

REVIEW ESSAY

Three titles on aspects of the British Empire

John Darwin. *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*. London: Allen Lane, 2012. xiv+478pp., illus, notes, index. £ 25.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-84614-088-4.

Kwasi Kwarteng. *Ghosts of Empire: Britain's Legacies in the Modern World*. New York: Public Affairs Books, 2011. Ix+466pp., illus, maps, notes, index. US \$29.99, cloth; ISBN 978-1-61039-120-7.

Pankaj Mishra. *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012. xi+356pp., illus, notes, index. CDN \$34.95, cloth; ISBN 978-0-38567-610-6.

The historiography of the British Empire is, I dare say, limitless. It broadly splits into the two categories of the panegyric and the apology: the former involving large dollops of Panglossian-tinged nostalgia, the latter varying degrees of anger, regret, or sorrow. Regarding the inevitable question as to whether an empire is (or was) a “good thing,” the former, of course, answering in the positive, the latter in the negative. It is difficult to find a neutral, dispassionate position on the subject.

Canadians all have a stake in the history of empire, as the country is the undeniable product of the British Empire, whether we take pride in the legacy or deeply regret it. Beyond Canada's borders, the entire Western Hemisphere was shaped by imperial struggles, with not one national boundary having any link to indigenous populations or entities that existed prior to the arrival of the Europeans and their rivalries. The same can be said of Africa (excepting perhaps Ethiopia) and Oceania (Australia and the Pacific island states). Only Asia was able to impose its own views as to borders, but it too was profoundly affected by the imperial European powers, and much of it ruled from London, Paris, Amsterdam, Madrid, Lisbon and (parvenu) Berlin. Nominally independent Asian entities, such as China and Japan, were utterly dominated economically, militarily, and technologically by the European powers.

Our modern world is therefore unambiguously the product of the imperial struggles from the eighteenth century to the post-Second World War era and decolonisation. Within the Canadian frame of reference, the imperial power to which we owe our existence is the British Empire, the dominant empire of the era. As well, of course, the British Empire succeeded that of the French *Ancien Regime*, which has left an indelible and unique stamp on this country. What does it all mean in the early twenty-first century?

This period of European paramountcy is now certainly in the rear-view mirror;

The Northern Mariner/le marin du nord, XXIII No. 3, (July 2013), 287-296

decolonisation is complete (absent a number of minor island colonies that seem unlikely to seek outright independence at this stage); and the world is left with a legacy, for good or ill, that powerfully affects geopolitical events to this day. These legacies, in terms of borders, law, constitutions, culture, sports, militaries, politics, alliances, hatreds and affections, will certainly continue to be a factor in world events for decades yet.

The question arises as to whether it is now possible to assess the effect of empires on our world given the fact that they are now fundamentally extinct, in a dispassionate fashion. Can empires be examined today as simply a phase in world history in a neutral fashion? I am not optimistic that this is yet possible. While the last “ruling” generation of imperial bureaucrats, soldiers and governors is in its declining years, the families and memories survive evergreen. (The writer is a son of a still-living British Army officer who, *inter alia*, served in Malaya, Aden and Kenya. My memories are indeed evergreen, albeit juvenile.) No doubt this link to the past will take another generation to allow personal connection to empire to pass fully from living memory and the distance thus obtained may permit ex-rulers and ex-ruled to rub along without regrets and resentments. Yet, given the persistence of remembered slights, humiliations and defeats as well as victories, triumphs and nostalgia for past dominance the world over, perhaps it is unrealistic ever to expect such a transformation. (One thinks of Serb defeat by Muslim armies in 1389 and its influence on the Kosovo question in the 1990s as a case in point. Closer to home is the case of Quebec and its “*je me souviens*” leitmotif. Examples are legion.)

These are large and important questions. A short review essay cannot hope to do more than start a conversation on the subject. The three books selected for this review have the merit of seeking to provide some answers to the big questions that empire elicits and they come from very different perspectives. A generation ago, the range in backgrounds and starting points for these three books would not have been possible. Today they self-evidently are and we are the richer for it.

The first I wish to touch on is Mishra’s volume *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia*. The author is a journalist and writer who splits his time between London and India—a predilection that, one might add, is entirely the product of empire. One abiding habit of mind that all of us fall prey to on a regular basis is mistaking our perspective as both the “right” one, and, often enough, the “only” one. It takes most of us a real effort of will to consider that there may be alternate world views that are no less valid than our own. Mishra’s book provides that reminder that, indeed, alternate world views certainly exist and for Westerners to understand the modern world at all, we need to perceive history from the perspective of the other side.

The notion that Western empires in general, and the British in particular, were a force for good, a beneficial means of pulling the benighted natives out of their decayed and obscurantist civilizations and into the modern world needs this second look. The self-evident benefits of technology, of trade, of education, of Christianity, of government, of law, made British rule wholly positive from the perspective of the rulers. Only the most obdurate natives could fail to see the good involved. That all this had, occasionally, to be delivered at the end of a bayonet was regrettable, but surely a minor setback or

quibble on the road to enlightenment. Ultimately, the colonized would earn a sliver of self-government. One day, perhaps in an unimaginable future, independence might happen, but such were the feckless characteristics of the ruled, the conquered, that this idea was purely notional. Certainly, the white, settler colonies would get a more advanced form of independence and self-rule, but the metropolitan power would always retain its paramountcy even there.

Needless to add, this view was highly flattering to the imperial powers and perhaps, provided a balm to consciences troubled at the quantity of broken eggs involved in the creation of the omelette of empire. The rougher edges justified by the greater good delivered.

Mishra reminds Western readers, the target of his book, that indeed there were very different views about the imposition of empire on subject peoples. In particular, as the subtitle implies, he focuses on Asia—the wider definition that includes the Ottoman Empire at the western edge all the way over to Japan on the east. In all areas that the Western empires came to dominate over the nineteenth century, there were many local or native commentators, philosophers, patriots, journalists and thinkers who were appalled at their circumstance and who worked to undermine empire's certitudes and the rule of the “barbarians” from the West.

Mishra opens with a “beginning of the end” observation as to the watershed event occasioned by Russia's crushing naval defeat at Tsushima in May 1905. Across the entire Asian world, and beyond of course, the implications of Russia's defeat by an oriental enemy gave hope to those who sought to overturn the undeniable fact that they were ruled by westerners. Till then, the effortless superiority of the West in terms of technology, military, commerce and drive had been unstoppable. Most recently, the Boxer Rebellion in China had been crushed by trivial numbers of western troops, cobbled together in alliance against the “spot of bother” occasioned by Chinese nationalism in 1899-1900. The personalities that Mishra introduces are, for the most part, names unheard of or noted fleetingly in standard histories. Others played enormous roles as the twentieth century unfolded, such as, *inter alia*, Ho Chi Minh, Mustapha Kemal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Mahatma Ghandi.

An important point raised by Mishra, one that must be grasped in all the world's foreign ministries, is that no one likes to be told how to behave or think or how their government should be organized. Such impositions, no matter how well intentioned, are often as not resisted simply because they are impositions. Peoples everywhere want to have a say in how they are ruled, and what values they will live by. Telling people how it will be will inevitably lead to resentment and opposition. Imposing alien norms, laws, culture and trumpeting their superiority over the manifestly inadequate local efforts in these arenas almost demands a negative response. Prior to the Battle of Tsushima, such sentiments were considered by both rulers and ruled as quixotic and scarcely worth bothering about.

The British, for their part, assiduously cultivated local elites—indeed their empire would have been impossible to run without active support from native rulers, the wealthy and the influential—and yet failed to grasp, for the most part, that their British

association automatically tainted these individuals. Furthermore, a liberal, western education—increasingly common within such groups as the nineteenth century progressed—was no guarantee that the native elite bought into the world view implied with that experience. Nehru and Gandhi are simply two of the most famous who were anything but convinced of the rightness of British rule despite their position at the highest levels of Indian society. Their circumstance was repeated throughout Asia, no matter the imperial power.

Asia is a vast geography and contains an enormous range of communities in consequence. Mishra describes how each area developed its own form of resistance, based on its history, traditions and religious faith. The Islamic, Confucian and the Hindu civilizations all created their own forms of resistance, their own ideologies, their own aspirations for a new world freed from European dominance. This resistance was almost immediate. Once imperial rule was established, the frustration and unhappiness with the circumstance was made manifest by local thinkers. The thinkers who Mishra adopted as representatives for their part of Asia include Jamal al-Din al-Afghani for Islam; Liang Qichao for China; and Rabindranath Tagore for India. With the possible exception of Tagore, none of these has much of a profile in the West. This is part of the story—these men led an intellectual resistance against the imperial powers on their terms, not on the terms of those powers. This made their influence legitimate in the eyes of their literate compatriots and also made it difficult for those of us in the West to understand, particularly when the assumption of so many is that the benefits of westernisation are indisputable.

It needs understanding, however, that the debate led by people like Tagore spoke to the elites in the dominated societies of the European empires, which was by definition a tiny, tiny minority. The vast mass of the population in all territories was often indifferent in that the domination by new European overlords was materially much the same as under their own. Most were fully engaged in the business of living and had no time or energy to devote to contemplations regarding the iniquity of foreign rule. In many cases, the empires brought stability, a more consistent application of law, better public administration and peace. These are not small things.

Nonetheless, and this is Mishra's fundamental message, if we in the West wish to understand the origin of today's world, we have to understand from where it came, and not just from our received view of history. We have to understand that the search for dignity, equality and respect involves the restoration of pride and the distancing from Western example. The notion that these formerly subject lands to the European empires, will happily adopt the forms of government, the rule of law, the economies, and the strategic interests of the West is, of the face of it, naive. The Arab Spring, heralded as proof of former President George W. Bush's prescience and sagacity by some in the United States, has developed along unwelcome, to the West, lines, and is anything but a mirror of our forms of government or governance. Where and how it will all end is most uncertain, but the likelihood of an outcome conveniently aligned with Western norms and expectations is quite low.

The second book is Kwarteng's *Ghosts of Empire*, in which he examines, as in its

subtitle, Britain's legacies in the modern world. His ambition is to torpedo the notion that the Empire was some sort of liberal beacon for a benighted world, and that it held together with coherent philosophies or policies. In particular, he wishes to disabuse those American neo-conservatives who see in the *Pax Britannica* some sort of model for the United States and its hitherto fruitless search for a "new world order." Kwarteng suggests that neo-conservatives in the United States are active imperialists in the sense that they want America to impose its values on the world, administer the unruly corners of the planet, and thereby keep it safe for commerce and democracy. Is this what the British Empire was truly about?

The answer must be no. To be sure, the Empire was firmly for the rule of law and sound administration. It certainly was not for democracy or "rule by the many" or liberalism, however defined. It was pragmatic, paternalistic, elitist and absolutely class bound. It was there for a bewildering combination of reasons involving military and naval factors, trade and commerce, evangelism, settlement, and to thwart rivals.

Kwarteng bases his story on the mental furniture of imperial administrators, proconsuls, and commissioners. That furniture was remarkably similar and hence it produced a type of man who could be counted on to have "sound" views about all the important questions, and who could be counted on to behave in certain ways whatever fate might impose on him. The keystone was education. Most senior administrators in the Empire came from approximately fifteen to twenty top private boarding schools. Eton and Harrow were the two *primes inter pares* amongst this group, but anyone familiar with the English scene will have heard of many of the others: Winchester, Rugby, Marlborough... From there, the young imperial neophyte would proceed to Oxford or Cambridge and attend Christ Church or Balliol Colleges at the former, or Trinity or King's Colleges at the latter. He would have got a "first" in one or two areas of study, predominantly Classics or Greats. He would have studied Latin and Greek. He would have played games and likely been on the "first eleven" for one of his school's teams. He would like G.A. Henty novels. He might polish this off with a stint in the Army—not too extensive (not the navy, as it took too long to acquire the skills of an officer in that most exacting and professional service). It likely need not be stated that it was always a he and never a she.

Kwarteng drew three interesting general observations that are perhaps not immediately evident to the casual observer. The first is that within this very elite and privileged group of boys and young men, awareness of class and natural hierarchy was deep and pervasive. You were "in" or you were irredeemably "out." This class structure, however, was essentially based on wealth, not ancestry. You could gain entrance to this rarefied world via a combination of cheques and examinations. What one's grandfather did was less relevant—not irrelevant, but less so than many might imagine. (A feature of the English aristocracy is its openness to new members (particularly the second generation), all of whom possess the entry fee of wealth, no matter how nouveau. Breeding and land tend to dominate more feudally-oriented aristocracies.) But, to get to the top of the imperial tree absolutely required the educational and experiential background touched on above, and that in turn, required wealth and status. Snobbery was

endemic. You did not have to be a peer.

The second observation was the top administrators were not stereotypically racist, as a casual observer might think. They were arrogant. They were paternalistic. They were casually dismissive of other races. But, once again, money was a leveller. This is seen in the way that native elites were accepted into the club and, for their part, often enthusiastically joined in the game. Snobbery in the ranks of the imperial administrators was rampant, but they were not as racist as caricatured. There was no sense of racial equality, but Kwarteng implies racial politics was less central to the establishment of the Empire than generally assumed. This is certainly a departure from the received view of Empire and its impetus; the more remarkable, perhaps, in that Kwarteng's parents are from Ghana.

The third is what Kwarteng describes as the anarchic individualism of the Empire's administration. One of the abiding clichés describing the British Empire is that it was accumulated in a fit of absent-mindedness. Kwarteng does not fully subscribe to that view, but he notes that there was certainly no overarching policy regarding the Empire emanating from London. Territories were ruled according to the judgement of the "man on the spot." In the days when communications were slow, to put it mildly, such reliance was inevitable. Nevertheless, the occasions in which London's preferences were ignored, or, more properly, not well understood or known, were frequent. Out of such circumstances, it is perhaps no surprise that there was much muddle and contradiction in the Empire's administration and growth.

I am not sure that Kwarteng is completely correct in his analysis, particularly regarding racial attitudes and the role of class. Entry into the upper class was not as straightforward as simple financial resources. Snobbery was a very real barrier for those not of the "right" background, no matter their talents. Kwarteng's own family background of wealthy expatriates from Ghana, schooled at Eton and Cambridge, and his election in 2010 as a Conservative MP, may perhaps prove his point in present-day Britain, but it is perhaps less helpful in assessing realities of 75 years ago. Nonetheless, his observations regarding the de facto background of the imperial civil service are fair enough.

From this framework, Kwarteng selected six colonies with which to expound upon his themes. These are Iraq, Kashmir, Burma, Sudan, Nigeria and Hong Kong. Each in very different ways provides examples of how Britain went about creating and administering its Empire.

There is not space to dig into them all in this article, so a quick look at one will serve to illustrate them all. Iraq, a creature that came out of the rubble of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, was only formally in the Empire for 13 years (1919-1932). Three old Ottoman provinces, none of which had much connection with each other, were united into the new state of Iraq. Britain's interest in the area was entirely due to oil, and after Iraq's "independence" in 1932 when the mandate expired, Britain continued to dominate the place into the 1950s. The circumstances of Iraq's birth, and the complete disregard of the views or interests of the inhabitants, have conspired to render its history a long, sad tale of instability and violence. The proximate cause was

the selection of Faisal, of the Hashemite family, as monarch. He was a Sunni Muslim in a predominately Shia territory. Culturally a nomadic Bedouin, closely attached to Mecca (his father was the Sharif of Mecca), he had almost no personal connection at all to his new kingdom. For the British, however, the notion of establishing a monarchy, with its assumption of a stratified, hierarchical society, fitted in well with their notion of the natural order of things. Faisal's job was to ensure a stable government so as to allow British companies to extract oil for the British economy and armed forces, on favourable terms. Faisal and his family fitted into the aristocratic strata of British society and as such were "good" natives, doing as expected of them. It all led to the upheaval of the 1958 revolution, to Saddam Hussein and today's highly unstable, unhappy country.

Kwarteng's other examples have similar trajectories. British impositions, aligned with the views of their "man on the spot" as to what was right for the territory in question, without much or any consideration for local realities, led to unforeseen outcomes in every case. Each had its unique features, but the common thread included the assumptions of the British as to what was commercially necessary and what was right and appropriate. There was a blindness and lack of empathy for those affected by their decisions. Good intentions abounded. Ugly results were rife.

Interestingly, Kwarteng notes that the world view of the imperial administrative class bore increasingly little resemblance to the rapidly changing world view of Britons living in the home country. Aristocratic prime ministers of the nineteenth century gave way to Labour or Liberal Party prime ministers of very modest antecedents indeed (e.g. Ramsay MacDonald and David Lloyd George), or even ex-colonial luminaries such as Bonar Law. The British Army and civil service increasingly were populated by men from all sorts of backgrounds, unthinkable in the Victorian and earlier eras. Talent and drive were the key attributes for advancement, not one's place in life as determined by birth. The imperial civil service, in contrast, was a world in which time had seemingly stood still, where an aristocratic outlook predominated, and where class, place and background were reassuringly still properly regarded by all right-thinking persons, even if they could not afford such affectations in England. Returning home after a career abroad could be very disconcerting as the twentieth century progressed, particularly after the Second World War.

Of the six territories selected, only Hong Kong has really had a smooth transfer from direct British rule to that of China. Yet, this outcome cannot be accounted an unvarnished triumph given the nature of China's rule. Brave talk of democracy, rule of law, and autonomy from Beijing has been rubbished in the event, albeit the ability to thrive economically left untouched. The latter aspect is too valuable to risk by pre-emptory action from China's communist rulers. The remaining examples have much less happy histories post-independence.

What does Kwarteng make of all this and what does it tell us, the readers? Kwarteng is no apologist of Empire, but he is neutral. For him, the Empire was a phase of world history, the British example being merely the largest and most diverse, and that it needs assessment on its own terms, not those of today. He describes the unhappy legacy that Empire imposed on his selected territories, and he notes the haphazard way in

which these legacies were constructed. He does not gloss over the Empire's sordid side; neither does he outright condemn its existence. It happened. It's gone. Time to move on.

The final volume I wish to address in the triumvirate selected is Darwin's *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*. Of the three, Darwin's is by far the most academic and the writer is a professional historian of, in my view, the first order. He has written two previous volumes on the subject: *After Tamerlane* in 2007; and, *The Empire Project* in 2009. Darwin quite deliberately places the British Empire within the context of its time as well as global history more generally. He also eschews the default condemnatory attitude of most modern writers on the subject by taking it as it was, without lamenting that things ought to have been different.

Darwin comes the closest to describing the Empire in dispassionate terms, and is the most clear-eyed about the entire subject, of the three authors here considered. He notes, for example, that empire is the "default form of governance" throughout history. There is nothing special about the European empires in general, or the British in particular. He further notes that the Empire itself, often described in near caricature, defies simple descriptions or explanations. It was incredibly diverse, with an enormous range of characters that populated it, each with an equally individualistic range of motives and ambitions. Darwin also emphasizes that the creation of the Empire was anything but a controlled enterprise from the centre of British power, with all the strings pulled by the government and monarch in London. In this, his views are not unlike Kwarteng. He underlined its roots in medieval England and the "first" empire within the British Isles and with its French possessions. Darwin observes that the Empire was always under construction, from its earliest beginnings to its very end. It was never "complete" *per se*, never in that ideal state of producing untrammelled benefits to Mother England.

Why was all this so? Perhaps the most significant reason was the lack of any single objective or motivation for the Empire. Some were keen on colonizing with British settlers; some focused on civilizing territories with British administration and *savoir faire*; others on converting the natives to Christianity; still others on commerce and the matter of making fortunes. The latter predominated. These broad motivations could certainly co-exist, but they often clashed, making coherent policy-making impossible, or at least, very difficult. Rule of subject territories was complicated by the very necessary relationships between the factions noted above, along with native elites co-opted into managing the enterprise in one form or another. Without that co-operation, the Empire would have been infeasible. Finally, of course, the Empire did not exist in a vacuum. It was pummelled by military and naval struggles with European rivals, it was internally stressed by political and religious differences between colony and Mother Country, and it was subject to economic forces that lurched from crisis to crisis with some regularity. The colonized, that is, both the settlers (if present) as well as the native populations and their elites, were by no means passive actors and their motivations, rebellions and intrigues were a constant source of instability and difficulty. In such an environment, there never could be, and never was, a final form of the Empire.

Darwin examines the litany of charges against the Empire including its exploitative economic aspects, its racism, its deprecation of indigenous culture, its subversion of local elites into the colonial system, its violence, and excuses none of it. But he notes none of these attributes can be remotely described as unique to empires in general and the British specifically. Darwin points out that the establishment of empires has been well documented throughout history from the earliest times, and in all areas of the globe. European dominance of the world was a comparatively recent affair leaving European empires to colour recent history. Dig a little deeper and what is China, what is India, what is Persia, but an example of empire.

The creation of stereotypical views of the British Empire is pernicious in Darwin's view and entirely misses the very real ambiguity in relationships between all the actors involved: officials, traders, soldiers, local rulers, financiers, industrialists, workers of all races and backgrounds. These relationships were dynamic and shifted with individual understandings of interests and objectives. Empire was not a polar opposite arrangement with the interests of the imperial power at complete odds with those of the colonized (be they natives or settlers).

This is Darwin's theme and his book convincingly works on breaking down these simplistic notions, driven by political correctness and ill-considered analysis. The oft-received view of Empire as an unmitigated evil is as unhelpful and unperceptive as its mirror opposite perspective as an unparalleled force for good.

Darwin reminds us how tentative much of the Empire was throughout its history. Very often, a given colony involved a port facility of some kind with only the slenderest claim to, let alone control of, a hinterland. The Indian Raj was very much of this nature in its earliest days, with the British hanging on by their fingernails to what were, essentially, small trading posts. A combination of rivalries involving other European powers and internal struggles with nearby native states, led to the slow accumulation of both territory and civil administration. Events and incidents leading to the accumulation of new territory were decried by officials in London, as well as those on the scene, as leading to unnecessary expense and unwelcome responsibilities. The other European powers conducted affairs in exactly the same manner. Hence, the received and naïve view of brutal military conquest conducted with long term aims is incorrect. Indeed, the fact that when India became independent of the British Raj in 1947, there were complications associated with the treaties with the princely states, as well as with Goa (still, at the time, Portuguese) and Pondicherry (still French). And, of course, the very presence of Muslims within the territory of India (at the full extent of British control) reflected an earlier, alien imposition on the Hindu population, which has been unhappily resolved with the establishment of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

India is but one example. The sheer variety of territories within the Empire makes the drawing of common threads difficult in the extreme. Time also played its role in the organic growth and development of the Empire—what worked in one place and period, might not in another, despite superficial similarities. Thus, Egypt was very different from Australia, which bore little resemblance to Nigeria, and in turn, none at all with Barbados. With the exception of what might be termed “naval base territories,” the

one common thread linking them all was trade. Great Britain was a trading nation whose economic life blood was dependent upon the exchange of goods and services. In turn, this obliged a large merchant marine and a strong navy. The links with overseas territories were based on this key fact and the drive for monopoly, which led to the creation of the trading enterprises such as The Hudson's Bay Company and the British East India Company. The cynical rule of thumb when looking for causality is to "follow the money," and it applies to any examination of the Empire and, indeed, its rivals.

The story that Darwin tells is, therefore, a wonderfully complex, fascinating exploration of a bewildering range of factors that led to the creation of the Empire. It was very much an exercise of contingency, with intended ambitions giving way to unanticipated developments, leading to unexpected outcomes. Throughout the story, we can see the strong links forged with local societies, many of them highly sophisticated in and of themselves, who were making the best arrangements they could with the traders, sailors, soldiers and officials from a faraway country anxious for its goods and products. It is a refreshingly sober story, told with verve and punctuated with telling detail. Importantly, Darwin remains dispassionate and factual about a subject that so many cannot achieve, notwithstanding their credentials as historians or public commentators.

The three books touched on in this extended review are all worthy additions to the library of anyone with an interest in the subject. The three very different perspectives provided by the three very different authors make for compelling reading and interesting contrasts in interpretation and understanding. A topic as vast as that of the British Empire defies simple, single explanations, and requires considerable study to make a dent in it. The legacy of that Empire, along with its rivals from Spain, France and others, remains a very real part of today's world. If we are to make sense of that world, then it behooves all to understand better that history and to contextualize it appropriately. The near-universal unwillingness to do so, and the predilection to stereotype and feed prejudice, seriously impedes the peaceful evolution of relationships between nations and to learn from the past; or, worse, to draw inappropriate parallels and lessons and applying them to current circumstances.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan