, however, provide references for those readers wanting better descriptions of the battles should look elsewhere. The Navy’s administration evolved from a very ad-hoc arrangement to the Navy Board to Whitehall. Training went from civilian seamen to press-gang crewing to proper training at HMS Illustrious (cadets) and Excellent (gunnery) to Royal Navy College (officer education).

I appreciated Herman’s description of the progress towards Second World War starting with the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). It failed where the Congress of Vienna (a century earlier succeeded. The road to war started with Japan becoming a military dictatorship in 1930 and its subsequent aggression in Manchuria, Italy’s aggrandisement in Africa, and Germany’s rearmament and European expansion. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty violated the Treaty of Versailles by allowing Germany to have capital ships and submarines—an interpretation of historical events that I missed in high school. I felt really sorry for the down-sizing of the Royal Navy af-
ter 1945 and for the loss of naval bases at Singapore, Aden, Trincomalee (Sri Lanka), Simontown (Cape Town), and Malta, to name a few. How can one be a global power without naval bases sprinkled around the world?

The book is a good source of trivia that I never heard explained before (or had forgotten). For example, ‘Starboard’ comes from the side of the ship where the steering board was normally found, so ‘Larboard’ was the side where loading was done in port. Due to the similar sounding names, the latter became ‘Port’. Naval seamen were fed ‘three square meals a day’ because they were served on square wooden plates. The book is full of the names of captains and admirals who were so much part of the Royal Navy and later, were commemorated in names of ships: Anson, Howe, Rodney, Nelson, Hood, and Collingwood.

Here is a book that will refresh your high school history by connecting the historical events with the political manoeuvrings during the past 500 years. I bought the book at a second-hand bookstore, but I plan to make it a “keeper”.

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