Book Reviews


The authors of this book, Sasha Barac and Roger Boxall, hail from Western Australia. They are members of the surprisingly large, international, floating population of long-distance cruisers. Their own boat, Ednbal, is a Beneteau 393, and is typical of the smaller class of long-distance cruising sailing yachts. A yacht in the 10- to 15-metre range is a seaworthy vessel and modern electronic instruments and communications have greatly improved safety at sea. Of course, any vessel can be overwhelmed if the weather is bad enough, but there are not a lot of disasters among cruising yachts.

There are always adventurers who want to challenge the Arctic or Antarctic seas, but for the most part, these cruisers frequent warmer waters — although not everywhere. The Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the South Pacific draw great congregations of these sea gypsies but regions where piracy is a constant danger, like the Indian Ocean and the East Indies, are avoided.

In the popular cruising seas there are places and events when cruisers get together—hundreds, sometimes thousands of boats congregating in one harbour. That is a considerable itinerant population. Crossing the Atlantic to attend one of these events is almost commonplace. Needless to say, few of these cruisers spend one hundred percent of their time afloat. Most sailors have a house ashore to which they must return from time to time. Some have children and grandchildren who join the boat for the holidays, but some have small children who live on board and are home- (or boat-) schooled.

That is the world described in Cruisers Exposed. The book is a logbook of sorts, recounting Ednbal’s journeys from 2007 to 2015 but it is not arranged in chronological order. Rather, it is an account of their friendship with other yacht dwellers with whom they cruise for a while and pursue adventures ashore. They part, but some months or years later, they reconnect and so the chapters of the book are named for their friends’ boats and recount the cruises they have taken in company. There are thirteen of these sections. In the course of the authors’ travels they

naturally did some extended sight-seeing ashore. For example, while in Turkey they travelled to Georgia and later to Petra, and while in Colombia, to Machu Picchu in Peru. After the initial expense of the boat, the cruising life is not all that expensive, especially when you buy in local markets and catch a lot of your own fish, although you still need an income in the background to pay for trips ashore, spare parts, harbour fees and, in many places, bribes. One nice feature of the book is the recipes for food and drink. It is plain Sasha and Roger lived well, especially in secure anchorages, socializing with other sailors. The maps attached to each section show the immense distances Ednhal travelled (and is still travelling. At the time of writing, she was in French Polynesia).

Who would benefit from and enjoy this book? Anyone who dips into it, especially if he or she has been to some of the places described. Its greatest benefit, however, would be to those who are contemplating extended cruising. The accounts are full of practical hints. One very practical admonition: if you are prone to seasickness, this life is not for you!

Nor should one forget that life on board is not always idyllic. Sailors all have to cope with sudden gales, hidden reefs, dragging anchors and, not least, officialdom. These days, it is the yacht sailors who are the true repository of seamanship skills.

Charles Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


*Hey Sailor, Looking for Trouble?*

Ports are measured by the annual number of million tonnes of cargo handled, the number of cargo containers loaded and unloaded, the size of the port area, the number of ships entering and leaving, the total length of quay walls, the number of freight trains filled and emptied, market share and the value of all cargo. Often, the annual results are a port's economic indicators. Ship's crews have always been of less concern to results-driven port authorities. They leave these temporal guests largely to their own devices in the ports in which they visit or stay over.

The majority of studies into urban-maritime history focus on the port’s role within a variety of economic networks. The cultural significance of this maritime-urban space has been generally ignored. In *Port Towns and Urban Cultures* the editors’ aim, through the exploration of a series of ports from around the globe, is to advance the reader's understanding of how each port was a crucible for the forging of distinctive urban and maritime identities. Moreover, it examines the
relationship of the port with its urban hinterland, together with the cultural connections that may have existed between international ports.

Port districts have always had a wide array of facilities that could provide sailors with all sorts of pleasures and necessities. Pubs and boarding houses served as crossroads of maritime communication on shipping news, jobs and local information. The sailor's stereotypical image included whoring, heavy drinking, brawling and violence. It becomes clear, however, that in his free time ashore the seaman had to associate with his work colleagues, or wander alone in a strange environment. In a culture of male honour, violence was seen as a natural way of resolving conflicts among men. Outsiders talked about ports as 'sinks of infamy, and abominations of almost every description'. Lovely stories. But there is more to history than digging up old clichés. This book’s approach to the nature and character of sailor town culture and port-town life, and the representations of port towns that were forged both within and beyond urban-maritime communities delivers insight in the lives and deaths of ports themselves, as if they are living entities. In a way, a port is just as alive as the men and women who depend on it.

The book contains twelve studies, six of them focus on English ports and cultures, and three are about ports in South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining studies discuss urban-maritime life in Sweden and Finland. The latter make it a somewhat bewildering combination. The editors, however, have succeeded in their mission. This book most certainly contributes to urban-maritime history. Moreover, it is a good read.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, The Netherlands.


Much has been written about hardship and heroes in the Battle of the Atlantic, but virtually nothing has been available on the stoic rescue tugs that salvaged men and ships from the clutches of the enemy and the vileness of the North Atlantic. Ian Dear has helped fill that gap in our knowledge with his splendid book The Tattie Lads.

The real focus of Dear’s work is the Second World War, which he tracks through eight chapters. His account is roughly chronological, starting in chapter 2 at the concentration of rescue tugs at Campbeltown early in the war, and follows a somewhat anecdotal course through the various classes and theatres. Having tackled the originals (the “Saints and Brigands”) in chapter 3, Dear moves on to the
exploits of the Dutch rescue tugs which arrived following the collapse of Western Europe in 1940, then picks up the exploits of the first war-built tugs, the Assurance class, in the Battle of the Atlantic in chapter 4. The rescue tug service expanded tremendously when the USA entered, and as the mid-war building programs in Britain began to bear fruit: these stories are the subject of chapter 6. Mediterranean operations follow in chapter 7, the “Jaunty, the cripples and the feisty Empire class” in chapter 8, and the Normandy campaign of 1944 in chapter 9. A short epilogue tells a brief tale about one Pacific tug.

Dear’s account is based on an extensive body of secondary literature, but he has also mined reports of proceedings and logs at the British National Archives in Kew. The result is less a comprehensive account of the Rescue Tug Service and more stirring tales of rescues and salvage operations which Dear has stitched together into a coherent narrative. Most of the tugs, especially early in the war, were comparatively small, under 500 tons, and coal fired. In the worst weather imaginable, and under constant threat from U-boats, aircraft and surface raiders, they set off on long forays into the North Atlantic to bring home stricken vessels—or what remained of them. Tows often took a week or more at barely a walking pace, and often at or beyond the technical capability of the tugs themselves. Few tugs had winches, so vessels under tow careened their way across the ocean while the tug laboured to keep them on course: manila line and wire cables chaffed and parted with alarming frequency. Days of gruelling work often ended with the damaged ship foundering near the coast.

Twenty rescue tugs were lost to enemy action or to the sea. Englishman was swarmed by aircraft and sunk in January 1941, and Empire Wold simply disappeared off Iceland one brutal winter day in November 1944: no trace was ever found. It proved easy to find Sesame after she disappeared with all hands on 11 June 1944. She was towing a portion of the artificial harbour to Normandy when she was attacked by German motor-torpedo boats. When Storm King found Sesame’s pier head section stationary in the Channel her captain reported that, “we found the tow line bar tight so we knew there was a tug on the end of it.” The book ends with a harrowing account of the tug Lariat towing a damaged tanker through a typhoon in the South Pacific. Lariat was hurled about like a cork, and was very nearly lost when she rolled enough to ship green water down her funnel. But the tow line never parted and both vessels arrived safely.

The book contains an appendix listing some 100 vessels of the Rescue Tug Service. By the end of the war they had salvaged nearly 3 million GRT tons of shipping: roughly the equivalent of annual losses to enemy action for any year of the war except 1942. This was no mean feat. They also brought home 254 warships.
The Tattie Lads is not the full and final word on the Rescue Tug Service: the wider context, background to the building schemes, policy, operational control issues, impact of the salvage operations on the war effort and more critical appraisal of what it all meant remain to be told. But it is enough for now that Ian Dear has rescued the rescuers from obscurity. Recommended.

Marc Milner
Fredericton, New Brunswick


The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is America’s most renowned military force. Until the First World War, the USMC was a small, lesser-known branch of the U.S. Navy Department. This book briefly tells the story of the USMC’s Marine Brigade, part of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in the First World War, which brought the USMC to the esteemed position it holds to this day.

In April 1917, when the United States entered the First World War, American military war preparedness was mixed, at best. The U.S. Navy was in the best condition for war, having been successful in the 1898 Spanish-American War and also undergoing modernization in the early 1900s under President Theodore Roosevelt. The American Army, on the other hand, with the exception of the brief 1898 war with Spain, had not seen major combat since the end of the American Civil War in 1865. The USMC was in a different position: most of the USMC’s activity throughout its prior history had been small unit actions. The singular exception to these small unit actions was the seizure of Guantanamo Bay by the 1st Marine Brigade in the Spanish-American War. Due to its small size and intensive training, the USMC was more prepared that the U.S. Army for a major conflict—but as the authors point out, that was a difference more of degree than actual preparedness. The First World War demanded that the USMC become a large land force, a historical fact which forever altered the USMC’s role in American military conflicts.

The authors rightly note the American occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, as the USMC’s rehearsal for participation in the First World War. Approximately 1,300 Marines landed at Vera Cruz in March, 1914, occupying the port as a result of the tumult caused by the Mexican Revolution. Vera Cruz saw the USMC used as light infantry, rather than a small landing force. The chief result of the occupation, however, was that the U.S. Navy and USMC demonstrated their capacity for rapid transport and the possibility of transforming USMC units into a larger, more cohesive combat force.
When America entered the First World War, the USMC demanded to play its part in the AEF. Despite some opposition by the U.S Army, the U.S. Marine Brigade became an integral part of the Expeditionary Force.

The authors begin their narrative with a brief introduction, a review of the Vera Cruz occupation, and a chronology of the USMC in the First World War. They then go on to outline the Marine Brigade’s organization, belief and belonging, enlistment and training, unit organization, appearance and equipment, life on campaign, first combat, museums, collections, and re-enactments. A bibliography, glossary, and an index complete the book. The writing is concise and to the point. These sections are woven together seamlessly without a break in the narrative.

Like all Osprey books, this one is well-illustrated with many period photographs, reproductions of First World War posters, and colour plates depicting the Marine Brigade’s uniforms and equipment. It is worth noting that the Marine Brigade originally went to war with a forest-green uniform. Over time, this colour was found to be too close to the German uniform — Feldgrau — a greenish grey. That, coupled with the heavy wear and tear or combat, forced the Marine Brigade to switch to a U.S. Army uniform of khaki-brown, although distinct USMC insignia were retained. The various firearms are shown in colour plates and provide a good guide to USMC equipment in the First War. Other colour plates depict combat, rest areas, and medical care—all parts of the wartime experience. Also included are useful maps of combat areas which clarify the action for the reader.

The authors include a useful narrative of the Marine Brigade’s actions. Their greatest and best-known action was one of their first — Belleau Wood. In that combat, the Marine Brigade successfully stormed German positions in Belleau Wood, but at great cost. Floyd Gibbons, a correspondent embedded with the Marine Brigade, wrote of the Marines’ great success; the resultant publicity placed the brigade, and the USMC as a whole, directly in the public eye — a position which it occupies to this date. Gripping first-hand accounts of the battle add spice to the narrative. As a tribute to the Marines’ sacrifice, the French government renamed Belleau Wood Bois de la Marine Brigade — The Wood of the Marine Brigade.

This is a valuable short work, serving as a useful reference guide as well as a starting point for further reading. The “selected references” section lists several books on the Marine Brigade. It is recommended for those who want to know more about America’s most famous fighting force.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Paul Gilje’s *To Swear Like a Sailor* examines in detail the use of language (both foul and fair) by the American sailor from the eve of the American Revolution to the mid-nineteenth century. He explores the place of sailors, their reputation (real and mythical), and their language in mainstream American public discourse, literature and fine art. A multitude of examples serve as evidence for his conclusion that the sailor and his language, and society’s understanding of both, is far more complex, interwoven and nuanced than previously considered. Gilje repeatedly reminds the reader that America was originally a sea-faring society, tied to the sea for its founding and its first livelihoods of fishing and trade. To comprehend America, one needs to look into the world of the sailor and its interaction with mainland United States.

The subject of the main title is covered in a chapter on swearing, the sailor’s harsher language. Questioning the moral and socially refined nature of someone’s mother or his legitimacy of birth, or simply damning him, seem to be by far the worse insults to be flung, often stirring the aggrieved to fight the declaimer. A separate chapter examines the non-swearing language usage of the sailor and the nonsailor’s description of life afloat. Here the literary work of James Fenimore Cooper and Herman Melville (two men with experience at sea) are employed (along with numerous lesser known authors) to capture both shipboard language usage and the landsman’s knowledge of sailors. Gilje demonstrates that the sailor and mainland worlds were closely linked, influencing each other’s vocabulary and its expression.

Gilje delves into the ship’s log book and the sailor’s journal. He thoroughly reviews their development and draws on dozens of them to illustrate the value of their content to let us look inside the sailor’s world. He describes how, over time, the merchant log books of the period melded a bare record of location and time (which served as a navigational instrument) with the informality of a personal journal and sketch book. The former approach to log-keeping reveals little, the latter is a rich cache of interpersonal ship dynamics, family relationships, insight into the mind of the sailor, and an intimate look at daily life aboard a ship. Sailors recorded all sorts of information in their journals, from the fish they caught, through the peoples they encountered in far off places, to sketches of the landfalls they made. The journals and logs represent their view of the world in which they lived. The logbook also influenced the development of the novels of Cooper and Melville. Gilje, however, explores only the logbooks of merchant and whaling ships, not
those of the navy, where content was strictly regulated.

The spinning of yarns is the topic of chapter 4. Yarns were originated by mariners to pass time, influence shipmates, family and others, reshape truth or keep memories alive. Gilje states that it fell to the British underworld (bestowing on it a rather dark mark) before returning to the world of the sailor. Through the wide dissemination of sailor stories, the very phrase “spinning a yarn”, he suggests, “became imbedded in American print Culture” (133), exerting a robust influence on contemporary writers.

Sea songs and shanties are unpacked in the next chapter. Their evolution from British origins into American styles and usage is traced by means of copious examples. Songs covered every possible topic from love to shipwreck. They evolved by being traded between land and sea, by professional and amateur musicians. They portrayed the sailor in several roles. One was as national saviour in times of war, fighting the enemy. In peace, they ran the trade and fishing necessary for national economic survival. Seamen were depicted as the faithful departing lover as well as the adulterous Casanova. Gilje notes that the development of sea songs and shanties was influenced by revolution, war, and peace, creating a unique American genre.

The Pirate’s Own Book forms the central text around which Gilje explores the sailor’s literacy. The Pirate’s Own Book was a risqué volume in its day, with a twisted history and a tradition of borrowing tales from other sources. It appears to have been widely read ashore and afloat; influencing other would-be-authors to write similar tomes. Pirate adventures, shipwrecks, and disasters at sea were mainstream entertainment. The author touches on a host of other popular books that made their way to sea, to show the broad taste of sailors in their reading material. We come to see a far more literate person than we might have thought. Gilje notes merchant ships with small libraries, and men with their own collections that they read repeatedly and traded eagerly with sailors from other vessels, making the ship a conduit for spreading literacy and book-borne knowledge.

The final chapter turns to the fine arts and takes the reader through editorial cartoons, illustrations from novels, prints, and scrimshaw, all depicting the world of the sailor. Sailor drawings often appear devoid of perspective and are focused on the ship rather than shipmates. Sailors and their concerns were often a way for cartoonists to comment on political or social issues of the day. The book’s cover is one such example, referring to the evil of British impressment and the lack of national pride in American sailors who sailed in British ships. As with depictions of the sailor in novels and verse, the drawn representations were at times a caricature of the sailor and used for comic relief, or as a messenger of unabashed straight talk. The ‘sailor character’ appears to have played the role of Shakespeare’s fool;
providing humour but speaking the truth others dared not utter.

In each area covered, Gilje notes that the American sailor’s linguistic traditions first resembled those of the British sailor. This is to be expected, as most colonists were of British descent, the colonies were founded on British culture, and many of the sailors would have sailed on British ships. But, in each area, American sailors (and their society) pulled away from the British, giving the language their own linguistic turn. The American Revolution and the War of 1812 were the two periods during which major change took place, though after 1783 departure from British usage and the shaping of a more uniquely American sailor’s vocabulary and larger identity was almost constant.

All of this marvelous content is wrapped up in the epilogue, in which Gilje disassembles a seaman’s chest, unpacking the sailors’ worldly possessions, including their books, scrimshaw, letters, journals and clothing. While this does stray a bit from the linguistic theme, he pulls it back by referencing Melville’s symbolic use of the seaman’s chest in *Moby Dick*.

Thirty-one black and white contemporary illustrations, or images of sailors’ artwork are spread unevenly across the text. As expected, ten of these are in the chapter exploring art created by, or about the sailor. The illustrations are just another level of the thick evidence amassed by Gilje to establish his conclusions. Each image is fully discussed in the surrounding text. The endnotes are useful, as is the volume’s index. The list of sources is exceptional, underlining the thoroughness of Gilje’s research.

The book will appeal to those interested in maritime cultural history in general, United States’ maritime history in particular, and to a lesser extent Britain’s maritime past. Those studying the linguistic culture of late colonial through antebellum America will also find the book a worthy read.

As with his previous work focusing on sailors, Gilje’s *To Swear Like a Sailor* is an excellent addition to our understanding of both life afloat and the sailor culture’s integration into the larger society.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


The authors of this work set out to compile a graduate dissertation published in 1974, which focused on an evaluation of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, along with several seasons of archaeological fieldwork starting in 1997 conducted on the blockade-runner *Denbigh*. The intent was to use this information, along with contempl-
oratory accounts and archival documents of the Civil War, to re-address and re-evaluate the effectiveness of the Union blockade efforts along the western Gulf Coast. The book opens with an overview of the blockade-runner *Denbigh* Shipwreck Project and then is divided into two main sections: the complete 1974 dissertation by Robert Glover, followed by a section on the archival material and notes, which are used to answer the question: how did both the blockaders and the runners fulfill their duties or goals?

While it is possible to view the land battles of the Civil War, and the strategies of the Union and the Confederate leaders, in quite concrete terms and understanding of the outcomes, the efforts by blockade-runners and those assigned to stop them appear to be different. Over time, there has been discussion of the effectiveness of the runners and the blockaders, and the effect the blockaders had on the outcome of the Civil War. In other words, historians and researchers have long debated the historical ambiguity of this topic. J. Barto Arnold collected and organized the contents of this work, specifically Part II, to understand blockade running from the Southern point of view. He chose not to simply use the number of ships captured by the Union blockaders as reported by them, or the number of runners that were reported to have outrun them, but to look at which ships pierced the blockade, and what often went up for sale in Southern cities. With newspaper advertisements, bills of sale, and auction records recovered from local archives, Arnold successfully proved that the blockade was not all that effective, and those southerners with the wherewithal had the opportunity to maintain a lifestyle to which they had become accustomed before the war.

The reasons the runners tended to be successful along the Gulf Coast, for a good part of the war, and the why the blockaders often failed, centre around two items: types of vessels that the runners used and the avarice of the blockers had for prize money. In both cases, primary as well as secondary sources illustrate solid reasons for both arguments. The *Denbigh* was a well-built side paddle-wheel steamer, typical of the vessels runners often used. Fast steamers driven by expert and crafty captains faced Union captains who were often distracted by the lure of prize money, providing a background of derring-do and adventure. There was also the opportunity for those runners to make vast fortunes in only two or three successful runs.

While this work credits two authors, it is clear that it is Arnold who assembled the historical information into an organized work, starting with a well-written dissertation by Glover that constitutes Part I. Arnold expertly incorporates a well-written text and intertwines it with images of contemporary historical documents. In the end, Arnold succeeds in his aim of presenting readers with an historically accurate summarization that clearly makes his point about the non-effectiveness of the West Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron.
While this reviewer had no issues with spelling, grammar, clarity, word choice or argument, just about all of the illustrations were copies of contemporary (hand-written) documents with very few maps and no photographs. These could be included to enhance future editions of this work. Although this work does not lend itself to casual sit-down weekend read, it should be viewed as a useful reference source.

The Blockade-Runner Denbigh and the Union Navy, while interesting, would appeal most to those who are interested in the Civil War and maritime archaeology. It would also fit well on the bookshelves of those interested in maritime history, maritime and international law, and the business of war. As this reviewer is currently working on a manuscript documenting a history maritime crime along the Gulf Coast, this work has proved to be a valuable asset. Not only has J. Barto Arnold succeeded in his main objective of understanding the effectiveness of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, but this reviewer has already benefitted from his secondary aim of providing a springboard for individual research in other areas.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida


To many, the First World War conjures up images of mud and trenches, death and no man’s land. The Naval War in the Mediterranean opens an entirely new perspective on the war. Its subject is, literally, a backwater, but author Paul Halpern describes its actions, personalities and significance to the conflict as a whole.

The Great War in the Mediterranean is a swirl of air, land, surface and underwater combat, shifting national alliances, officers contending for commands, victories and defeats. The main foci of the book are the Dardanelles Campaign, struggles between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Adriatic, and raids on commercial shipping.

The section on the Dardanelles Campaign, better known as Gallipoli, was most interesting. The goal of the attacks was to force the Turks out of the war and ensure the safety of the Suez Canal. I had read about the landings, but this told the naval story of what was, at its inception, supposed to be a naval battle. When plans to have the Greek Army seize the Dardanelles floundered over Greek distrust of Bulgaria and Russian designs on Constantinople, attention turned to naval bombardment of Turkish fortifications. These, too, failed due to overestimates of the effects of flat trajectory naval gunfire against land targets and underestimates of Turkish resistance.
The initial bombardment of the Turkish forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles began on 19 February 1915 and by 1 March, the British were prepared to destroy the intermediate defenses and clear the minefields. As ships moved into the more restricted Straits and mines kept them off shore, the balance shifted in favour of the Turkish artillery. Hopes for the Russian Black Sea Fleet to attack the Bosporus from the east were dashed after Russians chose to fight closer to their own bases of supply. When sea power proved unable to bring Turkey to its knees, British colonial forces and French troops (largely to maintain French influence in the Levant) began their bloody and, ultimately unsuccessful, assault on the beaches. The naval role began with landing and ended with evacuating the troops, the latter being the most successful aspect of the whole campaign. Between those bookends, the Western navies supplied the troops ashore while their submarines interdicted Turkish supplies to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

This book highlights several interesting aspects not covered in other studies of the war, some of which seem obvious once the author lays them out. Much of the conflict centered in the Adriatic where equally weak Austro-Hungarian and Italian forces had to rely on their respective allies for supplies and defense while threatening to attack across each other’s homeland. For Italy, that meant entreating Britain and France to devote vessels to protecting Italian waters. For Austria-Hungary, it involved the overland transport of submarines, some of which sailed with German crews and under either German or Austrian-Hungarian flags. Although largely fought by submarines, the Austro-Hungarian “Fleet In Being” kept larger Entente forces unavailable for deployment elsewhere. Much of the action was directed to sinking Entente, particularly British, merchant shipping in conjunction with the submarine war on the Atlantic. In the Mediterranean, the concept of naval escort that grew into convoys was experimented with and tested. The allocation of patrol areas was a matter of both apportionment of the work load and a recognition of spheres of influence in the region. The breadth of worldwide involvement is shown by the introduction of Japanese and American vessels into the Mediterranean. This theatre also contributed its firsts, including the first launch of a torpedo from an airplane. Toward the end of the war, the Russian collapse and surrender set off a scramble between Russia, Ukraine, and Germany for the ships of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and the response of Britain and France to that threat, which never really materialized.

This book is extremely detailed, spending much ink on the names of officers, (Capt. von Trapp, before he discovered the Sound of Music, being the most recognizable), ships, and the details of engagements. While I found it useful to learn new concepts about the strategy involved, the flow of the combat and how it affected the larger war, as a casual reader, I could have gathered as much or more from a version that was half the length.
This is a definitive and thorough narrative for experts in the field and would be of greatest interest to them.

James M. Gallen
St. Louis, Missouri


The author presents a detailed history of the organizations and people responsible for strategic thinking in the U.S. maritime services, principally the U.S. Navy, from the end of the Cold War up to 2007. *Toward a New Maritime Strategy* is written by a specialist in strategy development for other specialists. In the introduction, Haynes defines strategy as the relationship of seaborne U.S. military force to political purpose. “This book examines how key U.S. naval strategic statements and policies were developed and the documents themselves, which are manifestations of U.S. Naval thinking” (12) and specifically “provide the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] with a way to rationalize the Navy and its claims on the defense budget” (13). The bulk of the work is focused on the evolution of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), which was responsible for development of strategy.

The navy officer corps is described at the outset as developing in a restricted system of beliefs, which facilitated superb operational performance, “But what made the Navy arguably the most operationally adaptable of the services made it intellectually weak and uninterested in understanding the Navy’s deeper purpose and strategic effects” (8).

The first chapter, “The Cold War”, contrasts the ascendancy of the Air Force with a strong strategy development organization and its strategic nuclear weapons with its sputtering performance, particularly in the view of the legislators who determined levels of funding. With the advent of the ballistic missile submarine, which is seen as placing the U.S. Navy at the heart of nuclear deterrence as the “nation’s only invulnerable second-strike platform”, came the placement of submarine officers into high-ranking positions, including three Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNO) from the 1970s to the 1990s. At the same time, technology and engineering became the pre-eminent backgrounds for a successful career path. Meanwhile, the wider education of naval officers was neglected to the extent that they are described as constricted and “illiterate” in such aspects of education as would permit strategic thinking. The revolution wrought by Robert McNamara’s centralizing style of management is seen as furthering that condition: “Starting in the 1960s the path to promotion changed to managing weapon systems programs and personnel and has not changed much since” (27).
The final barriers to developing maritime strategic thought include a continental mentality and a fixation on the battle-centric portion of Mahan’s teaching at the expense of his systemic, political economy-based theories. Hayes sees the U.S. Navy sailing into uncharted post-Cold War waters historically naïve and strategically inept.

The bulk of the work is divided into chapters with headings based on the titles of the strategic planning documents developed during the period, from *The Way Ahead* (1990) to *A Cooperative Strategy* (2007). The process is seen within the context of unfolding political events and the personalities and influence of succeeding key politicians, such as, secretary of defense. The influence of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which was intended to optimize and downsize the military with its emphasis on “jointness” or the integration of the armed services, runs through the discussion.

The author traces the evolution of the bodies that make up OPNAV which succeeding CNOs sought to control by changing the mandates and internal organization. The text is dense with acronyms, which is to be expected where the organizations have arcane short forms, such as N513 (Strategic Concepts Branch) and OP-00K (CNO Executive Panel) and U.S. Marine equivalents. In terms of staffing OPNAV: “Kelso also ensured that N8 had the power and resources it needed. N8 had a three-star admiral, five two-stars, a dozen one-stars, and four hundred civilians. In contrast N3/N5 had a half-dozen admirals, including a three-star admiral, a two-star deputy, and a two-star admiral that led its one-hundred-person N51 (formally known as OP-60)” (89).

Language is informal and loaded with expressions that have meaning within the target audience, that is, naval officers and politicians familiar with strategy and tactics. Sometimes, the author’s comments are unnerving; for example, “The Vietnam War was essentially a laboratory for the RAND theorists” (251), or a passing reference to the Tomahawk missile being an agent of “coercive diplomacy”. Nevertheless, the work is lively and hard-hitting, often containing critical analyses of the people and organizations recently responsible for developing naval strategy, particularly OPNAV. Other organizations include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), U.S. Naval War College, and the U.S. Headquarters Marine Corps. The book is remarkable in that it traces minutely the influence and activities of individual senior officers, describing concepts such as the Bush administration’s “Transformation” and cost-cutting inherent in “The Enterprise”. Alongside the theme of inter-service rivalry between the Army and Air Force for resources, is the friction between the Navy and the Marine Corps, especially after the Marine Corps came into prominence with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the end of 2004, the author describes the Navy as operating in heavy seas: “The United States was engaged in what appeared to be
two long-term ground wars, whose implacable requirements had elevated the importance of the Army and the Marine Corps, and called the importance of the Navy into question” (176). That the Marine Corps is seen as a competitor, despite being one of the naval services, further confuses the picture.

The author returns continually to his central thesis: that the real strategic importance of naval forces is in underwriting the political, commercial, and security conditions for global prosperity. In this way, he elevates naval strategy into a component of wider maritime strategy, although he concedes that it does not resonate with the American public or legislators in the way that direct threats do. This work is revolutionary in that it makes public what has always been very private, that is, the workings of the organizations making up the naval services and of the individual people in them. It is part of a movement that intends to shape future naval and maritime strategy to make it open and understandable by legislators.

In the final chapter, “Recommendations”, the importance of general academic credentials for naval officers, in areas other than engineering and science, is seen as necessary for development of a strategic ethos. “The Navy needs to explain in clearer and more compelling terms the merits of a maritime-systemic approach.” (252)

The lack of a bibliography detracts from the book’s value as an academic work. Illustrations are in the form of dense, inscrutable diagrams. Since the work is intended for experts, a full list of acronyms and terms is presumably unnecessary. It is a fascinating polemic that ends with the attempt to elevate the U.S. Navy once again to the heights enjoyed during the Second World War: “Regardless where globalization may lead, there is only one organization on earth currently capable of conceiving and executing a maritime strategy. The fact that the U.S. Navy cannot do so alone does not relieve it of the requirement to exercise strategic leadership” (252).

Ian Dew and Kathy Traynor
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Ben Hughes has written a detailed account of the naval engagement between HMS *Phoebe* and US *Essex* on 28 March 1814, off Valparaiso Bay, Chile. He details the Essex’s final voyage from its departure from Delaware Bay, 27 October 1812, through to its fate as a British prize, seventeen months later. HMS *Phoebe* and HMS *Cherub* receive equal attention, from their assignment to hunt down and capture the *Essex* to their ultimate end, long after the conclusion of the War of 1812. The
narrative is based on the journals of midshipmen Allen Gardiner and David Farragut (British and American, respectively) as well as the ships’ logs and the captains’ correspondence. It also examines the leadership of the two opposing captains, the American, David Porter, and the British, James Hillyar. This is a well balanced, straightforward description of the events and people involved, with minimal analysis outside of contemporary comment.

In alternating chapters, Hughes brings Hillyar and Porter from their points of origin, across the Atlantic, around Cape Horn and into the Pacific. For David Porter, the goal was to disrupt Britain’s Pacific whaling industry by capturing whaling vessels and seizing their highly valuable cargoes of oil. Porter is depicted as an energetic officer seeking the glory of a single-ship action, with an evenly matched British ship. He is driven, both to cause as much damage to British trade as possible, and to obtain prize money for him and his crew. The Essex’s armament was dominated by short-range but powerful carronades and Porter honed his men’s skills in gunnery and boarding.

Once in the Pacific, Porter sailed in search of British. Frustrated at first, he eventually found and captured several whalers. Instead of sending them home as prizes right away, he built up a small flotilla to extend his reach. One vessel he captured and armed to accompany the Essex, he named Essex Junior.

Hillyar, in the Phoebe, accompanied by HMS Cherub (Captain Tucker), left from Portsmouth, England, to hunt the American threat to the Pacific whaling fleet. Captain Hillyar, a very religious and disciplined man, brought both characteristics to bear on his crew. He diligently trained his men to hit a mark at a distance, and, like Porter, he also drilled his crew on boarding. On learning that the Essex’s armament was chiefly carronades, Hillyar decided against a close engagement, where Porter would have the advantage of weight, choosing instead, to use his long guns, from a distance, to dismantle the American ship. The British never caught sight of the Americans, hearing only news of their success.

Throughout the book, Hughes traces the ships’ exploration, describing the Galapagos, the Marquesas, and the area around Valparaiso Bay in rich detail. The most dynamic is a sub-story that develops around the men that Porter left on Nuka Hiva, in the Marquesas. Their misadventures with each other and the local population is a tale of betrayal, mutiny, abandonment and escape, worthy of its own book.

With his work mainly done, and the British on his trail, Porter decided to head for home, but first sailed to Valparaiso for supplies, information and possibly, one or two more prizes. He arrived there on 3 February 1813 and Hillyar appeared five days later. An immediate combative encounter was barely avoided, as both officers knew the law against fighting within neutral waters, and neither took the first step to break it. After a couple of weeks of threatening each other in
harbour, Hillyar took *Phoebe* and *Cherub* out to sea and began a blockade of the bay, waiting for Porter to attempt to break out.

Hillyar declined Porter’s invitations to meet in his ship in close combat and continued the blockade. With changing political circumstance in Valparaíso and the need to head home before more British vessels appeared, Porter attempted to break out of the Bay. A failed ruse to distract the British off their blockade positions and a snapped main topmast as a result of a sudden squall finally brought Porter and his crew under *Phoebe*’s guns. After the first exchange of fire at close range, Hillyar assumed a position far enough from the *Essex* to bombard the Americans with his long guns. Amid the squalls that blew through the bay during the battle, *Cherub* barely managed to keep to the fringe of the battle. What Hughes does not account for is why the *Essex Junior* remained four miles away and did not attempt to join in the fight. After two hours of battering, Porter recognized the *Essex*’s hopeless situation and surrendered. *Essex Junior* surrendered a week later.

In the aftermath of the battle, Porter worried about his reception in America and worked to explain his actions and the loss of the *Essex*. Hillyar oversaw repairs for the ships and paroled Porter and his crew, sending them home in *Essex Junior*. The defeated Porter arrived home, to a hero’s welcome for his Pacific exploits. The victorious Hillyar returned home to less fanfare, though his post-war career saw far less turmoil than Porter’s.

Though he did disrupt the British whaling fleet for 1813, Porter did very little else in the waters off the west coast of South America. He lost the *Essex* (one of the very few frigates in the American Navy) and most of his prizes. In the contemporary debate over Hillyar’s choice to stand off and bombard the *Essex*, rather than run in and engage in a close broadside to broadside battle (which he was likely to lose), Hughes sides with Hillyar’s choice as being what was called for, rather than the more ‘heroic’ close action.

The five maps provided are helpful, in detailing the routes of the opposed ships and the islands they visited. The illustration of a frigate sail plan is helpful in dealing with the extensive descriptions of sail handling throughout the book. The 30 illustrations range from small photos of the two main captain’s signatures to full-page images of contemporary paintings. They are placed in the centre of the book and provide some interesting depictions of major and minor characters in the story.

Official ship logs, crew musters, captain’s letters, personal journals, published contemporary material and secondary sources used by Ben Hughes are detailed in notes and listed in the healthy bibliography. This is a well researched, detailed examination of the events surrounding this famous engagement, which makes some of its errors around the larger context of the war frustrating. For example, Sir Isaac Brock was not Governor-General of
Canada and Sir John B. Warren was not a Vice-Admiral but an Admiral (9), and General Ross did not march to Alexandria after sacking Washington (189). These are relatively minor issues, but their presence will annoy the more knowledgeable reader.

This irritation aside, Hughes has provided a very good, evenly balanced and thorough account of the meeting of HMS Phoebe and USS Essex. His reliance on Gardiner and Farragut’s journals adds a new layer of description and comment to the story. Well worth having on one’s bookshelf, the book will appeal to those interested in the specific incident, the War of 1812 more generally and naval engagements, particularly those featuring a pursuit and a dramatic showdown.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario


The War of 1812 does not figure into the American creation story, nor does it currently garner much attention in the collective memory. Despite a recent bicentennial for the conflict, few Americans even noticed the celebration. Some may have celebrated in Maryland or Virginia on the Star Spangled Banner National Historic Trail, or may have seen Louisiana license plates denoting the Battle of New Orleans. Part of the problem with conveying the historic sense of the war is that few even understand the reasons for the conflict. Complicated diplomatic events pushed the United States to declaring war on Great Britain, even though the country’s army and navy were virtually non-existent. In fact, much of the conflict at sea would be fought by privateers, an ill-defined occupation that modern readers inevitably equate with legal piracy. Faye Kert’s painstaking research and thoughtful prize-winning book details these key weapons of the maritime War of 1812.

Licensed by their home governments with a “letter of marque and reprisal,” privateers had the authority to attack and capture enemy commerce. After capturing an enemy vessel, Kert describes how privateers took them to friendly ports where admiralty courts condemned them, permitting the sale of cargoes and ships. Privateers pocketed the profits from this honourable calling that combined patriotism and profit; the more glamorous but dishonourable piracy is illegal robbery and criminal violence at sea. Converting a private merchant vessel into a naval auxiliary, privateers enjoyed the protection of and were subject to the obligations of the laws of war. If captured, privateer crews were entitled to treatment as prisoners of war, whereas pirates would be hanged as criminals.
The extensive business model of privateering existed because of the profits to be derived from a conflict against commerce. Merchant investors, ships’ captains, sailors, longshoremen, government officials, jurists, and others profited from the war on trade. Very few privateers, however, brought in big prizes or captures, even though every privateer anticipated profitable results. The Liverpool Packet of Liverpool, Nova Scotia, captured as many as one hundred prizes, grossing as much as four million dollars. In reality, fewer than half of all privateers ever captured a single ship. Of those who did, only one in three ever arrived in a prize court for adjudication. Other times, privateers encountered naval forces and engaged in ship-to-ship combat where they found death rather than elusive wealth. Ultimately, as the risk increased during the war, reportedly the opportunity for profit increased yet skimpy surviving records make it impossible to determine the true profitability of privateering.

Kert organizes the book into five sections along with an introduction, conclusion, and appendix of prize makers and prizes. Chapters on the origins of privateering and prize law are juxtaposed against chapters on the cost of war and the perils of privateering. Through twenty-plus years of prodigious research in legal records, newspapers, personal and business papers, Kert documents 45 privateers commissioned in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, along with 1,172 commissions issued to 625 vessels in the United States. This important contribution corrects earlier lower estimates, and denotes one of the book’s most noteworthy achievements.

The war on commerce did have an impact on the conflict. U.S. privateers captured some 1,900 British merchant vessels, driving insurance rates up by at least thirty percent between 1812 and 1814. But with more than 21,000 British merchant ships, American captures represented less than ten percent of the total number of British vessels at sea—hardly the cause of an economic disaster. Because of the Royal Navy’s blockade of the American coastline, few commercial cruisers went to sea after the first six months of the war. Nonetheless, Kert estimates that Canadian privateers brought in five million dollars to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick while American privateers took at least ten million dollars into U.S. ports. The economic impact of this activity trickled throughout port town economies at a time when commerce was suffering because of the war. Finally, governments also profited from the court and legal fees and custom duties, proving that the trickle-down effect of privateering had an impact on all segments of society.

Kert’s book provides an intellectual roadmap for future scholars who want to pursue the exciting world of privateers. Her notes, charts, and tables detail laborious but important archival work that provides the foundation of this study. Additional appendixes (on U.S. privateers and letters of marque, Atlantic
Canada’s privateers and letters of marque, prizes taken by American privateers and letters of marque, and prizes taken by Atlantic Canada privateers and letters of marque) are also available on the book’s website at www.press.jhu.edu to provide fodder for future historians wanting to delve into this topic.

Just as scholars have not definitively answered what caused the War of 1812, they have also not defined the role and impact of privateers either. Kert’s outstanding book, joining with Jerome R. Garitee’s The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore in the War of 1812 (1977), begins to answer many of those complex questions about the role of privateering during the second conflict between Great Britain and the United States. The War of 1812 represented the high point of privateering activity and Kert’s book ably describes how privateers faced dangers, fought battles, and tried to advance the prosperity of their communities. Some did so far better than others. It should be on the bookshelf of everyone interested in the War of 1812 and maritime history during the age of sail.

Gene Allen Smith
Fort Worth, Texas


Brian Lavery is a well-known maritime author specializing in accounts of the Royal Navy (RN) from the perspective of the men who served. This particular book complements some of his earlier works such as Churchill’s Navy, In Which They Served, All Hands, and some twenty other volumes. As Lavery notes in his introduction, this particular book on HMS Belfast is specifically intended to address the experiences of the ‘big ship navy’ of battleships and cruisers and complement his earlier books, Assault Landing Craft and The Frigate Surprise which covered the small-ship RN. The lives of those who served in the larger ships of the Royal Navy, or any navy for that matter, are of a quite different nature from those who served in the little ships.

HMS Belfast was commissioned in August 1939, and was ready just weeks before the outbreak of the Second World War. Her initial complement was regular RN seamen and from the start, it was a ‘happy ship’ with the mix of captain, officers and men rubbing along well, making the ship correspondingly efficient and effective. Active throughout the conflict, Belfast experienced a wide range of service over the six war years. The initial half of the war was somewhat inglorious as the ship was
damaged in the Firth of Forth, not far from Edinburgh, in November 1939. The cruiser had triggered a magnetic mine, one of Hitler’s ‘secret weapons’ that was overcome via ‘degaussing’ to reduce or eliminate the natural magnetic field created by any ship. Repair of the damage took no less than three years, almost the length of time to construct a new ship—her keel had been badly distorted by the mine’s explosion and the repair process complex. She rejoined the fleet in August 1942.

There is no question that the greatest action involving HMS Belfast was the sinking of the German battleship Scharnhorst on 26 December 1943. The Battle of North Cape, as the engagement is known, was the RN’s last ‘big gun’ action. The Scharnhorst was targeting a convoy bound for Russia while HMS Belfast, in company with two other cruisers, provided close escort duties. Further off, the battleship HMS Duke of York provided distant cover. The weather was appalling but the cruisers protecting the convoy did their job, with HMS Belfast prominent among them. In due course, HMS Duke of York caught up with the Scharnhorst and pounced. The resulting engagement saw the German ship overwhelmed and sunk with heavy loss of life. Rescue work was complicated by the gale force winds, heavy seas, darkness and anxiety over the presence of U-boats.

After a year on Arctic convoy duties, highlighted by the Scharnhorst action, HMS Belfast was redeployed to support Operation Overlord, the long-awaited invasion of France. Belfast was to provide the army with shore bombardment off the landing beaches. Assigned to protect the Juno and Sword beaches, HMS Belfast provided direct fire support to the Canadian Army engaged there. It is clear that shore bombardment proved less effective than desired, largely due to inadequate communication between the army and the warships involved. Nonetheless, as the Normandy campaign progressed, the effectiveness of the naval guns improved as all involved learned their business.

After the Normandy campaign ended and war in Europe entered its final months, the allies turned to concluding the war in the Pacific. HMS Belfast was shifted to the Far East as part of this redeployment of the RN’s strength. The ship needed modifications for prolonged service in tropical waters, notably adequate ventilation, and repair of the wear and tear of the previous two years. This was completed by the summer of 1945 and HMS Belfast headed off to Australia to join the British Pacific Fleet. Lavery touches on the difficulties obtaining crews as many sailors were less than keen on going to fight Japan. Indeed, the challenges experienced by the RN have a direct correlation to the same problems that affected the RCN on the same issue. In essence, most of the men and officers of the RN were perfectly content serving king and country against the existential threat posed by Germany, but were less committed to the distant threat of Japan. Defence of colonial and imperial interests were of far less moment than defence
of hearth and home to most, which is an interesting reflection.

HMS *Belfast* was involved in dealing with the aftermath of the Japanese defeat, particularly in arranging for the surrender of Japanese forces in bypassed areas as well as looking after and caring for the liberated European population and prisoners of war (POWs) from Japanese hands. The ill-treatment experienced by both groups shocked the men of HMS *Belfast* and left a deep impression. Yet this was not the end of *Belfast*’s service. She continued in the post-war RN, fought in the Korean War, experienced a major refit in the late 1950s and was finally paid off in 1970 after a number of years as a depot ship. The original intent was, unsurprisingly, to simply scrap her as was normal practice, but the decision was made to create a museum ship in concert with the Imperial War Museum. To that end she was moored in the Pool of London, opposite the Tower of London, where she remains to this day.

Lavery has written a thoroughly enjoyable book on HMS *Belfast* and her career in a Royal Navy that had changed out of all recognition between her 1939 commissioning to the time of her paying off. The combination of ‘human interest’ digressions with the recollections of those who served in the ship, alongside an operational history is compelling. It is a reminder, if any is needed, that what makes a warship effective is the crew. It helps that the ship had an interesting war, and played a significant part in it. While not central to Lavery’s purpose, he also delves briefly into design features of British cruisers of the 1930s, as well as the potential use of the ship in the first fifteen years after the war. This was a time of rapid technological change as well as vast modifications in the potential conduct of war between major powers, creating a great deal of uncertainty about how these challenges would be met. One consequence was the demise of the ‘big gun’ and with that, the day of the cruiser was done. The author has provided an excellent bibliography, which includes both primary and secondary sources. The selection of photographs is an interesting blend of wartime and museum shots. Included on the inside front cover of the book is an ‘exploded’ view of the ship, which is a pleasure to pour over. One wishes it were bigger. I have no difficulty in recommending this book. Indeed, if you are visiting London, you must visit the ship itself.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan


This work can best be described as a construction and combat chronology
for the United States Navy’s twelve “Interim” Landing Ships, Medium (Rocket), following the ships and crew from the drawing board through to the end of the Second World War. To craft such a work, the author relies not only on surviving official records, period documents, and photographs, but an impressive collection of interviews and material from a mix of 75 surviving LSM(R) crewmembers of all ranks. Chapters are broken up into the distinct periods of the vessels’ combat service, presented in a chronological order and followed by statistical appendices. The bulk of the work focuses on 26 March to 18 June 1945, the period in which the LSM(R)s were actively involved in the Okinawa operations.

The introduction discusses available sources for MacKay’s “comprehensive operational history,” along with the deficiencies caused by war, most notably the loss of all official documents pertaining to LSM(R)s 190, 194, and 195 following their destruction in May of 1945 (3-4). Additionally, all interviewed survivors are listed under the ships in which they served, showcasing the author’s wide range of first-hand sources from a dozen vessels. The rest of the book is divided into thirteen chapters. The first two can be viewed as a pair, documenting the Rocket Ships from inception through to their deployment to the Pacific. MacKay does an admirable job of conveying how rushed and unusual the creation of the LSM(R)s was, with the roughly drafted plans combining with secrecy and wartime urgency to result in “uneven qualities of workmanship and disparate levels of completion” amongst the supposedly uniform vessels (27). The unique difficulties faced by the eight ships mounting fin-stabilized rockets versus the four carrying spin-stabilized examples is also heavily documented. While the “Finner” LSM(R)s faced problems with their outboard launchers and seaworthiness, the tribulations of their “Spinner” cousins seems worse. From the outset, this quartet of Rocket Ships suffered from supply and construction problems, with the crippling lack of proper rockets forcing their firing tests to be done with jerry-rigged oversized rockets. Meanwhile, manufacturing flaws on their hastily installed launchers actually delayed their arrival into the Pacific since they desperately needed repairs and maintenance after passing through the Panama Canal.

Chapters three through ten form the core of the work, thoroughly documenting the combat operations of the LSM(R)s from their arrival at the Kerama Rettos through their final fire support missions off Okinawa. McKay notes both the greenness of the crews during their initial actions as well as the helpful side-effect of their unintentionally early salvos — which actually cut approach lanes through dense coral reefs for the approaching landing craft. While not directly mentioned, one cannot help but draw comparisons to the reefs around Tarawa, and how this “jumping of the gun” probably saved a good number of lives. Post-action crafting of their own firing doctrine
shows the ingenuity of the crews, while information regarding Japanese suicide boats, kamikazes, and Operation Ten-Go builds up to the LSM(R)s’ first real experiences with the horrors of war, and to the eventual loss of three vessels. MacKay impartially presents both sides of a divisive issue, most notably the assignment of the LSM(R)s to the dangerous task of Radar Picket Duty. By presenting the opinions of the interviewed survivors on the subject, McKay shows that while some felt that the Task Force Commander Dennis L. Francis was trying to “make a name for himself,” other men held that it was the “unfortunate decision” of a pair of Admirals and that their Commander had done his best to have them removed from the hazardous duty (131-132). There is also a good deal of coverage regarding friendly-fire controversies during the landings at Iheya Shima, where McKay argues that it was not the LSM(R)s, but rather “one or more U.S. Marine fighter-bombers, and reckless ground fire” that caused the casualties instead (229-232). The final three chapters document the post-combat retrofitting of the LSM(R)s into ammunition carriers for the invasion of Japan, and their return to the United States following the secession of hostilities. A series of helpful appendices covering characteristics, crew, markings, and ship data follow to provide more detailed statistical information on the vessels, their crews, and their post-war dispositions. Finally, there is a glossary of relevant military and naval terms, notes, a bibliography, and an index.

The overall composition of the work is well thought out. There is a variety of rare, original photographs and period sketches, along with technical drawings to enhance understanding of the general construction and layout process in the early chapters. Maps, both vintage and modern, aid with visualizing the larger scale aspects of operations and the LSM(R)s’ place in them. Notations within the text explain less common terminology such as mils, and the division of sources in the bibliography into subsections based on which archive possesses the specific documents is an inspired choice to aid others in their research.

The only place where there seems to be a break in the flow is with a photograph on page 85. The photograph shows LSM(R) 196 firing off Aka Shima, but the caption and direct references in the text appear to be referring to an image taken during the same operation which was used on the work’s cover instead. However, this is a relatively minor error in the grand scheme of the work.

As it stands, The U.S. Navy’s “Interim” LSM(R)s in World War II is a solid overview of an often neglected piece of naval history during the final stages of the War in the Pacific. Technical data is provided in a manner that is understandable to the lay reader, and the inclusion of firsthand accounts helps illuminate details that are often lost when nothing but official documents remain. This piece can therefore act
as a solid research tool not only for readers interested in the Rocket Ships themselves, but for those focusing on the experiences of sailors during the Okinawa Operation and the origins of modern American missile ships as well.

Charles Ross Patterson II
Yorktown, Virginia


The Cunard Line has been around in its various corporate guises since its founding in 1839 by the Nova Scotian Samuel Cunard. In the early twentieth century, the company established a reputation for luxurious premium passenger services on scheduled voyages between New York and Britain. In the 1930s, trans-Atlantic travel became an extremely competitive business; even to the extent that national prestige was invoked in order to build bigger, faster and more luxurious passenger liners. Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Italy vied for the unofficial but highly prestigious “Blue Riband”. This was awarded to the ship making the fastest west-bound crossing of the Atlantic and no nation was a dominant winner until the new Cunarder RMS Queen Mary first won in 1936, and followed that with another victory in 1938. This run was not beaten until 1952 by the current holder of record, the SS United States.

Thus began the mystique surrounding “the Queens” and the reputation of Cunard itself. Catering to the rich and famous, as well as to lesser mortals, Queen Mary and her younger sibling—the larger Queen Elizabeth of 1938—established a reputation for luxury, service and an elite standard of travel comfort unobtainable elsewhere. It was a carefully cultivated image nurtured by an outstanding Cunard Line PR organization supported by a complicit British Government hungry for the US dollar revenue the ships generated. Of course, the elite standards really applied only to First-Class passengers. Those who travelled in the lower-priced classes had to make do with much less.

In the twenty-first century, Cunard is a very different corporate entity. While it is still the only shipping company offering scheduled passenger services on the North Atlantic run, it is no longer British-owned — it is part of the giant Carnival conglomerate. None of its ships are registered in Britain (but in the Crown Colony of Bermuda, which entitles them to fly the Red Ensign); and, the last ship the company built in Britain was the Queen Elizabeth 2 (commonly known as QE2). She was launched 49 years ago and now rests idly alongside a pier in Dubai. The mystique lingers, however, and is energetically promoted by the contemporary incarnation of the company. The current crop of Cunard ships are essentially one-class
cruise liners operating in a business environment just as competitive as that of Blue Riband days. The reputation of the old days is a competitive edge enhanced perhaps by the new crop of “Queens”—the current fleet of *Queen Mary 2*, *Queen Victoria* and the new *Queen Elizabeth*. It is these three ships, and the now retired *QE2*, that this book looks at.

The author is a noted New York-based maritime historian and author. His specialty is passenger liners and he has written extensively on the subject. In this book, he focuses on three specific periods in which two or three Queens were in the same place at the same time in 2008 and later in 2010. The book is a paean to an aura of time past, carefully recreated in a modern image where the opulence of a bygone era can be obtained without the necessity of being rich and famous.

The first section (they are not entitled as Chapters) opens in January 2008 when all three ships arrived in New York at the same time to great fanfare. This event is described almost breathlessly and is followed by a short history of Cunard. Then the narrative moves ahead to April 2009, when the three liners were once again together, but this time in Southampton, England. Interspersed within the text are sidelights — a piece on the Hotel Manager of the *QE2* and the reflections of a former cook in Cunard ships. There is a certain lack of cohesion in this part of the narrative which, unfortunately carries on into the other sections.

The section on the farewell voyages of the *QE2* comprises 55 pages; by far the longest. This may be apt, however, as *QE2* was the last of the line of true “ocean liners” and her retirement marked the end of a long era of elegant-looking ships. The new “Queens”, as the photographs show, display little to distinguish them visually from their many similar cruise-ship contemporaries. In the opinion of this reviewer, most modern cruise ships are far from elegant and graceful in their appearance. Again there are sidelights, including one about a lady who made the ship her home for nine years! The final segment of the book covers the introduction into service of the new *Queen Elizabeth* in 2010.

This reviewer found the book disappointing because there is little substance in much of it. Of its 128 pages, only 40 contain text. The bulk of the book is photographs of each of the ships in almost every conceivable situation—under construction, at sea, in harbour, entering harbour, leaving harbour, performing manoeuvres or simply lying alongside a pier. For the true aficionado of cruise ships and devotees of Cunard liners, and Cunard itself in particular, this is likely a treasure trove. Some of the photographs are excellent but the book seems to suffer because of the overexposure of the subjects. Definitely a niche market book.

Michael Young
Nepean, Ontario

Nothing exemplifies the vastness of the Second World War more than the appearance seventy-odd years on of studies and stories that illuminate still obscure corners of the conflict. Lawrence Paterson’s study of U-boat operations on the watery northern and southern flanks of the Eastern Front fits snugly into the category. The Arctic and Black Sea theatres of operation posed sharply different challenges to Hitler’s U-boat arm. In the icy, storm-lashed seas above Scandinavia and the Russian coast where total darkness reigned four months of the year, German submariners strove mightily and with some success to disrupt where they could not destroy the Allied convoys to Murmansk. In the Black Sea, a relative handful of boats maintaining a high tempo of operations sought out enemy merchant shipping and warships assisting in the initially sporadic but ever-growing Soviet counteroffensives after Stalingrad.

As Paterson makes clear, frustration dogged and soon crowned all efforts. Karl Doenitz, head of the U-boat service, and then Navy Commander in Chief, understood that Germany’s decisive theater of operations at sea was the North Atlantic. He seldom sent his best captains and crews anywhere else. Any and all efforts that detracted from vigorously working that battle space were essentially wasted. Appalling weather conditions in the Arctic and the shallow waters off the Kerch Peninsula and Caucasus / Crimean coasts that precluded U-boat efforts to disrupt Soviet ground offensives meant that every submarine attached to these peripheral areas was in effect a submarine lost. There were to be no “happy times” in these secondary theatres.

As was so often the case in battles elsewhere, Hitler personally compounded the problems confronting him in the Black and Barents Seas. While the Fuhrer paid little attention to the former (though not to the fate of his armies ashore), his insistence that Norway was an inevitable Allied invasion corridor that must be contested by a formidable force of U-boats sensibly weakened his navy’s struggle for control of the Atlantic. Paterson traces mounting German failures with understanding and no little sympathy.

After mid-1943, Germany’s fortunes progressively darkened and U-boats everywhere went on the defensive, cursed by poor equipment, half-trained men and a growing loss of morale. Paterson recounts one incident of cowardice by a commanding officer in Norway, but there were doubtless many more despite an infusion of younger captains burning with Nazi determination to fight to the bitter end.

Paterson’s stories generally make for good reading. If his prose seldom
rises above the level of battleship grey, it is nonetheless serviceable, and in one instance, reaches a level of undeniable poignancy as he recounts the tale of a fearfully burned merchant seaman (probably American) plucked from Arctic seas only to endure an icy hell in a lifeboat before finally succumbing in hospital ashore. (92-94)

But there are problems. Both the text (including chapter endnotes) and the bibliography seem to have been hastily thrown together. Many accounts of individual operations lack citation; an essay detailing the handful of archival materials used would be of great help. The editing is too often sloppy. Words are dropped and occasionally sentences make little or no sense in context.

Much is redeemed by striking photographs, especially those in colour, which bring back sights, sounds, smells and atmosphere across seven decades. Despite its several drawbacks, this is a study that should be read by anyone interested in exploring the relatively remote corners of Second World War naval history.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


Germany’s attack on seaborne trade during the Second World War is probably best associated with the U-boat, and yet they were not the only weapons the Kriegsmarine fielded during the conflict. Big warships, such as Bismarck, were also famously sent out to attack the sea-lanes as were a handful (nine, to be exact) armed merchant cruisers. Modern, well camouflaged and relatively inconspicuous, they hunted for enemy merchant shipping literally across the globe from 1940-43.

One of these nine German raiders was the *Komet* or “Raider B”, as she would be known by the Admiralty. Interestingly, *Komet* would not become the most successful, or have the longest voyage, or the most adventures. It was just another warship in a time of war going about a mission that had been assigned.

Aside from an excellent introduction situating the raider within its historical context and a chapter on the narrative of *Komet*’s life, the value of the book lies in the 200 previously unpublished photographs of the ship’s first raiding voyage between July 1940 and November 1941. Mysteriously, where these photographs came from or were found is never explained and leaves the interested reader with many questions. What was the chain of custody? Where were they acquired?

This intrigue is further deepened when the author later states that the photographs had serial numbers and if the numbers were chronological, then some 40-odd photographs have disappeared from the collection — those documenting the ship’s passage...
through the North-East Passage from Norway to the Pacific Ocean. What happened to these images? Were they seized upon return for political reasons? Lastly, there is also the question of the photographer who is never positively identified, but the author makes a convincing case that it was likely the ship’s surgeon, Dr. Jürgen Hartmann.

The pictures themselves are a fascinating study and well annotated without drawing too many conclusions. Those familiar with the study of photographs, especially wartime collections and albums, will immediately see several themes coming out in force. Aside from the numerous photos of ships, from both sides, the photographer captured daily life aboard the ship. From posted crew photographs to shots snapped at random, the images are highly varied. Photos taken ashore give the feel of typical ‘tourist’ photography while those of sinking enemy ships and captured goods and prisoners are ‘trophy shots’, documenting the raider’s success.

Worth noting is that all the pictures of the commander are almost stereotypical ‘Captain’ pictures, while there are no scenes of the officers’ mess or ‘fun’ aboard ship. The crew appears in generally good physical condition and seems to have enjoyed various amusements on board, breaking up the mundane tasks with line-crossing ceremonies, boxing matches, captain’s birthday parties, etc. Readers will also note that, although raiding was almost exclusively a lone-wolf operation, the pictures reveal that a supply ship, u-boat, or another raider were never that far away. They illustrate a well-organized supply system for the raiders and the intricate disguises employed by the German ships. Especially in the Pacific, the raiders masqueraded as Japanese vessels, which was useful pre-Pearl Harbor, but strained diplomacy. The German raid on the British Phosphate installations at Nauru, while extremely successful, would deprive Germany’s ally of vital raw materials when they joined the war—an interesting chapter in the Pacific War that was overshadowed by subsequent events.

Perhaps the biggest lesson, and one that all military historians should remember, is that battle represents at the very most, one-tenth of everything that transpires. Days, weeks, and in the case of the Komet, seven and half months went by without a single capture or ‘action.’ When action did happen it was sharp — and as several photographs show — deadly. Although the victims were well cared for and loss of life was minimized as much as possible, it was wartime and enemy merchantmen fought back with what they had, often times both wireless and with the few guns they carried.

The author’s previously mentioned introduction should be noted as one of the best written on the subject, useful for a popular audience as well as professional scholars. One memorable example is the statistic that, on average, German armed merchant cruisers sank 90,000 tons per ship while U-boats averaged only 15,000 tons apiece (13). One
could argue what exactly this means, but at the very least, it offers much food for thought. The book’s preface, written by a former French naval officer, also links the topic to the modern period where as late as the Cold War, NATO naval exercises considered enemy raiders breaking out and attacking both sea-lanes of communication and enemy warships.

Aside from a few odd phrases and what this reviewer found to be randomly placed footnotes in the text, an issue that could well have arisen during translation, the book’s only real shortcoming was the missing background for the collection of photographs and the unanswered questions it raised. A short discussion of what we can see — or cannot see — in the photographs would also have been beneficial to the work.

Overall, the photographs were a great find and they are now presented in an easy-to-access manner for anyone interested in the topic. Readers from all backgrounds will enjoy this book and specialists in the field should be pleasantly surprised. It is a recommended read and a chance to “step back aboard.”

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


The lucrative export of furs had been a key driver behind Russia’s rapid expansion into Siberia starting around 1600. Furs were still the main national export in 1741 as control over the Kamchatka Peninsula — the last portion of the Eurasian mainland to be absorbed — was still being consolidated when the inexorable search for fresh hunting and trapping grounds took Russia into Alaska. Exploring and Mapping Alaska is a comprehensive description of how knowledge about this vast and remote region was accumulated in successive expeditions for commercial and scientific motives and how the results were made available (or suppressed). Despite the daunting challenges of operating in what remained a barely accessible area, the steady progress over the decades in geographic exploration and studying and describing peoples, fauna, wildlife and resources was a singular achievement. One of the distinguished experts involved in producing this book, Professor Richard Pierce, asserts that it in terms of the volume of information gathered, the Russian output exceeded that of any other contemporary colonial power operating in a territory of comparable size. (462)

Exploring and Mapping Alaska is the result of collaborative effort by academics whose lifetimes have been devoted to study of Russian expansion, its role in Alaska and cartography. It was originally pub-
lished in Russian in 2000. The lead author is Dr. Alexey Postnikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, an internationally recognised authority on the geography and cartography of Russia. Born in 1939, he has had a long and distinguished academic career, starting interestingly at sea when as a graduate he served in a research vessel. The story of the English language version is complex, involving many hands. Postnikov apparently collaborated on this book with Richard A. Pierce, an American historian who was at Queens University in Kingston, Ontario for 29 years before spending a decade at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks. During his long academic career, Pierce authored, published and translated from Russian several historical studies, and in later years, on Russian Alaska. He had apparently originally planned to publish his English translation at the same time as the Russian version, but this did not happen and he subsequently asked Dr. Lydia Black, a colleague in Fairbanks and another distinguished historian of Russian Alaska to help. Black, a native speaker and well known ethnographer and translator in her own right, unfortunately died in 2007 before completely finishing the project. It was left to Dr. Marvin Falk, also of the University of Alaska, to oversee polishing of the translation and selection of illustrations from the university’s Rasmuson Library. The original illustrations provided by Alexey Postnikov were unfortunately not available for inclusion in the English-language edition. Falk also updated the Postnikov narrative to reflect scholarship after the Russian version was published. The finished product is a pleasure to handle: well-bound and attractive with very clear typefaces and an excellent index. This book is a rich resource but lacks a good overall map of Alaska. This makes following the descriptions of various expeditions difficult, particularly when obsolete names for rivers are used.

As Russian influence spread into eastern Siberia and then Alaska, the geographic knowledge of indigenous peoples was assimilated into a growing picture. The narrative explains how the fur traders and government expeditions deliberately incorporated native place names in their surveys. The significant contributions to knowledge about the Alaskan coasts by British voyages, and those by French and Spanish explorers are not neglected. Postnikov carefully describes the accuracy of successive surveys and the techniques being used to determine latitude and longitude. Exploration and surveying involved operating at extreme distances from European Russia using vessels constructed on the frontier. There were many strands to the process; Postnikov describes how Vitus Bering established schools in coastal Siberia as early as the 1730s to train navigators. Several of such locally-trained mariners would, in time, undertake substantial cartographic and hydrographic surveys. The push to steadily expand geographic knowledge came from a combination of commercial and government interests. The commer-
cial drivers are exemplified by the entrepreneur Grigory Shelikhov (1747/48 - 1795), and after its foundation in 1799 the Russian-America Company, which was a monopoly analogous to the Hudson’s Bay Company in North America and the Royal Danish Greenland Trading Company. Having said this, then as now, the Russian state played a much more substantial role in the national economy than the state of Britain and Denmark of the time. The state bodies fostering exploration and investigation were the Russian Admiralty and Academy of Sciences, which did not always share information.

Three long chapters with copious end notes trace in detail the successive Russian projects to map and describe Alaska. This is the story of how knowledge was accumulated and shared over time. The enumeration of expeditions and results in the text is exhaustive, including charts no longer extant and explorations which never published results. The long chapters are chronological but there is a succinct summary of main trends in the conclusion.

This study is forthright about how a characteristic Russian policy of shrouding geographical knowledge in secrecy operated right through to the end of Russian America. All European states conducted their affairs with secrecy at the time; the Spanish also suppressed information about the cartographic achievements of Bodega y Quadra’s 1775 voyage which reached southern Alaska. For the fur traders, preserving secrecy about new areas had obvious advantages — the Hudson’s Bay Company operated in a similar fashion for the same reasons. But secrecy bulked even larger in Russian practices due to the country’s isolation, torturous heritage of internal and external struggles and suspicion of foreigners. Postnikov started his academic career in the 1960s when the Soviet Union omitted sensitive areas, excluding entire large population areas from maps and making only vague schematics publicly available as city maps. The situation has changed since the end of the USSR but he writes that the practice of cartographic and geographic secrecy “has carried forward even in very recent times”. (18)

Three examples follow: when Vitus Bering was despatched on his second voyage from Kamchatka in 1732, this time to establish once and for all if an isthmus connected Asia with America and to thrust towards the American coast, his instructions were to be kept secret and specified “…for public use another special instruction is being issued to you” (53). A few decades later, a secret Admiralty expedition in 1768-9 under two naval officers succeeded in delineating where the Aleutians lay in the North Pacific and produced high quality hydrographic surveys. The valuable expedition reports, however, remained secret, were never published in Russia and began being introduced into Russian scientific literature only in the twentieth century (98). Starting in 1818, a series of seasoned naval officers was
appointed as the Russian-American Company Chief Manager stationed in Alaska. Several had first-hand hydrographic experience and they shared an interest in advancing geographic knowledge. The most outstanding of these naval Chief Managers was Ferdinand von Wrangell, in office between 1830 and 1835, who published a famous study on the geography and ethnography of Alaska in 1839. Virtually all skippers of Russian-American Company vessels were instructed to improve existing charts and to search for new islands. (315). Secrecy, however, continued to apply to exploration. As Postnikov notes, the words “its goals must be kept secret” were underlined in the instructions for an 1838 exploration along the northwest coast of Alaska. (328).

The Russian presence in Alaska was along the Aleutians, Kodiak Island and the most accessible portions of the southern coasts along with the southeastern Panhandle. Traders also worked the western interior south of the Yukon River and the lower 300 km of the Yukon. In addition, charting was done on the northwest coast. By 1867, these were the best mapped areas accompanied as well by a body of ethnographic studies that had been compiled along with investigations of mineral resources, flora and fauna. The Russian population in the vastness of Alaska never exceeded 2,800: 800 Russians plus fewer than 2,000 persons of mixed race termed “Creoles” in Russian descriptions, analogous to the Métis of Canada.

*Exploring and Mapping Alaska. The Russian America Era 1741-1867* is volume 17 in a University of Alaska Press series of translations from Russian and is a credit to the publishers for the quality of both its contents and its attractive format. This is a substantial and rich academic work which brings together insights accumulated over the lifetimes of its distinguished collaborators about how knowledge concerning Russian America was gathered and disseminated.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


This is a complex subject and the authors handle it very well, combining the strategic and geostrategic levels of what was going on in the Soviet Union between 1935 and 1953 with the proposed and actual procurement that was carried out. They explain not only why ships were built but also why specific ship designs were chosen, including a chapter actually titled “Why Did Stalin Build his Big Ocean-Going Fleet?” This chapter offers an
interesting counterpoint to such works as Admiral Sergy Goshkov’s *The Sea Power of the State* (1979), David Fairhall’s *Russia Looks to the Sea* (1971) and Dismukes & McConnell’s *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (1979). In essence, it examines the Soviet navy’s switch from building what was a very modest, mostly coastal force, to a large and impressive ocean-going fleet with an emphasis on vessels that would enhance national status. What really sets this book apart is its extensive use of previously-closed Soviet archives to add an important layer of illumination to the subject.

The book delves deeply into Soviet shipbuilding strategy and Stalin’s role within the procurement process. It examines how important his personal perspective was to the viability of any project and how his thinking on the geographic reality and geostrategic situation of the Soviet Union permeated everything. Stalin remained sceptical about the value of aircraft carriers and was drawn to battleships, even though the experience of the Second World War demonstrated the need for long-range strike capability. In fact, the authors constantly refer to the ongoing Soviet debate over the relative value of ship designs as having a major influence on naval procurement plans. It is very clear that the Soviet navy was not really wedded to any particular design as a core ship upon which to build their fleet. This may explain why, in the end, the navy ended up with the *Sverdlov* class ‘Cruiser’. This was the smallest class of vessel considered capable of everything, but, if built big enough and strong enough, still carried enough cachet to enhance the prestige and pre-eminence of the Soviet state.

Thankfully, the book’s structure is in direct contrast to the complexity of the topic. It follows a chronological path, principally the five-year plans which were the core Soviet planning medium. The authors outline a clear priority of inputs that enables the reader to easily follow their analysis while gaining an understanding of the process. While this book is certainly an exceptionally detailed work that will be of great assistance to any academic, the quality and clarity of its writing also make it accessible for the pleasure reader. This clarity is especially true with the tables, which synthesize a huge quantity of data about proposed designs, into a structure that is both understandable and informative. Some excellent photos, including one of *HMS Royal Sovereign* (144) as the *Arkhangelsk* during her service with the Soviet navy further enhance the reader’s experience.

The fact that a British battleship served as the pride of the Soviet navy from 1944-9 is one of the consequences of Soviet procurement problems. At one point, the Soviet navy even attempted to have battleships built in the USA, because the domestic yards and machinery plants were not able to produce what was needed for such complex vessels. Another example of the ongoing Soviet saga of battleship procurement was the attempt to procure suitable geared turbines. Although they
ordered four sets from the Swiss firm, Brown, Boverie & Cie (88), only two sets were delivered prior to the German invasion. This meant that the battleships were never completed. Luckily for the Soviets, their procurement from Italian sources was more successful, and provided essential ships that were of great operational importance during the Second World War.

Ultimately, this work stands on the quality of research and on the information provided and is really only limited by the length of the book. There is much scope for further analysis and extrapolation from the data assembled. For example, there are fascinating illustrations of aircraft carriers designed in the 1930s that look like a combination of American and British designs—which apparently originated in Italy. The data provided by Rohwer and Monakov not only provides insight into Soviet naval procurement and design, but also into the thinking of other nations. Moreover, by discussing the Soviet leadership’s attempts at foreign procurement, the book provides a context for decisions made at similar levels in other countries.

Alex Clarke
Epsom, Surrey


The American privateers were arguably the most effective seaborne operation that contributed to the British defeat during the Revolution War. Although they sailed from New England through South Carolina ports, much of the activity occurred off the coast of New Jersey, the stretch of coastline between New York Harbor and the Delaware Bay port of Philadelphia. Shomette divides the book into three progressive but interlocking sections: Resolved, Deprivations upon the Trade, and Iron Depression. He states that this book is not a history of late-eighteenth century American privateering. Still, its vast scope and attention to detail make it an excellent source for any scholar wishing to learn about this specific enterprise during this era.

The author defines privateering, how it came about in the nascent United Colonies, how the British developed a counter-initiative, and relates a series of tales of its effectiveness from both vantage points of the conflict. The captivating writing is sprinkled with references that add to the authenticity of the narrative. Shomette takes the reader through intriguing tales of bravado in the tiny ports of Little Egg Harbor, Barnegat Bay and Barnegat Inlet where privateers intercepted British commercial vessels. New Jersey was partly a rebel colony, but with a core of loyalists including the colony’s Royal Governor, William Franklin, the illegitimate son of
Benjamin Franklin. The nascent state was a centre of the vital iron works and salt industries. Salt was vital to the sustenance of the population for general health issues, preservation of meat and fish, and food flavouring, and was, therefore, a valuable commodity.

The book leads the reader through a series of privateering adventures that are spellbinding. These include the convoluted story of Connecticut’s privateer captain Gideon Olmsted (ancestor of famed landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted), who was captured, exchanged, escaped and ultimately landed in Philadelphia with a valuable prize, the Active. Problems ensued in determining whether Pennsylvania or the new Continental Congress had jurisdiction over the sale and distribution of the proceeds from the sale. The legal wrangling went on for many years until Olmsted was sixty-one, but he was not paid until he was eighty-four and by then received only a token recompense.

Another tale of note was the Joshua Huddy affair, a tale of a privateer who was captured by the British and hanged in retaliation for the perceived murder of an Englishman, Philip White. This led to all sorts of accusations and counter-accusations about recriminations, the “eye for an eye” policy and prisoner exchange rules. The story is legalistic as was the Olmsted chronicle, but it caused one to think about the problems of communication during this time and the so-called rules of war which were in effect.

Perhaps Shomette’s best writing was his account of Captain Joshua Barney and the Hyder Ali. Barney was one of the heroes of both the Revolutionary War and the later War of 1812. Through bravery, boldness, brilliance and a great deal of good fortune he overcame a superior British force, including the 20-gun sloop-of-war General Monk and the 16-gun brig Fair American. Later he fooled the frigate Quebec near the capes of Delaware Bay. This involved the twenty-two year old Barney’s clever use of the duplicitous “rule of the contrary” enticing the enemy into a maritime trap, a defeat against overwhelming odds that became legendary.

There are many other tales but the most riveting is found in roughly the last fifty pages concerning maritime prisoners of war and the horrors they experienced onboard the prison ship HMS Jersey. Not be read before bedtime, these chapters vividly describe the noxious smells, the insanity and hopelessness, acts of cruelty and deprivation that took place onboard these floating prisons. Shomette evokes “the cruel, horrible days and nights . . . spent in her squalid hold, a thousand mariners at a time . . . thirsting, moaning, puking, and suffering, with as many as ten a day dying from disease, starvation, and unending brutality.” (9) Foul smelling excrement tubs were “laboriously carried up the ladder to the upper deck [each morning] with the contents often slopping over the sides upon the bearer and then pitched over the side of the ship in
the same locale where salt water for cooking was hauled up.” (268)

The author tells of the appeal to set up a prisoner exchange that was sent to General George Washington. The response was slow in coming. Washington was the commander of the Continental Army and these were captured mariners, many from the privateer fleet, and, therefore, outside his official authority. In addition, the prisoners held by the army were mostly British and Hessians soldiers and their release would likely reinforce Washington’s battlefield opponents. In a drawn out and sometimes dramatic negotiation, some American sailors obtained their freedom, but approximately 20,000 lost their lives in the most horrendous way. Shomette ends with the multi-layered story about the Brooklyn monument that commemorates their sacrifice.

There are a few flaws that the editors at Schiffer apparently missed including proofreading errors and leaving some illustrations mislabeled or misspelled. The book’s focus is at times peripatetic, but does extensively cover privateering operations along the New Jersey Coast. Shomette asserts that William Franklin was incarcerated in the “Catacomb of Loyalty,” the Simsbury (now East Granby) copper mine locally known as New-Gate. Conflicting Connecticut historical documents imply that he was held in Wallingford, Middletown and Litchfield. Franklin’s imprisonment in the copper mine seems unlikely because he was a Franklin and a New England Royal Governor. During the late eighteenth century, a class (caste) system commonly separated important prisoners from the general convict population. That noted, this detail is of little importance.

In general, this book is well written, well organized, thoroughly researched, interesting and thought-provoking. Shomette’s command of his subject provides a significant contribution to maritime history students by his illumination of privateering as it occurred during the critical formative years of the United States of America. In addition, the prolific historian provides difficult-to-find information about the Pennsylvania privateer fleet of the period as well as an extensive bibliography. I thoroughly recommend this work to all students of the American Revolution.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


David Owen Spence’s contribution to the National Museum’s History of the Royal Navy Series is ambitious indeed. Condensing more than five hundred years of British history into a single 200-page volume on the Royal Navy and the British Empire is no simple task, and yet, Spence appears to have done just that. In this
volume, he argues that the British Empire and its navy were interdependent, not only for the purpose of gaining a global empire, but maintaining it as well. Britain’s navy provided the “hard” power to secure the empire but it was also the instrument of “soft” power that imbued British culture (including Christianity), society, and law across the globe. Invariably, this history concludes that the “Royal Navy” was “a fundamental force in shaping the world as we know it” (196).

The author uses a chronological narrative to make his case, but at times, his chapters become more topical in focus. The book generally follows the arc of the British Empire from its Elizabethan roots through its elegant decline in the twentieth century. Briefly diverting from the form of the other chapters, chapter two focuses thematically on “Science and Exploration” by quickly covering the earliest expeditions of the Pacific in the seventeenth century to the conquering of the South Pole in 1911. Other chapters explore the nexus between the trappings of empire and imperial culture, highlighted by an increasing dependence on colonial navies to support Britain’s imperial interests. Black and white photos of the Royal Navy, colonial activities and imperial subjects contribute visually to Spence’s argument throughout the text. There are four coloured leaves of royal naval vessels from the age of sail. It is a nicely bound volume, but the small typeface (7-point font) makes this book an optical challenge for the reader.

Despite the small print, Empire and Imperialism creates a context for objective consideration of the merits and shortcomings of the British Empire. It highlights the “tension between local interests and imperial strategy” that occurred over control of Royal Navy ships as they sailed the empire from home to the colonial outposts (18). Spence writes, “influenced by Victorian morality, romanticism, neo chivalry, and the cult of Nelson, many naval officers felt justified in exceeding their official orders to pursue a higher imperial calling” (37). They felt compelled to be paternalistic towards other peoples and cultures, extolling the merits of British science and values. For example, the chapter, Pax Britannica, describes how the expansion of the British Empire facilitated the general end of slavery around the world as the Royal Navy secured global trade, suppressed piracy, and helped spread Britain’s idea of liberalism (45). Later, the author describes how colonial authorities, tired of the inequalities and hypocrisies of the British system, supported post-colonial independence and a global network of navies modelled after the Royal Navy.

Spence’s exploration of British culture and the Royal Navy is particularly illuminating. The 1808 Army patronage and sex scandal with the Duke of York shocked British elites to the point where many thought it compromised the war against Napoleon and the French. In response, British writers “portrayed naval officers as romantic, chivalrous, paternalistic and
commanding gentlemen, resistant to political and moral corruption” (87). As a result, the Royal Navy came to represent “British manliness” and imperial righteousness. British naval literature provided a “moral compass” for those questioning the empire, portraying the Royal Navy as “the virtuous embodiment of patriotism, self-reliance, courage, paternalism and duty, which made them better leaders and gentlemen” (91). The author notes that this was the rendering lampooned famously by Gilbert and Sullivan. Just as significant was the role of the Royal Navy in spreading English sport to the corners of the empire. The Royal Navy encouraged football (soccer), cricket, sailing, and scouting—all in the vein of “nationalising the force” (106).

Beyond the effects of soft power in the colonies, the Royal Navy also enabled a mercantile shipping industry that contributed to an ever-increasing body of quality seaman available to serve in war and peace. Imperial naval operations “… increased flows of trade, which accelerated Britain’s industrialization ahead of its rivals” (193). Britain’s naval exploits influenced “romanticism” in British arts and entertainment, and ultimately reinforced imperial justifications for subjugating other peoples to British rule.

While this study covers the time span of the British Empire, it still is only a compliment to the literature of British maritime history. Those new to the past of the British imperial experience and the Royal Navy may find this volume less than satisfying. On the other hand, readers who already possess a general understanding of the history the British Empire and the Royal Navy will appreciate this work and the sophistication of Spence’s narrative.

Jon Scott Logel
Portsmouth, Rhode Island


Jo Stanley’s stated purpose was to write a truthful book, an unbiased picture of life as it actually was for women who went to sea, across time, and for a variety of reasons. This is a serious study of the seafaring life of women in Britain and the United States over the last 250 years, from menial jobs to positions of responsibility, and a discussion of how and why those opportunities and working conditions improved over time. It contains a wealth of detailed information based on a combination of personal interviews and historical records about real women who went to sea.

Stanley’s language is plaintive, and for the most part, her literary style is intense. In the introduction and throughout the book, she sometimes assumes a first-person voice, explaining to her readers her rationale for undertaking this
research, choosing specific research methods, and so on, and then re-
examines these topics in Appendix 1. The book also includes other helpful appendices, including a chronology of women who went to sea, a list of cross-dressers, a brief explanation of the organizations in which the women in her book served, and a multidisciplinary social analysis of the concept of the ship as a woman.

Stanley writes from a feminist perspective, including discussions of women who were motivated to go to sea for a variety of reasons, but were forced to defy social norms regarding acceptable women’s roles in order to seize the opportunities that would fulfill or start them on the path toward their occupational goals. Her study includes women disguised as men (cross-dressers) out of necessity, because some jobs were only offered to men, as well as those who were “visibly female” but who dressed in traditional male attire because it was required or appropriate, or because of choices they made associated with their sexual orientation. She also includes those who assumed traditionally feminine roles, such as accompanying their husbands or working in pink-collar occupations. Beginning in the 1970s, women could be employed in the navy and/or merchant marine as deck workers, and more recently, as ship’s officers and captains. In addition, she examines the importance of gender to the men with whom women worked, both in terms of occupational advancement and the ways in which the women were treated, as well as to women who denied that gender was important to their sea-going careers.

The book is formatted into chapters based on similar positions, such as “From Convict Matron to Cruise Director.” The information in these chapters is discussed in roughly chronological order, following the progression of those women as they assumed increasingly responsible positions, and the social and economic reasons that contributed to their advancement. The text is accompanied by numerous photographs of smiling women, as well as some etchings from earlier periods, and biographical sketches of women Stanley interviewed who held these positions.

Many of the women she interviewed talked about their love of the adventure and freedom of the seafaring life, the chance to see the world, and their appreciation of the environment, ranging from the beauty of the ocean, closeness to nature, and the industrial environment of a ship, to the luxury and romance of “floating hotels.”

As Richard Henry Dana Jr. wrote in the first sentence of the concluding chapter of his iconic sea travel narrative, *Two Years Before the Mast* (1840), “There is a witchery in the sea, its songs and stories, and in the mere sight of a ship, and the sailors’ dress, especially to a young mind, which has done more to man navies and fill merchant men, than all the press gangs in Europe…” The same is probably true for women. It would have been helpful if Stanley had devoted more discussion to the factors that influenced girls and
young women to consider the seafaring life. Early in the book, she posed the question, “What starts a woman on a seafaring path?” Books which purport to provide an unbiased picture of life at sea are not new to maritime history, and the reactions of many of the women she interviewed toward the seafaring life are very similar to those described in sea narratives and novels written by and about men. Sea literature, such as Dana’s book, as well as songs about sea life, such as those of Charles Dibdin, were very popular with both sexes, and are known to have influenced boys and young men to go to sea, so it is quite possible that it had the same effect on girls and young women. Stanley discusses the lives of women who went to sea in amazing detail, but it would have been helpful if she had included more detail about what initially motivated little girls to consider a life at sea, and in particular, if she had asked that question to the women she interviewed.

Stanley’s book has a multidisciplinary focus which should appeal to a variety of academic disciplines, including, but not limited to, maritime history and culture, gender studies, and American and British social and occupational history.

Marti Klein
Laguna Niguel, California


The 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War was the first “modern” war of the twentieth century, and marked three things: the beginning of the decline of Czarist Russia; the emergence of Imperial Japan as a world power; and the future dominance of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as a military force. Stille briefly describes the sea combat and the ships that characterized the IJN in its first great test against a European power.

Although a relative newcomer to the naval world, the IJN was well-equipped and its officers trained at a first-class naval academy. Its successful performance in the First Sino-Japanese War 1894-95 should have made foreign observers aware of this new naval threat. The result of that war was increased tension between Japan—now a major East Asian power—and Imperial Russia. Russia had eyed expansion eastward for many years; Imperial China encouraged Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea which eventually brought Russia into conflict with Imperial Japan. Russian intrigue eventually led to Japan’s loss of its war prize of Port Arthur, in Manchuria’s Liaotung Peninsula (which was quickly taken over by the Russians). A Russian-backed coup d’état then overthrew the Japanese-backed government of Korea. During the period 1897-1904, Russia built
railways in Manchuria and dominated that land both economically and militarily. During China’s Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Russia sent 100,000 troops into Manchuria. For its part, Japan managed to isolate Russia by signing a non-intervention treaty with Great Britain. By 1904, it was clear that a war between Imperial Russia and Imperial Japan was only a matter of time.

Imperial Japan struck first on the night of 8–9 February 1904, with a destroyer attack against Russian battleships docked at Port Arthur, although the Japanese ships inflicted minimal damage on the Russian ships. (The Japanese concept of a surprise attack on a foreign naval base was repeated with much greater success at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.) Land combat as well as a number of sea engagements between the two countries followed as the Japanese and Russian armies met in many conflicts over the next year with Port Arthur and Mukden falling to Japan. But the Japanese army was exhausted. Russia, with its near-inexhaustible reserves of manpower, could have ultimately defeated the Japanese on the ground. But the Russians chose a naval strategy: they sent a polyglot naval force from their Baltic Fleet to challenge the IJN. After an epic seven-and-a-half-month voyage, the Russian ships met the IJN on 27–28 May 1905, in the Strait of Tsushima. The IJN, under the able command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro, annihilated the Russian ships with 34 of the 38 Russian ships sunk, captured by the IJN, or fled to a neutral port for internment. By this time, Japan had reached the end of its resources in manpower and economics, while the defeats at Mukden and at Tsushima sapped Russia’s will to fight on. American President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate a settlement to the war, which both sides accepted. The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth was the result and Roosevelt earned a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

Stille’s book is a useful introduction to the IJN of 1904–1905. Wisely, his narrative of the naval engagements of 1904–1905 is brief enough to inform the reader without exhaustive detail. It is clear that, with the exception of Tsushima, the naval engagements were closely fought. Included is the attack on Port Arthur, IJN activities during the siege of Port Arthur, and the Battle of the Yellow Sea (a narrow victory for the IJN). The Russian Navy was almost victorious when an IJN shell killed Russian Admiral Vilgelm Vitgeft, causing the Russian ships to break off the engagement and return to Port Arthur. He also mentions brief naval engagements between the IJN and the Russian Vladivostok naval squadron before describing the climactic Battle of Tsushima.

Following the narrative is the heart of the book, featuring in-depth descriptions of the various classes of IJN ships—battleships, armoured cruisers, protected cruisers, unprotected cruisers, coastal defence ships, gunboats, destroyers, and torpedo boats. All are detailed with each ship of each class (and in some cases, each sub-class of ship) listed,
together with charts showing their specifications: displacement, dimensions, propulsion, speed, range, protection, armament, and crew. An accompanying chart shows the different ships’ builders, dates laid down, dates launched, and dates commissioned. As well, Stille includes a brief narrative of the ships’ various roles in the 1904-1905 war.

The book is heavily illustrated with period photographs, many colour sideview plates of various IJN ships, illustrations of the surprise attack on Port Arthur and the Battle of Tsushima, and a cutaway view of Mikasa, Togo’s flagship at Tsushima, which has been preserved as a museum in Japan. These illustrations offer readers a visual sense of the ships and break up the array of the charts. They will be of aid to the modeller as well as the historian.

Anyone looking for a detailed study of the IJN in 1904-1905 will not find it in this book. Many books have been written about the Russo-Japanese War; Osprey alone has two other books available for those wishing to learn more (Osprey Essential Histories #31: The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 and Osprey Men-At-Arms # 414: The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905.) The Imperial Japanese Navy of the Russo-Japanese War should be seen as a handy reference to the IJN ships and as a starting point for further reading and research into this fascinating conflict which led to so much in the future. In recommending this book, this reviewer hopes that Mark Stille will write a companion volume on the Imperial Russian Navy of the Russo-Japanese War.

Robert L. Shoop
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I doubt that the distinction between Operation Neptune and Operation Overlord needs defining for readers of the Northern Mariner. Operation Neptune, of course, refers to the maritime aspects of the invasion of Normandy and is often glossed over, or worse, taken for granted and ignored, in the accounts of the military campaign. There are at least two reasons for this. One is the common assumption that the naval war was won, the Axis naval forces and capabilities were derisory, and there was really nothing to it. The second is that Operation Neptune was a stunning success, virtually flawless in execution and result, and as such, can be put to one side. Closely connected to that notion is the fact that the ground campaign went anything but according to plan and so that is the more fruitful arena for drama and historical study and analysis.

Symonds has provided a critical corrective to this common appreciation of those cataclysmic events surrounding the highly successful return of the Western
allies to the northwest European continent and so commenced the liberation of France, the Low Countries and, ultimately, the invasion of Nazi Germany itself. He reminds us that Operation Neptune was a vast, complex and fraught undertaking that was unquestionably the most difficult naval operation ever attempted. A seaborne assault against a heavily defended coast, in contested waters, with the landing force numbering in the multiple tens of thousands of soldiers and their equipment, vehicles and supplies, was without precedent and, let’s be clear, could not be done today with the resources at hand by even the United States, let alone the much diminished reach of then-contemporary other powers.

The author, an emeritus professor from the U.S. Naval Academy has written a marvellous account of Operation Neptune. While emphasizing the American side of the equation, he is even-handed and covers the British side of events with sensitivity and generosity. He is a rare American historian in his willingness to credit the contribution of the British and essentially accepts that it was a genuine partnership between, if not equals in the material sense, certainly so in the moral one.

The account is wide ranging and covers to a good level of detail the strategic discussions and arrangements made between American and British officers, as well as those made at the political level between Roosevelt and Churchill. These discussions had got underway before the entry of America into the war and established from the very beginning that Germany was the chief threat and would be dealt with first. While the British assessment of this reality was straightforward, it was less so for the Americans at a surface level. Isolationist sentiment was a powerful force in American politics and Roosevelt had to accommodate this factor with great care and sensitivity. As well, the perceived immediate threat was Japanese as, indeed, it turned out to be on 7 December 1941. Nonetheless, senior American military, naval and political leadership had all independently concluded that Germany had to be dealt with first and that conclusion did not shift with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Symonds’ account of this thinking and the developing Anglo-American relationship is well done.

With this framework established, Symonds provides an excellent account of the strategic planning, discussions and compromises that led to the invasion of June 1944. He lays out the perspective of the participants clearly and comprehensively. Chapters follow that cover the build-up of American forces in the United Kingdom, logistical matters, and how the necessary shipping was designed and built. In operational terms, he covers the differences in procedures between the two allies, praising in particular the imaginative use of technology by the supposedly hidebound and rigid British. Another chapter covers the training required for the assault forces and the lessons learned from those exercises. Against this background, the core of
the book describes Operation Neptune itself vividly. Symonds ranges widely and inserts anecdotes from the participants both high and low. The sheer scale and painstaking detail involved in Operation Neptune is brought to life and the achievement of those responsible for it—such as RN Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and his subordinates, American and British—is remarkable. Operation Neptune was the midwife to the successful D-Day invasion, and hence the liberation of Western Europe. It deserves to be much better known, respected and, indeed, revered as is its much higher profile offspring.

Symonds has conducted thorough research into the archives of the United States— including the memoirs of participants that are retained in a number of repositories. He has provided an excellent bibliography of both primary and secondary sources. Most of his research on the British side of things is by way of these secondary sources. There are only cursory references to Canada in the volume as one might anticipate. There are numerous maps, diagrams, illustrations and photographs to illuminate the text. These are well done and helpful.

This is a useful history of Operation Neptune. It tells a neglected story well and it is a story that deserves to be known much better. Symonds book is an excellent addition to the shelf of anyone interested in the Second World War and I recommend it accordingly.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


The Henry Huddleston Rogers Collection of ship models at the U.S. Naval Academy Museum is an exceptional collection, renowned to serious ship modellers, and the subject of a well-known and well-worn catalogue, originally published as a pamphlet in 1946 and subsequently by the USNI Press (editions 1954, 1958, 1964, 1971). For ship model builders, historians, and ship model lovers, however, the current publication by Grant Walker takes access to the wonders of dockyard models to a whole new level.

The approach of telling the history of ship design through an examination of contemporary ship models has developed an enthusiastic following and has resulted in the publication of a number of well received volumes, two examples being, the Robert Gardiner and Brian Lavery offerings in the Seaforth Publishing/Naval Institute Press “History in Ship Models” Series (2012 and 2014 respectively, both previously reviewed in these pages). This latest contribution to the genre, the first of a planned series of four, is complementary to the previous two. While it follows the mould of placing the models within the historical context of the operational history of
the ships concerned, and of the advances in naval architecture and of naval science of the period, where it differs is in the degree of detailed inspection of each individual model, and in the identification of differences in modelling approach, technique, and evidence of restoration. In this sense, the history of the models themselves takes the foreground.

The core of the book (181 pages) examines seven models of the Rogers Collection, three First Rates and four Second Rates, representing ships spanning the years 1682 to 1828. The presentation of these models is supported by a truly exceptional collection of photographs, ranging from complete ship photographs spanning full pages, to close-up details (for example, of figureheads at more than twice actual size), to numerous interior shots taken with a surgical arthroscope, to a couple of x-ray shots and even one CT-scan image of a model in cross-section. The quality of photographic reproduction in terms of resolution and colour is, with one sole exception, quite outstanding. The interior shots (in the case of one model, no less than 12 of them) show an astounding degree of attention to modelling detail, all the more surprising in that some of it was eventually completely enclosed by the completion of the model. The author speculates (177) that this apparently wasted effort may have been due to the maker(s’) showing the model off to interested parties at various stages of construction.

Throughout the text and in dedicated appendices, the author discusses the origins and provenance of the models in terms of purpose, builders, and succession of owners. This is a fascinating part of the book as it emphasizes just how exceptional and unlikely it is to have such a collection assembled in one place.

While it is commonly supposed that dockyard models were constructed as part of the design (and design approval) process, the author points out that that this was generally not the case, but that solid hull (or 'bread and butter') models were used for this purpose. The more detailed dockyard style (framed) models took simply too long to build to be effectively used in this way (in one documented case, p. 202, a rigged model for the Admiralty boardroom took four years to build, with up to four builders involved). Rather, the author concludes that what we know as dockyard models would most likely have been built as gifts in the patronage system then prevailing. He notes that Pepys received models from Antony Deane and Phineas Pett, respectively master shipwrights at Harwich and Chatham Dockyards. Pepys' successor as Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board, Charles Sergison (1655-1732), himself amassed a considerable collection of ships models, 15 in all, which were purchased from his family by Col. Henry Huddleston Rogers in December 1922 for the (then) considerable sum of £6000.

Col. Rogers, a U.S. Artillery officer who served in the Mexican campaigns against Pancho Villa and
in the First World War, was heir to the immense Huttleston Rogers fortune and thus, after his military service, had the leisure and means to indulge his collecting urge, which turned more and more to ship models.

His personal interest and wealth, applied through acquisition and restoration of the models, construction of a private museum, and eventual bequest to the U.S. Naval Academy, is a significant (and significantly unlikely) factor in the preservation and augmentation of Sergison's collection as an integral whole. As the author notes, the circumstances of the discovery of other models (one unidentified model having been found hanging in the rafters of an antique dealer's lumber room!) highlights that the patronage origins of the models led to their ownership in private hands rather than in state institutions, and hence, vulnerability to dispersion in economic hard times (as after the First World War).

And what of the model makers themselves? As Walker notes, due to their production largely as patronage gifts, the models are associated more with the donor than the maker. There is one notable exception where, in the 1990s, handwritten notes (dated 1774 and 1787) were found inside two models identifying the builder as one George Stockwell, ‘moddler’ at Sheerness Dockyard. A subsequent note dated 1820 was found in one of Rogers models signed 'George Stockwell son of George Stockwell Moddler'. The only other model of the collection with a known builder was the most recent, HMS Royal Adelaide, build by Sir Robert Seppings, Surveyor of the Navy 1813-1832, for his patron and the ship's namesake, Queen Adelaide. Interestingly (and somewhat tragically), this model (illustrating a number of Seppings' significant design innovations) came into private rather than royal hands after Seppings was unceremoniously dismissed on the dissolution of the Navy Board and appointment of Sir William Symonds (a yacht designer) as Surveyor. Ironically, relative to this tale of the connection of dockyard models to patronage, Seppings' fate was probably sealed by the fact that (regardless of their war-fighting merits) King William IV found Seppings' rounded sterns “displeasing to the eye” (185), while Symonds had successfully designed a number of Royal Yachts.

The memorial to the majority of un-named model makers remains their works, preserved in a number of collections, but most effectively presented in this marvellous volume. This book is a tremendous testament to the exceptional technical and artistic craftsmanship embodied in the models. Just as one measure of the accuracy achieved, one series of measurements used the remarkable consistency of ‘room and space’ over 30 frame spacings, compared with the specified frame spacings of the 1706/1719 establishment in order to determine the unusual scale ration of the model. For this and many similar insights, this volume is very highly recommended for all interested in the miniature nautical archeology enabled by contemporary ship
models. Anticipating a continuation of the high standard of production and scholarship, this reviewer awaits eagerly the subsequent volumes.

Richard Greenwood
Victoria, British Columbia


The often-quipped axiom “never judge a book by its cover” has surely never been better demonstrated than by this work. On first glance, the cover is an understated black and white photo of a burial party, with the title in bold red and a drab khaki green background. Its appearance belies the drama and quality that lie within, a story of hardship and triumph, of brave young men and women rising to the occasion in a part of the Pearl Harbor attack that is often overlooked in favour of the more famous portions.

This is a book which deserves to be read. It will certainly be of great interest to both the academic and interested reader, although it may be a little densely packed with content for the casual reader. In compiling the exceptionally well researched text, with an exhaustive list of resources, the three authors have really poured a lot of their lives into this work and it shows. Their choice of black and white photos throughout lends it a level of authenticity although the shades of grey chosen for the plans, whilst useable, are a missed opportunity for splashes of colour that could have been quite enlivening. One would buy it, however, for the words, not the illustrations.

This work follows a logic, not only a chronological order, but what an eye-witness would experience. It provides a fulsome understanding of what happened, along with a real sense of being there; for example, what it would have been like flying in a patrol bomber based in Kaneohe Bay, before, during and after the Japanese attack on Hawaii. Patrol bomber is where the “PB” in “PBY Catalina” comes from, the “Y” standing for Consolidated, the company that built them.

Kaneohe Bay was, in many ways, the most crucial strike for the Japanese, as it was the PBY Catalina’s based there that were capable of finding their carrier force. Especially in the pre-radar era, aircraft had assumed the scouting role previously assigned to naval cruisers, namely, finding the enemy. For the United States Navy and the force on Hawaii, the scouting fell to flying boat squadrons. The Japanese destruction of Kaneohe Bay, and the equipment, personnel and facilities there, represented a major setback for the U.S., both in the immediate and longer term. Unfortunately, this is a forgotten and largely overlooked...
episode in comparison to other strikes, such as the attack on Hickam Field. As the book highlights, in both cases, US aircraft had been lined up in neat rows for the strafing Japanese, almost certainly against the instincts of the officers directly responsible for them. This decision was exacerbated by the withdrawal of the heavy Anti-Aircraft unit from the US Army’s 98th Coast Artillery unit.

The book does not just consider a single day in December: it starts by explaining the background of the base, its commissioning in February 1941, the state of its manning and its personalities. The emphasis on individuals is explicit, for the authors seem to have found a photograph of almost everyone they mention. Whether it was Cdr Harold M. Martin (who would go on to become a full Admiral and retire in 1956, after having held commands like that of 7th Fleet and 1st Fleet in his career), the commissioning base commander or Grace Watson, whose husband Raphael “Ralph” Watson died in the attack on Kaneohe Bay, and many, many, others. This is all part of their personal approach to highlighting the history and developing the narrative—but again it is definitely value added and highlights the effort they have made.

After covering the origin of the base, they discuss how decisions were being made, and how personnel dealt with those decisions. This provides valuable background, a baseline, from which to compare the men’s actions prior to December 7 and what they did on the day. Again, this adds a fascinating level of depth and analysis. The authors then focus on the day of the attack, delivering a lot of intricate detail quite quickly, but not overwhelmingly. Once again, personalizing the story helps to break up what could otherwise be huge blocks of information, making it much more enjoyable to read.

The reader is left with a lasting image of the sheer mental unpreparedness of the US forces. Time and again it highlights people trying to raise the alarm only to be ignored. It might have been arrogance, it might have been the Sunday/day off effect, it might have been any number of things, but the result was to catch the US military quite literally napping. The lesson we are left with is that if money is going to be spent hiring and training people, then when they say something is wrong, someone should listen. After all, if they are going to be ignored, why bother spending the money in the first place?

Alex Clarke
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