BOOK REVIEWS


“The whole operation, moreover which culminated in her destruction is of exceptional interest...in point of dramatic reversals of fortune, of the frequent alternation of high optimism and blank disappointment, of brilliant victory followed quickly by utter defeat, it is probably unique on warfare.” These words are from Captain Russell Grenfell’s *The Bismarck Episode* (1949), the first authoritative book on the attempt by a powerful new German battleship to break into the Atlantic to attack Allied merchant shipping in late May 1941. A career naval officer turned respected defence correspondent, Grenfell drew on unique first-hand insights from many of the key senior British players. His book is a minor classic and laid out a narrative of events that has become standard in the many subsequent books about this celebrated contest between the British and German navies. The epic story continues to sell and *Killing the Bismarck: Destroying the Pride of Hitler’s Fleet* by Ian Ballantyne is one of three new books on this topic published in the U.K. in the past two years.

Ian Ballantyne is a seasoned writer: he is a defence correspondent, the editor of the magazine *Warship,* a scriptwriter for TV documentaries and the author of several earlier books about British warships. *Killing the Bismarck* is a popular, journalistic history. Ballantyne buttresses his narrative with passages, mostly brief, by British eye witnesses drawn from letters, published sources and websites. He was also able to interview 11 participants, 50 years and longer after their involvement in the epic pursuit of the German battleship. He explains that he wanted to portray, among other things, how a spirit of vengeance after the loss of the battle-cruiser HMS *Hood* to Bismarck’s guns on 24 May animated the British fleet. Ballantyne also wanted to reveal the “necessary brutality of the Bismarck episode’s finale” (p.15).

The narrative is supported by informative endnotes (which, however, do not provide page numbers for references cited) and five pithy appendices on topics such as the myths that have circulated about the sinking of the *Bismarck* and whether *Hood,* before being blown up, had succeeded in firing torpedoes at Bismarck’s consort, the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen.*

Ballantyne’s focus is firmly on the Royal Navy participants. This single-minded emphasis results in an uneven narrative. In fact, aircraft of the RAF’s Coastal Command were involved in two of the critical episodes over the long eight days after Bismarck exited the Baltic. The first, photo reconnaissance by Spitfires establishing that the battleship and Prince Eugen had anchored in a Norwegian fjord after leaving the Baltic, is not mentioned at all. (Nor is a subsequent daring flight by shore-based Fleet Air Arm target-towing aircraft which verified that the German ships had left the anchorage.) The second critical event involving Coastal Command

*The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, XXII No. 3, (July 2012), 309-359*
was several days later, on May 26. A Catalina flying boat (recently supplied by the U.S. under Lend-Lease, and with one of its two pilots a USN Ensign on loan) flying out of Northern Ireland located *Bismarck* after contact had been lost for 31 hours. This development is described tersely as a sighting by the RAF of a “mystery battleship” (p.131).

The *Bismarck* breakout coincided with critical events in the Mediterranean—the British had been ejected from Greece the previous month and were now losing Crete. Ballantyne’s story is framed within the popular war narrative current in May 1941. The British were “fighting alone” (p.16); the foreward by the former first sea lord Admiral Band sounds the same note: “Britain stood very much alone in May 1941” (p.9). This was stirring propaganda at the time, but now that 70 years have passed, this myth is simplistic. Troops from Australia, India, New Zealand, Rhodesia and South Africa were fighting in North Africa and the Mediterranean, as were Commonwealth airmen and warships. Two Canadian divisions were in Britain along with Canadian airmen, while the RCN was steadily increasing its contributions in the Battle of the Atlantic. At the same time, Canada was producing military equipment and raw materials for Britain. Finally, the United States had initiated Lend-Lease in March 1941 and was pursuing a policy of “short-of-war” collaboration with Britain.

While accounts from various individuals move the book along, their eyewitness records are presented without evaluation. Nor do the endnotes always indicate when statements were recorded. These problems undermine the credibility of the narrative. The most sensational claims concern reports that men, still alive in *Bismarck* late in the final action, indicated a desire to surrender (p.181). This is said to have occurred around 0930, when *Rodney* was quite close—around 2,000 yards from *Bismarck*, by then reduced to a burning hulk. A rating in *Rodney*’s 16-inch gun director apparently observed a black flag at *Bismarck*’s yardarm and reported this. The same rating also reported having seen a German sailor waving semaphore flags. Moreover, he apparently told the gunnery officer sitting above him in the director that he had seen *Bismarck* flashing signalling lamps at *Rodney*. The gunnery officer is said to have told the rating not to make further reports, since if the Germans had wanted to surrender, it was too late now. Around the same time, an officer in *Rodney*’s air defence position is said to have observed what he thought was a light on *Bismarck*’s mainmast, apparently sending a message which was cut short when the mast was shot down. Finally, a rating in *Devonshire* said that he saw light signals from the German battleship. Because no information is provided about how long after events and to whom these recollections were told, the reader cannot judge whether this sequence of events is based on reliable contemporary observations. As for the reported black flag, information in the Admiralty Naval Staff History (not in the bibliography of *Killing the Bismarck* and not mentioned in Ballantyne’s narrative) is perhaps pertinent. It notes that German survivors, when interrogated after rescue, stated that *Bismarck* had hoisted a blue ensign as a recognition signal for U-boats. (*German Capital Ships and Raiders in World War II: Volume I* (2002), “Interrogation of Survivors,” section V, (f) p. 21.)

*Killing the Bismarck* is rich in details about individuals and ships. One of the arresting vignettes concerns a chaplain who came to the bridge of the battleship *Rodney* to plead with his captain to cease the slaughter as *Bismarck* was being pounded at close range. The chaplain was ordered below. Interestingly, this was the first operation for several ships or ships’
companies. For example, the captain of the new battleship, Prince of Wales, had reported his ship ready for operations only the day before Bismarck sailed; the carrier Victorious was still completing trials; on the same date, the heavy cruiser London had emerged from a major two-year rebuild only weeks earlier; and the workup of Bismarck in the Baltic had been shortened by a severe winter. While Ballantyne notes that the 110 German survivors rescued (incredibly, a further five were picked up by a U-boat and a small German weather ship) were treated humanely, his focus on the British point of view results in a one-dimensional image of events. He relates how the senior surviving German officer, Lieutenant Baron Müllenheim-Rechberg, remonstrated with Captain Martin, of the heavy cruiser Dorsetshire, because rescue operations had been broken off when it was thought that a U-boat has been sighted. Ballantyne quotes a British account which says that the Baron “was quickly put in his place.” (p.200) Müllenheim-Rechberg published his own account in Schlachtschiff Bismarck in 1980, writing that Captain Martin had started their conversation by giving him a whiskey and soda. They eventually agreed to disagree about the rescue and Müllenheim-Rechberg notes that all the German survivors picked up by two British ships were well treated. He ascribes this to both the friendly pre-war naval relations he had experienced directly and to the fact that Captain Martin reported having been well treated himself while a prisoner in Germany during the Great War. Martin apparently made a point of meeting his German prisoners and told them that their treatment would be just as good as his had been.

This book has been nicely produced by Pen & Sword with glossy photos. The main strength of Killing the Bismarck is the author’s marshalling of eyewitness statements and use of letters and first-hand accounts. These are, however, presented uncritically without information about how long after events reminiscences were recorded. Although the work focuses on action, the author has added some introspection into his five appendices. It is an easy read, thanks to Ballantyne’s experience as a journalist and veteran author of books of popular naval history. Killing the Bismarck is a re-telling of a classic tale as experienced by Royal Navy participants.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


David Blackmore’s lively study sets out to provide a concise analysis of the campaigns and confrontations fought in the Mediterranean in the centuries between the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and the development of the first prototype torpedo by Robert Whitehead in 1866. It is very much aimed at the general reader rather than the specialist, and is organized in an accessible and straightforward manner, with narrative accounts of major confrontations arranged in chronological sequence. The author brings to bear a seafarer’s knowledge of tides, winds and ships, and explains any technical terms in an easily understandable way to non-experts and “landlubbers.” His valuable explanation of the tactical constraints in fighting with sailing ships (pp.71-77) is a case in point. More attention is given to campaigns at the later stages of this work, and this provides an enjoyable and readable account of, among others, the engagement at Aboukir Bay (pp.178-190). Indeed, the author’s enthusiasm for the
topic leads him to delve into events that took place before 1571 and after 1866.

The work sets out to rival A.C. Anderson’s oft-cited study of Mediterranean battles and skirmishes (Naval Wars in the Levant, 1571-1859 (Liverpool, 1952)). This is no easy task. Anderson’s work has served as a reliable point of reference for generations of historians, who continue to depend upon it when pressed for a succinct account of battles at sea in these centuries. Unfortunately, a number of factual errors occur in Blackmore’s work, although it is perhaps inevitable in a narrative of this scope and range. The classification of the Battle of Kasr al-Kebir of 1578 (“Alcazarquivir” to Europeans) as a Turkish victory might raise a few eyebrows, as might the subsequent analysis that it marked “the establishment of Ottoman hegemony in Morocco, and began the decline of Portuguese maritime power.” The term “the Islamic Porte” (p.315) is unusual and clumsy. Similarly, the statement that the Ottoman fleet captured 36 ships at the Battle of Preveza (1538) has this reviewer reaching for tomes by John F. Guilmartin, Fernand Braudel, K.M. Setton and, of course, Anderson, while the description of Nelson’s actions at Naples (“Injustice at Naples,” p.203) will have recent hagiographers of the British admiral-duke up in arms. French historians may be puzzled to read that the “jury is still out” on Napoleon Bonaparte: “was he a despot or an enlightened ruler?” This reviewer, as an Englishman, will refrain from attempting to provide an answer to this particular question.

At this point it should be added that scholars have tended to err on the side of caution when providing narrative accounts of the events examined here. As we know more about the campaigns examined in this study, so greater emphasis is placed upon the use of propaganda and the “spinning” of information by the various participants after the event. As Blackmore notes (p.61), Lepanto was the first campaign to be discussed and glorified in the public domain, and the subsequent polemic about who was to blame for the failures and collapse of the Holy League (1571-73) serves as a reminder that nearly all accounts were written with a degree of self-interest.

At points, the author might have engaged more thoroughly with the work of academic historians such as John F. Guilmartin, whose study does not appear in the bibliography. For Guilmartin, the inapplicability of the Mahanian model was a critical feature of Mediterranean “system of warfare at sea,” and given the changing nature of the forms of conflict examined here, it would have been useful for Blackmore to have entered into a discussion of his thesis. So important was blockade as a naval tactic in years such as 1648-49, 1655, 1656, early 1690s, and 1803-1805, it would have been extremely interesting to know how the author viewed the changing balance between land power and fleets. The structure of the work tends to confer historical prizes with relatively little doubt or scruple (on Venetian decline and Ottoman decadence, pp.104-105; on the limitations of Spanish “grapple and board” tactics at sea, p.63). While these traditional classifications remain the orthodox interpretation among historians, some of the material presented here might serve as the basis of a “revisionist” approach. A point in order might be the decline of Venice, as much of Blackmore’s narrative underlines the relative success of the squadrons of the Republic of St. Mark in the long conflicts fought between 1645 and 1699 (pp.85, 91-93).

In short, David Blackmore has written a colourful narrative account of Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail in the years between Lepanto and the American Civil War. The general reader will find much in it to prick his interest. It
will be read as a companion to Anderson, although the narrative study of 1952 will, perhaps, be the first port of call for all those needing the black-and-white account of the events that took place in the mare nostrum in the centuries between don John of Austria and Abraham Lincoln.

Phillip Williams
Southsea, England


This work is the latest in a series of historical dictionaries of various trades published by Scarecrow Press since 2007. As Blume notes in his introductory essay, it might more appropriately have been titled “Maritime Industries,” as he documents shipbuilding and ship operators as well as the unions and regulators. It is a singular act of courage in the age of online databases to produce a printed volume of this level of detail and comprehensiveness. The marketplace is confronted with efforts like Wikipedia, whose entries are less constrained by length (this volume is a door-stopping 580 pages and few entries get a full page) including the ability to embed corrections without a issuing a new edition and the space to supply external references/citations. The price of these volumes clearly suggests that the publisher is targeting libraries as much or more than the individual scholar.

The volume comes with a reasonably full set of scholarly apparatus: tables of abbreviations; timeline; introductory essay; tables of legislation, unions, ports and national statistics; and finally, a bibliography with another introductory essay. There are just over a dozen black and white illustrations, none of them credited. Curiously, all but three appear in the second half of the volume, and almost half in the last hundred pages. The introduction to the series (p. i) promises maps. There are none in this volume. The closest we get is a birds-eye view of New Orleans in 1914 (p.353).

The volume is full of cross-references. Bold text within an entry indicates a “see also” reference to another entry. In addition, there are explicit “see” and “see also” references in parenthesis or presented in all caps the end of an entry. The entry on shipbuilding wins the prize, with over a page of “see also” references. A whole page in capital letters is a solid clue that the person designing the book should have given the linkages a little more thought. All caps are from the era of the card catalog and typewriter.

As a historical dictionary, the presentation is predominantly a series of mini-essays of one to four paragraphs in length, presented in alphabetical order by main entry. On any random page not containing an illustration, there might be a dozen references to places, ships, people, and companies that did not warrant a full entry. A full index could easily have added another 50 pages to the volume, but in the age when users expect full-text search as part of their discovery, print volumes like this need indices to expose all that additional value. This reviewer might well be the only person, apart from the author and the copy editor, to actually read the book cover to cover.

The coverage attempts to be comprehensive: from A & B Industries (a small Louisiana boat-building firm founded in 1996, see also “Shipbuilding”) to Zidell Marine (a Portland, Oregon ship-breaker founded in 1916 and sold to the Dutch in 1997). In between are over 500 pages of mini-essays, two to five per page. The volume’s strengths are in corporate
maritime activity, especially in the twentieth century. The challenge that faces Blume, like most historians of shipping before the mid-nineteenth century, is that it is a widely dispersed business activity with a great number of ship owners (and fractional ship owners). He does a reasonable job of supplying entries on the main American sailing “lines” on the North Atlantic and to the Gulf and Caribbean ports. Individuals and partnerships that commissioned the great mid-nineteenth century clipper ships appear, as do the major shipbuilders.

One of the regular features of the volumes is the phrase: “In [this year, this ship or person] was elected to the National Maritime Hall of Fame as one of the great [ships or people] of U. S. maritime history.”

In addition to ships, people, companies and places, various other entries are scattered through the volume. Some cover the major freight trades: petroleum transportation (no cross-references from oil); the coal trade; the grain trade; and most notoriously, the slave trade (a full page). Terms like TEU appear (with a “See” from “Twenty-foot-equivalent unit”), along with pilot and smuggling.

There is a consistent pattern of emphasizing the corporate form of the name over the personal, which leads to a series of entries under initials and first names. Thus, on the first page, we have the “A. A. Turner Shipyard” which has a cross-reference to “Shipbuilding” but not from it, and nothing under Turner. The personal names are inverted, so we get entries for James Farrell Sr., James Farrell Jr. and John Farrell immediately before the entry for the Farrell Line. Taken in isolation, they are all reasonable entries. Read in order, there is an overlapping narrative, sequenced by the spelling of their first names.

The dictionary does a good job of tracking the major labour unions in the seagoing and cargo-handling trades, helped significantly by a table in the back that pulls them together chronologically and which indicates under which of the myriad variations of names you’ll find the entry. From that point you can trace the cross-references to union leadership, almost all of them active in the period 1900-60, although some lingered much longer. There are two items on labour action that are given their own entries: “Strike of 1921” (under S) and “Big Strike of 1934” (in the “B’s”).

Likewise, the Dictionary does yeoman work providing access to significant pieces of federal legislation and the agencies that supported them. Appendix I has a list of “Significant Congressional Legislation” which usually references an entry about the specific act. There is no entry for the Piracy Act of 1820, but the entry on piracy covers the gap. Unfortunately, there is no parallel table for government agencies, so you frequently need to consult the entry for the enabling legislation and follow the cross-references. Or you could start with the eight pages with United States in the entry title. Rather oddly, the segment opens with a steamboat named United States and ends with the steamship United States. In between are the Coast Guard, the Navy and my personal favourite name for a government agency, the “United States Shipping Board Bureau” (1933-36). James H. Boren would be proud.

It is difficult for reviewers lacking Blume’s encyclopedic acquaintance with American maritime history to judge the accuracy of the entries outside their field of competence. Generally, this is a very solid piece of work. But what reviewer would not find something to quibble about? I was dismayed in the timeline (p.xv) to read that old canard about the Walk-in-the-Water being the “first steamboat on the Great Lakes” in 1818. It was the fifth; the preceding four were operating on Lake Ontario by the time it got out late in the season. The main entry (p.508) correctly
limits the claim to Lake Erie, and then notes that the vessel was 135 feet in length and 8 feet, 6 inches in beam. One wonders how it stayed upright. The answer is in the enrolments, which show a 32-foot beam and an 8-foot, 3-inch depth of hold. The entry for the owners, the Lake Erie Steamboat Co., correctly notes that it was succeeded by the Superior, and misses the fact that the firm was wound up over the winter of 1826-27, when Superior was sold to the captain. The stockholders had nothing to do with the other five steamboats mentioned in the entry (or any other Great Lakes steamboats) either individually or collectively. The entry for Whaleback Freighter says that McDougall designed, but never built, a whaleback passenger vessel. The cross-references include “Christopher Columbus, SS.” That entry notes that the Columbus was “the only passenger vessel ever built with a whaleback hull” and was designed by McDougall… and is in the National Maritime Hall of Fame.

Caveats aside, with the pressure on publishers to produce electronic versions of books, and on reference material to be full-text searchable, it is quite possible to predict that Blume’s work on the U. S. Maritime Industry may well be the last word on the subject. And with its wealth of entries and cross-references, it is a job well done.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


2006 marked the centenary of HMS Dreadnought, the world’s first all-big-gun battleship and an icon of British sea power. In that year, England’s National Maritime Museum hosted a conference to re-evaluate central aspects of the Edwardian age (approximately 1897 to 1914) using Dreadnought as a focal point. The organizers hoped for a “productive clash between different kinds of history.” (p.xiii) This volume, one of the results of that effort, suggests that they succeeded.

The editors contend that naval history has too long been cut off from other fields of historiography. This separation has, in part, been self-inflicted but also reflects the larger trend toward ever narrower specialization. The mass of specialist expertise within each sub-discipline, they assert, creates an “intimidating barrier” for other historians. (p.xiii) In an attempt to scale that barrier, the editors selected eleven wide-ranging essays that examine Dreadnought’s symbolism and significance, the political and diplomatic contexts surrounding the ship’s construction, the social and cultural context of the age, and finally the technical and operational contexts of the ship and the Royal Navy. True to the stated goal, the essays are largely free of specialist jargon and target an informed, but general audience.

Perhaps the greatest value of an effort such as this is to locate British naval history, and particularly the decision to build Dreadnought, within the larger stream of British and European history. It was a decision fraught with both great possibilities and great risks. The Royal Navy stood as England’s first line of defense. Although the specifics varied over time, national defense policy essentially called for a navy larger than those of any likely combination of enemies. Great Britain held a commanding lead in capital ships, a lead Dreadnought immediately erased. Simply put, Dreadnought changed the rules of the game, making everything that came before instantly obsolescent, if not totally obsolete. Any nation possessing battleships would
have to replace them.

The essays in this volume help explain why England took such a risk. Britain’s naval policy did not exist in a vacuum. Both the nation and the Royal Navy faced a number of challenges. There were obvious strategic threats, such as the rising naval power of Imperial Germany, in addition to tactical challenges, such as the increasing range and accuracy of torpedoes. Perhaps less obvious, but no less real, were the domestic political challenges proponents of a strong, modernized navy faced. The British Admiralty and Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher in particular, consciously addressed both the internal and external challenges with Dreadnought. Every aspect of the ship, from her name to her massive guns and her revolutionary turbine engines, was carefully chosen to overwhelm all possible opponents, both foreign and domestic.

Bringing together such diverse essays allows the reader to draw connections between action and reaction, events and consequences, perception and reality, symbolism and substance. Germany had considered all-big-gun ships in 1904-1905 and, for a variety of reasons, decided against them. Britain’s decision to build Dreadnought forced Germany to react. These decisions had grave consequences for both nations. Efforts to finance both the navy and a growing welfare state eventually forced a fundamental restructuring of the British tax system. Germany faced a similar challenge. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, mastermind of German naval strategy, eventually concluded that the financial commitment necessary to match Britain would destroy the German political system. Dreadnoughts became the sole measure of nation’s naval might. Bases, lesser vessels, and necessary infrastructure were all sacrificed to build more battleships. The appearance of power, the ability to deter a foe, took precedence over true war-fighting capability. Dreadnoughts were symbols of national power. Whatever their tactical and strategic value, the ships became powerful public relations tools. The Admiralty, hoping for “positive press,” staged “carefully choreographed naval spectacles” to present the navy in best possible light (p.114). Nevertheless, other groups, particularly women, appropriated maritime imagery to serve their own political needs. Taken as a group, the essays provide a nuanced assessment of Edwardian England.

This slender volume has much to recommend it to a wide audience. Its broad scope and absence of jargon make it easily accessible to both specialists and generalists alike. If not for the high price, which will likely limit purchases, this volume would make an excellent text for a number of academic courses. The authors demonstrate a convincing mastery of the relevant historiography on their subjects. While the volume lacks a bibliography, each essay is extensively footnoted. Unfortunately, some of the primary source citations are abbreviated without a first, full reference, i.e. TNA, T168/62 (35); UBL, AC 17/2/29 (41); and BA-MA RM 3/3707 (91). These appear to be portions of the British and German national archives, but the non-specialist will find them opaque.

Larry Bartlett


Shipwright became an annual publication in 2010 after being a quarterly journal for 36 years and publishing 144 issues in that format. It is dedicated to all aspects of the scratch building of ship models. While each of the annual issues has been excellent, this
one surpasses the already high standards set with the 2010 volume. This issue continues to use the same high-quality materials, illustrations, and lavish photography and its excellence is apparent even before opening the book. The glossy dust jacket features a wonderful photograph of the magnificently executed carving and painted frieze-work adorning the model of HMS Minerva by Malcolm Darch, one of the world’s great scratch ship model builders.

The book presents a variety of model-building activities in a range of scales, using many construction techniques, some traditional, others not, with all requiring extensive research, the basis of successful scratch building. It also presents an interesting range of non-model-building articles.

The first article is an interview with Simon Stephens, curator of the Ship Model and the Full-size Boat Collection at The National Maritime Museum. This was conducted by the publisher of Conway, John Lee, at the New Collections Research Facility in Chatham Historic Dockyard, Kent, where Stephens and Lee discussed improvements to the storage of and public access to the models, photographs and documentation. Stephens indicates that models and information, at one time difficult to access, are now much more accessible and that photographs and documentation will be available on-line as all models in the collection have been photographed, including unique aspects of each vessel. Some models have been scanned using a C.T. Scanner revealing interesting, otherwise unknown details.

Model building articles include: “The Construction of the Pilot Cutter, Palmerin,” discussing the research and construction of a smaller clenched-lap (clinker) model, albeit with some supposition as to details. At the other end of the scale we have the 29-page article on HMS Minerva (1780) by Malcolm Darch, beautifully illustrated with 38 in-process photos supporting the text; combined they provide a very clear look at the construction and adornment of a great model.

There are two models by Robert A. Wilson, FRSA; RMS Carmania (1905), and further into the book, “Preussen (1902), The German Five-Masted Ship.” Built in the transitional period just three years apart, the two ships present totally different technologies—one turn-of-the-century steam, the other, the final configuration of sail.

“HMS Swallow, a 278-ton sloop” by Trevor Copp, presents an interesting, well-populated model, bringing what could have been a static display very much to life by including the creation of countless figures. “The Aviation Cruiser Kiev: A Model Making Challenge” by Dave Wooley, refers to the Soviet carrier Kiev, classed as an aviation cruiser to allow it to pass through the Bosporus where the passage of aircraft carriers was banned under the 1936 Montreux Treaty. The research spanned much of the northern hemisphere as Kiev’s Soviet origins made information retrieval difficult. The research and building process is clearly described along with 33 in-process photos, including its in-water trial before completion, after which the model went on permanent display at the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton.

“Modeller’s Draught: M/Y Griffioen” by J. Pottinger presents a very sea-worthy vessel and an excellent candidate for a radio-controlled model, supported with one overall photo taken from above, four on-board views, and two sheets of plans containing lines, outboard profile and deck plan. In “Buckets for the Georgian Navy,” Trevor Copp reviews his approach to the creation of model buckets for Georgian navy models. “Akranes FD33: A Steam Trawler” by Neil Howard presents a good look at a trawler circa 1900. Beautifully built and detailed for display, it
is shown as ready for trawling. This vessel could have made an excellent model for radio control work, especially as it has a GRP hull, with plenty of room for internal equipment.

“Sindia (1887): A Four-Masted Barque” by Ian Hunt is a big sailing model. With an overall length of ten feet, six inches and a height of five feet, it is impressive, especially when underway. With all sails rigged, but not radio controlled, it takes a team of four to get it afloat. “STS Tenacious: A Modern Square-Rigger” by David Mills is about a ship designed and built to allow the integration of able-bodied and physically handicapped persons as crew; this included a fully integrated construction crew. She was built following the success of Lord Nelson, the first ship built to accommodate a crew with handicapped members.

“The Practice and Power of Firing Broadsides in British Men of War” by Peter Goodwin, Mphil. I., Eng. MIMarEST, involved firing 32-pounder guns under simulated gun-deck conditions, recording the shot damage and the fact that the shot was timed at supersonic speeds during the tests.

“Salt Water Painters: the Royal Society of Marine Artists” by David Howell, PRSMA, offers an interesting look at artists who prefer to paint maritime subjects, with a brief look at the construction steps of a painting. “Jack Aubrey’s Minorca, Winner of the Conway Maritime Sail Prize” by Matthew Jones features Geoff Hunt’s painting Minorca, created for Patrick O’Brian’s book, Master and Commander. “Shipwright Gallery” offers an interesting collection of models from the National Maritime Museum Collection. In “Model Intermodellbau Dortmund: Marine Exhibits at Europe’s Largest Show,” David Wooley examines an exhibition that covers an enormous site with seven halls, of which Hall Five, The Boat Hall, displays ship models, kits, etc. in all classes; however, there are also ship models in the other halls. “Book News” concludes the volume with a series of book reviews.

Roger Cole
Toronto, Ontario


Surely not another piece of alternative history about the Second World War? Well, actually, this is not about the whole of the war, or even the whole of the Pacific War, but it is an alternative view of what might have developed during the Pacific naval war. It seems to be an increasingly familiar aspect of history that as soon as the source material and its original interpretation have been examined and re-interpretations begin to become exhausted, historians then turn to alternative views which, in some cases, are an informed consideration of what might have been and in others, wild speculation based on an author’s hobbyhorse. So where does Refighting the Pacific War fit in?

Firstly, because author/editor Jim Bresnahan, something of an expert in “What If?” speculation with works on the American Civil War and an alternative history of baseball, has taken a different approach. Most “What If?” books tend to be narratives by a single author or chapters by a small number of experts, but this is very much in the former category. Bresnahan has assembled a panel of 35 experts in this field to answer questions in a round-table format. Contributors include well-known professional historians and veterans of the action and brief details about each of them are given in a summary at the end of the book. There are chapters
representing a number of the major events characterizing the entire US-Japanese naval rivalry from the Washington Naval Treaties in the early 1920s, through Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal and the drive across the Central Pacific to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In each of these chapters, Bresnahan sets the scene with a brief introduction and then summarizes key aspects. For example, the chapter on Pearl Harbor covers the War Warnings, Third Wave Controversy, absence of the USN’s carriers from Pearl Harbor that Sunday, a possible invasion of Oahu and the appointment of Admiral Nimitz to replace Adm. Kimmel as C-in-C Pacific Fleet. In each case, a “What If?” question is posed and a few of the panelists’ answers are quoted in edited form.

The important points here are that not all of the experts cover each topic (usually only two to five contribute) and that their answers are edited. The edited comments are typically one-half to a full page, but in some instances, little more than six to eight lines. It is rather a tall order to fit any history of the Pacific naval war, let alone an alternative one, into 235 pages, and one might speculate about what the book might have been if the publishers had allowed 500 pages. The problem with a panel of 35 experts and a target of 235 pages is that the editing needs to be rather fierce. We can only presume that this concentrates the narrative on the key points the experts made and that other contributors had less or nothing to say, however unlikely this may appear.

Another problem is who chooses the questions, and do the panel answer or stray off the point without this being edited? This certainly happens with a few of them. Some questions are typical of what might be expected, such as Vice-Adm. Nagumo’s dilemma over arming and re-arming his reserve strike force. But other questions, such as what if the Japanese had employed different tactics on Guadalcanal, are posed. Also, would weaker Japanese resistance on Okinawa resulting in fewer American losses have in turn reduced the strength of the casualty argument in favour of dropping the atomic bomb?

A frequent difficulty with “What If?” questions is that they presume the reader has a detailed prior knowledge of what happened, as without this, it is difficult to understand the alternatives. In this respect, the book is definitely not one for the un-initiated, as the brief summaries by the editor in each chapter do not do enough to set the scene.

One of the experts, Vice-Admiral Yoji Koda, the retired commander of the JMSDF (effectively, the re-born Japanese fleet of the post-1950s era) does not provide answers to questions. Instead, his entire 14-page introduction gives a rare insight into Japanese naval doctrine, especially naval air operations in the 1930s and 40s. There has been a tendency to view the Japanese at that time as the experts, primarily because they operated their carriers in pairs (and built the island structures to accommodate this) and were the first to assemble a six-carrier task force in the form of the Kido Butai for the Pearl Harbor attack.

Apart from the edited narrative, this book contains six pages of endnotes (mainly related to the editor’s brief introductions), a two-page bibliography (not really enough in the circumstances), a detailed ten-page index and a number of well-known photographs but no other illustrations.

In commenting on any edited work, it is important to consider the success of the volume as a whole in shedding light on particular events rather than the individual contributions. With a panel as expert as this one, their various views do illuminate the war in a different but interesting way. The editor acknowledges that his book may “start more arguments than it settles.” We may in turn ask ourselves whether such
speculation helps us to understand events better. If it does this by provoking arguments among experts, this is a valid justification for this type of work. Overall, Bresnahan has produced some thought-provoking alternatives, though he has been rather let down by the length of the volume produced.

John Francis
Greenwich, England


In recent months, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become the focus of major international attention as the spear point of what believe to be the Beijing regime’s growing regional bellicosity. Barely veiled references abound to similarities between the PLAN and the aggressive Imperial Japanese Navy of a century ago which eventually required a world war to subdue. How good is the PLAN and how aggressively might it be employed?

Bussert and Elleman confront these questions directly and offer fascinating answers based on exhaustive research and professional lifetimes immersed in combat systems technology. The result is a work that, however difficult its subject, is absolutely essential reading for military, diplomatic and academic communities here and abroad, and for those who simply harbour an interest in the growth of Chinese power and ambition.

As the title suggests, this is no casual Friday night read. To get the full flavour and meaning of the authors’ arguments requires some time and care. And their conclusions may well frustrate both those who see the PLAN as a coming force in global calculations and those who dismiss it as (perhaps irretrievably) second rate. The answer lies somewhere in between.

The PLAN is a force in transition from the pathetic coastal defense entity of 1949 to one possessing full, blue water power extension. Its handful of new destroyers, its growing amphibious warfare capabilities and, perhaps most disturbing, its growing submarine fleet promise the emergence of a new player on the world ocean. The Beijing regime has, practically speaking, laid claim to much of the crucial South China Sea, an area of great potential off-shore oil and a major sea lane linking oil-starved industrial China with the great Mideast fields. In pursuit of absolute security, the PLAN has even refurbished a Soviet/Russian aircraft carrier.

Yet as the authors emphasize repeatedly, the PLAN is confronted by possibly crippling restraints. First and foremost, roughly two-thirds of its surface and subsurface vessels are obsolete. Second, and perhaps of even greater importance, the PLAN has imported both its best vessels and the advanced technologies aboard them from a variety of foreign sources, creating staggering problems of systems inter-operability and integration. Far too much of their fleet and systems are of often inferior Soviet/Russian origin and require continuing good relations with Moscow to maintain. Time after time, the authors present what appear to be impressive if not astonishing advances in Chinese naval capabilities only to properly remind us of significant operational and strategic constraints.

Bussert and Elleman conclude their tautly written and argued discussion with a
consideration of the PLAN fleet in the coming century. They assume, as many others do but I do not, that the PRC will sooner or later invade and overrun Taiwan. This is a typical American view, based on the assumption that if you have a problem you solve it, if something itches, you scratch. The Chinese do not think that way; conscious of their long exercise in civilization and governance, they are a far more patient people. So long as Taipei does not foolishly seek outright independence, Beijing is perfectly prepared to wait matters out, conscious, if nothing else, of the extraordinary cost of an invasion that could well fail and would be extraordinarily bloody in any case.

The supreme achievement of this comparatively short book is that stimulates such ruminations and leads inevitably to further thought and debate. Neither authors nor readers could ask for anything more.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


History is always about people. No matter the technology in question or the events focused on, people are the agents of history. When such people are as enigmatic as Captain Joseph Rochefort, a man whose name has become intimately linked with codebreaking and the Pacific War, they turn history into a truly fascinating study. This is certainly the case with Elliot Carlson’s 2011 biography of Joseph Rochefort, *Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway*. In 588 well organized and written pages, one of the least understood characters of the Pacific War comes alive in a way that only a well researched and written biography can provide. Biography is not an easy task in most cases. It is even harder when the subject is Joseph Rochefort, an individual who spent a large part of his naval career working with materials that were classified, technically until well after his death. He was a man who was both good at, and enjoyed, keeping secrets, even about himself.

Not a light read by any stretch of the imagination, a life as rich and full as Rochefort’s requires extensive study, something that Elliot Carlson does well. Through the course of some thirty chapters, plus epilogue and appendices, he traces the life and career of a sailor who had a far greater impact than anyone but his closest friends and colleagues realized. Born on May 12, 1900, to twice-transplanted Irish parents in Dayton, Ohio, Rochefort’s life is, in many ways, as much the story of the struggle for acceptance by a son of working class parents as it is about his career as a commissioned officer. As a naval officer who did not attend the US Naval College at Annapolis, his is the story of being accepted in an institution generally dominated by the “old boys club.” As a naval officer who had a gift for both codebreaking and the Japanese language, it is the story of a career path that was seen as a dead end and was actively discouraged by most naval officers of the period. Ironically, as a small branch of the large naval hierarchy of the 1930s and 1940s, it was a career path that played a huge role in the Allied victory in the Second World War.

For readers who are not familiar with Rochefort, he was in charge of the codebreakers at Pearl Harbor, starting before the attack on 7 December 1941 and running through the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Rochefort and his dedicated
team of codebreakers and analysts broke both the main Imperial Japanese naval code, JN-25, several times, as well as the merchant or maru code used by their merchant marine. The intelligence gained from these codes alerted Admiral Chester Nimitz to the impending operations in the Coral Sea and against Midway in May-June 1942. It is the breaking of the code and the intelligence gathered that produced Rochefort’s detailed warning that Midway Island was the next major objective for the Japanese. He and his staff not only pieced together the aims of the Japanese attack plan, but they were able to verify the intended target through some clever signal work. Rochefort and his team gave the U.S. vital intelligence which helped to win the war. Yet Rochefort, the man who played such a vital role in what many see as the most decisive battle of the Pacific War, ended the war not as a hero, but as the commander of a floating dry dock—almost forgotten and ignored. Luckily, Joe Rochefort was not completely forgotten. He finally received the recognition he rightly deserved for his role in the Pacific War when his Distinguished Service Medal was awarded posthumously on 30 May 1986.

What Carlson manages to deliver in these pages is quite startling. He provides a fascinating look at the inner workings of the intelligence organs of the American navy for the period and the political infighting, intensified by the tendency to marginalize both codebreakers and non-naval academy officers, that dominated the USN at the highest levels. This is balanced by an examination of the operational level of the codebreakers at Pearl through the eyes of Rochefort and his staff. It offers an absorbing look into how the system functioned, who the characters were, and more importantly, how it related to the greater whole of the Pacific War. It is a bottom-up understanding of codebreaking operations that is sorely needed. Rochefort and his staff were tasked with piecing together information from a vast sea of often unrelated signals and individual messages that were often transmitted months apart. Without modern computer support, this task is entirely a function of memory and intuition to combine code groups and terms. Even more surprising, the story of the intelligence for the Battle of Midway may not be what you think. Rochefort and his staff did not know the full scale of the Japanese plans for Midway. While they identified the Japanese carriers and their role, they missed the fact that Admiral Yamamoto and the main body of the Imperial Japanese Navy sailed to support the attack and were about a day behind the First Air Fleet. Unknown at the time, this lack of knowledge could have had significant repercussions. It is only with hindsight that scholars came to realize the danger to the victorious American carriers that lurked over the horizon. This is not something that is often discussed in the literature.

Carlson also reveals other startling facts. Joe Rochefort was an enigma because he wanted to be. Deep down, he was a naval officer who put the good of the service first and foremost. Yet he was secretive, even with those closest to him. Whether it was the year of his birth or his role at Midway, Rochefort liked to keep secrets. The author is uncertain whether it was intentional or not, but Rochefort left almost no papers, covering his tracks by destroying materials that he wanted lost forever while leaving a carefully crafted persona behind. While it made Elliot Carlson’s work extremely difficult, I believe it was intentional on Rochefort’s part. Once he became embroiled in intelligence issues, he became a huge stickler for security, as Carlson himself points out. Rochefort continued this circumspection throughout his life, probably culminating in the way he
was portrayed in the movie *Midway*, where Hal Holbrook gave the character a folksy southern twang and an irreverent attitude towards authority and his job. The image is nowhere near accurate, something some of his friends objected to, yet Rochefort seemed to accept it. Since he was a consultant on the movie, he had to help tailor that image just a bit. Why we will never know, as he passed away on 20 July 1976.

This book is highly recommended at various levels. No serious scholar of the Pacific War should ignore what the author tells us about codebreaking and the people who did it. They played such a significant yet poorly understood role in the conflict that this window is priceless. For anyone just interested in the field, it is a good read that provides an understanding of the US Navy of the pre-war years as well as the impact of the wartime pressures on it. Thus, it is a valuable resource to understand the man and his times. It is also most likely the best understanding of Joseph Rochefort we will get. My only complaint, and it seems petty, is the title. Rochefort did not outwit Yamamoto at Midway. He was not in command, but he saw through the fog of war and armed the USN with what it needed, information. Others decided the battle. The title not withstanding, this book really is a must-read if you have any interest in the Pacific War.

Robert Dienesch
Windsor, Ontario


For an historian, and a sailor, brought up in the middle of the past century, it is fascinating to see how the so-called Whig interpretation of British history has gone through its various transitions. What G.M. Trevelyan called the heroic age of British naval history, something that sailors in British Commonwealth navies celebrate every time they drink to “the immortal memory” of Horatio Nelson, was also a time of severe hardship for the vast majority in the Royal Navy. In this significant collection of articles by British scholars of the present generation (in which I can find only one mention of Lord Nelson), the polite interpretations of such well regarded naval historians as David Hannay, William James, J.K. Laughton, Michael Lewis, Christopher Lloyd, John Masefield and Dudley Pope, whose books are wonderfully readable, but as the historian Richard Drayton argues in the *Journal of Contemporary History* (2011, 46:671) were “written mainly for the pleasure of the reading classes of past and present imperial powers,” give way to hard analyses of what life at sea was really like for jolly British tars during that heroic age.

The Royal Navy was a vital instrument of power for British governments during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. William Pitt and his successors, it must be said, had a tiger by the tail. It comprised the largest labour force in the nation, drawn from various levels of society by various means of persuasion, and included among its ranks such destabilizing elements as the United Irishmen, and Quota men who had been impressed to bring ships up to strength to meet the demands of war. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the navy was seething with discontent. The usual solution to this problem, a solution not unknown to sailors of more recent times, was to keep the hands busy, but in an amazing display of unity and perseverance,
as the subtitle of this book so aptly describes it, and well aware of the risks they were taking, the seamen at Spithead, Plymouth and the Nore took advantage of their numbers, did so while a nation at war had need of their services, and won redress for grievances—not all of them, not for all time, and not without painful consequences—but enough to create a precedent that could not be ignored, not even when, more than a century later, British seamen mutinied at Invergordon.

The book is organized into chapters dealing with almost every aspect of mutiny in the Royal Navy, not only the 1797 mutinies, but also with wide ranging discussions of mutiny before and after the events of 1797. A great deal of new scholarship illuminates the subject, so that earlier and still highly respectable studies, studies which the authors have clearly relied upon, have to a large extent been superceded.

In three introductory chapters, Ann Coats and Philip MacDougall set the scene. They begin with a remarkably perceptive comment by the ship’s company of the Queen Charlotte, made on the first day of the Spithead mutiny, 16 April 1797: “Never had British seamen more Reasonable demands nor a favourable opportunity of rendering themselves a Respectable Body of men than the present but if they are Deverted or amused by false alarms and fair but vain Speeches or Promises from their present Glorious and Righteous Resolution of doing themselves Justice after having so long fought for the Intrest of Others—neglecting their own. Dreadful is the Consequences, the Success is sure.”

And so it was. The demands at Spithead that were met—marines to have the same allowances on shore as paid on board; provisions raised to 16 ounces a pound (instead of the 14 ounces previously allowed); care or pension for injured seamen; full pay for sick or injured seamen; and the removal of named officers (many of whom were evidently brutal sadists who made life unbearable for their victims on the lower deck)—suggest just how hard life was in British men of war. The Admiralty did not approve a pension increase from £7 to £10 a year, nor did their Lordships agree to equal shares of prize money, but in the end they compromised on demands for an increase in pay. An Act of Parliament on 20 May 1797 raised pay, not to the 30 shillings a month for able seamen first demanded, but from about 24s to 29s and 6d a lunar month to Able Seamen, from 18s 6d to 23s 6d for Ordinary Seamen and from 14s to 21s 6d to Landsmen.

That, of course, was nothing like the end of the story. Many previous accounts have given credence to the influence of revolutionary movements on discontent in the fleet. The authors have provided clear evidence that although such political unrest influenced events, it was in no way the prime cause. Firstly, the mutinies took place a year before the United Irishmen’s proposed actions against the British. As Wolf Tone complained, when he finally knew what was happening, “For weeks; I believe six weeks, the English fleet was paralysed by the mutinies at Portsmouth, Plymouth and the Nore. The sea was open, and nothing to prevent both the Dutch and French fleets to put to sea. Well, nothing was ready: that precious opportunity which we can never expect to return, was lost.” (p.132) Furthermore, the number of Irishmen in the navy, and the degree of support they really gave to “the cause,” is much less than many historians have suggested. Thomas Paine’s writings—“the tremendous influence of Paine’s ideas were now transmitted to the ignorant Jack,” wrote James Dugan in The Great Mutiny (London, 1960)—were not an issue. Ann Coats in a splendid sentence demolishes these ideas: “This insulting view of the majority of seamen misrepresented
the true significance of the Spithead mutiny: that long serving seamen, part of the social and political milieu of the 1790s, could successfully organise and execute a collective action.”(p.21)

Coats, citing the work of Nicholas Rodger, convincingly documents the radical tradition of British seamen from the seventeenth century. Roger Morriss, on the other hand, in giving an example of good crew management in the Minerve between 1796 and 1803, concludes that: “The many paternalistic practices and welfare provisions, common to all ships in the Royal Navy, have a tendency to be ignored. So too does the fact that many ships, especially those on foreign stations, remained unaffected by events in home waters, or, like Minerve, were only mildly affected. And reappraisal of the Spithead and Nore mutinies should take into consideration this stability elsewhere and balance the revolutionary potential of the mutinies against the forces in the navy that made for cohesion and unity.”(p.119)

Another persuasive slant on this argument is provided by Nick Slopes, (p.229):

for the greater part of a ship’s commission, compared to the merchant marine, a King’s ship would have a significant number of off-duty hands. If the overcrowded conditions on the lower deck are added to a large number of off-duty men that are supplied with considerable daily amounts of alcohol the potential for disciplinary problems are clear. It is little wonder that men were regularly holystoning the decks and painting the ship in order, no doubt, to give them something to do.

(That has a familiar ring to this reviewer, who seems to remember, as an ordinary seaman in the University Naval Training Division in 1947, much more time being spent painting and cleaning ship than in naval instruction.) The naval mutinies of 1797, significant as they were, did not, in other words, change the fact that, to use the old cliché, Britannia ruled the waves.

The mutinies on the Nore add a significant dimension to the theme of this book. Although the disturbances seemed to have subsided on 15 May, notes Philip MacDougall, “In various ill-lit alehouses or in the secluded corners of cramped gun decks, many continued to weave the web of intrigue.” Four seamen sent to Portsmouth as delegates from the Nore, where the fleet had been in mutiny since 12 May, were spared from arrest by Admiral “Black Dick” Howe, who had negotiated with the mutineers, because he was deaf to continued complaints. He thought the men from the east coast would take back tidings of comfort. They did not. One of the four decided to desert anyway, one remained in Portsmouth, “imbibing both great quantities of liquor and the atmosphere of a town outwardly in celebration,” (p.148) and the other two returned to the Nore, having learned on their way through south-east England that there was still great dissatisfaction with the outcome of the mutinies.

By 15 June, the Nore mutinies had been put down, not only by a combination of cynical manipulation and harsh punishment, but by remarkably clever deception and a constantly growing opposition group. The interception of letters home from men in the fleet, letters that have been preserved in Admiralty records at the Public Records Office, provided very useful intelligence. Moreover Admiral Lord Duncan, who had continued the blockade of the Low Countries with only two ships of the line, remained convinced that he had the loyalty of his crews. Philip MacDougall argues that, although the system of representation in each ship mirrored that of corresponding societies of the day, the representatives themselves achieved very little. So when, at last, the large and constantly growing
opposition group finally forced the militants to surrender, “those who had been members of such organizations as the United Irishmen, United Scots and United Britons faced the choice of either remaining and taking the consequences or fleeing abroad.” (p.263)

Even after the surrender, and the execution of selected ringleaders (the case of Richard Parker is particularly disturbing), there remained wide discontent. Discipline, for instance, the use of flogging and starting, remained unusually harsh. Jonathan Neale discusses the influence of the 1797 mutinies on the 1806 mutiny in the *Nereide*, a case history of horrifying brutality. Captain, Robert Corbet ordered 14 floggings, with an average of 17 lashes each, over a period of 211 days.

Neale suggests, from good evidence, that a general shift in attitudes by officers did not really take place until after 1800. “Because it was gradual, and because it was not publicly discussed, it was only partly conscious. After the mutiny in the *Nereide*, it seemed that new signals were coming from the Admiralty. This enabled the gradual shift in attitudes to crystallize into a rapid shift in behaviour.”

Although he is not a contributor to this collection, Nicholas Rodger has, in my view, shown the way with his magisterial studies *The Command of the Ocean*, (Penguin, 2004) and *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Royal Navy* (Collins, 1986). Both are beautifully written accounts that were well received by “the reading classes”; whether those readers will discipline themselves to tackle this somewhat more analytical collection remains to be seen. It would certainly do no harm for professional sailors to read the book for themselves. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.*

W.A.B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


This book fulfils the promise made by John Dawson, the editor, to his father, John Dawson the sailor, a hostilities-only rating in the Royal Navy from 1940 to 1946, to publish his story through a diary and some letters. The diary is a transcription of what the author calls a “narrative” written in 1946, soon after the main events which occurred between 17 December 1940 and 20 March 1946.

There is a succinct introduction to the man who is the centre of our story and a brief account of each vessel in which he sailed. The style of the diary is simple and direct, telling the story of much more than the fledgling sailor, the “ordinary signalman”, and his development into a pivotal personage: yeoman on a flotilla leader. We join Dawson, Sr. deciding to serve his country and the service’s determination that he might be good signaler. He starts signals training at Devonport during the blitz of that naval installation in 1940. The conditions were chaotic with heavy casualties and defeat staring the survivors in the face. It is a dramatic time, but rarely is the author dramatic. The neatly handwritten narrative tells the story in matter-of-fact terms, but because it is written in the first person, the action is immediate.

Dawson’s letters are contemporaneous with the events of the diary and addressed to family members, especially his elder sister. Although written with an eye to the wartime censor, they include important clues as to his emotional state as well as factual information and the texture of his social and living conditions. The book follows the chronology of the diary interleaved with the letters.

Dawson’s life at sea begins with a
chase across the Atlantic Ocean to Newfoundland, to catch his ship. During the chase, he is able to give us a snapshot of HMCS *Ottawa*, which he contrasts with a comparable R.N. vessel: "What a difference. The mess was clean and everyone seemed eager to make an Englishman feel at home." (p.17) He goes on to tell us that the ship was sunk in 1942 on another convoy with 114 crew members lost, another reminder of the lethal nature of war at sea. There are descriptions of St. John’s and Halifax at war early in the Battle of the Atlantic when things were going badly.

There is an account of a cruise down the east coast of the United States before the outbreak of war, when that country was supposedly neutral, to drop off torpedoes and supplies. Then a review of Dawson’s career in HMS *Forth*, a submarine tender with a huge volume of signals, which were used for routine communication. A picture emerges of a resourceful, modest young man working within a service that has molded men in wartime for hundreds of years. He is selected as having the talent to be a signaler, which requires good vision, memory, and ability to process information. He identifies the importance of information and communication, “the buzz,” as the dominant topic and preoccupation on any warship. As a signalman, he was placed where he could contrast the “buzz” with what was really happening, with occasionally hilarious results. It is remarkable that he covers the process of signaling only in passing, although studying and practicing it is his constant preoccupation. His time is full with taking classes, studying, and writing exams to reach greater proficiencies of signaling and higher rates. As important as Dawson is, there is also the picture of the manning system of the Royal Navy during a period of great stress. The diary gives an authentic insight into the Second World War in Britain and the Mediterranean Sea that no formal history can.

The second half of the diary covers Dawson’s career in the Mediterranean in HMS *Spartan* and, until it is sunk, HMS *Aurora*. The author describes the sinking and his survival matter-of-factly. We get a look at the signaling function when the ship carries an admiral and his staff, making it a flagship. Dawson gives us a front row seat to the invasions of southern Europe; ending with the Greek Civil War and adds his own commentary. When the war was winding down, Yeoman Dawson spent much more time with his real enthusiasm, sport, and especially cricket.

The title is gently ironic and characteristically modest, in that Dawson demonstrates talent and remains an ordinary signalman for only a short time on his rise to becoming a pivotal communicator in a pivotal warship, HMS *Aurora*. Because the *Aurora* was a flag ship we observe major historical events close up, such as a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the transport of the Greek Government-in-exile back to Athens. Finally, he gives us the texture of being “demobbed” in an exhausted and scarred post-war Britain.

There are insights into the ships and the people who sailed them and especially the ordinary signalman himself. The account of the vessels at the beginning of the book is worth referencing because it provides continuity to the story and is also a very heartfelt homage to the ships. The editor provides commentary for major periods, which is a gloss of world history through his eyes, which turns out to be problematic. The affiliations of the editor, political and religious, do not help us understand the subject, the ordinary signalman, and detract overall.

The production is superior being on good quality paper and hard bound. Photographs are entirely secondary, those of the *Spartan* and *Aurora* being small-scale
and indistinct. There are some miniature facsimiles of key documents, including a few pages of the “diary” and family photographs, Dawson’s ID card, the signals sending him home and his discharge.

This slight volume could easily have been just another family history. Instead, thanks to the vitality and immediacy of the diary and letters, there is an unvarnished view of the naval service at a critical time in the history of the world. This work belongs in libraries dedicated to the history of the Mediterranean theatre of the Second World War. It is a must-read for anyone contemplating an oral history project. It contains information and insights useful to modern observers: readers will be able to connect the dots between the navy of Imperial Britain during the Second World War and contemporary events in the Middle East.

Ian Dew and Kathy Crewdson
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Since about seventy percent of our planet is covered by water, it is not surprising that the seas were battle locations throughout history and many combat ideas were tested there. The 13 chapters of this book examine the origin and development of one military vessel that is now part of many modern navies across the world: the submarine.

The first chapter reviews the early development of submarine devices, mostly for military purposes. Their first recorded use occurred during the American Revolution, when the submersible Turtle tried unsuccessfully to destroy HMS Eagle, a 64-gun, third-rate British ship of the line moored off New York. Submarine explorers and their inventions follow. Most of the technology was eventually applied to military uses, although some ideas were so far ahead of their time that they had to wait years for the technology to catch up. Chapter 3 concentrates on the military use of submarines by the Confederate Navy to counter-balance their weakness at sea against the Union forces during the American Civil War. For the next few decades, the submarine was seen as the weapon of a weaker naval power.

Technological developments after the Civil War led to several experimental submarines, a process that continued until the most of the technical problems were resolved by the end of the century. Chapter 5 focuses on submarine development around the globe in the late-nineteenth century, especially propulsion and weapons systems that eventually characterized submarines in both world wars. The author next addresses the American navy’s acquisition of submarines at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by early-twentieth-century submarine development and how the introduction of submarines into fleets and war-games added an extra dimension to naval strategy. Chapter 8 covers the Great War and the initial deployment of submarines until Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaigns.

A discussion of technical developments and tactics for the major navies follows, including the secret German U-Boat program instituted just prior to Hitler’s rise to power. Chapter 10 reviews the successes and shortcomings of submarines used by various navies during the Second World War and the measures developed to counter them. Then submarine innovations in the post-war period, including nuclear propulsion, are examined. The following chapter looks at submarine deterrents, especially missile
carriers, employed by major navies. This section also covers some late-twentieth-century submarine actions and accidents and reviews the deep-sea diving done by non-military research subs. The final chapter introduces the reader to movies featuring submarine plots, submarine museums and the maritime archaeology of submarine wrecks around the globe.

The book is richly illustrated with photos, schematics and graphics which make it very enjoyable, although many illustrations have appeared in previous works; most of the illustrations in the second half are from the publisher’s collection and have appeared in other Osprey books on submarines. The book also includes notes and a decent bibliography.

There is no denying that this book is a good source of information on submarines, but it is clearly for the neophyte. Although not an expert in submarine history, I learned very little. Much of the information is available from other publications and, although not too U.S.-centric, the author does devote a lot of space to American submarine development, mentioning others on the side or in less detail. Furthermore, there is a lack of recent research, not to mention small misleading facts, such as identifying Newfoundland troops at the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915 as Canadian. The author overlooks the impact of submarines on maritime warfare for Union forces in 1861, or for the British in 1914 or 1939, or to Argentina in 1982. Nor are the reasons for the failure of German submarine tactics such as the “wolf-pack” presented. Delgado wastes some valuable pages on topics that have little impact on the main subject, such as Operation Crossroads in Chapter 11. On the other hand, there is little mention of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine program and its development or the submarine service in the Soviet Navy and its impact on NATO during the Cold War. The discussion of deep-sea research vessels has little to do with the book’s main topic, while the proliferation of electrical-diesel submarines in medium or small navies and their impact is not mentioned. The last chapter is definitely interesting, albeit inconsistent. In conclusion, this book is not the definitive work on the topic because of the many gaps in the story, particularly relating to the second half of the twentieth century.

Karl Gagnon
Ottawa, Ontario


Larrie Ferreiro states that naval architecture was born under the pen of Pierre Bouguer, while he worked in the mountains of Peru far from the ocean. (The work was actually conducted in equatorial Ecuador, which was part of Peru until 1830.) Bouguer codified a series of hydrostatic, hydrodynamic and stability principles in a work known as Traité du navire, de sa construction et de ses mouvemens (Treatise of the Ship, its Construction and Movement) while working as a member of the French Academy of Science’s Geodesic Mission (1735-1751). This was an expedition to measure a meridian arc between two points with the same longitude at the equator and compare it with one measured in Paris (48 degrees N). The goal was to resolve the debate about the earth’s shape; whether it was a perfect sphere, flattened at the poles or at the equator.

While on this mission, Bouguer derived a set of mathematical expressions for ship constructors, a far-reaching accomplishment concocted under
extraordinary circumstances. This story is covered in great detail in Ferreiro’s earlier book, *Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment Expedition that Shaped the Earth*. Bouguer’s most seminal discovery was the determination of metacenter, the intersection of vertical lines through the center of buoyancy of a floating body when at equilibrium and when floating at an angle. His equations related the whole performance of a ship to its weight and shape, thus determining the theoretical measure of a vessel’s stability. This practical knowledge enabled a ship designer to measure cargo capacity and the ability of a vessel to withstand the vagaries of transiting the seas before it was built and sailed.

*Ships and Science* is about naval architecture rather than marine architecture. This distinction was made because governments underwrote military-related research. Once a desirable warship design was established, it could easily be converted to commercial use. A navy offered a practical, and usually economical, means of engaging an enemy in warfare. For example, in 1815, Napoleon fought Waterloo with 366 cannon. These guns required about 5,000 horses and 9,000 men to deploy them and they could only be moved about 20 miles a day. Nelson’s 1805 Trafalgar fleet of 27 ships carried 2,200 cannon and 14,000 men and could cover 100 miles a day. Moreover, there was no need to find fodder for horses. Therefore, a naval fleet could carry six times as many guns (usually larger than field artillery pieces) than an army at five times the speed with less logistical support. In addition, a 350+ artillery unit needed in excess of 50 hectares of land for gun emplacement, while the fleet carried six times the fire power on about 3 hectares of decking.

Warships were the most complex engineering structures of their day; the combination of heavy wooden construction of hulls and masts, strung with a dizzying array of rigging and mechanical lines and blocks to control and operate the vessel. Initially craftsmen built ships in shipyards where they learned a trade not taught in schools. These vessels functioned reasonably well and upgrading came through the employment of sound shipwright practices and experience.

In time, naval warfare changed via the massive increases in the use of firepower. This required stronger hulls and several new decks, leading to the concept of cutting gun ports for cannon. Constructors made heavier framing to support the ever-increasing gun size while providing protection against shot for both guns and crews. At the same time, deeper hulls were needed for lower gun tiers to increase firepower, yet they had to remain clear of water in a rough sea. In addition, some designs were made sturdier, perhaps at the cost of speed, while lighter and more maneuverable vessels offered certain tactical advantages. But the biggest single advantage turned out to be anti-fouling coppering of hulls that increased speed and the useful life of a vessel.

Ferreiro’s book focuses on the profession of naval architecture, purported by the author to be the first history of those men who contributed the concepts that make up this complex specialized science. It consists of technological tools, basic mathematical science and finally engineering. The combination of these entities yields a product whose characteristics and performance should be predictable before it is put to use; the theoretical starting point of any ship design. Published by the MIT Press, this book contains numerous formulae and intricate diagrams, many of which may challenge the casual reader. Examples include: point vêlique, dévire, bow of least resistance, impulsion of the stern, ship oscillations (roll, pitch, and heave), center of rotation, and the double tangent rule of sail, to name
a few. Only the calculation of metacenter survives for use today. Fortunately, the author explains the practical concerns behind these sometimes arcane mathematical and physical sojourns with understandable logic.

Still, there are some mundane issues that were not addressed. Once the science behind ship design was worked out, there were variables that might lead to failure, including the skill of local shipwrights, the availability of such critical components as types of specific cured wood and rigging materials, and the crucial unknown—ships lost at sea and the causes of these failures. Ferreiro also spends few pages on the development of “iron hulled” vessels and the special problems that they represent.

In summary, Ships and Science is a meticulously researched, scholarly book describing the often-convoluted history of naval architecture, at times a demanding endeavour. This part of maritime history has arguably been neglected, but deserves to be revisited. Any maritime historian or maritime architecture scholar should benefit from reading this erudite, thought-provoking book.

Louis Arthur Norton West Simsbury, Connecticut


Studies of English maritime adventurers have usually featured romantic swashbucklers and great sea captains in times of war while there existed only a hazy picture of the common pre-Elizabethan sailor. Today, though, social historians prefer to focus on the bigger picture of ordinary seafarers and the way in which they earned their living both on routine commercial voyages and as explorers, or even privateers.

Cheryl A. Fury holds degrees from the University of New Brunswick, where she is an associate professor of European History, and McMaster University. She is also on the editorial board of the Northern Mariner and is currently researching the early voyages of the East India Company. Her previous books include Tides in the Affairs of Men, a social history of the period between 1580 and 1603. For this new book, she has brought together six experts on the English maritime community in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The editor herself has contributed two chapters: one on the Elizabethan maritime community between 1500 and 1650, and the other on the hitherto neglected subject of merchant seamen’s wives and widows. Some of the other topics covered in this book include the men of the Mary Rose, Tudor merchant seafarers in the early Guinea Trade, the religious shipboard culture of sailors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Jacobean piracy in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, health and care at sea and the relief of disabled ex-sailors circa 1590–1680.

Possibly no comparable book has provided such an overview of the lives of English sailors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This may be because in the past, maritime and social historians have concentrated on famous and infamous captains like Frobisher and Drake. This is understandable, since contemporary official records seldom mention the men who sailed the ships that opened up the global marketplace to England’s trade. The editor argues that the time is now ripe for a detailed examination of the impact that the cycles of war and peace during the Tudor-Stuart period had on maritime employment for all
those who went to sea.

It is clear that the expansion of English merchant shipping was not a straightforward matter. Existing literature shows two main obstacles to overseas trade in the sixteenth century, namely communication and transport, and consequently, supplies were erratic and costly. Although surprisingly little is known of the pre-Elizabethan sailor, a hazy picture of his life can be assembled. Often, he was a fisherman with few other qualifications but, like most workers at the time, he would be engaged for the duration of a particular “run” or voyage.

Richard Braithwaite, who was born in the year of the Armada, wrote disparagingly about his fellow mariners, “the breadth of an inch-board is betwixt him and drowning, yet he swears and drinks as deeply as if he were a fathom from it…” (Hope 2001). Richard Dana noted that “the discipline of the ship requires every man to be at work on something…” (Earle 1998). His only benefit might be a little cargo space to carry goods to trade on his own account (Munck 1990). By the seventeenth century, the growth in trade, coupled with prolonged periods of warfare when the Royal Navy competed for seamen, saw significant wage increases for experienced sailors. After 1688, 70 per cent were aged between 15 and 30 with only ten per cent over 40 (Wrightson 2002).

The importance of wills and probate records in gauging changes in the wealth and literacy of agricultural workers in the sixteenth century has been promoted by historians such as Michael Zell. Heretofore, information about naval seamen came from their commanders and officers, but Fury has successfully researched the content of merchant seamen’s wills, especially in the notorious Guinea trade. These give a personal view of life on board ship, indicate the rising prosperity of seamen and illustrate how their religious affiliations still reflected their land culture.

This excellent book contains informative illustrations from the wreck of the Mary Rose, an exhaustive bibliography, including manuscript sources, printed and secondary sources and a comprehensive index. Equally important as a contribution to maritime history is Fury’s analysis of Tudor-Stuart women. They seldom had an easy life, particularly if they came from less affluent circumstances and their menfolk were sailors. Researchers, however, still find it problematic to unearth sources where women speak for themselves.

Fury and the various contributors to this book merit the strongest praise for clarifying the complexity of the social life of those who served in the English merchant service in the Tudor-Stuart era. The picture they paint is always sympathetic, highlighting their successes and clearly explaining their problems. This book will be enjoyed by readers with an interest in both sociological history and maritime studies, and could act as a maritime researcher’s template for how to present a well-reasoned study of the social history of English seamen at any period.

Michael Clark
London, England


A great many books on the age of fighting sail have been published during the last two decades. Lavery, Winfield and others may be thought to have covered the subject, but now we have this large and beautifully illustrated volume which can be considered...
as complementary to the books by those authors.

First published in 1999, this book is a new and improved edition. In the forward, the author states that the essence of the book is provided by the draughts reproduced from the comprehensive collection of original ship plans, held at the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich. Many of these even include alterations to the design as built and later repairs noted in different coloured inks. But to the reader, the greatest impact is likely to be the magnificent illustrations: reproductions of paintings and photographs of period models that are shown at their best in the large format of this lavish volume.

The chapters on the different types and rates of ship include explanations of their evolution during the period, comments on their good and poor qualities as seen by contemporaries, and remarks on their employment and how it changed during the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Ships of the line are described, starting with first rates and working down. Their rates (first, second and third) had been established in the seventeenth century and, except for a gradual increase in size, had changed little. Then frigates (fifth and sixth rates) are dealt with, ranging the other way, from small to large. There is a reason for this. The frigate originated in the late 1750s, replacing older designs in the lower rates, and their evolution is described as they grew larger and carried heavier armaments. The 50-gun ships are included with the ships of the line and 20-24-gun post ships with the frigates.

Further chapters describe sloops of war and the smaller craft: gunboats, cutters, and so on, and ships built on the Great Lakes. It should be noted that wooden warships could last for a long time and many that served in the period covered by this book had been designed and built decades earlier. As is well known, HMS Victory was 40 years old at Trafalgar, and was still considered one of the best first rates.

All of these chapters—the bulk of the book—deal with ships built for the Royal Navy, but the Admiralty took care to survey and fully record captured ships, providing data for chapters on the designs of French, Spanish, Dutch, Danish, American and other warships, including explanations of the different design philosophies of those nations, whether based on strategic policies or geographical constraints such as, in the case of the Netherlands, shallow coastal waters.

Throughout the text there are interesting discussions regarding the employment of the various rates and classes as influenced by their characteristics. The first rates of 100 to 110 guns were limited in number and were the flagships on the Home and Mediterranean stations. The second rate three-deckers of 90 to 98 guns were secondary flagships. Although they were seldom good sailers, they were favoured by Britain as they provided concentrated firepower, but France and Spain preferred large two-decked 80s. The Royal Navy did build a few third rate 80s and captured others, and with the “large class” of 74s, they were often used when fast detached squadrons were required. The “common class” 74s were the most numerous, general purpose battleships. The 64s were meant for the North Sea and, along with the 50s, could provide some force on distant stations although a few were sometimes to be found in the main fleets. The frigates were scouts for the battle fleet, convoy escorts and commerce raiders. From 28-gun sixth rates with 12 pdrs they grew in response to French developments to 18 pounder fifth rates of 32 to 38 guns and even a few with 24 pounders. Then, in the War of 1812, a number of losses to the big American frigates of the Constitution class caused the construction of a number of very big 24-
pounder frigates and the conversion of 74s by removing a deck. These never had a chance to prove themselves. Sloops and smaller craft were needed for a variety of subsidiary tasks.

*Warships of the Napoleonic Era* is a very attractive book as well as being absolutely sound in its descriptions and conclusions. The only problem; it’s so big, where do you keep it?

C. Douglas Maginley  
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


The *Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum* has a proud tradition of publishing highly rated nautical works and with volume 69 of its book series, it has produced another fine work. Andreas Gondesen’s book on the last generation of F. Laeisz Line’s famous flying P-liners is sure to bring delight to anyone with an interest in Windjammers and their use during the final decades of merchant sailing ships.

Gondesen begins by providing a brief but good introduction to the general topic, placing it in its historical context, especially the role of the P-liners in the saltpeter trade with Chile. Readers will quickly note the amount of material and facts with which the author infuses his work. Gondesen argues that the four-masted barques were the best evolution of great sailing ships. During their height, P-liner’s cargo efficiency tripled from 28 GRT/34t per crew, achieved on clipper ships like *Cutty Sark*, to 91GRT/136t per crew on *Pamir* (p.14). The only ships larger and with more cargo carrying capacity were the five-masted, full-rigged ships like *Preussen*, but according to Gondesen, their sheer size meant it was a challenge to find outbound cargo and they had to be towed into the German Bight before they could make sail. The 3000 GRT four-masted barques were easier to run and cargo could be found to fill their holds, making them the most successful and economical type of ship. F. Laeisz, in fact, had recognized this and from 1891 onward, ordered only four-masted barques and five-masted full-rigged ships from shipyards. All other ship types in their fleet were second-hand acquisitions.

Gondesen offers a short history of the F. Laeisz shipping company highlighting that it was one of the few to retain Windjammers when most of the competition was switching to steam. By specializing in niche markets like the saltpeter and grain trade, the line’s sailing vessels were still able to return a profit. Although the line was forced to hand over all ships above 1500GRT after the First World War, “through clever and targeted negotiations with the Allied reparations commission” the line was able to retain the unfinished *Priwall* and bring home the interned ships at its own cost (pp.18-19). Despite having to hand over the latter, the profits put the shipping line in a good state financially and it quickly began to buy back its former vessels throughout the 1920s.

The largest portion of the book is dedicated to the individual ships, especially the eight famous “half-sisters,” as Gondesen calls them. Although *Pamir*, *Passat*, *Peking*, *Pola*, *Priwall*, *Padua*, *Pangani*, and *Petschili* were all similar, only *Peking/Passat* and *Pola/Priwall* were true sister ships. Gondesen uses the *Pangani* as an example of the type and provides a very detailed description of everything from the winches to the masts. Following this is a useful short history of each vessel and lists...
of their captains, voyages, cargo carried, and transit times. One interesting detail the author brings to light is that of the group of eight, the two ships built by the Joh. C. Tecklenborg yard, *Pangani* and *Padua*, were, on average, faster than their Blohm & Voss built half-sisters. Tables providing a detailed analysis of the individual voyage times and the technical data of the above named ships are also included along with a section on the other four-masted barques of the F. Laeisz line again with short histories, captains, voyages and cargoes.

Technical aficionados will be especially pleased with a detailed comparison between the eight individual ships, for which an English translation is included, and the impressive 100 pages of full-page technical drawings ranging from hull lines, deck plans, and mast cross-sections to the sail and rigging plans. For each drawing or plan, both German and English captions have been provided.

Although the book is written in German, in the DSM’s established tradition, an English summary is included at the end. A summary cannot fully replace the work, but this summary does its job remarkably well, effectively capturing all the important points of the work and the details mentioned above. It should be noted that Gondesen has also made an effort to footnote where important and provided an extensive bibliography of sources used.

Perhaps most impressive for all interested readers is the plethora of photographs that have been interlaced into the work from a wide range of sources. The photographs cover the whole time period concerned from the firm’s early years and include colour photographs of the ships surviving to this day. Many images appear to be previously unpublished and each German caption is accompanied by an English translation.

The vast number of photographs, plans and drawings alone make this an excellent volume and the detailed histories, stats, and technical details make this work well worth the investment. Overall, Gondesen’s book is a fine addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in the topic and this reviewer would recommend it to anyone who is especially interested in the world’s last great Windjammer.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


Shawn Grimes’ *Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918* penetrates decades of seemingly insufficient scholarship around the origin and development of the British navy’s strategic preparations and coping mechanisms during the thirty years of technological flux which characterised the Edwardian era. Giving Fleet Lord John A. Fisher and Sir Julian Corbett their due, Grimes adds the names of Admiral Sir Cyprian A. Bridge, Captain Reginald Custance, Sir John Knox Laughton, and Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb to the expected list of reformers. These latter few—and many others besides—are lauded by Grimes as ground-breaking academics who introduced the historical method to the flagging educational program offered by the Navy, bolstering it with a means to improve the strategic analysis methods employed by the British. He critiques the untempered education available to British officers, arguing that the introduction of historical methods removed them from the context of their parochial mathematical educations which arguably rendered them inept in practical scenarios,
unable to analyze strategic and tactical situations. The historical method introduced by Custance, Laughton and Colomb permitted reforms to the Royal Navy beginning as late as the 1880s, which in turn led to the “development of strategic doctrine” suitable to the task of coping with the introduction of increasingly advanced technology and potentially out-moded strategies (p.14).

Under the combined influence of Laughton, Colomb and Corbett, the RN began to adopt a more strongly academic approach to strategic studies via the historical method. This, for example, revealed weaknesses in various formations of blockade. Professional academics were able to gather sufficient scholarly evidence to prompt more trials of new technologies and the review of time-honoured strategies and tactics by means of war-games. Grimes attributes the success of these war-games to the gradual acceptance of observational blockade strategies and advance bases as well as the Royal Navy’s increased acceptance of the value of academic strategic studies, intelligence reports and manoeuvres. His case study is the navy’s initial distain for the small, fast, and heavily armed torpedo-boats beginning to populate the navies of continental European powers. The RN’s assertion that only weaker nations would employ torpedo-boats prompted Colomb and Laughton to produce a series of scholarly articles that would eventually introduce a select group of highly-placed naval authorities (including Cyprian Bridge and Reginald Custance), to the idea that the potential threat posed by cruisers and torpedo-boats under France’s Jeune École doctrine was far greater than the Admiralty had been willing to consider or admit (p.25). The potential embarrassment such vessels posed, Grimes argues, was a greater concern than any actual threat they presented to men and matériel, and it was with this perception in mind, that anti-
cruiser and torpedo-boat strategies were developed. By 1904, Britain had codified observational and intermediate-distance blockade strategies and counter-cruiser tactics.

The bulk of the book is dedicated to illustrating how these arguments influenced the development of the Navy through the 1904-1918 period. Without divulging too much of Grimes’ text, this reviewer finds one relatively significant issue that may be off-putting for some readers. Although strategically important, Grimes insufficiently addresses Scandinavia’s neutrality and the spanner it threw into the Admiralty’s strategic planning during the pre-war period. This could indicate any (or all) of three possibilities. Firstly, Grimes may not have considered the problem of Scandinavian neutrality particularly important to his specific study. In fact, he says that “[t]he Admiralty’s offensive contingencies against Germany … were potential hostages to any Scandinavian neutrality guarantee involving the Baltic entrances …,” suggesting that tracing the Scandinavian influence upon British policy is beyond the scope of his project (p. 230). The second possibility is that he could not find additional documentation to expand his thesis. Thirdly, he may have simply decided to not discuss the Scandinavian issue in greater depth. This reviewer feels a combination of the first and third options to be the most likely, and as such, does not view this as a failing, per se.

Shawn Grimes’ Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 may be seen as somewhat revisionist because of his insistence on the influence of Laughton, Colomb, et al. upon the later efforts of Fisher, Corbett, and others. This said, Grimes accomplishes his goal of illustrating both the success of and the necessity for Fisher’s policies and the influence of academics upon the realization
and adoption of historical methods as a viable means of strategic analysis. The charge of “revisionist” would be an overreaction, however, if only because Grimes’ thesis is that academic study validated before-the-fact Fisher’s policies, not that academics superseded the value of Fisher’s work or his politicking. The appendices are direct and to the point, if a bit light in detail. He compensates for this weakness by his clear referencing and sourcing, drawn heavily from archival sources, manuscript repositories and periodicals. The bibliography is extensive, illustrating an admirable lack of bias in favour of any given author, implying a historical vision unclouded by others’ lenses. Another strength is his use of seven “Unpublished Theses and Papers”; by incorporating recent efforts by other scholars before they are published, Grimes not only gives them their due, but also provides his work with a sense of “cutting-edge” scholarship. The one shortcoming is an over-reliance upon the work of the others who authored his masses of secondary sources. This confusion could have been ameliorated by explicitly identifying which archival sources were authored or supervised by Fisher, particularly when one considers Grimes’ pro-Fisher argument, which would have been considerably stronger if he could have illustrated Fisher’s deliberative process, rather than only its conclusion.

The maps, the list of abbreviations, and index included with the monograph are functional, but deserve no other accolades.

In the final estimation of this reviewer, Shawn T. Grimes’ *Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918* is an effective and competent discussion of a particularly tumultuous period in British naval history. Many of his opinions and assertions seem to stem from those of Donald Schurman, but far from sounding derivative, *Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918* reinforces rather than contradicts, and offers an additional perspective rather than parroting the arguments of Schurman. Grimes’ arguments, highlighting the importance and influence of dedicated academic scholarship, historians, and the historical method upon British strategy, are convincing and well reasoned. They, in turn, set up and effectively support—and are supported by—Grimes’ particular take on Fisher’s strategic constructions in preparing Britain and her navy for the First World War.

Ambjörn L. Adomeit
London, Ontario


Ripped from the headline of a broadside published by Edinburgh-based Menzies, the
title of this captivating work accurately reflects both the tragic loss of life and the agonizing circumstances surrounding the wreck of a British ship filled with female convicts off the French coast in 1833, and the sensationalist style of reporting of the event that spurred intense controversy and extensive public scrutiny across two nations. Accomplished author and U.S. Navy veteran Andrew Jampoler presents a solidly researched, engagingly written, and remarkably informative book on an incredibly dramatic yet largely forgotten event in the annals of maritime and European history.

The horrific tale of the loss of the *Amphitrite* and 133 of those on board en route from Woolwich to the penal colony at Botany Bay in New South Wales in the late summer of 1833, and the aftermath following the loss on a sandbar in a storm well within reach of the French port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, is related in eight enthralling and moving chapters. Imaginatively opening his book with J.M.W. Turner’s unfinished seascape *Fire at Sea* and a later version of the same by English landscape engraver John Cousens, which until recently was not known to depict the wreck of the *Amphitrite*, Jampoler gradually adds to his canvas multiple layers of personalities and conditions that together enable us to make better sense of this dreadful event.

This particular shipwreck garnered special attention for several reasons, paramount being the loss of mostly convict women and their children, despite their being within close proximity to a well-populated and equipped port during daylight hours. There were a multitude of other details reported, some accurate, but most based on little more than wild speculation, fuelled by a steady stream of sensationalist publications, that quickly morphed into a collective anger on both sides of the Channel, bringing pressure on the Admiralty to launch an official investigation into the causes of the disaster and the failed rescue efforts. Perceived negligence on the part of the ship’s captain, John Hunter, and the ship’s doctor, James Forrester, and his wife, both of whom allegedly terminated a brief call to abandon ship on account of Mrs. Forrester’s refusal to go ashore in the company of female convicts, invited public outrage. More upsetting was the apparent non-response of the ship to two separate courageous actions on the part of Boulogne’s residents, one led by the harbour pilot, François-Augustin Huret, and a small crew, and the other by a beach lifeguard, Pierre Antoine Hénin. These details, according to the chief investigator, Captain Henry Ducie Chads, had some credibility, but many more were the direct result of one man’s crusade to make a name for himself—John “Bubble” Wilks, Jr. For a while, the latter had tremendous power over popular opinion, as well as influence over the direction of Chads’ investigation. Wilks’ flurry of letters and newspaper stories, often under different aliases, created fires where there were none—variously pointing to the ineffectiveness of the British consul in Boulogne, the incompetence and callous disregard for human life exhibited by French customs officials on the beach, and the poor quality of hired ships’ construction and maintenance.

Though some readers may find the author’s regular diversions from the core narrative to be distracting and perhaps too source-driven, others will appreciate Jampoler’s attention to these significant subjects. The author adds flesh to the bones of unknown yet key individuals such as Chads and Wilks, and does not presuppose an awareness of topics crucial to understanding the event within a larger context, such as the British practice of, and rationale for, transporting convicts to Australia and Tasmania; the growth and development of the port of Boulogne; the evolution of British navigation and
shipbuilding; and the history of gales, storms and shipwreck in the nineteenth century.

While this reviewer’s reaction to the book is overwhelmingly positive, at least one element could be strengthened: a clearer conclusion that more forcefully establishes who and/or what circumstances were at fault for the tragedy. Jampoler does an excellent job of probing the numerous factors potentially responsible, as would a professional investigator, but performs a disservice to his carefully researched and measured study by concluding that what destroyed Amphitrite and drowned all but three on board was a “lack of imagination” on behalf of Captain Hunter, Dr. Forrester, and the doctor’s wife, “who could not see clearly into their own future.” (p.248). The author contends that they could not conceive of their ship breaking apart under the pounding surf, as could harbour pilot Huret, lifeguard Hénin, and apparently many of those witnessing the events from shore. Hindsight permits us to identify what the right course of action should have been. The author himself, however, dismisses the idea that the experienced captain and his crew did not comprehend the situation; rather they fully intended to raise the ship from the sandbar on high water following the storm. There are too many other pieces of the story to consider when attributing blame. The captain’s personal financial stake in the ship and the potential controversy of releasing a large cargo of convicted and sentenced individuals onto a foreign beach are but two that render Jampoler’s concluding brief and ambiguous consideration of culpability as slightly disingenuous.

Among the matters considered in the book’s concluding chapter is the fate of the victims’ bodies. The environs of a memorial to Amphitrite’s 82 dead buried in Boulogne’s English cemetery have undergone various changes since the obelisk was erected in the 1850s. Similar to the memory of a first responder, lifeguard Pierre Antoine Hénin, whose resting place is long forgotten, the memorial has also lost meaning over time. Jampoler’s comprehensive and thoughtful book rescues the memory of this disaster, its many victims, and the compassionate few who attempted to avert a horrible shipwreck.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


The scientific programs of two expeditions, Robert Falcon Scott’s in Discovery and Terra Nova and Ernest Shackleton’s in the Nimrod, are given centre stage in this new history of exploration in Antarctica. They make for a fascinating new synthesis that acts as a kind of general introduction to the scientific exploration of the continent as well as the intellectual background to that pioneering work.

The author, whose previous work revolves in large measure around the history of Darwinian thought and its implications, puts forth individual chapters covering the fields of terrestrial magnetism, geography, oceanography, biology, geology and glaciology. Each of these would require a book in itself, so the author has set himself an enormous challenge to explain how these fields developed as distinct intellectual and academic traditions and then, came to dominate polar exploration.

The result is a work that, overall, can be uneven and repetitive. Similar phrases appear then reappear a few pages later, as each chapter recapitulates how these separate fields entered the formal
program of each expedition. The “gracefully curved isogonic and isoclinic lines” on p. 29 become “gracefully curved lines of isogonic and isoclinic charts” on p. 39. The reader is reminded—more than a few times—that the Royal Society, with its focus on studies of magnetism, was the bastion of the “professional scientists,” while the Royal Geographic Society, which sought to fill in blank spaces on the maps and charts of the British Empire, was the place where the rich amateurs hung out. The tensions between these two mighty groups, as well as between them and the Admiralty—in particular over the staffing and leadership of the Scott expeditions—are a central thread running through the work.

The Challenger expedition is mentioned several times in succession as if the reader had not been introduced to it in previous chapters. Even so, how the Challenger—as well as the earlier Lightning and Porcupine expeditions—laid the scientific groundwork for Scott’s Discovery expedition makes for excellent history of science.

As if to emphasize the somewhat jumbled construction of the work, a chapter on how the expeditions were viewed as a Darwinian test of what could be called “national selection” is plunked in the middle of the work. The eugenics views of Darwin’s cousin and long-time Royal Geographic Society Council member, Francis Galton are presented as the intellectual backdrop for the Geographical Society’s Clements Markham’s choice of Scott to command the Discovery expedition. It supported the belief that vigorous young men with “a first-class education” were allowed to mate, while others considered less fit were not, to say nothing of a bloody defense of “man-hauling” and the disastrous failure of the British to develop competent dog-drivers, skiers, or motor-sledgers. Coming in the middle of the book and given the author’s previous works, the chapter reads as if it had originally been the basis for an extended exploration of this theme that never quite materialized and was replaced by a more general survey of various scientific pursuits.

The work begins with a largely uncritical acceptance of British priority for the exploration of Antarctica and an unworthy dismissal of the skill, the scientific research, even the right of the Norwegian discoverer of the South Pole, Roald Amundsen, to interfere with the serious science of the British. To arrive at this point, one needs to ignore Norway’s claim to polar exploration through the scientific and geographic work of Fridtjof Nansen, to say nothing of centuries of whaling, sealing, and an exploring heritage stretching back to the Icelandic sagas.

Here, only Britain is viewed as having a legitimate claim to explore Terra Australis Incognita, even though much of the formal, government-sponsored British exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic in the nineteenth century was desultory at best and disastrous at worst. Amundsen, who is described as a “proud” man three times in the first 23 pages, was a mere business man, a “polar adventurer…who cared only about winning the race” with Scott to the South Pole (p.x) and then cashing in on his fame. “Simply reaching…the South Pole was not enough” for the British (p.2).

These are familiar charges made against many a polar explorer, but they ignore the minor fact that nearly every expedition leader—not least Scott and Shackleton—sought to “cash in” with product endorsements and publishing contracts in order to pay the debts of their travels. It also diminishes the remarkable and efficient conquest of the South Pole by Amundsen—a feat that was anything but ‘simple’ and one that should stand all the more magnificent when seen in contrast to the horrendous cost paid by Scott and his men for reaching the same point.
There are quite a few other points to quibble with, including the author’s lubberly use of statute miles when nautical miles would be more appropriate, especially in the context of expeditions commanded by naval and merchant marine officers. Shackleton’s *Heart of the Antarctic* is mislaid at least once as *Heart of the Atlantic*, while a “blight” in the Antarctic Barrier becomes a “blight” (p.81), though no doubt Scott and Shackleton saw it that way as they swayed in their tiny balloon basket during the first aerial exploration of Antarctica. The U.S. Navy’s Charles Wilkes is referred to as “David Wilkes.” The sourcing is a bit problematic, as there is no bibliography to sort through, though we are assured that the author has a lot of polar books on his shelves. And for a Darwin scholar, the (mis)use of the phrase “ontology recapitulates phylogeny” (p.183), when of course he means “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” would be more than enough to raise Ernst Haeckel’s hackles.

There is more occasional editorial sloppiness; for example, African rivers running west when they should be going east and vice versa. But the overall effort succeeds well in placing the pioneering science done in Antarctica, as well as the continent itself, its weather and fossils and oceanography, directly in the middle of the currents and winds and history of the planet.

Peter J. Capelotti
Abington, Pennsylvania

“He then drew such a picture of the sea: how I should have nothing to do but sit and let the wind blow me along: live on plum-pudding and the roast beef of old England: lashings of grog and tobacco: seeing the world the while and meeting and chatting with princesses and all the beautiful ladies of other lands - ah! It was a gay life.” (p.90) By this was Sam Noble recruited into the Royal Navy by a Royal Marine sergeant in 1875. This book makes clear that it was not always thus through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Brian Lavery is a former curator at the Chatham Historic Dockyard and the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, where he is curator emeritus. He is the author of more than thirty books, chiefly on the Royal Navy, from the earliest times through the Second World War. This is the second volume of a trilogy on the experience of enlisted sailors in the Navy. The first, *Royal Tars* (2010), took the story through to the last days of sail.

This volume covers the nineteenth-century period of great technological and strategic change, the late-Victorian “imperial” era, the naval race with Germany, the Great War and the interwar era of retrenchment. Through it all, Lavery gives us both the conditions of service as promulgated by the Admiralty, and what it was actually like to serve in the Navy through the words of the lower deck personnel themselves. Seamen and engine room personnel, boys in the training ships, those unfortunate enough to have to live in the hulks moored in England’s ports, those in the new types of vessels such as torpedo boats, destroyers and later, submarines offer their own accounts. His story begins in 1850, not so much with the advent of steam widespread through the Navy, but rather with (in abeyance, albeit, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars) the beginning of continuous service in which the sailor signed on for a fixed term of years rather

than for the commission of one vessel. Lavery presents his story as a series of mini-essays of one or a few pages, each on a specific subject, each with a caption title within his wider chronological chapters. Thus, for instance, we are returned to a short essay in gunnery improvements in each chapter, as the great guns changed from muzzle-loaded smoothbores in broadside batteries to, eventually, massive rifled, breech-loading cannon mounted on the centre line with fire controlled from a central director. Such technological change had great implications for the skill sets needed by the Navy, and the requirement for specialized—for the nineteenth century—establishments, such as the gunnery school at HMS Excellent in Portsmouth harbour.

The change from sail to steam had enormous implications for the lower deck personnel, not all of them immediately obvious to the reader. Lavery takes us through the establishment of the new rank of Engine Room Artificer (ERA) in 1868, a technician, “part of the Victorian ‘aristocracy of labour’ and very conscious of the fact” (p.75). The ERAs’ close connections to the craft union movement led them in 1878 to reject wearing a badge of rank on their uniforms, as a mark of servitude, and to threaten to leave the service if forced to wear it.

Steam, with coal as fuel, upset the traditional shipboard hierarchy in many ways. A larger numbers of stokers than seamen was needed to feed the fires. The King Edward class of pre-Dreadnought battleships needed 273 seamen and 120 stokers, while the Invincible class of battlecruisers of 1907 each needed only 163 seamen with 244 stokers. Demand meant that the Admiralty had to offer higher wages, and somewhat better prospects for promotion, for stokers than for seamen. While the increasing efficiency of steam engines wrung more horsepower from every ton of coal, the vastly increased horsepower needed to provide greater speed to the battleships and battlecruisers demanded even more personnel in the stokeholds. Of course, the switch from coal to oil beginning in the First World War again changed the crew mix.

When seamen no longer had to scamper up the rigging, but existed in closed compartments in steel ships, physical fitness of crews became an issue, and Lavery examines the Admiralty’s introduction of a system of “physical training or Swedish gymnastics” from 1889.

Lavery has used Admiralty records at the British National Archives to advantage for the top-down view of the lower deck, but supplements this admirably with sailors’ memoirs, both published and manuscript from the National Archives, Imperial War Museum, National Maritime Museum and British Library. His bibliography of archival sources is made up of notes of the sort of material available in each repository, rather than long listings of papers. The endnotes likewise are very economical, but adequate.

He includes an extensive glossary, but this landsman reviewer could not find a definition for the “truck of the main top-mast” (p.32).

The illustrations, both photographs and line drawings, are well-chosen to illustrate points made in the text. The sources of the photographs are all given, but not always for the line drawings. Some of these have been reproduced so small that it is impossible for older eyes to read the fine print explaining the drawings. This is true of the particularly interesting drawings illustrating rank, specialty and good conduct badges in 1901 (pp.120-121).

Genealogists with ancestors in the Royal Navy will be delighted with the appendix “Tracing Naval Ratings,” which examines the classes of personnel and other records available for research on individuals.
Throughout, Lavery’s style is approachable and stimulating. A volume of great value to social historians and naval historians—and not just of the Royal Navy—it is also a delightful read for anyone with even a casual interest in the subject. We must wait for *All Hands*, the final volume which will take the story through the Second World War to the present day.

Owen Cooke
North Gower, Ontario


The exploratory voyages of Captain Cook provide a confluence of the many themes of Royal Navy development throughout the eighteenth century. Several of these themes are explored in the Captain Cook Memorial Museum's exhibition companion *Fish and Ships! Food On the Voyages of Captain Cook*. *Fish and Ships* is a photographic catalogue of two exhibitions from the museum. These photographic essays are combined with short, but well researched and highly informative essays that examine questions surrounding the voyages of Captain Cook.

The acknowledgements section begins: “Food is a subject which links past and present... Here was an angle on the Cook voyages which could be both appealing and instructive.” Food and culinary history provide an interesting and somewhat undervalued perspective on naval history. The exploration of Cook's voyages brings together the mundane and the fantastic and the catalogue examines both the reality of food in the day-to-day life of the Royal Navy, and, for the sailors aboard Cook's ships, the completely different culinary environment of the South Pacific. Similarly, the catalogue combines research essays with photographic essays of the exhibitions themselves, together with well-chosen contemporary illustrations. The catalogue is divided thematically, with two articles on the theme of the exhibitions.

The first exhibition, from 2011, is *A Journey 'round the World at Captain Cook's Table*. This is accompanied by two essays, Janet Macdonald's “Food for the Voyage: Naval Provisioning in the 18th century” and Brian Vale's “Diet and Disease: Cook and the Conquest of Scurvy.” Macdonald's is a balanced examination of the subject and includes an evocative description of the preservation, preparation and consumption of the naval diet during the eighteenth century. (See a review of MacDonal’s *The British Navy’s Victualling Board, 1793-1815: Management Competence and Incompetence in The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord XXI*, no. 2, April 2011.) Vale's essay examines one of the central myths of Cook's legacy, his contribution to the eradication of scurvy. He argues that any criticisms on Cook's experiments take into context the limit of Cook's orders.

The second exhibition is *Eating the Exotic: Food on the Voyage to Polynesia*, and is accompanied by Nancy J. Pollock's “Meeting of Tastes: Captain Cook's Gastronomic Experiences in Tahiti and New Zealand.” As an anthropologist Pollock provides an important perspective in a collection dominated by historians. Pollock examines her subject from the perspective of cultural transactions. This included exchanges between Cook and the inhabitants of the Pacific, the inevitable reaction of Europeans to the unfamiliar, and the introduction of European crops to Tahiti. Pollock argues that “travels not only broadens the mind, but sharpens the taste buds,” a significant statement given the
socio-cultural aspect of the fight against scurvy during Cook's voyages.

The final research essay is Simon Werrett's “Captain Cook, Pyrotechnist.” Unlike the previous focus on culinary interaction, this essay examines the introduction of fireworks to the Pacific. It is, however, thematically connected to Pollock's contribution through the interaction of cultures. Described as a “spectacular commodity of exchange,” Werrett compares the Polynesian understanding of fireworks to the European comprehension of Polynesian dances and plays. He concludes that “Fireworks were subject to multiple, if contradictory, interpretations from Britons and Pacific islanders alike.”

Overall, this is an excellent publication for the museum. As Glyndwr Williams states in his foreword, the essays and the exhibitions together “bring to life the practical side of Cook's voyages on both shipboard and distant islands.” It is the combination of essay and exhibition, the mundane and the fantastic, history and anthropology that together brings new insights onto an under-appreciated aspect of the Royal Navy's exploration of the Pacific.

Sam McLean
Greenwich, England


Canada's navy is housed in a mansion of many rooms—the obvious and self-evident, such as the bases in Halifax and Esquimalt, and in smaller, more modest, rooms such as that represented by the Navy League of Canada. The origin of the RCN is a separate topic as this book recounts the story of an entity that had as its focus the matters of developing and raising “sea consciousness” and the health and welfare of merchant sailors. The former objective remains ever green; the latter is essentially the responsibility of the state.

Author Ken Mackenzie is a retired RCN officer and an academic historian, educated at Dalhousie University. A varied career of some thirty years followed in the field, with a happenstance suggestion at working on a history of the Navy League for its centennial leading to this book. That centennial was in 1995, so the final effort took rather longer to compile that no doubt intended. And, the narrative ends in 1965, so its full century has not been covered. But, better late than never, and better half the story than none.

Mackenzie structured his book into five basic parts. The first deals with the origin of the Navy League until the outbreak of the First World War. The second covers that conflict up to 1917, when a change in emphasis in the League’s mission evolved out of experience in the maritime conflict in modern war. The third section deals with the interwar years: the Locust Years of the RCN itself. Next is the Second World War and Canada's coming of age. The final chapter carries the story into the post-war period into the mid-1960s, when the “golden age” of the RCN hit its apogee and decline set in, and a need for recalibration of the League was manifest.

The Navy League originated in Great Britain. It was founded there in 1895, with the Canadian version established later that year. Australia and New Zealand quickly followed suit. All the Empire was one in those halcyon days, more or less, and the adoption of British institutions was mirrored by more than the Navy League. Notwithstanding this evidence of apron strings, there was a real interest in raising
the importance of maritime affairs throughout the Empire given its very real reliance on sea communications for trade, for prosperity and for economic growth. The threats to the Royal Navy’s hegemony may not have been evident at this early date, but the more astute observers of the time noted German bellicosity and growing economic strength, as well as that of the United States. Indeed, the Naval Laws of the former, and the voyage of the Great White Fleet of the latter, in combination with American imperial ventures of the most traditional kind in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, should have added a touch of urgency to the Navy League’s raison d’être of sea consciousness-raising in its earliest years. While the specifics have altered dramatically, this basic theme remains fundamental to the Navy League to this day, via its Maritime Affairs Program.

The Navy League’s first glory period was that of the Great War. It had a rather sputtering existence prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, mirroring the political conflicts over naval issues throughout the Edwardian period. The submarine crisis of 1917 saw a rapid expansion of the League (now formally named the Navy League of Canada). Its key activity at this time involved helping merchant sailors in Canadian ports, with hostels and social assistance. It is easy to forget in these days, that the provision of social services was then by and large a matter of private charity. The Navy League’s role in filling a gap was therefore important and valued.

The inter-war years were, like its first fifteen years, also rather sputtering, further characterized by penury, ineffectiveness and near bankruptcy—just like the RCN. Interestingly, this was the time when the Navy League’s support of the Sea Cadets became well established. In its way, this initiative was similar in effect to the RCN’s investment in the naval reserve divisions. The Navy League’s second glory period arrived with the Second World War. Once again, the urgent demands of war left their mark and the Navy League rose to the occasion. Once again, the main focus was that of providing succour for merchant sailors, as well as hostels for the men of the RCN. The significant difference this time was that succour involved funds from Ottawa. The Navy League had proved its value and received assistance for its work accordingly.

The post-war years saw the Navy League’s focus shift away from the social assistance aspect of its activities and into that of the Sea Cadets, its main youth program. This program of the Navy League is perhaps the more familiar to most than its earlier initiatives, including that of raising sea consciousness.

The book is, in effect, a monograph on an aspect of the naval tradition in Canada. It addresses a subject that is not well known in regular naval circles, let alone among the general public. Many of the latter no doubt are vaguely aware of the existence of the sea cadets, but little more. Consequently, Mackenzie has provided a useful service in recording the first seventy years of the Navy League’s history. Anyone who wishes to delve into Canada’s naval history, particularly in the arena of public advocacy, should certainly stop here for a look at a neglected chapter.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Charles Mann is not a maritime historian, but he draws a “mental maritime map” in the mind of his reader. It is crisscrossed by the wake of Spanish ships from those who benefited from Columbus’s discovery. They
sailed to Mexico and Manila, from Cadiz to Peru, Seville to Cartagena de los Indios and Whydah to Havana for the four “S’s,” silver, sugar, spices and slaves, as well as gold and later, the by-product of sugar, rum. Mann called this the “Columbian Exchange.” This trade, largely transmitted by sea, forever altered transatlantic and later transpacific history ecologically by moving new crops, weeds, and microbes from point to point. Not only did “human beings cause the Columbian Exchange, they were buffeted by its currents—a convulsion within our own species...” (p.286). Sugar cane, wheat and coffee were introduced to the New World, while potatoes, tobacco and corn, among many other products, made the opposite journey. Of equal or perhaps greater impact was the list of diseases that the navigators, explorers and conquerors of the New World carried with them; among these were plague, malaria, yellow fever and more. There is some evidence that indigenous Americans bartered these afflictions for syphilis as it traveled back to the Old World. Imported European domestic animals—horses, cows, domesticated pigs and chickens—while all useful, also carried disease. New World earthworms were another east-to-west addition reintroduced after disappearing during the repeated glaciations. By digesting dead or decomposing organic matter, worms made a major contribution to the recycling of nutrients and aeration of soil crucial for developing the New World’s agricultural society.

“The history of the civilizations of the Middle East and Egypt is entwined with the development of wheat and barley; similarly, indigenous societies in [the Americas] were founded on maize. In Asia, China’s story is written on paper made of rice. The Andes were different. Cultures there were nourished not by cereal crops like these but by tuber and root crops, the potato being most important.” (p.210) Therefore, the discovery of the New World enabled the vast exchange of undreamed of goods from distant places. Sometimes the exchange was peaceful, but more often it resulted in exploitation. This was the real dawn of globalisation and a new biological era. The author coined the word “Homogenocene” to describe where agricultural diversity devolved into monocrops and invasive foreign plants. Pests were then able to feast across what were formerly ecological boundaries—disaster for many and opportunity for some.

Mann offers many fresh perspectives on various aspects of post-Columbian history. For example, the first Old World immigrants were not Europeans, but Africans. They were the first to clash with the native Indians and ultimately integrate with them. Mann describes how fugitive African slaves, warring with both natives and the Spaniards, beat Spanish explorers to discover the land-route to the Pacific via the Central American isthmus. A common viewpoint shared by most historians is that Western superiority in weaponry and organizational skills produced the European domination of the New World. Mann, however, argues that biology was likely the most critical factor. Disease and ignorance about how to grow food in the new lands debilitated white settlers in the English colony of Jamestown and elsewhere in the Americas, yet American tubers and corn helped stabilize the European population by decreasing or eliminating periodic famines. By contrast, American biological technology in China encouraged a population explosion that resulted in cleared forests leading to devastating floods and soil erosion. This was an example of how ecology and economics produced unplanned consequences. Unfamiliar animals, vegetables and minerals produced disease, misery, social upheaval for the many, and unimagined wealth for a few—perhaps a
preview of our highly populous modern world.

Plants, microbes, insects, and excrement in the form of guano are leading actors in Mann’s intriguing drama. Globalization had horrendous costs as well as wondrous benefits. South American-derived potatoes conquered famine in parts of Europe especially Ireland, but the Peruvian guano that fertilized the land to increase the yield, transported the potato blight that subsequently caused massive starvation. The importation of malaria was responsible for the depopulation of the New World natives, but it also kept European armies out of other parts of the Americas. Finally, Mann shows that malaria made slavery of West Africans in the New World, and particularly North America, almost an economic necessity through the slaves’ immunity to the disease. Slavery’s contribution to the conquest of land, its integration into societies and intermarriage, add a novel and fascinating dimension to the entire subject.

The author explores a whole series of post-Colombian events that altered the rest of the planet, particularly in the Far East. European explorers discovered silver in what is now Peru which became species (coinage) that bought foreigners admission to the previously inaccessible Asian markets. It also opened up the exchange of other goods with the Chinese and South East Asians. The discovery of rubber may have had the most impact when combined with western inventiveness. This was a crucial event that, in time, helped form the modern industrial age. And Mann’s list goes on!

The scope of _1493_ is extensive, a complicated but engaging tale told in clear prose. Unfolding in roughly chronological order (from 1493 to 2011), Mann combines world history, medicine, ecology and economics to create a range of historical subplots that are Mann renders unusually graphic having visited many of the places that he describes. Sometimes a few of his assumptions are an intellectual stretch, but his well thought-out arguments are both challenging and appealing. _1493_ is highly readable and an engrossing book, that overs a broad swath of history, but is not meant to be comprehensive. Although the book does not focus directly on maritime history, the explorers, merchants and slaves sailed the seas to produce and participate in this Columbian Exchange and “Homogenocene.” Maritime history is really a footnote to every chapter. Mann’s book is an enjoyable work, one that is easy to recommend to both lay-people and academicians alike.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


In this latest contribution to the Campaigns and Commanders Series, Michael Matheny examines American military theory in the early twentieth century through the lens of the professional military education system. Rejecting the conclusions of historians such as Russell Weigley and Martin Van Creveld regarding the dearth of American operational art in the interwar Army education system, Matheny argues that the military schools developed and taught a sophisticated, distinctly American understanding of operational art. This American operational art drew from the First World War experience, theory, and strategic considerations and was designed to utilize America’s industrial, productive, and mobilization capacity to support overseas,
Matheny concludes that the “key lesson” of the application of American operational art in the Second World War is the “importance of professional education” for staff officers and unit commanders (p.267). In developing his case, the author utilizes student and faculty records and papers at professional military schools as well as federal records at the National Archives and Records Administration.

Matheny uses a modern definition of operational art, emphasizing the role of campaign planning in linking broad strategic concerns and battlefield level tactics. This third level of modern warfare has traditionally been seen as a German and Soviet interwar development. Matheny concedes that the American military did not officially codify operational art in published doctrine, but argues that the military, in practice, developed a concept of operational art tailored for “logistically supportable jointed and combined-phased operations” (p.xiv). Perhaps most interesting to readers of this journal is Matheny’s analysis of maritime operational art. He demonstrates that through a combination of war-gaming and concepts imported from the Army War College, the Naval War College grew to understand the importance of phased, successive campaign plans in pursuit of a strategic objective.

Alfred Mahan’s contribution to maritime operational art is cast as bringing the Navy to conceive of operations in terms of fleets that must be organized, maintained, and resourced instead of individual ships and small squadrons. Sir Julian Corbett gave the Navy an understanding of power projection, the central strategic requirement for the United States in the twentieth century. Officers on loan from the Army War College as faculty at the Naval War College brought an appreciation for the role of logistics and a dedication to the five-paragraph field order.

Using a comparative analysis of the Army and Navy’s respective senior educational institutions, the war colleges, Matheny notes that while the Naval War College prepared officers to return to the fleet, the Army War College focused on educating future staff officers. This difference in organizational culture did not prevent both services from emphasizing the role of joint operations in future conflicts during the interwar period and preparing accordingly. In particular, a sustained focus on War Plan Orange by both the Navy and Army led to a largely successful joint, dual advance across the Pacific in the Second World War.

The first two chapters provide an introduction to operational art and the Army’s experience with this third level of war throughout the First World War. The following three chapters examine the development of inter-war American operational art on land, air, and sea. Matheny then examines the application of these developments with a chapter on the European theater (using Operations Torch and Overlord) and a chapter on the Pacific theater (focusing on the invasions of the Philippines and Okinawa). In both Europe and the Pacific, a distinctly American operational art was expressed through superiority in command and control arrangements, logistics, and intelligence. In the Pacific, the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns highlighted the contribution of joint staffs under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. In particular, General Simon Buckner exercised command at Okinawa through a truly joint staff consisting of Army, Navy, Army Air Force, and Marine officers in each staff section with a Marine general as second-in-command.

A minor editorial mistake mars this otherwise well written, innovative, and revisionist work. There is a grammatical mistake in the first sentence of the final
paragraph on page 5. In his chapter on the Pacific, Matheny draws a parallel between the broad front strategy American commanders applied in Europe as well as the Pacific. Though an in-depth examination of this comparative assessment is outside the scope of this work, this reviewer hopes that Dr. Matheny will pursue and expand on this insightful comment in future scholarship. This book is a significant contribution to American military history, particularly the history of American military thought.

Corbin Williamson
Lubbock, Texas


Kevin McCranie has written a detailed account of the United States Navy’s fight against the Royal Navy on the high seas during the War of 1812. He clearly confines himself to this aspect of the war, telling the reader in the Preface that he has omitted any discussion of the extensive use of privateers to destroy enemy merchant shipping and the British activity in the American littorals (including the numerous raids in Chesapeake Bay). He also excludes the naval activity on the Great Lakes, which he claims was “unusually isolated for a naval war” (p.xii), a comment begging further explanation, but he returns to that theatre later in the book as he blames the Lakes for draining men from both British and American ships serving in the Atlantic theatre (pp. 161 & 207, respectively).

The well known bones of contention, seamen’s rights (the United States’ rejection of British impressment of American citizens on the high seas) and free trade (France and Britain’s efforts to wage economic war on each other and the American response, in particular to the British Orders in Council) are laid out as the causes of the war. A comparison of naval forces available for a war at sea is offered leaving the reader with a sense that, while the Royal Navy had the numerical advantage, the Americans (at least in North American waters in 1812) had the upper hand in ship quality.

McCranie’s description of the opening manoeuvres of the war, including the string of early American victories in single ship actions, and the British response to these unsettling events, brings the unpreparedness of both sides for the war sharply into focus. Not all of the very small American navy were ready to sail at the commencement of hostilities, to take advantage of an unknowing enemy. The British appeared unwilling to fully engage in war with their new adversary. The clearest embodiment of this lack of martial will is seen in McCranie’s excellent analysis of the ambiguity that British Admiral John Warren (sent out to command a combined North America and West Indies Station) was forced to deal with for the first nine months of the war. His orders involved protecting British merchant shipping, blockading or destroying the fledgling American navy, seizing American merchant vessels returning home, continuing the necessary licensing of American vessels to carry goods to support the British Army in Portugal and Spain, and to see if the American Government would be willing to settle a peace after news of the British repeal of the Orders in Council (which allowed the “free trade” the Americans desired) reached the United States. The British Government and Admiralty clearly did not comprehend the demands on the North America Station nor the drive of the American Government to exert its martial
influence. The Admiralty seems to have doubted their choice of Warren as commander-in-chief almost from the outset, criticizing him for his constant demands for more ships and men and his failure to contain the American frigates and brigs in port (see pp. 88-94).

According to McCranie, the single ship victories for the United States served more of a propaganda purpose than inflicting any major loss to the British Navy’s resources. They did however cause the British Admiralty to alter its deployment of ships, by ordering frigates and smaller vessels to sail in pairs and avoid single ship fights. He suggests that the British should not have been surprised by their losses to the American vessels as they had visited and assessed these larger vessels in the years prior to the war and should have prepared to meet them in battle. Even with the early combat successes, McCranie sees the first cruises of American squadrons as less then successful in either destroying British merchant shipping, or drawing the Royal Navy away from the American coast. The replacement of Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton with William Jones in December 1812 is viewed as a significant advancement in organization of naval resources and control over the Navy’s independent-minded group of commanding officers. Rather than sailing in small squadrons, Jones ordered the American ships to go to sea and act individually, increasing their opportunity to come across merchant vessels, combat smaller British naval ships and draw the British Navy away from the country’s coast. The final chapter looks at the naval actions that took place at sea during early 1815, after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent (24 December 1814). The capture of the American frigate President by a squadron of British vessels was balanced by the escape (for a third time) of the Constitution from a British squadron. These two British squadrons were assembled specifically to chase and defeat the large American frigates, which McCranie aptly uses as a representation of Britain’s adjustment to the American threat.
The book ends without a final conclusion or definitive statement of the overall conduct of the naval war. Instead, McCranie tells the story of the confused, unnecessary and bloody post-peace action between the American ship-sloop *Peacock* and the smaller armed East India Company *Nautilus* (on 30 June 1815) as an analogy for the handling of the war at sea itself.

McCranie’s opening discussion of the disparity between ship armament ratings and the actual number of guns carried in any particular ship, is outstanding. He reminds us that captains armed their ships (when they could) with the type of gun they preferred. The advent of carronades which required less deck space to work than the traditional long guns allowed for more guns to be carried then for which ships were originally built. Official ship ratings may be good for general discussions of comparative fire power, size, and manning needs but for individual actions (especially single ship actions) a precise accounting of the number, type and weight of guns employed by the antagonists is required. Table 1.5 (p.22) and the surrounding text and the introduction of this problem in the preface (p.xiii) will become required reading for those telling the tale of any single ship action during the course of the long eighteenth century.

There are ample black and white illustrations of the actions discussed in the text. The usual American officers are illustrated, Decatur, Rodgers, Porter, (no Hull), but Sir Philip Broke is the only British officer. Secretaries of the Navy Paul Hamilton and William Jones appear, but no Lord Melville, Secretary Croker, Admiral Warren, nor Vice Admiral Cochrane. The cover image is interesting in that it depicts the defeat of HMS *Guerriere* by the USS *Constitution*, with the British flag upside down indicating a ship (or is it a navy?) in distress.

Numerous battle diagrams help the reader follow the wears and tacks of the opponents in most of the single ship battles. Missing are battle diagrams for USS *Argus* vs. HMS *Pelican* and USS *Essex* vs. HMS *Phoebe* and HMS *Cherub*. A brief glossary is provided and will be useful for the lay reader. An error appears in the definition of the term “Bend (sails)”; defined as, “To secure a sail to a mast,” it should read “to a yard” (p.333). Maps are helpful in locating where the action described in the text takes place. They are however, not exact renderings of coastlines but more “representations” and thus some locations shift between maps, for example Boston drifts north between map 2.2 (p.44) and map 6.1 (p.120) and Shelburne is given the location of Halifax on map 12.1 (p. 222).

The tables are generally extremely helpful and are put to good use by the author, especially in the discussion on British ship deployments during the war, see Tables 13.1, 13.2 and 13.3 (pp.246, 250-1, & 253, respectively). There is one nagging problem and that is the difference in ship totals between Table 1.1 (p.5) and Table 1.3 (p.11). In the first table the British Navy has 516 ships and vessels while in the later table the number is 515. The problem is compounded by the fact the in-text description of the point states 515 as a total and both tables are given the same source (pp. 4 & 11).

The writing in this work is excellent. McCranie is even able to retell the well trodden stories of the single ship actions with an intensity that makes the book nearly impossible to put down. His cogent analysis of both the American and British naval efforts on the high seas is supported by a wealth of primary source material. Given his self-limited scope of examination Kevin McCranie has produced a book that will be an essential read for anyone writing about what took place on the high seas during the War of 1812 for some time.

Thomas Malcomson
Toronto, Ontario
During the Second World War, Allied navies lost close to 1,400 vessels of all sorts and sizes. From rescue tugs, trawlers, minesweepers, frigates, aircraft carriers and submarines to battleship, over 250 warships were sunk by German submarines.

A U-boat’s war diary (Kriegstagebuch) gives insight in the commander’s personal views on the events. Navigators, radio officers, supply officers and torpedo officers each kept their own logs. The final draft for the cruise in question was composed by the commanding officer. Thus, each war diary had a single author. This was a perfect opportunity for commanders to reflect the truth in a personal manner. On occasion, information was exaggerated, concealed or falsified but most attempts to alter or cover up events failed dismally; for example, the U-boat commander’s report on his patrol in the Algerian Sahara!

At the end of the war, a British Naval Intelligence Team found the archive of the German Navy from 1850 to 1945 virtually intact near the town of Tambach in Germany. The War Diary, records and Log Books of almost all the U-boats that returned safely to port were saved and taken to the United Kingdom.

U-Boat Attack Logs contains information on 246 warship sinkings. The authors managed to compile 109 complete records, but before entering a successful U-boat action into their complete records, the authors set some criteria the information had to meet. Firstly, the U-boat log had to have survived the war and be accessible for research. The second condition related to the Allied warship that was sunk by a U-boat. To be included, the vessel had to be larger than approximately 600 tons displacement (except trawlers, navy tankers, landing ships, troop transports and miscellaneous vessels) or a submarine. The 137 sinkings that did not meet these criteria were listed in the Gazetteer.

The authors made use of both Allied and German sources. The book contains information on the basics of a U-boat attack, the tactics, trigonometry and torpedoes. The war diary kept on board recounts the conflict between the U-boats and the allied navies. Readers will find the stories of 109 ships, their careers, the background of the attacks, submarine war diaries, the sinkings, the fate of the crews, and information on the submarine and its commander. Each section ends with a paragraph on sources, most of which are readily available, either as documents or on the internet. The combination of sources, however, offers new information and corrections to earlier publications.

U-Boat Attack Logs is a massive piece of work, well documented, comprehensive, rich in source references and well written. Top notch.

Jacob Bart Hak
Leiden, Netherlands


Stories of the various navies in the Second World War alone continue to pour out almost weekly. Yet most add something to the corpus of its history, this volume being no exception. While this is Prysor’s first book, he is yet young, and has been teaching
at Oxford. He has mined a different series of sources to give another slant on that five-and-a-half-year struggle. His 30 pages of “Notes” and another 5 pages of “Personal Sources,” most from the Imperial War Museum’s Department of Documents (personal recollection) is an indication of the care and effort Prysor has taken to give us the individual views of a wide selection of participants. Only occasionally does the author venture into the realm of event analysis, but almost always just to set the tone for the quotations he has extracted from his many sources. And yet the story flows along, following the course of events, in this case, as they were seen at a personal level.

His quotations are not just from “Citizen Sailors”—the lower deck Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) seamen, but on occasion from Regular Force Admirals, Captains and others involved with those citizens. Almost all of Prysor’s subjects speak for themselves: the shock of the newly joined at their conditions in barracks and afloat, often in abysmal conditions in small requisitioned fishing vessels or merchantmen: “Never seen anything like it. The ship was covered in ice, the mess decks were a sight, almost unbelievable, inches thick in slime...” (p.241), and this was in a fairly new destroyer. Astonished comments on first encounters with an enemy, in anti-submarine ships attacking and attacked by U-boats, in HMS Suffolk’s dangerous encounter with U-boats in the Dodecanese: “Panther was hit amidships by two bombs. She was going fast at the time and just drove herself under the water like a submarine... It was a truly terrible sight.” (p.369).

Through all these tales the author carries the story of the RN’s war along, explaining in every case why the “citizen sailors” and others were at the specific locale, what was happening, and even more valuable, why. Thus it is also a useful overview of the naval war in its broadest sense. It need not be read straight through, but can be dipped into for a few pages or a chapter, for it is a tale of a huge number of only slightly connected parts. He is telling what the participants felt at the time, whether excitement, fear, hostility or other very personal emotions, or a calm and post-event assessment. It begins as the first citizens volunteered or were called up in mid-1939, and ends with letters and memoires from the ending in the Far East and the shocked comments at the relief of POW camps out there.

While not great analytical history, it is a valuable and carefully documented human story of an inhuman time. And interestingly, for a non-naval writer, there are almost no errors in terminology.

F.M. McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Presenting the submarine as a “cultural artifact” (p.202) is certainly a novel approach to modern naval history. Redford confines his study to Britain and its Royal Navy, but his analysis, or most of it anyway, can be applied to other contemporary sea services over the past century which have possessed such complex and steadily evolving weapons of war. His argument is simple in outline, but rather more complex in detail: roughly between 1900 and 1970, the submarine came full circle in the cultural perceptions of both the British public and its navy from being “Underhand, unfair, and un-English” (p.56) to the status of a prime guarantor of national survival. The Royal Navy, not surprisingly, was the first to embrace the submarine as a morally suitable as well as operationally necessary weapon of war. The public followed later.

The author presents his argument in an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion, following the now ancient scholarly admonition to tell the reader what he will say, say it, then tell the reader what he has said. It may not necessarily be great writing, but the argument comes through strongly. Redford’s approach is strictly chronological, save for the first chapter, which examines the submarine’s place physically, and thus culturally, within the half-dozen great naval reviews which Britain conducted mostly, but not invariably, as part of royal coronations throughout the twentieth century. Only the most dauntless readers need read it. Clearly meant as an introduction and overall analysis of the book’s content, it is at once unnecessary and rather boring.

Redford hits his stride in the following chapters, however, as he demonstrates the submarine’s changing cultural role in both public and naval circles from a sneaky weapon of war employed only by Britain’s caddish enemies to the dawning realization that it must be regarded as a key component of national defense, and then of national security itself. The tipping point came with the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty in which, Redford contends, the Royal Navy realized that the submarine, however distasteful its role and employment, was here to stay. He argues that far from being the disastrous opening for a German naval renaissance it has always been portrayed, the “AGNT” was in fact a clever ploy by Britain’s civil and naval establishments to trick Hitler into building the kind of submarine-oriented fleet that the Royal Navy thought it could defeat. Having worked intensively in Royal Navy documents of the time, I find no evidence for this rather bizarre conclusion. Redford, however, is absolutely bang-on in emphasizing that during this same period as Europe crept toward renewed warfare, the bomber rapidly replaced the submarine in the mind of the public as the chief threat to their national existence.

Despite the absolutely crucial importance of the Second World War Battle of the Atlantic, the submarine faded from British public attention in the years following 1945. The coming of nuclear power and intercontinental ballistic missiles when married to submarine technology at once created a monster weapon system of unimaginable power and intimidation, and a deterrent to atomic and thermonuclear warfare that any nation that could afford one or more—including Britain—had to have in its arsenal.

This, in sum, is the interesting tale that Redford has to tell and for the most
part, he tells it well. I recommend it to naval professionals, scholars, and enthusiasts.

Lisle A. Rose
Edmonds, Washington


Most highly technical books, even of the highest quality, are of only passing interest to those not directly involved with the subject. This “coffee table” volume, apparently a reprint from the original Polish, has been produced in several improved editions, but this is a really quite spectacular version. It fully deserves the praise appearing on the back cover: “This hugely comprehensive encyclopedia... every German artillery piece mounted afloat ... almost every known close-up photo... is included.”

Skwiot opens with a brief resumé of the controls that governed the selection of certain major guns for the larger German ships as a result of the necessity to adhere to the terms of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Ways were found to circumvent its terms in several cases, such as the development of anti-aircraft weaponry and the employment of expatriate German technicians in other countries who, in the post-First World War economic depressions, were looking for business. As well, the Allied governments changed the rules as time went on, for instance, insisting that no guns over 305mm were permitted when Germany had already been working on their new Deutschland class design, which was to be equipped with 380mm main armament. The reduction didn’t bother the designers overly, as Krupp’s could build the 305mm gun quite satisfactorily and it had proved adequate for their ships. But then the French occupied the Ruhr Valley, and Krupp’s were told they could only construct one such gun a year. This meant a delay in the final decision-making regarding new German battleships, although by then they presumed the terms would be either cancelled or at least ignored at some stage. This introduction, of only four half-pages, is typical of the brief comments on almost all the various classes of guns described. It is a half-page of text because almost every page in the book contains at least one photo—of a ship, of a turret or a single gun, or even of close-ups of parts and crews manning the guns.

This, for the non-gunnery technician, is where the book is truly worth putting on one’s coffee table. For not only are there, as the blurb tells us, over 1,000 photos, but there are also, in almost every case, perspective drawings of all major pieces, from the mighty Bismarck turrets to the 20mm Oerlikon and Mauser AA guns in a multitude of mountings—single, double and quadruple. These drawings are almost artistic in quality, usually in a variety of perspectives. For most outfits there are, as well, full engineering drawings of many turret arrangements, and all have tables listing weights, calibres, rates of fire and training, range, propellant charges and so forth. Photos encompass everything from views of ships at sea to shell base-plate and nose-fuse markings.

Naturally, the book will prove of most value to the model-maker, especially where a model is being made from scratch rather than a kit. Each gun description includes details of how it was developed and when, and any minor changes in fittings. Much of it is far more than the casual reader needs to know—“The land-service variant of the Flak 28 mount was set on a rotating ring on a twin-axled
towed chassis...” (p.354). Most readers will dip into it rather than absorbing it whole. Many of the photos of crews manning these guns in some odd vessels are in themselves of considerable interest.

The author divides the text into four main categories; Heavy Guns, Medium Guns, 105mm and 88mm Guns, and Light Anti-Aircraft Guns. Then each is sub-divided into their various categories, sometimes by ship—“Aboard the cruiser Leipzig” or “Single mounts”, “Twin Mounts” and “2cm U-Boat Turrets.” The index is comprehensive, by type of gun, by class of ship, often by individual ships. Skwiot includes many comments on various choices of weapons which make for interesting reading. For instance, the fitting of the augmented 2cm AA weaponry in an initial seven U-boats, intended to escort other submarines across the Bay of Biscay, at first proved unsatisfactory and were canceled, in favor of the heavier 3.7cm fittings eventually fitted in some boats. Due to manufacturing and supply problems (thanks, one presumes, to RAF and USAF bombing), the 2cm Flakvierling had to be fitted, in about 20 percent of the surviving U-boats. These small details throughout make for intriguing reading.

This is quite a book, certainly not for everyone, but a most impressive production—and with remarkably few translation errors as well.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Søreide’s Ships from the Depths is a rare attempt to synthesize the study and practice of researching shipwrecks in deepwater environments. The overall format of the book provides sufficient detail on certain aspects of deepwater archaeology to satisfy professionals in the field, while still remaining accessible to non-specialists. In particular, the book’s division into separate parts allows the author to address two very basic questions: what is deepwater archaeology and how is it performed?

In part one, Søreide addresses several key points, not the least of which is how to define “deepwater” archaeology. He makes an interesting assertion that there is no such thing as a deepwater archaeologist, and that the environment is less important than the material culture being studied (pp.6-7). This assertion underlies all further discussion. The author defines deepwater archaeology as the study of sites located in water depths greater than conventional diving limits, which are those wrecks located deeper than 50 meters (pp.6-7). Despite this defined depth range some case studies are discussed in the book that pertain to shallower sites, typically as examples of excavation or artifact recovery using remote technology in concert with divers. The author further delineates deepwater archaeology activities as either academic or treasure hunting. This dichotomy encapsulates most of the examples provided in Chapter 3, which includes research-based projects by universities and government as well as synopses of treasure- hunting ventures. While this approach may be a convenient way to organize case studies, it minimizes the contributions of deepwater archaeology conducted as cultural resource management, although Søreide does include subsequent references to management-based archaeology by citing agency guidelines and compliance-related
projects.

Part two of the book focuses on how deepwater archaeology is conducted and draws from the author’s own experience for the subject matter. Methods for discovering deepwater sites via remote sensing are discussed in Chapter 4. The discussion is clearly written, but archaeological professionals familiar with geophysics may find the material overly simplified. Chapter 5 discusses documentation and mapping of deepwater sites and begins with a critically important overview of navigation and positioning data. The remainder of the chapter includes excellent discussions of photo and video recording techniques, such as camera and light configurations, photomosaics, photogrammetry, and acoustic cameras. It is the author’s contention that “For an underwater archaeologist, vision is perhaps the most important of all senses in that it accounts for the majority of information perceived” (p.120). The author’s discussion of visual recording methodologies is excellent, but does not take into account those sites with limited or reduced visibility, for example how deepwater biofouling (such as the growth of lophelia coral) can interfere with visual inspections and how to address these issues. Chapter 6 presents information on deepwater excavation and details different methods of removing sediment overburden, retrieving artifacts of various sizes, and even recovery of entire structures. Documentation of artifact provenience is stressed in this chapter and the author provides a thorough overview of the Site Recorder software as one example of proper data management. Chapter 7 discusses site preservation in deepwater and the author explicitly discusses hull damage caused during the wrecking event as a primary component of site formation. The author provides a brief discussion of the conditions that separate shallow from deepwater sites, such as pressure, and hull sinking speeds and impact forces. Although it is not realistic to expect the author to address all possible factors that can affect wreck sites, the discussion is primarily focused on northern Europe and minimizes impacts such as those caused by bottom currents and anthropogenic activities that, although not common in that environment, do occur in deepwater environments elsewhere in the world (p.157). The final chapter in this volume provides a review of the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, which entered into force on 1 January 2009, as well as several European and U.S. laws on submerged cultural resource preservation.

Deepwater archaeology is a complex topic with many unresolved questions. The ocean floor remains a mostly uncharted region with a wide range of diversity that is not easily condensed into a single volume. Readers should, therefore, not expect this book to cover everything that one needs to know or consider when conducting archaeology in deepwater environments. It is incumbent upon those working on deepwater sites to understand the capabilities and limitations of both the equipment and the data in order to complete a successful project. While there are topics that could have been included or expanded upon, the volume provides a good review of recent deepwater projects, and excellent discussions of photographic and visual documentation techniques and excavation methods. It is to Søreide’s credit that this volume serves as a much-needed opening in the discussion of what constitutes deepwater archaeology.

Amanda M. Evans
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

*The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* is a short, elegantly written, "macro" history of the War of 1812. As a volume in the Cambridge "essential histories," it is designed as an introductory text for college students studying the early American republic, and in that role, it succeeds admirably. Stagg, a history professor at the University of Virginia, is the editor-in-chief of the papers of James Madison, and his mastery of the subject is impressive. Indeed, Stagg wrote an excellent work on these events, *Mr. Madison's War*, nearly thirty years ago, and having devoted his scholarship to this era, the publication of *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* promised much.

The scope of Stagg's new book is wide. He informs readers that his viewpoint is trans-Atlantic, to situate the War diplomatically within the Napoleonic Wars, but he also writes within the framework of Canadian history, with an awareness of American domestic politics, and with sensitivity towards the plight and peculiar position of Indians in Canada, in the American Northwest, and in the American Southeast.

Yet *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* begins on the wrong foot. For an historian with such knowledge, and for a book with such ambitions, this is a small book: there are 170 pages of text. It is remarkable, then, that the initial 17 pages are an extended essay on the historiography of the war. Stagg displays complete authority over the material, and he has much to say about how each generation of scholars has viewed the conflict. Yet it is odd to read a discourse on the perspective of other historians on the war, and how their writings reflected their eras, before reading anything substantive that Stagg writes about the War of 1812. Similarly, the last sixteen pages of the book are an essay on sources, and while there is no question that Stagg knows his texts, there is little value added by an essay that a select bibliography would not have provided—in less space.

The size constraints of the book meant that, more than most writers, Stagg had to decide what to emphasize. Quite reasonably, he chose to examine the war through its grand strategy. By stripping away all but the essentials, he has made coherent what has always seemed confusing about American strategy—although that clarity may be from the benefit of hindsight and may give too much credit to Secretaries of War Eustis and Armstrong. American strategy centered on attacking Canada, which was a hard nut to try to crack, and not the "mere matter of marching" that ex-President Jefferson, no great military mind, imagined. As Stagg demonstrates, the United States went to war inauspiciously, without allies, without a solid domestic consensus, and even without making intelligent preparations for war. Campaign after campaign, the strategy failed, yet there was no recourse but a repetition. American war finances were a debacle, buffeted by domestic politics and Republican Party ideology, so there was no national bank and no direct taxes until very late in the war. Nor does Stagg spare the weak leadership, poor organization, and inadequate training of the U.S. army. Stagg demonstrates that the diplomatic position of the United States vis-à-vis Britain was essentially a function of French power: as France's 1812 invasion of Russia failed, and then as Britain's allies swept the French armies back across
Europe, Britain found less reason to compromise with the Americans. Only when Napoleon was defeated, and after the Americans had checked the British on the Lakes and at Baltimore, was peace possible.

Stagg has synthesized the vast historiography of the War into an eminently readable account of chosen aspects of the war: grand strategy, diplomacy, and a birds' eye view of the land campaigns. Stagg's pithy style makes The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent an enjoyable book to read.

Yet the conciseness of the text leaves unsatisfactory gaps. First, in a war filled with outsized personalities, foibles, blunders, bravery, and cowardice, The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent is rather colourless. Stagg provides no vignettes of the people involved, no description of battles, and little of the sights, sounds, and emotions of war. (The text is also literally colourless, in that there are no illustrations). Second, maritime operations are minimized—almost totally submerged, as it were—which is odd for a war ostensibly fought for free trade and sailors' rights. In Stagg's account, Perry's victory on Lake Erie receives about one paragraph, Macdonough's triumph on Lake Champlain a little less, and the early U.S. Navy frigate victories, which did so much to maintain flagging American popular opinion, a few phrases each. American privateers, whose moral and financial effect on Liverpool and London merchants ultimately may have cooled British ardour for continuing the war, are entirely absent from Stagg's account. Nor do British privateers sailing from Canada appear in the text. Even the British navy's blockade of the American coast, which began in March 1813, and slowly spread to choke off the American economy and destroy the public fisc, receives slight attention.

The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent is an excellent, focused introductory text to the background, course, and results of the War. For general readers, it is less successful. Despite the claims of its publishers, it cannot be considered definitive, and it is a shame that size constraints prevented one of this generation's leading scholars from exploring the War in all its color and detail.

Frederick C. Leiner
Baltimore, Maryland