Coastal concrete, or tabby, as they call it in the Carolina and Georgia Lowcountry. No history-minded traveler there can miss it—that delightfully practical concoction of lime, sand, and oyster shell that was used to erect brooding river forts, plantation big houses, slave dwellings, barns, sugar mills, cisterns, rice gates, seawalls, and box tombs. Tabby was fashioned from the ocean’s bounty and spread largely by means of naval power. Surviving examples, backgrounded by spreading marsh, placid estuaries, and moss-hung live oaks eloquently conjure up a culture tuned to its distinctive environment.

A good book about tabby has long been overdue, and now Colin Brooker, a British architect and engineer with decades of experience as an historic preservation consultant, has provided it. Brooker explores tabby from every conceivable angle, including its chemistry, antecedents, variants, history, and literature, and writes with winning ease. His research is impeccable, and his knowledge of the material profound. He has seemingly investigated every surviving remnant of the stuff, from an old foundation repurposed under a Daufuskie Island lighthouse to a crumbling chimney base situated by a Hilton Head baseball diamond. But even more interesting than Brooker’s architectural knowledge, is his cast of characters—“landowners … sea captains, pirates, merchants and speculators, politicians, governors, an occasional clergyman, one or two signers of the Declaration of Independence, several heiresses … and women widowed with fortunes large enough to fuel ambitions of suitors and new husbands alike.” (9) Who knew that such a modest compound could thread through the lives of so many intriguing protagonists?

Brooker begins with an overview of tabby’s old-world antecedents. These include examples along the North Af-
American littoral where mixtures of lime, earth, gravel, and rock were employed in buildings, walls, gates, aqueducts, and fortifications. From there, craftsmen took the technique into southern Spain, whence it eventually spread into the Caribbean and southeastern margins of North America. There are accounts of tabby as early as 1493 in Santo Domingo, where Christopher Columbus’s house was made of it. A century later it appeared at Spanish Santa Elena (now Parris Island, S.C.), and St. Augustine, Florida. By the eighteenth century it was ubiquitous in the Sea Islands, where deep shell deposits provided handy quarries. In 1766, the naturalist William Bartram wrote that “ye people comes and rakes up what they please brings them in a boat heaves them on shore to dry after which they burn them to lime.” (50) If the shells were not washed before burning they produced a hideous smell that offended neighbours and proved inferior for construction. The generally accepted formula for good tabby was three parts clean shell, three parts lime, and three parts sand, but wise builders adjusted the sand to match the quality of their lime.

Once they had a good supply of tabby, workmen poured it into pegged wooden box forms, typically many feet long and one- to two-feet high. After each pour dried, the form was broken apart and reset atop for the next pour. Skilled artisans could raise a wall quickly, and they also excelled at making tabby floors, roofs, and just about any other construction element required or the human mind could conceive.

Beaufort, S.C., established by royal charter in 1711, preserves a delightful collection of tabby buildings, and Brooker details them carefully. Beaufort was occupied by Union forces early in the Civil War but, happily, was not burned, and is today one of the prettiest towns in the United States. Outlying plantations did not always fare so well. After their owners abandoned them, looting and decay were often their fate. The use of tabby declined during the late nineteenth century when efficient railroad connections facilitated rapid delivery of building materials from commercial hubs. It is, therefore, fortunate that so many examples still survive, especially in Beaufort, but Brooker worries about ongoing threats to isolated remnants, including rampant coastal development and “irresponsible zoning.” (14)

The Shell Builders will primarily be of interest to architectural historians, but maritime historians, and scholars more generally, should also take note, given that tabby is, in Brooker’s apt phrase, “a quintessential product of the Atlantic world.”

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


Lying as it does, in the author’s words, “a great lobster stuck off the northeastern coast of North America,” Nova Scotia is the most maritime of Canada’s Maritime Provinces, prevented from being an island by only a narrow isthmus. The title of this new history, the first scholarly treatment in several generations, references the relationship the area has with the sea and the reader with a nautical bent might expect the title to set a major theme for the work. It is with a slight disappointment that we find that the author, although standing
at the ocean’s edge, does so with a view facing the shore and with only the occasional glance back towards the sea.

Nevertheless, this is an impressive and long-needed volume. A general history must draw on the research work of other scholars as well as the specialization and interests of the author, and the scope of this volume, testified to by the range of sources cited in the notes, shows how much examination and thought the region has supported for the last thirty years. In many respects, *At the Ocean’s Edge* can serve as a reader’s guide to Nova Scotia historiography. In addition to dozens of articles in journals such as *Acadiensis*, the Canadian Historical Association Journal and the *Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society*, the volume makes extensive and effective use of the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* and an extremely large number of monographs and thesis from the full range of academic research. If the nautical side of Nova Scotia’s story has been slighted, the problem lies more on the dearth of relevant scholarship in the field than on the book’s author. While several nautical themes and events receive coverage, there is no overall sense of the role of the sea in Nova Scotia’s history. That being said, Dr. Conrad does draw on a broad range of the available nautical sources including, but certainly not limited to, the important work of the several scholars associated with the Maritime History Group at Memorial University, Greg Marquis’ study of the maritime role in the American Civil War, Julian Gwyn’s analysis of the colonial economy and Faye Kert’s treatment of privateering in the early nineteenth century. The reliance on the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* for information about prominent individuals exposes the extent to which the entries in that series have, until the more recent volumes, downplayed economic and social activities and emphasised politics in the lives and contributions of those selected for entries. The work of the shipbuilders and merchants, and fishers and sailors who created and maintained a maritime economy is often ignored in preference to their political involvements.

*At the Ocean’s Edge* attempts to situate the region in an expansion of Europe with the attendant damages from settler colonialism and impacts on the environment (335), yet there is relatively little discussion on the latter, especially as regards the nautical aspects. The land-based perspective results in the sea being generally treated as a barrier, with Northumberland Strait, Cabot Strait, the Bay of Fundy, and the Gulf of Maine separating Nova Scotia from the rest of the area, instead of being an easily negotiated communications corridor for trade, commerce, people and ideas within the region and connecting it to the world beyond.

As the volume progresses, there seems to be a reduction in the treatment of the marine aspects of the history. From recognition that in the sixteenth century the value of the area’s cod fishery “eclipsed all other economic activities in the Americas.” (41) The narrative concludes with greatly reduced reference to the role maritime issues played in the psyche of the colony. There is reference to Louisbourg as a major port in the early 1700s exceeded in ship visits only be Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. (105) The establishment and growth of Halifax is positioned as a military consequence of empire with trade as a secondary consideration. Although the author does recognize that “greater Nova Scotia” could be an important regional approach, once New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island are carved out of the territory, there is relatively little discussion of how the colony, and
especially Halifax, still operated as the financial, industrial, commercial and cultural leader for the region.

Where this volume really differs from earlier general histories is the extent to which the activities and role of formerly unrecognized groups and individuals is recognized. Before there was a Nova Scotia, there was Mi’kmaq, and Conrad, rather than starting the story with European settlement opens with the First Peoples, unlike some earlier histories which ignored the original inhabitants after the arrival of the French and English. She treats them, and other later minority populations as a full part of the human story on a continuing basis. This is an area where the recent scholarship of writers such as John Reid, Stephen Davis and Ruth Holmes Whitehead comes to the fore. It is a testament to Conrad’s writing skill that this inclusion is not an intrusion or an add-on but an integral and essential element in the story. At the Ocean’s Edge is a very human story with individuals being allowed to tell their own stories—not simply the stories of the great and the good, but also the lesser saints and scoundrels, of which there are a good number, especially in the early European settlement period.

Originally planned as a history of Nova Scotia to the present, the volume leaves the post-Confederation story to another historian. That person will face an immense challenge matching the quality of documentation, analysis, and writing that Margaret Conrad exhibits in At the Ocean’s Edge.

H.T. Holman
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island

I must admit that when I volunteered to review this book I had no idea of its contents, but thought if the Naval War College Press had produced it then it “Can’t be too bad.” When the book arrived “down under” I discovered it was the history of African-Americans, both male and female, who had been commissioned as United States Navy officers, between 1944 and 1988, and subsequently reached star rank; Rear-Admiral Lower Half (or Commodores in Commonwealth navies) through to full (four-star) Admirals.

While the book, on the surface, might appear to be simply a collection of short biographies of these men and women, the true insight (and its value) is that it is a history of how segregation in the US Navy was gradually but permanently removed; and that the ability to rise to the highest ranks in the service was opened to all. It was not an easy path but those described in the book were more than equal to the task.

In early 1942 Black men, then described as Negros, could serve in the US Navy but only as cooks or messmen. In April 1942 the rules were relaxed to allow men to enlist in other specialisations and by early 1944, the first African-American naval officers were commissioned. Their service was not easy and then-Lieutenant Samuel Gravely, who later rose to the rank of Vice Admiral, recalls being arrested in Miami, Florida, “for impersonating an officer.”

There are several constant themes throughout the various biographies which point to why the three women (and female officers had it even harder than their male counterparts) and 57
men are detailed in this book. The first theme is family—all had family who encouraged them to work hard and do their best. Some came from single-parent families or were raised by grandparents or uncles, aunts or grand-parents. Most came from backgrounds of poverty, growing up on farms or in cities where their parents were blue-collar workers or lowly paid office staff. But all of them had strong family support and encouragement.

The second theme is education. All were encouraged (pushed at times) by family and various mentors (teachers, scout leaders, sporting coaches and the like) to finish school and where possible, go on to higher education. Many entered the Navy via the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) that existed in many American universities. Fewer than half were commissioned via the US Naval Academy.

Thirdly, all had the dogged determination to succeed and knew that as they were a minority (making up only 13% of the US population) that some in the Navy would find any excuse to remove them from training courses, or the Navy, or refuse to obey their orders. One officer recalled, however, that the Navy saw rank first and race as unimportant when one of his sailors refused to follow the orders of a “N……r.”

The then-young ensign took the sailor to the ship’s executive officer where the sailor again refused to carry out any orders issued by a Black officer. This was then immediately elevated to the commanding officer who held “Captain’s Mast” on the spot and the sailor again refused to carry out any orders issued by an African-American officer; the sailor was discharged from the Navy three days later. Regardless of race, any challenges to good order and discipline would not be tolerated.

Another young Black officer, who later became a four-star Admiral, stood his ground against none other than Admiral Hyman Rickover when trying to enter the nuclear power program. Rickover told the midshipman he needed to improve his class standing, at the US Naval Academy, by 20 positions in order to be considered and required him to sign a document accepting this offer. The midshipman refused, since while he could work hard, so would the others in his class, and while his grades might go up, so would others’ and there was no guarantee he could jump 20 positions. At first Rickover refused to accept this, but the midshipman stood his ground and was accepted into the program.

The final theme is mentoring within the US Navy. Many of the African-American officers rose to high rank because their mainly white superiors saw that they had the ‘right stuff’ and were prepared to support them and assist their career. Or as one Black officer put it, he was lucky to serve under officers who were “ladder builders” (helping others to advance through the ranks) rather than “ladder climbers” and only interested in furthering their own careers.

The biographies also follow the history of de-segregation in the US Navy but it was a long and, at times, difficult journey. One female officer recalled that even in the late 1980s sailors would cross the road in order to not salute her and that at one mess social occasion, when she was in civilian clothing; she was mistaken for one the wait staff!

I am highly recommending this book. Readers will need to look beyond what might appear to some to just be a collection of 60 biographies of US Naval officers during war and peace and observe how integration actually worked in the US Navy. There may be other agencies in the US (and Australia for that matter) that could learn from...
the US Navy on how to better integrate all genders and races to ensure “good order and discipline is maintained.”

Greg Swindden
Canberra, Australia


The author of this comprehensive book concerning electric motive power on the water was in a library researching a history of motor-boating. The librarian asked if this included electric boats? Mr. Desmond agreed it should, so was given a slim file of mostly old newspaper clippings and ads. From that meagre beginning came this thoroughly researched description of the slow development of boats and ships powered, at least in part, by various versions of electric motors. Today, the industry is still very much a work in progress, due at least in part to the current growing demand for the use of more ‘green energy.’ In fact, Desmond’s last six chapters are devoted to the most recent developments, and incentives such as 2016 Paris Climate Agreement, at whose goals we are supposedly aiming.

