
Long Island is officially and inexplicably classified as a peninsula by the US government, although it is surrounded by water. Located on the North Atlantic’s western American shore, it has a rich, varied and colourful history with its neighbouring sea. The eastern gateway to one of America’s most important harbours, it is the barrier or land-buffer forming Long Island Sound off Connecticut’s shoreline. Its history goes back to the indigenous people, early European settlers and the founding of the United States.

Bill Bleyer, a prolific author and journalist, has written an extensive overview of the events that took place on this lean and lengthy coastal terrain in a series of tales in 29 chapters. Each is written as a chronology covering notable events within the topic. Some are mundane, but many more are narrations of little-known facts, heroic acts and heart-rending tragedies. The reader may first encounter some with familiarity, but will likely leave with new and occasionally surprising information.

The first section of the book visits the Age of Exploration, then the obvious seaborne trades: whaling, offshore fishing, crustacean harvesting, and finally, maritime commerce and its illegal offshoot, pirating. Whaling started with the relative abundance of these animals near Long Island and the natives developing methods that were reasonably successful in catching the behemoths. Once the Europeans settled in the area, fishing provided a readily available source of protein. Bony and oily menhaden became fertilizer to sustain agriculture for these early settlers. Shipbuilding and boatyards for repairs were an obvious outgrowth that sustained these maritime industries. Then came pirates, criminals who have garnered a certain romanticism in the modern public’s eye through novels and films, but who were extremely dangerous to trade but, paradoxically, a thriving business. New York City turned into a pirate cap-
ital during the mid- to late-1600’s. Because Long Island was sparsely inhabited and had many coves and beaches, it became a good place to hide out from the authorities and dispose of booty. The most noteworthy was on Gardiner’s Island, where the infamous Captain William Kidd buried some of his treasure leading to the storied search for the swag, his later botched hanging followed by an ultimately successful execution in London.

Bleyer next takes his readers through contributions by the citizens of Long Island to the American Revolution, tales of bravery and fascinating subterfuge. Of particular note was the successful American whaleboat raid from Guilford, Connecticut, to Sag Harbor led by Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Meigs, for which he was awarded a presentation sword for his “prudence, activity, enterprise and valor.” (96) Also of note is the author’s extensive coverage of the Culper Spy Ring that engaged in espionage against the British, an episode that receives little exposure to the casual reader of the history of that period. Bleyer furthermore relates tales of the War of 1812 that saw some significant action, particularly off the Long Island coast.

Bleyer next focuses on maritime navigation and trade; the rise of a very large number of lighthouses and their eventual demise; the great expanse of commercial steamboats and ferries that plied the Atlantic and Long Island Sound waters to transport both people and trading goods. Two of the best written and most memorable chapters are those encompassing shipwrecks, slave ships, and the life-saving service that later became part of the US Coast Guard. Each relates stories of people in dreadful, challenging circumstances. Some had fortunate outcomes and others ended calamitously from which many new heroes and a few shameful cowards emerge. Here the reader is inspired by the bravery and the resourcefulness of Captain Alexander McKown of the Bristol and repulsed by self-serving weakling Captain Charles Wilson of the Mexico. Bleyer also tells the well-known stories of the slave ships Amistad and Wanderer with all the repugnance and legal complexity that their slave cargoes engendered at the time.

One later interesting chapter has to do with rum-running on Long Island’s north and south shores. The isle was endowed with beaches and small coves ideal for hiding illicit booze. The cat-and-mouse game and its relationship with the authorities frequently clashed with the “mob’s underworld,” along with bribery and scandal. Law and order did eventually prevail. A chapter on Theodore Roosevelt’s connection with his home at Oyster Bay adds a fresh hue to the already colourful president. The remainder of the book covers a myriad of topics: Long Island during the Civil War, First World War and Second World War. The most intriguing story was the landing at a Long Island beach of eight Nazi saboteurs and their ultimate capture and different punishments during the Second World War. Finally, Bleyer discusses the technology boom of war-related and civilian industries. In addition, there was yacht building, yacht racing, exclusive and storied yacht clubs, aircraft manufacturing and power-boat fabrication as well as the maritime colleges that took root on this now more heavily populated isle.

Because of the author’s journalistic background, Long Island and the SEA is a very readable history that touches upon a broad range of subjects. This somewhat eclectic work has abundant notes and an extensive bibliography. Bill Bleyer’s latest literary effort is an enjoyable source of maritime-related
facts about Long Island and for many, an entryway leading to more in-depth studies.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut.


This comprehensive, lushly illustrated work belongs on every battleship aficionado’s bookshelf, but it holds more than antiquarian interest. Perusing Battleships of the Iowa Class could help mold fleets for the age of great-power strategic competition now upon us.

As its title indicates, author Caresse allots over a third of the book to recounting the design history of the Iowa-class fast battleships (3-191). He presents more than just a study of armour, propulsion plants, or gunnery, although the book abounds in details pertaining to the material dimension. The author, in fact, goes so far as to include a chapter (184-191) describing the paint slathered on Iowa-class hulls, in particular camouflage schemes applied during the Second World War. This is fitting. Naval architects must make timeless tradeoffs among speed, protection, and armament when drawing up plans for a ship of war. These tradeoffs are especially painful when devising a capital ship, defined by historian Alfred Thayer Mahan as a vessel able to dish out and take “hard knocks” in action against an enemy battle line. Substituting one attribute for another could spell the difference between high-seas victory and defeat.

Better yet, Caresse situates these super-dreadnoughts in their larger context, showing how technological advances, politics, and international law shaped their attributes. The Iowa class had its genesis during the 1930s, a time of flux in naval warfare not unlike our own. Back then, naval strategists and sea officers wondered whether the armoured battleship would remain the centerpiece of battle fleets as aircraft design advanced, amplifying the range and hitting power of aircraft carriers. (Spoiler alert: no.) Today, naval strategists and sea officers wonder whether the flattop will remain the pride of navies or whether something else—unmanned vehicles, missile-armed patrol craft, land-based missiles, or something else—will demote it from capital-ship status.

Battleship designers chose to hedge against uncertainty, fashioning a “Swiss army knife” of a dreadnought. The Iowa class boasted sufficient speed to operate in company with fast-carrier task forces, sufficient firepower to pummel hostile capital ships or coastlines, and sufficient armour and compartmentalization to let the vessels absorb punishment in a firefight against peers from the Imperial Japanese Navy or German Kriegsmarine. Designers, in other words, created a ship class that could render valuable service in a variety of potential futures. Hedging has merit—now as then.

Shipwrights also obeyed mandates from their political masters, who in turn factored international law into the political guidance they handed down to the U.S. Navy. For instance, Caresse retells (11) how President Franklin Roosevelt personally forbade the 16-inch gun’s debut aboard American battlewagons. FDR was loath for the United States to become the first naval power to “change the principles laid down” in the Washington and London naval accords after the First World War. He blanched at vitiating efforts at arms control. The
president relented only in 1937, after Congress approved battleships bearing 16-inch artillery. Battleship history shows that such technical minutiae as the calibre of a gun can have strategic or even political import.

Domestic and international politics, then, shape and may be shaped by implements of naval war. This remains as true in 2020 as it was in 1937, or any other time in history. Now, it is doubtful the *Iowas* themselves will make a comeback, despite the occasional push from battleship enthusiasts. Candidate Donald Trump campaigned on a bigger U.S. Navy in 2016. Indeed, Trump staged a rally on the decks of *Wisconsin*—with my battle station, the aftmost 16-inch gun turret, as the backdrop—to help frame his case. During his speech he hinted broadly about reactivating the *Iowa* class once again. That is a far-fetched prospect for 75-year-old hulls with 75-year-old innards. Even so, reviewing the battleships’ design history pays dividends for naval architecture while reminding navy chieftains that ship design never takes place in a political or social vacuum.

It seems churlish to point out flaws in a work this fine; but this is a book review, after all. There are a few small factual errors sprinkled throughout the text. For example, Caresse gets the name of *Wisconsin*’s last skipper, Captain Coenraad van der Schroeff, wrong (511). He places *Iowa* “in the Persian Gulf in 1991 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait” (ix). In reality, the vessel was berthed at Norfolk awaiting retirement when war broke out. The author gets this right in his operational history of *Iowa* (294). He has *Wisconsin* depart Norfolk for the Persian Gulf on 3 August 1990, just a day after the Iraqi invasion. The true date was 7 August, after a few days of feverish preparation. And he has *Wisconsin* relieve *Missouri* on station in the Gulf that September (505). In fact, *Wisconsin* was the first battleship on scene for Desert Shield, reaching the combat zone in late August 1990. *Missouri* arrived months later, departing Long Beach, California, in November and transiting the Strait of Hormuz in early January 1991—as the author correctly states in his operational history of *Missouri* (446; I was on board, perchance, for the Hormuz transit).

Minor editing blemishes, however, detract hardly at all from the overall impact and elegance of Caresse’s work. If he gets a small detail wrong on occasion, he gets the big things right—which is all anyone can ask of any writer. Strongly recommended for any individual or library harbouring an interest in maritime affairs.

James R. Holmes
Newport, Rhode Island


The phrase, “Korean War Combat Aviation,” usually evokes images of United States Air Force (USAF) F-86 fighter jets fighting North Korean and Communist Chinese MiG-15 fighter jets. This is understandable, because the 1950-53 Korean War was the first “jet war” and has been heavily chronicled over the years. Not as well-publicized has been the contribution that U.S. Navy aviation (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps aviation (USMC) made to the United Nations’ effort in the Korean War. In *Holding the Line*, Cleaver has written a comprehensive account of what USN
and USMC aviators did in that most difficult conflict.

The USN and USMC went to war with a combination of Second World War-era aircraft and the first generation jets. The USN and USMC used five major types of combat aircraft in Korea: late versions of the famous Vought F4U Corsair fighter aircraft; early versions of the Douglas AD Skyraider attack aircraft—though introduced post-Second World War, it was designed during that conflict and should be considered a Second World War-type aircraft; the Grumman F7F Tigercat—again, an aircraft that was too late for the Second World War that the USMC used in Korea; the Grumman F9F Panther—a first-generation jet that provided the bulk of USN and USMC jets in Korea; the McDonnell F2H Banshee—also a first-generation jet that appeared in both fighter and photographic versions in Korea.

