
Deep sea shipping was arguably the first global industry. Around the time of Confederation, large Canadian-built sailing ships, many under Canadian ownership, traded worldwide. In fact, they formed the fifth largest merchant fleet in the world. In this handsomely produced book, Captain John Anderson, a retired deep-sea mariner, originally from Liverpool and now living on Vancouver Island, describes the careers of 17 notable sailing vessels built in the Maritimes and Québec. These particular ships, previously undocumented, typify the efficient sail-powered merchant vessels of the time. What makes Anderson’s narrative particularly valuable is his mariner’s perspective. Using contemporary records, he describes actual voyages, ships’ crews (often containing several nationalities), cargoes carried, ports visited and navigational challenges. The book is illustrated by fascinating, contemporary photographs, nicely produced in large format so that details can be seen clearly. The author’s descriptive captions are excellent. Four colour plates reproduce paintings of ships done at the time. There are portions of contemporary charts interspersed throughout the narrative to illustrate descriptions of sailing through challenging areas, such as rounding the Horn or approaching Bombay (Mumbai). The text is rich in information about how cargoes were stowed, navigational techniques, passage times, the professional qualifications of officers, and how crews were signed on and discharged. The author incorporates details such as how many lighthouses were operating along the coasts, where his ships traded, and the fact that lighted navigational buoys made their first appearance in 1872. Interestingly, Anderson notes that the majority of the large ships involved in transporting emigrants to Australia from Britain were Canadian-built. The “Noble Ship” in the title is the full-rugged ship *Morning Light,*
completed in St John, New Brunswick in 1855. About one-third of the book is devoted to this handsome vessel, which was both large for her time (2,377 net tons, 80.7 meters or 265 feet long) and fast. She made several voyages carrying emigrants from the UK to Australia. This small gem is obviously the result of years of research and seagoing experience. Anyone interested in learning about how the tall ships built in the Maritimes and Québec operated will find This Noble Ship and Others a rewarding read and source book.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


The “Great War,” better known as the First World War, spawned a vast number of accounts and memoirs from both sides of the conflict, most of which have been out of print for many years and now nearly impossible to find. David Bilton’s Sea and Air Fighting: Those Who Were There is a compilation of a dozen short First World War memoirs, all originally published in an 800-page book in 1936. The stories Bilton collected deal with the Royal Navy at sea, aerial conflicts involving its air branch, the Royal Naval Air Service, and even some land warfare carried out in part by Royal Marines units. The chapters include: the duel between the Cap Trafalgar and the Carmania; the sinking of HMS Audacious; the victory of a Q-ship (an anti-submarine ship) over German U-boats, which earned the ship a Victoria Cross; a long account of the Battle of Jutland; two further accounts of Q-ship activities; an account of the famous Zeebrugge raid in April, 1918; a short remembrance of an air raid over London; the story of the downing of the highest-scoring fighter pilot of World War One, Germany’s Baron Manfred von Richthofen; a memoir of Gallipoli; the incredible story of L.A. Strange, who was saved from near-death by freak luck; and the final story recalls the air war over the Somme.

Since this is a small anthology, the reader should not expect a straight-line narrative. Each story reflects its author’s distinctive style as well as being a product of its time. For example, the “n-word” appears in one story, an unfortunately frequent reference to those of African descent at the time, although now no longer acceptable. Another chapter reads as if Canadian A. Roy Brown was responsible for shooting down von Richthofen, the “Red Baron,” in air-to-air combat. While this was a common belief after the First World War, research since the 1950s
indicates that Richtofen was fatally wounded by ground fire.

That said, the chapters in this book contain the freshness they had when first published, making it a valuable read. The lengthy chapter on the Battle of Jutland has the virtue of being written by an actual participant, as does the chapter on Gallipoli, written by novelist Compton Mackenzie, who describes the battle of 4 June 1915 with the eyes of one who was in that horrible struggle. The story of L.A. Strange is familiar to many aficionados of First World War aviation. While standing in the open cockpit of his biplane fighter to change an ammunition drum, Strange’s aircraft suddenly turned upside down and he found himself hanging in space. It was a miracle that the drum did not come loose before he was able to grab onto a strut, get back in the cockpit, and right the aircraft. Again, those unfamiliar with the Zeebrugge raid will learn about it from a combatant’s point of view.

*Sea and Air Fighting* includes brief biographies of the various authors along with a photograph section that illustrates many of the subjects in this book.

The ultimate test of any book—is it worth reading? The answer is yes. Since the veterans of the First World War have all passed away, their memoirs help remind us of that ghastly conflict. As an anthology, this book can be picked up on the spur of the moment, dipped into at any chapter and enjoyed. It is also suitable reading for a rainy afternoon or evening. Thanks to Bilton’s republication of these memoirs, we are not only reminded of the horrors of war, but the courage so frequently shown by its combatants.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Gary Burn’s 2016 publication of *Shipmates: The Men of LCS 52 in World War II* presents a stunningly intimate series of portraits of the sailors who served aboard one of the US Navy’s 150-foot island invasion vessels (Littoral Combat Ships) purposefully designed for the Pacific theatre. Presented much like a Hollywood film in organization and outline—with just as many emotional asides, politically-incorrect outbursts, nonchalant meanders down memory lane, and childhood flashbacks—the reader is seldom far from the first-person accounts that comprise the work. This is Second World War history learned sitting at the feet of one’s grandfather, and represents an extremely raw, emotional, unfiltered, and highly subjective account. While it proves to be a rich source of
compiled primary material, it is not, however, a balanced, objective, or contextually-placed history of the battles or events in which participated the men and the vessel on which they served.

What is lost from the work is a stiff or formal feeling that treats the reader as an outsider looking on from afar. Instead of the typical accounts of battles and scenes presented from the top down, where a reader has all the omniscience of presidents or dictators, generals or admirals, this work treats the reader like a newly-enlisted recruit on an LCS. First, one knows very little about what is happening while it is going on; the events only make sense in retrospect, and this is probably by design. The addition of a map or simple diagram, however, to illustrate vessels in spatial relationship to one another during radar picket duty, especially during the accounts surrounding action off Okinawa, would have been very useful, without sacrificing the informal feeling. Second, one is assumed to be familiar with the lexicon of sailors of the era. For a fuller comprehension, one is advised to have a dictionary or other reference handy for terms and military jargon that are simply never defined, such as “V-7 program” (54), “UDT operations” (87), “Kates” (109), “Zeke” (110), and “Baka” (112). Sensitive readers also are advised that the storytelling is highly irreverent, sometimes for effect or to impart feeling more than information. While descriptions of the taste of pineapple in one’s vomit (56) might arguably make for a good story, it hardly improves a history.

While the author appears either to have researched widely or to have been personally aware of much of military detail presented in the book, proper citations are sparse, which necessarily lessens the work’s academic value. So, too, does unmitigated speculation, especially in terms of the feelings of the Japanese: “Across Japan, citizens walked humbly, all the while fearing that their army’s atrocities throughout a decade of war might be visited upon them by the conquering forces. Their compliance was reciprocated with none of the rape and vengeance they expected.” (157) Such declarations undermine an otherwise rich and detailed account.

Several unique gems from this work warrant special mention. There is an excellent explanation of the Japanese kamikaze program and the ideology behind it (100) which provides rich context for comprehending the attacks that are later described. The author’s discussions of “barrage balloons” (47) and sweet-heart pillow cases (50), as well as “skunk patrol” (105) are rare in histories of the era and will be extremely welcome to readers of a younger or future generation.

The presentation of the battle of Iwo Jima and picket duty around Okinawa, especially the kamikaze attack that killed Engineering Officer Spencer Burroughs and severed Robert Payne’s arm (122), are
masterful and gripping. Readers learn the gory details of shoveling a kamikaze pilot’s body, blood, and intestines out of a gun turret so that the LCS can continue defending itself against the next wave of attack. The battle account is enormously engaging and kept this reader on the edge of her seat… right up until it was abruptly interrupted by a flashback about the childhood of Ensign Adler Wilhelm “Swede” Strandquist. While this pattern occurred throughout the book, at times, it felt very poorly placed. The pivotal attack on the LCS was one such example.

This book makes an extremely valuable, if irreverent, contribution to Second World War maritime studies for which the author makes no apologies. The presentation is challenging at times, and the material often politically incorrect and occasionally, irrelevant. But as a whole, the work is engaging, personal, and shares a very intimate view of one crew and their vessel in the Pacific theatre of the Second World War. For readers who crave a seriously authentic first-hand account of these actions, Shipmates is not to be missed.

Brandi Carrier
Alexandria, Virginia


A. Roger Ekirch’s *American Sanctuary* is a meticulously researched and elegantly chronicled literary triptych. In the first section, the author recounts an obscure but tragic 1797 maritime historical event, a savage mutiny on board a British frigate. This little-known affair led to a multi-continent dragnet to locate the mutineers. The subsequent events and their repercussions significantly affected American national identity, immigration policy and political history. Most importantly, they led directly to a national debate concerning the granting of political asylum to refugees from foreign governments.

Initially, the story recounts the hard life aboard the frigate HMS Hermione under the command of Hugh Pigot, a cruel martinet. On the night of 21 September 1797, off the coast of Puerto Rico, many members of the crew, brandishing boarding axes and cutlasses, killed the captain. Next, they turned on other officers, slaughtering ten of them in the most brutal manner. The mutineers then sailed to the coast of Venezuela and abandoned Hermione, thereby making it a Spanish prize, the property of Bourbon King Charles IV.

The next part of the book focuses on the British search for the mutineers who had scattered to various lands or continued to ply the
sea as sailors with false names and papers. Many were caught, tried and executed. Others escaped the hangman through the mercy of a court system that took into account the frequent lashings Captain Pigot visited upon them. One of the ringleaders was a sailor known on the ship’s registry-log as Thomas Nash. He was captured in Charleston, South Carolina, over a year after the mutiny, after he bragged to a sailor on a merchant ship about his *Hermione* escapade. When the British learned about his arrest, they demanded his extradition. Upon questioning during his incarceration, the sailor insisted that he was not Thomas Nash, but Jonathan Robbins, a native of Danbury, Connecticut, who had been impressed into the Royal Navy.

The resulting legal squabbles focused on whether a reputed American citizen who claimed to have been impressed (essentially kidnapped, while sailing on international waters), and then brutally abused, should be remanded to British custody for trial in a foreign land. The arguments on both sides of the issue are compelling, but ultimately, the fugitive was “loaded with irons” (83), handed over to the British and tried in a court-martial during which “Robbins” confessed to being Thomas Nash. Convicted of mutiny and murder, he was hanged from the fore-yardarm of the frigate HMS *Acasta*. Adding to the humiliation, his body was suspended in chains from a gibbet beside a small Thames River island as warning to seamen contemplating a similar crime.