As he recounts, the history of electric motors began in the 1830s with experiments, mostly in Europe, with electro-magnets, moving on to the concepts of the ‘accumulator’ or storage battery by 1848, the ‘Grove cell.’ Soon a few, usually well-to-do, supporters adopted the idea for small and quiet launches for their enjoyment, for local transport and for the demonstration of possibilities, not only in the U.K., but particularly in Russia, France and Italy. This soon led to slow-speed races and cross-Channel competition. By 1870, thanks to an interest in the surge of railways there, Viscount Bury went to Canada and met with Thomas Edison to discuss the concept of electric trains to solve the problem of steam engine emissions in tunnels. On his return Bury founded a company to make electric engines suitable for boats. In the U.S., it wasn’t until 1888 that electric batteries in motor boats began to appear, with a few manufacturers experimenting with electric accumulator-powered small craft.

The first two chapters chronicle all this development up to 1914, some successful, others less so, illustrating its progress with multiple drawings and photographs, sometimes referred to as the ‘Golden age of electric boating.’ The major problem with making the concept a wider commercial success was the weight and complexity of larger batteries, their relatively modest electrical output, and the constant requirement for recharging, at home or en route. But some trials, a few of which are still in use, were surprising: in Germany, and briefly along New York’s Erie Canal, barges carrying produce, coal and other items powered by electricity drawn from overhead trolley wires like streetcars, supplemented in open areas by relatively brief endurance batteries proved both practical and economical. The author gives multiple examples of local electric motor ferries across rivers and canals, where recharging was readily available and speed not a criterion. Until about the 1950s, the electric power at sea industry puttered along relatively unappreciated.

The development of efficient and more powerful gasoline inboard and outboard motors and their easy and wide availability tended to discourage serious attention to larger electric mo-
This work represents the first English translation of Imperial Russian Rear Admiral Sergei Nikolaevich Timirev’s memoir regarding his service throughout the First World War and Russian Revolution. Completed by Timirev in 1922 while serving as a ship captain in Shanghai, this account offers a rare firsthand account of the Imperial Russian Baltic fleet at both the ground and command level during key points in Russian History. Given the diaspora of loyal White Russian forces after the Revolution and subsequent purges, primary sources regarding the early naval actions of the First World War through the upheaval of Revolution from a non-Bolshevik perspective were essentially non-existent for decades until the Russian-language publication of Timirev’s text in 1961. Doubtlessly important, this work remained largely unavailable to scholars who lacked the ability to read it in its original Russian. Translator Stephen Ellis’s magnificent efforts have solved this dilemma, bringing Timirev’s words forth in an excellent translation, complete with helpful endnotes, appendices, and a translator’s commentary.

The work begins with a collection of introductory elements, such as Ellis’ translation preface, the original Russian language publication’s 1961 biography of Timirev, three personal photographs, and a map of the Baltic area. Timirev’s memoir is then put on display as he wrote it, with bulleted key point summaries at the start of each chapter for quick reference and the translator’s historical notations done as endnotes. As a whole, the work is divided into two parts—before and after the February 1917 Revolution. The first section’s seven chapters cover Timirev’s experiences from 10 July 1914 through the end of February 1917. His firsthand accounts of the clumsy and chaotic nature
of the Baltic Fleet, the personalities of staff officers and unit commanders, the decisive nature of Admiral Essen in the early days, and the spike of Germanophobia which cost several good officers their positions, all provide excellent insight into the early war situation faced by the Russian Forces. Timirev’s assignment to a naval staff position occurred at a key point in history, allowing him to give accounts of operational planning, the purchasing of former Russian ships from Japan, and the struggles in the aftermath of the death of Admiral Essen. Likewise, his transfer to command of the cruiser *Baian* in mid-1916 placed him on the front lines of the war, experiencing air raids, mining operations, and the rumblings of change as Admiral Nepenin took control of the fleet and became “drunk with power” (72). Timirev was coincidently on leave in Petrograd at the end of February 1917, which also gave him the Baltic Fleet’s first eyewitness view of the collapse of protest into Revolution. His decision to cut his leave short to report back to command just as the tinderbox was lit proved a fateful respite.

The second half of the memoir carries us from 28 February 1917—the start of the Revolution—through Timirev’s 15 January 1918 notification of discharge without pension by the Bolshevik government. This in itself is a fascinating section, detailing the slow disintegration of the Baltic Fleet from rear echelon bases up to the front-line vessels from the view of an officer powerless to stop it. The execution of Nepenin and other officers, the rise of the committees, and visits from key figures such as Alexander Kerensky and Pavel Lebedev in the early days of 1917 are all well documented, with Timirev stating that within two months of February 28, “everything necessary to destroy the fighting capacity of the fleet had already been done” (101). The further indoctrination of younger enlisted men by Bolshevik ‘universities’ is shown to sow distrust amongst once-close crews, with fear of counter-revolutionary claims replacing camaraderie. This paranoia and dissention would aid the Germans in their successful seizure of the base at Riga and in the Battle of Moon Sound, forcing the Baltic Fleet back as the Bolsheviks carried out their coup. Timirev’s decision to be discharged rather than serve under the new Bolshevik regime is understandable, with the final insult of being denied a well-earned pension softened slightly by his story of the *Baian*’s committee nervously granting his request to keep the flag from his promotion to Cruiser Brigade Commander. In spite of the collapse of all he had known, Timirev clearly still had pride in his beloved and “very proper ship” (168).

The end matter of the work is a combination of additional primary materials and commentary by Ellis, consisting of the translation of a report on the January 1915 grounding of the cruiser *Riurik*, three obituaries for Admiral Timirev, a 25-page translator’s commentary, and end notes. Ellis’ commentary section in itself is impressive, detailing not only his translation choices, but Baltic geography, Imperial Russian naval structure, ranks, and officer backgrounds. The scandalous affair between Timirev’s wife with his friend Admiral Kolchak concludes the section, documenting its ‘representation’ in modern nationalistic productions compared to the reality of the situation. The post-war fates of Timirev, his wife, and son are included, adding an underlying level of personal background information to an already striking war memoir.

In terms of possible improvements, very few come to mind. Given Timirev’s references to both his own vessel
and others, an appendix with scaled profiles or images of said ships would help with visualization. A similar appendix with photographs and brief information on some of the key people and places Timirev discusses would also be appreciated. Finally, Ellis has an excellent collection of rank conversion tables in the end matter, whose relocation to the front matter might aid in quicker referencing. These are relatively minor suggestions, however, and their absence is in no way detrimental to the work.

Stephen Ellis’ translation of *The Russian Baltic Fleet in the Time of War and Revolution* is an excellent addition to the historiography of the Imperial Russian Navy during the twilight of its existence. Timirev’s unique career prior to the First World War and positioning throughout both the war and collapse into Bolshevism offers a ground level view of the Baltic Fleet interwoven alongside encounters with multiple key figures. Ellis’ analytical endnotes further bolster the usefulness of Timirev’s text, creating what is doubtlessly a key resource for scholars of the Baltic Fleet and naval aspects of the Russian Revolution.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The authors of the ten papers in this collection are experts in their subject areas. Two have been associated with universities in Australia, and four each with British and American universities. Their topics are indeed diverse.

Evan Mawdsley describes the naval strategies of the US, Japan, and the UK in the run up to war in 1941. This analysis starts back in the 1920s and concludes that all three powers had confused strategies. It is a masterful paper that puts many controversial decisions into context, such as the deployment of US bombers and submarines to the Philippines only weeks before hostilities, the despatch of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to Singapore, and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Two other chapters focus on the start of the war in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Goldrick writes about how, between the wars, the RN saw submarines as a key element in its plans to meet a possible attack on Hong Kong and Malaya by Japan. They were to help delay the enemy during what was termed the “Period before Relief” while the “Main Fleet” made its way out from the UK. The paper describes the various classes of submarine that operated as part of the RN’s China Fleet, and the sort of training undertaken. These interwar plans were never tested, however, because the China Station submarines were withdrawn to the Mediterranean in mid-1940. (Although not mentioned, two RN submarines were sent from the Mediterranean in December 1941; they arrived in area in January 1942, but one was damaged by bombing within days and the other one did not operate with success). Goldrick speculates that “The submarines of the Fourth Flotilla might not have been able to stop a seaborne invasion by the Japanese, but they would not have allowed it to be a bloodless one,” (23) while conceding that the performance of the US and Dutch submarines actually present was “disappointing.”

The chapter by American academic and former naval officer, Dr. Alan Zimm, is a careful analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor in terms of actual effec-
tiveness of weapons and systems versus their potential. He is interested in why new technology may not improve performance and uses Pearl Harbor as a case study. The author describes several aspects of the attack, from command and control of a multi-carrier force and a strike force of aircraft to the low effectiveness of Japanese bombs, and the high effectiveness of their level bomb aiming techniques contrasted with problems created for dive bombers by low clouds. Finally, the Japanese had underestimated the effectiveness of anti-torpedo underwater protection in American battleships. This is a detailed description attack wave by attack wave that dissect not only weapon and tactical performance but inadequate Japanese radio communications. Zimm briefly mentions how Japanese bombers and dive bombers overwhelmed Allied ships in the following months but does not compare performance in of terms bombs used, attack formations, etc. with the Pearl Harbor attack.

In “The Dominions and British Maritime Power in the Second World War,” Dr. Iain Johnston-White explores how the Dominion navies contributed to the overall British war effort. This is a complex topic; the coverage of merchant shipping is reliable but his treatment of naval aspects lacks depth. After describing how British plans for war were based on “naval dominance” the author’s focus becomes the role of shipping and its defence. The treatment of the several dominions, therefore, narrowly reflects their role in trade protection. But the war at sea was more than the defence of shipping. While the author covers the importance of shipping in maintaining imports to Australia and New Zealand, he fails to mention the operations of Australian cruisers in the Mediterranean and Middle East from 1939 to mid-1941, and then in the defence of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. (Australian destroyers in the Mediterranean are cited fleetingly.) The treatment of South Africa is largely keyed to the strategic importance of the Cape Route to Britain while the Mediterranean was closed to shipping. The paper describes deficiencies in ship repair capability in South Africa. The role of South African naval and air forces in defending shipping is covered in general terms, but there is no clear picture of the command and control structure and of how many RN escorts worked out of Simon’s Town.

Canada’s part in providing naval and maritime forces and in shipbuilding is given considerable emphasis. The author makes the important point that mariners and marine industry expertise from Britain played key roles in the war efforts of all the Dominions. Tellingly, in November 1943 some 40% of the navigating and engineering officers in Canada’s mushrooming merchant fleet were from the UK. (90)

Iain Johnston-White summarises Canadian contributions in the Battle of the Atlantic but several of his assertions are based on careless generalizations. For example, concerning the first six months of 1942 we read “…set against the areas under RN control [Canadian forces]… fared very badly; U-boats operating west of Newfoundland near Canadian ports, as well as under Canadian air cover, took a toll of shipping well above that in the eastern Atlantic.” (95) Losses were indeed serious, but the situation was analogous to the first U-boat “Happy Time” to the west of the British Isles between July and October 1940. In both cases, U-boats were able to make individual attacks on individual targets because too many merchant ships were being permitted to steam independently instead of in convoy. In January 1942, U-boats had surged into
the western Atlantic in numbers for the first time, with only a handful left operating in the western approaches to the UK. The first wolf pack attack did not occur in mid-Atlantic until May. The U-boats off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia were able to find targets for two reasons: first because the Admiralty had been dispersing westbound convoys south of Newfoundland, and in addition, several convoys were scattered by heavy weather as late as March. The standard routing was changed to Halifax and then, later in the year, to New York. Secondly, the Admiralty had routed too many merchant ships independently and some became targets. The RCN promptly instituted coastal convoys. Virtually all of the RCN’s available escorts were committed to defending the transatlantic trade convoys along with Britain’s and a diminishing number of American escorts. Ninety-one convoys with a total of 2,712 merchant ships (an average of 452 per month) passed through the northwest Atlantic between January and June with no losses.

Professor G.H. Bennett examines the role of *Schnellboote* (motor torpedo boats roughly 35m long) in the German defence of occupied Europe. His particular focus is the D-Day landings. He argues that *Schnellboote* achieved more than has been reflected in historiography. He advances a counterfactual case that had the Germans reordered their priorities between U-boat and *Schnellboot* construction, and in general focused on coastal defence in the face of the anticipated Allied amphibious assault landings, they could have been able to inflict “sufficient casualties to give the German Army a chance of victory at the water’s s edge and behind the invasion beaches.” (133)

Charles Ian Hamilton’s “The Development of Combined Operations Headquarters and the Admiralty during the Second World War. Personalities and Administration” is based on extensive research and mastery of his subject. This is an analysis of how the organization of Combined Operations Headquarters evolved from a shoestring body under Lord Keyes to a multifaceted body under Commodore Mountbatten starting in July 1941, when Mountbatten “brought it up to date by about two decades” in his first six months. (144) The role of “Combined Operations” reflects what in today’s jargon is “Joint Operations”. How the British Admiralty has evolved over the centuries is Hamilton’s field of expertise. He describes the inevitable friction between Combined Operations Headquarters and the Admiralty whose officers saw Mountbatten’s organization as encroaching on their responsibilities. Over time, Combined Ops HQ influenced how certain sections of the Admiralty were structured; the Admiralty also regained control of parts of Combined Ops such as ships assigned to it. This all sounds dry and arcane, but Hamilton writes crisply with a sharp eye for personalities and does not neglect their influence on developments. This paper is a rewarding read.

Up until 1942 the corporate experience of the Australian Army along with that of the RAN and RAAF had been gained in fighting in the Middle East and Malaya. They now became important participants in General Douglas MacArthur’s South West Pacific Command and were faced with the unfamiliar new challenges of amphibious warfare to dislodge entrenched Japanese forces. Australian academic Professor Peter Dean contributes a chapter on how Australia established a training infrastructure and drew on Combined Operations developed by the British and the US Marine Corps and US Navy. He then describes Australian amphibious
Dr. Donald Mitchener writes about naval gunfire support for the attack on the island of Iwo Jima in February-March 1945 which the Americans wanted to occupy for its airfields, being only 600 miles from Japan. The subtitle of his paper is “the Perils of Doctrinal Myopia”. Mitchener shows that that the US Marine leadership, which demanded 10 days of preliminary naval gunfire bombardment based on experience in earlier amphibious assaults, was myopic in not adequately anticipating its limitations against the in-depth defence being prepared by the Japanese, and in concentrating the bulk of the bombardment against the beaches. The American naval leadership, determined to use battleships and cruisers to defend carrier groups striking Japan, insisted on only three days of bombardment. The Japanese commanding general, resigned to losing the island in the face of overwhelming American resources, was determined to inflict maximum casualties but was myopic in changing his dispositions to move pillboxes closer to the beaches where they were promptly overrun. Michener’s paper is a detailed discussion of successive steps in the planning process and includes four documentary appendices. While it sketches in available intelligence and the Japanese preparations, it concentrates on exchanges of documents among the US authorities and who said what when, rather than describing the actual bombardment and grinding capture (oddly, not even mentioning the number of casualties) and cites several after-action analyses. The Iwo Jima campaign obviously had several controversial aspects. Those familiar with the background will readily understand the significance of points being made by Mitchener, but for readers unfamiliar with the general background this paper requires careful attention.

“Naval Power, Mao Zedong, and the War in China” by Professor Francis Grice, a US academic, is about how naval forces, mostly from outside powers, influenced developments in China during the rise of the Chinese Party and into its early years in power. The author underlines that Mao Zedong did not understand the role that naval power had played. It’s interesting that 40-plus years after his death, Mao’s successors have made China a major naval power.

Professor George Monahan traces the impetus for a single authority over the US armed services through the lens of Secretary of War Colonel Henry Stimson’s wartime role and postwar writings in “Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate”. For 18 months between early 1942 and mid-1943 the US Army Air Force (USAAF) operated several squadrons of bombers configured for anti-submarine warfare. Until July 1942 the entire American production of large, land-based aircraft was going to the USAAF because of a ruling by Congress in 1920 that the Army should control land-based aircraft, and the Navy-based (including amphibious) aviation. The USAAF squadrons allocated for maritime defence were placed under US Navy operational control in March 1942 as German submarines faced little opposition while sinking large numbers of ships off the US eastern seaboard. Although these squadrons gradually built up expertise in ASW and received better radar equipment, there were ongoing disagreements between the two services about doctrine and employment of these specialized squadrons. Two titanic figures of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Henry Stimson and Admiral Ernie King became dogged protagonists. The bureaucratic
struggle over land-based ASW aircraft dragged on because there was no clear higher authority to resolve the issues. Eventually, the Army ceded its ASW aircraft to the US Navy.

The protracted wrangling became just one example of poor management of resources that convinced officials that national defence need a single department head. A House of Representatives committee started hearings on changes to the national defence organization in 1944; subsequently after further hearings and in-fighting, both houses of the US Congress passed an act in 1947 creating the US Air Force out of the USAF and placing all three armed services under a single Secretary of Defense. Monahan argues that it was the counterproductive effects of service parochialism and the pitfalls of divided leadership during wartime as much as strategic unease early in the Cold War that lay behind the military unification debates. He tells this story in a vigorous manner and includes George McBundy’s words in *On Active Service in Peace and War* (1948 which he co-authored with Stimson) about Henry Stimson’s view of “…the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church. The high priests of this Church were a group of men to whom Stimson always referred as ‘the admirals.’ These gentlemen were to him both anonymous and continuous”. (285)

*The Sea and the Second World War* is a collection of thought-provoking papers about disparate maritime aspects of the Second World War. Recommended.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


In 1828, the English merchant vessel *Morning Star*, en route from Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to the United Kingdom, when it was attacked by the pirate Benito De Soto and his crew on board the *Burla Negra*, a former slave vessel that had been taken over by mutineers.

After the pirates boarded, they assaulted and tortured the crew and passengers. After looting the vessel, they abandoned it with its hull pierced, intended to sink it. The captain and the mate of the *Morning Star* were executed by a shot in the head. Despite the bad condition the ship was in, the survivors of the ordeal managed to save the ship from sinking. A month later she sailed into the English port of Deal.

A few days after the attack on the *Morning Star*, the pirates attacked the American merchant ship *Topaz*. After seizing the ship and its cargo, De Soto had the vessel set on fire with the crew on board. In 1830 De Soto was tried, found guilty, and executed for his actions. A simple pirate’s tale you might say, but there is more to it.

The *Morning Star* was Quaker-owned and hired to carry sick and wounded British army casualties from Ceylon (Sri Lanka). In accordance with strict Quaker custom, *Morning Star* was not permitted to carry munitions or weapons of any kind. The people on board had no means of defending themselves in case the vessel came under attack.

As a hospital ship, she was to be escorted by either a Royal Navy vessel or
an armed ship from the East India Company. Off St. Helena, it appeared to be the latter, but soon after departure, the *Morning Star* was left to fend for herself.

Unknown to most of those on board, the ship carried a precious cargo. It was the treasure of the Kingdom of Kandy; the sale would alleviate the British government’s financial troubles, now headed by the Duke of Wellington, victor of the battle at Waterloo.

In England, news about the fate of the *Morning Star* led to political uproar and critical attention from the media. What did the government intend to do about the piracy on the high seas? Why wasn’t there a naval squadron in the South Atlantic? Questions were raised about the role of the British East India Company. Shipping companies and the public demanded action from the government.

Call it Divine intervention: Benito de Soto’s ship was wrecked on a beach in the south of Spain near the port of Cadiz. Local police arrested the crew and soon it became clear that they were the pirates who had attacked *Morning Star*. After a trial, most of them were found guilty, sentenced to death and strung up. De Soto, however, managed to escape to British Gibraltar. He was able to hide there for a while, until he was recognized and arrested. In his possession were items that had been stolen from the *Morning Star* and the American vessel *Topaz*, the ship that De Soto had torched.

After a trial that left something to be desired, Benito de Soto was found guilty and hanged in 1830. Interestingly, there were no witnesses from the *Morning Star* who could identify him. It was almost a century later before De Soto’s guilt could actually be established. In 1926, in Galicia in the north of Spain where De Soto had grown up, a treasure was found. It contained riches stolen from the *Morning Star* and *Topaz*.

The author tells a beautiful story about an ugly event. Sometimes close to over-dramatizing the events, Ford carries the reader along step-by-step. The accounts related to political, commercial and judicial matters are as gripping as the story of Benito de Soto himself.

This page-turner is more than a story of piracy on the high seas. It is a time capsule containing both the good and the bad of the era. Personal greed and failures, both inside and outside established structures and political machinations beyond belief, led to great loss of lives. In the cesspit of diplomacy, yellow press, corruption, commerce, cover-up, organised crime and religion, where the underworld meets society, De Soto almost got away with his crimes. With *Hunting the Last Great Pirate* Michael Ford has laid down the perfect foundation for a movie; a great story.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands


Most atlases include very few maps of Antarctica and often represent the whole continent with a single circum-polar physical map. Sometimes there is the narrow strip at the very bottom of a world map that, due to the limitations of map projection, does not usually show the South Pole. Without any doubt, Antarctica is the least covered continent...
Peter Fretwell’s new *Antarctic Atlas* breaks this tradition by dealing exclusively with the seventh continent and providing an abundance of topical maps that tell the story of the icy continent in a new and refreshing way. Even for the few specialists familiar with the topography of Antarctica, whose view of that continent is as strong as their knowledge of the rest of the globe, Fretwell’s new atlas will provide a wide variety of new insights. It offers a better understanding of the continent, its physical characteristics, its biological features, and most important for the historian, past and present human activities south of the Antarctic convergence.

In recent years, a wide variety of books on various aspects of Antarctic history and human activities on the continent have been published. While most published works contained a few maps providing some basic information, a comprehensive collection of such maps remained a desideratum. Fretwell has now closed this gap with an atlas that is a comprehensive collection of charts accompanied by short, crisp and concise explanatory texts for each subject. Unlike many cartographers of the polar regions, such as the famous nineteenth-century German cartographer August Petermann, who never actually visited the polar regions themselves, Fretwell has been to Antarctica several times. The maps in his atlas do not only provide a precise representation of the physical features of the continent, but also tell the story of what matters most to those familiar with Antarctica. As one might expect, distribution maps of the various species of Antarctic penguins and marine mammals are delivered in convincing quality and cartographic design. But he also presents maps relating to the various effects of climate change, the building history of Antarctica, and the concentration of Antarctic tourism in a few small areas. This is the real strength of the book—telling these and other important stories without using a single word. Of course, there are explanatory text sections, but Fretwell lets the maps do most of the talking. Other maps illustrating mountain ranges easily rivaling the Alps, or canyons longer than the Grand Canyon, handily demonstrate that Antarctica is a continent of superlatives. The images teach without ever becoming 'schoolmasterly' lectures.

The subtitle of the atlas reads: “New maps and graphics that tell the story of a continent” and without a doubt, the book delivers on this promise. When teaching my students how to write book reviews, I often recommend including at least one critical point about the book, but I must admit that such a flaw is hard to find. Of course, the maritime historian in me would have hoped for a more complete coverage of the maritime history of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, but when looking at the map of the journeys individual seals took around Antarctica these thoughts are immediately replaced by the humble feelings most Antarcticians get when thinking about the amazing nature of the continent and that humans (fortunately) have had so little influence on the continent. Finally, the maps relating to the political history and situation of Antarctica make the reader hopeful that humans have finally found ways to deal with a continent that was a white spot on most charts only little more than a hundred years ago without resorting to war and the concept of traditional boundaries and nation-state based sovereignty. Each turn of the page provides access to a new feature of Antarctica; some familiar, some totally new and unexpected. This knowledge reflects one of the most important char-
acteristics of Antarctica—regardless of how often you have been lucky enough to visit the southernmost continent, you will always discover something new and important; something you never thought about while living in the higher latitudes. Most readers will never have seen such an abundance of southern circumpolar maps before, let alone the many stories they contain. It will make you think not only about Antarctica, but more importantly, how this remote, icy wilderness is directly or indirectly connected with the other six continents and the oceans in between.

With a retail price of only UK £22.75, Fretwell’s book is without any doubt a bargain, particularly given that comparable atlases with such a number of high-quality maps regularly come with price tags in the three-digit range. I recommend Fretwell’s Antarctic Atlas to everyone, even those only remotely interested in Antarctica and its history. For the serious Antarctic historian, it is a long-expected compendium that will serve as a reference whenever it comes to the spatial dimension of Antarctica. For the casually interested reader, it works as a great coffee-table book and conversation starter, while the Antarctic greenhorn it will find it a quick way to clarify the unfamiliar geography. Even the armchair traveler who is planning a future real trip to the frozen continent will appreciate this atlas as welcome travel guide. Having reviewed a good number of books on Antarctica and its history, and recommended them to one or another group of potential readers, I have to say that this is the first book I would recommend without the slightest hesitation to any reader, even one only remotely interested in Antarctica. It needs to be part of any library having a section on the frozen continent.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


Nicholas Frykman’s The Bloody Flag: Mutiny in the Age of Atlantic Revolution is an ambitious study of naval mutiny in the Age of Revolution. According to Frykman, the red flag or the bloody flag that historians associated with revolution originated as a symbol of naval mutiny in the era of the French Revolution. Although mariners traditionally used the red flag to declare their intentions to stop work or to fight, this symbol acquired new meaning in era of republican ideology and collective action.

Unlike earlier scholars who studied naval mutiny within a national context, Frykman, employs an Atlantic approach to the subject starting at Camperdown, moving to Revolutionary France, the Caribbean and ultimately to England. According to Frykman, “While conflicts in each navy followed their own trajectory, in the latter half of the 1790s overlapping waves of revolt flowed together into a single revolutionary surge, genuinely Atlantic in both origin and Scope.” (10) The French, Dutch and British navies experienced 150 single ship mutinies and half a dozen fleet mutinies which lasted a few days to several months involving 3,000 to 40,000 men. Navies maintained discipline through regimen of harsh punishments, including floggings, keelhauling and hangings. Objection to such cruelty and the shipboard social hierarchy that maintained it began with an insurrection in the Toulon dockyard on 1 December 1789 and spread to the French Fleet.

Although the French ship of the
Line, *Leopard*, left port before the uprising, it sailed to the French part of Santo Domingue, a colony divided between the petits blancs, small farmers, overseers, and artisans and the blancs blancs, plantation owners. Once revolutionary ideas infiltrated the *Leopard*’s crew, they responded by renaming their ship, electing an assembly, and refusing to intervene in Santo Domingue’s affairs unless the colony’s assembly was attacked. To avoid losing control of the *Leopard*, Captain de Gallisonnière returned to France. France’s National Assembly responded by issuing a new Code Penal de Marine that replaced court martial with jury trials and strict regulations on the degree of punishment a man could receive. The code distinguished between disciplinary punishments for minor offenses and afflictive punishments which resulted in death or galley service. Despite the creation of a new Code Penal de Marine, mutinies continued in the French Navy.

As the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon spread eastward to the Dutch Republic, republican ideas spread to the Dutch fleet. When Napoleon created the Batavian Republic, crews of the Stadholder’s fleet decided to sign new ships articles under the new government. Despite instituting a new penal code and replacing offensive naval officers, the crew of the *Jason* rebelled and carried their ship to Greenock, Scotland. When the French fleet landed the *Black Guard* at Fishguard, Wales, the British government went off the gold standard to prevent a run on the banks. According to Frykman, the anxiety created by these events instigated the great mutiny at Spithead. As conflict with France progressed, mariners found the issue of impressment increasingly contentious. Mariners forced into naval service for years became more and frustrated with lost wages and opportunities for promotion in the merchant service. The mutineers who engaged in the Spithead Mutiny realized their demands could not be met by disabling a single ship, so they presented their grievances to a council of delegates that met on board the *Queen Charlotte*. Despite achieving several of their objectives at Spithead including higher wages and the removal of 50 offensive officers, mariners continued to object to the harsh conditions of naval service.

Mutineers at the Nore Anchorage hoped to join the Spithead Mutiny before it ended. Although they demanded wage increases, payment of bounties, and a more equal distribution of prize money, their most radical demand concerned liberty or shore leave. The Nore Mutineers believed King John granted the right to shore leave in the Magna Carta and the Royal Navy had continuously violated that right since 1215. During the mutiny, each ship was ruled by a series of committees subordinate to a general committee which led negotiations.

When the red flag appeared at Nore it symbolized more than just a quest to restore lost rights. Flying the red flag took on new meaning as a symbol of regicide, class warfare and social renewal, forcing the Royal Navy to drop it from their signal book. “By embracing the red flag as their symbol, the mutineers at the Nore signaled their understanding that they were now engaged in a conflict between two sides with fundamentally opposing interests, and that a resolution to this conflict could only come by superior force.” (163) Once the British Army surrounded the ships at Nore, sickness spread through the fleet and the Committee of Delegates’ authority collapsed. When the red flag passed from mutiny to mutiny it acquired new meaning as a symbol
of republicanism and collective action and eventually emerged as the emblem of communist revolution at Kiel, Kronstadt, and Sevastopol.

As Frykman takes his reader on a whirlwind ride across the Atlantic Ocean during the Era of Revolution, he weaves a compelling narrative that draws on material cultural, ideology and mariner’s biographies. Although numerous studies of the Era of Revolution abound, Frykman’s book employs a novel methodology that connects this age with the Communist Revolution.

Edward Martin
Manchester, Maine


Daniel Gifford’s *The Last Voyage of the Whaling Bark Progress*, New Bedford, Chicago and the Twilight of an Industry, focuses on roughly fifty years’ worth of events surrounding the titular vessel. From construction to destruction, the story of *Progress* is truly remarkable as it ventured to the Antarctic to hunt whales and was later featured at the 1893 World’s Fair. Gifford’s narrative includes the perspectives of the whalers who were employed on *Progress*, the businessmen and politicians who saw the value in *Progress*’s exhibition at the World’s Fair, the tabloids along the route that took the ship from New Bedford to Chicago, and the descendant community of the whaling industry.

Gifford’s information was primarily gathered from various newspaper articles, personal accounts from whale-men, and other scholarly works on the subject. He also consulted and included Admiralty records, museum exhibition accounts, as well as various patents and speeches. The images he includes are very appropriate, adding clarification and visual examples, while not taking away from his narrative.

The book is organized chronologically and moves between events occurring on *Progress*’s whaling voyages, in New Bedford, Chicago, and the way-points en route to Chicago on its titular “last voyage”. Each chapter focuses on a slightly different location, group of people, and aspect of the overall story, but they all set the stage for the penultimate chapter. The author does an excellent job of building the life story and importance of *Progress* in its heyday, as well as detailing the events that transpired leading up to its destruction. Carefully building upon the character of every individual tied to the historic whaling bark, Gifford’s account has no heroes or villains, but certainly highlights the differences in the approaches to the ship and its history.

Gifford’s is one of those desirable authors who expertly combine academic information and study with a style of writing that is inviting and compatible with a reader of any background or education level. He expresses notions about the whaling industry, the history of *Progress* itself, and the events surrounding the exhibition at the World’s Fair in a way that is easy to follow, understand, and appreciate.

In some ways, Gifford’s book could nearly be seen as a “what not to do with historic items” though the attempt to make *Progress* an interactive floating museum was the first of its kind and, certainly, there were lessons learned. The last chapters highlight the disconnect between the reality of history and the entertainment value for which some
stories and museums strive. It is made clear that publicity and fascination are not the same as education and value, either monetarily or culturally. 

It is quite possible that without Daniel Gifford’s ancestral tie to and vested interest in the history and legacy of Progress, this story might never have been told. Be it a cautionary tale for historians, archaeologists, and curators, or a tale of one of the last survivors of a bygone era and the complications that surrounded the last attempt at showcasing its glory, Gifford’s book is an excellent addition to any personal or professional library.

Olivia L. T. Fuller
College Station, Texas


When the naval history of the Second World War is considered, even when it is granted the sole position of consideration within a work, it is almost exclusively discussed in terms of the overtly militaristic aspects of that history. Primarily, this takes the form of considerations of the various fleet movements and engagements, particularly where they related to the air and land wars. In this way, those who were engaged in the war, on waters spanning the globe, are largely considered to be members of the armed uniform services with infrequent consideration of the civilian aspects of the war. Infrequently considered in studies of the Second World War are the men of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the civilian auxiliaries to the Navy, whose duty it was to carry supplies vital to the war effort, and whose significant sacrifices to the war effort often receive scant recognition. With Merchant Marine Survivors of World War II: Oral Histories of Cargo Carrying Under Fire, Michael Gillen, former merchant mariner and professor of Asian History at Pace University in New York, focuses on those sacrifices through a collection of twenty oral histories from Merchant Marine veterans.

Nearly thirty-five years in the writing, the book began when Gillen was serving as the director of the preservation efforts on the Liberty Ship SS John W. Brown. He was motivated to begin interviewing veterans of the Merchant Marine who had served in the Second World War. Because all of the oral histories that he presents in the book were collected between 1978 and 1987, all of his subjects unfortunately died before their stories were published.

The central focus of these stories, as hinted at in the title of the book, is not just the men’s war service but their survival, often in the face of extremely trying circumstances. While Gillen initially intended that all of his subjects should have survived the torpedoing of at least one ship on which they served during the war, he came to conclude “that all who served, whether torpedoed or not, contributed vitally and ‘paid with some of their own’ in multiple ways … that could, from the trauma of it, endure for years.” (4) Gillen diligently prepares an introductory paragraph about each interviewee’s career prior to their particular story, as well as a concluding paragraph summarizing their career after those events. Beyond those contributions, he has been very careful to allow the voices of his subjects to maintain their often rough, occasionally colourful, authenticity.
This authenticity is in many ways one of the most valuable aspects of the book, creating an emotional connectedness that hooks the casual reader, while also providing the kind of information that scholars find so tantalizing. These gripping accounts cover the globe, representing experiences of merchant sailors who were in Manila as it fell, who had to hurriedly evacuate sinking ships in nearly every major body of water, who aided in the invasion of Okinawa, and even those who were captured by German naval auxiliary units. Those with an interest in the Second World War in the Arctic, will certainly appreciate three different accounts from survivors of the ill-fated PQ-17 convoy, as well as outsider descriptions of wartime life in Archangel and Murmansk, Russia. Although not an exhaustive collection of accounts, the book highlights the enormous contributions made by members of the U.S. Merchant Marine in the Second World War.

Gillen deserves a large amount of praise for his skill as an interviewer, particularly given the numerous decades that had passed before he recorded his subjects’ accounts. In reading these memoirs there is little sense of the length of time that has passed, or of major holes in the narrative. This leads interested readers to a better understanding of the various subjects’ experiences and provides researches with a greater level of evidence. As a former merchant mariner himself, Gillen is deeply familiar with the terminology and enjoys a level of credibility that is a major part of the book’s success—from which we all benefit. The downside to the long time that it took for this project to reach fruition is that any research interest it generates in the U.S. Merchant Marine in the period will be blunted by the inevitable deaths of those veterans. On the other hand, the book finally turns the spotlight on the role of the merchant marine in the Second World War. As these men were not granted veteran status until 1988, it can be hoped that Merchant Marine Survivors of World War II will promote more research into their contributions and grant the merchant mariners their rightful place in the history of that war well before the centennial of their service.

Michael Toth
Fort Worth, Texas


In From Captives to Consuls, Brett Goodin has written a scholarly, collective biography that explores the lives of three Americans who shared two characteristics: all were mariners in the early republic, and all were held as slaves in the Maghreb, the Barbary world of North Africa. Goodin, a post-doctoral fellow at New York University, Shanghai, has amassed impressive details about the lives of Richard O’Brien (1758-1824), James Leander Cathcart (1767-1843), and James Riley (1777-1840) from all sorts of hitherto unknown sources. Using concepts of “Othering” and Orientalism, Goodin tries to demonstrate that these men drew on their Barbary experiences to influence the non-elite American “Village Enlightenment” understanding of the Islamic world. But Goodin goes far beyond their captivity experiences. Through the three not-quite-parallel lives of these men, Gooding illustrates...
what it meant to be a “self-made man” in early-nineteenth-century America, a phrase, he notes, was coined by Henry Clay in 1832. Goodin attempts to illuminate the emergent United States of the period by focusing on these three lives, to comment on American nation-building and evolving concepts of liberty, masculinity, and nationhood in the early republic through the Jacksonian era.

O’Brien was born in Maine to Irish immigrant parents. His early life is obscure, but he likely served as a captain in the Pennsylvania and/or Virginia State Navies during the American Revolutionary War. After the war, he was a merchant shipmaster before Barbary “pirates” captured his ship, the Dauphin out of Philadelphia, in July 1785. While in captivity, eight of O’Brien’s letters were published in American newspapers.

Scots-Irish by birth, Cathcart came to America as a child, likely served on an American privateer or Continental Navy warship before he reached his teenaged years, but when he was captured, he reasserted his British identity to avoid imprisonment (Goodin unkindly says Cathcart “defected,” and elsewhere refers to his “negotiable loyalties”), and as the price for a pardon, served briefly in the Royal Navy. Postwar, with a revived American commerce and a revived American allegiance, he returned to the sea, but Barbary pirates captured his ship, the Maria from Boston. Both O’Brien and Cathcart were slaves in Algiers, from 1785 to 1796. Through his wits, luck, and networking, Cathcart rose to become the chief Christian clerk to the dey. Goodin’s research has uncovered some important new information, including that Cathcart, who in Algiers temporarily reasserted his British origins, petitioned King George III for assistance, and that he wrote to William Wilberforce, the great English abolitionist, for help with their ransom.

Upon their return to America, President John Adams sought to take advantage of the recently freed captives’ knowledge of the Barbary world by appointing O’Brien as consul to Algiers and Cathcart as consul to Tripoli. In Algiers, O’Brien and Cathcart had been friends, but in returning to the Mediterranean with his new, teen-aged wife, Cathcart apparently tried to seduce his wife’s maid, who promptly fled to O’Brien, who married her after a whirlwind courtship. Cathcart took this embarrassment as an affront. He never forgave O’Brien, tried to undermine him, and dealt with him only on official business; for his part, O’Brien often did not deign to respond. Cathcart left Tripoli after the bashaw declared war against the United States in May 1801. After being declared persona non grata in Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, Cathcart spent more than a decade in consular posts in the Madeira Islands and in Cadiz, before returning to America. Although he badgered presidents for positions, he received a short-term appointment as a navy agent to survey wood in Louisiana, and then received a minor, stultifying post in the Treasury Department for the last two decades of his life. Although he never made it to the West, he encouraged his children to go, and a Cathcart enclave was established in LaPorte, Indiana. The highlight of his career was certainly in Tripoli. Cathcart wrote detailed and colourful letters, both official and private, about his posting in Tripoli and his diplomacy with the bashaw, many of which were published in American newspapers. More than a half-century after he died, a daughter published two books containing his early letters, The Captives: Eleven Years a Prisoner in Algiers (1899), and then Tripoli[::]
First War With the United States[:]

In 1803, O’Brien was superseded in Algiers, and although Goodin does not mention it, O’Brien stayed in the Mediterranean to try to assist in negotiations to ransom the 300 American sailors held captive in Tripoli, after the frigate Philadelphia ran aground. Like Cathcart, as a consul, O’Brien wrote letters about the Barbary world that American newspapers published. When he left the Mediterranean, O’Brien moved to Philadelphia and served a single term in the Pennsylvania legislature, then settled on a farm outside of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where he died in near obscurity.

Riley’s life did not intersect with Cathcart’s or O’Brien’s. Riley was too young for Revolutionary War service, and apparently avoided the War of 1812. With the return of peace, he commanded a merchant ship, the Commerce, which ran aground on the West African coast. Riley spent three months as a slave, traversing the Sahara as a captive to nomadic tribesmen until being ransomed by the British consul. Riley wrote Authentic Narrative of the Loss of the American Brig Commerce about his experiences, a work that went through many editions. According to Goodin, unlike Cathcart and O’Brien, Riley was dispassionate about his captivity, indeed he saw the humanity of his captors, and helped break down an Orientalist or Othering stereotype about Muslim people. Goodin approaches Riley primarily as a literary figure, tracing the impact and focus of the various editions of his work. Interestingly, at age 51, Riley went back to sea, and spent the rest of his life as a shipmaster and entrepreneur, dying in the Caribbean.

One of Goodin’s broad themes is that these three men went to the “marine frontier” as young men, and later, as archetypal self-making Americans of their time, they turned to the Western frontier for new opportunities. But none of the three fit neatly into that theme. After a few years in northwest Ohio, Riley went back to sea; after some years in Philadelphia, O’Brien settled on a farm in Carlisle, which was hardly the “West” when he moved there, and Cathcart was a contentious job seeker and office holder, who stayed in Washington.

Another Goodin theme postulates on the effect of the writings of these men on popular American understanding of the Barbary world, and perhaps, of the wider Islamic world. With the many editions of his Authentic Narrative, and readership in the thousands, Riley certainly had influence, even, it is said, on Abraham Lincoln. But before Cathcart’s letters were published in books at the turn of the twentieth century, some of his and O’Brien’s letters from Barbary were published in newspapers when they arrived in America. Cathcart and O’Brien may well have framed a distinct Orientalism, as Goodin proposes, but it is unclear how wide an audience, and how much influence, they enjoyed with the non-elite Village Enlightenment, based on the short half-life of letters in newspapers.

From Captives to Consuls is a valuable book. Unfortunately, some factual errors have crept into the narrative. For example: during the 1798-1800 Quasi War, the French did not capture 1,800-2,300 American merchant ships; Richard Henry Lee was a Virginian, not a Pennsylvanian; the frigate George Washington was neither “brand new” nor “the pride of the young U.S. Navy” (she was a converted merchant ship) and when Captain William Bainbridge moored her under Algiers’ gun batteries, it was not any failure of O’Brien’s
diplomacy but rather Bainbridge’s extraordinary gaffe (which Goodin mentions only as an afterthought) that allowed the dey to humiliate the United States by using the George Washington as a transport for his tribute of exotic animals and slaves to the Sultan in Constantinople. Goodin makes other questionable interpretations, such as asserting that Cathcart’s personal diplomacy with the bashaw, and his efforts to engage in private trade, “eroded hope in a lasting peace,” as opposed to the Barbary regime’s rapacity for tribute payments; suggesting that Jefferson welcomed war with Tripoli in 1801 as a way to put the United States on a par with Britain and France; or claiming that Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison had little foreknowledge about using Ahmet Karamanli, the deposed brother of the Bashaw of Tripoli, to attempt “regime change,” when in fact they knew all about those plans.

In From Captives to Consuls, Goodin has discovered interesting and previously unknown biographical information about Richard O’Brien, James Leander Cathcart, and James Riley. He demonstrates how they perceived and reacted to the Barbary world as slaves and as diplomats, and how they portrayed that world to Americans. On their return to America, each tried to network themselves into economic betterment and higher stations. Using their lives as an interpretive vehicle, Goodin makes provocative and insightful points about the early republic.

Frederick C. Leiner
Baltimore, Maryland


Professor Harlaftis, the preeminent historian of modern Greek shipping, has produced an ambitious comparative study of the most successful Greek shipping family of the nineteenth century, the Vigliano brothers, and of Aristotle Onassis, the most famous shipowner of the post-1945 era. Onassis was a celebrity before he married the widow of an American president, while the three Vigliano brothers were major players in opening the Russian Black Sea grain trade to world markets. Creating Global Shipping argues that these four Greek shipowners were in large part responsible for the development of modern bulk shipping as a multinational business. The author draws on a vast range of archival sources from Imperial Russian court records, the Vigliano Brothers’ accounts in the Bank of England and the Aristotle Onassis papers held by his private foundation in Greece. Harlaftis appears to be the first scholar to have had access to the Onassis records. Thus buttressed, she makes her argument forcefully but there are qualifications to this thesis that are not discussed.

The book is divided into two roughly equal parts, with an introductory chapter and a conclusion. Chapters two through five analyse the careers of the three Vigliano brothers, Marino (1804–1896), Panagi (1814–1902), and Andrea (1827–1887). Aristotle Onassis’ business activities are the subject of chapters six through nine.

All three Vigliano brothers began as ship’s captains with the eldest, Marino (Mari), commanding a small coasting vessel in the Sea of Azov in the early 1820s. After he established himself as a successful grain trader and shipown-
er at the port of Taganrog, his younger siblings followed him into the family business. The establishment of a London office by Panagi in the 1850s was a strategic masterstroke that allowed the Vigliano brothers to expand geographically and to transform their business into an integrated shipping empire. They now offered vessel and cargo brokerage services as well as financial services to their clients while at the same time expanding into steamships.

The Vigliano network’s success helped to create problems of its own. In December 1881, Mari was among a group of Taganrog merchants who were arrested by the Russian authorities for smuggling, tax fraud, and forgery. Eventually, after appeal, he was acquitted of all criminal charges and merely fined a rather insubstantial sum. More importantly, the senior Vigliano escaped being exiled to Siberia. Harlaftis puts the prosecution down to the xenophobia of the new Tsar Alexander III. This, despite the fact that the expert witnesses used by the government came from competing Black Sea ports which does hint at the possibility that intra-regional rivalries may have been involved as well.

Onassis began his adult life as a refugee from the Greco-Turkish War fleeing Smyrna for Athens in 1922. The next year, after emigrating to Buenos Aires, he used his position as the local agent for his family’s Greek-based tobacco business to begin to learn the shipping business. Onassis purchased his first two ships from the Canadian government at Depression-era prices in 1931. Following the well developed strategy of older Greek shipowners, he continued to acquire second hand tramps throughout the 1930s.

While Onassis was developing his shipping business during 1930s, he was also learning the ropes by developing contacts with London Greek, and Norwegian shipowners. He further expanded his knowledge and his network by ordering his first new vessels, a series of tankers from a Swedish shipyard. In 1939 he began moving his vessels to the Panamanian registry. Thus, before moving to New York in 1942, Onassis had already established himself as an ambitious young shipowner. His first big break came post-war when he was able to finance the purchase of ten Liberty ships handled through the National City Bank (NCB). Secondly, he introduced a level of opaqueness not seen before by flagging out the ships to the Honduran and Panamanian registries while they were owned by a Panamanian company whose stock was owned by another Panamanian company. This type of ownership model became Onassis’ preferred method of shipping investment. Not only did it obscure the beneficial ownership of each vessel, it protected his own personal liability. The acquisition of T-2 tankers from the U.S. government presented a thornier problem because these ships were too strategically valuable to be sold outright to foreigners. The solution arranged by a prominent Washington law firm and a helpful retired Congressman, allowed Onassis to control five separate U.S. companies which purchased twenty-three vessels, (including fourteen tankers), from the U.S. government. The financing was done through Wall Street banks and insurance companies. The author claims, quoting the CEO of the NCB, that Onassis “invented” (244-245) the ship loan. While this may have been true for the NCB, shipping loans backed by mortgage bonds had been standard practice in the U.S. since before the start of the twentieth century. American banks had been financing foreign steamship companies for many years before Onassis arrived in New
York. Regardless of the parentage of his financing, Onassis made spectacular profits from these purchases which led him to begin ordering new tankers from American, European, British and Japanese yards.

But being a prosperous foreigner in the United States during the Cold War drew unwanted attention. In the highly charged atmosphere of the McCarthy era, Onassis (and several of his fellow Greek shipowners) made the mistake of not appearing to be American citizens. Most of the shipowners were not, but their companies were. After an investigation by the FBI, Onassis settled for a face-saving fine and moved his operations to Monte Carlo. His ships were now super tankers of ever larger size. His fleet operated as part of a virtually stateless network. The ownership structure of his fleet was now more elaborate than earlier but with the same purpose, that of protecting each ship from the liability of its fleet mates while obscuring the true ownership. Onassis, himself, seemed to have no fixed abode but spent much of his time on his yacht.

Harlaftis has provided an insightful analysis of the development of ship owning from the 1820s through to the end of the post-Second World War boom. The key to success for Greek shipowners was a combination of family management tied to networks of trust. The Vigliano brothers developed trusted networks with a legion of shipowners, agents, bankers, and shipbuilders based in the centre of world commerce, London. Panagi Vigliano created the prototype for the Greek London office which was followed by a host of Greek shipowners in the twentieth century. The problem of succession, however, remained unsolved. Onassis’ contributed to the evolution of shipping management on two fronts. First, he devised an ownership structure that was extremely opaque to protect himself and his investment. Secondly, he helped broaden the financial base for shipping. Creating Global Shipping is a significant work that opens the door to further research in the business history of shipping.

M. Stephen Salmon Orleans, Ontario


Consuls and Captives is part of a series entitled ‘Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe’, and in this book Erica Heinsen-Roach analyses the roles of Dutch consuls in Algiers, Tunis, and Salé during the early-modern period to make the argument that the idea that Maghrib Corsairs did not respect European law and diplomacy and therefore, European nations could not make treaties with them is far too reductive. This book rotates around three related concepts. First, the roles of consuls as opposed to ambassadors in European-Maghribi diplomacy. Second, the differences between the Dutch and Maghribi perceptions of these roles. Third, how geopolitical changes over the seventeenth century altered the first two. Consuls and Captives looks primarily at the roles of the Dutch consuls in first Algiers and Tunis, and then Salé, and their roles in releasing and ransoming Dutch sailors enslaved by corsairs. Discussions of other English, French and even Danish and Swedish efforts provide context when needed, but the
focus is very much on the Dutch.

The book is divided into four sections. Part One, ‘Encountering Barbary’, focuses on 1596-22 and the origins of the Dutch-North African relationships, as well as the diplomatic relationship with Constantinople. The second chapter provides basic information on corsairs, and the enslavement of individuals by both the corsairs and the Dutch. The second part, “Transformations” covers 1616-30 and the development of the consul’s role as a state representative rather than merely a trade representative, as well as the conflicting systems between the established practices of ransoming, and Dutch efforts to legislate repatriation of captured sailors through treaties. Part Three (“Confrontations”, 1651-83) deals with the conflicts that arose from Dutch frustration with the failures of their treaty approach, and more importantly, how the Dutch State’s constant struggle to avoid financial responsibility for ransoming sailors, affected the success of their consuls, and why rivalries formed between Christian Dutch consuls sent by Amsterdam and the other cities and locally-based Jewish merchants who acted as agents for both the Dutch and the Maghribi. The final section “Normative Relations” (1679-1726) describes how the Dutch seemed to finally grasp the importance of tributes, and why they had never been able to legislate away the practice of ransoming sailors.

One cannot criticize the research which is at the heart of this book; it was clearly sufficient for the author’s doctorate. Her absolute mastery of the information shines like a beacon. Not only does she use of the appropriate/local terms such as Maghrib throughout the text, but I also enjoyed her ability to balance discussions of Algiers, Tunis, and Salé, within the context of Constantinople, but with an important remove. The very beginning of the book, and the final 90 pages or so (which comprise sections III and IV), contain the clearest writing. Most admirably, Heinsen-Roach brings balance and context when she backs off a bit, and paints in the broader strokes about the larger transformations that render the general, whiggish description of Dutch early-modern diplomacy irrelevant. For example, in respect to Salé, she reveals that the original relationship was built on a common enemy—Spain—which didn’t apply after 1648. Likewise, Heinsen-Roach smoothly introduces aspects of Islamic law and theology which made long-term, permanent treaties and frameworks impossible, whatever the Dutch might have hoped for. There is an excellent section describing the 1670s and discussing Sir John Narbrough’s time in the Mediterranean and England’s efforts at Tangiers. I really wish I had had this book when I was completing my PhD as it would have provided some lovely context for my discussions of those missions and their effect on the Royal Navy’s professionalization ca.1690-1710.

Unfortunately, the writing in the middle section of this book is more muddled. In particular, having put the book down, I found it difficult to get back into the details and the argument due to the complex nature of the Consuls, and the different conceptions of their roles. There is also some confusion around a number of the illustrations/images. For example, the author includes images of sabres (nimcha) “owned” by Cornelis Tromp and Michiel de Ruyter, but does not directly refer to them in the text. In fact, the book would not suffer if some of the images were removed and replaced with tables, charts or graphs to provide visual comparisons of the number of Dutch sailors enslaved by Corsairs over time, or the value and the
amounts of the gifts made to the governors of Algiers, Tunis and Salé, or similar comparisons. The inclusion of maps would help situate readers who are less familiar with the geography. A fuller explanation of the Dutch relationship with the Hanse/Hansa cities would have clarified why the Dutch acted as their agents during the period. Likewise, it would have been helpful if the author had included some discussion around the realities and duration of maritime (and naval) scheduling during this period. For example, the length of voyages between the Netherlands and the *Maghrib*, the number of crew aboard merchant ships of various sizes (as well as warships), the seasonal nature of maritime warfare as undertaken by Northern European nations such as the Netherlands and England, and similar details.

My ongoing complaint about modern academic books involves the use of endnotes rather than footnotes, thereby reducing the likelihood that readers will bother to access some useful and interesting comments. Second, is the cost. While $125 may not seem out of line with comparative books, it is still awfully expensive for those grad students and early career researchers who might not access to a review or library copy. That would be a shame, because this is a book that should be widely read, by maritime historians and diplomatic historians, IR specialists and anybody whose interests and research intersects with this topic. Erica Heinsen-Roach’s argument that the existing concepts of *Maghribi* diplomacy must be overhauled is absolutely convincing.

Sam McLean
Toronto, Ontario


Great Lakes maritime history, as so much else that passes as popular maritime history, is often told via a collection of shipwreck tales. Indeed, the reader will learn of a number of “dark and stormy nights” ... and days, for that matter. But in this “maritime history inspired by shipwrecks,” Jensen approaches the wrecks as “the consequence and the convergence point of larger patterns of historical events, factors, processes, and social networks.” (1) Consequently, this volume is particularly successful in presenting the reader with the general historical patterns which the class of vessel under discussion illuminates, before diving into the evidence presented by the archaeological work.

Jensen is at considerable pains to situate this study with the historiographical paradigm of the Atlantic World, and Atlantic maritime culture. He begins by arguing that “During much of the nineteenth century, the maritime technologies employed on the Great Lakes differed little in essence from those of the other coastal regions of the United States and North Atlantic.” (15) The challenge is then to sustain that claim against his own argument that the early Great Lakes palace steamers were largely homegrown designs through the 1840s, that were superseded by inferior designs or construction practices imported from the Hudson River and Long Island Sound in the 1850s. (89, 91) I suspect there is significantly more evidence of Long Island Sound inspiration in the steamboat designs through to the 1840s than the author has considered,
which serves to underwrite his larger thesis. And the brief discussion of the evidence from the 1871-built Cumberland (94) suggests that certain patterns of hull framing persisted longer and may reflect variations within the Great Lakes region. Navigation on Lake Superior can be a very different experience than that of Lake Ontario, which makes nearly its only appearance in a passing reference to a study of the Maple Leaf. (94)

While placing the study within the context of Atlantic maritime culture, by the end of the volume and the end of the nineteenth century, Jensen is beginning to argue for something more nuanced. “By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the Great Lakes had become a more distinctive maritime region, with unique technologies afloat and ashore…” (153). It was a place “… clearly recognized as a nationally and even internationally important and highly creative maritime region with a distinct Atlantic frontier cultural heritage” (260). As such, Jensen laments its marginalization in American maritime history.

It is striking that in making the latter argument, Jensen chooses not to invoke the dominance of the huge, steel bulk carriers, which he characterizes as “industrially produced cargo-moving machines,” and others have seen as unique to the Lakes, beyond rooting the emergence of the design in earlier wooden-hulled bulk freighters. Instead, the final three chapters of this volume pursue the construction, operation and eventual archaeological investigation of a series of large wooden bulk carriers and their schooner-rigged barge consorts, especially those constructed by their last, and most enthusiastic advocate, James Davidson. These were not composite hulls, of which no mention appears in the volume, although a number were deployed in the same era. Rather Davidson built over 300-foot wooden hulls, made possible by iron and later steel cross-bracing, bands and arches (183), and built to withstand repeated groundings, collisions, storms and ice. (223) So little is steel construction respected here that Jensen proclaims “It was not technological obsolescence that finally closed the era of wooden shipbuilding on the Great Lakes; it was simply the lack of building material.” (259). Jensen may find himself alone in this assertion, since, by the First World War, steel freighters were appearing that were twice the length, and as time would prove, frequently had twice the operational lifespan of Davidson’s best contenders.

On another level, this volume is even more regional than the Great Lakes. The shipwrecks that inspired the sub-title are all situated in the waters of the state of Wisconsin, and have been studied by underwater archaeologists working with the Wisconsin Historical Society, including at one time, Jensen. Wisconsin can certainly take pride of place among the jurisdictions surrounding the Great Lakes for the care with which its shipwrecks have been documented, both generally, and the ones featured in this volume specifically. Indeed, Tamara Thomsen’s wonderful underwater images, largely drawn from the archives of the WHS, enrich the volume from the front cover to the back. And the paper on which the volume has been produced serves to deliver these images well. The publishers (the Wisconsin Historical Society Press) are to be commended on producing such a fine physical volume at a reasonable price.

No review would be complete, without a couple of caveats. For those not familiar with the coastal geography of Wisconsin, or the larger Great Lakes, a modern map highlighting those places
would not have gone amiss. It might have prevented a reference to the Niagara, a “palace” steamboat whose hull was too large for the Welland Canal (and thus to navigate the lowest of the Great Lakes, Lake Ontario) having arrived at Ogdensburg (on the St. Lawrence River) in late 1846. (65) The utter lack of imagination of ship owners has led to multiple vessels of the same name operating in adjoining waters in the same years, and thus to the confusion of those of us engaging in research via keyword searches. Beyond this, the only editorial misstep this reviewer noticed was to 400-foot-long shipping containers (145).

*Stories from the Wreckage* is much more than its title suggests. It is a serious effort to explore several dimensions of the maritime history of the Great Lakes region, with a weather eye to the larger Atlantic maritime context, and to bring together the scholarship of the underwater archaeologist with the historian. It is worthy of consideration by a readership well beyond the limits of the state of Wisconsin and the Great Lakes watershed.

Walter Lewis
Grafton, Ontario


During the period 7 December 1941, when Imperial Japanese forces attacked American military installations at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands and the British colonies of Hong Kong and Malaya, through 4 June 1942, when the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) suffered a massive defeat in the Battle of Midway, the IJN and the Imperial Japanese Army were unstoppable. In *Images of War. Japan Triumphant*, Philip Jowett has compiled a very useful work of little-known photographs accompanied by short, accurate explanatory narratives.

Jowett’s book comprises an introduction offering background to the 1941-45 Pacific War, followed by fourteen chapters. Jowett rightly states that Japan’s success in 1941-42 was the end of a continuum of conflicts that began with the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, then the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, Japanese involvement in the First World War, the 1931 Japanese Invasion of Manchuria, and the full war with China beginning in 1937.

After that useful introduction, the book’s chapters are: Japan Prepares for War, 1940-1; (sic) The British Empire in the Far East Prepares, 1941; ‘Defence on a Shoestring’—The Philippines Army, 1935-41; ‘The Forgotten Army’—The Army of the Netherlands East Indies, 1941; The Japanese Empire Versus the USA—‘Japan Strikes, 1941’; ‘For Reasons of Prestige’—The Fall of Hong Kong, 1941; The Malayan Campaign, 1941-2; ‘The British Army’s Greatest Defeat’—The Fall of Singapore, 1942; Battle for the Philippines, 1941-2; The Burma Campaign, December 1941-February 1942; The Burma Campaign, March-May 1942; The War at Sea, December 1941-May 1942; The Conquest of the Netherlands East Indies, 1942; and Japan’s Spreading Tentacles, 1941-2.

Each chapter has a well-written introductory narrative of two to three pages in length, which, while necessarily brief, contains much accurate information on its topic.

The photographs and their accom-
panying captions are the heart of this book. Only a very few of the photographs were familiar to this reviewer; the captions are relevant and well-written and enable the reader to learn much from the accompanying photos. This reviewer found no errors in the captions worth mentioning. The photos give depth and meaning to the narrative and were taken from all sides in the Pacific War—American, British, Dutch, and Japanese. The reproduction quality is excellent including many details; such as propaganda posters and photos from obscure battles such as the invasion of the island of Guam. All these are valuable, connecting the reader with what actually happened.

Besides the above comments, the chapter subjects stand out. The book covers topics not well-described in standard histories of the Pacific War. For example, the chapters on British and American war preparation mention such locally-raised forces such as the Burma Defence Force, the Tongan Defence Force, and the Philippine Army. Further, the chapters on the Hong Kong disaster and the Netherlands East Indies Army and conquest thereof are important; most histories of the Pacific War simply mention the defeat at Hong Kong and touch only briefly on the Netherlands East Indies campaign. The chapter on the War at Sea has photographs of many ships—often written about, not always pictured.

The only criticisms that can be made of this book are 1) that there could have been included a page of “Recommendations for Further Reading,” noting at least some of the many works on the Pacific War; and 2) perhaps some way of stating the sources of the many photos could also have been included.

Still, this is a very useful book. It is not a comprehensive history of the first few months of the Pacific War, but it was never intended to be such. It is, rather, a helpful reference book for the student of the Pacific War and/or a good introduction to that war for the novice. It is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


The traditional founding story of America is the Pilgrims, those religious dissenters who sought freedom in a new land, befriended the Indians and started Thanksgiving. Marooned challenges that tradition and posits that America’s true founding story is Jamestown. It draws its title from a Spanish derived word indicating those who run away, separate themselves from civilization to become “savages”. The early history of Jamestown was a tug between the ordered life of Europe with its standards and laws and the life of the marooned, uncivilized, unrestrained, free to establish their own civilization.