Cleaver describes the above aircraft in detail, as well as the early USN and USMC helicopters and the catapults used on USN aircraft carriers. At the beginning of the Korean War, the propeller-driven Corsairs, Skyraid- ers, and Tigercats and the straight-winged Panthers and Banshees were adequate to combat the propeller-driven aircraft of the North Korean Air Force. When Communist Chinese and North Koreans introduced the famous MiG-15 fighter (many of which were flown by Soviet pilots), the balance shifted dramatically towards the Communist forces. The MiG-15 was a swept-wing jet and able to outperform the Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Tigercats, and also the Panthers and Banshees. Thus, the USN and USMC aerial efforts were devoted to close support and attack missions (though aerial combat did occur between MiGs and USN and USMC aircraft. The MiGs were not always victorious.)

The USN and USMC air missions were vital to the United Nations’ campaign. The close support of ground troops plus the attack missions on targets such as dams, supply centres, and electric generation stations added immeasurably to stopping the Communist effort in Korea. Indeed, it is not too much to say that without the efforts of the USN and USMC aviation, the Korean War would have continued longer and perhaps had a much different outcome.

Cleaver’s book relates the story of post-Second World War USN and USMC aviation; with the creation of an independent USAF in 1947 and the possibility of nuclear war, there was a very real effort to reduce or eliminate USN and USMC aviation in favour of the new USAF. Cleaver relates this controversy and then goes on to detail the USN and USMC missions in Korea. It is not well-known in the US that Great Britain and Australia had their own aircraft carriers off the Korean west coast. Cleaver includes a very good chapter on their efforts. (A full account of the British and Australian Navies’ aviation efforts in Korea is found in John R.P. Lansdowne’s *With the Carriers in Korea*, reviewed in *TNM/LMN*, Vol. III, #2, April, 1993.) Cleaver also notes that several prominent names flew missions in Korea: Neil Armstrong (the first man to walk on the moon) flew USN missions in Korea, while John Glenn (the first American astronaut to orbit the earth) flew USMC missions in Korea. Often, Glenn’s wingman on combat missions was Ted Williams, the great Boston Red Sox player who was a USMC reservist who had been called back into service for the Korean War. These details add much flavour to the narrative.

Cleaver writes well and his book is well documented. The bibliography provides resources for further study.
Many photographs add to the narrative, though this reviewer spotted one error in a photograph caption—a F4U Corsair is labeled as an AD-3 Skyraider. But that was the only problem noted. Nevertheless, one or more maps showing the location of airfields, carrier stations, and targets would have been helpful.

It is curious that little has been written about the USN and USMC aviation in Korea, given its importance in the Korean War. In fact, the most popular book on USN aviation in Korea is James Michener’s novel, The Bridges at Toko-Ri, and the movie based on that book. Cleaver chronicles the efforts of the USN and USMC in the Korean War in sufficient detail and this book should be considered as a definitive account of same for the general public and a valuable resource for the expert. Definitely recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Adam Clulow, currently associate professor at Monash University, is a well-regarded scholar of the Dutch East India Company. His first book, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan (2014) won several book prizes. His Amboyna Conspiracy Trial website won the New South Wales Premier’s Digital History Prize. Amboina, 1623 begins on 23 February 1623, when the Dutch arrested Shichizō, a Japanese soldier in their employ, for asking suspicious questions about the strength of Castle Victoria, the Dutch fort on Kota Ambon. The Dutch believed Shichizō belonged to a broader conspiracy and tortured him to obtain more information. He confessed, under torture, to having “joined a plot by a group of English merchants based nearby to seize control of the fortification and ultimately rip the spice-rich island from the Company’s grasp” (2). The Dutch questioned and tortured more men, in order to determine the extent of the conspiracy and eventually executed 21 alleged conspirators. News of the executions enraged the English East India Company, as well as many people in England, threatened to drive a wedge between England and the United Provinces, and became the subject of considerable controversy.

The historiography of this episode tends to focus on two key questions. First, did a plot exist and, if so, were the charges justified? Second, what impact did the trial have on relations between England and the United Provinces? Working on his Amboyna Conspiracy Trial website, Clulow explains, led him to new conclusions. Firstly, it is difficult to defend the Dutch view of a far-flung conspiracy involving so many diverse groups. Secondly, it is unlikely the English merchants plotted anything, but it is impossible to disprove a plot. Thirdly, he was asking the wrong questions. Rather than focusing on the English merchants, as many accounts do, Clulow analyzes the Dutch officials. He discovers that the Dutch officials were so willing to believe in the existence of a conspiracy because of the endemic fear and paranoia that marked both their lives and their colonial endeavours.

After the Dutch arrival in the Spice Islands in 1599, captains and merchants signed treaties with local rulers and leaders, many of whom resisted when the Dutch claimed the rights they be-
believed they were due under the treaties. Spice growers on the Banda islands resisted the Company for years. Thus, in 1621, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, governor-general of the Dutch East India Company, gathered an invasion fleet to attack the Banda islands. This operation, designed to shore up Dutch control in the Banda islands and Amboina, instead sparked violent disorder, bloody warfare, and brutal pacification. Rather than winning a sense of security, Dutch officials became convinced that they governed a “far-flung territory populated by armed centers and filled with false allies” (43). Threats seemingly abounded within and without the very walls of Castle Victoria. The slaves in the fort posed a threat to their masters and, as did masters everywhere, the Dutch worried about armed insurrection. Coen praised the Company’s contingent of Japanese soldiers, but many other officials worried about another potential threat. The most dangerous adversary, according to the Dutch, were English. The English and the Dutch had recently entered into a marriage of convenience—an alliance against Spain. Suspicion about the English and their motives dominated Dutch correspondence and most officials concluded, “it was only a matter of time before the English snake, forced by a misguided treaty within the walls of Castle Victoria, gave into its nature” (114). Dutch officials fully intended to be prepared to destroy the English snake when it arose to kill them. Clulow’s account of the trial reveals, in unsparing detail, the many errors made by Isaaq de Bruyn, the advocate-fiscal. It also highlights the similarities between the language the Dutch used to defend torture by water and the George W. Bush administration’s defense of waterboarding.

Critically, the story did not end with the execution of the alleged conspirators. Different actors, both English and Dutch, shaped the memory of the massacre at Amboina. The English East India Company and the Dutch East India Company both kept professional witnesses on the payroll for years, in order to defend their version of events. Critically, some of these professional witnesses were disreputable people whom both companies planned to repudiate on the eve of the massacre for their shady behaviour. Repudiation became impossible because their testimony was vital to the creation of the English and Dutch versions of what happened in 1623. Eventually, the English won some compensation from the Dutch, a moment often regarded as the end of the story. The story, however, really ended in Amboina. The Hoamoalese War in the 1650s and a subsequent Dutch campaign of mass relocation left a “depopulated wasteland” (175). No writer made what happened in Amboina in the 1650s an enduring controversy—as they did with the 1623 massacre—and yet the consequences were considerably greater. The Hoamoalese War marks “an alternate end point for the longer story of the Amboina conspiracy trial, centered not on Europe but on Asia” (194).

_Amboina, 1623_ offers a radically different story about a well-known episode. It highlights the fear and paranoia that drove Dutch officials to believe in widespread conspiracies and false friends. It also makes an important point about the nature of empire and colonialism in Asia. This book will appeal to anyone interested in Dutch history, Asian history, and the history of empire.

Evan C. Rothera
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Maritime shipping and the people who toil on waterfronts make the world go round is the central premise of this comparative study of dock/longshore work and related political action in the port cities of Durban and San Francisco. While race and capitalism figured prominently in the historical development of societies in both South Africa and the United States, only a few labour historians studying maritime labour and unions have drawn connections with slavery, segregation, and apartheid, and even fewer go outside respective national boundaries. Eric Arnesen’s study of waterfront workers in New Orleans, written three decades ago, represented one pioneering work. Peter Cole, a professor in the history department at Western Illinois University in Macomb, who previously published a book on waterfront unions in Philadelphia during the American Progressive Era, assumes a more modern focus in his latest book by contrasting waterfront workers and the organized bodies that represented them in the two respective ports as they responded to technological change in the global industry and calls for greater equality through political movements over many decades up to the present day. Cole, a white American, has spent time teaching and researching in Africa and maintains affiliations with several universities in South Africa.

The centrality of work performed on time and in a predictable manner without interruption in the flow of goods across oceans and into countries through maritime and continental transportation systems stands behind the existing global network of trade and prosperity described by Cole as neoliberal. He asserts that dock and longshore workers knew they had power to press demands and used that to their advantage in relations with employers and building a sense of common community and concern for other causes to free the peoples of the world. San Francisco was the epicentre for the rise of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) on the west coast of North America after significant strikes in the 1930s, when Harry Bridges emerged as the most recognized leader. ILWU Local 10, on which Cole focuses, transitioned from having a relatively white membership to being predominantly black during and after the Second World War. The waterfront workforce in Durban comprised mostly Zulu black male workers drawn from the rural countryside working on a casual basis, housed in hostels near the port, known to act collectively despite absence for a long time of more formal organized labour bodies to represent them. The second and third chapters show how the two groups opposed racial oppression to effect meaningful change at personal and broader levels in their societies. The civil rights movement amongst the Afro-American population, criticism of the war in Vietnam, and crusades against apartheid shared many common goals and viewpoints. Chapters four and five recount the impact of a new technological innovation, standardized shipping containers, on the workers and waterfront unions. The ILWU, under Bridges, negotiated favourable agreements that preserved the job security and pay of longshore workers in transition to new work-
ing arrangements away from gangs to operators and maintainers of the machines. Containers increased volume and productivity, and eventually meant significantly fewer, though higher paid and rated, skilled workers. Durban, due to the heavy infrastructure investment, handled containers much later, with devastating effect on the number of employed workers, just as they were forming themselves into the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SARHWU). The last chapter documents the use of strikes, work stoppages, and boycotts in San Francisco and Durban by waterfront workers to engage in political protest and activism targeting continuing racism and apartheid. Waterfront workers in each country frequently went against their own economic and individual interests, and sometimes higher union leadership and signed collective agreements, for the sake of the greater good. Cole considers these actions by union members to be activist and world changing over the longer term.

The discussion is well-grounded in the existing literature and scholarship, which Cole synthesizes and explains adeptly. Juggling the narratives for two separate countries is generally done in a thematic manner with separate defined sections within the chapters and comparisons drawn in ending conclusions. The discussion at parts becomes very repetitive and ponderous, in a formal academic manner. On one small point, Cole refers to Trotskyists as an influence and participants, but leaves that strand unexplained for readers who might have wanted to hear more. The oral history interviews done by Cole are well integrated and provide many insights into how working people reflected on their activities and lived experiences. Bill Chester, a prominent ILWU Local 10 member, tirelessly fought for greater representation of Afro-Americans and against discrimination in his own country and apartheid in South Africa. Harry Bridges, once considered an untouchable, heroic figure in the ILWU and broader American labour movement, comes under some criticism for his accommodating stances later in his career when he often sided with employers and abandoned rank-and-file represented by ILWU Local 10 during the 1971 waterfront strike, which was a last ditch groundswell by those unhappy with technological change associated with containers and the effect on the workplace. Cole only briefly mentions the crime, labour racketeering, and coercive acts prevalent on the waterfront that the advent of containers also changed in nature and scope. Criminal activity shore side became far more transnational and organized rather than individually opportunistic on the part of waterfront workers.