The American public, perhaps unaware of Nash’s confession, did not believe the truth, or chose to ignore it. His fictitious background grew in the print media, sparking a national debate over the rights of maltreated refugees who claimed asylum upon American shores. The fate of the political ghost of Robbins/Nash became the focus of diverse opinions between the new Federalist and the Republican political parties, and among many of the important names in American history.

One of the most intriguing chapters, “Revolution of 1800,” details the acrimonious election battle between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. Once there was clear evidence that “Robbins” was really Nash, the mutineer, President Adams ordered the murderer turned over to the British consul for extradition. Many Americans were convinced that Robbins/Nash was an unjustly-treated American, although there was no record of his birth or residence in Connecticut. Despite the clear evidence of Nash’s deceit, political opponents of Adams used the many newspapers of the day to accuse him of bartering away an innocent American citizen to placate the still-detested British. It was, after all, less than a decade and a half after the Revolutionary War. During the unpleasant election of 1800, Thomas Jefferson and his followers were
determined to use the “Robbins” case to unseat the president and spread the hoax as truth to damage the chances of Adams’s reelection. By means of this issue, the repeal of the Sedition Act and other political “bones of contention,” the Republicans succeeded.

In the first fifty years of the republic, politicians kept drawing upon the “ghost of Jonathan Robbins” as an election issue because national expansion was important and refugees were ideal sources of badly needed new citizens. They would be opposed to oppression because most had fled from it. For four decades, the United States did not extradite people facing charges from a foreign government.

There was frank hypocrisy, however, when it came to the extradition of rebellious slaves and the exploitation of America’s indigenous people. When the American brig, Creole, taken over by recalcitrant slaves, was landed at the British island of Nassau, the American owners pressed for its return to the United States. Britain refused because it had declared slavery illegal in 1833. Many Americans believed that right of resistance should not be dependent upon the colour of one’s skin, an argument that was contrary to opinions held in slave-owning states. Yet, morality was primitive by today’s criteria. The economy of the southern states depended upon slave labour, while the rest of the country expressed little concern about the nation’s theft of Indian land.

To what might have been an historical footnote, Ekirch’s scholarly work adds a perspective on the current worldwide refugee issue that is uncomfortably contemporary in its recounting of historic changes in criteria for admission or rejection of immigrants to the United States. The book’s sub-title, Mutiny, Martyrdom, and National Identity in the Age of Revolution, succinctly captures the central topics: a mutiny in all its gory details; the worldwide pursuit and apprehension of the perpetrators leading to a martyr’s death; and finally, an analysis of the aftereffects of the Robbins/Nash affair that produced a far-reaching political debate played out in the pages of the era’s highly partisan press.

Illustrations, woodcuts, and portraits of many prominent members of the story’s dramatis personae are intermingled with the text. Academic non-fiction usually includes a bibliography, but this is missing. In its place, Ekirch has provided detailed notes concerning source material used to tell this story, papers of participants, official documents and secondary resources. A minor proofreading error on page 220 names Thomas Truxtun as the captain of the USS Constitution when he actually commanded the USS Constellation, a fact correctly cited in an earlier reference (87).

In summary, this is a dramatic story of the legal evolution and politics of the early 1800s that is well-written and masterfully told with cohesion, insight and skill. I enthus-
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

iastically recommend American Sanctuary to maritime historians and the general public.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This is a rewarding, in-depth examination of the Royal Navy’s officers during the years between the two world wars. It covers how officers entered the Navy, their training, professional development and initially haphazard career management, the quality of oversight and leadership they experienced under successive First Sea Lords (the professional heads of the RN) and how these affected overall officer morale. While the focus is on the years between 1918 and 1939, the narrative first sets the stage by examining officer development leading up to the end of the Great War. The penultimate chapter looks at officer performance in the Second World War in light of the effectiveness of changes in the 1930s to career management and development. The book is based on the PhD thesis completed in 2013 by Mike Farquharson-Roberts, a Surgeon Rear Admiral, who took up academic studies in retirement. The credibility of his narrative is buttressed by the use of a sample of performance reports on naval officers which were provided by the Ministry of Defence.

During the technological changes that were profoundly affecting all navies in the run-up to 1914 the RN is described as…..” a vibrant organization, well aware of technological changes and developments…” (11) and a “….seething mass of innovation and changes:” (9). The author demonstrates that up until the Great War, there “…were actually very highly educated and able officers whose abilities were multidimensional.”(8) The war was eventually won by attrition, but at the time, the critical contribution of the Royal Navy’s blockade of the Central Powers was not understood. The fact that there had been no dramatic victorious fleet action had a serious impact on the self-confidence of the Royal Navy’s officer corps.

Career prospects had been excellent in the Royal Navy during its dramatic expansion in the decades just prior to the First World War. Farquharson-Roberts cites figures which show how personnel strength mushroomed 2.4 times from 62,400 in 1888-89 to 151,000 in 1914. (30) In fact, by 1912, the training system which took cadets at age 13 was
producing too few junior officers to meet the expanding demand. To distinguish it from trainees entered at 13, a new scheme of “direct” or “special” entry for cadets at age 18 from public school was introduced in 1913 to run in parallel with the existing system. By the 1930s, 20 percent of officer trainees were direct entries and thereafter, this training scheme provided an increasing portion of career officers. Once the Royal Canadian Naval College was axed in 1922, the Special Entry system became important for the interwar RCN, because it was how 128 Canadian permanent force officers were prepared for their careers between 1924 and 1942. Formal training ended with the award of a bridge watchkeeping certificate by one’s captain, generally as a Sub-lieutenant. After 1918, the Royal Navy faced serious retrenchment. Poorly planned personnel reductions were handled insensitively but still left too many officers in some ranks. These reductions, coupled with four pay cuts in the 1920s and indifferent management by successive First Sea Lords, contributed to poor officer morale by the time a cut in pay for the lower deck ineptly handed by the Admiralty triggered the Invergordon Mutiny in 1931. The author calls this period the Nadir of the officer corps.

The author traces the impact of specialisation on individual careers in depth. Since the nineteenth century, Seaman Officers had been able to volunteer for specialisation training in a particular field such as gunnery, torpedoes, or navigation (other specialisations were added later). The requirements for officers with deeper training in these areas had grown to keep pace with increasingly technological equipment afloat and the need for officers in staffs ashore with adequate technical grounding. By the early 1920s, roughly half of the junior officers opted for specialist training. The various schools, particularly Excellent, home of the prestigious gunnery branch, played an active role in the future appointments and thus, careers, of their specialist trainees. The author observes that having command was not seen as essential for advancement. Instead, there was a perception that the road to flag rank was through specialization. Command of smaller warships up to destroyers was, therefore, dominated by non-specialists. For example, specialist officers in the Second World War and immediately afterwards, sometimes reached the rank of Captain before they were given a command. Examinations for command of a destroyer were introduced in 1921. Preparation was by self-study and recommendation by the officer’s captain was also required. Farquharson-Roberts observes that it was not until 1931 that prospective destroyer COs were required to receive tactical training. Interestingly, after 1930, specialist
officers who gained command of flotilla leaders or cruisers and above were required to do a tactical course. They did not, however, have to pass command examinations, presumably because qualified specialist department heads in large warships or on a flotilla staff had the required specialist background.

Between the wars, the Admiralty gradually accepted overall responsibility for managing officer careers. Until 1929, junior officer appointments had been handled entirely by civil servants in what the author terms “an impartial and arbitrary system.”(142) The creation of an embryo cell of serving officers responsible for overseeing junior officer appointments that year was the start of centralized career management oversight by the Admiralty. Until then, the system had involved a combination of patronage by senior officers, influence by the specialist schools, and efforts by officers themselves to secure positions they thought would advance their careers. An essential tool in tracking and ranking the performance of individual officers was the confidential report (known as the 206) rendered by the commanding officer. Numerical scoring in specific areas of performance was not introduced until 1931. Thus, innovation, along with establishing a “batch system” for officers eligible for promotion which ensured that they were being considered against others with similar seniorities, were major improvements in career management.

Farquharson-Roberts pays particular attention to promotion from the lower deck. There was steady resistance, largely class-based, to expanding this source of officers. He notes that in today’s Royal Navy, roughly 40 percent of officers started their careers on the lower deck (46), a truly impressive utilization of personnel resources. (Statistics for today’s Canadian Navy are not available, but reliable estimates place the percentage as under 10). The RN figure is achieved by a flexible system which employs some ex-lower deckers in areas where their technical background is suitable, while also qualifying others to take on broader responsibilities.

The key improvements in officer development during the 1930s, including a formal recognition that leadership had to be inculcated, reflected sustained attention by successive First Sea Lords. In 1932, an Admiralty Fleet Order stressed the importance of nurturing “officer-like qualities” and resulted in an emphasis on developing leadership in officer trainees. When war came in 1939, almost 90 percent of lieutenants would have been exposed to the improved training system. (153) The author makes several interesting observations about performance between 1939 and 45. He argues that the pre-war emphasis on specialisation resulted in too few officers
able to command ships up to destroyer size in a vastly expanded fleet. He also cites cases of burnout and excessive periods of time in command.

The officer corps was expanded during the Second World War by producing large numbers of officers who were intended to serve in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) only for the duration of the war. “The Royal Navy’s greatest achievement during the war was that it expanded its officer corps from 9,762 (excluding marines) in January 1939 to 57,682 by June 1943, but in so doing maintained the ethos of the original organisation; indeed it managed, in the modern idiom, to lift its game.”(197) Some writing about the prodigious expansion of the wartime RCN, through growing the RCNVR, has suggested that the wartime Canadian Navy somehow reflected a largely civilian ethos. The RCNVR members naturally reflected their recent civilian backgrounds, but they were functioning as part of a fighting organization with its own distinctive way of doing things. The author’s description of the wartime RN could apply equally well to the wartime RCN: “To repeat this important point, the RNVR produced junior officers, and they were inculcated into the navy to a surprising degree… They had been moulded by the navy and became part of the navy. Inevitably the navy had adapted to some degree to them, but the war was fought by the Royal Navy supported by the RNVR but within a Royal Naval structure.”(228) Farquharson-Roberts deals robustly with the argument that the Battle of the Atlantic was left largely to RNVR officers. He observes that while RNVRs were the bulk of the Navy’s junior officers—6,967, excluding the Fleet Air Arm, compared with 1,721 Royal Navy—leadership and command positions were predominately held by RN officers. (226)

The author claims that the growth of the RN was unprecedented, claiming that it was probably matched in history only by the expansion of the Roman navy during the First Punic War. This is followed by a general remark that the USN would manage a similar expansion and “certainly gained from the Royal Navy experience.”(197) In fact, the numbers of officers in the Canadian Navy grew from 650 in December 1939 to 6,621 in an expansion modelled on the British organizational system. It is surprising that a well-informed British writer is unaware of how a navy closely modelled on the Royal Navy grew exponentially to meet the demands of war. To be fair, Farquharson-Roberts’ topic is the Royal Navy, but a straight comparison with wartime growth of the RN is not valid for several reasons; the much wider scope of the requirements for officers in the Royal Navy for one, and the
reality that the RCN expansion was based in part on training in the UK and gaining sea experience in British warships. Nevertheless, his extensive 16-page bibliography does not include anything about Commonwealth navies.

The stiff US $90. price of Royal Naval Officers from War to War, 1918-1939 will, unfortunately, probably limit sales and availability to all but specialist libraries. It has also been produced in a compact, hardback format which means that the book does not lie flat for reading. The author’s own photographs documents, such as an official letter, an officer’s ledger or a sample 206, are so dark and stingy in size that they frustrate rather than enlighten the reader.

Mike Farquharson-Roberts quotes extensively from contemporary sources and his analyses of official records underpin a narrative rich in pertinent observations. Royal Naval Officers from War to War, 1918-1939 is an essential source of information about the professional development of the Royal Navy officers who fought the Second World War.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


This book provides a very different access to the lives of those who entered the Royal Navy to serve king and country from the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-48) to the years immediately after the fall of Napoleon. Employing private letters, memorials and petitions, Ellen Gill has added new depth and strong familial twist to the usual narrative delving into naval career and duty. We see a side of the officers that is seldom even hinted at in general surveys of the officer corps.

Gill organizes her book around the different recipients and purposes of the correspondence. She begins with spouses, partners and duty. Married officers had three allegiances, their wife, their ship and crew, and their country. A sense of duty called them to sea and kept them there, but the struggle between patriotic duty and the desire to return to the one they loved pulled sharply at most, creating anxiety, and at times, a crisis of dissatisfaction with the service. Gill’s evidence indicates both officers and their wives accepted the immediate primacy of the call to national duty, suggesting women felt a sense of fulfilled national service as they sent their husbands off to war and tended to their domestic life.
Family takes centre stage in the second chapter with a continued exploration of letters between sea officers and their wives and children. Separation and pending reunion were favourite topics and demonstrate the officers’ love of wife and family. The letters also reveal the men’s efforts to maintain their involvement in daily activities and decisions at home. Of particular note are the passages that demonstrate a common practice among officers to proffer supportive advice when their wives were pregnant and about to deliver. They appear to have sought out reading material and the opinion of ship surgeons on the subject, passing along any information they collected. Officers often arranged for shore based naval surgeons to provide care to their pregnant wives.

Chapter three focuses on ways the sons of officers (and other relatives) gained a berth aboard ship as a midshipman or officer’s servant, and the issue of patronage. This accepted means of entry into service, and the path to a career as an officer, was at its high point during the time period of the book, with the alternative, meritocracy, just beginning to eclipse this tradition. Gill explores letters of introduction by mothers as well and letters of encouragement and chastisement by fathers and patrons, noting that from salutation to closing, the words were crafted for maximum effect. That there were guidelines available for writing these letters is not surprising, for their outcome could start, make, or end a career. This chapter draws out the importance of social connections and the role played by wives and mothers in working this system.

The place of patronage and friendship among officers is discussed in chapter four. Patronage did not end with entry into the navy, it was essential for moving from midshipman to lieutenant to captain, and into ships where one’s “service” could yield advancement, prize money, and the notice of still more powerful patrons. Small offences could end a career, or make gaining patronage difficult. Patronage might also lead to friendships that could last a lifetime. Friendships between junior officers serving together certainly developed as well. Correspondence between friends reveals the personal side of captains, their interests, sense of humour, goals and concerns, such as a series of letters between Henry Hotham and Philip Broke. They stand in sharp contrast to the carefully constructed letters seeking a patron’s aid.

The next chapter examines the “women of war”, the wives of serving officers. Wives of naval officers bonded together, forming friendships, supporting each other in child rearing, domestic chores, and their separation from spouse. The letters between them allow a glimpse at their experience, from family dynamic
issues, to miscarriages, through marriage, illness and death. It is clear the women provided critical support and guidance for each other, a point Gill masterfully illustrates with a series of letters from Susan Middleton (wife of Captain Robert G. Middleton).

In the debate over the nature of the press gang, Gill chooses a course that takes the reader through the current perspectives accepting a middle position on the press gang’s treatment of the men it collected and people’s acceptance of the process. Chapter six wrestles with this topic and the seaman’s perspective on life afloat. In a series of letters from James Whitworth to his wife, he describes his experience in the British navy, unleashing his thoughts in a way that the author suggests, “would have been considered unacceptable, and possibly mutinous, if expressed verbally aboard ship.” (184) Letter writing provided lower deck seamen (like their officers) with an ongoing connection to their life outside the wooden walls.

The final chapter covers the use of petitions by seamen and their families to extract pensions and other forms of assistance from the Admiralty. The petitions of the mutineers at Spithead and the Nore, and those from Royal Dockyard workers dominate the chapter. When seeking assistance, the dockyard workers took care to note their loyalty as subjects/workers, but stressed their role as men with familial responsibilities. Books and pamphlets on how to craft petitions, and professional petition writers, were available to help the seeker obtain their desired end.

Besides exploring naval careers from these various perspectives, Gill includes a small number of military officers, as seen from the pages of their letters. This seems odd, given the book’s title and the predominance of naval references. She mentions the intent to have both in the text, but there is little interconnection between naval and military correspondents, though some comparison appears in the chapter on advancing of children into the service. It is a small concern and easily overlooked by the amount of insight gained through all the correspondence and personal writing covered in her volume.

Gill includes correspondence from some famous officers, such as Sir Philip-Bowes-Vere Broke, but otherwise shies away from those officers whose letters have been deeply dredged (Nelson, and Emma appear only in the introduction). Instead, she draws on less well-known correspondents, providing insights into the lives and families of the average officer. This choice is to be applauded since she has provided information that will be used by future researchers.

An appendix containing short biographical statements on 21 of the people whose correspondence
appears in the book adds a sense of completeness to their stories. The bibliography is very thorough, and a significant aid to those wishing to find Gill’s sources. She has touched on much of the traditional naval historiography. The four illustrations spread throughout the book are interesting and the index is very useful.

This book will be very helpful to those using personal correspondence as the basis of research, as her discussion in chapter one on the letter as historical document, and her own use of such material, are very strong. Those interested in the career of a naval officer and its interplay with his “land life” will find Gills’ work illuminating. It will also appeal to people studying broader aspects of gender roles, gender interaction and class issues within this period of time.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


This slim volume contains the memoirs of John Gillett, a Newfoundland swiler (seal hunter), fisherman, and advocate for traditional sealing rights. The book highlights Gillett’s career as a swiler, encompassing decisions on whether or not to hunt each year, piloting ships through ice packs, the seal hunts, selling the cargo, and dealing with increasing regulations.

As a memoir, the book adheres to a very conversational tone, with individual stories linked by connections in the teller’s memory between people and places, but following a roughly chronological order. Chapter one covers the childhood stories Gillett heard growing up, and encompasses oral traditions from as early at 1862. The next six chapters describe four sealing trips, two on his uncle’s large sealing vessel, the Arctic Endeavour, in the years 1961, 1971, 1972/1973, and 1974, respectively, in some depth.

The remaining chapters of the book are devoted to later seal hunting, increasing government regulation, and external pressure from animal rights groups to control the sealing industry, about which Gillett openly expresses frustration and concern. Overall, Gillett gives the most in-depth descriptions and accounts of the actual processes of seal hunting in two eras: the early 1970s, when he was employed on the Arctic Endeavour, and in the early 2000s, when he ran his own vessel, the Gillesport Hawk. This later block of accounts also describes the economic and mechanical concerns of running a vessel in the North Atlantic,
including detailed accounts of pelt prices and seasonal takings, as well as descriptions of the vessel repairs needed after foul weather and difficult sailing.

As an oral history, this book usefully shows the slang and specialist terms in use on Newfoundland swiler vessels, including various terms for ice varieties, seal species and ages, and items aboard ship. This book also holds interest for those looking for first-hand accounts of those affected by fishing and hunting regulations, and the views of those who oppose the current legislation. Most stories in this book are first-hand accounts by Gillett himself, supplemented by his log books or stories from other members of his community.

Writing from personal experience, the author does not tend to use academic references, but does note in the text when his accounts are supplemented by other sources. In addition, he includes personal photographs, original artwork, letters, and newspaper clippings. This material is used to greatest effect when he describes legal proceedings against him in 2007, when the opening date for the seal hunting season was changed unexpectedly. He uses documentary material from other swilers to support his (eventually successful) contention that the date was changed without his knowledge. This section serves as the crux of the theme of the second half.

Gillett does an excellent job of describing the logistics of captaining a seal-hunting vessel, offering a rich source of information on local terminology and contemporary attitudes towards the seal hunt from this time period and community. The text, however, can be rather dry in places when seal pelt prices and daily catch numbers overwhelm descriptions of day-to-day life on board.

The author’s aim, especially in the last chapter of the book, is to show the past and ongoing importance of the sealing industry in his own life and that of his community of Twillingate, Newfoundland. In this reviewer’s opinion, the book falls short of this goal by including only the seal hunts in the narrative. There is no sense of the impact of sealing on the North Atlantic communities, or how it fit into the community’s daily life as a source of livelihood. Although the author repeatedly states the importance of the seal hunt to “our culture and heritage,” the cultural connection was unfortunately missing for this reader. Read with local context and knowledge, the book provides a useful insight into the local attitude to seal hunting, but, like many memoirs, it would be enhanced by a deeper understanding of the fundamentals of the topic.

In summary, *Leaving for the Seal Hunt* is an easy, fast-paced read, based and arranged around John Gillett’s personal experiences. While sparse on descriptive detail due to
covering such a long swath of experiences, and in need of more context within the text itself, Gillett’s book provides an overarching look at the changes within the North Atlantic sealing community, and offers an insightful depiction of the problematic effects of greater regulation without community input. It is an excellent look at the frustrations and tensions that have developed between national regulatory agencies, activist groups, and local communities in the past fifty years.

Mara Deckinga
Grand Rapids, Michigan


The usual conception of the American Revolution is an interesting cross between mythmaking, on the one hand, and historical accuracy on the other. Generally, most accounts of the war centre on the story of how a group of colonial individuals, largely farmers and merchants, came together to stand up to the oppression of the British Empire. The struggle was a desperate one. Usually the pinnacle moment revolves around the 1781 British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown, where the great General Charles Cornwallis was forced to surrender to General George Washington. In the wake of this defeat, a political crisis in England led to negotiations and the final Peace Treaty in 1783. The rest, of course, is history. But that is not completely accurate; the war did not end immediately. In fact, fighting continued right up to the day the peace treaty was signed.

Don Glickstein, award-winning journalist and author, examines the post-Yorktown American experience. Through extensive research and careful analysis he presents a well-balanced argument that rather than ending the conflict, Yorktown just changed the nature of it. Within North America, the two years following the battle were characterized by hundreds of fights and skirmishes. While there were relatively few major engagements between Redcoats and the Continental Army, a virtual civil war arose between loyalists and revolutionaries which dominated the struggle in North America. The battlefield was not the Thirteen Colonies, however, it was worldwide. Aided by European powers and the greater conflict that spanned four continents, Britain’s final defeat was not solely an American victory.

Glickstein’s account is a fascinating merging of the colonial experience with the international struggle
against the British. Divided into 43 brief chapters that are concise and focused, the lively narrative easily captures the mind of the reader. The author skillfully grounds his discussion of the latter half of the revolution within the greater colonial experience addressing both sides of the conflict to produce a balanced account. In the process, he reminds us of the great interconnectivity of people within history. In this case, some of the names are famous in their own right, but not often remembered within the context of the American Revolution. Horatio Nelson, who later rose to great fame after defeating the French fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, stumbled during the Revolution as a junior officer failing to gain any victories. Eli Whitney, who went on to invent the cotton gin in 1794 and single-handedly saved slavery in the south, received some of the inspiration for his gin from an unlikely source, General Nathanael Greene’s wife, Caty.

In some cases it is both fascinating and not always pleasant to watch the mythology of American history break down. General Nathanael Greene is an excellent example. Often portrayed as a key figure of the Revolution, Greene fought throughout the war, never won a battle, and yet he had the confidence of Washington and many others. He was also linked to the Gaspee affair which helped propel the colonies towards war. His involvement, however, was not based on revolutionary passion but the result of illegal activity—it was his family that owned the smuggler seized by the customs schooner, Gaspee. The fact that he retained a good reputation despite his lacklustre performance is impressive, but also fits in with the prevailing mythology. Even Washington had his myth-making moments. Glickstein does not avoid the first President’s role in triggering the French-and-Indian War for example, one of the not-so-pleasant aspects of American history.

After Yorktown has many strengths that make it stand out, including a far better account of Native American involvement than most texts. It also relies heavily on both British and North American archival sources which forced the author to wrestle with the challenges of conflicting accounts and fragmented materials. Well researched and documented, the text provides a solid body of work for scholars and students. Unfortunately, factors beyond the author’s control limit the strength of the book. The sheer scale of the conflict makes an all-inclusive text impossible. For example, the role of the frontier in the American Revolution is not explored because it is an entire story in its own right. Likewise, the role of America’s Dutch allies or even the Hessians for the British, are not well discussed. Again, the scale of operations and
After Yorktown is definitely recommended for anyone fascinated in the early period of American history. It reveals just how tenuous the American Revolution really was. Grounded in the international conflicts of the day and solidly documented, this text is a must for any student of the Early Republic. In fact, anyone who enjoys a really well written book will appreciate Glickstein’s clear prose and skillfully crafted text.

Rob Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


I first met Barry Gough in 1964, when he was beginning his groundbreaking study of The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America: A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy, which would be published by UBC Press in 1971. A significant addition to the literature, it recorded naval activities in the northwest Pacific before the Royal Canadian Navy came into being, and provided more than a glimpse of British naval endeavours in the Pacific theatre before the First World War. Fifty-two years later he has expanded on that well received book, bringing to bear his own extensive work in the field, together with some new scholarship that has appeared in the intervening years. It is the kind of revision to their own work that few scholars undertake in their own lifetime.

Historians of the Royal Navy have not had much to say about the Pacific in the nineteenth century. In 1962 Gerald Graham and R.A. Humphreys produced, for the Navy Records Society, a collection of the correspondence generated by Commanders-in-Chief on the South American station from 1807-1823. Arthur Marder, in The Anatomy of British Sea Power, related problems in the Far East to the rise of navalism in the 1890s. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, in his biography of Earl Jellicoe, dealt in some detail with the British naval presence in China from 1897 to 1907. British naval activities east of Suez are recorded in some secondary sources, such as Send a Gunboat, a 1967 study of the gunboat as an instrument of British policy by Anthony Preston and John Major. In addition, Ross Gillet and Colin Jones have published useful histories of Australia’s colonial navies, but Barry Gough’s own books and articles now comprise the most complete study of
the Royal Navy in the northwest Pacific from 1812 to 1914.

Some observations are in order. Firstly, the Hudson Bay Archives, which Barry Gough consulted in the 1960s, as a graduate student in England, have since been transferred from London to Winnipeg; secondly, this edition incorporates his research for various significant articles over the past fifty years, and especially for two important books, *Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and West Coast Indians, 1846-1890* (UBC Press, 1984) and *Pax Britannica: Ruling the Waves and Keeping the Peace before Armageddon*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Barry Gough, in my view, is one of those scholars who have approached evidence which has been the subject of controversy with an open mind. His *Historical Dreadnoughts: Arthur Marder, Stephen Roskill and the Battles for Naval History* (Barnsley, 2010), and his interpretation of British naval history, reflects the mindset of those historians who are not slaves to the revisionists. They do not, as James Goldrick once observed, “... despise the efforts of predecessors or seek to detail their faults without granting equal exposure to their merits”. This point has been made exceptionally well by Matthew Seligman in *The International History Review* (Vol. 13, No.5, 2016).

As a former president (from 1987 to 1990) of the Canadian Nautical Research Society, Barry Gough has a warm attachment to this journal, and we now have an opportunity to reciprocate that feeling. I strongly recommend this book to your attention: it fills large gaps in the literature, and it brings together the wide range of scholarship that has a bearing on nineteenth century naval activities in the Pacific.

W.A.B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


By the early years of the twentieth century, the Canadian Pacific Railway company (CPR) had evolved into what we would consider a modern transportation system. From the Far East across the Pacific, the company’s white “Empress” liners connected to the western rail terminus in Vancouver, then crossed the Canadian land mass and on to the Atlantic, where other “Empress” liners ran scheduled services to Britain. In addition, the company operated ferry and freight services in coastal British Columbian waters. In
effect, the CPR was what today would be called an integrated transportation company and for many years, it went unchallenged.

Competition for the CPR began in 1899 with the formation of the Canadian Northern Railway (CNoR). In 1903, the Grand Trunk Pacific (GTP)—a subsidiary of the Grand Trunk Railway based in Eastern Canada—became the second competitor. Both ventures were strongly supported and encouraged by the federal and western provincial governments which had become outraged by the protectionist, anti-competitive behaviour of the CPR and its pricing policies affecting western farmers. Both new railways also acquired shipping arms to compete with the CPR especially on the coast of British Columbia. In 1923, both companies were eventually absorbed into the newly formed Canadian National Railway in 1923.

How these short-lived marine branches were acquired, operated and met their eventual demise is the basis for this book.

The author starts out with a comprehensive survey of the key players in the maritime trade to Canada during the early years of the twentieth century. As he points out, the timing of the entry of the Grand Trunk Pacific into the coastal freight and passenger trade was not auspicious as the region was already well if not over-served by a multitude of established Canadian companies. In addition, there was the formidable Alaska Steamship Company. In the East, the Canadian Northern would have to compete in the trans-Atlantic trade with the likes of Cunard, White Star and other well-known British and European shipping companies as well as the Atlantic “Empresses” of the CPR.

Three chapters are devoted to a detailed history of the principal companies that were absorbed into, created or acquired by the Grand Trunk Pacific Steamship Company during its formative years. It is fascinating to read of the wild exploits that some of the company’s intrepid mariners undertook in the tugboats and stern-wheelers working the Skeena and upper Fraser Rivers. Guay also gives a detailed look at the company’s express service, established in 1910 with two new “Prince” ships, between Vancouver, Victoria, Seattle and Prince Rupert and other northern ports. One is frequently reminded of just how essential the coastal shipping services were to the isolated towns and settlements on the BC coast.

The second half of the book focuses primarily on the marine arms of the Canadian Northern, which ventured into scheduled passenger service on the North Atlantic run in 1910 with its ‘Royal Line’ ships. It, too, assimilated a variety of other steamship lines involved in the trans-Atlantic trade. The author covers this period in considerable detail. There
some surprises—at least for this reviewer—in that Canadian Northern Steamships operated their passenger service from the UK out of the port of Bristol. This seems a somewhat unusual choice, but given the protectionist nature of the North Atlantic Liner conferences, it could have been that Liverpool, Glasgow, Belfast or Southampton were off limits to an upstart. That the service was quite luxurious—and on a par with its contemporaries—is indicated by a sample dinner menu reproduced in the book. The ships in this service were requisitioned by the British Admiralty for war service in 1914.

Guay discusses the extensive operations of the Canadian Northern in the coastal and inland waters of British Columbia, including a double-ended railcar ferry operating between the mainland and Vancouver Island. It also covers the extensive tug and towing operations in the province as well as the surprisingly extensive shipping activities on the Great Lakes system in the east. The scope is remarkably comprehensive.

This is not a book to attempt to digest in one or two sittings. The level of detail is quite astonishing and obviously reflects an enormous research effort on the part of the author. There are voluminous tables, mostly at the end of each chapter, which detail the principal characteristics of each vessel in the respective fleets. They list the established shipping companies engaged in the regions against which the two new entrants began to compete. In this reviewer’s opinion, the inclusion of some companies on the trans-Atlantic trade is a bit of a stretch (for example, Manchester Liners which the author insists on calling Manchester Lines; once my employer for a brief period!) since they did not compete in the primary passenger trade. These tables can be distracting and they would have been better placed together in an Appendix.

The book is not an especially easy read, although profusely and intelligently illustrated with photographs, maps and diagrams. The style is not conducive to an informative flow despite the wealth of interesting information. This is unfortunate since the author has made a major contribution to an overlooked part of Canadian maritime history and he deserves credit for that.

Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario

While conducting research for another project, Gill Hoffs found accounts of the American sailing vessel *William and Mary* and the spurious tale surrounding the loss of the ship and her passengers; some two hundred European immigrants. The *William and Mary* was one of many ships cashing in on the lucrative immigration trade, but after departing England in 1853 and making their way across the Atlantic, the captain and crew encountered severe weather and found themselves in dire straits on reaching the Bahamas. Fearing the worst, the captain and crew murdered at least two of the passengers and abandoned the others to their fate in an effort to save their own lives. Intrigued by the story, the author set out to create a work that not only documented the events of the voyage, but gave voice and justice to those left abandoned on the high seas, and credit to the Bahamian wreckers who risked their own lives, and profits, to save them. At the same time, Hoffs sought to bring to light the crimes of Captain Timothy Stinson and his crew.

A preface followed by twelve chapters presents the entire saga in chronological order. The preface provides an excellent overview of the work, and a compelling reason why anybody should read this work. The first chapter is an interesting and in-depth discussion about the plight of Europe's poor, described in great detail from both a macro and micro point of view. It explains why so many Europeans would dare leave their homes and head to unseen places in North America, and even Australia. In the decade before 1853, millions suffered as crop blights, famine, and subsequent diseases ravaged the impoverished populations of Europe. This deadly time also came on the heels of the Industrial Revolution where whole villages crowded into city tenements seeking work in mills and factories. With increasingly limited opportunities in Europe, many of those most affected sought a living elsewhere. The subsequent chapters reveal the hopes, dreams, troubles, and horrors faced by those who embarked on the *William and Mary'*s unfortunate voyage. Hoff’s book is well organized with an easy-flowing narrative that could also serve as a case study of the wave of European emigration at the time and its effect on countries elsewhere.

One reason why this story is such an intriguing read is Hoffs’s excellent research and use of primary information. She incorporates all manner of sources including newspaper articles, eye-witness accounts, obituaries, diaries, and official reports to present the entire story. Quite often, this reader found himself engulfed in the plight of the immigrants, their sufferings aboard the ship, their abandonment and eventual rescue.
While the extensive use of so many sources revealed a story that needed to be told, it occasionally feels as if Hoffs simply pieced together an extraordinarily long series of quotes and created a book by inserting connecting paraphrased passages of her own words. This reader found the text over-full of in-text quotes and extensively long block quotes, but others may feel differently. If fact, the final story of human desperation, depravity, and kindness is so powerful, the author can be forgiven the excessive references.

Despite growing up on the coast of Scotland, Gill Hoffs’ background is not particularly maritime. She earned a BSc in psychology and worked with children with special needs but wrote several award-winning pieces on maritime history out of a deep personal interest. In this book, I believe Hoffs has succeeded in telling a story for those who were not able to tell it themselves: those poor Dutch, German, and Irish immigrants who risked their lives fighting against deadly seas and a murderous ship’s captain and crew. Again, regardless of the excessive use of citations and lengthy quotes, this book should be useful to anybody interested in general maritime history, the Bahamian wrecking industry, and European immigration to North America in the 1850s.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida


Dutch overseas history in early modern times is more than the Dutch East India Company and its all important shipping and trade, or its settlements all over Asia and in Cape Town. Dutch historian Wim Klooster (Clark University, MA) takes us along to another part of Dutch overseas enterprise. While not unknown, Dutch Atlantic expansion has not previously been analyzed and described in such a comprehensive and detailed way. *The Dutch Moment* deals with war, trade and settlement in the Atlantic world from the 1620s into the 1670s. At the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce in 1621, the West India Company (WIC) was founded, primarily as a war machine against the Iberians in the Atlantic area and in South America. In 1623, the Dutch developed a Grand Design to send two fleets to conquer Salvador da Bahía, the sugar district in Brazil, and Luanda in Angola for slaves. Sugar would then become available as trading commodity, thereby making the WIC the dominant commercial force in the Atlantic. War against the Iberians was preferred over trade.
This story with all its defeats and victories has been described before, but Klooster puts it in the perspective of three stages: the unleashed lion, imperial expansion, and imperial decline. The Grand Design had already failed in 1625, though Portuguese and Spanish losses at sea were heavy, particularly the loss of the Silver Fleet in 1628. The imperial expansion came later and reached its peak in the 1630s with the conquest of Pernambuco in North East Brazil, and Luanda where sugar plantations were started. The Portuguese resurrection in 1645 marked the beginning of the WIC’s demise as an overseas political and military power, formalized in the total surrender in Brazil of 1654. The company ended up without a plantation empire, without sugar, without its own slave trade, and without financial returns. It was dependent on subsidies from the States General in Holland.

This history is only a part, though a substantial one, of the book’s first three chapters. The WIC and private entrepreneurs were also active in other areas of the Atlantic: in the settlements along the North-American east coast, on the Caribbean islands (occupying Curacao in 1634), and in West Africa. Multiple stories about military operations are presented.

The other four chapters are more innovative, dealing with various aspects connected with the impact of the Dutch effort to build an Atlantic empire: from relations with the Amerindians, slavery, conversions, religious ministers, tolerance, Dutch application of violence, defection, the immigration of Jews and other Europeans and so on. The WIC possessed a military force larger than any other country in the Atlantic. It was, however, unable to cope with all its related problems, such as shortage of food and lack of money to pay its men. The author sketches a gloomy picture of defecting, starving and unpaid seamen and soldiers, many of whom claimed their wages in vain back in Holland. The chronic lack of money was always at the heart of the organization.

The WIC settlements never managed to attract sufficient Dutch colonists, not even in North America. White women were always in high demand. Unlike in England, convicts were never transported to the West, and only a few small groups of orphans were sent. Many Dutch settlements did not produce sufficient foodstuffs for their inhabitants. In this context, Klooster mentions the role of the rather unknown comforters of the sick next to the religious ministers. The settlements in Brazil and elsewhere, particularly later in the Guyanas, were often populated by groups of Jews from Amsterdam, who had fled from Portugal. The first synagogue in the Western Hemisphere was built at Recife in 1636. Klooster also discusses Dutch relations with the
Amerindians, the native neighbours of their settlements. He remarks that in these contacts, as with other overseas Europeans as well, violence was the ultimate expression of what it meant to be Dutch in a religious and cultural sense. In religious affairs, Roman Catholics and Lutherans were tolerated, but for the Dutch, tolerance meant coping with religious diversity, not fostering it.

Their failure to establish an Atlantic empire did not hamper the Dutch from becoming masters of trade during the 1650s and into the 1670s. Their ships crisscrossed the Atlantic Ocean and traded with nearly all territories, the Spanish included. The author provides us with many details about the tricks applied to supply Spanish settlements and to carry away their commodities. A simple but basic trick was to name the ships after a Roman Catholic saint. The English Act of Navigation, French mercantilism, and successful raids by the French navy finally curtailed the Dutch freedom of trade and shipping very severely. By the end of the 1670s the Dutch moment was over. The Dutch had to abandon most of their trade with foreign American colonies, restricting themselves to the few territories in the Caribbean and in West Africa that still could show the Dutch flag. Curaçao became a staple market for slaves.

Klooster has to be complimented on his very thorough research for this book. The most obscure or the most recent publication did not escape his attention. He has also used a massive variety of archival sources, pamphlets and newspapers, reflected not only in a book full of panoramic views, but also in many colourful details —perhaps too many as the author hops from one settlement to another. Of the book’s 419 pages, 133 are for the notes. A more efficient system of reference would have made this material more accessible. Despite a few illustrations of poor quality, the book is nevertheless, strongly recommended.

Jaap R. Bruijn
Leiden, The Netherlands


*Commonwealth Cruisers* is a most necessary work, because it treats the navies of Britain and the Dominions as if they were one navy, which in many ways they were. Officers, ships, and training were not only interchangeable but often were exchanged. Allowing all Commonwealth naval personnel to gain more experience, as well as enabling the
navies to achieve economies of scale in purchase and deployment ability, really helped Britain meet the defensive needs of Empire. Furthermore, in an era of treaty limitation on construction tonnage, the ‘independent’ dominions qualified for their own tonnage, allowing to an extent for a larger overall force to be constructed. Konstam presents all this in a small book with an eloquent, almost laconic, style that allows readers to absorb the information virtually at their own pace; the book suits either a fast or a slow read.

The structure of the book helps set the pace. The author first explains the Dominion navies, their situations, their realities; while the British Royal Navy is not the focus, it is always a presence. The focus is the Commonwealth, unlike some of Konstam’s other work (also published by Osprey, and also worth a read) *British Light Cruisers 1939-45*. It provides an alternative for readers interested in this period (who might be more used to reading about the Royal Navy, the US Navy or the Imperial Japanese Navy) with an invaluable insight and introduction to three very distinct navies of the period that had a real impact on world events. It starts with the Royal Canadian Navy, a force which became the fifth largest fleet in the world by the end of the Second World War, yet would never have a battleship, and only operated two cruisers. In contrast, the far smaller Royal New Zealand Navy (which started as the New Zealand Naval Division) operated three battlecruisers during this uncertain period, and the Royal Australian Navy, seven.

For all these navies, cruisers were their big capital ships, these were fleets that were largely based around destroyers (the RAN and RCN Tribal class vessels would see extensive use in quasi-cruiser roles), escort carriers, the few light carriers and cruisers they had were the prestigious major fleet units. This affected how they were used, and the prestige attached to their service, potential loss and actual loss. Konstam examines this, in the level of detail which Osprey books are known for, he has also worked to make sure every page has either a tip bit of ‘human interest’ or ‘ship interest’; the sort of things which provide the answers to tie-breakers in class quizzes. What is more is that this book also includes a large chunk of Second World War history, making it a book not only for those interested in warships, the politics of procurement and struggles of nascent navies, but also for those who are interested generally in the history of the Second War.

This is most definitely true of the illustrations, which are a lively and stimulating mix of original photographs, and vivid paintings—none more so than the front cover, which is a highly evocative picture of the modified *Leander* (*Perth* class).
HMAS *Perth* fighting at night in the Sundra Strait (1942), which is repeated with caption on p.43. There is also a cutaway drawing plus many illustrations. Illustrator Paul Wright has done both Konstam and the reader a great service with a very fine hand. All of this combines to provide an above-standard work, even by Osprey’s reliably high quality reputation.

Unfortunately, even though the bibliography cites several excellent authors and their works, academic readers will have a problem with Osprey’s lack of footnotes. While *Commonwealth Cruisers 1939-45* serves as a good entry point and an attractive, quick reference, it does not offer an academic chain of evidence to supplement and nuance the factual data presented. This may be nit-picking, however, for most scholarly researchers would not expect an Osprey book to do more than offer a solid overview of a topic, bibliographies that enhance a researcher’s own reading list, and an ability to quickly check the context of something before diving in deeper.

With that in mind, this work is most definitely a must-read for both the hobbyist and the academic. Everyone who reads it will most certainly come away knowing something they didn’t know before they picked up the book.

Alex Clarke
Epsom, Surrey


This book examines a group of 17 midshipmen and master’s mates who were on board the 46- gun HMS *Indefatigable*, under the command of Edward Pellew, in the two months centred around the *Indefatigable*’s impressive defeat of the French 74 *Droits de L’Homme*, on 13 January 1797. They would have been the companions of the fictional Horatio Hornblower, when Forrester had him serving in the *Indefatigable*. The stories of the individuals (including Pellew’s) are separated and parceled into chapters which deal with specific topics (such as, patronage, education and interpersonal relationships). This type of research is a critical component in the pursuit of the larger picture of life (and career) in the British Navy, during the long eighteenth century.

The authors selected 17 men for whom enough biographic information and some correspondence existed, from which their stories could be fleshed out. Although the information is thin for many of the men, the authors weave these slender threads
into rich descriptions of their lives, giving us insight into the naval career of the average officer, most of whom history would otherwise forget. The small sample is warranted by the time taken to research and write the stories of people who left little evidence behind them. The restricted time period was chosen to focus on a group of young men who had lived and worked together during that important phase of their naval development, as midshipmen and master’s mates. The battle with Droits de L’Homme is a high point in Pellew’s (later Lord Exmouth) career as a frigate captain. His power as patron and his reputation as a great officer make him an ideal fulcrum, around which the other stories are posed.

In the first chapter, the authors place Pellew within his own historiography, preferring S. Taylor’s Commander: The Life and Exploits of Britain’s Greatest Frigate Captain (London, 2012) as a basis for their central character. Pellew is portrayed as intelligent, individualistic, determined bordering on stubborn, a man who was able to forgive and move on, a devoted husband, and a father-like figure for those who served under him, even long after they left his service.

Indefatigable takes centre stage in chapter two. Originally designed as a 64-gun ship it was converted to a rasée frigate by cutting away the original forecastle and quarter deck, making it a heavy frigate, carrying more guns and significantly more weight of shot than most frigates of the day. The ship became Pellew’s favourite vessel, never to be replaced, which made it particularly difficult to leave it in 1799. Chapter 3 deals with how the group of 17 young men came to be on Indefatigable. Ten had come to the ship with Pellew, having been in one or both of his previous two commands. The other seven entered the ship while Pellew was Captain. Many had previous service in merchant ships.

Chapter 4 covers the engagement with Droits de L’Homme, when Indefatigable and its consort, the 36 gun Amazon, intercepted the French ship returning to France after the failed assault on Ireland. Rough seas prevented the Droits de L’Homme from opening its lower gunport, thus reducing its broadside. That handicap, and the presence of a large number of troops being carried home, encouraged the captain to run for port. Indefatigable and Amazon assumed positions that allowed them to hit the French ship, while it could return little fire. In the end, with the aid of a storm and night’s darkness, Indefatigable ran Droits de L’Homme ashore. The victory (though the Amazon was lost ashore as well) received great praise in Britain, adding to Pellew’s status.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 deal with patronage, development of the core group as officers, Pellew’s method
of training his officers, and the promotion of his protégés, respectively. Here the narratives of the 17 young men take centre stage. Describing their entry into and progress through the navy, the authors effectively illustrate the various themes raised in each chapter.

The sections on patronage and education stand out. Patronage is clearly evident in Pellew’s transfer of ten men from his previous ships into *Indefatigable*. The chapter dedicated to the subject provides well fleshed-out examples of patronage, but it reappears in other chapters where Pellew uses his influence again and again to keep a group of followers together (as best he can), and promote them into positions where they can flourish and be noticed by more powerful patrons. Like the prototypical naval patron, Pellew also takes on new clients (of friends, family and acquaintances from Falmouth) as he is asked.

The discussion of how Pellew developed his junior officers showcases his strength as a leader and developer of his subordinates. In the various individual narratives, we see Pellew moving the midshipman and master’s mates back and forth, from one position to the other, even making them able seamen for a time, and then promoting them to either acting-lieutenant, or acting-master, as opportunity allowed. He gave these young men the range of experience necessary to expertly sail and command a ship. In an age when names appeared in ships’ musters while the person resided ashore, in order to reduce time at sea before qualifying for their lieutenant exams, and the dark threat of that tradition on ability, Pellow’s method of rotating experiences is a piece of brilliance. These two areas, patronage and education, are the strongest elements of this book and its most significant contribution to our knowledge of leadership afloat.

The everlasting interpersonal web of relationships proposed in chapter 9 are not entirely convincing. Certainly some of the men may have continued their relationships with each other, and Pellew clearly continued to correspond with, and act to improve the lot of, these men across the rest of his life. But, since not everyone wrote to everyone else as is suggested (180), the evidence is not there.

What is the place of Hornblower in all this? As the title suggests, Hornblower is conjured out of fiction and placed into the real world occupied by these men. It is a ‘what if’ in some ways, a brush with historical fiction, demonstrating the authors’ deep appreciation for Forrester’s knowledge of life afloat and his hero, Hornblower. It does not add significantly to the book.

The volume includes ten illustrations of various people and places mentioned in the text. There is
an appendix, which contains the letters between Pellew and Lord Spencer (First Lord of the Admiralty) when Pellew was ordered to move from *Indefatigable*, at the beginning of 1799. He wanted to take a large number of people with him, but Lord Spencer refused. The exchange is not flattering to Pellew, who appears to whine in his last letter to the First Lord. Footnotes are ample and helpful throughout. The bibliography is thorough and provides good access to the new archival material presented in the book. The index is clear and useful.

Heather Noel-Smith and Lorna M. Campbell have written a very important and useful study of a group of young man entering the world of warrant or commissioned officer, in the British Navy of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War period. It will serve well as a map for other studies of the development and careers of the junior officers. This book will appeal to those with a general interest in the British Navy of the era, and those more focused on naval education, patronage, and the life and influence of Lord Exmouth.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


The American Navy may sail on water, but in reality, it floats on the whims of Congress and a succession of U.S. presidents. This is the theme of Paul Pedisich’s studious examination of American naval power during the post-reconstruction era through the First World War. The national purpose of sustaining a naval force significantly evolved over the 40-year period of the author’s core theme.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, the navy was left with few ships, most of which had deteriorating wooden hulls propelled partly by sail and partly by steam, and obviously outdated by the world’s maritime technological standards. Added to this predicament, the navy had too many officers on its payroll who were reluctant to retire. America’s naval capabilities ranked poorly among the nations of the world and there was little countrywide incentive to project American sea power beyond protecting the nation’s coasts and merchant vessels within littoral waters. A series of presidents, senators, house members and secretaries of the navy often used their political offices to acquire lucrative contracts for their constituents to gain re-election approval. Many politicians or
businessmen were appointed to leadership roles, but most lacked any background in naval affairs. Finally, America’s great industrial barons were emerging, eager to furnish the needs of the navy, sometimes for unwarranted profits.

Each chapter generally starts with a brief biography of a new president, his naval agenda (if any) and his relationship with powerful congressmen of that time and progressed to the secretaries of the navy, and finally how senior naval officers influenced events. The large cast of characters and events are reminiscent of Dickens’s *Nicholas Nickleby* or Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*. The first real attempt at modernization was the authorization and building of the so-called ABCD vessels (the *Atlanta*, *Boston*, *Chicago* and *Dolphin*) in the 1880s. Unfortunately, the ships were considered obsolete before they were even launched. In 1890 came the publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* where he put forth a world view implying the interconnection of status with naval power, and outlined several strategies for the most efficient use of naval forces.

Influential congressmen, such as South Carolina’s Benjamin “Pitchfork” Tillman, managed to keep naval bases and ship yards in his state. Navy Secretary Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama, one of several men called “Father of the New Navy,” established his home state as a crucial supplier of armour plate. Congress, however, set a low ceiling price the government would pay for armour plate over several years, thus controlling the design and number of vessels that could be built. Up to roughly the 1890s, the United States Navy largely consisted of small ships, such as torpedo boats and rams, along with commercial vessels converted to carry guns. Politicians debated whether the ships should be built and maintained in federal navy yards or private facilities. This was the time when naval engineers and staff officers battled for recognition and equality with line officers as the requirements of ship-manning and naval planning burgeoned. Merchant mariners and even longshoremen were recruited to supplement the navy as it expanded into the twentieth century. The latter order occurred via a message from President Taft on 7 December 1911. One obscure factoid is how General Order No. 99, the prohibition of liquor onboard all Navy vessels, was accompanied by four pages of explanation. Illuminating these and other facts, Pedisich lucidly narrates the influence of George Meyer, William McAdoo, William Moody, and the Senators Lodge (John D. and Henry Cabot) plus Admirals George Dewey and Stephen Luce among many others.

The most engaging chapters involve the administrations of William McKinley, Theodore
Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson. This was the advent of the modern navy participating in the Spanish American War (1898) and the First World War I (1914-18). Arguably, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Vice President and President Teddy Roosevelt had the strongest effect.

*Congress Buys a Navy* successfully focuses on the role of politics on the evolution of the United States Navy. What are missing, however, are the political drivers of naval readiness, as well as the role of technological advances in the navy’s progression. These include the change of fuel from coal to oil which decreased the need for colliers and worldwide coaling stations; advances in naval gunnery which led to increasing accuracy and damage per round; improvements in armour, propulsion and ship design; innovative tactics involving torpedoes and aviation for long-range scouting and ultimately, effective offensive weapons; and finally, electronic communications between ships allowing rapid coordination of offensive and defensive manoeuvres within a fleet.

*Congress Buys a Navy* is an excellent work that covers the politics behind a nation that had just suffered a huge loss of life from the Civil War, subsequent regional animosities, reconstruction that fostered corruption, an economic recession and a period of weak leadership and cronyism. The navy sprouted and shriveled during the administrations of seven presidents, twenty congresses, dozens of secretaries of the navy (Roosevelt alone had six). This, and the ever-changing press of foreign powers makes fascinating reading. *1881-1921* was an important juncture in American history that relates to the development of its naval officer hierarchy, naval fleet and reserves as well as its relation to America’s merchant marine. Pedisich’s well written but succinct work addresses a sphere of maritime history that is often neglected; it is a book that deserves a place in any historian’s library.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


This is a book about the little ships of the RN’s war, the ‘Dog Boats’, or the D class MTBs and MGBs. Their role is often overlooked, but just as crucial as many larger vessels. There was not a scrap of water in the European Theatre of war that these
boats did not traverse; evidenced by the titles used for the 11 main body chapters and underscored by the foreword written by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin: “Early responsibility, small close-knit crews, the chance to get to grips with the enemy... What little those of use serving in destroyers and bigger ships heard of their dramatic deeds filled us, young as we were, with envy.” (vi)

Reynolds extolls the history of the Dog Boats in an absorbing tapestry of interwoven big-picture events and personal stories that brings to life this corner of the Second World War. There are beautifully drawn diagrams, a plethora of pictures which allow the reader to glimpse all aspects and levels of life on these boats. The book may be printed in grey tones, but it is certainly not grey in timbre, maintaining a useful academic standard and a simple, logical structure that guides the reader from the preconception of the Dog Boats to their eventual redundancy and slide into obscurity at the end of the war. Built as a “power pack within the confines of thin plywood” (9) these ships weren’t meant to last, and they certainly weren’t preserved. Out of 228 boats built, only 42 were lost in combat, and even though a few were sold as houseboats, none have survived. (257,274)

During their short lives, these boats earned their keep. For a craft which would be so well used by the Royal Navy, the very first flotilla was allocated to the Royal Norwegian Navy. They were very successful, despite an unusual hazard for a stealth vessel; “Occasionally, boats were faced with the dilemma of local fishermen coming alongside! The policy was to be as nice as possible to them, invite them on board, serve them coffee and food and impress upon them that what they had seen and heard should not be mentioned to anybody. Quite often the visitors provided useful information on the German coastal activities. In some cases there were even touching meetings between MTB crew members and men from their own families.” (35) Norway’s choice of crews experienced in inshore waters meant they could often get their camouflaged boats close to crucial ports and hide, sometimes for days, lying in wait for the big target. In one case, MTBs 626 and 620, spent two days not far from Bergen with a German airbase close by, before sinking the SS Altenfels, carrying 8,000 tons of iron ore, and damaging the ‘M’ class minesweeper that was escorting her. (39) Interaction with civilians and daring feats of courage were not confined to Norway, however.

Britain’s wider Home Waters ‘theatre’ was of massive importance, and Dog Boats were employed extensively on both defensive and offensive operations—although the
presence of radar-directed shore batteries made it necessary to employ very different tactics. Boats in this area were often asked to allow war correspondents to accompany them—ensuring the survival of another, often florid, perspective on their war.

For example, an American reporter who went to sea with MTB 628 on the 24/25 July, described the action: “The moon, the convoy and the intruding flotilla all met at the same time. Through a rift in the clouds the skipper picked out four flak trawlers and ‘something big’—the convoy had been sighted.... Suddenly night became day” (75); no comparison with the official description on the same page, “During the night of 24/25 July, Light Coastal Forces under the command of Lt W.S. Strang RNVR encountered a heavily escorted enemy convoy of Texel.” Such contrast adds so much to the reader’s enjoyment of the book, and the information that can be gained.

Reynolds writes well, interweaving details that, instead of distracting the reader, actually focus on the events at hand, making the book both readable, and still academic.

Alex Clarke
Epsom, Surrey


Readers will be aware of the events of 7 December 1941 at America’s Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the airfields on Oahu Island in the Hawaiian chain in the central Pacific, FDR’s “date that will live in infamy.” On that day, Japanese carrier aircraft crippled the USN’s Pacific Fleet and Army and Navy Airforces as the opening shot of an advance into American, British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia, thereby extending the war they had already been fighting in China since 1937.

Few events in America history have generated as much controversy. That people still argue about this attack shows the depth of feeling that has grown up about it. But why do we need another book about it, even though 2016 was the 75th anniversary of the attack? Perhaps the answer lies in the title of this book. Although yet another book about Pearl Harbor, this one is presented in two parts, “Catastrophe”, which describes the events leading up to the attack in chronological order and “Consequence”, which covers the various recriminations and inquiries afterwards. Its second part deals primarily with attempts by Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the C-in-C of
the USN’s Pacific Fleet, to clear his name following the verdict of Justice Roberts’ Commission in the immediate aftermath of the attack that Kimmel and Army Commander Lt. Gen. Walter Short, were guilty of “dereliction of duty” in not heeding the war warnings they received to defend Hawaii.

It is important, however, to be aware of how this verdict was subsequently modified. Both commanders fought long campaigns to clear their names after being coerced into early retirement following the Commission’s verdict. In many respects, the Commission had been a hasty affair, but America was at war and needed a clear-cut decision on who was responsible. Both Kimmel and Short were replaced immediately. While it was possible to replace the immediate commanders in wartime (and selecting Chester Nimitz to replace Kimmel proved to be a masterstroke), the replacement of the President, his Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff was less likely, especially in the dark days of early 1942 when the Allies faced one problem after another, and not just in the Far East. Clearly, the Commission did what it set out to do, which was to find someone to blame.

Attempts by Kimmel and Short to clear their names started soon after, initially by requesting a full Court Martial. Efforts grew following the death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the end of the Pacific War, when it was felt that there was an opportunity to review the verdict, especially as wartime secrets about code-breaking could now be revealed. As other information was beginning to leak out, a Joint Congressional Committee was appointed in 1945/46 to reinvestigate the attack.

After seven months of deliberations and countless witnesses (including six days of testimony by Kimmel himself), it concluded that FDR and his Ministers were blameless, but some of the senior Army and Navy Commanders had failed to give proper consideration to the MAGIC decrypts of the Japanese diplomatic code messages and Kimmel and Short, although not guilty of “dereliction of duty”, had still made “errors of judgement.” This partial vindication did not satisfy Kimmel and he fought on, determined to obtain the release of all information that he felt had previously been concealed. Short died in 1949, but Kimmel campaigned until his death in 1968, when relatives and friends continued to keep the campaign alive.

Over the years, the revisionist approach that FDR and his ministers were really to blame grew stronger, fuelled by the conspiracy theorists, a notable example being John Toland’s *Infamy – Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath* (1982), though some aspects of his conclusions have subsequently been challenged.

Finally, it seemed that the work of Kimmel’s family would pay off
despite repeated rejections by various Secretaries of the Navy and Defence and Presidents as well, when a group of influential Senators led by Sen. Strom Thurmond agreed to raise the matter in 1995. Under Secretary of Defence Edwin Dorn was assigned to carry out a review on behalf of the Dept. of Defence independent of the Navy and Army Departments. The result was not exactly what Kimmel would have wanted. It supported the earlier conclusion that responsibility should not fall solely on Kimmel and Short but should be broadly shared with the Chiefs of Staff and other Washington officers. It did not name them, though a report by Maj. Henry Clausen for Sec. of War Stimson in 1944/45 had actually named 14 men (including FDR) who had varying degrees of responsibility. As Commanders, Kimmel and Short were still accountable for the lack of readiness, but only to the extent of “errors of judgement” and not “dereliction of duty”, hence their wartime rank should not be reinstated. Vice-Adm. D.C. Richardson produced a very detailed rebuttal of this on behalf of Kimmel’s family in 1997. This rebuttal raises a number of doubts about the extent of Dorn’s investigation and conclusions. But it took until 1999 for the matter of rank to be raised again and for the House to vote 52:47 in favour. Still both Presidents Clinton and Bush dallied. This is where the matter of rank and responsibility still stands, though the campaign has continued. In 2001 the National Parks Service, responsible for the Arizona Memorial, organized a symposium at which both sides argued their case.

In terms of public perception, however, the two original guilty parties had finally come to be seen as “scapegoats”, albeit not entirely innocent ones. Even if they were partly innocent, some guilt had to rest elsewhere, as Clausen had shown. Since 1999/2000 there have been further revisionist volumes which lay the blame more firmly in Washington and particularly on FDR and his Ministers who had earlier been exonerated, as well as on the senior Admirals and Generals who had been partly blamed. These volumes include Robert Stinnett’s Day of Deceit (2000) and Michael Gannon’s Pearl Harbor Betrayed (2002). These writers (among several others) contend that there was such a wealth of evidence of a Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor that the local commanders should have been given this specific tactical information and not just vague strategic war warnings that did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor. But other writers pointed out that Kimmel and Short must still bear a measure of responsibility for the lack of proper reconnaissance and preparedness and for failing to change the culture of Pearl Harbor as a relaxed and comfortable posting. So now there was a post-revisionist view as well.
With such opposed views being aired, it is not surprising that the reinstatement of Kimmel’s rank has still not been decided. Meanwhile, to his family, it had become “a matter of honour”.

Every new book about Pearl Harbor claims to be based on new research and unseen archive material, but after 75 years, is there any archival material left unseen? There has long been a feeling that not all of the information available has been released into the public domain which is what has fuelled the conspiracy theories. But given that all of the principal characters are long dead, and even the youngest of the sailors present during the attack are now over ninety-years-old, new testimony is unlikely. It was for this very reason that the USN’s former Asiatic Fleet Commander, Adm. Thomas Hart, was appointed in February 1944. He was to obtain, in secret, testimonies from survivors of the attack and Washington staff and politicians while they were still alive, in case it was needed during any future post-war inquiry. Unfortunately, not all the characters agreed to be interviewed and the number of Washington interviewees was small. There is also the evidence of Capt. Laurence Safford, in charge of code breaking in 1941, who informed Kimmel and Hart (at no small risk to his career) that when he checked for information on MAGIC sometime after the attack, not all of it was in the files. Neither his staff nor Lt. Cmdr. Kramer, the MAGIC traffic coordinator, could find the missing items. The information might have been misfiled, but these were the men who should have known. Safford later testified that in the month before the attack, 1900 MAGIC messages had been received in the Navy Department alone (others would have been dealt with by the Army), though only 950 were considered important enough to decode in full. So where are the missing ones? There were also questions over the evasiveness under questioning of the Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Harold Stark, and the different treatment of General MacArthur, in charge in the Philippines during the Japanese attack on 8 December 1941.

With new witnesses unlikely, it is still perfectly possible that what had been said at the time and lost, might be found. Equally, when the members of Dorn’s team visited Hawaii in 1995, Daniel Martinez, the National Parks Service’s historian at the Arizona Memorial, referred them to local newspaper reports, including interviews with Kimmel and Short, and the cuttings were still available to view. Additionally, over the years, Kimmel had accumulated a vast treasure trove of some 56 boxes of files, which are now held by the University of Wyoming’s Heritage Center.
The two authors, Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, are not primarily known as naval historians. They have explored and written about many of the seminal events of the past century including 9/11, the Mafia, the Kennedy assassination and Watergate and have produced biographies of Richard M. Nixon, J. Edgar Hoover, Frank Sinatra and Marilyn Monroe. If there is a theme running here, it may be encapsulated in the word “conspiracy”, yet they have not allowed this book to be taken over by the conspiracy theorists. They are, therefore, to be congratulated, not only on the scope of their research into what is a naval and military matter as well as a political one, but also on the extent to which they galvanised help not only from the Kimmel family, but from the keepers of various archives both in the USA and the rest of the world. What is clear from the two authors’ acknowledgements of the assistance they received as well as their extremely detailed end notes section of the book stretching a very lengthy 106 pages, is that they carried out an enormous amount of research which they have woven into a highly readable narrative.

In the final analysis, have the authors made a sufficiently robust case for reinstating Kimmel to his wartime rank of Admiral, and is this still important? In some respects, the whole issue of “responsibility” has been taken over by the family’s unsuccessful pursuit of reinstatement of his 4-star rank, an issue which the Depts. of Defence and Navy found easier to refute than to re-examine the blame objectively, lest it reveal other information they would prefer to remain hidden. There are many people who are convinced that there is information that is unreleased or has been destroyed, though the authors concentrate on the issue of honour rather than conspiracy. In his later years, Kimmel himself said that his rank was not the main issue; rather, it was the betrayal of the men under his command at Pearl Harbor. Instead of Washington giving him the information it possessed that pointed to an attack on the base itself, he received vague warnings about Japanese intentions and the likelihood of war in unspecified locations.

There have been no further inquiries since the Dorn Report in 1995 and it seems that the events of 9/11 will reinforce the case about responsibility when America is attacked, meaning that the pendulum of public opinion, which had swung in favour of Kimmel 1995-2000, may well have swung back. It may be a matter of honour, but it seems that honour is not going to be satisfied.

It is a measure of the scholarship of this book that it has taken two non-naval historians to see the events of the attack and the treatment of Kimmel in a different light and as a matter of honour rather than wartime expediency.

John Francis
Greenwich, UK
Maritime history has been described by some of its practitioners as the history of the World, including of course, the littoral zone where the water meets the land. Working on the Dock of the Bay examines the lives of ‘longshoremen’ who met, unloaded and reloaded the ships sailors brought to port.

Surprisingly, this well-balanced labour history of the antebellum waterfront of Charleston, South Carolina, begins with a vignette from the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era. When a white cotton stower was fired for being a “white Republican and a member of the port’s mostly black Longshoremen’s Protective Union Association” in late October, 1869, hundreds of dockworkers organized an impromptu supportive strike that forced the exporters to rehire him within a few days. Thompson uses this example of the complex history of Charleston’s dockside existence to guide the reader back to the period preceding secession, and the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter in Charleston’s harbour that marked the beginning of a cataclysmic war in early 1861.

In Dock of the Bay, five vivid, topical chapters lay out the ongoing historical struggles of the black slaves who were the earliest waterfront workers (even the poorest white Charlestonians always refused to do such demeaning work). Eventually, they elbowed room for themselves as independent workers rented out by their slaveholder masters to earn extra income, provided, of course, that most of it came back to their owners.

Their existential fight is an epic one. Leveraging their status as essential cogs in the local economic machine, they struggled against slaveholders, dockside employers and supervisors, ship owners, town councils setting wages and ever-more-restrictive regulations, the dangers of hauling 400-pound cotton bales about, and stowing them with screw jacks so expertly and tightly that when the wet cotton swelled, the cargo occasionally pried the ships’ planking apart, turning cotton ships into ‘widow makers.’ Dreadful summer heat, even snow and ice in the winter shipping season, and sharks in the harbour were all opponents to be overcome or avoided. Fascinatingly, this daily fight to survive eventually became one against competition from free, white, Irish and German immigrants in the final decades preceding the Civil War. These poverty stricken immigrants possessed two main tools they
used to dominate the traditionally black dockyard world; their white race, and their right to vote.

Some recent histories of American slavery have convincingly argued that, absent the slave labour of millions of men and women of African descent, and the millions of tons of raw cotton they harvested by hand in the American South, western industrial capitalism, based initially on the industrialized production of cotton cloth, could never have achieved the rapid growth and world dominance it achieved during the nineteenth century. Given that perspective, it should not have been startling to read about thousands of poverty-stricken immigrants from Western and Central Europe sailing away from New York and Boston for the winter shipping season to compete for slave labour wages in southeastern U.S. ports, but it was. The often-violent struggle for domination of such waterfront work opportunities between the very bottom tier of white and black workers fighting for bare subsistence in a very dangerous workplace lays bare again this cruel, unsavoury and oft-overlooked aspect of capitalism’s modern roots. There is fine historical irony in the fact that where Charleston’s insecure leading societal lights once feared the threat of slave rebellion in a city where blacks outnumbered whites by the early 1830s, after the flood of immigrants from the North and Europe, they were frightened by the prospect of white people doing “black” work. This situation held underlying implications for a society founded entirely on slavery, which was becoming increasingly defensive about it as the early 1800s rolled, seemingly inexorably, down to the apocalyptic ‘War of Northern Aggression.’

The fifth chapter is an interesting exploration of how perceptions of differing susceptibilities to infectious diseases helped determine decisions by local authorities on who should get the upper hand in waterfront Charleston. For example, cholera (brought by white immigrants) appeared to infect black slaves and black freedmen more than whites, while yellow fever (which slaves of African descent appeared to be relatively immune to) attacked white populations more severely. This provides an intriguing glimpse into how the history of disease can directly influence politics, perhaps inspired by Michael Willrich’s history of smallpox vaccination in the United States (Pox, 2011). This reader’s one criticism is that the chapter seems to explore the infectious diseases angle in somewhat excessive and repetitive detail.

Using primary sources including census, tax, court and death records, city directories and ordinances, state statutes, wills, account books, newspapers, diaries, letters and medical journals, Thompson has created an exemplary and comprehensive labour history of Charleston’s antebellum
dockside. In the end, he elegantly brings the discussion full circle, emphasizing the origins of Longshoremen’s Unions as defensive measures by dockside workers (the lowest of the low), against the rapacious and unrelenting demands of employers, and the surprisingly multiracial character of their emergence in the early post-Civil War South. Thompson was Assistant Professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga when this volume, his first book, was published. I look forward to subsequent works.

David More
Kingston, Ontario


Much has been written about Great Britain and the Second World War. As a rule, historians have approached the subject from their own particular angles. Economic historians write about the perilous state of Britain’s finances and industry. Diplomatic historians focus on appeasement, alliance politics and the perils of wooing the Americans. Social historians track the impact of war on civilians from enlistment, to labour management and the Blitz. The great value of Daniel Todman’s monumental study *Britain’s War 1937-1941* is that it does it all, and it does it exceptionally well.

*Britain’s War* is an ambitious project, to say the least. In this first volume of a projected two volume series, Todman sets out to weave a wholly integrated tale of Britain’s experience of the final stages of peace in the 1930s through to the globalization of the war in December 1941. The first 200 pages of this tome (fully 718 pages of text) are devoted to the approach to war. These first two parts reveal the scope of Todman’s effort. He tracks economic and social policy, the machinations of British domestic politics and the efforts of a series of British governments to avoid war while striving to find the resources to build the armed forces that might prevent war from happening. What emerges is a complex and nuanced picture, yet one described with remarkable clarity in an unpretentious writing style. Neville Chamberlain comes across as a respectable man walking a fine line between bankruptcy and coalition politics at home and the maniacal ambitions of despot abroad. The British economy is revealed as much shallower than it had been in 1914, with less scope for mobilization of industry for military production than many thought, coupled with the need to keep export industries going in order to pay for increased defence costs. We have long known that
Chamberlain was caught in a cleft stick, but Todman’s calm and careful articulation of the British dilemma before September 1939 is probably the most succinct available.

Parts three, four and five of Britain’s War take the story through a series of crises that cast a critical eye on Winston Churchill’s leadership and a sympathetic gaze on Britain’s accomplishments. Once the “Bore War” was over (part three), what follows is a series of unanticipated crises that systematically erode quite dramatic and dynamic British advances in military and industrial preparedness. By Todman’s estimates, Britain soon outstripped Germany’s production of war supplies, especially tanks and aircraft, but it was never going to be enough to equip the roughly 54 divisions the War Office wanted to raise or the bomber force the RAF wanted to build. So Britain’s financial reserves were poured into America to jump-start American war production. When those ready funds were exhausted – and British assets and investments were liquidated in America – Britain was “saved” by Lend-Lease: which enabled her to fight on while systematically destroying the her economy and her empire.

Todman describes all this, as well as Churchill’s machinations, his bullying, his precarious situation in Parliament and within the coalition against the backdrop of unrelenting stress and disaster. His account, in particular, of Britain’s situation in late 1940 and early 1941 is probably the best and most comprehensive in print. Having lost her only major ally, France, and under the threat of first invasion and then aerial assault, Britain also fought Italy and Vichy France, as well as Syrian, Iraqi and Persian nationalists in the Middle East. In the process, she drove the Italians back into Libya, conquered the Italian possessions in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, pacified the Middle East and sent an ill-fated expeditionary force to help the Greeks. In the meantime, Britain fought the Battle of the Atlantic to a standstill, and fended off the worst of the Blitz. Then, after the German attack on Russia, the British offered tanks, aircraft and supplies to the Soviet Union, while watching nervously over their other shoulder at the Japanese – who are now feeding on French imperial possessions in the southeast. There is little to send to Asia, but as Todman observes, when the Germans reached the gates of Moscow in December 1941, one-third of the tanks they encountered were British Matildas and Valentines. He does not say so explicitly, but that may well have been Britain’s single most important contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1941.

Little of Britain’s War is really new—the book is based on mastering an enormous body of secondary sources—but the way Todman pulls it all together is. Indeed, in the final parts of the book,
he does a remarkable job of conveying the idea of Britain being like a man standing on a pile of rocks in a rising tide. Every time it looks like the Brits will go under, the Americans throw them another rock. When the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, everything changes. Highly recommended.

Marc Milner
Fredericton, New Brunswick