
Anthony “Tony” Bentley-Buckle’s autobiography, *Through Albert’s Eyes*, is the latter part of a two-volume series titled *The British Navy at War and Peace*. Edited by Captain Peter Hore, whose previous works range from naval histories to detailed encyclopedias of capital ships, Bentley-Buckle’s memoir highlights a life of adventure, suspense and enterprise, first as a naval officer and later, as a commercial entrepreneur. Described as a “child of the empire,” Bentley-Buckle’s tale leads readers all over the globe, from his father’s plantations in Ceylon and boarding schools in Belgium, to combatting Germans in Arctic waters, on Italian beaches, in Yugoslav forests, and ultimately into a naval prisoner-of-war camp in northern Germany.

Born 13 August 1921 in Knokke, Belgium, Bentley-Buckle introduces his “empire family.” His father, Noel William, often referred to as “Box,” owned a rubber plantation in Ceylon with his wife, Mary. By 1926, the family decided to return to England with the ambition of retiring to a flat in Monte Carlo. Unfortunately, the discovery of synthetic rubber and the economic downturn in the 1920s meant Box’s money, tied up in rubber shares, dwindled to the point of forcing Bentley-Buckle’s parents to return to Ceylon. Left in the care of his austere Victorian aunts, both Bentley-Buckle and his sister spent their early lives shuttling between England and the continent, frequenting schools in Belgium. After enduring severe teasing from other students, Bentley-Buckle convinced his mother to allow him to attend St. Richard’s at Little Malvern, England.

He attended Ampleforth school from 1930 to 1938, during which time his mother passed away of a heart attack induced by an overdose of gas at the dentist. Bentley-Buckle decided to sit an examination for the Royal Navy, in which he passed out thirty-third in the Executive Branch. As a young cadet, Bentley-Buckle’s naval career began on board HMS *Frobisher* for training duties, which then led to HMS *Vindictive* for cruises to France and Iceland and finally to HMS *Dunedin* for his first assignment. At the outset of the Second World War, HMS *Dunedin* patrolled the northern seas against U-boat activity between Scapa Flow and the Faroe Islands and then between the Faroes and Iceland. Admiral Max Horton, commander-in-chief of Northern Patrol, immediately recognized his talents after Bentley-Buckle navigated the Swedish cargo vessel, *Pedro Christopherson*, through the Fair Island Channel once the Swedish captain, petrified of mines and U-boats, had “proceeded to his cabin with a bottle of port and refused to be responsible for the navigation of his ship” (p.13). During 1941 Bentley-Buckle saw service escorting convoys in Murmansk, hunting the *Bismarck* (in HMS *Edinburgh*) and then performing minor duties aboard HMS *Repulse* and HMS *Revenge* when they were based in South Africa.

In the spring of 1943, Bentley-
Buckle returned to the Admiralty after a year-long stint in South Africa during which he suffered a broken elbow and wrist fracture from a riding incident. At HMS Armadillo in Scotland, he began commando training for special services as a beachmaster in the Allied invasion of Sicily; by July, his G Commando was the first wave ashore at the southern tip of Pachino. Three months later in Messina, G Commando prepared to cross the strait to Reggio, where Bentley-Buckle’s encounter with Field Marshal Montgomery “haranguing the troops” prompted the beachmaster to end Monty’s performance with “would you mind vacating the beach?” (25). Once the invasion force had reached the east coast of Italy, Bentley-Buckle’s next adventure was on the Croatian island, Lussin Piccolo; his objective was to deliver rations to Yugoslav partisans looking to leave the island. Not unlike a Harrison Ford thriller, a German spy within the Yugoslav ranks contacted the Wehrmacht; six days after Bentley-Buckle’s arrival, German landing craft appeared along the coast equipped with SS-Gebirgsjäger to take the villa occupied by the partisans. Now on the run, Bentley-Buckle sought refuge among local townsfolk along his way to Trieste when he was sold out to the Gestapo by his so-called Italian protector. Being a naval prisoner-of-war officer, Bentley-Buckle spent the remainder of the war at the Marlag Nord – short for Marine Lager – in the village of Westertimke outside of Bremen. There, he was reunited with his former shipmate and war artist John Worsley. The two of them conspired with other prisoners in creating a papier-mâché dummy (which influenced the 1953 film named after the dummy, Albert RN) for fooling the guards.

With the end of the war in sight and the camp liberated by a British armoured division, Bentley-Buckle’s post-war life boomed into commercial enterprise. Constructing commodity shipping lines from scratch, such as the Southern Line and the East African National Shipping Line, this “child of the empire’s” tale concludes with big business, adventures of world travel, and retirement along the Beaulieu River in Hampshire. Overall Tony Bentley-Buckle’s memoirs are a riveting read for all types of enthusiasts as well as for the avid scholar seeking details into one man’s daily life throughout the twentieth century.

Christopher Pearcy
West Haven, Connecticut


The end of the Napoleonic era in 1815 ushered in a period in which the British Navy focused on exploration and expeditions. As this shift occurred, so too, was there an accompanying shift in religious attitudes and activities in the navy. Building upon his earlier history, Evangelicals in the Royal Navy 1775-1815: Blue Lights & Psalm-Singers (Boydell, 2008), Richard Blake provides an exceptionally well-written and well-researched volume on religion in the Royal Navy during much of the nineteenth century. He capably demonstrates how religion, especially evangelicalism, as both an expression of low church spirituality within the Church of England (identified by the author as Evangelicalism) and conservative spirituality and theology in nonconformist churches (identified as evangelicalism), moved from the periphery to the centre of much of maritime spirituality and gained greater acceptance and influence as the century progressed.

Drawing from several decades of research by historians of evangelicalism (no
distinction made within this review) such as David Bebbington, Mark Noll, Andrew Porter, and John Wolffe, the author firmly situates Royal Navy Christian piety within the strong evangelical expression of Christianity that was present in nineteenth-century Great Britain and that transcended denominationalism. Evangelical expressions of Christianity were built upon four things articulated by David Bebbington in *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (1989) and known now as the “evangelical quadrilateral.” The components are biblicism, crucicentrism, conversionism, and activism. While much of nineteenth-century evangelical fervour and social reform activity in Great Britain (and in the United States) was directed at social concerns ashore, there was a parallel effort directed at the merchant marine and navy. Blake’s history looks at the naval recipients of those efforts – the officers and sailors of the Royal Navy – and shows the importance of their faith commitments to the structure and operations of the service. For example, a close friend of antislavery champion William Wilberforce was Sir Charles Middleton, Lord Barham (1726-1813). When Middleton became first lord of the Admiralty in 1805, his personal convictions were translated into naval policy, ethos, and regulations that set an administrative course for the next fifty year in the Royal Navy. It was on this sea of religious conviction that ships and crews of the navy operated.

The volume is divided into three parts and a conclusion. In Part I, “Surviving and Spreading,” the author demonstrates how, in the immediate aftermath of the war, there was a greater presence of evangelicalism in the merchant marine than in the Royal Navy. And yet, because there was so much contact between the two, the spread of piety and fervour into the Royal Navy was not extraordinary. For some men in both the upper and lower deck, evangelicalism gradually became part of their understanding of their profession and vocation. It was also in the years following the war that concern for the social wellbeing of mariners afloat and ashore, the “Sailors’ Cause,” began to grow. Blake skillfully describes and illustrates the evangelical maritime network that addressed this cause.

In Part II, “Mid-Century Tendencies,” the author demonstrates how religious attitudes in the navy interacted with and shaped ideas regarding a constellation of issues that needed to be addressed by the naval profession such as discipline, punishment, education, alcohol abuse, sexual behaviour, health, and leave. Interest in organized religion also grew in the nineteenth century and this social rise did not exclude the navy. For many officers, spiritual disciplines such as prayer, Bible reading, devotions, and worship joined easily with the rigours of the naval profession even though time to perform them was always a challenge. Revivalism and increased interest in religion and spirituality in society at large affected religion in the navy through the work of chaplains and the enthusiasm of devoted officers and sailors. Religion was also strengthened formally through naval regulations. Additionally, Tractarianism found its way into the navy and though it offered a different spirituality from evangelicalism, it strengthened the overall standing in the sea services. The interweaving of several strands of ordained and lay piety provided enhanced expressions of spirituality from the wardroom to the gunroom.

In Part III, “Naval Piety’s Global Reach,” the author recounts the linking of the nineteenth-century Protestant missionary movement with the seaborne reach and influence of the Royal Navy (something that would parallel late-nineteenth-century America’s rising naval power and missionary endeavours). The
linking of evangelism with imperialism would have positive and negative effects but Blake shows the mechanisms of that linkage and some of its repercussions, especially in China and the South Pacific region.

The nineteenth century was an era of enthusiastic exploration and scientific enquiry from Africa to the Arctic and religion was a prominent part of that story. The ill-fated Franklin expedition produced numerous headlines generating significant official and unofficial response. Franklin’s religious enthusiasm was prominent as was that of others such as Sir Edward Parry (1790-1855) and Captain (later Admiral Sir) George Nares (1831-1915). Whether fighting, surveying, or exploring, spiritually sensitive officers were able to easily link their piety to the navy and naval profession in which service was understood as being part of a greater humanitarian cause.

The volume includes a helpful glossary and extensive bibliography. The work is a welcome addition to the history and readers will not be disappointed in this highly-recommended book. It is essential reading for any person interested in the faith of those termed by the psalmist as “those who go down to the sea in ships” (Ps. 107:23).

Timothy J. Demy
Newport, Rhode Island


Judging by its cover and subtitle, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan* is an account of the political and economic relationship between the newly established Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan and the trading conglomerate known as the Dutch East India Company. This book, however, offers much more than that. The author, Adam Clulow, is a professor of East Asian History at Monash University in Australia. His doctoral studies at Columbia led him to write this book, which examines not only the interaction between the Japanese and the Dutch, but the nature and extent of European power in early modern Asia.

Clulow acknowledges a number of experts in the field of East Asian history in the preface to this book, but throughout the book, his own expertise in the field is apparent. The Dutch East India Company (which is referred to as the VOC, for *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) and its relationship with Tokugawa Japan is the focal point for this examination. The VOC was an organization that combined both the attributes of a commercial company as well as those of a modern state. Were diplomacy and violence the primary tools that the VOC employed in its dealings with Japan? In order to answer this question, Clulow divides the book into sections which cover the diplomatic, military and economic facets of the relationship between the VOC and Japan.

This is not simply a revisionist history designed to challenge the notion that European powers pummeled their way around the world in search of profits, subduing the peoples that got in their way. It is, rather, a sophisticated account of a sovereign European power dealing with a leading Asian nation in the early modern period. It builds upon the scholarship of others who have examined this historical era, and Clulow’s addition to this inquiry into the nature of European-Asian dialogue is a welcome one. His writing style is lucid and engaging, and his use of primary source material from both Dutch and Japanese writing adds to the authority with which he
addresses this topic.

Clulow presents the idea that the Dutch did not subdue their Japanese hosts as much as they were themselves subdued, and “mastered” by the Tokugawa clan. In order to ensure that sufficient economic activity was allowed to continue between the Dutch and the Japanese, the Dutch were forced to pay their respects in a number of rather unusual ways. Trampling the crucifix in the presence of the Shogun and his ministers was one such method, but another was to acquiesce to the Japanese demand that the Dutch assist the Tokugawa government in subjugating a Christian fortress by actually turning the cannons of the Dutch fleet on the fort.

Recounting the Dutch efforts to establish a trading presence in Japan is only one of Clulow’s objectives. In the section of the book on diplomacy, an interesting account of the trials and tribulations that the Dutch faced in forging their relationship with Japan is contrasted with similar explanations of the English and Portuguese efforts to do likewise. Clulow explains how the political situation in Europe and the fact that the Dutch were from a Republic, few of which existed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, hindered, and in some cases helped, to form lasting diplomatic and economic relationships. This is a fascinating overlay of European and Asian political, military, and economic history, yet Clulow manages to present the story interlaced with exciting accounts of maritime adventure and intrigue.

An important topic in the section on violence is the technological advantage that European powers enjoyed at the dawn of the modern era. Clulow discusses the revolution in maritime affairs that helped propel Europeans to the far corners of the world in the age of exploration. He then adds an element of inquiry that is generally missing in other accounts of European prowess at sea. Brilliantly juxtaposing the experience of European traders and explorers in the sixteenth century to the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early years of the twenty-first century, Clulow suggests that advanced technology does not always secure advantageous political, diplomatic, or economic arrangements for those who possess it. Examining the interplay between Europe’s technological “superiority” and their ability (or lack thereof) to leverage this advantage in diplomatic interaction with Asian powers in the early modern period occupies much of the latter half of the book. It is a fascinating account, and worthy of further study.

Meticulously researched and presented in a highly readable fashion, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan will appeal to both scholars and to general readers alike. It is not only a thoroughly researched political and economic history, but it is a fascinating maritime adventure as well. It fills a gap in our understanding of the Dutch experience in early modern Japan, and enhances our understanding of the political and economic interaction between Europe and Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is highly recommended.

Jeffrey M. Shaw
Providence, Rhode Island


The sea voyage from New York to San Francisco via Cape Horn is about 18,000 miles and even the largest American-built,
square-rigged ships could take up to five months to make the passage. In the 1850s, rugged Easterners seeking to make their fortune in newly blossoming California took the surest route by sea rather than going overland or via Chagres and Panama or Mexico. What those travellers might not have realized was that they were being transported in the most graceful wind-powered and wood-built ships ever to have plied the sea.

William L. Crothers retired in 1972 from a long career as a draughtsman in the design division of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He has already written a well-received book, *The American-Built Clipper Ship*, in which he examined the construction of American wood-built clippers. With this new book, Crothers modestly claims that he is “merely the compiler of a consequence of the experiments, ideas and dreams of individuals who designed and built ships.” On the contrary, he has written a brilliant analysis of how American wood-built packets and freighters were constructed in the 1850s and their subsequent development.

Demand for this class of ship peaked between 1853 and 1857, when American shipyards boomed, but it was followed by a twelve-year slump until 1870 when America’s role in world shipbuilding declined. Crothers’ book focuses on two categories of vessel, packets and freighters, which were built in shipyards located along North America’s eastern seaboard. Both classes were acknowledged to be man’s most beautiful creation and the author believes that anyone fortunate enough to have seen them under sail would have been unlikely to forget it.

The author explains how American-built sailing ships had traditionally preferred to avoid trading to the tropics. In the 1850s, however, they formed an important nucleus to the commercial shipping industry. Coupled with the demand-led construction of new ships in the east coast shipyards, they also fuelled a revival. Crothers discusses the achievement of naval architects and shipbuilders in conquering the problem of achieving flotation, as well as the naval architects’ quest for improved propulsion. All these important developments and refinements resulted in new ways to overcome the sea’s natural forces.

The author strongly believes that although much has been written and explained about the external and interior appearance of these wooden vessels, there has not been enough published about the forces needed to combine for their creation. This imaginative book fills that void, as it is not only written in layman’s terms, but it is also accompanied by some 150 illustrations of these iconic ships. These include the radically designed *Sea Witch*, launched in 1846, with its unusual concave clipper bow designed to pitch the ship upwards rather than smash headlong into the waves.

A feature of this book is how the author’s privileged access led him to uncover rare and basic building plans for a series of important ships. Through illustrations, text, plans and drawings he provides an explanation of the steps needed to prepare for construction, the selection and suitability of timbers to be used, the laying of the keel, stem and sternpost, the assembling of frames, floors, beams, masts and rudders and, finally, the fitting out of interiors and rigging. The limited number of vessels described (only 67) in the book’s alphabetical and chronological lists reflects the general lack of interest in the workhorse packets and freighters compared with the public’s fascination with the more glamorous clippers.

Crothers traces the characteristics required to operate a useful and profitable business with wooden clippers constructed on the east coast of North America during the 1850s. He also discusses the
consequences of the great financial depression that struck America in 1857, only to be followed four years later by the Civil War, when many British shipowners seized the opportunity to buy solid American-built clippers at low, knock-down prices. Finally, the threat of iron construction was beginning to loom over the shipbuilding industry.

Basil Lubbock, in his book The Colonial Clippers, argued that American-built ships had affected the Australian gold boom in the 1850s and also the emigrant trade from Europe. While many points in their construction were common to all—ranging from their semi-elliptical stern via the large wheelhouse aft to their elaborate, full-length figureheads—they still lacked the graceful shape of contemporary British-built vessels.

William Crothers has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of American maritime history that would interest a broad swath of readers, including economists and maritime historians. The book contains a helpful glossary of contemporary industry terms and it is a definitive study of the mid-nineteenth century’s great American-built square-rigged ships. As such, it justifiably deserves a place on the shelves of anyone with an interest in maritime history.

Michael Clark
London, England


I was expecting to read yet another account of dramatic, heretofore classified, Cold War submarine operations written by a former junior sailor, the type of book that seems to be proliferating among booksellers these days – which are invariably short on detail and long on speculation. This book pleasantly surprised me as being nothing of the sort. It is a refreshingly straightforward recollection of six years of a young man’s life in the U.S. Navy serving onboard a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

The author, Ted Dubay, is a nuclear-trained specialist who tells the story of his short career in the U.S. Navy, between 1966 and 1972, at the height of both the Cold War and the Vietnam War, when military service in the United States, unlike today, was not at all popular. Using a chronological narrative, he effortlessly recounts his experiences through training and deployment, while deftly explaining the equipment and procedures of being an operator of a nuclear propulsion plant on the ballistic missile submarine USS Henry Clay based out of Guam. I say deftly because he cleverly explains the submarine with details that are understandable to the layman, while maintaining the interest of more knowledgeable readers and not divulging classified information – it is really well done.

The title, Three Knots to Nowhere, really sums up life in a ballistic missile submarine on patrol; while attack submarines seek confrontation, ballistic missile submarines, on the other hand, must remain undetected and always ready to launch their missiles. Therefore, once in their patrol area, ballistic missile submarines remain very quiet and patrol at slow speeds in a vast open ocean area – as he says, at three knots (about 5.6 km/h) going nowhere. Understanding there is not much exciting to tell about submarine operations when on patrol, Dubay explains the training routine every submariner in the world undergoes, with the lack of privileges and the complete focus on study to become a
qualified member of the team. Moreover, he tempers his narrative with the knowledge that patrolling Soviet submarines are always at hand and that everyone onboard has a role in avoiding counter-detection. On a lighter note, there are a number of pranks that underscore the rather unique submariner sense of humour that anyone familiar with life at sea in the Navy will instantly recognize.

Very easy to read, the book has a few black and white photos and one basic drawing of the submarine. To be clear, this is very much a personal story of one man and his experiences, which at times can seem a bit melodramatic, but one must remember this is a snapshot of a period of naval history that is not well documented – personal accounts of Cold War submariners – and it understandably portrays their contemporary thoughts and concerns. The description of life as a young sailor in the late 1960s is particularly interesting to historians, as it accurately reflects the mixed feelings of the time, combining the sobering thought of nuclear deterrence tempered by the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and anything military.

The author also tells a story of life on and off the submarine through personal anecdotes and the deprivations that life in a submarine demand. That said, although he volunteered for service in submarines, I was struck by his frequent references to needing “to escape the confines of the metal cylinder” (p.93). Throughout the narrative, he recounts the nagging concern he had for previous submarine accidents, which he explains well. His account of a very real hydroplane jam and the resulting hair-raising depth excursion is something that will immediately attract the attention of any submariner.

An enjoyable read, the narrative reflects a young man, not resigned to a full naval career, who is professional in difficult circumstances while going through a period of his life which just happened to be onboard a ballistic missile submarine. Throughout the book he gives an accurate depiction of routine patrols and effectively explains the camaraderie, which is common in all submarine forces. I would recommend this book to anyone with an interest in submarines, as it is an excellent scene-setter for life onboard submarines, however, at US $29.95, it is a bit pricey.

Norman Jolin
Kanata, Ontario


Amid an overall increase in world trade, Norwegian shipping in particular expanded rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century. By 1880, the relatively small nation of Norway boasted the world’s third-largest merchant fleet, and Norwegian sailors had gained international renown for their skill. During the same period, however, as the worldwide preference for steam- over sail-powered vessels steadily increased, Norwegian ship owners proved reluctant to make the transition. Among the reasons typically cited for this hesitation are Norway’s continued dependence on traditional wooden shipbuilding methods, a lack of natural resources needed for the operation of steamships, and the prevalence of joint ownership that hindered substantial investment. As a result, Norwegian shipping continued to rely to some extent on sail-powered vessels well into the twentieth century.

One of many accounts of the final days of sail, Legends in Sail by maritime historian Olaf Engvig focuses on late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century sailing vessels under Norwegian ownership.
Rather than a general analysis of Norwegian sailing during this period, Engvig draws on a range of modern and contemporary sources to highlight the careers of nine distinguished vessels. Following an introduction with a brief overview of the history of Norwegian sailing, the book is ordered into stand-alone chapters by ship, with some minor overlap between chapters. These chapters focus primarily on sail-training vessels (*Statsraad Erichsen, Christiania, Transatlantic, and Christian Radich*) and polar-exploration ships (*Gjøa, Fram, and Maud*). There are also chapters on *Lancing*, famed for its record-breaking speed, and *Lingard*, the last square-rigged cargo ship built in Norway. It was preserved as a memorial to Norwegian shipping in the late 1930s but scrapped after the Second World War.

Four of the chapters detail the careers of vessels owned by Christiania Skoleskib. A non-profit organization established in 1877 to maintain the superiority of Norwegian sailors through the onboard training of young students. From 1881 to 1901, boys trained aboard *Christiania*, a full-rigged, stationary sail-training ship, originally built as the *Star of Empire* in Maine in 1853. Realizing the importance of a seaworthy sail-training vessel, Christiania Skoleskib’s Board purchased *Statsraad Erichsen*, a decommissioned Royal Norwegian Navy brig built in 1858; this ship hosted students from 1901 until 1937. The organization’s last ship, the full-rigged steel ship *Christian Radich*, gained international fame after being featured in the 1958 film, *Windjammer*. Designed and built as a sail-training vessel in 1936, this ship hosted students – including girls after 1983 – until the training program ceased in 1998. Engvig served as a crewmember aboard *Christian Radich* during a race across the Atlantic in 1980, which he describes on pages 129-132.

From the final years of the nineteenth century until the 1920s, Norwegian ships also played a key role in renewed efforts at global exploration, and Engvig details the colourful careers of three such auxiliary sailing vessels. The sloop *Gjøa*, a coastal freighter launched in 1872, was reinforced to withstand the increased pressure of operating in ice and, under the leadership of explorer Roald Amundsen, became the first ship to navigate the Northwest Passage successfully in 1903–1906. Engvig’s passion for the preservation of historic ships is unmistakable throughout this work, and he provides a thorough and engrossing account of *Gjøa*’s later career as a museum ship, first in San Francisco and eventually, in Oslo. Unlike *Gjøa*, polar-exploration vessels *Fram* (1892) and *Maud* (1917) were uniquely designed and built to operate in ice. Although *Fram* failed to carry a Norwegian crew to the North Pole first, the ship did carry Amundsen’s team to Antarctica, where they were the first to reach the South Pole in December 1911.

While each chapter offers substantial insight into a specific Norwegian sailing vessel, the subsidiary sections are less successful in supplementing the work’s strengths. This book would have benefited from an expanded introduction to Norwegian sailing and shipping in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; a general overview, such as that provided in Kaare Petersen’s 1955 book, *The Saga of Norwegian Shipping*, offers a better foundation for understanding Engvig’s work. The bibliography for *Legends in Sail*, just over two pages in length, lists a range of English and Norwegian publications, newspaper articles, expedition reports, and archives. While the book is indexed, bibliographic references are not included in the text and endnotes are not provided. A variety of images, particularly early photographs of these fascinating ships, enhances the work, although in some cases,
captions printed over parts of the photograph detract from the value of the image.

Perhaps the book’s most significant drawback is the language, a somewhat inelegant English translation of Engvig’s 2012 Norwegian work, *Legendariske skuter* (Pirforlaget, Trondheim, Norway). In the foreword of *Legends in Sail*, Engvig clearly states his intention to provide a detailed, English-language account of the accomplishments of these great Norwegian vessels. Unfortunately, the readability of the work is marred by what may simply be a poor translation from the original Norwegian text, with occasional grammatical errors and inconsistencies in spelling scattered throughout. While comprehensible, the text fails to live up to Engvig’s admirable goals and the research undertaken to produce it.

Rebecca Ingram
Fort Worth, Texas


It is always a challenge for a collection of papers to maintain cohesiveness, and this volume only partially succeeds. All twenty contributions focus on the Mediterranean, but their contents span intellectual, social, military, archival, and archaeological history, and cover a date range from antiquity to the nineteenth century.

Nonetheless, this volume does offer, in the papers by Lev, Abulafia, Mott, Balletto, and Airaldi, a hard kernel of recent scholarship of great value to anyone interested in the Mediterranean of the central Middle Ages. They are united by an emphasis on the quotidian: trade, cultural connections, navigation. Lev provides an up-to-date survey of the Fatimid commerce in the Mediterranean, a useful corrective to the strange dearth of studies on the economic importance of that dynasty, which was something of a superpower in its time. The papers of Abulafia, Balletto and Airaldi advance a further two centuries, and encompass the successors to Fatimid maritime pre-eminence, the mariners of Spain and Italy.

Mott’s contribution is a microhistory, not of a place but a voyage – a happy exception to much medieval maritime history, which has few detailed sources for seafaring until almost the end of the period. Mott paints an impressive picture of the cargo, crew, itinerary, and political context of the voyage of the *Santa Maria de Natzare* from Barcelona to Seville in 1292. The details, including the diverse cargo of such exotica as frankincense, suggest continuity with the Fatimid-era commerce discussed by Lev.

Karpov also maintains a tight focus in his discussion of “les vices et la criminalité” of Venetian sailors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. His subject is entangled with piracy and slavery, and he offers a fascinating episode of intercultural contact in which Tatar officials of the Golden Horde first requested, and then seized, compensation for Crimean citizens illegally held (and sold!) by Italians.

The above papers are accompanied by a disparate group of articles on material culture. Benjamin Kedar takes a personable stroll through the history of the chains used to defend harbours, such as those of ancient Syracuse, West Point and Sevastopol. His emphasis, however, is the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, which nicely complements the work of Lev, Abulafia, and...
Mor, in “The Socio-economic Implications of Ship Construction”, relates evidence from underwater archaeology to changes in the political and commercial structure of Byzantium. He emphasizes the early advent of skeleton-first construction, but also draws attention to chronological variations in shipbuilding techniques, which is valuable in a field that, due to its inevitable reliance on far-flung shipwrecks, sometimes appears too homogeneous in its conclusions.

In contrast to these broad-ranging contributions, Jacoby restricts himself to the description of a fifteenth-century portolan, and links it to thirteenth century precedents – an interesting example of an early generation of European Mediterranean navigational aids. The title of Unger’s “Difficult Sources: Crusader Art and the Depiction of Ships” proves misleading, as the discussion is limited to illuminations made in the scriptorium of Acre between 1250 and 1291. The paper inexplicably lacks illustrations, which detracts from an intriguing investigation of the relationship between artistic representation and real-life shipbuilding. His conclusion, that the illuminations add little to our knowledge of thirteenth century ships, is disappointing but not surprising; this outcome is all too familiar to the student of medieval technology.

Ruthy Gertwagen’s “Byzantine Shipbuilding in Fifteenth-century Venetian Crete” is also deceptively named. The article’s topic is the colonial relationship between Venice and Crete, and how control of weapons was a key element of its regime. Despite regular threats to the island, Venice forbade the Cretans from building warships, and did its utmost to ensure a monopoly of military technology throughout its empire – a policy relaxed only in times of acute danger. Gertwagen emphasizes the importance of shipbuilding expertise to Venice, and how such distant possessions as Crete might serve to introduce new masters from the Greek Mediterranean.

The final third of the book steers away from maritime matters. The contributions range from the panoramic overview of the Albigensian Crusade by Mark Gregory Pegg, to the micro-detail of Riley-Smith’s study of the different types of sergeant within the hierarchies of the Templars and Hospitallers, to the quixotic, such as Murray’s argument that not all of the women accompanying the first crusade were prostitutes. Finally, it is impossible to overlook Madden’s contribution, ‘Triumph Re-imagined’, a romp through victory processions and cultural appropriation, that concludes with an Egyptian mummy misidentified as the last emperor of Byzantium, and immured in Constantinople’s Golden Gate as a talisman by the Ottomans, only to have its head stolen by a visiting French diplomat.

In sum, it is an uneven but satisfactory collection. For students of Mediterranean commerce and cultural exchange in the central Middle Ages, it is extremely valuable, but anyone interested in medieval maritime history will find something of interest.

Romney David Smith
London, Ontario


Hewitt tells a familiar story that has attracted positive attention ever since the actual event – the campaigns of the imperial German cruisers and auxiliary/ocean-liner cruisers in the first months of the First
World War. Although contemporary newspapers covered their activities at the time and subsequent books have discussed it, the author offers new insights into the ill-fated campaign.

Hewitt’s study brings several key ideas to the fore that were lost in the previous chronicles of this anti-commerce campaign. Although the German army in western Europe had already committed atrocities in 1914 (for example, the execution of 6,000 Belgian and French civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks), the navy adhered to international law in its capture and treatment of merchant shipping, earning its captains respect from the Allies. Hewitt points out how such scrupulousness hampered the cruisers’ operations as their commanders diligently determined whether even belligerent shipping should be detained or released. This leads him to provide information on cargoes and carriers (for instance, neutral ships were condemned for having cargoes subject to seizure). By literally covering the world’s oceans, this work provides a sense of the state of international trade in 1914. Hewitt’s concentration on the supply of coal and its quality addresses a critical issue for the success of the campaign that others have minimized. For example, warship steam engines required the best coal, unlike many of the steamships that they captured. Given the German reputation in the operational art, it is astounding to learn (200) that it was only the experiences of the cruisers that led Germany to arm more fuel-efficient freighter auxiliaries (May 1915) when a few minutes of logistical mathematics would have netted the same conclusion.

Some captains became obsessed with this logistical challenge, rightly fearing that their warships could become immobile. The attempts of the German Admiralstab to resolve this problem through its international Etappen system of regional directors arranging to supply the cruisers proved only partially successful. Meanwhile, it also ran the risk of revealing the cruisers’ locations. One reason was the widespread use of wireless communication, which, while it allowed warships and their supply ships to rendezvous, also exposed them to detection through Allied communications intelligence. The communications aspect of the book is perhaps its most valuable contribution to the subject, thanks to the author’s meticulously explanation of how wireless radio enabled ships to receive orders (from home and locally), conduct deception and undertake communications intelligence. Hewitt rightly castigates the British Admiralty for its micro-management of ship movements in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the hunts for Goeben and Breslau, and von Spee’s Asiatic Squadron, finding it detrimental to the success of local commanders. The final months of Dresden and Königsberg, when their captains used gaps in accurate cartography or a complex estuary system to hide their warships show how geography could still remain a trump card. Throughout one gains a respect for the relative remoteness of oceans in 1914, even when the cruisers did not take deceptive courses when in sight of Allied ports. The cruiser captains scored some notable and embarrassing successes with their attacks on shore establishments, especially von Spee’s victory at Coronel (the first British Royal Navy defeat since 1815). Still, as the campaign was waged, it was an exercise in futility that had no lasting impact, notwithstanding Hewitt’s comment about how the post-war German navies honoured the cruisers by naming new ones after them. The legacy of the cruisers in the short and medium term was minimal and demonstrated the weakness of commerce raiding based on steam engines requiring high quality coal. Nor did the heroic and honourable examples of the captains and their sailors serve to galvanize
loyalty to the state in the Kaiserliche Marine in 1918.

There are some issues with the book. Hewitt’s analysis, in chapter two on Goeben, oversimplifies why the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. One should read H. Strachan’s The First World War (2001) for a more nuanced account. The author does not provide a serious analysis of German naval plans. Imperial Germany went to war in August 1914 anticipating victory within three to five months. Its army had spent years planning for that result, comprehending that a war of attrition could only lead to defeat. Von Tirpitz’s efforts should have matched those of the military in order to cause Allied economic chaos and disrupt imperial mobilization. His failure to plan and implement a massive naval campaign that would have debilitated Britain and France marks an unforgiveable strategic error in a war planned to be concluded within less than six months. Since the High Seas Fleet failed to sortie before January 1915, the Admiralstab should have added its cruisers to those already abroad during the July crisis. The other rational alternative would have been to disembark the fleet’s crews so they could reinforce the army on the Western Front. As unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 demonstrated, import-dependent Britain could be defeated by commerce warfare, so a more extensive cruiser campaign had strategic possibilities. Hewitt entirely overlooks the grand strategic implications of the cruiser campaign. His criticism of the British Admiralty’s fixation on transporting imperial troops to the fighting fronts (chapters 2 and 4 covering Goeben and Emden) as opposed to hunting cruisers is equally misdirected, because Churchill, Battenberg, Fisher and Milne also thought the war would end quickly. Likewise, the Allies thought capturing German colonies (condemned on p. 89) would have more impact than sinking a few warships. The book never answers why Britain did not institute a convoy system to protect merchant shipping, given its previous successes with that method of countering commerce raiders.

The book’s supporting material is excellent, although the publisher, oddly, opted for endnotes. There are photographs of many key officers (British, in addition to the expected Germans), and five maps provide pertinent information that novices need to follow the story. The bibliography contains the works most relevant to the author’s research, and its inclusion of online primary sources indicates how the internet benefits historical research.

The book is readily accessible to readers at all levels. Its discussions of international law, world trade, the impacts of geography and technology, as well as naval operations, make it potentially attractive to those from different disciplines. Hewitt’s insights on the limitation of coal-fueled ships, wireless and central control of distant forces means that the book has value despite earlier publications on the subject.

Edward M. Furgol
Silver Spring, Maryland


The North Pacific has been a pulsing shipping artery for consumer goods arriving on the West Coast from Asia ever since the 1950s. First they came from Japan, then Taiwan and Korea and in recent decades, items manufactured in China have dominated. But Canadian exports have been increasing as well. On 21 February
2013, *The Globe and Mail* reported that China has now surpassed Britain as Canada’s No. 2 export destination (B1). The bulk of these shipments have been through the ports whose story is told in *Canada’s Pacific Gateway: Realizing the Vision*. The author, Dr. William Hick, brings a unique perspective to his book. Having spent his early years in Victoria, he became a physician on the North coast, initially in Stewart, and then, from 1965, in Prince Rupert. He had spent his university summers in offshore fishing boats. Over the decades he involved himself in the development of Prince Rupert as a port, initially helping to establish a community-based company to promote waterfront cargo terminal. While growing his medical practice, William Hick subsequently became an effective lobbyist for the harbour and served on the boards of both the port corporation and of BC Ferries. The author has, thus, played a role in the dynamic story of how Prince Rupert has developed and is now realizing its potential as a deep water harbour closer to Asia than to other North American west coast ports.

William Hick produced a book in 2003 called *Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert*. This second book, *Canada’s Pacific Gateways*, published in 2011, describes the development of all of British Columbia’s deep sea ports. (Charles Hays was the hard-driving entrepreneur associated with the building of a transcontinental railway to exploit the geographic advantages of Prince Rupert and who famously perished when RMS *Titanic* sank in 1912). The author’s perspective as someone closely involved in how BC’s maritime infrastructure and trade have evolved over the past fifty years gives his latest book a distinctive stamp. Dr. Hick’s insider insights have been supplemented by a detailed study of *Harbour and Shipping*, the authoritative marine trade journal which was published in Vancouver from 1919 to 2011.

Two of the main strengths of this book are the manner in which it traces the development of the railways, which made the coastal ports “gateways,” and the changing nature of the main cargoes handled on the coast. Vancouver owed its early growth to lumber shipments, but it was the coming of the Panama Canal in 1914 which would prove a major factor in its spectacular development. The first bulk shipments of grain to the U.K. from Vancouver were during the First World War, presaging its role in becoming a major terminal for the export of crops grown in western Canada. At the time the U.K. was still the world’s largest importer of wood and the new Panama Canal route was used to ship lumber both across the Atlantic and to the U.S. Eastern seaboard. Before the First World War, Prairie markets had taken 70 percent of BC’s lumber production but by 1928, due to the new markets opened by the Canal, output had soared and the Prairies were buying only 30 percent of the greater total. Victoria had been established as an export terminal before Vancouver and its infrastructure were also expanded to take advantage of the building of the Panama Canal. However, in 1919 Vancouver passed Victoria in throughput of tonnage and never looked back.

Dr. Hick describes how the organizations running the various ports evolved and the factors behind their uneven development. Public funds, particularly from the federal government, whether in the form of grants or loans on favourable terms, have played a major role in creating and improving port infrastructure. Hick argues that funding over the decades favoured harbour development in the metro-Vancouver area. He also lays out the reasons why the growth of Prince Rupert was long stymied. A useful appendix lists federal support between 2007 and 2010 to improve the cargo handling infrastructure for both the metro-Vancouver ports and Prince Rupert.
Canada’s Pacific Gateways is a handsome softcover book. The many photographs are outstanding. They have been carefully selected to illustrate how both the Gateway ports and the ships using them have evolved. Many, particularly the older black-and-white photographs, are excellent images, complemented by apt captions which convey interesting details. For example, the ones on pages 89 and 90 tells the reader that annual supply voyages out from the U.K. by Hudson’s Bay Company vessels took between 105 and 170 days around the Horn and that these operated from the U.K. as late as 1892. Others at the back of the book show the modern infrastructure of the gateway ports. The lack of any maps is a real limitation. The text is dense with descriptions of individual terminals and wharves. Fortunately, the fine aerial photographs help identify individual facilities. The narrative is written in an accessible style but there are no footnotes. The individual chapters are of a descriptive nature and there are generally no summaries setting the stage for what is to follow in the next one. Having said this, the book concludes with a valuable summary chapter which sketches in how the ports in metro-Vancouver and Prince Rupert have evolved and underlines the influential role that has been played by the federal government in their history. There is an adequate index.

This book has been published by the Prince Rupert Port Authority as a public service, meaning neither the port nor the author benefit from the sales. Written from the perspective of someone who was involved in the development of Prince Rupert for half a century, the book fills a unique niche in providing a valuable overview of the factors which have shaped Canada’s deep sea ports on the Pacific. At the same time, it outlines the main types of cargo being handled today. Overall, it is a well-illustrated and informative history and overview of current cargo flows.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Successive issues of Warship annuals do not stand on their own but, from year to year, continue to develop themes that, taken together, comprise an impressive body of knowledge. These articles in each issue are often by the same author and this year’s issue is no exception. Conrad Waters’ discussion of modern warship designs – those still under construction – continues with comparisons of European offshore patrol vessels. British, French, Spanish, and Netherlands craft are described of which the British examples are the simplest and the Netherland’s the largest and most complex. Canada’s proposed Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) fit into this category.

Stephen McLaughlin continues his series on early Russian ironclads of the 1860s. He has already described the Pervenets class and the American-type monitors of the Uragan class and this year he deals with the British type Smerch, Rusalka, and Charodeika with Coles turrets. These low freeboard monitors were not designed for open-water work and the Rusalka foundered in a gale in 1893. The Soviets maintained meticulous records and in spite of Stalin’s purges and the war, preserved those of the Czarist Navy, so McLaughlin’s information is extremely detailed.

In “Rebuilding the Australian Cruiser Squadron 1930-1939,” Peter
Cannon describes Australia’s acquisition of the three Sydney or “improved Orion” class cruisers. This is not a technical study but discusses the naval policies and negotiations that led to their transfer from the RN. Another article by Jon Wise discusses the export of ships by Britain. After the end of the Second World War, orders for warships in British shipyards naturally dried up and attempts were made, with Government support, to build ships for South American navies. In spite of the ready availability of surplus American tonnage, these had considerable success and some interesting destroyer designs were produced for Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil. Others ship types, like frigates for Chile and guided missile destroyers for Argentina (with which the RN would be in conflict in 1982) were practically identical to RN designs.

During the Japanese naval manoeuvres of 1935, a large Japanese fleet encountered a severe typhoon in which most of the ships present, destroyers, cruisers, and the light aircraft carriers Ryujo and Hosho, were more or less severely damaged. Two destroyers of the “Special Type” lost their bows but survived, the subject of “The Fourth Fleet Incident and the Fubuki class” by Hans Lengerer who has described Japanese ship losses in past issues. He considers that the need to improve longitudinal strength in existing ships revealed by this and other incidents significantly delayed Japanese preparations for the Second World War.

The editor of Warship, John Jordan, has published books on the French Navy and so it is not surprising that there are several articles about that service at different periods. Phillippe Caress tells the story of the Espignole, an early and short-lived French destroyer that was wrecked on the Mediterranean coast in 1903. The wreck is accessible to deep divers. John Jordan, himself, is responsible for a detailed account of the six semi-dreadnoughts of the Danton class that were competed in 1911. France had “missed the boat” with regard to dreadnought construction and built these large, expensive, turbine-driven ships with a mixed armament, ensuring they were outclassed by their contemporaries in other navies. The most important article in the 2013 annual (in this reviewer’s view) is titled “Toulon: The Self Destruction and Salvage of the French Fleet” by Enrico Cernuschi and Vincent O’Hara. Following the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942, German forces moved into the previously unoccupied Vichy zone, but did not occupy Toulon where a strong French naval force was stationed. Hitler hoped that the Toulon fleet would come into the war on the Axis side and attack the Allied invasion forces off North Africa. Indeed, its commander, Admiral de Laborde, was eager to do so, and reported his two modern battleships, seven cruisers and squadrons of modern destroyers fueled and ready; but he was told by the Admiralty at Vichy to wait. On 19 November 1942, the Germans moved in and the fleet was scuttled. Later, the Italians managed to salvage some of the smaller vessels and incorporate them into the Regia Marina but all the principal ships had been wrecked beyond repair. After a war has ended there are some events which by mutual agreement are either not emphasized or glossed over in the official histories. This is one of them. It was the worst blow the French Navy had suffered, even though it had faced more enemies than any other nation, at various times fighting against Germany, Italy, Britain, Thailand, America, Germany again, and Japan.

Other subjects covered in the issue are the casualties suffered by the battlecruisers Lion and Tiger at the Dogger bank and Soviet aircraft-carrier projects between the wars which were never realized. There are also the usual Notes, book reviews and photo gallery, completing
a volume fully worthy of its predecessors.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


The Navy Records Society (NRS) has a long, illustrious history of producing outstanding printed volumes of primary documents from the annals of maritime history. The society’s latest offering, Elizabethan Naval Administration, edited by C.S. Knighton and David Loades, is no exception. Both Knighton and Loades are respected editors and authors. Loades is a familiar name in Tudor history for his prolific publications on any number of subjects, including his work on the administration of the Navy (The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political and Military History and The Making of the Elizabethan Navy 1540-1590). Loades and Knighton have collaborated on a number of projects including Letters from the Mary Rose and The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I (Vol. 157 in the NRS Series) which was published in 2011. The latter is the companion piece to this present volume. The editors believe that because there is enduring interest in the Elizabethan navy among scholars and the general public, this collection of documents will be welcomed.

The volume focuses mainly on the pre-war and peacetime activity of the Queen’s fleet and features some of the “foundation documents for the Elizabethan Navy” such as the first ship list and the first ordinance of the Admiralty officers (p.xix). Those interested in material relating to the war against the Spanish should consult the other publications by the Navy Records Society which deal with that subject matter (such as State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, anno 1588; Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War, 1585-1587, and British Naval Documents, 1204-1960). This collection examines some of the more routine business of the navy: its administrative and financial dealings punctuated by small campaigns, escort duties, and pirate hunting. Included are: First Naval Business in the State papers; The Navy Treasurer’s Quarter Book for 1562-1563; The Navy Treasurer’s Declared Account for 1562-1563; Extracts from James Humphrey’s Book of Forms, 1568; Papers Relating to Wages and Wage Rates; The Navy Victualler’s 1565 Contract and Related Papers; Papers relating to Sir John Hawkins as Treasurer of the Navy; and Edward Fenton’s Notebook and Other Papers Relating to the Expedition of 1590.

The original documents are held in various archives in England: the National Archives (PRO), Pepys Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge; Pepys collection contained in the Rawlinson manuscripts at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and the editors have also reconstructed and included papers from the Cotton Manuscripts in the British Library which were destroyed in a fire. From a researcher’s perspective, it is a great asset to have a large number of naval documents from different locations and collections edited and made accessible in print.

Elizabeth I’s island kingdom required a blue water strategy and a naval force to back up England’s commercial and religious assertions in a world dominated by Catholic imperial Spain. When tensions finally did erupt in the 1580s, there were enormous pressures placed on the naval bureaucracy and the English maritime community. Thus, the workings of the navy in the years before this can be very revealing. These documents reveal much
about the complex matters of manning, provisioning, and running the dockyards.

Even in times of relative tranquility during Elizabeth’s reign, there was considerable activity and the records illustrate this as well as the costs for the most minute items and services. The fleet (which varied from 30 to 45 ships during this period) required constant upkeep whether the ships were in use or not, given frailties of wooden vessels in the age of sail. The editors point out that the dockyards were the “largest industrial organization in the land and needed a huge and relentless intake of materials” (p.xxvii). Perhaps even more surprising, given the ad hoc nature of much of Tudor bureaucracy, is how efficiently the dockyards were run.

One of the greatest struggles was provisioning the navy during this time of inflation and dearth. Even without the added challenge of intense naval activity during the war years, the thankless task of the surveyor general of naval victualling is evident.

These records involve some of the most important individuals in the Elizabethan maritime world. Those familiar with the period will recognize the names of those long-serving personnel in the naval administration as well as the master shipwrights who oversaw the work in the dockyards. The documents also contain the names of various men without claim to fame whose more humble labours and daily costs are outlined here in meticulous detail.

The editors should be commended for producing a valuable collection which has been meticulously referenced and cross-referenced to related volumes of documents. There is also a helpful introduction, a glossary, as well as appendices explaining dates, weights, and measures which could easily trip up those who aren’t experts with primary sources of this type and era. While one can appreciate the need for shared appendices on vessels and senior naval personnel between The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I and Elizabethan Naval Administration, this will prove an inconvenience for those not in possession of both volumes as the shared appendices appear only in the former.

Although this compilation of primary sources dealing with the nuts and bolts of the naval administration won’t have much appeal outside the scholarly world, it is definitely a “must have” for those researchers in the field as well as a useful addition to scholarly collections and libraries.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


In The American Clipper Ship, 1845-1920, Glenn Knoblock presents an extensive and colourful historical narrative of the famed American clipper ship from its inception in the 1840s, its success and achievements in the China tea trade and the California Gold Rush during the 1850s, then throughout subsequent decades as the clipper competed against maritime steam technology. Written with a general audience in mind, the book will satisfy the curiosity of maritime novices, but should also suffice as a historical foundation for more knowledgeable maritime enthusiasts interested in the era of the clipper ships and their crews and builders.

The book is nicely laid out in a clear and reasonable manner, allowing for an enjoyable and fulfilling read. The first ten chapters in Part One delineate the evolution of clipper ship design, bringing to life the more technical side of its development. In these first chapters, readers can begin to appreciate the creation
of such splendid craft through the accounts of Americans as well as immigrants who came to the United States in search of opportunity. Throughout Part One, Knoblock presents the broad history of the clipper ship in the words of their owners, builders, and captains to highlight the success of the entire industry. The second part of the book moves away from an historical narrative to a more specific and detailed listing of clipper ship builders and clipper ships by state. While also providing insight into America’s clipper ship era, the details provided in Part Two would likely be more useful for local historians and those interested in regional geography.

While Knoblock should be lauded for creating such a fine work and meeting his intended goal, his book is not quite as useful as an academic reference. The bibliography lists a variety of excellent primary and secondary sources but there are no footnotes or endnotes to support the specific details in the text. While there is some in-text citation, it is employed sparingly. Lastly, there are a few occasions where portions of the text are either redundant or unnecessary. That said, this work would still be a useful starting point for an academic research project. The bibliography, however, contains a number of valuable sources that should be extremely useful for anybody studying such an important aspect of American shipbuilding and maritime history.

Glenn A. Knoblock graduated from Bowling Green State University of Ohio with a BA in history, and has lived in New England since 1982 where he has become an enthusiastic lecturer and prolific writer of numerous New England-based historical works including bridge construction, cemeteries and gravestone carvers, local brewing of alcoholic beverages, and local maritime history. He has also published on the role of African-Americans in US military history, especially during the Second World War. Though not a maritime specialist, Knoblock has applied thorough research and a deep personal interest in the subject to put together a credible, well-written volume on the history of the American clipper ship and the men and women involved.

Despite a few minor issues, Knoblock has succeeded in presenting an up-to-date and inclusive narrative of the American clipper ship, argued by many as the speediest and most visually appealing sailing vessels ever constructed. In the end, this is an excellent volume to have in one’s library, whether novice or maritime professional, and a tale worth reading.

Wayne Abrahamson
Pensacola, Florida


Both these titles add to the long list of Osprey publications about weapons, ships, planes, and a variety of types of global violence by land and sea over several centuries. Like others in the on-going series, these two books are short – 64 and 80 pages, respectively – a brevity that limits their narratives and analyses, but both are lavishly illustrated to give colour and depth to the stories being told.

Konstam defines the golden age of piracy for the first title as the years 1714-
1724 (p.4), and delimits it to the Caribbean and eastern coastline of the Americas. The decade features a concentration of famous names associated with maritime violence, including Edward Teach, Bartholomew Roberts, Anne Bonny, and Mary Read. Chapters are organized around topics such as recruitment, skills, violence, and plunder in order to provide an analytic breakdown of the phenomenon. Throughout the text – though not in many of the illustrations – Konstam and Rickman make clear the difference between romanticized myth and the tawdry reality of maritime depredation. One chapter topic is “appearance,” in which the authors first follow the development of clothing lore and then undress the fiction of pirate accoutrement insisted upon by films and novels.

Edward Teach, or Blackbeard, is the focus of the second title that Konstam authored alone. He argues that Teach was the most notorious of the “golden age” pirates and is now the best remembered of them, partly because of his grisly end. Teach appeared at a time when British colonial policy was to offer amnesty to pirates who vowed to end their criminal ways, such amnesty being the least expensive way to deal with the burgeoning of piracy in the region. Teach’s ability to disturb much of the shipping off the coast of North Carolina brought him to the highly negative attention of the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Alexander Spotswood, who organized an incursion into North Carolina. By land, Virginia militiamen marched through territory outside the governor’s jurisdiction, but Spotswood was willing to take that political risk in order to cut off a landward escape by the pirate. By sea, British naval captains and crews manned two hired civilian sloops that could sail the shallow waters of Pamlico Sound where Teach, his men, and his own sloop were located. (The geography of the events is illustrated clearly with maps.) The manoeuvrings of the sloops in the sound, the hand-to-hand combat that ensued, and Teach’s slow death are described at some length. Konstam argues that through this military action, Spotswood had given all regional pirates notice that an offer of amnesty was not his first choice in dealing with them. Teach’s last fight, then, stands as an important case study in British colonial resistance to piracy.

In both of these books, the authors have carefully researched the narratives and have elevated their analyses with nods to the first-rate scholarship of, for example, Marcus Rediker. Given the brevity and the numerous illustrations, it is not easy for this reviewer to identify the intended readership, other than to say that both titles would be of interest to a broad, non-specialist audience interested in either piracy or the maritime history of colonial America.

Patricia Risso
Albuquerque, New Mexico


As observances and projects dedicated to the bicentennial of the War of 1812 wind down in the months to come, it is an appropriate time to reflect on the extensive number and diversity of fine publications devoted to the topic that have emerged over the past several years. While some studies have provided truly comprehensive examinations of the war and its root causes and consequences, others have focused on particular aspects, battles, or campaigns that until now have received very little in the way of scholarly attention. This very slim, yet exceptionally informative and beautifully illustrated work, clearly fits into the latter category, for it solely concentrates
on the three-year naval arms race conducted by Great Britain and the United States on the system of interconnected massive inland seas located at the strategic heart of the North American continent known as the Great Lakes. Particularly significant is the book’s recognition of the unique opportunities and challenges the Lakes presented to both forces and the implications these had on the construction and conduct of naval vessels.

Mark Lardas, an expert on naval architecture and marine engineering, authors this recent offering by Osprey Publishing in its well-regarded New Vanguard series of illustrated historical guides exploring the “design, development, operation and history of the machinery of warfare through the ages.” Lardas organizes his concise though superbly detailed examination of Great Lakes warships into three main sections: design and development; operational history; and the ships. Readers will appreciate the author’s keen understanding and enlightening insights into the technical aspects of naval shipbuilding on both sides, from the pre-war era to war’s end. Ships’ specifications were clearly dictated by the distinctive environment. Huge expanses of open water with few choke points meant that efforts to control the Lakes would require large numbers of armed vessels rather than the establishment of numerous shore batteries. Ample supplies of freshwater reduced the need for storage capacity and removed the costly requirement of copper sheathing. These benefits, however, negatively affected a ship’s stability and armament capability as they combined to give a ship a higher centre of gravity. Since speed was especially important on the Lakes, shipwrights designed ships with a higher deadrise, which only increased the centre of gravity. Though corners were often cut by both sides in producing Great Lakes warships, a plentiful supply of mature timber helped ensure a speedy rate of construction and convenience when locating shipbuilding yards.

Operationally, the naval war was fought in three main theatres: Lake Ontario, Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. Lardas delivers a fine account of the particular preparations and strategies employed by American and British forces in each of these regions while underlining the chief developments and engagements. A welcome feature is his inclusion of a series of vignettes such as the “Capture of the Growler and Julia” and the “Loss of the Scourge,” which serve to further captivate the reader’s attention and explore other aspects of the naval war. The third major component in the guide is a fairly detailed and well-researched list of the ships constructed as naval vessels or those purchased and converted to them by the United States and Great Britain by the lake on which they were built or re-launched. Significant information regarding vessel displacement, armament, crew complement, and construction/conversion serves to greatly enhance the value of this resource.

Those familiar with this excellent series will not be disappointed with the impressive collection of colour artwork, illustrations, and cutaways that are a regular feature of these guides. Much credit must be reserved for renowned marine artist and illustrator Paul Wright, an esteemed member of the Royal Society of Marine Artists, and contributor to numerous works of popular history including those by the late Patrick O’Brian.

This reviewer has but few quibbles. The absence of citations in such works is rare and understood due to space considerations, but the lack of a contemporary map depicting the sites of ports, shipyards and major naval engagements is a deficiency that could have been easily avoided. Those searching for a
substantive and sustained analysis of the War of 1812 as well as the wider economic, political, social and military implications of the conflict’s naval aspect on the people and communities of the Great Lakes watershed will require further reading. This could have been sufficiently addressed through either some concluding remarks or a more substantial introduction. Though in his acknowledgments Lardas makes reference to a forthcoming title by another author on the topic of nautical archaeology of Great Lakes warships, he refrains from any mention of the presence and popularity of War of 1812-era shipwrecks in the Lakes and of the ongoing archaeological studies conducted both underwater and along various stretches of the shoreline.

Of course this publication does not promise to be anything more than it is – an interesting and visually appealing guide to the general reader and a quick and useful “go-to” resource for specialists. Above all else, it relates the exceptional history of warships on the Great Lakes during the War of 1812 to a wide audience through accessible language and splendidly conceived illustrations at an affordable price.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


Another attempt to rewrite history or a genuine attempt to put the record straight on a much-maligned officer? Since rewriting history does not always go the way of the maligned, what do we make of John Lundstrom’s re-examination of Frank Fletcher in the early stages of the Pacific naval war?

Frank Fletcher was the only one of the U.S. Navy’s task group commanders to be in control during all three of the major naval actions that initially stemmed the tide of the Japanese advance during 1942. The Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942, was the first carrier-vs-carrier battle and was initially viewed as a Japanese tactical victory but a U.S. strategic one. In fact, the real cost to the IJN, particularly to the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, was not initially appreciated, despite ensuring they were unable to join the Midway attack. The Battle of Midway, what Walter Lord referred to as the Incredible Victory (1967), saw the loss of all four of the other carriers of Vice-Admiral Nagumo’s First Air Fleet in exchange for USS Yorktown. But in many respects, the battles that really turned the tide in favour of the Americans were those fought off Guadalcanal during August 1942 off Savo Island and the Eastern Solomons. After these, and perhaps because Fletcher had lost carriers in each of them, he found himself sidelined to command the 13th Naval District on the U.S. Pacific Coast because it was the only posting available to a vice admiral. To some extent, he managed to get back into the war in charge of the North Pacific area later, but it is clear that he was a victim of USN politics. How did this come about?

Part of the answer lies in the main title of Lundstrom’s work, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. The title refers to USN surface ship officers wearing black shoes as part of their uniform while naval aviators wore brown shoes. But it is also important to understand the infighting which took place in the USN. In 1926, a congressional investigation had resulted in a requirement that only naval aviators could command carriers, thereby creating a “them and us” situation in the pecking order for captains.
It did not initially apply to the rear admirals in command of task groups, but gradually, in the early part of the war, the “brown shoes” were promoted because it was felt they had a better understanding of carrier operations. A major promoter of this view was Admiral Ernest King, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, who later became overall commander-in-chief (C-in-C) and chief of naval operations shortly after Pearl Harbor.

But this is not the whole story. Ernest King had questioned Fletcher’s tactics and leadership after the Coral Sea, but was reassured by the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz. After Midway, however, one popular historian described what had happened by referring to Raymond Spruance as the tactical commander of the USN force and made no reference to Fletcher. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt commissioned Samuel Eliot Morison to write a semi-official history of USN operations in the Second World War, he picked up on various criticisms of Fletcher by King and other subordinate commanders. Also pitching in on the anti-Fletcher side was the 1948 report by Richard Bates for the Naval War College, which Morison came to rely on heavily for volumes 3, 4, and 5 of his history. What started as criticisms that Fletcher was ignorant of carrier operations, that his tactics were not aggressive enough, and he was always refuelling during the early 1942 raids and at Coral Sea gained more ground with the promotion of Spruance’s role at Midway. Lundstrom’s analysis contains many criticisms of the actions of the “brown shoe mafia,” though not of Spruance himself. But these criticisms took on a new direction during the Guadalcanal campaign. Various historians, particularly U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) ones, claimed Fletcher deserted the Marines and forced the transport ships to pull off the beachhead only partly unloaded, leaving the Marines to face the Japanese attacks without adequate supplies. It should be remembered that USMC historians were already incensed by Fletcher’s part in the failure to relieve Wake Island shortly after Pearl Harbor, although he was ordered to abandon it. Other allegations were made (incorrectly) that he had been court martialed rather than reassigned after the Guadalcanal campaign and of cowardice in the face of the enemy.

But, as with many events, new evidence has become available and who better than John Lundstrom, with his extensive knowledge of the early part of the Pacific War, to carry out a re-evaluation. Lundstrom explains in his introduction that he was first asked to do this by Rear Admiral Oscar Pederson, who served at Midway on Fletcher’s staff in 1942. At the time, he was too heavily involved in three books The First South Pacific Campaign (1976), The First Team (1984), The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign (1994), which analysed Pacific fleet strategy, aerial tactics, and the 1942 carrier battles. This work, however, provided Lundstrom with additional sources and background information and enabled him to publish his study of Fletcher in 2006. He quotes a particular comment made by Fletcher to author Walter Lord that “After an action is over, people talk a lot about how the decisions were deliberately reached, but actually there is always a hell of a lot of groping around.” He goes on to say that the purpose of this book is to explain the “groping around” and how this and the orders he was operating under all explain Fletcher’s actions.

Lundstrom has accomplished this in a similar style to his earlier works. He examines in detail what Fletcher did and why, what courses his various ships followed, what information he actually had—not what others thought he had, or even thought he should have known about. He explains the problems over search
procedures and reporting of positions and courses by land-based search aircraft. He also lays to rest the “Fuelling Jack” reputation that even the noted author, Captain Edward Beach, was still quoting in 1999 by revealing that the fuel consumption of USN ships, especially the escorting destroyers, had been miscalculated by as much as 70 percent.

What Lundstrom has not written is a biography of Fletcher, though he does mention his later appointments on the U.S. West Coast and in the northern Pacific. Some readers may be disappointed at this. In these later appointments, he was not as well supported by his old commander, Nimitz, who by this stage saw the north Pacific as something of a sideshow. Nimitz was also influenced by other subordinate commanders, particularly Richmond Kelly Turner, the commander of the transports at Guadalcanal, who was so incensed by Fletcher’s withdrawal of the carriers.

In many respects, the mystery is that Fletcher retired with his wife to his Maryland farm soon after the Second World War in 1947 and made little attempt to correct the unfavourable impressions being created by historians, some of whom jumped to conclusions in the light of what occurred in the Pacific naval war 1943-45 and assumed that the tactics the USN later employed so successfully were the tactics they were using in 1942 instead of “groping around.” His greatest difficulty in defending himself is that his papers for Coral Sea and Midway went to the bottom in Yorktown in 1942.

Other “black shoe” carrier admirals, notably Tom Kincaid, were successful in resurrecting a threatened career and re-emerged as carrier commanders in the latter stages of the war. Raymond Spruance, in many respects one of the architects of the Midway victory, and later Nimitz’s chief of staff and then commander of the Fifth Fleet in the final attacks on the Japanese home islands, was himself a “black shoe” carrier admiral. One is left with the conclusion that perhaps what Fletcher lacked was the instinct of self-preservation that is so important in any large organization.

It is not clear why the Naval Institute Press chose this particular moment to re-print Lundstrom’s 2006 work in paperback, apart from purely commercial considerations. There have been a number of recent books re-examining various aspects of the early days of the Pacific War, particularly of Midway, and also paperback reprints of earlier works. What is clear from Lundstrom’s book is that Fletcher was not afraid of a fight on the right terms, but was guided by his orders for “calculated risk” and the need to ensure his covering destroyers had enough fuel to fight a high speed battle in those early days when the USN did not have a fleet train and the luxury of large numbers of Essex and Independence carriers and also “jeep carriers” that could cover invasion beaches. Lundstrom has pointed out that the mistake that Bates, Morison and others made was that they judged Fletcher on the basis of 1943-45 strategy, tactics, and logistics. He leaves us in no doubt that although Coral Sea stopped the Japanese thrust in the South Pacific and Midway was a spectacular loss for the IJN in the Central Pacific, it was the Guadalcanal campaign and its associated naval battles that put Japan on the defensive and began to wear down their capacity to fight. By that stage, the USN had lost four of its six carriers leaving only Saratoga and Enterprise and, at one stage, they borrowed a carrier from the RN. Fletcher was one of the commanders and the high command were entitled to consider the need to learn lessons (which Fletcher contributed to), learn new tactics and promote junior officers who had performed well. The tragedy is that the “brown shoe mafia” and the USMC were given the opportunity in
postings and later books to marginalize Fletcher’s contribution to stemming the tide of the Japanese blitzkrieg. Lundstrom’s book serves to remind us that, in the words of another reviewer, “Adm. Fletcher got a bum rap.”

Make no mistake, this book is a long read at 515 pages (it was 638 in the original 2006 hardback version) with 115 pages of supporting information. Despite Lundstrom’s style, a book of this length can make readers want to move forward more quickly, especially if they think they know the story. But is well worth sticking with, since nobody escapes without criticism, even Nimitz and the “brown shoe mafia,” particularly Marc Mitscher. Perhaps this is an area of further study?

John Francis
Greenwich, England


While the interwar naval disarmament regime ultimately collapsed under the burden of growing global tensions in the late 1930s, it was still, arguably, the most successful attempt at limiting armaments between the wars. These conferences can inform historians on a wide range of topics from arms limitation itself to the complexities of naval strategy. Unfortunately, there is relatively little secondary literature on the topic, leaving researchers with little to draw upon. Both John H. Maurer and Christopher M. Bell have published works on interwar naval disarmament and are well positioned to serve as editors for this volume, which fills a significant gap in the literature and incorporates new perspectives and sources.

The main underlying theme of the book is that the 1930 London Naval Disarmament Conference represents an excellent case study of the political machinations that led to the Second World War. For Maurer and Bell, the conference was a key turning point of the interwar period, and this book incorporates new research focusing on the role played by intelligence and back-door political deals in the conference’s outcome. It provides the first comparative examination of the London Naval Conference and seeks to incorporate a view extending beyond the traditional focus on the United States and United Kingdom. Secondarily, Maurer and Bell use the conference as a tool for understanding current geo-political issues. For example, arms limitation is often cited as a mechanism for reducing international tensions with China. The editors point out that this approach is fraught with problems as Chinese aspirations will not likely be tempered and the development of new and powerful maritime technologies strongly suggests that America will have to focus increased efforts to counter Chinese growth in the Western Pacific (p.6). The key parallel between the era of the London Conference and the current day is that of rising nationalism – much as the Japanese leveraged rising nationalist trends to further foreign policy goals in the 1930s, the impetus of current Chinese nationalism serves much the same purpose.

Introduction of new material is a vital and refreshing component of this work. Paul Halper’s “French and Italian Navies” and John Ferris’ “Information Superiority: British Intelligence at London” have mined the archives and uncovered new sources to detail the nuances of French/Italian strategic rivalry and competing interests alongside a thorough analysis of British signals intelligence and the role it played throughout the conference respectively.

Also included is a re-examination
of the American and British decision-making processes vis-à-vis the London Conference. Both John Maurer and Norman Friedman tackle the American conundrum; the United States found itself in a difficult position – the Great Depression highlighted the need for greater economy, but perceived threats from Japan counterbalanced this and demanded a compromise be struck to measure and control the relative cruiser strength of the British, American and Japanese fleets. Maurer’s assessment focuses on the historical context of the Conference – the onset of the Depression and deteriorating global stability as Japan and Germany began to radicalize politically, which doomed the agreement struck at London to fail. In contrast, Norman Friedman chose to focus his work on the interplay between naval planners and political leaders and the impact of that relationship on the process, especially in terms of how dramatically both parties misunderstood the Japanese system.

Maurer and Bell have assembled a truly first-rate compilation. They secured the leaders within the field and provided an interesting and novel approach for analyzing the 1930 London Naval Conference. The threads which tie interwar naval disarmament together are complex and largely unexamined. The new perspectives offered in this work provide fresh insights into a hitherto neglected topic. The London Naval Conference represented the high point of interwar arms limitation efforts and requires closer attention to better understand its context and lessons. At the Crossroads: Between Peace and War provides an important step in furthering our understanding of this event and will certainly become a cornerstone for future scholarship on a wide array of topics.

Tavis Harris
Edmonton, Alberta


This, the first soft-cover version of the book follows the same Anatomy Series layout and design as its earlier hardcover versions published in 1987, and revised in 2000. New research conducted since the earlier volumes has been incorporated into this latest volume. Nonetheless, John McKay wisely states “It is reasonably safe to say that there will never be a final word on Victory; research and restoration will continue, but to date this book reflects current thinking.”

Starting with an introduction, the contents progress with a detailed list of the First Rate ships and Victory’s history; a career summary of her design, her construction and arrangement; repairs, refits, rebuilds and decoration; steering gear and ground tackle; pumps, boats and sheathing; crew and accommodation, masts and yards; standing rigging, running rigging; and finally sails and ordnance. These extremely detailed sections are followed by 20 photographs that cover the ship inside and out, including many photos of areas unlikely to be seen by many visitors. The remainder of the book is taken up with John McKay’s superb drawings. A skilled draughtsman in his own right, McKay spent five years researching and drawing these plans, requiring 3000 hours of work to complete. His research was complicated by the fact that he lives on the West Coast of Canada, a very long way from Victory.

McKay prepared the plans from which to scratch-build an accurate, fully-framed model of Victory and large-scale working copies of the plans can be obtained directly from McKay, whose contact
information can be found on page 34. McKay's plans, plus the wealth of material presented not only in this book, but also in other excellent books listed on page 34. Among them is *The Anatomy of Nelson's Ships* by C. Nepean Longridge, written from a model-builders point of view and presenting a wealth of model-building techniques, including drawings prepared by G.F. Campbell. Another excellent book is Arthur Bugler's *Victory - Building, Restoration and Repair* as well as numerous other extremely useful books.

The soft cover foldouts are a much better way to present larger plans that are traditionally printed inside the book, crossing the gutters, effectively making them difficult to use. The inside of the front cover presents a starboard outboard profile, while the back cover contains a plan view and starboard profile of the framing, with the notation that both these drawings are keyed to smaller versions of the same drawings on page 48. I did not find a lines plan but I am certain that this would be available from the author.

Whether you are a ship buff, historian or model-builder, potential or actual, the drawings are a feast for the eyes. Starting with the general arrangement drawings (G.A.) with fore and aft views, and a starboard profile, the 14 pages devoted to the G.A. drawings continue providing a centre-line cutaway view showing the inboard profile, all decks and inboard spaces; the poop, and quarterdeck, followed by drawings for each deck in the ship. Next are the hull construction drawings which reveal the complexity of the framing. The keel, stem and stern post drawing are followed by the inboard profile framing; the stern, bow, poop deck and quarterdeck framing; the upper and middle decks; lower deck and the orlop deck framing plans. Then there are a series of truly wonderful isometric projections from which the entire hull building process can be followed page by page, starting with the keel construction and framing drawings (with sections omitted to show the relationship between the various parts and assemblies) right up to the completed hull. These are followed by 32 section drawings before going into external details. The remainder of the book is filled with major and minor drawings, including the mastng and rigging drawings, which are followed by the detailed rigging tables of each and every part of the complex rigging.

With the wealth of material available today there would be absolutely no excuse for failure, other than one’s own model-building capabilities when building a fully-framed model of *Victory*. Speaking as a model-builder, undertaking the building of a totally scratch-built, fully-framed model of *Victory*, at any scale, would be a daunting and extremely time-consuming challenge for a master builder. While the notation on the inside front cover indicates that the drawings offer ship buffs, historians and model makers a novel insight into the technicalities of the ship, which they most certainly do, the book should not be construed as a model-building guide for creating a model of *Victory*; in fact there is absolutely no model-building advice in the book. Presumably McKay expected that anyone undertaking such a task would already have very well-developed ship model-building skills. Tyro's be warned – please don’t try this one at home!

Highly recommended for ship buffs, historians and model-builders, or simply those who wish to see what was entailed in the building of, and maintaining a ship such as *Victory*.

N. Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario

In this lavishly illustrated volume, the author addresses what he laments as the astonishing lack of attention these small combatants have received. He notes that, until now, there was no book specifically devoted to the sloop of war. As the first volume of a contemplated trilogy on British sloops, this one begins in 1650, when England first began seriously to contest mastery of the seas, and ends in 1763, by which time Britain had largely won her empire. Subsequent volumes would cover the great age of sail (1763-1815) and the transition from wind and wood to steam and steel (1815-1950). This reviewer earnestly hopes the other volumes will be forthcoming.

The author offers the caveat that a work covering over one hundred years must be of a general nature. His stated purpose is to discuss the development of a class of ships rather provide an exhaustive study. Nevertheless, McLaughlin provides an astonishingly rich and detailed narrative. One the first issues he tackles is the matter of definitions. What is a “sloop of war?” A good question and one that is difficult to answer with any great specificity in this period. These vessels were “unrated” (not included in the Royal Navy’s formal establishment); this also meant they were unregulated, allowing a wide variety of hull designs, rigging and sail plans. During the seventeenth century, these ancillary vessels, known variously as sloops, escorts, advice boats, brigantines, and ketches performed a wide variety of missions. In the early-eighteenth century, the Royal Navy condensed these descriptors into a single category: the sloop of war. As such, ‘sloop of war’ describes a set of missions as well as a particular class of vessels.

Tracing the origin of the class to the large, open boats used by Basque whalers in the Bay of Biscay, McLaughlin discusses the factors driving their design and develops the relationship between rigs and hull forms and intended duties. One factor McLaughlin identifies is the interaction of the Royal Navy with the navies of other nations, particularly France. The French influence manifested in two ways. First, England had to respond to French attacks upon its commerce, primarily by building larger and more powerful sloops. Second, the British copied and adapted French designs, which were generally faster and more manœuvreable than their British counterparts. By the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714, McLaughlin asserts, there was recognizable trend toward a general-purpose vessel, larger, more powerful and capable of undertaking a variety of roles.

Any book about sailing vessels must, of necessity, contain a great many terms that will be unfamiliar to all but specialists. This book is no different, but McLaughlin clearly recognized the difficulty. Other than knowing the difference between stem and stern, port and starboard, the reader needs little specialized knowledge. McLaughlin includes an entire chapter on rigging that describes sails and how they are controlled as well as adding a little practical theory on sailing. Throughout the book, unfamiliar terms are explained in either the text or the endnotes. Copious illustrations also aid the reader’s understanding.

As mentioned earlier, the illustrations in this volume are quite remarkable. They run the gamut from copies of actual ship plans, details from contemporary paintings and renderings by the author, to photographs of both contemporary and modern ship models. Virtually every page contains a table or illustration of some type.

Six useful appendices supplement the text and illustrations. These include lists
of every purpose-built sloop with details of rig, armament and builder. They also include a table of mast and spar dimensions, notes on armament and a list of available sloop plans. A series of captains’ reports on the sailing qualities of a representative sample of the sloops provide a valuable window into the operation of these vessels. Somewhat surprisingly, the bibliography consists exclusively of secondary sources. The endnotes clearly draw on Admiralty records and the ships’ plans are originals credited to the National Maritime Museum. This is perhaps due to the fact that Derek Andrews, to whom the book is dedicated, completed most of the original research for this book. Due to ill health, Andrews could not bring his research to book form and graciously passed it to McLaughlin.

The author has certainly accomplished his stated purpose with this volume. Warship enthusiasts, those interested in the history of coastal sail or small boat rigs and ship modelers will find much of interest here. Highly recommended.

Larry Bartlett
Fort Worth, Texas


This biographical study of Civil War hero William B. Cushing focuses on a single epoch in Cushing’s life: the years between 1865 and 1869, when he commanded a United States Navy warship in East Asian waters and nourished his engagement with his fiancée, Kate Forbes, from afar. By 1865, Cushing had already earned national acclaim by sinking the Confederate ironclad *Albemarle*, which he had accomplished by driving a torpedo-tipped launch into the rebel hull in Plymouth, Virginia. After the war, the Navy Department reassigned Cushing first to the Pacific Squadron and then, in September 1867, to the Asiatic Squadron.

As commander of the USS *Maumee*, Cushing would show the flag in the major waterways of East Asia, support American diplomacy with Qing China and Meiji-era Japan, and would reinforce the nation’s commercial interests in a region destabilized by the forces of modernization and Western imperialism. As the captain of an American warship, naval and diplomatic etiquette required Cushing to spend much of his time socializing with prominent residents and foreign naval officers in the ports that he visited, including Hong Kong, Beijing, Tianjin, Formosa, Taipei, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Edo (Tokyo). When his naval obligations allowed, Cushing toured, commenting on such topics as prominent locals, fashions, customs, race, religions, and modes of transportation. He smoked opium in Hong Kong, chased elusive pirates in the Gulf of Tonkin, met with imperial Qing officials and the emperor of Japan, kept a watchful eye on civil disturbances in Tianjin and Japan, toured Beijing, and fraternized with other Western naval officers.

While this book describes Cushing’s foreign adventures, the naval policy of the United States, and European imperialism in East Asia, its chief concern is what McQuiston calls Cushing’s "private diplomacy,” his long-term, long-distance courtship of Kate Forbes (p.95). Forbes was a resident of Cushing’s hometown of Fredonia, New York, who caught the naval hero’s attention while serving as a bridesmaid at his sister’s wedding in June 1866. Smitten with her, Cushing proposed and she accepted, perhaps in part due to Cushing’s reputation as a dashing naval
hero. Yet orders from the Navy Department orders would soon carry him away from her, first to the West Indies and then to East Asia.

During his absence, Cushing kept up a lively correspondence with Forbes. The missives from that conversation, especially those from Cushing to Forbes, make up the chief primary sources for the book. It is not entirely clear how many of Forbes’ letters to Cushing have survived, or for that matter, how many of Cushing’s letters to anyone else. Even so, McQuiston seems generally able to tease out the contents of Forbes’ letters through Cushing’s replies, which were numerous, descriptive and long. Overall, McQuiston portrays the naval hero as a complex, impulsive character who felt torn between his cosmopolitan career and his romantic attachment to Forbes. His efforts to fulfill his obligations as a naval officer, his desperation to maintain his engagement with Forbes, and his coping strategy of socializing and sightseeing until he could be reunited with his beloved, form the principal themes and tensions of the book.

The result is a unique contribution to a venerable tradition of naval biography. Naval biographers have tended to focus on the careers and exploits of their subjects to the exclusion of their personal lives. In so doing, they risk assuming that a naval officer’s profession was the most defining aspect of his life. McQuiston’s book, however, reveals a man who performed his duty overseas but who was simultaneously terrified of losing his fiancée to another man. His letters to her overflow with romantic sentiment: “Music is a pastime,” he chides her at one point for taking one hobby too seriously, but “love is a religion” (p.145). Cushing’s correspondence reveals just how devout American naval officers could be when it came to the cult of romantic sentimentalism in the Victorian Age. As such, the central contribution of McQuiston’s book is to reveal that such cultures extended as far as distantly-stationed American naval officers. In fact, Cushing’s experience may even suggest that physical distance and the sluggish pace of overseas postal systems may have made naval officers stationed abroad more susceptible to romantic culture than those who remained on shore.

As with any laudable undertaking, however, this monograph has its weaknesses. The biggest has to do with organization and orientation. While the central themes of the book weave in and out of the story well, there is no clear introduction or conclusion that sets out an overarching argument, supporting points, or relationship to any particular historiographical conversation. Rather, the reader is left to discover McQuiston’s main points through a careful reading of the monograph. When McQuiston leaves Cushing to describe the larger context of his subject’s experiences, he can end up either repeating points that he has already made (Perry visits Japan numerous times throughout the book, for example), or he offers important insights into larger historical themes and issues that would have been stronger if more prominently placed in the introduction or conclusion of the book or at the start or end of a chapter.

Those points aside, this is a very good and insightful study. While readers of McQuiston’s book will learn about post-Civil War American naval policy, European imperialism, and the international politics of the Far East, they will especially come to appreciate that some naval officers, even famous heroes like William B. Cushing, yearned for more than naval glory.

Michael Verney
Durham, New Hampshire

The Sea and Civilization is an ambitious investigation of maritime history as it relates to and affects the advances of the world’s civilizations. Lincoln Paine leads his readers into a maritime maelstrom of the science, technology, cartography, industry, commerce, and politics of humankind as it is linked to the navigable waters of the world. He also touches upon sociology, religion, naval conflicts, international relations, transnational communications, intercultural migration, and exchange of natural resources. In summary, this work is an extremely complex narrative of mariners and ordinary people, and their varied activities that connected them to the seas and oceans.

Imagine being transported upon a series of vessels each built and launched during a particular time at a certain place representing an astounding array of intellectual, social, political, economic, technological, and industrial aspirations of a nation. Every ship and its mariners would become a microcosm of the society that created it on shore. The Sea and Civilization illuminates interrelated themes that have propelled world history.

Paine’s hypothesis is that the seas of the world have acted as pivot points in world history. To support this argument, Paine retells man’s experiences on the sea with masses of meticulously gathered historical evidence. The first voyages across open water occurred about 50,000 years ago and, according to Paine, those out of sight of land started 13,000 years ago. These pioneering events largely took place in the South Pacific. In each chapter the author reflects upon the history of navigation, naval architecture, shipbuilding, and their use in seaborne trade and warfare for each area of the world and its evolving culture.

The raw materials used in each ship’s hull construction ranged from tree bark, through animal hides, acacia, cedar, coconut, pine, oak and teak. The joining or fastening of the planking to the keels for water tightness varied greatly depending upon local rope-like matter and time-tested but primitive waterproofing compounds. Hulls were constructed in a shell form reinforced with ribbing. Mediterranean builders were the earliest shipwrights to abandon the shell-first hull-construction technique. This advance was more economical in terms of rapidly dwindling materials, available skilled labour and construction time. It, in turn, gave rise to the vessels that launched European domination of the Atlantic and ultimately, beyond. Watercraft were oar-propelled at first and became more sophisticated and less labour-intensive as they evolved from square, lug and lateen sails and complex rigging. As mariners plopped the oceans during different seasons, they noted that the prevailing currents also changed through the year. Natural sciences were harnessed as an aid to propulsion.

This led to the global age of seafaring beginning just prior to 1500. Mariners devised depth-sounding devices by using lead lining and tide tables. They mapped what they could discern of the ocean floor to aid their movement between distant land masses. Adjustable compensational compasses and ship designs for specific purposes enabled trade to flourish more easily.

Paine’s chapter about Columbus notes that he made his historic voyage(s) largely due to an error of judgment about the size of the earth and had the good fortune to find landfall just before his crew was about to mutiny. Columbus’
preparation as a seaman and the aftermath of his adventures are illuminating. The voyages of Columbus and his contemporary, Vasco da Gama, who rounded the Cape of Good Hope to Asia, opened the so-called “age of expansion.” “This era was unprecedented not only because extraordinary floods of people, ideas, and material wealth, as well as flora, fauna, and pathogens, were unleashed around the world, but because Europeans were for the first time in the vanguard of world change. . . While maritime initiative shifted among various European powers, supremacy at sea would remain a European monopoly until the end of the nineteenth century” (p.406). European mastery of the seas evolved into the domination of global exploration and commerce. This led to colonization and unfortunately, slave labour on a mass scale. “Twelve thousand slaves were shipped in the first quarter of the [sixteenth] century, forty thousand in the second and a further sixty thousand between 1550 and 1575. . . The first slaves taken directly from Africa to the Americas arrived in 1530” and rapidly increased in number to work in the Brazilian sugar plantations (pp.410-411). Slavery supported agricultural demands and massive industrialization needs.

The biggest advance in maritime travel and shipping was steam technology dating from around 1800. Wind was a free source of power, but undependable and variable. Generation of steam required fuel sources such as wood, coal, or petroleum and in some military vessels, nuclear radiation. Providing ready access to fuel supplies led to the establishment of bases such as coaling stations, some of which morphed into mini-colonies of seafaring nations around the world. These outposts both opened up continents and connected them.

Canals and improvements in navigation transformed the industrial and economic landscape. Opportunities sprouted for economic development as goods and people moved across the seas and inland waterways. The tempo of life changed rapidly, leading to the realignment of trade and control of financial markets and the movement of capital. Steamships were used to lay intercontinental communications cable making instant communiqués for ordering and selling raw materials and finished goods to manage markets on a global scale. Water was the most efficient and cheapest way to transport bulk goods. The global trade in agricultural and industrial products that currently plies the world’s seas account for about 90 percent of global movement of freight. The cost of this seaborne transport has been driven down by more than 80 percent through port facility innovation, containerization, and especially reductions in labour costs.

The sea, however, has been a duplicitous friend. It enabled the conquest of distant lands, depredation, slavery, indentured servitude, deadly pathogens, and crime, such as piracy, that nibbled away at the edge of the seaborne spread of civilization. Yet it also promoted economic expansion, the promise of a better life in new lands, and, thanks to mechanical efficiencies in shipbuilding, means of propulsion and the maritime sciences, the steady march toward ever-rising standards of living.

Paine presents a consistent style for each chapter. The first section sets the broad historical scene as it relates to the nearby waters. The next roughly twenty-plus pages take the reader through a whirlwind of historical maritime events. This usually leads to a section on the advances that a culture made in naval architecture and maritime science. Finally, Paine summarizes the chapter, putting it into historical perspective and leading into sections that cover the Mediterranean civilizations, the South Pacific, the African continent, plus the Arabic, Indian and Far
Eastern cultures emphasizing Chinese maritime history.

Such a broad and ambitious undertaking inevitably leads *The Sea and Civilization* into some shoal literary-waters. It begins before recorded history and describes places whose names have changed many times over and minor civilizations that have come and gone. The author includes many maps, but the places mentioned in the early part of the book are either difficult or impossible to find. The same applies to the peoples who, in many cases, are historically obscure. It is an exceptional guide through maritime history, but the information is so broad and vast, one occasionally feels drowned in a deluge of seafaring and cultural details. The choice to include some facts and exclude others was obviously difficult. The important details of many historical events are mentioned only in passing – if at all. Thus, Paine calls at a few “seaports” of historical information, but steams past others. It does, however, make me wish to visit the missing ones now that my interest has been piqued.

*The Sea and Civilization* is a well-written and brilliantly organized book. It is extremely inclusive in its breadth, if not in depth. With its literary grace and richness, one could safely predict that it is destined to become a classic of maritime history. Paine’s literary opus certainly deserves a prominent place in the libraries of all maritime historians.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut

There’s nothing like a good pirate flick! To that end, McFarland Publishing has re-issued James Robert Parish’s compendium of pirate and privateering movies that appeared on the small and large screen between 1914 and 1992. This prolific author of more than 100 books specializes in writing on the entertainment industry. In this volume, he examines the enduring genre of pirate movies which “deal nostalgically with a bygone, heavily-romanticized era in which derring-do, courage and the right of might rules” (p.1). Typically this genre relies on action scenes, portraying pirates as idealized, heroic swashbucklers while ignoring the gritty reality of history and the outlaw existence. The main character is normally a rogue with enough redeeming characteristics to evoke sympathy and interest from the audience. Some of these movies feature a heroine whose interaction with the pirate changes his trajectory. Of course, the screen borrows heavily from the many novels and plays which were written before the advent of the film industry. Whether in print or in film, it seems many of us continue to be captivated by tales of pillaging and plundering at sea.

Parish’s book contains a great deal of information about the films he examines: there are lists of casts, information on producers, directors, those who wrote the screenplay, as well as those who have composed and performed the music and sound for the movie. There’s a brief discussion of the main plot of each movie as well as quotations from reviewers. The scope of the book includes early offerings like *The Corsair* of 1914 and other silent movies, to the era of talking pictures and the classic films of Errol Flynn and Maureen O’Hara; Parish’s tour ultimately ends with the underwhelming comedy, *Captain Ron* in 1992. He covers well-known pirate films such as Spielberg’s *Hook* (1991), as well as obscure productions. The author is clearly

knowledgeable about movies, and general readers and fans of the genre will find this book informative.

The great weakness of Pirates and Seafaring Swashbucklers on the Hollywood Screen is that it was reprinted in 2013 and yet it contains no updated sections. In the original publication (1995), the author alludes to a number of upcoming films (such as The Muppet’s Treasure Island and the big budget bomb Cutthroat Island) but Parish did not seize upon the opportunity to include those films in this edition. Even more puzzling is the author’s failure to add more recent blockbusters such as the multi-billion dollar Pirates of the Caribbean series—the most famous and profitable films of the genre (The Curse of the Black Pearl (2003), Dead Man’s Chest (2006), At World’s End (2007), and On Stranger Tides (2011)).

This is a valuable synopsis of pirate movies which would be much more comprehensive and marketable if the reissued version had included films released after 1992. Whether it’s Veggie Tales’ The Pirates Who Don’t Do Anything or the ongoing adventures of Captain Jack Sparrow, the author rightly points out, “the genre continues onward,” (p.10) even though Parish missed this opportunity to stay current.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay, New Brunswick


It is commonly accepted that ships and seamen played a prominent role in the early United States’ relationship to the outside world. Commercial shipping connected the new nation to Europe, the West Indies, and even China, while restrictions on neutral trade and impressment meant that American seafarers played a direct role in the coming of the War of 1812. After 1815, America’s commercial presence on the seas only increased, and merchant shipping tied the growing young nation to the rest of the globe. Matthew Raffety addresses these realities, but he urges us to consider the significant impact that merchant shipping and sailors had on the new nation’s domestic evolution. The proper treatment of seamen and their rights as citizens, Raffety argues, were issues that opened the door to the expansion of federal power. Furthermore, while most Americans identified more strongly with their state or region, Jack Tar was a truly national citizen; sailors appealed directly to the federal government for redress of grievances as citizens of the United States of America, and possessors of all the rights such citizenship promised. Their primary point of contact with the government was the court system, which grew in power and influence as it assumed the role of final arbiter of American maritime law.

In addition to captains and sailors, Raffety includes discussion of an array of figures in the early republic who played a crucial role in the evolution of ideas about citizenship, law, and the sea. He explores the work of federal judges who forged a coherent American admiralty law from the morass of British practice and confusing precedents from the colonial era and Articles of Confederation. In the years after the War of 1812, federal judges claimed for themselves oversight of not only American ships at sea, but also on inland waters. Congress, too, expanded its reach over shipboard life, passing a series of laws designed to manage the relationship between officers and men on American
merchant vessels. Congressional oversight even extended to abolishing flogging in 1850, a concession to years of efforts by reformers to recognize the innate dignity of seamen. Finally, consuls allowed sailors and officers alike to remain in contact with the federal government even when they were far from American shores. Consuls served as arbiters of disputes between officers and men and, prior to 1815, campaigned on behalf of sailors pressed into the British service. More importantly, consuls became “the embodiment of the nation and...an important site of national self-definition” (p.161).

Obviously, federal oversight of shipboard life, whether from judges, Congressmen, or political appointees, faced a severe backlash from captains. Not without reason, captains argued that the necessity of maintaining discipline aboard ship required them to exercise a decidedly unrepublican measure of authority over their men, and to back that authority up with violence. Intrusion by lawmakers into the officer-seamen relationship undermined discipline, even when it granted authority to a captain. Laws that permitted captains to deal harshly with sailors still rooted a captain’s authority in the law, not in his person as supreme officer, and thus undermined his standing before the men.

Raffety’s analysis ignores a few points that would have strengthened his argument. The United States Navy is almost wholly absent from his discussion. It occasionally gets a sentence or two in passing, but he prefers to focus exclusively on the world of merchant shipping. This strict bifurcation between civilian and military would have been foreign to the sailors he discusses. Unlike the British service, sailors in the American Navy usually signed on for the length of a single cruise. American tars moved fluidly between civilian and military vessels. Naval officers were more permanent, but they certainly brought similar perspectives to their civilian counterparts on the abolition of flogging, interference of the federal government in their crews’ treatment, and the democratizing spirit of the age. This vital perspective is well worth considering.

Such criticisms, however, should not discount the tremendous value of this work. Raffety’s analysis will appeal to a broad swath of academia. Historians of American social, legal, political, and labour history will find fascinating insights and compelling arguments here, not to mention the obvious appeal to maritime historians. Most upper-level undergraduates will find The Republic Afloat very accessible, and this would make a fine addition to a wide array of courses. The argument here is an important one. Raffety makes a compelling case for the emergence of a truly national identity developing among maritime labourers in the years prior to the Civil War. He also speaks to the halting and often ill-defined, but nevertheless undeniable, expansion of federal power in the early republic. This expansion, at least as far as overseas commerce was concerned, began almost immediately after the ratification of the Constitution. Finally, this work provides a significant contribution to a growing body of literature on the role of seamen in the early republic. Countless sailors were quick to seize on the idea of citizenship and look to the government to advance their interests, and their story forms a crucial part of labour history in the early republic.

Thomas Sheppard
New Haven, Connecticut

Joseph-Mathias Gérard de Rayneval (1736-1812), ennobled in 1778, was a distinguished French diplomat and member of the conseil d'état under the ancien régime. Fluent in German and English, de Rayneval served much of his career at courts in eastern and central Europe. Back in Paris in 1776 as undersecretary to the foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, de Rayneval played an integral part in spurring French intervention in the American Revolution by writing an influential paper, “Reflections on the Situation in America,” that suggested aiding the American colonies as a way to strike against the British. At first, De Rayneval struck Jefferson, one of the American diplomats in Paris, as more cunning than wise and “neither great nor liberal” in his thinking. Yet de Rayneval was a learned and cultured man. Dismissed from the diplomatic service in 1792, he retired to his estates where he wrote a treatise on the law of nations, Institutions du droit de la nature et des gens (1803), for which Napoleon awarded him the Légion d'honneur. In his last years, de Rayneval wrote a treatise on maritime law, De la liberté des mers, published only once in France (1811) and never published in English, according to Professor William E. Butler’s fine introduction, until the present work.

Peter S. (Pierre Etienne) Du Ponceau (1760-1844) was a distinguished Philadelphia lawyer and a leading intellectual in the new American republic. French by birth, Du Ponceau displayed an astonishing facility for ancient and modern languages, mastering Greek, Latin, English, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Swedish, and German. Many languages he taught himself. He moved to Paris as a teenager to eke out a living as a translator. There, he met Baron von Steuben, and emigrated to America with him in 1777. When Steuben became the Inspector General of Washington’s army, Du Ponceau, as his secretary, translator, and aide-de-camp, was brevetted a captain. Described by Butler as “dreamy-eyed, nearsighted, and hopelessly scholarly,” Du Ponceau translated and arranged for the publication of Steuben’s “Blue Book,” the manual by which the army at Valley Forge learned its business. Diagnosed (erroneously) with tuberculosis, Du Ponceau was invalided out of the army after four years, settled in Philadelphia, became a naturalized American citizen, and read law. Du Ponceau soon became a leading advocate, specializing in cases with international issues or foreign clients – in a footnote, Butler lists fifteen cases Du Ponceau argued in the Supreme Court. For years, Du Ponceau was on retainer from the French government, although Du Ponceau was an unabashedly patriotic American. He also emerged as a legal scholar of renown, writing on such diverse topics as jurisdiction, bankruptcy, evidence, and conflicts of law. Using his command of languages and his mastery of the law, Du Ponceau translated many of the great European legal works into English, as well as essays in foreign languages on travel and linguistics. Du Ponceau's scholarship did not end there. His studies of American Indian languages were “pioneering and immense,” and Butler claims that Du Ponceau was “one of the great linguists of the world,” widely regarded as the founder of American philology.

The circumstances by which Du Ponceau received a copy of de Rayneval’s De la liberté des mers are unclear, nor is it clear when he undertook to translate the work, although issues of neutral rights, prizes, and blockade were critical to the United States by 1812. Du Ponceau’s English translation of De la liberté des mers, On the Freedom of the Sea, has been in manuscript, sitting in the archives of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia (where Du Ponceau once served as president) for the better part of
two centuries. Butler, a professor at Penn State University's Dickinson School of Law and an international legal scholar, found the manuscript. He describes Du Ponceau's translation as a "free translation of the original" by a specialist, who gently and only slightly edited the text and added some interpretive and clarifying footnotes. To de Rayneval's treatise and Du Ponceau's translation and editing, Butler has provided elegant, scholarly biographical essays on de Rayneval and Du Ponceau, as well as a short essay on the text itself.

De Rayneval's treatise is in two "volumes." The first volume deals with the nature of the law of the sea, belligerent and neutral rights, contraband, and the rights and limitations of stopping, searching, and seizing neutral merchant vessels on the high seas in time of war. The second volume, somewhat shorter than the first, is de Rayneval's heavily-footnoted, 50-page analysis of state papers (themselves attached and heavily annotated) by which he attempts to demonstrate how, with "cunning and perfidy," the British government intellectually subverted the principles of the league of armed neutrality formed against British dominance of the sea in 1780.

De Rayneval's work shows great erudition and easy familiarity with legal scholars of earlier generations. But his goal is to strip away the layers of self-serving maxims, treaties, and usages which had, in his view, corrupted international maritime law. Instead, he attempts to cleanse and restate the law of the sea by utilizing first principles of natural law and reason. Based on these principles, de Rayneval understands the sea as a limitless "commons" that all may use with near-absolute freedom. A staunch, even extreme, advocate of the principle "free ships make free goods," de Rayneval challenges the existing legal regime by which belligerent maritime powers (read, Britain) claimed the right to lawfully stop, search, and seize neutral vessels on the high seas. Indeed, he denies any such right exists on the high seas, and would have privateers and warships respect the *bona fides* of the papers of neutrals. Although de Rayneval's essay is closely reasoned, his writing is not ponderous, at least as Du Ponceau has translated him, and in fact, shows occasional witty flashes. Volume One of de Rayneval's work is really an extended essay, organized around themes that form the headings of the essay. There is a sprinkling of proofreading errors (misspelled words and dropped letters, mostly) that do not affect any sentient reader's understanding.

*On the Freedom of the Sea* provides an exposition of a French scholar's thinking on critical aspects of international maritime law, written at a time when those concepts were tested in armed conflict in European and Atlantic waters. How influential de Rayneval was in his own country is a question that Butler does not address. At the time de Rayneval wrote *De la liberté des mers*, Napoleon's Continental System was at its high-water mark; the French government seized hundreds of neutral American merchant vessels on legal pretexts that de Rayneval surely would not have countenanced. Most readers also would have benefitted if Butler had provided an essay placing *On the Freedom of the Sea* (and what may be de Rayneval's original ideas) in the historical development of international maritime law scholarship. Still, as is, publication of this almost unknown work in contemporary translation must be welcome to that small band of Anglophone historians and legal scholars interested in issues of neutrality, blockade, prize law, privateers, and general maritime law in the Napoleonic Era.

Frederick C. Leiner
Baltimore, Maryland

“A Bold and Hearty Race of Men” explores the literature of whaling and to a lesser degree, the sea and western expansion. Literary works such as Moby-Dick were initially poorly received, but later caught the imagination of readers in many nations. Gender topics have been popular with historians for about twenty years, but they usually address the role of women in society. Jennifer Schell’s research is heavily skewed toward masculinity, hypothesizing that the most manly profession was that of a whaler, particularly an American whale fishermen. Whalers would go to sea for long periods of time and endure the harshest of conditions to hunt their prey. They sought the largest animals on earth that inhabited a vast inhospitable and perilous ocean. The whales were captured from small vulnerable boats using, by most standards, puny weapons. Once killed the quarry had to be dangerously and laboriously rendered into oil, a storable, marketable product.

Whalemen lived in extremely close quarters within a rigid, hierarchical shipboard society. They were, at times, thrown together with various representatives of society: whites, blacks, Native Americans, Inuit, Asians, and Polynesians. Each had their personal and varied customs and religious beliefs. Some were educated, young and fit, but many were not. While a majority of men were relatively experienced seamen, others had never been to sea. The inhabitants of this strange floating world also had their own language, a vernacular both colourful and precise, with minor variations furnished by the ethnicities of those onboard. Often neglected was the relationship of a captain’s wife who made occasional whaling voyages with her husband, a situation usually as uncomfortable for the lady as for ordinary sailors.

Schell suggests that whalers were the exemplars of “American-ness.” Their life depended upon finding and capturing a species that was declining because of the owners’ lust for riches. They took from the sea with little thought for the sustainability of their prey. Their work was killing, as opposed to conserving, the species that brought them prosperity. Similarly, farmers planted and cultivated crops, carefully gathering their seeds, but then ruined their land by neglecting crop rotation practices.

Most of the ship owners from Nantucket, the earliest whaling port, were Quakers. They were avowed pacifists yet the profit motive generally trumped what one might consider morality today. The whaling industry seemed to contradict the moral tenets of Quakerism as it was “notorious for starving, overworking and whipping its employees. . . Nineteenth-century whaling involved performing vast amounts of manual labour under brutal and oppressive conditions” (pp.116-17). Although the author focuses upon evidence of manliness, stoicism and accepting one’s place in the hierarchy of the crew, the sometimes-wanton cruelty could lead to desertion. In fact, five of the most famous authors who wrote about whaling deserted their ship, including Herman Melville.

The author relates the clashes that these cultural differences brought via the vast literature concerning whaling. Many of the references are to classics, but the reader is introduced to some that may have eluded them and therefore, this book has the potential to broaden the reader’s literary horizon. It is well paced, each chapter being about 30 pages in length divided into two segments. In the first segment, the
author explores literary references to a distinct theme such as physical labour, the chain of command, gender roles at sea, or racial problems. Halfway through these chapters, she shifts gears and heavily quotes the narratives of selected books to reinforce the points she raised in the first part. Some segments work better than others, but they succeed in giving the book a sense of logic and erudition.

A pleasurable feature is the opportunity to revisit many well-known passages from the extensive whaling fiction literature along with some unfamiliar quotations that are valuable ‘finds’. For example, there is a moving excerpt from Frederick Douglass’ Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself (p.59) that was not about whaling per se, but an outstanding example of maritime-related writing as he compares his life to that of a ship.

You are loosed from your moorings, and are free; I am fast in my chains, and am a slave! You move merrily before the gentle gale, and I sadly before the bloody whip! You are freedoms swift winged angels, that fly round the world: I am confined in bands of iron! (p.196)

This is not an easy book to be read by the fireplace. The narrative is replete with a myriad of references, likely part of a graduate thesis, that seem to illustrate a comprehensive bibliography. While most whaling titles are familiar, there are a few obscure works related to the author’s theme. Therefore, the secondary title, The Lives and Literature of American Whalemen, point to its use as a whaling literature syllabus concerning gender with a masculine focus.

The book has several flaws of repetition that could have been avoided by more careful editing. Frequent references to masculine traits such as muscularity, manhood and ruggedness appear overplayed. There are many mentions of sailors’ colourful language and often-unique patois, particularly among those from Nantucket — interesting, but perhaps overdone. Finally, the fact that the life onboard a whaler was “periods of intense physical labor often punctuated by protected periods of inactivity” (p.90) appears too often, if not in exactly these words. In aggregate, these make the book long-winded at times. Still, those minor points noted, A Bold and Hearty Race of Men is stimulating, erudite and, at times, moving. It is a worthwhile addition to the collected works about gender and whaling.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Robert Shenk’s America’s Black Sea Fleet serendipitously arrives just as the Black Sea gains renewed strategic emphasis. The collapse of the Ukrainian regime, coupled with apparent Russian restiveness and the increasing clamour of dissent in Turkey, have created a significant level of uncertainty within the region. The Black Sea of America’s Black Sea Fleet serves as a clear antecedent to today’s political turmoil, Shenk adeptly portraying the post-First World War region as one of nationalist and ethnic forces vying for dominance in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Amid this torrent of competing forces, Admiral Mark Bristol and his small fleet of U.S. destroyers represented American interests, while also protecting the numerous American charities and relief organizations present within this incredibly
conflicted area. Shenk shows how, contrary to the overarching notion of “American Isolationism,” the United States Navy played an integral, if complicated, role in the post-war Black Sea.

Admiral Bristol arrived in the Bosporus during the war’s immediate aftermath, finding himself ostensibly responsible for the welfare and safe-keeping of a hodgepodge of American missionaries, relief agencies, and college-faculty members. Bristol slowly managed to become the most prominent American in the region, turning his command into both a pseudo-diplomatic mission and economic liaison for U.S. interests. From this position, the admiral watched as the political reality of the Black Sea devolved into a morass of nationalistic and ethnic differences. Rather than sitting on the sidelines of a conflict, Bristol’s destroyers repeatedly steamed into the midst of the competing sides. The constantly changing geopolitical landscape forced many captains to take actions in an operational environment devoid of clear moral choices. American ships witnessed the waning days of the Russian Civil War, escorting White Russian generals throughout the Black Sea; they protected transports filled with much-needed grain required to feed a Russian population in the throes of one of the fiercest famines of the century; and they watched the forced migrations of ethnic Greeks and Armenians by nationalistic Turks, securing American citizens and property while thousands marched into the Turkish mountains to die.

Lacking uniform directives, Bristol and his officers found themselves dictating policy.

Shenk’s rendering of the Armenian genocide and Greek expulsion may be the book’s most important historiographical legacy. *America's Black Sea Fleet* provides nuance to the American response to the crisis. Bristol and his officers readily identified with Mustapha Kemal, the nationalist father of modern Turkey, and his followers, foregoing their allies from the First World War. From his position as the chief American voice in the region, the admiral dampened the stories forwarded to him by missionaries and relief agents who witnessed Turkish brutality. Bristol painted the events as *quid pro quo* for Armenian atrocities and the behaviour of Greek occupation forces; such a portrayal helped stem the rabid pro-Armenian faction within the United States. Not even the tragedy and conflagration at Smyrna, where Turkish forces and partisans ravaged the Greek population while they awaited evacuation, served as proof of Turkish perfidy. While U.S. destroyers and cruisers assisted with the eventual evacuation, Shenk shows how Bristol’s comments about the crisis downplayed the event and stymied any official rebuke.

*America's Black Sea Fleet* does not focus solely on the diplomatic or the political, alternating chapters between standard chronologies of events and examinations of the lives of sailors stationed on Black Sea duty. Shenk dutifully recreates the frenetic social atmosphere of Constantinople in the early 1920s. A professor of English, Shenk’s narrative escapes the mundanity of scholarly work and borders on the literary. Emerging as less historical figures than characters in a story, the sailors, denizens, and refugees that populate the twisting streets of Turkey’s capital add flavour and colour. Russian princesses starving while they waitress in the city’s finest restaurants, young sailors escaping Prohibition in the United States among numerous Turkish grog shops, young children picking pockets to feed their families—all provide the reader a fuller sense of the time and place than most historians portray.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s defeat of Greek forces during 1922, and the ensuing
expulsion of ethnic minorities from Turkey, effectively closed the door on the American adventure in the Black Sea. With the Russian Revolution over, the famine ending, and nationalism remaking Turkey, no tasks remained for the U.S. fleet. That said, their departure was not enacted in defiance; simply put, the mission had ended. The expulsion of most of the Christians from Turkey meant no more flocks requiring missionaries and no more impoverished or oppressed minorities relying on relief agencies. Lacking a clear task, the destroyers left during the autumn of 1923. But in their wake remained some interesting anecdotes concerning the role of the navy in the application of soft power. By sending Bristol’s fleet to the Black Sea and providing him with the flexibility to determine policy in the region, the United States protected its assets and citizens within the region at a low cost. At the same time, these destroyers and their officers forwarded American interests in the region. While America’s Black Sea Fleet may not prove to be the primary source to understand America’s complicated role in the complex region, it will provide fodder for current naval historians to examine how small ships may have large impacts.

Andrew J. Forney
West Point, New York


This book is a re-issue (entirely unamended, apart from a new three-page preface) of a volume that first appeared in 1989. When it was first published, the book was greeted as a pioneering attempt to offer a fresh explanation of British naval policy, one that took as its central theme the influence of financial and, more especially, of technological developments on the unfolding of new policy directions. The particular peg on which the author hung his analysis was the British Admiralty’s interest in, and ultimate rejection of, a new fire control system invented and developed privately by Arthur Hungerford Pollen. According to the author, the promised capabilities of the Pollen system played a major role in the introduction of new capital ship types, especially the battle cruiser, and on all the policies – tactical, strategic and financial – that flowed from such design and procurement decisions. Similarly, the rejection of this system in favour of an allegedly inferior but cheaper rival, the Dreyer Table, condemned the Royal Navy, or so it is argued, to failure in the key surface fleet action of the First World War, the battle of Jutland.

There is no denying the originality of the thesis, which has in the past exercised enormous influence, despite the narrowness of the core topic that informs the argument –one, ultimately rejected, fire control system. Unfortunately, while some books are destined to remain classics – for example, Arthur Marder’s From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, which is still the bedrock of the discipline more than half a century after publication – this book has not aged all that well. When it was first released, the author benefitted from an almost total absence of other scholars working on, or even equipped to comment on, what was undoubtedly a very technical area. Thus, if doubts existed about Sumida’s analysis or the broader conclusions he drew from it, few had the inclination or ability to express them. This all changed, however, with the entry into the field of John Brooks, who combined professional expertise in engineering
alongside his skills as a historian. Brooks, who examined many of the same issues as Sumida, but from a wider angle and on a better-balanced evidential base, drew very different conclusions. His forensic analysis, while unfailingly polite and always willing to acknowledge the pioneering role that Sumida had played, could not but fail to hint that a thesis about the Pollen system, written largely to vindicate Sumida’s hero Pollen, analyzing events from the point of view of Pollen, drawing heavily upon the Pollen papers and enjoying the support of the Pollen family, might lack objectivity and be drawn, as a result of its partiality, to conclusions that would look suspect when seen from a broader perspective. By contrast, Brooks’ more judicious analysis, drawing extensively on records that Sumida had marginalized, and using a wider lens, strongly suggested that, if consideration were given to the Admiralty’s agenda, the rejection of the Pollen system was not the travesty that Pollen believed and Sumida endorsed, but an entirely logical one, given that the Dreyer Table better suited the Royal Navy’s proclaimed tactical requirements. This conclusion, being totally at variance with Sumida’s core position, inevitably shone a critical light on some of Sumida’s other judgements, which now appeared out of place and inconsistent with the evidence. In particular, the argument that Fisher’s revolutionary advances in warship design had been driven by a belief that the Royal Navy would, courtesy of Pollen, soon have a monopoly of instruments that would enable them alone to practice long range gunnery looked especially suspect, all the more so as no evidence was presented that Fisher knew about the Pollen system at the time he conceived his new warship programme.

Since Brooks opened Sumida’s ideas up to scrutiny, several other aspects of this book have been shown to be wanting. In most cases, this is because the arguments advanced run ahead of the documentary evidence presented. The hypothesis that the battle cruiser was designed to counter French and Russian armoured cruisers is a case in point. Mountains of evidence that the Naval Intelligence Department was unimpressed by the capabilities of these foreign vessels and did not believe that the French and Russian programmes would be completed as planned get no mention. What is presented instead is an argument based upon extrapolation. Fisher, as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet before 1902, was worried about these vessels; therefore, he must have been similarly worried by them in 1904-5. The fact that there are no documents presented to sustain this link and that Russia’s armoured cruisers had been all but annihilated before a single British battle cruiser had been laid down is not allowed to stand in the way of the hypothesis. As Sumida and others have subsequently asserted on the authority of this book, the agenda behind Fisher’s reforms was preparing the Royal Navy for a global cruiser war. The fact that this book actually offers scant proof for the assertion needs to be stressed.

All in all, the reissue of this book is to be welcomed as the financial data in the appendices remains useful. The re-issue will also enable those who wish to do so to review the state of the historiography as it existed in the late 1980s. Given that no effort has been made to incorporate subsequent scholarship in this re-issue, however, anyone who wishes to read an up-to-date analysis of the fire control question is advised to refer to John Brooks’ *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control* (London: Routledge 2005).

Matthew S. Seligmann
London, UK

Brian Whitehouse’s *A Sense of the Sea* has a promising title. From the book’s introduction, a reader has the expectation of learning new insights into the often-opaque world of oceanography. The author is an academic oceanographer with many years of experience, well qualified to lead the reader to a better understanding of the vast sea around us.

A major driver in promoting the science of oceanography was the need for oceanographic information for the successful conduct of the Second World War. It grew substantially during the Cold War years that followed, especially as submarines proliferated and their technology and sophistication increased geometrically. “Marine technologies developed for war often result in new discoveries in the civilian sector, and vice versa” (97). This scientific discipline subsumed academic specialists in biology, chemistry, physics, geology and meteorology to focus on the problems of the oceans’ effects on the earth’s terrestrial and aqueous surface.

Whitehouse explains many physical facts about salt water; for example, the speed of sound traveling through this medium increases or decreases in relation to temperature, depth and salinity; water temperature has the greatest effect on the topmost kilometre; at greater depth, pressure is the most important variable. Constructing models of air–sea interactions requires vast amounts of data. Powerful computers are employed to make sense of the samplings from arrays of sensitive high-tech buoys and satellite observations. The results of the modeled marine environment provide vital information to the world’s fisheries, as well as to merchant and naval ships at sea, the sea-borne energy-exploring oil and gas platforms, and other maritime-based commercial enterprises. These mathematically-derived models also provide weather, wind and tide information that can be used to harness energy in coastal communities and for aquaculture as a source of nutrition, a vital life-sustaining resource. Whitehouse states that our remarkably sophisticated satellite systems are, in a sense, time machines that can reasonably predict weather. They also show wind patterns that help predict coastal flooding, sea level surges and the subsequent terrestrial topographical changes that are likely to occur from them in the littoral waters.

The author also explains the physics of how light changes the colour of the water with increasing depth. “Red light is absorbed in the first few feet of water whereas blue light is not. It is scattered down and back to the surface, and because of this, the sea appears blue. Phytoplankton absorb blue light … and reflect green and because of this sea water containing plankton becomes less blue and increasingly aqua as their concentration increases” (67).

Oceanographers have detected “mesoscale” eddies or massive currents that supply roughly ninety percent of the kinetic energy of the oceans and these in turn produce the weather systems that start and encircle Antarctica to be propagated by the earth’s spin. Similarly other currents come out of the Arctic waters, but the Antarctic clime seems to have the greatest influence, particularly upon the Americas. Plate tectonics, underwater volcanoes, hot water vents and deep canyons stir this swirling mix. Added to this are the influences of the sun, moisture, landmasses and the atmosphere. The sunlight from 93 million miles away almost always shines directly on the Equator causing warm ocean currents.
These same rays, oblique at the poles, produce icecaps as less of the sun’s energy is reflected back into space. Local weather and oceanic phenomena are affected by other events far away, but are increasingly in flux due to our global climate changes.

The author delivers reasonably well upon the promises made in the introduction in the first half of the work, but then abruptly tacks on a new course. Part II of the book is titled “The Ocean We Perceive.” Here, Whitehouse abruptly turns the publication into a series of loosely connected memoirs about his grandfather and father, Rachael Carson, Jacques Cousteau, and Ian Fleming and, as a fairly constant backdrop, himself. The narrative jumps from their scientific or inspirational contributions to pop culture to maritime history and then back again. The author becomes mired in detailed information about these personalities and how each affected oceanography and the author on a multitude of levels. While Whitehouse’s insight into their contributions to oceanography in general and his own scientific career is interesting, he unfortunately seems adrift from the theme, making *A Sense of the Sea*.

In summary, the author makes many good points concerning oceanography and specific personalities that influenced his view of the science, but there are more focused recently published books about this and related topics. Dr. Whitehouse is a Canadian academician who works in a fascinating field. I expected him to deliver more cutting-edge information to the reader. Although this work has its rewarding moments, as a whole, this reviewer found the book mildly disappointing.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


It is a rare find among recently-published naval history books to have a book dealing with Second World War U.S. Navy vessels that contributes something new to the existing body of knowledge. Without any doubt, Williams’ book belongs to this category and is, consequently, a welcome addition to any naval history bookshelf.

Like all belligerent nations of the Second World War, the U.S. expanded its navy substantially at the beginning as well as during the course of the war. Besides large naval vessels, the U.S. Navy built hundreds of smaller vessels for various purposes and recruited a wide range of civilian vessels, from yachts to tugs and cargo ships. Although many of these vessels were lost in action during the war, a substantial number survived and were returned or sold to private and commercial owners once the navy no longer had a need for these often-modest watercraft.

Williams has compiled the available knowledge about them into a register of Second World War naval vessels that were transferred into private hands after the end of the war. Organizing them by vessel type, Williams provides the pre-war history of the vessels (if any), a short overview of their various deployments during the war and most importantly, what happened to the ships and boats up until the present or, at least, the last date for which evidence for it could be found. Like all registers of substantial size, Williams’ book is the result of painstaking and detail-driven research carried out over years and based on a broad array of primary and secondary sources. The result is a comprehensive list of all former naval vessels owned by private American citizens or companies that were used for commercial or recreational
purposes. This makes Williams’ book an important tool for any historian interested in U.S. naval and maritime history, and in particular, for historians interested in the history of the ships themselves.

Despite its value as a reference, there is one question that needs to be raised: is printing the data as a traditional book the most appropriate format to use for such information in 2013? Computer and web-based databases have become standard for scholarly and scientific research and even historians are using these tools on a daily base for good reason. While the content of both an electronic and a printed database might be the same, the access possibilities are quite different. Working with the printed register somewhat limits research by confining the reader to the author’s chosen organizational structure or the index, rather than allowing the user to design specific queries or combinations of queries. Access to an electronic version of the database behind the register would have provided users of the data with an opportunity to search the material in a much more direct and sophisticated way. Researchers would, thus, be able to answer questions the compiler of the register might never have thought about or to expand their study from a qualitative to a quantitative approach.

Therefore, the final comment on Williams’ book remains ambivalent. On the one hand, it is an important contribution to US naval history, but on the other, the publication remains way below the potential of the research behind the publication. It is hoped that, in the near future, the author and the publisher might decide to make the database behind the publication available in an electronic format, either on CD or via the web. Since the author most likely prepared the book with the help of such a database, perhaps it was simply a publication decision not to include this database right from the beginning.

Until the database behind the register becomes available, however, the book should be recommended to any historian interested in ships of the U.S. Navy during and after the Second World War. It may not suit everyone’s private bookshelf or qualify as casual reading, but it is important for anyone conducting proper historical research and a must for the libraries of institutions dealing with naval history.

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Yoshihara and Holmes, associate professors at the U.S. Naval War College, analyze the rise of China’s navy with the succinct and straightforward purpose of “helping the United States manage a disturbance to the regional order–to the extent possible” (p.5). The “disturbance” is the shift of the focus of naval activity in the world to the Asia Pacific region and in particular, to the growth and development of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and associated forces.

In proclaiming this book as a companion to their first major work, Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century: the Turn to Mahan, the authors describe the publications and information sources used and methods of analysis for each type of literature. The book is a discussion of Chinese naval development in recent history and its context within politics, foreign relations, and warfare as a whole.

The first chapter, “Mahan’s Two Tridents,” sets out the book’s approach, which is, first and last, to establish the
nineteenth-century work of Alfred Thayer Mahan as the framework and grammar of the discourse. Chapter 2, “China Engages the Strategic Theorists,” looks at Chinese interpretations of classic literature on warfare, especially Mahan and Mao, to provide clues to future doctrine. The next chapter compares in detail the current situation in the Asia-Pacific region with that of pre-First World War Germany. The authors concede that the complexity of the modern era is greater in many dimensions, such as possible alliances and technology. “Fleet Tactics with Chinese Characteristics” presents the development of China’s ships, weaponry and facilities, and offers scenarios for a “Post Taiwan” world. Chapter 5 is the most technical chapter, presenting the proliferation of weapon types, like ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missile defense systems up to the year 2010. The authors discuss the interplay between possible theatres of combat in addition to war at sea, including land, space and cyber spheres. They describe the emerging missile race among the powers of the Pacific region, especially Japan, the Koreas, China, Taiwan, and America. This chapter is most heavily based on Chinese language sources and gives the closest look at new technologies of war at sea. Here, the reader is introduced to the Second Artillery Division of the PLAN and inter-service relations in the Chinese context.

Chapter 6, “China’s Emerging Undersea Nuclear Deterrent,” describes the likely development and deployment of its ballistic missile submarine fleet, while Chapter 7 looks at China’s attempt to fashion a “usable past” and the co-operative peaceful uses of its navy, such as anti-piracy, search and rescue and humanitarian missions. The next chapter, “U.S. Maritime Strategy in Asia,” looks at recent changes in official U.S. strategic planning documents to measure the trajectories of American naval strategies. The chapter compares and contrasts the basic naval strategy document of the Reagan era, the Maritime Strategy (1986) with that of the George W. Bush era, Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) issued on behalf of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The cooperation extends beyond the “Sea Services” to friendly countries, who will become allies and partners in maintaining the status quo. The final chapter, “Who Holds the Tridents?” presents the authors’ conclusions and likely future scenarios, which, in general, depict China as gradualist and moderate.

There are some miss-steps in setting the stage. As a prelude to the nineteenth century, the Battle of Trafalgar is incorrectly placed in the Mediterranean Sea (p.1). Similarly, “Prussian strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz sheds light on the twin nature of Mahanian sea-power theory” (p.8). Since Clausewitz (b. 1780) antedates Mahan (b. 1840) by many decades, this cannot have been so. Neither slip helps the reader’s confidence about the quality of the information that follows.

The use of Chinese-language sources, including newspapers and journals, is a major strength of this work. The quality of sources appears to be high, i.e., official documents from the navy and defense ministries and the Rand Corporation. The list of acronyms is helpful and well placed immediately before the preface since there is so much modern technology mentioned which tends to be expressed in acronyms. The single grey-scale map is very small scale, but packed with useful geopolitical information, including the First and Second Island Chains. The lack of an organized bibliography and list or sources, however, detracts from usefulness, in spite of an index.

Two messages emerge: first, that U.S. pre-eminence is natural and beneficial to the freedom of the common sea and the promotion of trade; and, second, that
Chinese naval development will be minimalist and modest. The latter is expressed throughout the work in a number of contexts: “Our chief finding: a larger, more advanced, more capable squadron of fleet ballistic missile submarines does not necessarily signal a break with China’s tradition of minimalist nuclear strategy. Indeed a modest undersea deterrent would reinforce minimum deterrence…” (p.133).

The U.S. strategic document, *The Cooperative Strategy* (2007), was intended to minimize competition between the U.S. Navy, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The authors seem to downplay the role of technical development, enjoining, almost willing, politicians and strategists in China toward pacifism. They dismiss the likelihood that a destructive arms race could replace the sedate shift of balance with the symmetry of the two main powers: “the safest assumption is that the logic of sea power, not the technical specifications of this or that naval weapon, will determine China’s nautical destiny” (p.224).

Important terms and bibliographic citations are presented in Chinese script with a translation following in English, in the nature of a parallel text. Terms used in military doctrine are anglicized translations of Chinese script, such as, “Aegis inundation” and “bristling BMDs,” (p.109) which presents the reader with language-related problems. First is the proliferation of technical language on the subject of naval warfare and its evolution and proliferation. Second, is the presentation of the core of the language used in Chinese sources to describe contemporary naval activity. Language can be seen to change quickly to comprehend rapidly evolving technologies.

The authors’ straightforward point of view increases the utility of the work. The intended audience of this paperback version of the 2010 title presumably reaches beyond planning staffs at military colleges and other institutions to a market including students and academics. The book should also appeal to politicians and bureaucrats, theoreticians, naval scholars and military people. It would even be extremely helpful for anyone learning the Chinese language in the wider areas of current affairs, international trade, politics and non-naval warfare in general.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
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It is said that desperate times breed desperate measures. In the summer of 1944, as American naval forces approached the inner ring of the Imperial Japanese defense perimeter, it was clear that an American-led invasion of the Japanese home islands was no longer an impossibility but a certainty. Accordingly, the high echelons of the Japanese military began to discuss ways to forestall the inevitable American invasion of Japan.

One result of their discussions was the *kamikaze* – the suicide weapon which has become a part of the common vocabulary. The word means “divine wind” and refers to a typhoon that destroyed a Mongol fleet poised to invade Japan in 1281 AD. The method was simple – pilots would take off on a one-way trip in an airplane equipped with one or more bombs. The pilot was expected to seek out an American naval vessel, avoid the defensive aircraft and anti-aircraft fire, and crash into the ship, destroying himself, the aircraft, and (hopefully) the American ship. The Japanese military reasoned that if enough...
American ships were sunk or damaged, with associated heavy personnel losses, perhaps, just perhaps, the Americans might consider a negotiated peace or maybe such heavy losses would cause the Americans to quit the Pacific War.

Those were slim hopes, underscored by the realization that American military production and the skills of American pilots had far outstripped Japanese capacities in those vital areas. Significantly, the development of the kamikaze was one of the few times that the Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) and the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force (IJNAF) cooperated fully with each other – the two services have gone down in history as notorious rivals for resources and manpower. Many kamikaze attacks were joint JAAF-IJNAF operations.

While individual kamikaze attacks – pilots crashing their airplanes into enemy airplanes or ships – had occurred prior to the decision to launch kamikazes as an organized combat tactic, the JAAF and IJNAF began to train pilots just for kamikaze attacks. The first organized kamikaze attack occurred on 25 October 1944, when kamikazes attacked ships of the U.S. Navy’s (USN) Task Force 77.4.1. In that action, four USN aircraft carriers were hit by kamikazes, with accompanying damage and loss of life.

The problem was how to stop the suicide planes from reaching their targets. Fortunately for the USN, and also units of U.S. Marine Corps aviation (USMC) and the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF), the kamikaze pilots were usually poorly trained and flew obsolete aircraft. This provided the USN, USMC, and USAAF, armed with up-to-date fighter aircraft and well-trained pilots, with opportunities for their fighter pilots to score many aerial victories. Indeed, 90 USN, USMC, and USAAF fighter pilots became aces (scoring five or more aerial victories) against the kamikazes.

It is this story, the fight against the kamikazes, that Edward M. Young relates in Osprey Aircraft of the Aces # 109: American Aces Against the Kamikaze. It was a desperate fight – with the Japanese pilots attempting to fulfill their duty to the Emperor and their homeland while the American pilots had to intercept them to prevent strikes on USN ships. Young writes a coherent, easy-to-read narrative which shows his knowledge of the subject. He focuses on kamikaze campaigns – the Philippines and Okinawa – and deals with the aerial combats chronologically, rather than focusing on each individual USN, USMC, and USAAF ace pilot. The book is well-illustrated with many relevant photos and the usual Osprey Aircraft of the Aces centre colour section, presenting 32 colour sideviews of USN, USMC, and USAAF anti-kamikaze aces. This will be of great interest to modelers but the non-modeller reader will find the colour sideviews attractive and interesting as well.

Young also answers a questions so often posed when dealing with the kamikaze phenomenon: Why would young pilots willingly, even gladly, fly a suicide mission? Young’s analysis ties three strands of Japanese culture together—Shintoism, which valued the warrior ethic; Buddhism, which stressed the temporary nature of life; and Confucianism, which emphasized loyalty to the Emperor, the pilots’ commanders, and the pilots’ families. Taken as a whole, those three religious concepts explain the motivation behind the kamikaze phenomenon.

The fight against the kamikazes was one of the most vicious Second World War aerial campaigns. It was scarcely a fair fight; the Japanese kamikaze pilots often flew obsolete aircraft and were just given enough pilot training to fly the one-way suicide mission, while the American pilots flew the most up-to-date models of the F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, FM-2 Wildcat, P-38
Lightning, and P-47 Thunderbolt fighters. Moreover, by late 1944, American pilot were well-trained and many had extensive combat experience. Still, quite often, a kamikaze would penetrate the aerial defense screen and survive antiaircraft fire to score a hit on a USN ship.

The kamikazes were costly for both sides; kamikaze attacks in the Philippines between October 1944, and January 1945 cost the Americans 22 ships sunk, 115 others damaged and the loss of approximately 2500 USN sailors. The JAAF and IJNAF kamikaze units lost about 1100 aircraft in the Philippines and another 1100 kamikaze aircraft during the Okinawa campaign.

Clearly, the kamikazes were an effective weapon, but one which did not prolong the war in favour of Imperial Japan. Indeed, the kamikaze’s efficacy may even have shortened the war by playing a part in the American decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Young’s work is recommended for those who wish to learn more about this vicious, but ultimately futile, weapon of war.

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The author, Britt Zerbe, recently completed a doctorate in maritime history at the University of Exeter. His detailed research for this book has shone a new light on the manner in which Royal Marines were recruited, as well as their social background, training and pay. He has pinpointed the development of the structure of the Marine Regiments and their role in manning the Navy, describing the Marines’ key duties as an early rapid reaction force whose presence guarded against the threat of mutiny or desertion. Yet he also found indications that sailors enlisting on the earliest long-distance voyages often experienced a discipline as brutal as any in the armed forces.

One purpose of this book is to illustrate how the Marine Regiments were raised, either individually or by unilaterally sending ordinary marching regiments to sea in response to whatever war was on the political horizon. One of the earliest sea officers to acquire a commission in the Marines was a Captain Digby in 1671 (Rodger 2004) but within 70 years, artillery officers at the Royal Military Academy opted to qualify as professional soldiers rather than Marine “gentlemen amateurs” (Foulkes 2006).

The author meticulously traces the development of the Marine Battalion from its operations in the Nine Years’ War from 1689, through the Wars of Spanish Succession, Jenkin’s Ear, Austrian Succession, Boston in 1775, and the French Revolutionary Wars from 1793. Finally, in 1802, the Battalion was created “Royal” as the British Marine Corps and allocated operational priority. An obligation to serve the state was then established by government and the British Maritime Foot became the British Maritime Corps.

Existing literature confirms that as the decades proceeded, the government commissioned several thorough examinations of the Royal Marines’ seagoing history and found that a typical
74-gun ship carried at least two Marine officers who were nominally volunteers (Davies 1996). Although under strict orders to neither strike their men nor permit them to be struck by others, Marines were not like the ordinary seamen, who mainly served aloft and needed little encouragement to work in an organized way. Inexperienced landsmen, however, wore no uniform at sea and strongly risked being struck, if that was the established practice on board (Rodger 1986).

Zerbe’s skillful research has uncovered that in 1802, the ruling government prioritized replacing the British Marine Corps by the Royal Marines and, a mere two years later, the Royal Marine Artillery was formed. Provided with small arms fire from muskets, it took part in attacks on land, aided press-gangs and generally assisted on board. Like soldiers, their army colleagues, the marines occasionally wore red tunics and were not only called “redcoats,” but were also considered part of the Corps of Marines and Marine Department, which gave them divisional structure, barracks, official sanction and permanency.

Objectively, these sea soldiers also served on board warships as sentries and acted as a buffer between officers and seamen in naval engagements. The important role of the Royal Marines in the formation of the British Marine Corps at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War in 1755 was a defining moment for the Marine Regiments, which had until then been under the control of the Admiralty. Naval officers wore a blue uniform and although ordinary seamen did not have a uniform, blue was their preferred colour and, thereafter, they were nicknamed “blue jackets.”

Britt Zerbe’s individual style and his comprehensive material is well balanced. He combines overview with detail and his background knowledge of historical progressions adds to the reader’s knowledge of the Marine Corps. Thus, the reader obtains not only information on the Corps but also understands more clearly the context of its creation. In addition, Zerbe has made thorough use of his sources and the result is a fascinating and important contribution to maritime history that will benefit potential readers with an interest in this subject.

The author concedes that his imaginative book is neither the final nor even the definitive work on the Marine Corps in this period. On the contrary, he modestly claims that he believes there is still much more analysis to be done on the subjects of manpower, combat, command and control, administration and officers’ backgrounds. Readers, however, may disagree and decide that this book should be the standard reference on the foundation, rise and existence of the Royal Marines.

When, in 1739, the House of Commons debated the structure of Marine Regiments for manning the fleet, out of a total of 124 ships of the line, only 30 were ready for action. At the time, this was partly blamed on an acute shortage of manpower created by milder conditions and better pay in the merchant navy. We now know that for over 300 years, from Captain Cook’s voyages of discovery to the Boxer Rebellion to the beaches of Normandy, the Royal Marines have served with exceptional and commendable gallantry. Published in heavy-duty board covers and high quality glossy paper, this is a book that will be often dipped into to check facts and figures about the Royal Marines.

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