*Dockworker Power* is highly recommended for anyone interested in seaports, maritime labour on waterfronts, and the political activism of unionized workers. The book is ambitious in execution and delivers new perspectives through a comparative and transnational approach.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia


Thomas J. Cutler’s *The Battle of Leyte Gulf at 75* is a two-part compilation of essays and articles written about what many historians have deemed the great-
est naval battle of the Second World War. He introduces the book as a retrospective study in five “elements” of the battle; its size, whether or not it was the last fleet engagement, Halsey’s blunder, Kurita’s ill-timed retreat, and the courage that the “Tin Can” Sailors exhibited off Samar. *The Battle of Leyte Gulf at 75* is an extremely informative, yet palatable read that students of naval history will find intellectually satisfying.

In Part I, Cutler selects 11 impressive original essays that give the reader a fresh, but comprehensive look at various aspects of the battle. Many of the essays read more as a social history than straight-forward battle history, yet they do not neglect the important operational aspects of the naval engagements. Part II is a collection of 13 previously published essays and articles that he labels “Archives,” drawn from the well-worn pages of academic and popular historical journals alike. In total, the two dozen articles provide a definitive compilation of different perspectives that enriches our understanding of the historiography of the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Cutler’s edited volume offers a better understanding of one of the grandiose and complicated naval battles of the twentieth century this side of Jutland. As for the essays themselves, a few are worth noting. Lisle Rose’s “Planning the Penultimate Stages of the Pacific War” is a well-written (and entertaining) glimpse into high command strategic discourse of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and General Douglas MacArthur in planning for Leyte. A. Denis Clift’s “Leyte Gulf Reminiscences” provides vivid vignettes of the battle such as Admiral Gerald Bogan’s recollection of Halsey’s “mistake,” a Quartermaster’s perspective of the battle from the bridge of the USS *Franks*, and a truly amusing but telling recount of the tongue-lashing Bull Halsey received from King after his run to the north. Norman Friedman and Trent Hone analyze the basis of Halsey’s decision to turn north when he was desperately needed to the south with Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet forces. Friedman argues in “The Principle of the Objective at Leyte Gulf” that Halsey’s studies and war gaming at the Naval War College had the most influence on his decision-making in late October 1944. Friedman supports his argument with a plethora of intriguing end notes that give the reader a clearer understanding of how the Naval War College trained and educated its officers during this period. Hone offers an artful blend of tactical and human factors that he posits are most responsible for Halsey’s questionable decision.

Readers will thoroughly enjoy David Winkler and James Hornfischer’s essays, which share what one could describe as emotionally stirring, yet tactically astute personal accounts of the battle. Winkler crafts an accurate, intriguing narrative of two junior officers’ experiences in “Jack and Jim.” The reader is placed into the cockpit of F6F Hellcat and on a U.S. destroyer through the retelling of two different aspects of the battle. This allows Winkler to deliver an “aha” moment where he tells us how each officer moved on and succeeded in life, albeit via very different career paths. Hornfischer’s fascinating account of the courage of Admiral Clifton Sprague’s “Taffy 3” sailors in “The Tin Can Sailors are Gone” is just as compelling. He masterfully ties the experience of the 1944 USS *Samuel B. Roberts*, which sank off Samar to the *Perry*-class frigate of the same name which struck a mine during Operation Earnest Will in 1988. The heroic actions of both crews are intriguingly displayed such that the reader ends Part I.
with a thorough familiarity of the Leyte Gulf not only as a battle, but a human experience that deserves its place in Second World War historiography.

Whereas in the first half of the book, Leyte is experienced through the secondary source lens of recent historians, Cutler takes us down another road in Part II, “The Archives.” Much of the second half of the book is Leyte through the eyes of those actually there. Most of the articles and essays are quite dated, such as Halsey’s and Oldendorf’s personal accounts of the battle, but compliment the original essays in Part I with primary source material. Cutler also give the reader a more complete picture of Leyte than other histories of Leyte by including essays written by surviving Japanese officers that tell their side of the story. These accounts are useful to the discerning reader who may be wary of accepting a one-sided version. Cutler also includes his own article published in 2009 detailing the political guile of MacArthur and his careful manipulation of the situation long before October 1944. His interaction with President Roosevelt is noteworthy and helpful to the reader in understanding the bigger picture of the Pacific campaign. In all, Part II adds another layer to this multi-faceted volume, providing much of the primary source material applicable to the original essays in Part I.

While integral to the study of Leyte, the repetitive dialogue of Halsey’s infamous decision in multiple essays does become a bit tiresome. Although it has generated great debate for the last 75 years, Cutler could have replaced some of the discussion with other, less infamous aspects of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Nevertheless, The Battle of Leyte Gulf at 75 is a masterfully crafted compilation of essays suitable for professional and casual historians alike. It will make a worthwhile addition to any Second World War library.

Stan Fisher
Annapolis, Maryland


In two world wars, the German navy’s U-Boat (submarine) campaigns almost brought Great Britain to its figurative knees. Indeed, Winston Churchill said that the Second World War U-Boat campaign was the only thing that truly worried him. The U-Boat commanders were well-trained, effective in their missions, and generally highly-decorated. In The U-Boat Commanders. Knight’s Cross Holders 1939-1945, Jeremy Dixon relates the lives and careers of the decorated German submarine commanders.

The Knight’s Cross was awarded in four levels: the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, then the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves, followed by the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves and Swords, and the ultimate award of Nazi Germany, the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves, Swords, and Diamonds. The Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross was the basic medal; it was the first Knight’s Cross to be awarded. Successive awards of the further levels of the Knight’s Crosses were based on being awarded the previous-level Knight’s Cross. In all, 122 U-Boat commanders received the first order; 23 U-Boat commanders received the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves; three U-Boat commanders received the Knight’s cross with Oakleaves and Swords; and only two U-Boat com-
manders, Albrecht Brandi and Wolfgang Lüth, received the Knight’s cross with Oakleaves, Swords, and Diamonds.

Dixon divides his book into winners of the four Knights’ Cross levels. He begins with Brandt and Lüth, then proceeds to identify the further winners of each other Knight’s Cross level. He lists the rank of each award winner, the ships sunk and damaged and the applicable tonnages of each. The reason for the award is also included. There is a full biography of each U-Boat commander beginning with their dates and places of birth, schooling, naval service, their careers as a U-Boat commander, and any post-war careers and dates and finally, where and when they died. U-Boat crews had an incredibly high casualty rate—over 80% of them were killed or captured during the Second World War. Although many of the men Dixon chronicles died during the war, a surprisingly large number survived and joined the post-war (then-) west German Bundesmarine. Each biography includes at least one photograph of the U-Boat commander and many photographs of the assigned U-Boat and often, their targets. Included is a biography of Grossadmiral (Grand Admiral) Karl Doenitz. Doenitz served as a U-Boat officer in the First World War, as commander of U-Boats from 1935-43, commander of the German Navy from 1943 to 1945, and the last Führer of Nazi Germany. That Dixon included Doenitz in his book simply reminds the reader that Doenitz was the key individual in the re-establishment of a U-Boat arm and its deployment. The cover has an attractive photo of three U-Boat commanders, two of which wear beards—indicative of the demanding and cramped nature of life aboard U-Boats. An appendix lists and explains the various German medals and decorations. A glossary explains the various German-language terms used and a bibliography lists some of the many books on the U-Boat war.

Although much can be learned about the U-Boat campaign from the individual biographies in this book, the reader should not expect a straight-line narrative of the U-Boat campaign of the Second World War. The reader of Dixon’s book will have to look to one or more of the many books available on the U-Boat for that narrative. Dixon’s book can be most profitably read in conjunction as a supplement to one of the books containing that straight-line narrative or as a book to dip into periodically when the reader is interested in a specific U-Boat commander. With those reservations, Dixon’s book is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Steven Dunn has written a number of books on the conduct of war at sea during the Great War that cover the Royal Navy’s trade protection and interdiction activities. Unlike the Second World War’s unrelenting focus on the Battle of the Atlantic and ‘little ships’ that fought the convoy battles, the First World War’s similar campaigns have a far lower profile. Focus instead is on the four-year stand-off between the great battlefleets of the two major maritime protagonists, or on the Gallipoli that might have been. The German submarine campaign is certainly well covered,
particularly the political dimension of the eventual unrestricted warfare aspect that brought the United States into the war. The British response tends to be focused on the convoy controversy with much less attention to the blockade aspect. Dunn has sought to correct this gap with his Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in World War One; Securing the Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol 1914-1918; and, Blockade: Cruiser Warfare and the Starvation of Germany. Southern Thunder adds to this oeuvre.

Perhaps the first thing to note is that prior to the Great War, there were expectations that rules would be followed. The rules in question involved the provisions of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and the 1909 Declaration of London. Dunn provides a helpful summary of the main terms of these agreements that attempted to restrict war to the armed forces of belligerent states, and to protect commercial ships and merchant seaman, particularly neutrals. Importantly, only warships could be attacked without warning by submarines—themselves a new weapon of war that only became a factor at the turn of the twentieth century. Merchant ships could not be similarly attacked and could only be destroyed if carrying contraband and with provisions required for the protection of crews. If this latter obligation could not be managed, the ship was to be seized by a prize crew and sent to a port for adjudication of its cargo. Contraband was defined as materials directly destined for the enemy’s armed forces—articles such as foodstuffs were more complicated, in that they had both civil and military potential, however, the basic concept was that foodstuffs destined for an army were contraband, foodstuffs destined for domestic consumption were not. Starving civilian populations and sinking merchant ships without warning were anathema. Given the history of the Great War itself, let alone that of the Second World War, it all seems rather quaint. Navigating these rules and responding to the moves by the enemy—from the perspectives of both sides—was a fraught process and led in time to the ‘total war’ notions with which the war was eventually conducted. The story Dunn relates in the case of Scandinavia is emblematic of this evolution and is important to understand for all interested in the Great War at sea, as well representing a milestone on the tragic path that led to the accepted conduct of maritime war by the time of the Second World War and to the present day.

Scandinavia conducted peacetime trade with, unsurprisingly, all the future belligerents of the Great War. Such trade was entirely conventional and an important component of the economies of these relatively small states. As the war got underway, it rapidly became the interest of both Great Britain and Germany to secure the fruits of Scandinavia trade for themselves and to deny it to their enemy. Denmark, Norway and Sweden were caught in the middle and as the war wore on, increasingly faced diminishing agency in the conduct of their trade with both sides. Ultimately, British power was deployed successfully in its interests and the three Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway, were largely obliged to dance to their tune. This outcome was anything but one way and the ability of Germany to bend trade in its direction was a reality throughout the war.

Dunn tells a useful and interesting story that is not well known. Its significance in terms of the development of modern maritime war and the evolution of international law in light of the actual behaviour of the various bellig-
erents is crucial. Certainly, the issues that played out in this particular arena were mirrored by similar questions that arose elsewhere, but the Scandinavian aspect was important in more global terms than the scale of the trade in dispute might imply. Both Great Britain and Germany trod carefully in picking a safe route through the (near literal) legal, ethical and international relations minefield involved in the trade protection and interdiction element of maritime war.

The book is engagingly written and provides an interesting compendium of incidents on the high seas as well as policy and strategic questions. Dunn’s research includes a good range of primary sources from the archives, both local and national, albeit the clear majority British. Some Scandinavian journals were used, as were a number of secondary sources. That noted, the angle is essential a British one. The book would have benefited from more maps with greater detail than the one provided. The collection of photographs, however, is well done, with some illustrating personages unknown to most, as well as vessels not routinely featured in typical histories. It is, therefore, a most useful volume and well worth exploring for anyone interested in the Great War’s maritime component. A reminder, if any is needed, that much of the war at sea was a grinding routine of anything but glamorous ships or duties. Yet, without conducting such work well, the war could not have been won.

One clarifying detail. The title refers to a common Scandinavian term for the Great War to its south.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan


In this new book, oceanographers William J. Emery and Walter Zenk detail an oceanographic expedition undertaken jointly by the German Navy and a number of German scientific organizations on board the naval survey ship *Meteor* during the years 1925 to 1927, focusing particularly on German naval officer Fritz Spiess, the ship’s captain and expedition’s leader. Previously, Emery translated Spiess’s 1928 expedition account (*F. Spiess, The Meteor Expedition: Scientific Results of the German Atlantic Expedition, 1925-1927*, trans. William J. Emery. New Delhi: Amerind Publishing Co., 1985). As both German original and English translation have now become difficult to find, Emery and Zenk hope with this new volume to make the *Meteor* story available to a broader audience. They supplement Spiess’s account with archival material. The book contains no foot- or endnotes, bibliography, or index, though the authors list at least some of the archives consulted in their acknowledgements. Numerous well-selected, black-and-white photographs appear throughout, to good effect.

The book begins with a summary of Spiess’s training and his early career through the First World War. He played an important role in the conception and planning of the titular expedition, which coalesced out of frustration at the restrictions on German scientific and naval activity under the Treaty of Versailles. Despite initial visions of a worldwide ocean study, Germany’s post-war economic woes forced plan-
ners to scale back to a more manageable, but equally important, study of the Atlantic between 1925 and 1927. While much of the scientific effort focused on explicating the Atlantic current system in all its dimensions, they undertook significant meteorological and chemical studies as well. The *Meteor* expedition also produced the first chart of the Atlantic basin made via echo-sounding technology.

While the biographical chapters at the book’s beginning and end are the work of Emery and Zenk, the core of this book (about 16 chapters out of 24) is a condensed version of Spiess’s 1928 account, with an occasional comment by the authors to provide additional clarification or background. Once the expedition is underway, Spiess as narrator generally recounts the cruise chronologically, with each chapter describing an individual leg of the journey. These chapters frequently become a litany of numbers: how many temperatures recorded, bottom core sample lengths retrieved, water samples analysed. Even occasional hurricane force winds or encounters with Antarctic icebergs become data points in a record of mission accomplishment. The underway legs were punctuated by lightly described port visits on the South American and African coasts, but Spiess’s main focus remained the scientific mission. Usually shifts between these authorial voices are announced parenthetically, but because Spiess refers to himself in both first and third person and also uses a sort of royal “we” with which he signifies himself in company with the ship and crew, and Emery and Zenk also sometimes shift into first-person plural, there are occasional moments of disorientation when an inability to immediately identify the speaker pulls the reader from the text.

One place Emery and Zenk might have usefully exerted their own oceanographic expertise is in explaining the expedition’s legacy. The chapter on scientific results instead remains in Spiess’s voice, and while he certainly describes the large ocean circulation patterns the voyage uncovered, Emery and Zenk leave him to do so on his own. Perhaps this new information’s import in the development both of human understanding of the global ocean-atmosphere system and of oceanography as a science is obvious to the career scientists, but a primer on their importance in the longer arc of science would have usefully served the non-expert reader.

The book could also have benefited from a more thorough and nuanced discussion of Spiess’s post-*Meteor* career as president of the Germany Marine Observatory (Deutsche Seewarte). The authors address his service under the Nazi government, and they found and consulted his “denazification” file. However, they appear to accept at face value Spiess’s insistence that he was not a member of the Nazi party, an insistence on which payment of his civil service pension depended after the war. They do not engage or explain their reference to a June 1937 application, apparently for party membership. Even beyond the question of official membership, historians recognize many ways in which non-card-carrying officials could be quite complicit with Nazi goals. Portions of the German public also eagerly embraced claims of innocence on the part of scientists in the immediate postwar period, as historian Ruth Lewin Sime has shown in the case of physicist Otto Hahn.

As Emery and Zenk assert, the *Meteor* expedition does merit both further serious historical study and appreciation as a tale of adventure, but I suspect those looking for the latter will require active imagination to find it Spiess’s dry
recounting. This story will be of interest to oceanographers attentive to the history of their field, and more broadly, historians examining the relationship between military and naval actors and science, both on the level of the organizations involved in planning and on the deckplate level, should pay attention to this understudied expedition.

Penelope K. Hardy
La Crosse, Wisconsin


The People’s Republic of China (PRC) uses a range of tools from public diplomacy to economic coercion to defend and advance its maritime claims. The increasing influence of Beijing is particularly visible in the South China Sea. China has managed to obtain footholds on islands and reefs where it uses existing tools to create a state between peace and war. China’s maritime force consists of three major components; the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the regular navy with gray-hulled ships; the China Coast Guard with its white-hulled vessel; and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia with their blue-hulled ships. The modus operandi in this “gray zone” is quite simple. In order to gain control of contested waters, the Maritime Militia in their disguise as fishermen make their presence clear. The militia can call on great numbers for China has the world’s largest fishing fleet. Coast Guard vessels, eager to defend fishing rights and China’s historical claim to the area, always accompany the ‘fishermen’. In these circumstances, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is never far away. Once China’s dominance over a particular area is established, civil engineers flock in and build an island atop of a reef. On four occasions an airport was constructed with a three-kilometre runway, thus extending the range of the Chinese Air Force along with that of their colleagues in the navy, coast guard and fishery to cover the newly-acquired sea area. China’s claim on a large area of the South China Sea has resulted in disputes with neighbouring Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Taiwan. The success of Beijing’s strategy is undeniable and, thus far, any counteraction in the “gray zone” has not resulted in a Chinese retreat in any way, shape or form. Its innovative actions remain unopposed. These maritime “gray zone” operations represent a challenge for the U.S. Navy and the countries involved in maritime East Asia. Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gun smoke”. Already winning in important areas, China will gain far more. One of China’s greatest advantages, thus far, has been the lack of an effective response. The external environment is reshaped in a peaceful manner. It is obvious that the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are no match for the Chinese front liners disguised as fishermen. As long as the playing field remains unequal, China has the upper hand in this conflict, making it look like the Chinese are winning the battle for the South China Sea. Reading this excellent book, one cannot escape the feeling that the response by the U.S. to China’s maritime advances has been too little, too late.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands

This large format book is the first in a new series published by maritime imprint Seaforth devoted to the armament technical drawings of John Lambert, who died in 2016. Lambert, the co-author of several well-regarded books on allied coastal forces in the Second World War, produced the drawings for a larger book encompassing destroyers, escorts, and minesweepers that was never finished because of his advancing age and ill-health. Lambert was a trained naval draughtsman who worked for the London metropolitan police and pursued his true passion of naval history in his spare time before and after retirement. Seaforth acquired the drawings as part of the estate and instead of being thrown away or donated to a library or archives to sit on a shelf away from the public are now made available to devoted followers in the maritime history and ship modelling communities in a convenient format at a reasonable price.

The book comprises several distinct parts. It starts fittingly with a memorial to John Lambert, his work, and his publications. A short publisher’s note follows explaining the reproduction, sizing, and arrangement process used in putting the drawings into the book, and presumably the books to come in the series. Norman Friedman, a well-published American author on naval technology and weapons in historical and contemporary eras, provides a nicely illustrated introduction and chronological overview that provides context to the drawings. Finally, the next two-thirds of the book, the main attraction here, presents Lambert’s detailed captioned drawings and side views divided into ships, guns, automatic weapons, gun fire control, torpedoes, and mine warfare and miscellaneous. Each sub-section varies in length and number of drawings. An index lists the numbered plans at the end of the book.

Although not referenced, Norman Friedman’s introduction demonstrates in-depth knowledge and mastery of the trends in naval warfare and technical aspects related to fleets and smaller warships during the first half of the twentieth century, both within the Royal Navy and internationally. The discussion starts with the First World War and naval operations at Jutland, a sea battle which has received considerable attention in regards to gunnery and tactics by the likes of Jon Sumida, Nicholas Lambert, and John Brooks, and the equally important protracted engagements and campaigns against submarines and surface coastal forces. The experiences and lessons of the world war were incorporated into the design and intended deployment of destroyers into the interwar period. Given naval limitations on larger capital ships imposed at the negotiating table and shifting strategic postures and potential adversaries, the British balanced building programs for destroyers with developments in other navies. The Americans and Japanese put bigger guns on smaller hulls as the differences between light cruiser and destroyer narrowed. The resulting Tribal class destroyer encompassed greater endurance, a larger platform for guns and torpedo tubes, and in a response to an evolving threat from the air, anti-aircraft weaponry with sufficient range and hitting power. The Second World War amplified those trends, as Great Britain embarked like other countries on emergency construction programs.
for destroyers, a multi-purpose ship that could be built relatively quickly and used in fleet and escort roles. Depth charges, ahead-throwing explosive mortars, and higher caliber automatic guns competed for valuable space in the armament configuration on individual ships, as torpedoes and deck guns were supplanted. Introduction of radar and advanced computer fire control greatly increased the effectiveness of weapons carried on destroyers, which became sensor as well as firepower platforms. Friedman’s main discussion takes the reader up to 1943 and largely omits late-war developments when the Royal Navy adopted superior American-type weapons and fire control instruments through Lend-Lease and other mutual arrangements, though lengthy captions for ships in accompanying photographs do show outfits for the immediate post-war years. By that time, British warships, from the largest to the smallest, possessed a mixture of British and American weaponry, armament, and sensors.

The technical drawings done by John Lambert and selected and organized by Friedman and the publisher are representative rather than to scale. In this day of computers and electronic graphic illustration, it is remarkably to see that each drawing is meticulously hand-drawn and numbered, with captions and extended sidebars of capitalized and underlined text. The ship drawings include one example of a modified W First World War-type destroyer in 1924 and the remainder show the destroyers used in the Second World War and the advance in naval weapons. The various marks of the venerable 4.7 inch gun and mounts are well-represented, in single and twin configurations, as well as 4.5 inch and 4 inch high angle guns. The British response to the threat of aircraft was the 2 pounder pom pom gun in a powered mounting, roughly equivalent to 40 mm. The army 40 mm Bofors was soon adapted to naval usage and put into mass production in various mounts and configurations. For close-in protection, the Royal Navy adopted the 20 mm Oerlikon gun, which had been licensed from the Swiss manufacturer and given to the Americans for manufacture. The German navy also used the Oerlikon, which fired the largest explosive shell possible on a manual non-powered mount. As destroyer weapons, the Bofors and pom pom proved imminently more effective, particularly with fire control and proximity fuses in the larger caliber shells, against fast speed diving aircraft. The last drawings show 21-inch torpedo tubes and equipment, torpedo loading davits, sweep gear and paravane, depth charge racks, and smoke apparatus carried on British destroyers.

The book is a gem for those interested in naval weapons between the two world wars of the twentieth century and seeking detailed drawings and side views. It delivers exactly what was promised and brings John Lambert’s work back to loyal fans and a wider audience. Seaforth has made an investment in the series and should be rewarded. The book is highly recommended for naval historians interested in technical aspects and ship modelers trying to reach perfection in their creations.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver, British Columbia

This work is an interesting examination of both the career and wreckage of *U-1105*, the only remaining late-war German Type VIIC U-Boat outfitted with all three of the Kriegsmarine’s technological experiments to convert U-Boats from a submersible craft to a “true submarine” (15). Given the unique nature of the vessel and its post-war testing, author Hamilton covers not only the service life and remains of *U-1105*, but the technology and tactics utilized during her training and single wartime patrol. Period photographs and blueprints are used throughout the early sections of the work, with more modern images of *U-1105* in her current underwater state and of her salvaged components taking up the majority of the final two chapters. Three appendices document the vessel’s technical specifications, German crew, and chronological history from the 1944 keel-laying to the establishment of her historic shipwreck preserve in 1995. Three pages of end-notes and a two-page index follow these to round out the work.—

One can subdivide this work into four parts; the brief introduction and discussion of late-Second World War technologies, *U-1105*’s wartime service, *U-1105*’s post-war service, and *U-1105*’s current status as a partially-buried wreck. Given the technological uniqueness of *U-1105*, Hamilton begins his work with an examination into the development of the Snorkel mast, Alberich acoustic camouflage coating, and GHG Balkon sonar array outfitted on the vessel, along with the tactic of bottoming which became popular following the introduction of the snorkel. This is followed by a more specific focus on the particulars of *U-1105*’s construction, complete with a detailed two-page treatise on the submarine’s proper designation as a Type VIIC and not a Type VIIC/41 as it is commonly noted (34-35). Where the work shines is in the core five chapters, with the latter half of the Construction and Training chapter grouped with the War Patrol chapter to form a 25-page “annotated history of *U-1105*’s wartime experiences,” using a combination of ULTRA intercepts, Royal Navy War Diaries, and written account of her captain, Hans-Joachim Schwarz (37). Paired with period photographs, maps, and drawings, this section provides an excellent window into late war U-Boat training, patrol operations, British anti-submarine tactics, and the surrender of the German U-Boat fleet. Given the low survivability odds for U-Boat crews later in the war, the recounting of a crew surviving their first patrol in such detail is an excellent resource for scholars of the naval war.

The latter half of the text, with chapters on post-war testing and the current state of the wreckage, is primarily focused on the 1945-1949 period, with 40 pages devoted to the late-1940s and 26 dealing with the modern wreck. The accounts of British evaluations, *U-1105*’s post-war Atlantic crossing, and American ‘testing’ are all peppered with citations from primary sources and transcribed first-hand accounts, offering both larger scale and worm’s eye views of the submarine’s final four years afloat. Hamilton appears to have a justifiable level of contempt for the Navy’s decisions regarding the submarine, arguing that her transfer from the British and quick assignment to detonation testing was more about denying the vessel to the Soviets rather than learning anything from her design (82). The analysis of the wreck today relies of a variety of sources, using period photographs and modern drawings to illustrate the positioning of objects on the
visible sections of the wreck’s conning
tower area, paired with photographs
taken underwater at the wreck site and
of recovered and restored artifacts at the
nearby Piney Point Lighthouse Museum. Finally, three appendices covering
technical specifications, a crew list, and
chronological history follow this visual
tour of the wreck to conclude the work.

In terms of possible improvements,
a few are readily discernable. The fore-
most concerns the variation in image
quality between wartime photographs,
such as *U-1105*’s commissioning and
the damage to HMS *Redmill* which
are rather blurred (39, 56). While this
may be due to an unfortunately blurry
original, the photograph of a Snorkel
in operation is clearly a badly pixelated
image, a point emphasized by the crisp
blueprints rendered above it (20). Res-
canning of these few images might im-
prove resolution and increase clarity on
the handful of affected views. The sec-
ond involves a few statements. Hamil-
ton’s transition to post-war coverage is
odd, stating that this period of *U-1105*’s
career “exceeded its wartime role by
half a century” despite being sunk and
abandoned on 2 September 1949. (61)
While this may be a reference to the
 technological innovations gleaned from
the ship’s design, it reads as though the
vessel itself was somehow active into
the late-twentieth century. Addition-
ally, Hamilton’s concluding arguments,
largely focusing of the positives of rais-
ing the wreck and restoring it as a mu-
seum, are placed at the end of Chapter
Seven, “Forgotten but not Lost,” prior
to the final two chapters on the present
state of the wreck and the archaeolog-
ical work carried out on it (104-105).
If this preservation and recovery argu-
ment was relocated to after the modern
visuals of *U-1105* and the few recov-
ered artifacts, it might lend additional
weight and credence to the argument
for her salvage. These points do not
detract from the author’s basic scholar-
ship, however, and their improvement
would only refine an already excellent
resource.

*German Submarine* *U-1105* is
a case study of the service life of an
unique vessel and its present wreck sta-
tus. The technological advancements
deployed on *U-1105*, paired with the
fact that she successfully made a war
patrol in 1945 despite the destruction
of 136 of her fellow U-Boats already
highlights the vessel’s historical im-
portance. Her post-war Anglo-Ameri-
can analysis and transatlantic crossing
only further cemented this status, until
her ignoble ‘end’ as a Navy salvage and
weapons-testing prop. Her near com-
plete entombment in the Potomac river-
bed has created, as Hamilton points out,
an incredibly rare time capsule, and his
enthusiasm for the ship and her surviv-
ability is something that can be shared
by students of history, naval architec-
ture, and marine archaeology.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia

Peter Lush. *Winged Chariot. A Com-
plete Account of the RAF’s Support
Role during the Audacious Commando
Raid on St Nazaire, March 1942.* Lon-
don, UK: Grub Street, www.grubstreet.
co.uk. 2016. 190 pp., illustrations, maps,
tables. appendices, bibliography, sourc-
es, index. UK £20, CDN/US $39.95,

When the all too few Commandos and
supporting seamen returned to England
after the successful raid to destroy the
massive lock gates of the dry dock in
occupied Saint-Nazaire at the end of
March 1942, there was some boooing
of the RAF ambulances that met them.
The Royal Air Force was considered,
by the participants as well as by some of the families of the 169 who had been killed during the enterprise, to have let them down, if not, indeed, aggravated the enemy’s violent response to the attack. This force had consisted of 18 motor launches and the destroyer HMS Campbeltown, carrying between them 257 Army Commandos, 345 seamen and 5 civilians—two newsmen, a ship’s canteen NAFFI manager and French liaison officer.

Lush’s well researched book gives a clear picture of the RAF’s, in fact, considerable contribution to the effort. The author’s intent, quite reasonably, is to put forward carefully documented proof that the 18 RAF Squadrons had done as much as was possible, given both restrictions ordered on their operations over Saint-Nazaire as well as lack of sufficient pre-planning crew briefing. Moreover, their support also cost the RAF three lost aircraft and nine crew killed in their efforts.

*Ex post facto*, Lush ascribes the failure of the attack to contribute as operationally planned (as is often the case), to three factors, two of which could have been mitigated but for strategic restrictions set by the Government and secrecy requirements insisted on by the raiding force commanders. The solid cloudy weather over the target, the Saint-Nazaire dockyard, was just unfortunate.

Winston Churchill and the Admiralty had for some time been concerned by the potential availability of the huge Normandie dry dock for repairs to major German battleships should they be damaged in the contentious Battle of the Atlantic. Without it, the only other adequate facility was back in Germany. In fact, the Bismark was headed for France when she was fortunately stopped and sunk a year before, in May, 1941. The War Cabinet and the Government had also insisted that there was to be no indiscriminate bombing of French cities unless it was absolutely essential. Thus, the considerable bombing force allocated for an hour to support the landings, at 1:30 a.m., was told to only bomb certain dockyard and defensive anti-aircraft and defence gun position targets if they were clearly identified, and to use single bombs only. Dense cloud prevented that. The aircraft determinedly circled the city for considerable time, but only one aircraft managed to drop a bomb on a questionably identified target. The additional theory that the circling aircraft engine noise would distract the shore gun and searchlight crews from the attacking force’s engines coming up the Loire river is still a much debateable question, as is the theory that the threat of the bombing would either alert all the defences or cause them to retire at least temporarily to shelters. Lush has looked at both Allied and German records, finding arguments on both sides of each probability.