This saga begins with a reference to Shakespeare’s The Tempest, drawn loosely on the accounts of a 1609 shipwreck that left Jamestown’s Third Supply Fleet “marooned” on Bermuda. It then traces the Jamestown story from its 1607 beginnings. The first settlers left who London were contracted with the Virginia Company, sponsors of the colony. The were listed as “gentlemen” (presumably with military backgrounds), councillors, labourers, bricklayers, carpenters, surgeons, “boys”, a mason, a fisherman, and a sailor (good to have one on a Trans-Atlantic voyage) and divers others. With the distribution of occupations, a successful enterprise was not a given, in fact the road was rocky.
Though this was England’s first attempt at a New World settlement, the English were no strangers to the “plantation”. They had experience in “planting” English and Scotch settlers in settlements in Ireland. The circumstances were both comparable and divergent. The “planted” were similarly placed in a foreign land among alien populations speaking foreign languages and following strange customs. Lines of communication with Virginia were much longer than those with Ireland, the climate was warmer and the natives of a different complexion. As an Irish-American I was surprised by the suggestion that settlers found the Indians “less terrifying” than the Irish. At first, I thought it should be regarded as an insult but, on further reflection, took it as a source of pride.

Much of the tale is predictable: illness, starvation, death, uneasy relations with the Indians and unrest within the stockade. The fascinating development is the response of the surviving settlers to their new environments. In both Jamestown and Bermuda, leaders emerged who guided their communities through their most turbulent challenges. In Jamestown Captain John Smith, he saved by Pocahontas, emerged and ruled until deposed by men of the Third Supply fleet. On Bermuda Governor Sir Thomas Gates organized the castaways to survive and escape to Jamestown.

Several themes are woven into this work. There are comparisons of Spanish and English colonial practices. Readers are invited into political studies that examine shifting commitments and loyalties and the substitution of one social contract for another as settlers are untethered from their home country and are empowered to construct new agreements to fill the authority vacuum. Examinations are made of the relative attractions of the stockade, with authority figures and familiar customs, but often lacking the necessities of survival and the “woods”, that land beyond their culture, populated by “savages” who could share their sustenance and admit deserters into their own communities which, at that time, seemed to have more of a future than Jamestown. Connections between the London theatre and the Virginia wilderness are noted.

The theme I find to be most intriguing is the concept of the Middle Ground, the land where the settlers “go native” and adopt practices suitable to the location, thereby no longer being totally European, while the Indians become dependent on European goods, thereby no longer being wholly native or masters of their own domains. We are introduced to Wahunsonacock, chief of Tsenacomoco, a region almost twice the size of England’s largest colony, containing numerous satellite villages that paid him tribute. A large segment of this tome is devoted to the chess match between Wahunsonacock and John Smith in which food and tools were exchanged, spheres of influence contested, pressure exerted and native loyalties blowing in the prevailing winds. We see Smith setting himself up as a de facto “chief” commanding the respect and exacting the tribute previously given to Wahunsonacock.

Author Joseph Kelly sets out to challenge the Pilgrim “Shining City on the Hill” as the myth of America’s origin with the Jamestown story that is situated along the rivers and more mud-stained than shining. In making his case he provides an introduction to the first southern English settlement in America in the early Seventeenth Century. At times I found it hard to follow when it narrative strayed into unfamiliar realms. Although stretching from English royal courts to Irish plantations to the Spanish Main to Jamestown
and Bermuda, Kelly does a nice job of weaving the story lines into a mutually supporting unit. Although this was beyond my familiarity zone, it did help expand it. Marooned provides a good story, thought provoking historical analysis and a window into the first permanent English settlement in America.

James Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


This very interesting work focusses on the convoluted path that Imperial Germany followed until it reached its ultimate and fateful decision to wage unrestricted submarine—U-boat in German naval parlance—warfare during the First World War. The author’s previously published works include a handful of critically acclaimed works on the Imperial German Navy’s U-boat campaign in the First World War One. Overall, he has developed a detailed thesis and interpretation regarding Germany’s U-boat policies of this era which even many general and academically trained readers will find revolutionary, if not shocking. Despite having an MA in history and working as an IT consultant, there is no doubt that he is more than aptly suited to illuminate this subject.

The attractive book jacket is presented on the new type of almost matt-lustre paper which seems to be replacing the high-gloss paper previously favoured by publishers. The volume is divided into forty-two chapters of varying lengths and its appendices actually form the last four chapters of this work. It is profusely illustrated with well-chosen photographs but, unfortunately, many details are lost in very dark backgrounds. The same can be said for the numbers and some of the other details in the maps and charts that are presented. While there is no way of ascertaining if this is caused by the type of paper-stock this book is printed on, or the printing technology used, it definitely detracts from the overall impact of this work. Also included are a useful preface, a list of main characters, a timeline, and a table of principle measurements, endnotes and a welcome bibliography. Unfortunately, as good and detailed as the latter is, it also underlines the general weaknesses of bibliographies regarding what was listed and, more importantly, what is missing. For example, while Koever views Germany’s merchant submarine initiative in a very positive light, it doesn’t list the one major general work that was published on these vessels (Dwight R. Messimer’s The Merchant U-Boat, USNIP, 1988).

Perhaps unexpectedly, this work begins with a glimpse of the global economy and that of the key powers of the time and the general development of global trade prior to 1914. The author discusses the evolution of the submarine as a weapon of war and how several nations wanted to integrate them into their naval strategies. He agrees with most authors that Grand Admiral Tirpitz, the architect of the Imperial German Navy, was not a supporter of U-boat construction prior to the war. From here on, however, the author’s perception of Germany’s path to unrestricted submarine war quickly deviates from the accepted paradigm. He argues that Tirpitz became a U-boat advocate because of the Kaisers’ unwillingness to risk his fleet of dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers in a pitched na-
val battle. Britain’s decision to not play into Germany’s hand by implementing a “distant blockade” instead of a close blockade also upset Tirpitz’s battle plans for Germany’s battle fleet. Consequently, Germany’s only offensive naval weapon of consequence was the U-boat.

At the time, submarines were expected to comply with the rules of naval warfare as detailed in The Hague Convention and the rules of International Prize Law. Being forced to surface and order ships to stop for inspection exposed submarines to many dangers. Strangely enough, as the author argues, German U-boats working in the Mediterranean Sea were quite successful in carrying out this type of trade war. A certain clique within the German Navy, however, refused to believe that what worked in the Mediterranean could work in the North Atlantic. Overall, the author convincingly portrays the ebb and flow of the drive for unrestricted submarine warfare within Imperial Germany.

In general, this work exposes the reader to a number of seminal, if not revolutionary, interpretations of German U-boat warfare during the First World War. His main thesis is that a small group of German naval and army officers, as well as government officials, deliberately worked against the wishes of the Kaiser. According to him, they went out of their way to manipulate the Kaiser into waging unrestricted U-boat warfare, falsified data on U-boat successes, and even welcomed bringing the US into the war. It should be noted that the list of unexpected interpretations and arguments presented here is not limited to this main theme. They run the gambit from which navy first introduced the convoy system in this conflict to how close the Kaiser’s U-boats actually came to bankrupting England, even before unrestricted submarine warfare was declared.

Suffice it to say, many of the author’s interpretations and arguments will challenge the accepted perceptions of the reader. Overall, this is a well-researched and convincingly argued volume. Indeed, the author’s viewpoints are perhaps at least as eye opening for this topic as those that were espoused by Fritz Fischer in his work on Germany’s war aims and subsequent books on Germany during the First World War. This is highly recommended work that should find its ways on the bookshelves of twentieth-century European and naval historians alike.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Clare, Quebec


Here is a fresh look at the River Thames and London’s maritime world in the age of Cook and Nelson, which we take to mean from the mid-1700s to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This was an era of war, or preparation for war. The tidal river flows ceaselessly back and forth, bringing the wealth of the world to the wharves and doorsteps of London and taking at the same time and in exchange the riches of the land, in peoples, skills, foodstuffs, industrial goods, navigational instruments, and items of knowledge such as charts and books. The Thames, even yet, is a water on ceaseless change. Daniel Defoe talked about the river as a silver one, and by that he meant revenue and commerce, wealth and power. London, at the time, was
the largest European city, and it had all the infrastructure right to hand, close as it was to Westminster where the political power lay and the City of London, the greatest concentration of financial wealth and managerial techniques in the United Kingdom, if not the world. And the whole lay close to Antwerp and the ports of Europe across the English Channel, with links to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the North Sea and indeed all the seas of the world.

London, therefore, was the nexus. It held the world in fee. The early Tudors were slow to grasp the opportunities afforded by salt water but by seventeenth century and under the reign of Queen Anne a global empire had been achieved—and grew in spite of attempts to curtail formal growth. The Royal Navy was the prime force of the British economy; Britain was a militant state, and its navy the enabler of expansion, the protector of trade, and the guarantor of foreign policy. And we are reminded, when reading herein of Elizabeth Cook and Elizabeth Blight (sadly Emma, Lady Hamilton doesn't get a nod), that families were part and parcel of this global expansion and network. The whole was fueled by war, and the wars were reactions to foreign interference on the high seas or on the margins of where the Union Jack already flew. The British state of the eighteenth century was unlike any other in the world, then or later. And it depended on the one river and on what happened in the world and on its shores. Pilfering, theft and crime were rife in this hub of riches and notorious pubs, too, now of heritage status. Churches and almshouses abounded. The river not only drained the extensive and rich Thames Valley, but had links by tributary canals to the heartland of Industrial England. On the upper reaches of the Thames, at Teddington, for instance, small shipbuilding took place. Below London Bridge lay a long, winding series of reaches—Limehouse, Greenwich, and Blackwall—that became the hub area for dockyards, provisioning places, armaments facilities (at Woolwich), and ship chandleries. On the north shore, east of the Tower of London, stood the more populous parishes leading from Mile End Road and Ratcliffe Highway to Shadwell, Lime House and Poplar. On the south side, stood the naval/military establishments Rotherhithe, Deptford (one of the oldest Royal Dockyards), then Greenwich with its palace, parks, hospitals and astronomy facility, Woolwich and the royal arsenal and, below again, far again, to Gravesend, and all the way to the English Channel. What a fabulous geographic conglomerate, the heartland of commerce, of government, of business, of influence!

Lincoln takes this all in with majestic appraisal and true understanding, weaving the social with the political. We are given, for instance, an adroit understanding of how the East India Company shipping was contracted to ship owners, and how, in turn, their proprietary rights were protected, as if by feudal right. Fortunes were made in the shipping to eastern seas and elsewhere. Changes on shore were both dramatic and extensive. East India Company docks at Deptford gave way to immense structures at Blackwall. Urban removal meant tenements and houses being swept aside in a flash. The corporate world had priority, and the backing of Westminster and the City. So it was that the Thames below Tower Hill was recreated as the pulse of commerce matched that of making war. The sources for this study are extensive, and worth the future student’s every consideration as a model and a guide to future research. We are reminded that part of this area would again recreate itself,
sweeping aside the old, and doing so in the form of the Docklands project. The shipping and warehousing may have disappeared, the hewing and quartering, and all the heavy lifting. But still the throbbing heart of global commerce, insurance and finance lay headquartered on the immediate shores of the Thames. There is a romance to this that Peter Ackroyd missed, but now we have it in Margarette Lincoln’s treasured book. The many illustrations, extensive bibliography, and index combine with the delightful and edifying text to open to us a world we had lost but are now happily recovering.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia


One iconic image from the high Cold War years 1960-85 is of an intercontinental ballistic missile bursting out of the sea to ignite and race on its high-arc way to rain thermonuclear catastrophe on the enemy, be it the U.S. or Soviet Union. But years before the ballistic missile, first the U.S. and then the U.S.S.R. had developed initially short-range cruise missiles (i.e. guided from launch to target) carrying conventional, and then nuclear, warheads. The introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the arsenals of both powers did not terminate cruise missile programs but enhanced them.

This is the absorbing story that Polmar and Connell tell in some 165 pages of text and a half-dozen appendices. As with all of Polmar’s books, *Strike from the Sea* rests on formidable scholarship, mastery of the material and an engaging writing style. It is a tale that the specialist will relish and continue to consult, while the general reader will obtain an education in a key weapon system that in many ways shaped Cold War strategies and has emerged once again in the hands of the Russian Federation Navy (RFN).

Even as German “buzz bombs” rained down on hapless London in the summer of 1944, America’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, grasped the potential of rockets as future naval weapons. From 1946 on, American scientists worked assiduously to develop and elaborate both cruise missile technology and the surface and subsurface vehicles to deploy them both in a land attack and anti-ship configuration. Soviet naval strategists and scientists were no less aware of the possibilities of cruise missiles employed in tandem with submarine torpedoes and, just as promptly, began their own development programs in the early Cold War years. Thereafter, both sides advanced developments in near-lock step, with America’s initial “Regulus” program matched by a Soviet missile system designated “Shaddock” by NATO observers. Between 1956 and 1964, the Soviet program was hobbled by Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s general disinterest in pursuing advanced naval technologies, preferring land-based assault/deterrent programs. But after his overthrow, Navy chief Admiral Sergey Gorshkov was able to pursue a vigorous naval buildup in which sea-based missiles of both strategic- and cruise-missiles played a prominent role.

From the outset, the U.S. and Soviet navies equipped both surface ships and surfaced submarines with cruise
missiles. In the fifties and sixties, the Americans converted several heavy and light cruisers into missile carriers with the Soviets following soon thereafter. Later, both sides began building dedicated surface vessels as missile ranges steadily increased and payloads advanced from conventional to nuclear. But it was the development of submarine technologies that most bewitched both sides. Even as the American Loon (carrying the first generation surface-launched “Regulus”) and Soviet Whiskey boats that deployed the “Shaddock” came into service, both sides sought to solve the interlocking problems of guidance and submerged launch capabilities. In the former instance, first generation missiles had to be launched from surfaced submarines and directed to targets roughly three hundred miles away employing aircraft and other surfaced submarines to literally guide the missile to its target. Polmar and McConnell trace how both sides succeeded in developing onboard guidance systems and subsurface capabilities that made the cruise missile a truly formidable weapon system on a par with, though not as nearly powerful as, its ballistic missile cousins.

The authors emphasize that the Soviet naval leadership was ever spurred onward in its cruise missile development by an obsession with American aircraft carriers that most symbolized the West’s ring of sea power around the Soviet Eurasian empire. They write dramatic accounts of American “Regulus” submarine patrols off Kamchatka so close to that Peninsula laden with Soviet military and naval bases that navigators could estimate their position by referencing mountains ashore. Perhaps fortunately for the world, they were never detected.

The most striking impression one takes from this study is how formidable the Soviet sea- (and land-) based missiles apparently became. I say apparently because until quite recently, the Russians never really employed their cruise missiles against adversaries as the Americans did on several occasions, most notably post-Cold War when attention shifted to anti-terror warfare. In August 1998, American missile destroyers and a submarine launched somewhere between seventy and eighty Tomahawk Land Attack cruise missiles (“TLAM”s) against suspected and existing al Qaeda pharmaceutical, base, support and training facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan with devastating effect. The assaults were in retaliation for Osama bin Laden’s recent bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. More recently, however, reports have surfaced demonstrating more or less successful Russian cruise missile attacks against Islamic State bases in Syria from destroyers and submarines operating in the eastern Mediterranean.

These attacks once again raise a question insistently posed during the Cold War: how good is the Russian cruise missile capability? The question has added urgency now that the Federation Navy has emerged once again as a formidable challenger to American sea power. Polmar and McConnell’s answer is, very good, indeed. While the Americans have seemingly been content to rest upon the nearly half-century old (if still formidable) subsonic, 1,000-1,200 mile range “TLAM” system, the Russians have forged ahead with new systems of missiles that are both faster and of longer range. They are also beginning to experiment with subsurface drone weapons that could readily threaten America’s coastal cities and military/naval installations.

In many ways, the Cold War at sea has resumed.

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As Toll points out, this is the story of the predictable outcome of a bloody war that should not have happened. At the start of the war, Japan was a nation with almost no natural resources. It was largely dependent upon foreign suppliers for food, industrial commodities, especially oil, and a labour force of vanquished neighbours. They opportunistically acquired territories through diplomacy, exploiting unrest in nearby countries or by outright conquest. Japan’s large but vulnerable navy protected the vital sea lanes, salt water highways to their home islands. Although an emperor/man-god occupied the Chrysanthemum Throne, the political hegemony of the Asian nation was controlled by the heads of the Imperial Army and Navy, who were bitter rivals. The then-neutral United States was a trading partner, but held a tight hand on the oil, scrap metal and mineral supply that was vital for a nation at war. The Japanese military hierarchy gambled that by destroying a large part of the American naval fleet and air power at Pearl Harbor, the Yankees would not be in a favourable position to retaliate, especially if they declared war on Germany and Italy, nations half a world away.

In September 1940, Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact forming the Axis nations. The downside was that this alliance with European nations could not offer much assistance to the Japanese in their Pacific war effort. They failed to sufficiently recognize America’s resiliency, its vast resources and its ability to garrote or strangle Japan by cutting off their war and vital lifeline through US naval and air superiority. *Twilight of the Gods* switches between the points of view on both sides to describe how the metaphorical noose slowly tightened against the Japanese via a detailed journey drawn from American and Japanese archives. Of particular note, the author inserts many references to the diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, a naval commander who participated in the Pearl Harbor secret attack and fought through to Japan’s surrender.

In a way, Toll acts as a war correspondent, placing his readers into graphic scenes of battles while giving intimate glimpses into the character of most of the important leaders on both sides of the conflict. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, Admirals Chester Nimitz, Earnest King, Richmond Turner, John McCain Sr., Thomas and Raymond Spruance, Frederick Sherman, colourful Joseph “Jocko” Clark plus Generals George Marshall, Holland “Howlin” Mad Smith, and Henry “Hap” Arnold make extensive appearances. The author particularly focuses on the psycho-dynamics of the flamboyant egotistical but successful characters, the vainglorious General Douglas MacArthur, “ride out the typhoons” Admiral William “Bull” Halsey and cigar-chomping Army Airforce General Curtis LeMay. On the other side, Emperor Hirohito, Ministers Shigenori Togo, Kantaro Suzuki, and Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Jisabu-
ro Ozawa and Matome Ugaki (among many others) are profiled to a more limited degree.

The closing battles of the Pacific War have become iconic; the renowned assaults in Manilla, Luzon, Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The enemy fought with skill, initiative, persistence and at times, a seemingly inhuman lack of fear, in actions Toll graphically describes in blood-stained detail. Perhaps most chilling are his exceptionally vivid accounts of the horrors and destruction from the fire-bombing and the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Most noteworthy are the many background stories. Among them are tales about the effectiveness of the American submarine fleet, the initial and sometimes ongoing problems with defective torpedoes, and aggressive submariner heroes like Dudley W. “Mush” Morton, Richard H. O’Kane and Slade Cutter. Then there were the men who flew high above the fray, employing their new, gargantuan weapon, the B-29s, flying out of tiny Pacific island bases. It was General LeMay who decided that instead of using his huge aircraft to bomb in the standard high-altitude way, they could come in fast and low and drop incendiary explosives to obliterate largely wooden Japanese cities like Tokyo. After the war, LeMay stated that if the Allies had lost the war, he likely would have been tried as a war criminal. The detailed story of the preparation of the B-29 atom bomb missions and their results was particularly engrossing. And then there are cameo appearances by young draftees, several of whom who went on to make their mark in literature and medicine, such as James Michener and Dr. Lewis Thomas. Perhaps the most chilling and simultaneously fascinating concept was the rise of kamikazes. Famously known as suicidal aircraft pilots, kamikaze forces were also found in miniature submarines, swift boats and as swimmers carrying a variety of explosives devices. The aircraft were the first guided one-way missiles, a devastating weapon used to fight and inflict maximum damage, but these suicide weapons required a psychological reset of the normal human survival instinct. Perhaps not unexpectedly, such tactics evolved in a warrior and civilian society and wore thin in the final days of the war.

Other fascinating side-stories involved the use and subjugation of the media during war time, devastating typhoons that preyed upon Halsey’s Pacific fleet, and the varied terrain that posed challenges for various island landings as well as the subsequent building of vital airfields. Also, there was the central part that logistics played in a vast and diverse Pacific theatre and the massive Russian troop entry into the Pacific War just prior to its ending. After conquest, the author looks back upon the after-effects of an occupation of a defeated, once-proud nation and upon those who fought on both sides.

Finally, Twilight of the Gods, the final panel of a literary triptych, is a tour de force of writing that puts the close of the Second World War in the Pacific into a mesmerizing perspective narrated by a master maritime historian. This fairly long but extremely rewarding book should not be missed.

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In *The Longest Campaign*, retired U.S. Army officer Brian E. Walter leverages an impressive amount of statistical research into a broad perspective on Britain’s Second World War maritime confrontation with Germany. The author argues that this approach reveals the supreme importance of the European naval conflict to the Allied victory in the wider war. Simultaneously, it also asserts that the Royal Navy continued to serve as the bedrock of British power throughout this conflict.

Walter’s quest for a broader perspective on the European naval war is anchored solidly in what he identifies as the three main tenets of Britain’s maritime strategy: the securing of seaborne communications, the containment and destruction of all German shipping (blockade), and the transport and supply of the British Army. While these are simple ideas at a glance, their pursuit requires the author to trace all aspects of the Royal Navy’s activities between 1939 and 1945. Thus, while games of cat-and-mouse with marauding German capital ships and U-Boat wolf packs take centre stage in this narrative, as one might expect, they are a far cry from the dominant actors we typically see in scholarship of this nature. Naval mining operations, amphibious raids, and coastal shipping campaigns each parade across *The Longest Campaign*’s pages with robust supporting performances that combine to form a much more complete and satisfying snapshot of everything taking place off the northwest coast of Europe during this six-year period.

While a thorough exploration of Allied and Axis naval activities in the Atlantic and off European shores has been adequate for most studies of this theatre, Walter’s assertion of the primacy of this particular contest requires something more. This he delivers by augmenting his story with the concurrent activities Britain’s Royal Air Force and Army. For example, the dire state of the British Army following its successful yet ruinous evacuation from Dunkirk in mid-1940—a significant naval action in and of itself—dramatically escalated invasion fears on the part of the British government. While this fear was somewhat unfounded, owing to the poor state of German preparedness for such an endeavour throughout most of that year, Walter is able to systematically show that RN naval losses off Norway combined with the fog of war to radically alter British strategic planning. The result was a string of British naval decisions and operations that are often explored only in isolation: the diversion of badly-needed convoy escort vessels to invasion defense, the attack on the French fleet at Mers el Kébir, and concentrated attacks on coastal shipping along the French channel coast. While often criticized for other reasons, these activities ultimately left the attainment of air supremacy as Germany’s only option for a possible invasion of Britain. Although many of these logical deductions aren’t necessarily new, together they prove critical to the reader’s ability to see the naval story as one part of an integrated whole.

What truly sets Brian Walter’s work apart from the numerous other volumes on the European maritime theatre of the Second World War is his exhaustive exploration of British archival records in the pursuit of his goal. This is clearly evident with every campaign and individual action he explores: participating vessels, aircraft, and other equipment are thoroughly described, losses meticulously tabulated, and outcomes extensively explored from the political
down to the tactical level. Occasionally overbaked (paragraphs containing long lists of individual U-Boats lost in specific months may have fit better as a footnote, for example), Walter’s style generally flows well and his narrative is both engrossing and easy to follow. Ultimately, the author’s work culminates with a statistical analysis of the ledger compiled from all the actions throughout the book. Titled “The Reckoning,” the book’s final chapter lays bare the grand scale of the resources committed to its titular struggle, revealing German naval losses comparable to those suffered by all powers participating in the Pacific War and the Mediterranean combined. In this titanic collision, Walter estimates that the Royal Navy achieved an impressive combat tonnage exchange rate of 4.8 to 1 in its favour.

Much of the information contained within The Longest Campaign is not explicitly new or newly discovered. What is unique about Walter’s approach is his perspective and the analysis that it makes possible. The author has clearly done his homework; the result is a narrative that is both thorough and convincing. While some may contest the overall argument for how fundamentally critical this campaign was, such an attempt would require a similar degree of statistical analysis at a minimum. Overall, The Longest Campaign is an impressive piece of work that is recommended to the scholar and maritime history enthusiast alike.

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