Canada’s Naval Strategy – Purposeful Force, Collective Action and National Responsibility

Nicholas Tracy

Cet article se penche sur l’interface entre la Marine canadienne et les relations internationales du Canada, en appliquant les leçons des générations d’historiens qui ont cherché à comprendre les mécanismes par lesquels les forces militaires servent les intérêts nationaux. Sir James Cable a défini l’application directe de la force comme « force définitive », et donné le nom de « force tenace » à l’action militaire qui persuade un gouvernement étranger à modifier sa politique. Les actions de la Marine canadienne au cours des deux guerres mondiales peuvent, en général, être vues comme relevant de la première catégorie, mais dans un panorama historique élargi notre stratégie navale canadienne doit être considérée comme essentiellement « tenace », des mesures de persuasion amicale, et de persuasion hostile en l’application de sanctions économiques mandatées par les Nations Unies. La stratégie est un sous-ensemble de « l’art du possible » politique et exige la réconciliation de l’évaluation de la menace militaire et politique dans le contexte du droit international et moral.

The strongest, and most obvious, continuum in the strategic history of the Royal Canadian Navy is the role of the navy in Canada’s relationship with the United States. The navy was never intended to defend Canada from the United States, but it was seen at the time when Sir Wilfred Laurier introduced the Naval Service Bill into the House of Commons as a necessary means of redefining the relationship in more equitable terms, and it has continued to the present to serve that purpose. In the early twentieth century, Canada’s little navy could only serve its purpose because of the leverage it obtained from its relationship with the Royal Navy, but the imperial partnership was seen as problematic. Henri Bourassa, the leader of the Quebec-based Nationaliste party, objected that if Canada constructed a navy of value to the Empire it would be impossible for Canadians to resist the request for military assistance even if they disagreed with Britain’s policy at the time. On that platform the Nationalistes defeated the Liberals in Quebec, and Bourassa’s argument continues to resonate in Canada’s strategic debate. Now, however, it is applied to the professional relationships that exist between the Canadian and American services.

Canada’s armed forces have been drawn into a partnership with those of the

The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord XXIV, Nos. 3 & 4 (Jul. & Oct. 2014), 311-323
Canadian Military History 23, Nos. 3 & 4 (Summer & Autumn 2014), 311-323
United States that is so close it virtually replicates that which existed within the British Empire and Commonwealth until the late-1950s. But unlike the situation within the Empire, that defence relationship is not moderated by a comparable degree of consultation on matters of foreign policy. In some quarters in Ottawa there is a prevailing concern that the Canadian navy is so focused on its institutional success, which it measures in terms of its partnership with the United States Navy, that it strays from its responsibility for Canadian national interests.

This is not only a hypothetical problem: very difficult questions remain unanswered following the participation of Canadian forces personnel in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, despite Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s statement that Canada would only become involved if clear proof were shown that the al-Qaeda terrorists were using Iraq as a base. His refusal to participate in a war not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council led to a crisis in Canadian-American relations, both at the official level and in the media, and the arm twisting was effective; during the ‘shock and awe’ bombardment of Iraq, the American Ambassador Paul Cellucci admitted that “… ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel… will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly… than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.”¹ Until the archives are opened in 2033, it cannot be known for sure that the Cabinet approved these measures, but it is certain they did not reflect the will of Parliament. Mackenzie King’s dictum that “Parliament will decide” may have prevailed in 1939, but 64 years later the royal prerogative appears to have been used to assuage American anger. That incident is not the subject of this paper, but it is a strong indication of the problem.

My subject is the maturity of Canadian strategic direction, both as to its independence, and to its capacity to deal with complex international issues. Sir James Cable has defined the direct application of force as ‘Definitive force’, and given the name ‘Purposeful force’ to military action that indirectly persuades a foreign government to change its policy.² Canadian naval commitments during the two world wars can largely be considered as falling into the former category. Vis-à-vis the United States, on the other hand, Canada’s naval strategy may be said to be ‘purposeful’ in character, employing what Edward Luttwak calls “supportive suasion.”³ “In its purposeful application,” Cable wrote, “force does not itself do anything: it induces someone else to take a decision which would not otherwise have been taken.”⁴ Many will question the application of that concept to Canada’s defence relationship with the United States, but without too much strain it can be applied to Canadian military preparedness that over the century has served to deflect or moderate American military interest in Canadian real estate. This paper does not intend to address that history, but rather is interested in the

¹ Paul Cellucci, Speech to Economic Club of Toronto, 25 March 2003; at http://ottawa.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=embconsul&document=cellucci_030325
⁴ Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 39.
more recent roles played by the Canadian navy in support of the world community which can only be described as ‘purposeful’, and which were to a considerable extent undertaken as a dimension in Canada’s military relationship with the United States. Participation with the United States, and with Canada’s other friends, in such military operations were not only intended to deflect threats to Canada originating from the outer world, but also to serve the purposes of supportive suasion vis-à-vis the United States.

Purposeful, systemic, strategies of this sort are inherently problematic. The linkages between military inputs and economic and political outputs, like all extended linkages, encounter significant friction that may frustrate the objective, or even create so much heat as to be counter-productive. Engagement by Canadian forces in complex operations intended as purposive force as part of alliance or coalition strategies bring currency to Bourassa’s warning. If the intent in Ottawa is that the tail should wag the dog, a closer look at canine anatomy may be in order.

Writing in 1971, John Holmes observed that “the obsession with independence as the principal theme of foreign and defence policy” would come to appear “heedless” in the context of a serious threat to human security. That caution continues to be valid. Nevertheless, Canada’s defence policy also needs to be guided by Henry Kissinger’s observation in 1965 that, “in an alliance of sovereign states, a country’s influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally’s real – as opposed to his formal – role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement.” So long as the British Empire continued to hold its own on the world stage Canada did have choices, and at the time it was an easy choice to make, but so far as Canada was concerned the last vestiges of the Empire as a defence organization were snuffed out with the Suez Crisis of 1956. It can be argued that Lester Pearson found a way forward at that time when, by proposing a United Nations peacekeeping force, he established a new standard for Canadian statesmanship, but Canada’s role as a ‘Middle Power’ was to be exceedingly short.

During the Cold War, NATO provided an umbrella for Canada because it extended the American security perimeter well beyond Canada’s frontiers, but in the absence of a serious military threat to the Atlantic community the fabric of the NATO umbrella has become quite frail. The failure in 2009 of Defence Minister Peter MacKay to be welcomed as NATO Secretary General is the measure of Canada’s present stature in the organization. Canada needs to continue to seek breadth in its strategic relationships, perhaps through some revival of the historic relationships with Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and possibly with India. But even as it resonates with the theme of this conference, neither is that the core of this paper.

More to the point is Kissinger’s assertion that an ally’s status depends on its effort being considered “essential.” During the Cold War the Canadian navy specialized in anti-submarine warfare, which rendered it to some degree essential to allied defence planning, and Canada’s repeated commitments to peacekeeping operations on behalf of

---


the United Nations also enhanced the importance of its relatively small forces. To be essential, it is necessary to be skilled at a task that is valued. This claim is proudly made by the Canadian navy about its part in Operation Friction, the enforcement of economic sanctions mandated by the Security Council against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, in reality that episode was far from satisfactory as a Canadian baptism of fire into the work of peace enforcement: after all the spin has stopped the Canadian navy served only as an implementer of deeply flawed strategies made by others. The contribution the Canadian navy made to international peace, order, and good government through its enforcement of sanctions was valued for its activity, but cannot be for its wisdom.

There is no evidence that prior to accepting responsibility for sanctions enforcement the Canadian government gave any consideration either to the utility of sanctions, or to whether they could be enforced without violation of the Geneva Convention Protocol 1, or satisfy the provisions of Aquinian Just War theory. Considering the importance of the part the Canadian navy took in enforcing the sanctions against Iraq, it is essential to take an audit.

Secretary of State James Baker’s statement to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 December 1990, that sanctions, to be valuable, would have to “hurt Iraq so much that Saddam Hussein changes his behaviour and withdraws from Kuwait,” indicates that he was formulating his policy in the belief that economic pressure directed indiscriminately at a target state should have the power to coerce hostile governments. However, the failure of sanctions on their own to project enough “purposive” force to persuade the Iraqi government to withdraw from Kuwait prior to 15 January 1991 deadline set by Security Council resolution 678 is consistent with historical experience. The basis for the adoption of economic sanctions as the ultimate instrument for international law by the League of Nations in 1919 and by the United Nations in 1945 was the naval blockade between 1914 and 1919 of the Central Powers – but professional and scholarly opinion is divided about the importance of the blockade in the outcome of the First World War, and the trend is to down-grade its importance.

There is no dispute,

---

8 1949 Geneva convention Protocol 1 Article 54 made it absolutely clear that “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.”
10 Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, hero of the battle of Jutland and British First Sea Lord, firmly told Admiral David Earl Beatty as early as February 1917 that Germany would not be defeated by the blockade: “We may cause them a great deal of suffering and discomfort by the blockade, but we shall not win the war by it. The war will not be won until the enemy’s armed forces are defeated – certainly on land and probably on sea....”; see A. Temple Patterson (ed.), *The Jellicoe Papers, Vol 2* (London: Navy Records Society, 1968), mss 49008, 140–3, Sir John Jellicoe to David Earl Beatty, 4 February 1917. Other voices, notably those of the defeated German military leaders, Marshal von Hindenburg, General Ludendorff, and Grand Admiral
on the other hand, about the fact that the impact of the blockade, whatever it was, was in
the context of general war. As long ago as 1907, at the time of the Second Hague
Conference on the laws of war, Sir Julian Corbett had sounded a note of caution in his
study of *England in the Seven Years War*: “Of late years the world has become so deeply
impressed with the efficacy of sea power that we are inclined to forget how impotent it is
of itself to decide a war against great Continental states, how tedious is the pressure of
naval action unless it be nicely coordinated with military and diplomatic pressure.”

In 1934 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond published *Sea Power in the Modern World* in which
he developed the theme of the “limitations of sea power.” He wrote: “it is important to
recognize that... single-handed sea power can do little against any great power.”

Sanctions on their own, therefore, were unlikely to bring a reversal of Iraqi policy once
the prestige of the regime had been committed and nationalist forces unleashed by
military invasion. As early as the end of 1990 the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Judge William Webster, in a speech published in the State Department’s *Dispatch*,
warned against any idea that sanctions could lead to revolt in Iraq. “Services
ranging from medical care to sanitation have been curtailed in Iraq. But these hardships
are easier for Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, high casualty
rates and repeated missile and air attacks that Iraqis lived with during the eight year Iran-
Iraq War. During this war incidentally, there was not a single significant public
disturbance, even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the Iraqi population.”

Had there been any hope of making the sanctions an effective means of ending the Iraqi occupation
of Kuwait they would, in Corbet’s words, have needed to be “nicely coordinated with
military and diplomatic pressure.” But Secretary of State Baker explicitly rejected
making any concession to the Iraq government.

Perhaps most disturbing is the idea that imposition of sanctions against Iraq was
nothing more than a political formula to overcome a public reluctance to countenance a
resort to war. This cynical approach to sanctions appeared to some to have been
employed in the 1990 Kuwait crisis. The disjunction between means and declared ends

von Tirpitz, all emphasized the importance of the blockade on the domestic political scene; in
1927 Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the British Cabinet, used their assertions to support his
belief that, “In the long run the blockade proved to be one of the most essential means for
supplementing the actions of the military forces in bringing the war to an end. It was the
home front in Germany which broke first”; see United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA)
CAB 21/307, Maurice Hankey’s Memorandum on Blockade and the Laws of War, and
Appendix containing abstracts from Marshal von Hindenburg, *Out of my Life*, General

11 Sir Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, 2 Vols. (London: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1907 [1918]), vol 1, 5.

12 Sir Herbert Richmond, *Imperial Defence and Capture at Sea in War* (London, 1932), s.v.
“Employment of Maritime Force in War;” and *Sea Power in the Modern World* (London:
Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934), 71-2. See NA PRO, CAB 21/310, Richmond to Hankey
[undated], 10 pages: “… When, on the other hand, the Maritime Power has been allied in a
common cause with land powers, as Britain was in all but one of the great wars of the
eighteenth century, and in the war of 1914, economic pressure becomes a far more powerful
instrument. The financial needs and demands of the nations increase vastly.”
suggested a thesis that the underlying political purpose of coalition diplomacy was to ensure that the opportunity was not lost of destroying Iraq’s military potential.\(^{15}\) Whatever the intent, sanctions did in fact constitute a transitional phase before resort was made to war in 1991, and again in 2003.

Following the liberation of Kuwait, the continuing sanctions against Iraq did apparently achieve a measure of success. The concessions made in 1993 and 1994 by Iraq in permitting weapons inspectors and accepting the Kuwait border were important. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described in March 1997 the success of the weapons inspectors as “stunning.”\(^ {16}\) However, Iraq resisted the demand for reparations payment to Kuwait which had been left with its oil fields demolished and on fire. Whether that objective justified the continuation of sanctions to their full extent is an important question. It appears that the principal reason for their continuation was the decision of United States President Bill Clinton that Saddam Hussein should be forcefully removed from power. In November 1997 he declared that “sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as along as [Hussein] lasts.”\(^ {17}\) Regime change formed no part of the Security Council resolution, but the United States was able to use its veto power to prevent any change in the sanctions mandate. Because there was no time limit set by Resolution 687, a single veto could prevent a vote to reduce or end the sanctions.

The positive outcomes from the sanctions regime, such as they were, have to be seen in relation to the collateral damage they inflicted on the Iraqi population. Their effect, in the context of the 1990-91 Gulf War, was devastating. Experience has shown that action against a nation’s financial resources may be the most effective way of degrading its military abilities; no less an economist than John Maynard Keynes had advised in October 1939 that “in the last war, both sides made the mistake of concentrating too much on specific goods and too little on money.”\(^ {18}\) But targeting oil, and thereby affecting Iraqi money supply, created serious problems with respect to Iraq’s civilian requirements. United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar sent

---

13 US, Department of State, Dispatch, 2/3 (21 January 1991), 37.
14 US, Department of State, Dispatch, 1/12 (19 November 1990), 273; and 2/1 (17 January 1991.)
17 On 31 October 1998, President Clinton signed into law the *Iraq Liberation Act* declaring that it was the policy of the United States “to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.” Congress agreed that “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.” David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Lynne Rienner, 2000), 56. *Iraq Liberation Act of 1998*, 150(2) Congress of the United States, Thomas H.R.4655; passed 360-38 in the House of Representatives and unanimously in the Senate.
18 F.O. 837/5, J.M. Keynes to Sir Frederick Leith Ross, 10 October 1939.
Under-Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari on a fact-finding mission to Iraq and Kuwait on 10-17 March 1991, and his report was forwarded to the President of the Security Council three days later:

(8) It should . . . be said at the once that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society.\(^{19}\)

The devastation caused by the bombing of Iraq ensured that the effects of sanctions would be a humanitarian disaster of the first order. In the 1980s the oil trade constituted 60 percent of Iraq’s GDP, and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings, paying for the two-thirds of Iraq’s food which was imported. The consequence of this deprivation was inevitably a drastic decrease in life expectancy, especially amongst children. Infant mortality, which had fallen from 145/1000 in 1953 to 48/1000 in 1990, nearly doubled as a result of the war and sanctions, to 98/1000 in 1997.\(^{20}\) A 1998 UNICEF study reached even more dramatic, and distressing, numbers: mortalities per thousand under 5-year olds, which had been declining and was down to 50/1000 in 1990, and could have been expected to have dropped to 30/1000 by 1998, had sharply increased under the pressure of sanctions, to 125/1000. The conclusion reached by Gareth Jones, then Section Chief of the UNICEF Strategic Information Section in New York, was “that if the substantial reduction in the under-five mortality rate during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998.”\(^{21}\) Other sources have suggested half that figure, but still the number is catastrophic.\(^{22}\) There is no reason to think the metrics gathered following the American occupation of Iraq and used by UN agencies to revise their graphs are inherently more reliable.\(^{23}\)

---


21 Child and Maternal Mortality Survey, 1999, Preliminary Report, work undertaken under the direction of Mr. Mohammed Ali of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, jointly for UNICEF and the government of Iraq Ministry of Health, Preventive Health Department and Statistical Department; at: http://www.scn.org/ccpi/UNandUSreports.html, accessed 22 September 2014. (Information supplied by Edilberto Loaiza, Senior Programme Officer, Strategic Information Section, DPP 3 UN Plaza, New York NY 10017.)


23 Personal communication to the author from Dr Les Roberts, Columbia University, 6 January 2012.
Had the Canadian government done its homework, these consequences should have been anticipated. As long ago as 1920, when reviewing in an Admiralty Staff History the war-time economic blockade of the Central Powers between 1914 and 1919, Lieutenant-Commander W.E. Arnold-Forster cautioned against the temptation to use the economic weapon without regard for its consequences for civil society:

For there is a peculiar danger attaching to the use of this particular weapon, a danger which has not yet been sufficiently realized. It has now been found by experience that blockade is an instrument which can be wielded without any uncomfortable exertion, and can to a large extent be created, by men sitting in offices far from any visible sign of the consequences of its use. Men thus fighting with their pens in London come naturally to thinking that pens are cleaner weapons than bayonets, besides being much more convenient for the amateur. No danger, no mess, merely a Government ukase.

And that is just what makes blockade so dangerous a weapon in bureaucratic hands; it is so infernally convenient.

It would be a good thing if everyone who may have to use this weapon in future, whether at sea or ashore, would devote some serious study to the real nature of its consequences.\(^\text{24}\)

President Herbert Hoover’s experience as administrator of US food relief to Belgium prior to 1917 and to Europe in 1919 led to his being a determined critic of blockade during the 1920s. Hoover characterized the continuation of the British and French blockade of the Central Powers after the armistice in 1918, intended to apply purposive force during the peace-making process, as “a crime in statesmanship and against civilization as a whole.”\(^\text{25}\) Callous disregard for the health of civilian populations, suggesting that British democracy could not be trusted, undermined the civilian government in Berlin, and was used by Adolph Hitler to justify his intent to seize control of the food-producing areas in eastern Europe. Similar consequences can be attributed to the callous attitude of the Security Council permanent members in 1990, reinforcing the arguments of radical islamists that western secular leadership is not to be trusted.

The story of economic sanctions against Iraq is, of course, complicated by the efforts made by the Iraqi government to circumvent them. The account provided here is very much the shortened version. But it should be taken as a given that the target of economic sanctions will do its best to resist them, and may not be unduly concerned about their impact on civilians. Indeed, they may welcome them as providing leverage against the international community. Such was the case with the United Nations’ ‘Oil-for-Food’ program. And it is not only the target that is likely to seek to circumvent sanctions.

This author’s 1991 book, *Attack on Maritime Trade*, characterized the record of


blockade, and sanctions, with a “borrowed, and transformed, aphorism to the effect that ‘The businessman will always get through.’” It continued: “The motivation of those who wish to continue trading is greater than is that of those who wish to block it. Governments connive at wartime trade with the enemy, either because it is recognized that the belligerent itself must trade to live, or because business interests suborn government.”

This caution was certainly born out by events, although I could add that political motives are at least as corrupting.

The Volcker Committee reported on 3 February 2005 that, “These illicit sales, usually referred to as ‘smuggling,’ began years before the [Oil-for-Food] Program started,” and that the chief culprit was not France, as the American’s alleged, but the United States. Restrictions threatening the withdrawal of aid to any nation violating UN sanctions against Iraq were adopted by the American government in 1991, but national security waivers were issued as early as 1991, and one for Jordan signed 17 October 2002 by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage shows that Jordan had been in violation of the UN sanctions against Iraq since their implementation. Turkey’s illegal trades appear to go back at least to December 1998 when the Clinton administration authorized waivers for both Turkey and Jordan. During a hearing of the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations into Oil-for-Food Program allegations on 15 February 2005, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) remarked: “It is clear that the whole world, including the United States, knew about Iraq’s oil sales to Turkey, Jordan and Syria. In the case of the United States, we not only knew about the oil sales, we actively stopped the United Nations Iraq Sanctions Committee, known as the 661 Committee, from acting to stop those sales… Hundreds of millions of dollars went into the pockets of Saddam Hussein as a result.”

The lessons that were belatedly learned by the sanctions operations against Iraq were only slowly acquired, and are yet to be fully digested. It might be asked why the American government, when it occupied Baghdad in 2003 and seized documents from the Iraq government did not seek out evidence of what influence sanctions had on the Iraq government? Perhaps Washington did not want to know.

In the meantime, the European crisis occasioned by the break-up of the Yugoslavian Federation led to further experiments with economic sanctions, although enough had been learned by then to exclude food supply from the controls. Nor was food a critical import for Yugoslavia, unlike the situation in Iraq. When it became apparent

---


27 Also on the committee were Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa, who previously served as the Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Mark Pieth of Switzerland, a Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Basel with expertise in money-laundering. The committee was given unrestricted access to national documents, and UN personal were instructed to cooperate fully.

that the Miloševik government was supporting the actions of the Serbian militias, on 30 May 1992, by Security Council Resolution 757, the sanctions regime against the rump of Yugoslavia was extended to a wide range of measures intended to sever economic contact with the world. In July the North Atlantic Council agreed to provide the means to implement Resolution 757 by deploying the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean which had recently been brought into existence following the model of STANAVFORLANT, and on 17 November 1992 the Security Council finally agreed on resolution 787 somewhat Delphicly granting the naval forces authority “to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary.” In May 1993 Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral J.R. Anderson, justified the dispatch of the destroyer HMCS Algonquin to take part in the Adriatic operations to enforce the sanctions on the grounds that “sanctions enforcement… is a key to moderating Serbian behaviour… [and] was consistent with Canadian support for Resolution 820.”

Statistics compiled by the U.S. State Department show that the Serbian economy contracted by 26 percent in 1992, and a further 28 percent in 1993. Incomes fell in real terms by 50 percent, and industrial production fell by 22 percent in 1992 and 37 percent in 1993. Inflation in Yugoslavia rose from 122 percent in 1991, to 9,000 percent in 1992, and with Yugoslavia printing money to cover its costs, inflation reached 100-trillion percent by the end of 1993. In January 1994 Belgrade introduced new currency pegged to the German mark, and slashed government programs, which temporarily stabilized the situation but inflation was still running at 120 percent at the end of 1994. The restrictions on Yugoslav exports impacted on the health services because the priorities of the Miloševik administration precluded spending scarce hard currency on the importation of those specialist drugs not produced domestically.

Unlike the Iraq sanctions operations, there is some belief that those against Yugoslavia had more positive effects than negative ones. The report drawn up for the Secretary General following a Round Table conference on the Yugoslav sanctions that was held at Copenhagen on 24 and 25 June 1996 opened with the strong statement that the sanctions against Yugoslavia and later against those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian Serb control “have been remarkably effective. They modified the behaviour of the Serbian party to the conflict and may well have been the single most important reason for the Government in Belgrade changing its policies and accepting a negotiated peace agreement in Dayton…. These sanctions were – unlike the


30 United States, Department of State, UN Sanctions against Belgrade: Lessons Learned for Future Regimes, Interagency Task Force on Serbian Sanctions (Washington, DC, June 1996), 1-3.

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations – the only strategic instrument of the United Nations to contain the conflict and restore peace and security in the region, not involving the use of armed force.” However, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace characterized sanctions as a “blunt instrument” and asked whether “suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders.” On 13 April 1995, the ambassadors of the Permanent Members of the Security Council wrote a letter to the President of the Council expressing their concern about the humanitarian implications of comprehensive sanctions: “while recognizing the need to maintain the effectiveness of sanctions imposed in accordance with the Charter, further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.” Similar concern was also expressed by the International Red Cross/Red Crescent, and by UNICEF. The report endorsed the recommendation of the Copenhagen Round Table conference that a “pre-assessment” should be made of the humanitarian consequences of sanctions in particular circumstances, but also noted the value of the implementation of sanctions rapidly to achieve maximum political effect before the full humanitarian impact is felt. It left the paradox of systemic sanctions unresolved: “Conventional sanctions theory holds that political change is directly proportional to economic hardship. The greater the damage caused by sanctions, the theory holds, the higher the probability of attaining the stated political objectives. This understanding fails to account for the complex and often contradictory ways in which sanctions affect the internal political dynamics of a targeted society. In many episodes, there is no direct mechanism by which hardship is translated into political change.”

By now it is clear that the collateral damage inflicted by sanctions in the form they were used, and enforced by the Canadian navy, was far too high to be justified simply on the basis that they supported the United Nations, let alone that they demonstrated partnership with the United States Navy, or, as has been argued, that they reduced the heat on Canada for its decision to withdraw forces from the NATO garrisons in Europe. What I want to make clear is that the Canadian government, advised by the Canadian navy, has to ensure that it fully understands the implications of the employment

of potentially lethal force. In the 1990s I found the naval community hostile even to the idea that the Canadian navy, by its enforcement of UN sanctions, was employing lethal force, or that its actions could only be justified if proportional to the military objective. Canada was bound to comply with sanctions implemented by the United Nations, but was not bound to make Canadian forces available to enforce them on others.

Holmes’s observation that circumstances could make an obsession with independence “heedless” is not the last word. ‘Leverage’, ‘alternatives’, and ‘independence’ are, properly, means to the end of helping the defence communities of which Canada is part develop sound policies for their mutual benefit, and the benefit of all. Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King has a bit of a reputation for letting Britain and the United States gather all the strings of strategic direction into their hands during the Second World War, but at the 1923 Imperial Conference he followed his remark on the mutual respect developing between Canada and the United States with the caveat: “That does not mean that we are prepared to sacrifice vital interests on the altar of American friendship, that is not the way to deal with our United States friends.”

Thirty-eight years later President John F. Kennedy, addressing the Canadian Houses of Parliament with the famous words, “Geography has made us neighbors,” added, “This is a partnership, not an empire. We are bound to have differences and disappointments – and we are equally bound to bring them out into the open, to settle them where they can be settled, and to respect each other’s views when they cannot be settled.” These are good words: like any marriage, the relationship between Canada and the United States is always a work in progress. It is in the interest of Americans as well as Canadians that the Canadian navy sustain the highest standards, not only in the execution of naval operations, but in their design to serve international needs – to ensure that strategies and tactics are not adopted that are unethical or counter-productive. There are alternatives to the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq and Yugoslavia: one of these that I have labelled “Pro-Active” sanctions is derived from the trade war of the eighteenth century rather than from the disasters of the First World War, and uses money to affect change without engaging nationalist resistance.

There has always been a constituency within the Canadian defence community that has taken its values from the defence perceptions of Canada’s allies. In the early twentieth century this constituency viewed as the proper policy for Ottawa the provision to the imperial mother country of the military support requested by it. In the late twentieth century, and at the beginning of the twenty-first, that constituency has transferred its instinctive colonial attitude to the United States, and regards it as


36 “Pro-Active Sanctions, a New/Old approach to Non-violent measures,” Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Staff Paper, 1994.
invariably appropriate policy for Canada to meet the expectations of her ally to the south. Again, there is a conviction that the big boys know best, and that Canadians have a duty to support their ally. But, as a former Chief of Defence Staff put it to me, our allies deserve better from us.

I have no doubt that the over-worked people in the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs, and those in the Privy Council Office, do their best to develop effective and ethical defence policies. I am not here to bury Caesar any more than I am to praise him. But I would like to make a case for strengthening the resources available to the government, to ensure that institutional memories are sufficient to give wisdom to policy. Rather than hoping to be the tail that wags the dog, I would like Canada to become a major part of the animal’s brain. In the context of virtual integration of Canadian forces with those of the United States, that is the best hope for the future.