The raid itself, apart from RAF casualties, and despite the death of some 169 soldiers from various Commando units and the Royal Navy, was still considered very much a success. The dry dock gates were demolished by the charge buried in Campbeltown’s bow, never to be available for the remainder of the war. Saint-Nazaire provided a justification and an example for many such future raids, although, three months later, the Canadians at Dieppe were equally beset by lack of sufficient Staff oversight planning.

Lush gives a sufficient and very detailed coverage of the planning after January, 1942, that went into preparations to demolish the dock gate, operating mechanism and pumping arrangements. He makes use of actual copies of the relevant operational signals and orders that controlled the RAF’s in-
volvement from its inception. He writes clearly, making a logical case for all four aspects of RAF participation: the very useful pre-raid photo reconnaissance; the Bay of Biscay sweep to ensure undetected advance over two days of the outbound raiding force and its protective destroyers (indeed sighted by a U-Boat which fortunately radioed it was probably bound for Gibraltar); the bombing distraction that was not very useful; and the protective cover provided to enable the surviving vessels to escape. This latter effort was only partially effective, as the ships were very few in number, had left earlier than expected, and were not following the planned route back to Cornwall. If I were to be critical, Lush' numbering of every aircraft and naming of almost all crews and their backgrounds is rather over-kill, but establishes his points in this history, the only detailed description of the RAF's contribution to respond to the criticisms of the actual participants.

The appendix, including copies of the general Operation Order, and Coastal and Bomber Commands' Operation Orders, reinforces Lush's carefully detailed story of that contribution. All previous books seem to have concentrated only on the Commando portion of the raid (of which James Dorian's 1998 Storming St Nazaire (Leo Cooper) is probably the best); and CDR Rayner's own small 1947 volume The Attack On St Nazaire (John Murray) on the naval support effort, and the cost in lives and ships. This is a valuable addition to the overall picture of that valiant affair, missing until now, and providing a better balance to the whole.

The raid on Saint-Nazaire, the subject of probably some 20 or 25 books in itself, in both English and French, should be of interest to Canadians. The RN support force included four Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) officers. Two were killed; Campbeltown's lone medical officer, Surgeon Lieutenant W.J. (Jock) Winthrope, and Lieutenant Graham M. Baker, lost while trying to secure his Commando landing group Fairmile motor launch Q-411 to the Old Mole. Another man was seriously wounded and captured when his retiring ML was hit and sunk by shore gunfire, Lt. D. Lloyd Davies (whom I knew post-war as an RCN Staff Officer at HMCS York). Lieutenant John E. O’Rourke, CDR R.E.D. Rayner's (the Naval force commander) Signals Lieutenant in his command MTB was the only Canadian to get safely home that day. He went on to command an LST in the Normandy invasion.

A most interesting and different addition to the St Nazaire Raid story,

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


After Italy declared war on Britain on 10 June 1940, the two naval powers engaged in a bitter conflict for control of the Mediterranean Sea. The story is often told as a progressive victory from the Allied side. Vincent P. O’Hara’s Six Victories offers a new narrative of the campaign by re-examining the naval campaign between Britain and Italy from November 1941 to March 1942, during which both sides dramatically gained and lost control of the sea at different times.
O’Hara critically examines the key factors that contributed to the gain and loss of sea power on both sides, especially on commercial raiding and protection, which both are essential elements for maritime history. O’Hara successfully raised the attention on those less concerned convoy battles of the region with this book. Besides the narratives on convoy battles, O’Hara has further investigated the naval campaign. From his well-organised book, the author discusses many minor details on strategy, intelligence, and doctrines. These elements are seldom-discussed, but they did affect the struggling of Naval superiority in the region.

In terms of strategy, he provides a critical review of the British and Italian planning for sea control in 1940 and 1941. O’Hara pointed out that Mediterranean theatre was not a separated region during the war. For Italian, her maritime economy heavily relies on controlling the Central Mediterranean. For the British, the Mediterranean Sea provide a faster and more efficient route to the east of Suez, it is also vital for the victory towards Axis, by securing the Oil resource in the Middle East from the German and Italian. The control of the Mediterranean Sea could affect other theatres strategically. After the surrender of France, the unexpected change encouraged the Italian to launch an ambitious land operation on North Africa. For the British, they must hold Malta for defeating Italy even the sea transports were forbidden in the Mediterranean Sea. O’Hara has successfully connected the flow of war and organised it into a fluent narrative, provides his reader with a clear picture of the strategical situation at the time.

In the field of intelligence, the author re-evaluated the value of ULTRA and providing some unknown stories on the Axis side. The ULTRA was believed to be the most critical intelligence advantage of the British, one of the most decisive factors for Allied to win the war. However, the book reveals that the ULTRA had its restrictions on processing and usage. The pinpoint position of the convoy required confirmation by air reconnaissance, and the air reconnaissance helped to conceal the existence of ULTRA. These restrictions had made it only one of the elements of victory but hardly the most decisive one. On the other hand, the Italian and German Staff had obtained the ability to crack the naval code and diplomatic communications, which means the Axis is not overwhelmed in intelligence warfare. It is the un-cooperating of the Italian and German Intelligence units hindered the exploit of this work effort.

For naval doctrines, the author argues it is the advantages of doctrine determined the victory on the battlefield. The Royal Navy had several technological advantages, however, the victory of several convoy battle relied on the superior fighting doctrine of the Royal Navy, which the Italian Navy was absent in this aspect. For example, the British warships are instructed to bow-on towards escorts, this minor detail on doctrine dramatically reduced the chances of being hit by Italian. Combined with the narrative, the author demonstrated how the doctrinal advantages affected the outcome of battles.

Drawing from these discussions, Six Victories vividly demonstrates the delicacy of maintaining sea control. In December 1941 the Royal Navy almost gained control of the Mediterranean Sea. However, all sudden the Malta Strike Force sailed into a minefield while attempting to attack a convey sailing into Tripoli, resulted in two sank and two heavily damaged. The Italian Frogmen infiltrated into Alexandria which two battleships, a destroyer, and
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

The book provides a balanced narrative by making use of a range of archival materials. For the British side, O’Hara utilises the records from British War Cabinet, Admiralty records and War Diary, Government Code & Cypher School, Naval Staff History and several documents from the National Archives. Usage of less-touched Italian and German records, such as the correspondence from USMM (Ufficio Storia Marina Militare), Supermarina and the German Navy War Diary, ensured the narrative is balanced and fair. It is worth to mention that, O’Hara’s brilliantly organises all these records into a well-written account. Without his splendid historical skills, it is hard to imagine how these records could be made good use of.

The rich content of the book is inspiring. It encourages the reader to dig deeper into the minor details mentioned. For example, the book pointed out both the Italian and British Navy focused on Fleet battle as the instrument of maritime superiority, but the factors driven the two navies adopting to the extremely unexpecting situation in Mid 1941 could still be debate further. The reason behind the lack of trust between German and Italian staff is another good topic to discuss. The author mentioned the importance of doctrine, but how the two navies developed their naval and sea-air doctrines still require more attention.

As a conclusion, the well-organised content and discoveries of untouched details making O’Hara’s Six Victories is a scholar’s treasury for every naval and maritime Historian. The book provides us with a shed of light on further understanding the uniqueness of the Mediterranean region during the Second World War. He successfully achieved what he supposed to do with the book, and the experiences of sea power generated from this book are still worthy for the strategists and naval officers today.

Kater Ka-Ming Yip
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong


Chip Reid has written an engaging sequel to his 2012 book Intrepid Sailors: The Legacy of Preble’s Boys and the Tripoli Campaign that recounted the initial stages of America’s first overseas campaign against the Barbary pirates. Long a thorn in the sides of all European maritime powers, the peoples of the southern coast of the Mediterranean were notorious for their attacks on merchant shipping and had been for centuries. Dealing with this largely low level, but always vexatious, threat had engaged the fitful attention of Great Britain, France, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Venice and others over those centuries, but never with sufficient power to end Barbary mischief once and for all. The newly minted United States of America also suffered the depredation of the Barbary pirates, with a notable uptick with the ending of Royal Navy
protection after 1783, and, like their European forebears, resolved to do ‘something’ about these all too frequent outrages against legitimate and peaceable commerce.

Reid identifies the *causus belli* between the US and the Barbary states as the levying of tribute or, more ominously, taxes to conduct trade within the range of their corsairs. This imposition is equated by Reid to the hated taxation without representation by Great Britain and hence a ‘tyranny’ to be opposed with all due means available. This connection with the US domestic scene is a stretch to put it mildly, but the irregular imposition of tribute on merchant shipping to ensure safe passage and the free conduct of trade was an affront to the freedom of navigation and was resisted by all maritime powers, now including the US even if Reid’s characterisation is a bit over the top.

Most will be familiar with the US Marine Corps hymn that refers to their first foreign campaign “...on the shores of Tripoli.” Rather fewer are aware of the occasion that gave rise to the reference. The U.S. Navy came into its own with this first overseas campaign, as did its nascent marines. At one level, the effort was not notably successful in that the US conceded the unhappy necessity of paying tribute during the war itself, as well as into the early years of the next decade. Coming to grips with the Barbary forces and fighting a traditional war, with a traditional conclusion, was not easy and hence, the unsatisfactory outcome. Essentially, the power available to the US was inadequate to its ambitions, in concert with that of the other maritime powers that had engaged in similar struggles in the past. Nevertheless, the story recounted by Reid is an interesting epic that helped establish the fact of the United States on the world’s stage and confirmed the formidable capacity and competence of its youthful navy and marine corps.

Reid catalogues heroism, muddle, confusion, and no less than three separate efforts working at cross-purposes. That anything was accomplished at all is perhaps the real feature of the conflict. The prime effort, as recounted by Reid, was launched by Captain William Eaton, US Army, who sought to overthrow one member of a ruling family in favour of another via a rag-tag army that, grudgingly supported by naval forces, marched from Alexandria to Derne. (Derne is in the Libyan province of Cyrenaica, near Benghazi, presently spelled Derna.) Tobias Lear, a US diplomat who served as consul-general for the region, totally opposed Eaton’s efforts and ultimately negotiated the treaty that ended the First Barbary War (1801-05). (The first part of the war, involving Commodore Edward Preble, USN, forms the subject of Reid’s first book. That phase involved the ‘big’ USN frigates, including the unfortunate loss of the *USS Philadelphia* and the enslavement of its crew.) The USMC was represented by Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon, who led a squad in an attack on Derne, taking the Mameluke sword that remains a proud possession of the Corps to this day. The ranking naval officer was Commodore John Rogers, who opposed Eaton’s efforts on land and the whole strategy of overthrowing the ruler of the region. It is a compelling and interesting story.

Reid has made good use of American primary sources and done what he could with Arabic and Turkish accounts. These latter are comparatively scarce. The whole area was under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, but effective control was entirely absent. (In the 1830s the French colonised Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco achieved a nervous independence and in the ear-
ly years of the twentieth century, Italy absorbed Libya. Egypt was occupied and shared between Great Britain and France due to the Suez Canal investment mid-century. Borders were imprecise then and scarcely better now.) The maps provided illustrate the area, but use modern borders, which were absent at the time. There are also useful illustrations of the American personages involved, but none seem to exist for the Berbers.

The book is energetically written, moves along at a good clip and as such is a ‘good read’. It is a useful introduction to a little-known episode in the very early days of the American Republic, and well illustrates the difficulties of civil-military relations, the consequences of divided command and control, and the unhappy effects of conflicting objectives, ambitions and directives. Lessons for the ages to be sure.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Our driver picked us up at Havana’s Hotel Parque Central, hung a right on the magnificent Paseo del Prado, and headed straight for the Malecón. Like most Habaneros, he was friendly and loquacious, so when we stopped at a light, I mentioned that I had just finished a book about the 1762 British siege and occupation of his city. He lit up. “Oh, man! The amazing thing about that was the trade that followed!”

During the course of our five-day visit, I was surprised at how well-known this episode is among ordinary Cubans and how, like our chatty driver, their interest tends less to the heroic defense of the city than to the commercial cornucopia in the aftermath. No doubt this is explained in part by the present difficulties of the American embargo, which has induced near-crippling shortages of everything from fuel to medicine.

Elena A. Schneider, an assistant professor of history at the University of California Berkeley, is well familiar with this emphasis, for it has also been perpetuated by historians and writers since the eighteenth century. One Cuban planter/journalist set the tone thirty years after the siege when he declared that the British resurrected a dormant Havana by opening theretofore unexploited trade routes and showering the city with goods. In her absorbing new book, Schneider insists on the “need for a new approach” (7) and thus, introduces a little more reality into the picture. Rather than concentrate solely on the short siege and occupation, she casts a wider net. Pursuing far-flung archival sources in London, Paris, Madrid, and Havana, she examines Anglo-Spanish relations all the way back to Elizabethan times. Britain had long been attracted by Havana’s wealth and power, she reveals, and laid siege to the Key to the Indies no less than a dozen times. “The scope, conception, and aims of the Havana campaign of 1762 would not have been possible without plotting and prior attempts against Spanish America,” she writes. (21) As for Havana, it usually benefited from its relations with Britain whether they were hostile or friendly. After the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-48), for example, when Britain tried and failed to capture it, local elites “used wartime to pull the city into closer relations of trade and diplomacy with
British America and also make it a more open port, one that was more closely linked with British America before the invasion than historians have heretofore acknowledged.” (95)

During its 1762 attempt, Britain concentrated considerably more resources to the city’s reduction than ever before—230 vessels with 28,400 soldiers, sailors, and African slaves—all under the command of George Keppel, third Earl of Albemarle, an experienced political and military hand. The Spanish had not neglected their Caribbean jewel, bracketing its narrow harbour mouth with stone fortresses bristling with cannon manned by multiracial troops, including regulars, militia, and enslaved men who were promised their freedom if they fought. Schneider calls this move by Spanish authorities “the single best decision … made during the entire defense of Havana.” (140) This is her book’s other great theme. Slaves thronged to the ramparts and fought hard, indeed were central to the city’s defense. One, Joseph Antonio Barreto, sallied out with a raiding party and nabbed a redcoat by grabbing his hair. Many of these men paid dearly for their valour—hundreds perished from wounds and disease.

Schneider describes the siege in detail, nicely balancing its naval and terrestrial aspects. British warships and land batteries pounded the fortifications throughout the long hot summer. While Havana’s slaves and soldiers desperately attempted to hold their positions, the city’s elites retreated into the countryside to await the outcome. After the city’s fall, Keppel proved himself to be an agreeable conqueror, and the elites flooded back. Once more ensconced in their high mansions and shaded courtyards, they were “poised to exploit the occupation as an opportunity to continue building ties to British Atlantic economies and expanding their access to enslaved Africans.” (165) This obviously did not sit well with those heroes of colour who had so recently defended the city. Schneider writes that at least two of these determined veterans made their way to Spain and personally appealed to the king. Charles III was embarrassed by Havana’s capture—one British soldier called it the most “humiliating loss since the defeat of the celebrated Armada” (177)—but he was sensible enough to know that the enslaved people’s recent bravery had better be rewarded. In the case of the two supplicants, he granted their freedom and gave them medals to boot. After Spain’s repossessing of Havana, the government considered the pleas of hundreds of other enslaved black veterans, but in the end granted freedom to only 156 of them. Wholesale emancipation on a scale commensurate with their service and sacrifice was out of the question lest Cuba’s slave society “be thrown into crisis.” (245)

Like any good historian, Schneider is alert to irony. After Havana’s occupation, its elites wholeheartedly embraced “free trade in slaves” (279) and significantly expanded Cuba’s sugar production. During the decades after the occupation, Cuba and Havana were more irrevocably tied to Britain and slavery than ever. Beforehand, Schneider writes, Cuba’s slaveowners relied on people of African descent in myriad roles, the sugar boom made them seek to narrow categories of blackness to the controlled and the enslaved.” (293) There would still be opportunities for black troops, most immediately at the sieges of Mobile and Pensacola during the American Revolution, but in the grand scheme, the events of 1762 were a disaster for Cuba’s people of colour.

The Occupation of Havana is an important work, enlivened by 14 colour
plates, 35 halftones, and eight maps. Schneider writes clearly and well, buttressing all of her arguments with copious notes. Unfortunately, like many recent university press publications, the book eschews a stand-alone bibliography. This minor quibble aside, anyone with an interest in Atlantic studies, the Caribbean, slavery, or eighteenth-century naval history will enjoy the read.

John S. Sledge
Fairhope, Alabama


To set this book into context, during Peary’s 1906 expedition to reach the North Pole, he claimed to have seen a vast archipelago about 130 miles NW of Cape Thomas Hubbard on Ellesmere Island. He named it Crocker Land in honour of George Crocker, a wealthy businessman, who had contributed US $50,000 towards the expedition cost. This is the story of the search for the archipelago, and the aftermath, published posthumously. The author’s granddaughter, Giulia Nicita, page-proofed, proofread and indexed the book on behalf of the author’s children.

The book is divided into two parts; Part 1, The Expedition in the Polar North covers the planning, execution of the expedition, the search for Crocker Land, and the murder of an Inuit guide by one of the expedition members. The expedition quickly dispensed with the concept of Crocker Land, diplomatically saying that Peary must have seen an Arctic mirage. Part 2, The Expedition and Scientific Research, is the larger part because of the extensive coverage of the complications that arose after the expedition members returned home. There is also an extensive prologue, which contains useful historical background to the two main entities which sponsored the expedition. These were the American Museum of Natural History (which took the lead role), the American Geographical Society, and the University of Illinois. Other organizations and individuals also contributed funds, including $500 from Peary, and $2.00 from a Sunday school class. The Canadian Government offered free wireless transmissions for weather forecasts and scientific data. The prologue also contains the book’s only map, which shows the expedition’s track from Etah in Greenland to Cape Thomas Hubbard.

The expedition was originally planned to take two years, and was budgeted at US $50,000 plus considerable in-kind contributions for such items as scientific instruments, special discounts on purchased equipment and donations of books. In the end, the expedition lasted four years and cost $163,000. Team members straggled back to the United States during 1916 and 1917 by way of Copenhagen, however, it is not clear when some members did make it home. Why the author takes 1920 as the finish date is not explained, although this was the year in which protracted negotiations about intellectual property and release of funds between the two principals ended. A particular sticking point was a side agreement between the Museum of Natural History and Donald MacMillan regarding publication rights. The Geographical Society was not advised of this agreement until after MacMillan returned, and the story is dealt with in considerable detail. There were also problems regarding transfer of adequate geographic information and
artifacts to the Geographical Society to justify their investment in the expedition.

While the outbreak of the First World War must have had an influence on planning for the return of the expedition members, it is never alluded to, except in a peripheral way. Much of the problem appears to have been due to a poor choice of ships, perhaps driven by an attempt to save on charter costs. The ships are only names, however; the author provides no details. Interestingly, one would have expected the principals to have approached Harvey over the 1913 availability of the *Adventure*, and Job Bros. regarding the *Nascopie*, both of which were high quality (for the period) ice-breaking steamers. As a result of possible penny pinching, it was the *Erik* (James Baird and Co.) that eventually landed the explorers and their gear at Etah, rather than the desired destination of Flagler Bay on Ellesmere Island. Built in 1865, *Erik* was known as a “clever ship” by sealers:, thus, one that could work well in ice. There may also be an error in ship names. The first relief ship, chartered from the Grenfell Association in 1915, is referred to as the *George B Cluett*, but it may, in fact, have been the *George C Cluett*, given its description as a schooner. The *George B* was a steel steamship built in 1920 according to *Ships and Seafarers of Atlantic Canada*. In addition to this minor error, there is a regrettable number of editorial and indexing glitches.

The book has been exhaustively researched, with considerable detail provided regarding the trips made by different team members, and is replete with dates. Unfortunately, the reader has to determine in which year events occurred, which is complicated by the narrative looping backwards and forwards. In order to appreciate where they traveled, more maps would have been of considerable benefit.

Profiles of some of the seven team members are provided, particularly Elmer Ekblaw, who was a geologist and contributed considerable new information. He was also the only casualty, losing a number of toes to frostbite. Donald MacMillan, who was a quintessential Arctic explorer, is also profiled. He led the expedition and had accompanied Peary on the 1908/09 trip to find the North Pole. He went on to undertake a number of other Arctic trips. Fitzhue Green, the expedition cartographer, has a lengthy profile, largely about his publishing activities after the expedition, although this was in contravention of the agreement he had signed at the outset. Other scientific team members receive short shrift, although Maurice Tanquary, the entomologist, does have Tanquary Fjord named after him. On page 177, there is an interesting, and scurrilous, summation of the expedition, apparently recorded by Hal Hunt, the expedition surgeon, and attributed to George Comer, the captain of the *Cluett*.

In summary, it is a very interesting book, which provides as many insights into the publishing world and mores of the early-twentieth century as it does the expedition itself. If you do read it, make sure you brush up your geographic knowledge of Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland, or have a good atlas to hand.

Christopher Wright
Digby, Nova Scotia

You would be forgiven if you thought that the main contribution of Nathaniel Bowditch to the world was his book *The American Practical Navigator*, which first appeared in 1802 and continues to be maintained and published today by the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The book is a masterpiece of theory and instruction for the navigational practitioner, widely used throughout the international maritime community and commonly referred to simply by its subtitle: *Bowditch*. It was based on the most popular navigational text of the late-eighteenth century, John Hamilton Moore’s *The New Practical Navigator*. Devoted almost exclusively to celestial navigation, Moore’s book contained extensive mathematical tables of logarithms, trigonometric functions, haversines and so on, to enable mariners to convert astronomical observations into position at sea. Bowditch reworked and corrected such a vast number of errors in Moore’s book that a new publication in his name was deemed appropriate—hence the birth of *The American Practical Navigator*.

Tamara Plakins Thornton, while acknowledging this significant undertaking by Bowditch, takes us much further into his life to show us the remarkable transformational impact that he had on nineteenth-century American capitalism. It is his role in shaping the modern bureaucracy into an impersonal, clockwork mechanism of unerring regularity in keeping with his mathematician’s sensibility that, she offers, is his true lasting legacy.

Thornton takes a roughly chronological approach to this biography of Nathaniel Bowditch (1773-1838), which conforms nicely to the main themes and stages of his life. The reader is provided with a superb description of Bowditch’s Salem, Massachusetts, birthplace on the eve of revolution, which shows how the combination of the family and social relationships of this intensely interconnected community combined with its worldly maritime trading outlook to shape the young Bowditch. Family hardships, including his father Habakkuk Bowditch’s capture as a privateer and imprisonment in Halifax during the Revolutionary War denied Nathaniel the opportunity for higher education—he was almost entirely self-taught. The perceived lack of refinement, social polish and delicacy that would have come from an education at nearby Harvard College would colour Bowditch’s personal and business ventures throughout his life. Thornton reinforces this theme with regularity.

Family connections, however, gained Bowditch a position as a clerk in a Salem ship chandlery, which offered him an introduction to the world of maritime business while simultaneously affording him the opportunity to pursue his expanding interest in mathematics. Proving to be unusually bright, Bowditch was captivated by the “mathematical vision of predictability and certitude which was aesthetic, even spiritual in nature.” (32) He became extraordinarily good at processing large quantities of numbers, virtually a human calculator.

Thornton’s encapsulation of Bowditch’s seagoing career casts him more as maritime businessman than seafarer. After his first voyage as captain’s clerk, he undertook three more in the role of supercargo or Cargo Superintendent, the on-board representative of the ship’s owner, who looked after all commercial business of the ship and her cargo during the voyage.
ing Bowditch’s fifth and final voyage as the captain of the sailing ship Putnam, Thornton effectively debunks the myth surrounding his return to Salem. Supposedly, on Christmas night 1803, based solely on his mathematical calculations, he sailed fearlessly into Salem Harbour in a blinding snowstorm. Thornton dismisses it as an over-exaggerated tale later told by his devoted sons.

At age thirty, Bowditch’s life veered sharply away from the sea towards business pursuits ashore. Thornton takes us into the world of insurance offices, banks, trusts, securities brokers and other institutions that made up the deeply interwoven commercial world of early-nineteenth century Massachusetts, as well as providing an engrossing depiction of local society of the period and Bowditch’s place within it. Bowditch was appointed president of the Essex Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the first of a string of leadership roles in corporations and societies he fulfilled over the next 34 years. Thornton illustrates how he applied trademark innovations, such as the systemization and standardization of information gathering and its meticulous organizing, cataloguing and reporting, based on his mathematical principles of regularity, uniformity and method. She very convincingly shows how Bowditch’s reforms and his rigid adherence to established rules were instrumental in “removing bias, idiosyncrasy and arbitrariness from [business], impersonality that invites trust and establishes moral legitimacy.” (184) In the new America it was becoming important to demonstrate that favouritism would not be tolerated and that poor and rich alike would receive equal treatment—Bowditch spearheaded this new accountability and efficiency.

Thornton devotes a chapter to what Bowditch considered his magnum opus, his translation and annotation of French mathematician and astronomer Pierre-Simon Laplace’s Mécanique Céleste, his mechanical interpretation of the solar system. The author does an exemplary job of describing the complexities of scientific thought of the day and the international world of the Republic of Letters, as she does with the world of early-nineteenth century business and social institutions.

This is no fawning portrait, however. Thornton shows us Bowditch as a highly intelligent, extremely effective businessman, mathematician and astronomer, but also a petty, self-righteous, relentless and tactless individual. He would carry a large chip on his shoulder throughout his life, took “delight in finding errors in others work,” (77) and regularly displayed uncompromising petulance at others’ shortcomings, mathematical or otherwise. This is well illustrated by his actions as a member of Harvard’s governing board, the Harvard Corporation, to ouster its treasurer, college steward and ultimately its president over a two-year period, having judged them as failing to run Harvard in a businesslike manner.

Because Bowditch’s accomplishments regarding The American Practical Navigator and his Mécanique Céleste translation amounted to ultimately reworking and annotating others’ original work, Thornton argues that his true legacy was his impact on the evolution of the “Laplacian corporation” (250) as an impersonal, clockwork machine. She presents a very convincing argument, supported by a vast amount of primary source research—the bibliography alone runs 50 pages. She leads the reader ably through labyrinthine mathematical, astronomical, business, social and nautical concepts in a clear, concise fashion, and leaves us with an outstanding portrayal of post-revolu-
tionary Massachusetts and the complex man who was Nathaniel Bowditch.

[Of note: The American Practical Navigator can be accessed online in its entirety at https://msi.nga.mil/Publications/APN.]

Tom Tulloch
Halifax, Nova Scotia

BACKLIST


The word ‘mutiny’ instantly conjures up images of brutal sea captains being overthrown by down-trodden seaman who have been pushed to their wits end by months of brutality, poor pay and harsh living conditions. Certainly, in warships, this has been the case, but the mercantile marine (merchant navy) has also had its fair share of mutiny. The ‘mutiny’ onboard the 517-ton barque Caswell, on 4 January 1876, while en-route from Antofagasta, Chile, to Queenstown, Ireland, with a cargo of saltpetre stands out as one of the most violent in the mercantile marine and also one of the oddest; hence the book’s title, The Riddle of the Caswell Mutiny. Séamus Breathnach, a lecturer in criminological studies in Dublin, Ireland, has examined the event as two of the mutineers were tried in Cork (one in 1876 and another in 1879) and subsequently hanged.

This is not the first book on the mutiny with The Caswell Mutiny by Martin McGregor published by Claymore Books in 1996. McGregor, a former member of the Royal Canadian Navy, was the grandson of Caswell’s carpenter (Peter McGregor) who survived the mutiny. I wish I had read his book first, as Breathnach’s book is a meandering wade through knee-deep treacle. The introduction alone is 23 pages describing life at sea in the nineteenth century before the reader gets anywhere near the Caswell. The rest of book is disjointed and filled with additional historical or legal ‘anecdotes’ that break up the flow of the history of the mutiny. Chapter 8 deals with the trial of a Thomas Crowe in Ireland, and has nothing to do with the Caswell mutiny except Crowe is later hanged in a double execution alongside one of the Caswell mutineers. Interesting, but another 20 pages of gravel to sift through to find very little gold. Caswell’s captain was George Best, who was known for his foul temper and poor treatment of his crew; so it is unsurprising that on the barque’s maiden voyage from Glasgow to Buenos Aires, during July-September 1875, he alienated the bulk of his crew who deserted in Chile rather than complete a return voyage. Also with the outbound cargo delivered, Best struggled to find a return cargo to make it worth his while leaving port.
Eventually, with a new crew—a mixture of 16 British, Greeks, Sicilians and a German cook—the Caswell departs Antofagasta on 4 December 1875; but even then, she sails two crew-members short as an Irish seaman and the German cook decide to ‘jump ship’ rather than sail under Best’s command. The temperament onboard, under Best’s flawed leadership, becomes more and more strained. Nor is it aided by the racial differences between the British and Mediterranean ethnicity of the crew members. After rounding Cape Horn, the matter comes to a head at the change of watch (at 8 a.m.) on 4 January 1876 when George Best begins to berate one of the Greek seamen (Big George). George ‘snaps’ and stabs and kills Best. Over the next few hours, the five Greek and Sicilian crew members attack and kill the First Mate, Second Mate and the captain’s steward. Their bodies are then dumped overboard.

Was this a mutiny by men who had only been onboard Caswell for a few months, who were driven to react against Best’s treatment and racism from the British crew, or was it a pre-meditated plan to seize any ship to return to the northern hemisphere? Part of the riddle?

With the Caswell’s crew now down to ten men, of whom five were ‘mutineers’, an uneasy truce settles in as both groups realize they can only sail the ship if they co-operate. On 18 February 1876, Caswell is off the mouth of the River Plate and two of the mutineers leave the ship in a longboat. The crew of eight continue to sail northward and on 11 March 1876 the five British seaman, led by carpenter McGregor, conduct a counter-mutiny, killing ‘Big George’ and another Greek seaman. The sole remaining mutineer, Greek seaman Christos Bombos, is wounded and ‘clapped in irons’. The five British seamen then took the Caswell to port arriving in Queenstown, Ireland, on 13 May 1876.

The remaining 140 pages of the book then deals with the legal ramifications of the mutiny with the subsequent trial and execution of Christos Bombos and the chance discovery, in January 1879, of mutineer Joseph Pistoria when he is spotted at Buenos Aires by Able Seaman James Carrick who had survived the Caswell Mutiny. Pistoria is arrested and sent to Ireland to stand trial (as that was where the Caswell had first arrived in 1876 and under British law the accused had stand trial there). Pistoria is tried, convicted and hanged in August 1879.

The Caswell then fades into obscurity until she sails from Newcastle, New South Wales, with a crew of 12 and a cargo of coal on 18 February 1899. She fails to reach her destination and no trace of the hapless ship is ever found.

So ends the story of the Caswell mutiny. This book is over 230 pages long and yet the story could be interestingly and adequately told in half that amount. Seamus Breathnach may be a highly qualified criminologist, but he is a dreadful author. The book is riddled with additional information and anecdotes which add nothing to the story; they simply distract the reader and slow down and obscure the real narrative. Several chapters had to be read and re-read and notes taken to confirm the real story and separate the dross from the gold. I will be seeking out a copy of McGregor’s book on the Caswell to gain a better understanding of this event.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia