BOOK REVIEWS


Written in Swedish, this book is about traditional boats and boatbuilding in “Övra Norrland,” the northernmost region in Sweden. The author, Per-Uno Ågren, was head of the Umeå Museum in Övra Norrland from the late 1940s to 1983 and has studied a wide range of subjects within the working field of the museum. A pioneer in the field of museology, Ågren held a chair in museology at the University of Umeå from 1984 to 1995. He died in 2008 at the age of 78.

Written in 1962 as his Ph.D. thesis (“licentiatavhandling”), this study, now over forty years old, belongs to the early part of Ågren’s career. Its aim — in the author’s own words — is to “describe six boats in text, pictures and drawings” (p.15). Furthermore, he wants to characterize these boats against the background of what is known about boats from other parts of the Nordic Fenno-Scandinavian area. The thesis is based on empirical data collected by the author during fieldwork in 1952, 1957 and 1958 under the auspices of the prominent Scandinavian maritime ethnologist Olof Hasslöf. The method is a combination of interviews, observation of the building process, studies of the boats themselves, and studies in literature and archives.

The book begins with a chapter about the sources: material sources, written sources, and oral history/folklore. The main part of the book is an 80-page description of six boats, three of which are from the coastal areas and the other three from the inland rivers. Each boat represents a dominant boat type from the period before the introduction of boat engines. The boats are accounted for individually under the headlines “Environment,” “Main data,” “The building of the boat,” and “The use of the boat.” Each description is illustrated by drawings of the boat based on measurements, construction drawings and drawings of sails. The six descriptions are followed by an analysis of the building of the boats and a comparison with Norwegian, Sami, Finnish and other Swedish ways of building traditional boats. The thesis is concluded by a one-page “Summary and historical perspective.”

The book is published by the Swedish “Boat Documentation Group,” a small publishing house which has published around thirty titles about boats, coastal areas and the sea since the early 1980s. In the preface, group member Peter Skanse introduces Per-Uno Ågren and the background for the study of traditional boats in Sweden. Except for a few early works, boat studies in Sweden began in 1929 with Olof Hasslöf as one of the leading figures. In 1930, Hasslöf published the first results of his studies in an article entitled “Cultural borders in Bohuslän”— which mirrors the main approach to material culture studies at that time. The work on traditional boats was carried on through the 1930s and 1940s by a number scholars and museums. After several years of decreasing interest, maritime ethnology — still with
Olof Hasslöf in the foreground — saw a revival in the late 1950s, and this was when Per-Uno Ågren carried out his work on Övre Norrland. Unfortunately, he did not continue his work once he became preoccupied with building up Umeå Museum and his interest in museology.

In the late 1970s, the idea arose to continue the registration of traditional boats, and the “Boat Documentation Group” was founded. The group publishes the series “Boats in Sweden” and is continuously working on covering still larger parts of Sweden. It was during this work that they became aware of Per-Uno Ågren’s thesis. Apart from the preface, the editors have supplied the maps and many photos from the fieldwork of the author and his colleagues. They have also extended the bibliography, adding seven pages of titles, mainly published after 1960 and therefore not included in the bibliography of the original thesis. The titles supplied are divided into three sections: 1. traditional boats and boatbuilding, 2. fisheries and seal hunting, and 3. transport and transport routes.

It is commendable that the editors have brought this very thorough work to light and made it available to the public. Dating from the early 1960s, the thesis gives a picture of that time in relation to the boats, their builders, and their users, and to the scholarly tradition of the period which was preoccupied with material culture and its distribution. The approach is “diffusionistic” although this is not spelled out to the reader as the thesis does not specifically deal with theoretical and methodological questions.

The editors’ expressed aim is to shed light on and attract attention to this pioneering thesis within the field of maritime ethnological research, so that it receives the attention it deserves in the hope of renewing interest in the subject (p. 13). Considering the character of the book, however, it will presumably appeal more to specialists than to a broader audience.

Mette Guldborg
Esbjerg, Denmark


The Hakluyt Society is a registered charity which was established in 1846 to advance the understanding of global history by bringing together annotated texts in English from many parts of the world. To date, it has published over 350 scholarly volumes of primary sources with biographical and historical introductions on voyages and travels undertaken by individuals.

In 2001, the society decided to issue a miscellany volume with three previously unpublished journals covering maritime exploration of the Americas and Antarctica up to 1831. The texts, however, were considered too short to justify a volume on their own and it was not until 2004 that the society took the imaginative decision to select a fourth element featuring a land journey. The book now lives up to the aims of the society to provide texts of early travel accounts, often translated from other languages, which make mention of the geography, ethnology and natural history of the regions visited.

Each of the four texts in this latest volume takes a different form. The first is a narrative of the hardships and discoveries of the 1775 Spanish expedition from Mexico to explore the north-west coast of America. Under Captain Bodega y Quadra’s command, the tiny Sonora made a heroic
voyage to 58° 30’ North where Bodega became the first Spanish navigator to reach Alaska. Although we now know that Bodega failed to find the strait that de Fonte was supposed to have passed through in 1640, his voyage allayed Spanish fears that Russia was actively exploring the Pacific coast (Williams 2002).

The second and third texts neatly reflect the Royal Navy’s new-found zeal in the 1820s to survey the world’s oceans and seas. One is a daily account by Commander Stokes of HMS *Beagle* in the western part of the Magellan Strait in 1827 and includes the strait’s hydrographic history. The terrible weather conditions at Tierra del Fuego led Stokes to shoot himself in a fit of depression in August 1828. The command of the ship was taken by Captain FitzRoy and it was while surveying the maze of waterways surrounding the Magellan Strait, that he discovered the Beagle Channel (Gurney 2000). FitzRoy returned to England with five Fuegians in the hope of educating them as missionaries and Charles Darwin later claimed that FitzRoy only joined his voyage on *Beagle* in 1832 in order to return the men to Tierra del Fuego (Darwin 1915). The other text is a lively diary kept by fourteen-year-old midshipman Joseph Kay during a scientific expedition by HMS *Chanticleer* between 1828 and 1831. The aim of the voyage was to ascertain the longitude of several ports in the South Atlantic and make pendulum observations at the Southern Shetland Isles to determine the shape of the Earth. After Kay was promoted to Lieutenant, he joined HMS *Terror* on its celebrated Antarctic circumnavigation with HMS *Erebus* in 1839-1843.

While the first three texts are essentially records of their authors’ day-to-day duties, the concluding journal is a moving account of personal devotion. Jacob Wainwright had been rescued from slavery by a Royal Navy Anti-Slave Patrol in about 1865 and was sent to a Church Missionary Society school in India. He returned to Africa in 1872 and joined a search party to find David Livingstone, eventually becoming his servant. After Livingstone’s death from malaria in May 1873, Wainwright carved the inscription on the mbura tree beneath which Livingstone’s heart is buried. His journal records how he brought Livingstone’s body out of the interior on a one-thousand mile, ten-month journey north and eastwards across East Africa between May 1873 and February 1874. Wainwright then accompanied the coffin on the ship from Zanzibar to Southampton and he acted as a pallbearer at Livingstone’s funeral at Westminster Abbey. He returned to Africa in 1876 but after suffering various hardships, he died in obscurity in 1892.

The editors of this volume are well qualified for their task and their sensitive organization of these four primary sources is inspired. Herbert Beals is an expert on the Spanish exploration of north-west America and has translated Bodega’s journal from Spanish. He has also compared the original holographic text of Bodega’s 1775 *Diario* in the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City with other writings known to be in Bodega’s hand, confirming that it is almost certainly written by him. Captain Campbell served in the Royal Navy as Hydrographic Surveyor and in 2002 edited *The Discovery of the South Shetland Islands*. Stokes’ journal is still in the possession of the British Hydrographic Office. Kay’s journal was purchased by the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge in 1970 for £130 and has been jointly edited by Ann Savours and Anita McConnell. The former worked at the S.P.R.I. and the National Maritime Museum and the latter was curator of Earth Sciences at the Science Museum in London. Roy Bridges, who is president of the Hakluyt Society, is emeritus professor of
history at Aberdeen University. Unfortunately, Wainwright’s original diary has disappeared (which is an interesting story in itself) but a German translation had been made in 1874. It is this version that Bridges has retranslated and is published here for the first time in English.

The Hakluyt Society deserves to be congratulated for persevering in bringing together these four disparate travel journals, each of which makes an invaluable contribution to the history of exploration. Their respective editors have added excellent maps, well chosen illustrations and informative introductions and summaries. This book will not only interest historians who specialize in exploration but will also appeal to maritime historians and entertain readers of history and geography.

Michael Clark,
London, UK


This highly detailed and remarkably comprehensive book is published posthumously. David Brown, who died in 2001, was a former Royal Navy aviator who subsequently became a historian in the Naval Historical Branch of the Admiralty in London and then its head. He had previously published two separate works on the wartime operations of both Allied and Japanese aircraft carriers covering the period 1939 to 1943. This book is primarily based on Brown’s unpublished research material that was made available to the editor and publisher. It not only completes the story to the end of the Second World War, but adds to the original works and combines what had originally been planned as three separate publications under one cover.

As the title indicates, the three volumes comprising the book are focussed on the operations undertaken by aircraft carriers of the three nations that deployed them in the Second World War. Volume One covers British Royal Navy (RN) carriers from the outbreak of war in September 1939 through to September 1945. There is a small overlap with the American Navy (USN) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) operations where the British Pacific Fleet is concerned. Volume Two deals with the operations of the IJN and the USN from December 1941 to February 1943 and Volume Three completes the series through to September 1945.

The advent of the aircraft carrier as a major fleet unit transformed naval warfare in the twentieth century. While the place of the battleship, and its purported invincibility, as the most important fleet unit had been challenged by proponents of air power in the 1920s, the major naval powers continued to build them. In Britain, the US and Japan, however, naval planners hedged their bets and also built carriers. The displacement and numbers of carriers allowed each navy were affected by limitations imposed by various post-war naval treaties. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain had six front-line carriers but only two of them had been designed as such from the outset. The remainder had all been conversions from battleships, battle-cruisers or, in one case, a luxury liner. There was also a building program begun in 1935 for a new class of fleet carrier; the Illustrious class, the namesake of which was commissioned in May 1940.

Arguably, the most significant event of the war at sea up to that time was the attack on the Italian battle fleet, which was in harbour at Taranto, on the night of 11/12 November 1940 by British carrier
aircraft — the first all-aircraft naval attack on an enemy fleet. The raid was devastating for the Italian Navy — half its battle fleet was lost in one night — and it never again posed a major threat to the British in the Mediterranean. The operation challenged pre-war thinking on the employment of carriers and their aircraft. The significance of the attack, on ships in harbour by torpedoes delivered from the slow, biplane Swordfish aircraft then the mainstay of the Fleet Air Arm, was not lost on Japan. The IJN staff learned the lesson quickly, factoring it into their planning for the Pearl Harbor assault the following year.

The USN and the IJN were at more or less numerical parity in large, fast, frontline carriers when the war in the Pacific began. Because of the vast distances involved, both navies had well-established logistical support for deployed carriers and refuelling-at-sea was standard practice well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Where the IJN learned from Taranto, the USN learned from the experiences of British carrier operations off Norway in 1940 and applied the lessons to their island-hopping campaigns in the Central Pacific.

This is an extremely thorough overview of all the actions involving carriers. There is little substantive analysis, but the intent is to document what the ships and their aircraft did, how they did it, and what happened. The text is well-written and easy to read. Explanatory tables which amplify the statistical data in the text are conveniently and logically placed throughout. The photographs are superb, with at least one photograph on each page, most of which have not been published previously. There is an interesting appendix which discusses and compares differences in carrier design philosophy among the three navies.

Fascinating tid-bits abound. For example, this reviewer was unaware that in March 1942 the US Navy had loaned the carrier USS Wasp to the British Home Fleet to replace the weather damaged HMS Victorious for a short period. In this role, among other tasks, Wasp made two voyages ferrying aircraft to Malta before her return to the USN. The RN returned the favour when, from May until July 1943, Victorious joined USN Task Force 14 for operations in the South West Pacific off New Georgia — where she was known as USS Robin and all her aircraft were repainted with USN-style markings.

This is not a book that one sits down and reads in one or two sessions; it is a book to which one will return time and again. It contains a wealth of reference material and this is its greatest strength. This is an important reference work and the editor has done a superb job in compiling and presenting the information. It is a fitting tribute to the legacy of David Brown.

Michael Young
Ottawa, Ontario


Appendix VI of Volume 2 Part 2 of the official operational history of the Royal Canadian Navy (A Blue Water Navy) gives a tantalizing overview of the RCN Coastal Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre. Bryan Cooper’s book is the perfect follow-on as it covers the employment of motor torpedo and motor gun boats, by friend and foe alike, in all theatres of the Second World War. As befits the story of the “little ships” themselves, the author provides a fast-paced, hard-hitting narrative of the false-starts and failures of the early years, then gradually leads the reader through the experiences and insights of the crews which
resulted in some pretty spectacular successes.

This is a huge story. Nonetheless, the author has selected a number of important and interesting events and based his narrative around each one, as an indication of the general state of small-boat warfare at the time. Not only is this an elegant way of getting the story across, but these events were chosen to highlight individuals of national importance to their respective countries; the author has also made an even-handed selection from every theatre of operations. It is certainly most gratifying as a former Canadian naval person to read not only about "The Three Musketeers" (Burke, Maitland and Ladner), but about thirteen other Canadians, including Tony Law and Tommy Fuller.

The story opens at a low ebb. The early use of these small craft had proven an inexact science marked by a very few, very limited number of successes. Whether or not this sort of craft would continue to be used at all was a question naval planners still had to answer. Still, though their crews were slowly learning the painful lessons that would eventually allow these small boats to live up to expectations, their pent-up frustration and fury at some of the technical and tactical failures they experienced are clearly and unambiguously related here.

The author then moves on to describe the main “characters” of his book — the various types of boats that served the British, American, German and Japanese navies. Chapter Two provides an excellent overview of the characteristics of each navy’s small boats, as well as informative illustrations of the various protagonists. Several of the illustrations are a bit faded, some show the moiré effect (the result of reprinting a copy of a printed photo), but nothing significantly detracts from the purpose of the illustrations in the book. This chapter, concise and very interesting, does not overwhelm the reader with technical details. Understanding the tools that were available, we move into battle with “…just a handful of boats – untried in combat, some of them already obsolete, and with no one being sure just how they could be used” (p.40).

The reader is now taken around the globe to visit every location where the gunboats were used. Each chapter builds on its predecessors in the same manner that the crews of the motor torpedo boats and motor gun boats built their tactics around successful experiments and sound common sense. It is really an incredible story and it is told well. Though the bibliography of the book is not extraordinarily lengthy, it has been used to good effect and no thought or word is wasted. This certainly reflects the author’s disciplined approach as a writer of radio plays and scripts for film and television as well as being a military historian. There is also a good set of photographs in the book, each relating to a specific person, battle or piece of equipment that makes an appearance in this story.

Bryan Cooper has succeeded admirably in providing a story that touches on all the basic elements necessary to understand the gunboat war: readers are introduced to the concept of small boat operations; shown how these craft looked; told about the men who crewed and fought them and taken to every major theatre where they were used. It is the perfect introduction to the subject. There are a great many books about motor torpedo boats and motor gun boats, but all that I have seen approach the story from a specific, focused and limited angle: the evolution of design and tactics; how the boats were used by different navies; model-building or the personal recollections of people who fought in them. None takes the same approach as the author does here and offers comparable insights into the varying aspects of these weapons and the men who used them. *The War of the Gun Boats* is the
basic chart that allows the reader to plot their course into any of the other available works on the subject when greater detail on subjects outlined in this book is required.

There is certainly more than enough here to pique the interest in the history of these ships and their “bloody war.” For anyone interested in light coastal forces or anyone interested in exploring another aspect of how naval forces projected power with limited resources in the Second World War, this book would be a valuable addition to your library.

J. Graeme Arbuckle
Ottawa, Ontario


Nautical archaeologist James P. Delgado has assembled from historical, literary, and archaeological sources the fascinating story of how Khubilai Khan’s powerful Mongol navy came to defeat along Japan’s southern shores in the late thirteenth century. Diffused over the centuries and varnished by legend, the saga of how the forces of nature and history came together to destroy Khan’s fleet in a Divine Wind is given a new understanding by recent archaeological discoveries.

More than a well-researched account of the unsuccessful naval invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, the book chronicles the evolution of Asian seafaring from China across the Yellow Sea to Korea and Japan. Intertwined is the story of the rise of the Mongol empire across vast territories, from Genghis Khan, whose armies marched from the steppes into the Middle East and Europe, to his grandson Khubilai, who conquered China and sailed against Japan, Vietnam, and Java. An ancillary story is about the consequences to Japanese history of the thirteen-century invasions, the rise of the fable about the divine wind, and its tragic modern manifestation at the end of the Second World War. Woven throughout the narratives are Delgado’s observations about how ongoing underwater archaeological investigations will help to unravel the puzzles of history and myth.

Each chapter is introduced by a short quote, or an excerpt from a poem or song, that sets the tone for what follows. Next, each chapter opens at a specific geographical location that sets the stage for the story to unfold. Content of the chapters is subdivided into titled sections; the narratives move seamlessly from the past to the present and back to the past. Delgado has a knack for storytelling, which carries what could be thick and musty history along a faster track, punctuated by his personal descriptions of places he visited or people he met while researching the book.

Delgado’s prologue, titled “A Divine Wind,” reveals a thread that runs through the work: the Japanese concept of kamikaze, a word that became globally recognized after the Second World War, when desperate Imperial pilots targeted their aircraft and themselves at American warships. Seen then as acts of duty, loyalty, and national pride, these human sacrifices were an attempt to turn around the war and save Japan. They echoed the legendary heavenly intervention of a divine wind sent by the gods 700 years earlier that saved Japan from Mongol invasion.

In 1281, Khubilai Khan, the Mongol emperor of newly-conquered China, sent two large fleets of ships and soldiers to invade Japan for the second time. One fleet sailed from present-day Korea, the other from China; together, according to legend, the fleets contained as many as
4,400 ships and more than 100,000 soldiers. Ordered to assemble off the coast of Japan, the Mongol fleets never made the rendezvous. One landed at today’s Fukuoka, the other farther south off the island of Takashima. There, a two-week battle on land and sea pitted seasoned veterans of the Khan’s wars against skilled samurai defenders, but slowly the invaders began to overwhelm the islanders. According to legend, Japan’s emperor prayed to the ancestral gods for intervention to save his earthly realm. In response, a divine wind, the kamikaze, arose to create ferocious seas that destroyed the Mongol ships and drowned their troops. Like many epic decisive battles, this episode became engrained in the fabric of ethnic self-characterization. Passed down through the centuries, the story became one of Japan’s most celebrated tales, reinforcing a belief in perpetual divine protection for that island nation.

Like any archaeologist, Delgado tends to focus on the material remains of momentous events, so he takes the reader with him to dive in Imari Bay, off the island of Takashima, where Japanese underwater archaeologists are discovering tantalizing clues to what happened there in 1281. The underwater team has found what appears to be a drowned Mongol soldier, lying face down with his arms and armour, and a Chinese rice bowl with the inscription “Wang, Commander of 100.” This find and others nearby were made by a small but determined group of pioneering researchers following in the footsteps of Torao Mozai, a retired mariner and engineer.

Delgado describes how Mozai became interested in stories of fishermen netting Chinese pots from the water off Takashima, and how he persuaded other engineers to help him devise sonar instruments to search the area where fishermen had snagged the pots. Several targets produced artifacts including iron spearheads and a Chinese saber. When word of Mozai’s research spread, a local farmer brought to him a small bronze seal, found under the beach, with the script “Commander of 1,000,” dating to four years before the 1281 invasion. Eventually, Japanese archaeologists led by Kenzo Hayashida formed the Kyushu Okinawa Society for Underwater Archaeology, which has found the remains of one, if not more, of Khan’s lost fleet under the mud in deep water near shore. Shattered remains of ships’ structures, stone anchors, Chinese pottery, armour, and weapons have been recovered, allowing researchers to radically reinterpret what happened in 1281 for the first time.

Working with the Kyushu Okinawa Society, sleuthing by archaeologist Randall Sasaki suggests that the Mongol fleet suffered from more than just a storm. The destruction of the ships in 1281 by a northwest gale or typhoon can be explained, except that the storm would not have left intact pottery or an undisturbed feature like Wang’s body. Analysis of wooden ship fragments show that the vessels were not as well built as they should have been. Evidence also suggests fire may have contributed to the disaster.

Khubilai Khan’s Lost Fleet will appeal to general readers who want to venture beyond the tales of Marco Polo and his visits with the fabled Khan. But with a wider maritime perspective, Delgado brings to life the impact of seafaring events in thirteenth-century Asia by demonstrating how the science of nautical archaeology inevitably will allow past people and their remains to speak to us again in the present.

Roger C. Smith
Tallahassee, Florida

Harry Dickinson has put forward an impressive and well-crafted study of the education system (if, indeed, it could be called one) for naval officers in the Royal Navy in the time period before the advent of the Selborne Scheme of 1902. It successfully interweaves the imperatives of the needs of the service with the evolving political changes particularly in the last half of the nineteenth century. The work is divided into nine chapters leading the reader in roughly chronological order from the early 1700s through to 1902. The first two chapters deal with the first century while a third discusses the evolution of the naval schoolmaster and the foundation of the Naval Academy in 1733. Chapters three and four investigate the early nineteenth century and the establishment of the Britannia system in the early 1860s. The history of Britannia itself is well examined in chapters five and eight and the Shadwell Report is superbly dealt with in chapter six. The higher education of officers and the foundation of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich is examined in chapter eight and the evolving relationship between deck and engineering officers is expertly handled in the last section of the text.

The chief weakness of this volume is that the author was forced to make some concessions in the depth and breadth of his study. Firstly, and most importantly, it focuses very heavily on the intersection of the political and the naval authorities and the near-constant revision of the system for training young naval officers. In this regard, the discussion of the founding of the Royal Naval College in chapter seven is particularly insightful and instructive. This is fine as far as it goes. What is less well done is the intersection of the evolving culture and ethos of the officer corps with the developing educational system. What expectations did officers have of their education and training even beyond the needs of the service? Naval officers had a very specific cultural and social position to maintain as guardians of British security that is only sporadically referred to. Secondly, it is very much regretted that no similar investigation was carried out in the education and training of non-executive officers or ratings. This, however, is an understandable omission in order to produce a shortened and more publishable study.

Another drawback of this volume is, quite frankly, the outrageous price of US $170.00 that will put it not only well outside the budget of many individuals, but stretches even the constrained budgets of research libraries save those with significant maritime/naval history collections. Nonetheless, this will be an essential study for any scholar dealing with the key changes in the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century. Any appreciation of officer training in the RN prior to 1902 is incomplete without a thorough reading of Dickinson’s offering.

Robert L. Davison
Waterloo, Ontario


When launched in 1843, the *Great Britain* was 100 feet longer and 1000 tons larger than any existing ship. She exploited the use of iron as a shipbuilding material with watertight bulkheads and a double bottom.
Among the radical innovations for a ship of her size was the use of a propeller rather than the originally-planned side wheels. The ship was brought home to Bristol from the Falklands in 1970 and is now preserved in the dock where it was built. The *Great Britain* is a technological and cultural artifact preserved in an award-winning museum dedicated to the ship’s life and times.

The *Great Britain* was built in a century of rapid change. Available investment capital, population growth, government policy, towering egos, colonialism, geopolitics, the birth of monumental engineering projects, heavy manufacturing, the creation of huge rolling mills and steam hammers — these are all a part of the *Great Britain* story. But here the author concentrates on “Life at Sea in the World’s First Liner,” and he has delivered a fine piece of work that illustrates the near-prisoner status of the passenger and the sub-culture of the sailor.

The celebrated Victorian engineer and designer, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, usually dominates these accounts, as he is entitled to. But every time the ship made a passage — fourteen days to cross the Atlantic from Liverpool to New York or say, fifty days to Australia carrying settlers or the work as a troop ship to India and the Crimea — she created a new community, a village of sorts that contained in it, not only the usual “sturm and drang,” but also, almost by accident, commentary about the ship and its governance.

Those aboard the ship as passengers and crew sent letters home, kept journals and blabbed to journalists, all sources which complement the terse ships logs. These are the stories the author tells, not in the scholarly style of a Marcus Ridiker or Greg Denning, but in a more traditional way. This narrative is uninhibited by the usual codes of writerly self-censorship that seems to dominate books intended for the well-informed general reader. One passenger, Edward Towle, reckons that the sailor could “do nothing without a song”, while another could tell what they were doing by the songs they sang. One line, sung to *Haul Away Joe*, expressed the usual sexual yarning: “Away, haul away come rock and roll me over,” with the next line more explicit. A musicologist might have fun tracing this expression to the modern genre of “rock and roll.” There are many points of entry for the military historian. Samuel Archer, on board for passage from Queenstown to India, was with men who had charged with the Light Brigade at Balaclava. “They had lit their pipes, conscious that soldierly etiquette was no longer of any account, and that they might as well take with composure the desperate task before them.” Most of the accounts quoted are from passengers. “Rounding the Horn aroused anxious expectations amongst the passengers, but the prevailing winds were normally with the ship… On some voyages there was a cry of Land! Land! And everyone rushed on deck, glasses of every description were raised and every eye strained to see the Cape, a large mountain in a dazzling black cloud.”

Nicholas Fogg avoids the mythology of the sea and in so doing, creates a greater tale in the voices of those who were there. This 192-page book will serve as a point of reference for more work. The *Great Britain* is an artifact, and with time and distance on its side, presents a compelling argument in favour of ship preservation.

The author has made full use of archival collections and newspapers and these are listed for those who wish to explore the life and times of this ship further. There is an excellent index that covers people, places and events. This is the intimate story of a ship from the point of view of those who sailed in her as passengers and crew.

Maurice D. Smith
Kingston, Ontario

In an age when massive ocean liners were touted as the only way to cross the seas and companies such as Cunard and White Star placed their emphasis on size, speed and luxury, a number of smaller companies managed to carve out successful niche markets with fleets of cargo liners. For every great transatlantic liner, there were dozens of these little ships, which could be found in ports both great and small. It is their story that Ambrose, Lord Greenway, tells in his compelling new book.

Lord Greenway has already written a number of books on merchant fleets and smaller passenger ferries, and here he takes an evocative look back at another age of travel and commerce. He centres his work on the period between the years 1850 and 1950, when the large liners on the lucrative North Atlantic service overshadowed the efforts of several generations of little cargo liners. The latter carried manufactured items and other goods, but also provided limited space of varying luxury for a few passengers looking to expand their horizons or explore the less traveled seaways of the world. Today, their role has been assumed by the giant container ships, which for various reasons, are less inclined to take on passengers.

A brief introduction sketches the salient features of the cargo trade, including important terminology, what items were carried, how refrigeration worked aboard ship during the steam age, and where and when passengers entered the picture. The main part of the narrative begins by exploring the need for a succession of classes of smaller vessels to link the world’s main mercantile ports in the industrial age. Many of these early ships carried full rigs of sails as well as steam engines; they were hybrids, linking the days of sail to the age of steam.

Greenway examines some of the major trade routes to India and the Far East and also looks into some of the forgotten ports that modern shipping and transport have passed by. Throughout, his narrative is accompanied by beautiful and splendidly reproduced images of the ships themselves. He traces the ship types through to the development of the motor liner, and their experiences during the two world wars and the Depression prior to their brief renaissance in the early 1950s before air travel sent many ships, large and small, to the breakers.

Enthusiasts for the era of the cargo liner will not be disappointed as Lord Greenway makes mention of just about every shipping firm involved in the industry, from the early days of the Holt Steamship Line, Elder Dempster and the other great British firms, to German firms such as the Hansa Line through a long line of Scandinavian, American and Asian firms that have built so many of these wonderful ships. As his narrative draws to a close, he also introduces many of the firms that expanded into containerization and are still in operation today, such as the Maersk Line.

For enthusiasts, this book will provide a wonderful glimpse into another era of shipping. The photography often speaks for itself but the text is well constructed and flows nicely from one era to the next. If there was one area that could have been expanded both in images and in text, it would be the passengers and their accommodation as there are, sadly, no photos of the interior compartments on the vessels. Lord Greenway makes mention of the fact that the passenger areas were on a par with first class on the transatlantic ships but we never get to see the cabins. The other difficulty that some readers may find
with the book is that, with the exception of the chapters, all of the text in the book is in a very small font, one that you would normally associate with photo captions. Much of this smaller type is in fact for captions, as the photographs tend to take centre stage in each chapter.

Still, *Cargo Liners* is a valuable addition to the catalogue. It is clearly a labour of love on the part of its author, and one that will bring back a flood of memories to those who traveled or worked in the ships that are featured in the book or saw them in the many ports they served. For those readers new to maritime history, it will provide a valuable look into the sea commerce of another age. Highly recommended.

Richard MacMichael
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


This is the story of Mickey Haydamaker as told to Allan D. Millar. His story begins with childhood memories of fishing with his father on the St. Clair River in a small boat built by his father and aptly named Mickey II. He transmits the feeling of wonder and romance during his early youth while watching the ships and hearing the stories of the lake captains, engineers and sailors in the villages and towns in the vicinity of his home. This made it perfectly natural for him at age 18 to sign on with the Interlake Steamship Company. The story related in the book then covers only two years, 1962 and 1963, when he, as a young man, learned the craft of a deckhand and graduated to deckwatch on lake ships hauling iron ore and coal from ports on Lake Superior back to the steel mills in the centres of industry in the south.

First, in the chapter “Algonac to Ashtabula,” Haydamaker relates his upbringing in the little river town in Algonac, Michigan, and his trepidation at leaving home, his family waving from the shore. We then follow his travels to the headquarters of the shipping company until he joins his first vessel, the ore carrier *Elton Hoyt 2nd*.

In succeeding chapters we follow him and his crew through the mundane and major events of the voyages: “Up Light to Taconite,” “Cleveland Panic and Other Joys,” “Laid Off,” “Shuttle Run,” “Deckhand to Deckwatch,” and “Portage Ship Canal.” Haydamaker sailed in five Interlake Steamship Company boats, from the modern *Elton Hoyt 2nd* to the ancient coal-powered *Colonel James Pickands* with its tarpaulin-covered hatches that were backbreaking to operate. Through him we learn many details of the ships and their crew members from bridge, engine room, and the deck.

We also get an insider’s view of the mundane duties performed by deckhands, as well as a lot of detail about the other people on the ship: the navigators and steersmen of the deckwatch and the “black gang” of the engineering department. A sailor’s diet is also consistently mentioned throughout the book.

We learn something of each port he visits, from the small ports like Algonac to the congested Calumet River and Detroit River to Taconite Harbor in Minnesota. The backdrop of the voyages was the waterway, especially the locks between the lakes, which absorbed the deckhands in a test of the ship and crew.

In the text and the appendix there is enough detail on the dimensions of the lake ships’ hulls, fittings, and especially the
machinery for loading and unloading and manipulating the ships, to satisfy ship buffs. With the shift from the Hoyt back to the Pickands, we make the leap back in time from diesel to steam propulsion and learn about the particulars of living and working in a coal-fired steam ship.

This wonderful, slim volume represents a departure from recent academic offerings to a narrative built on oral history. Alan Millar describes his methods of adding dialogue to help flesh out and make understandable the relationships among the crew members. It works! Deckhand opens doors and windows onto the life of the lake ships and people who sailed them.

Perhaps the clearest message is that the life of the deckhand is physical, from the never-ending routines of “soogeying” (cleaning) and painting to maneuvering the ship through the locks on the seaway to raise and lower the ships between the lakes. Through the descriptions of the choreography needed to bring the spouts carrying coal and ore into the exact hold needed to maintain trim, the reader acquires a picture of a deckhand’s work and life. That work is very active and demanding, especially on the older ships that had little in the way of mechanized equipment. Sidelights reinforce the picture of a young sailor’s social life as carefree, with experiences that bonded the men into good teams.

As he works through positions successfully as a deckhand, Haydamaker moves up to be part of the deckwatch, the organization that connects the brains of the ship with the brawn of the deckhands. He also comments on other societies in the ship, such as, the engine room and officers. There are references to the events in U.S. history as seen from the deckhands’ point of view. Events like the death of President Kennedy and the violence of international union strife in the Portage Ship Canal come alive in an immediate and dramatic way.

The editors and publishers at University of Michigan have gone back to basics with wonderful results. Deckhand has features that improve its ability to tell the story: a glossary, photographs and artifacts (scanned documents) of the lake sailor’s world. Illustrations, from the opening map to Haydamaker’s own excellent colour photographs, draw the reader into a detailed understanding of the world of a deckhand of a lake ship. The map, drawn by Joan Haydamaker, references all the places visited in the story.

This work has universal appeal and can be read by people of any age who want to find out about an important slice of Great Lakes history. It belongs in every library dedicated to merchant sailors and shipping on the lakes.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


When most people look at military history, the legal niceties that dominate normal everyday life are usually not the first thing talked about. The eye of most readers is drawn not to the issue of the legality of an action, but rather the events, the experiences or the lessons learned. This is certainly the case with most histories of the American submarine war against Japan. While mentioned in many books on the subject, it is interesting that the order to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare has never been examined. It has been just accepted as a natural necessity of the war; however, this is far from the case. As Joel Holwitt’s study “Execute Against Japan” The U.S.
Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, argues, the decision represented a huge change in direction for the US and the abandonment of long standing principles. This simple order, in essence, was the reversal of American custom and attitude towards international law.

The argument that is laid out by Holwitt’s book is carefully thought out and researched. As a serving submariner and dedicated historian, the author brings together a love of his profession and a scholar’s drive to present facts. Over the course of eleven chapters, he explains the significance of “freedom of the seas” to the US and its long standing support for the idea that the ocean was the “great common” open to all for use. Starting in 1609 and working forward, Holwitt outlines the emergence and development of the idea of Freedom of the Seas and the legal regime that supported it. Beginning with the First World War and the American political decision to go to war which has been attributed to the attacks by German U-boats on neutral merchant shipping, Holwitt explains the evolving American position throughout the inter-war years. He convincingly demonstrates that from 1914 on, the US government remained diametrically opposed to the free and unfettered use of the submarine against merchant shipping, as it threatened the universal access to the oceans and thus, American freedom to trade and use the seas. He traces the American attempts to limit submarine operations through such legal regimes like the Washington Naval Conference (1922), the Washington Submarine Treaty (1922) and the London Naval Conferences (1936), to demonstrate US government opposition to the submarine as an instrument of war.

Simultaneously, Holwitt demonstrates that the U.S. Navy did not agree with these principles. Immediately following the Great War, the USN understood that submarines had the ability to play a major role in any future war. Understanding the potential of the submarine, many in the leadership of the USN strove not just to preserve the submarine as part of the fleet, but to advocate for the use of unrestricted submarine warfare against America’s enemies. Often silenced or marginalized by the political leadership, these naval officers struggled to preserve an offensive role for the submarine fleet through studies and war plans. As a result of their determination and solid strategic understanding of the issues involved, the fleet class submarine played a huge role in the Second World War.

The most startling revelation presented by Holwitt wasn’t that the USN and the American government disagreed about how submarines could and should be used in time of war, but that the order for the unrestricted war on Japanese merchant shipping came not from the President but rather from the USN. There is little or no evidence that anyone in the civilian leadership was briefed on plans for unrestricted submarine warfare prior to the order being sent. Likewise, there is strong evidence that the order was sent before presidential authority was received. This illustrates a breakdown in the chain of command and how elements of the USN were able to override the civilian authority to launch an unrestricted war against Japan. The revelation that the USN had been preparing for unrestricted submarine warfare prior to Pearl Harbor and that at the moment of crisis the order was sent prior to Presidential approval is startling. What is equally startling is the fact that Holwitt does not really condemn or criticize the decision. He defends the action by pointing out that all naval officers are bound to defend the Constitution, even if in doing so, the actions are in violation of nation or international laws.

Holwitt has meticulously re-
searched a study of the legal history relating to the order given on 7 December 1941 and it should be included in a collection of anyone who is seriously interested in either naval warfare or the issue of warfare and the legal attempts to restrict it. The fact that the book aims itself at arguably the most important issue related to the submarine war, one not really discussed or understood, makes this a must-read for anyone interested in this field. This elevates the work above that of what might be considered for the casual reader, as the more knowledge you have relating to the period, the legal issues or even the international relations of the time, the more you will appreciate Holwitt’s efforts. From a layman’s perspective, approach with caution as the legal discussions and the legislative wrangling, while the central feature of the discussion, may be construed by many to be rather boring. If you’re looking for a rousing sea tale, this book will probably not be on your list.

Robert M. Dienesch
Tecumseh, Ontario.


On 19 November 1941, the Australian light cruiser HMAS Sydney, commanded by Captain Joseph Burnett, encountered the German raider Kormoran (under the command of Captain Theodore Detmers) off the coast of Western Australia. In the ensuing battle, both ships were mortally damaged and later sank, Sydney with the loss of the entire crew of 645 men. Sydney was the glamour ship of the Royal Australian Navy following its exploits in the Mediterranean in 1940, during which it saw extensive action, including the destruction of the Italian cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni. The loss was a severe blow to Australia and one which is still felt by many to this very day. Many theories regarding the final action have been put forward including German treachery, Japanese involvement prior to Pearl Harbor and an Australian government cover-up. Any book written on this subject is bound to receive in-depth scrutiny, and skepticism, from a wide range of academics, historians and ordinary readers. This latest book on the loss of Sydney is no exception.

Captain Peter Hore, RN (Retired), has done an excellent job piecing together new information and previously overlooked evidence. His well written and very interesting book is based on Captain Detmers version of the battle. There are several new details from an encrypted account of the battle which remained hidden, for many years, in a dictionary owned by Detmers. Captain Hore has been involved in researching the loss of Sydney for several years and this has included a painstaking search of archival material held in Britain and Australia on behalf of the Australian government, as well as conducting interviews with surviving Kormoran officers. The story unfolds in an easy-to-read detective novel style which is substantiated by extensive use of first-hand reports from German and Allied sources.

Much of the book deals with the controversy of Sydney’s loss and the location of the action (and thus the location of the wrecks of both vessels). Hore has used his extensive knowledge of the German official accounts, Detmers’ own coded account, interviews with German survivors and several Allied documents on the action to try and piece together what really happened in the desperate fight between the two ships. Much of this documentation has been available to researchers for many years, but a re-analysis
and cross-comparison of each item had not previously been done and shows the value of dedicated and thorough research. Captain Hore also does not pull any punches when calling to account some researchers and historians who have made a number of poor assumptions based on their failure adequately to review the available primary resources.

The book also examines two very important aspects of Sydney’s loss. The first of these is British Admiralty directions and policy when warships were confronted with potential enemy raiders. Hore’s analysis indicates that a number of British warships engaged in hunting raiders made the almost fatal error of approaching too close before adequate identification was made. This includes one British cruiser that came within one mile of a disguised British merchant cruiser whose captain was able to convince his compatriot that he was a harmless merchant ship! The second aspect is British cruiser construction and the flaws in design and construction which could have led to Sydney’s loss. Hore concludes that British warships were generally well built and could give and take a punch. This is supported by the first-hand evidence of the action and, once the wreck of Sydney was found, it was further corroborated by an analysis of the damage sustained by the cruiser. The extensive damage sustained to Sydney’s bow by a torpedo strike appears to be the fatal blow that ultimately caused the loss of the ship.

Finally, Hore’s research was also important as it assisted those searching for the wrecks of both vessels. His analysis of German and Allied records as well as the eye-witness account of the action by Reinhold Malapert (Kormoran’s communications officer) supported the “northern” location of the action. Peter Hore readily shared this information with “Wreck Hunter” David Mearns and the research was instrumental in setting the datum for the 2008 search. Hore’s research was vindicated when the wrecks were finally located in the northern search area some 2,500 metres deep on the floor of the Indian Ocean in March 2008.

The book’s subtitle, "Solving the last great mystery of the Second World War," is somewhat misleading. While Hore’s research helped to locate the site of the Sydney/Kormoran action, and subsequently the wrecks of both vessels, there is no firm evidence put forward as to why Burnett took his heavily armed cruiser to within one mile of Kormoran. Captain Hore supports the claim made by Detmers that Sydney did not suspect Kormoran was a raider — yet why did Sydney continually repeat its signal challenges right up to the point that Detmers made his fateful decision to open fire? Did Burnett simply make a fatal tactical error or is it possible that the German Navy was reading Allied naval codes and lured Sydney into a deadly (and potentially illegal) trap? This possibility is mentioned in vague terms but never fully investigated.

Despite this, Captain Hore has produced a very enjoyable and exceptionally well researched book; it is highly recommended for the armchair historian and non-naval reader alike. While this book is an excellent addition to the ongoing study of the Sydney/Kormoran action, it does leave some questions unanswered. The book outlining the full reason for Sydney’s loss has yet to be written; and probably never will.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia

Originally published in 1975, Porthmadog Ships was the culmination of the work of Welsh historians Emrys Hughes and Aled Eames, both of whom had an abiding passion for the maritime history of Porthmadog in northwest Wales. The former, a surveyor by profession, visited the homes of the men who sailed Porthmadog vessels, recording their memoirs and photographing any ship portraits in their possession. The result was a massive tome of some 748 pages listing hundreds of vessels as well as material about each of them gleaned from oral and written sources. Upon his death, his work was donated to the Record Office in Caernarfon where it became an extremely popular resource for a growing number of maritime researchers. To create a more widely available published version, Eames edited Hughes’ compilation and contributed a superb 165-page introduction to the growth of the maritime community of Porthmadog, to its ships, their builders, and the men who sailed them. At the time, he described it as a preliminary investigation of a very rich field that, in time, would be expanded.

The current edition, edited by John Alexander, includes some corrections to the original manuscript and, importantly, incorporates more detailed information into Hughes’ original list of vessels. This new documentation, gleaned from a number of sources including the Customs shipping registers, expands the list of Porthmadog vessels to 200 pages. Respectfully inserted at the end of Hughes’ and Eames’ notes, this information includes each vessel’s official number, name changes, tonnage, hull dimensions, selected changes in ownership, re-registrations and the fate of the vessel, if known. Alexander also added a list of vessels built on Traeth Mawr and Traeth Bach. The “Further Studies” section, presenting more complete information on selected vessels, has been retained from the first edition as has the index of people and vessels mentioned in Eames’ introductory section. Relevant maps, tables and images not only support the text and list but create a visual impression of Porthmadog shipping. The publication is a masterful hybrid of a narrative description of the evolution of Porthmadog shipping and an invaluable list of vessels registered at that port.

The significant strength of this publication is the quality of its contributors. Hughes, a grandson of one of the most successful master mariners of Porthmadog, had over many years systematically and meticulously collected information about the port’s vessels, a testament to his passion for the subject. As the long-serving editor of the annual publication Maritime Wales and having produced an impressive list of publications, including Ships and Seamen of Anglesey; Ship Master: The Life and Letters of Captain Robert Thomas of Llandwrog and Liverpool 1843-1903 and Venture In Sail: Aspects of the Maritime History of Gwynedd, 1840-1914, and the Liverpool Connection, Eames was eminently qualified to create the substantive introduction for Hughes’ work. Alexander’s editorship of the 2009 edition incorporates information from sources not readily available at the time of the first edition. His insertion of new information is explained logically at the beginning of the list and is presented so it can be followed easily even by those less familiar with archival shipping sources. Alexander not only understands the vessel information but more importantly, its use as a conduit to other sources beyond the scope of this publication. The inclusion of each vessel’s official number, a critical piece of information for accessing on-line sources and for distinguishing vessels with the same name is a prime example.

This book’s appeal extends beyond those interested in the Porthmadog shipping
or even in Welsh shipping generally. The list reveals that the Porthmadog fleet had connections far beyond that port or Wales itself and a significant number were built or registered elsewhere on both sides of the Atlantic. Welsh shipping connections to eastern Canada were quite prominent in this period, so it was not surprising to find vessels either built and registered there or having sailed regularly to Canadian ports. Two representative examples are the barque Ocean Child (300 tons, ON 12485) built at River John, Nova Scotia, in 1863 but employed regularly in the timber trade with Quebec by her Porthmadog owners. And there is an extended account of the little two-masted schooner Rosie (89 tons reg., ON 79358) built in Appledore, England, in 1885, that spent eighteen consecutive years in the Europe-Newfoundland fish trade during all seasons, sometimes doing two trips in one season.

Any criticism of this edition is tempered by Eames' vision that the original edition was a preliminary work that would become more comprehensive in time. This edition certainly moves that vision forward. Perhaps the next edition will address a thoughtful recommendation made by Basil Greenhill in his introduction to the 1975 edition, that the Lloyd's Survey Reports for Porthmadog vessels be examined to explain the superior quality of these Welsh vessels that performed so well and so long in their demanding trades. Having used these records extensively, I know they often provide more precise information on the construction site and the actual builder. As an information source for vessels, many of them engaged in the less glamorous trades of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Porthmadog Ships is an extremely valuable reference. For those with a more casual interest in Welsh shipping and its international diversity, it is an enlightening and enjoyable read.

Marven E. Moore
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


Endless Sea, is a story told by a single-handed (crew of one) mariner, of his voyage of world circumnavigation made during the southern summer of 1998/1999, aboard the 50-foot aluminum auxiliary sloop Paratii. Amyr Klink, the solo mariner, tells this tale in a most engaging manner. Relating the details of the what, why and how of the voyage, the author describes in detail the preparation of the vessel, the route, and its execution. Interwoven into the record of his daily routine, he refers to the personages of Antarctic exploration fame, and binds the whole with the thoughts and feelings that dominated his experience in the stormy and ice-strewn waters of the endless sea of the Southern Ocean, as he circumnavigated Antarctica. The title, Endless Sea, is a quote from a poem by the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935).

A record of the radio communications during the voyage, between the author and his wife, Marina, in Brazil, titled Marina's Land Log, adds the perspective of a keenly interested observer of the events described.

Amyr Klink, a Brazilian of much experience at crossing oceans in small boats, had commissioned the building of Paratii and had operated the sloop over a period of some eight years, when he commenced planning a Southern Ocean circumnavigation. On Paratii, handling sails while sailing upwind had always been comfortable and simple, but in a strong
following wind it was easy to make mistakes. One mistake could lead to broaching or even a career-ending capsize. To resolve the problem of sail control when running before gale force winds and surfing down large waves, a set of circumstances that could be expected to prevail over much of the voyage, Klink replaced the original mast and associated rigging with an Aerorig.

The Aerorig unit consisted of two parts. One part was the mast itself, 80 feet tall, free standing, and rotatable through 360 degrees. The other part was the square-bodied boom, 42 feet long, through which the mast passed. The two parts of the rig would form an inverted cross. One main sheet controlled the boom and thus, the set of the main sail and of the foresail. Compared to conventional rigs, which generally consist of complex control systems that are time-consuming and risky, Aerorig was, to the author, a magical solution.

Complementing the magical solution was a full suite of electronics for position fixing, collision-avoidance, autopilots, and maritime communications, including a hand-held satellite telephone and numerous electronic alarms throughout the vessel. A mechanical autopilot (no drain on the power supply) rounded out the design efforts to relieve the solo mariner of as many of the 24/7 tasks as possible, thereby leaving him time to sleep and to deal with the inevitable emergencies that occur in small craft on stormy oceans.

Amyr Klink was 43 years of age when he began his voyage at Paraty, Brazil, 125 miles south of Rio de Janeiro, 31 October 1998. From there he sailed to Grytviken, South Georgia Island, 16 to 23 November; thence eastward, remaining south of latitude 50 degrees South, to Dorian Bay, 64 49 South 63 30 West, on 2 to 9 February 1999, thence to the Brazilian Antarctic Station 62 08 South 58 40 West, 10 to 13 February, and so through Drake Passage and north-eastward back to Grytviken, South Georgia Island, 19 February to 7 March, and finally home to Paraty, 21 March 1999, 141 days out.

Klink experienced innumerable incidents that taxed him both physically and mentally: climbing the mast to replace a line that had parted; repairing the mechanical auto-pilot; diagnosing why the diesel engine that was fitted with a mechanical start started of its own volition; resolving the diesel cabin-heater problem caused by the varying air pressure as Parati rode to the top of one wave then raced down the next, resulting in a coughing heater and smoke billowing around the cabin. All these emergencies and many more occurred in a vessel that, at times, rolled such that the ends of the boom were dipping in the sea, and at other times, under minimum storm sails, surfed down mountainous following seas at speeds reaching twenty-two knots and all the time the captain was longing for real sleep, which only happened when safely secured at the Brazilian Antarctic Station and Grytviken.

There are seventeen excellent maps located appropriately throughout the book. The first is a map of the Antarctic Convergence (p.19), a line, thermally discernable, that circles the globe separating the cold waters to the north, from the frozen waters of Antarctica. It was south of the Antarctic Convergence that Klink made his circumnavigation. The remaining sixteen maps, one for each chapter, show the track made good as the voyage progressed.

A two-page facing spread of drawings (pp.42-43) show: the vessel’s portside in profile; the upper and lower decks in plan; and a profile from astern, showing the Aerorig with the mainsail set to the portside. Several photographs of the sloop at points along the route and of the author’s family, are included at appropriate
places in the narrative. Unfortunately, this story of immense detail is without an index.

A list of recommended reading closes the *Endless Sea*, a book that is, arguably, among the best of single-handed sailing literature published in English.

Len Forrest
Ottawa, Ontario


John Lundstrom’s purpose in writing *Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal*, is to determine the true ability of Fletcher as a commander in these three critical carrier actions of 1941-42. Lundstrom was motivated to write this book to set the record straight on Fletcher who, despite his success in winning these three battles, was vilified as a timid bungler at best and coward at worst, the man who failed to relieve Wake Island and abandoned the Marines at Guadalcanal. Historians particularly hard on Fletcher were Samuel Eliot Morison and Brigadier General Samuel Griffith, USMC, whose writings in the immediate post-war period became the authoritative sources. Criticism of Fletcher within the USN hierarchy, beginning with Admiral Ernest King, was also strong. Fletcher never defended himself publicly, for reasons explained by Lundstrom, and he became one of the most controversial figures in U.S. naval history and “a forgotten man.” Lundstrom’s masterful study restores Fletcher’s professional reputation and establishes him properly as an effective commander and pioneer in carrier warfare. In doing so, the author discredits Fletcher’s contemporary self-serving naval critics as well as historians for their lack of thorough research and objectivity.

Lundstrom carefully analyses Fletcher’s decisions and actions as a force commander from the abortive relief of Wake Island in December 1941 through the campaign at Guadalcanal to October 1942. He sets this in the panorama of the first dramatic year of sea warfare in the Pacific and traces Fletcher’s command activities within the structure of decision making at every level, strategic and operational. The author brings to the task a reputation as an expert on naval aviation and carrier warfare. A vast research effort is apparent in the book that he states began in 1974. While relying on some established sources, he draws on many newly discovered documents, massive dispatch files, and personal papers that no historian has previously used. The story unfolds through an exhaustive study of the multitude of minute details and influences that informed Fletcher’s decisions, particularly the analysis and effect of radio intelligence. The reader will be impressed, if not overawed, by the complexity of the decision-making process and nearly distracted, as Fletcher was, by the technical and structural problems in communications – the modern “fog of war.” Throughout, because Fletcher commanded the most precious assets in the USN, he was subject to micro-management by his superiors. One of the strong features of the book is the author’s portrayal of the principal characters, “warts and all,” and the interaction of powerful egos competing for position, grasping opportunities or trying to avoid censure in the rapidly evolving wartime command structure.

While this is not a biography and Fletcher’s personality remains elusive, the reader becomes fully acquainted with his professional persona and decision-making
Fletcher was neither an aggressive nor charismatic leader, which in many ways accounts for his subsequent treatment. He ascended to his wartime command through competent performance in peacetime as a surface warfare specialist and brought no experience in naval aviation (hence a “black shoe”) to his appointment as a carrier task force commander. Thrust into this position, he was in the forefront of the USN learning to do carrier warfare. Acknowledging his deficiency, he purposefully relied on naval aviation specialists on his staff and even pilots, to provide him with the information required to make his decisions. Lundstrom’s research suggests that Fletcher, while no innovator, was a competent learner who built on the experience of each battle. For example, he was the first proponent of grouping carriers within a single task force. Originally opposed by naval aviators, it became standard practice by 1944. His major foible was termed the “AFFAG disease” (Ammo/Fuel/Food/AvGas) or fixation with logistical issues that heavily informed his decisions. We would like to know more about Fletcher, but his files went down with the USS Yorktown at Midway, and the circumstances of his rapid replacement in October 1942 precluded him retrieving his Guadalcanal files. As a consequence of being without documents, he would not rely on his memory either to defend himself against detractors or participate in postwar reviews of the battles he won. Lundstrom infers that his appreciation of Fletcher is incomplete.

The reader will be impressed by Lundstrom’s narratives of the three battles. His treatment of Midway is clear, concise and accurate, possibly the best written. He demonstrates that the performance of Hornet’s air staff was a “fiasco,” and Admiral Marc Mitscher, later a paragon of carrier warfare, stumbled badly. The myth that Admiral Ray Spruance was in command at Midway and not Fletcher is completely dispelled. The author is particularly adept in his handling of the complex Guadalcanal campaign. There Fletcher was faced with the same dual tasking of Admiral Nagumo at Midway, to support an invasion and fight a surface action. Admiral Kelly Turner, who was in charge of amphibious operations and a virulent critic of Fletcher, is shown aggressively using every means, including fabrications, to deflect blame for his own command errors onto Fletcher. Lundstrom’s analysis of the disaster in the Battle of Savo Island at Guadalcanal is characteristically straightforward. The allied (USN/RAN) radar-equipped covering force had sufficient strength but was poorly handled, and as a result, it was cleverly ambushed and badly defeated in a night action by the Japanese cruiser force – beaten fair and square. The USN’s pride was hurt so it searched for a “scapegoat” and Fletcher was removed from his command. Lundstrom’s frankness and honesty is evident throughout and he faces off squarely against naval officers, marines and historians whose appreciations are inaccurate, biased, or plain lies. In particular, Morison’s proven inaccuracies and “hindsight analysis” in reporting these battles cast doubt on the reliability of his early volumes on the Pacific war. At times there seems to be too much detail to assimilate but this is precisely the challenge Fletcher faced. Lundstrom’s flowing style is easy to read and the book is full of excellent charts, tactical diagrams and photographs, but at 515 pages of text it is not to be undertaken lightly.

John Lundstrom has achieved his objective and demonstrated the professional competence of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. In doing so, the author has produced a book whose importance in understanding naval command at both the strategic and operational levels in the first year of the war in the Pacific cannot be overstated. While
not a revisionist history, it compels the reader to challenge the conventional wisdom of earlier works. It is an indispensable resource for serious students of this subject.

Wilf Lund
Victoria, British Columbia


The history of North America is a maritime history. Colonists and, later, Americans have always relied upon the sea for economic prosperity, food, and travel. Unfortunately, when writing about the founding of the United States of America historians have all too often cast their gaze in the direction of Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman farmer, while averting their eyes away from John Hancock’s maritime employee. This primary focus on agrarian, land-based history extends from the colonial period through to modern times. Nowhere is it more prevalent than in an examination of the history of the American Revolution. Christopher P. Magra’s new book, *The Fisherman’s Cause: Atlantic Commerce and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution*, manages to redirect the historian’s gaze back toward the sea in this crucial period.

Magra explores how the commercial cod fishery and overseas trade helped to spark tensions between Great Britain and her American colonies. When war broke out, colonists utilized their overseas trading networks, established as a result of the cod fishery, to import military supplies into the American colonies to supply the Continental Army, and, ultimately, win America’s independence from Great Britain. Magra divides his book into three parts: the rise of the colonial cod fishery, Atlantic origins of the American Revolutionary War, and the military mobilization of the fishing industry. Each section of the work contains meticulous statistical information that allows the reader to contextualize both the size and the economic importance of the cod fishery in American history.

Magra’s book is good in many respects. Much of the literature on the American Revolution views the conflict from the perspective of the wealthy landowner or the land-based labouring man. When mariners even receive a mention, it is because, while on shore, they may have joined a mob to ransack an influential colonial official’s house or thrown rocks at a British soldier. Magra’s book argues that the American Revolution began as a struggle over Britain’s control (or lack thereof) of the cod fishery in North American waters. This hitherto un-discussed cause of the American Revolution contributes significantly in explaining sailor participation in crowd actions in the American Revolution and the intense patriotism of American sailors toward the newly created country.

While clearly a groundbreaking and influential book, this work has a few minor problems. Magra’s monograph only focuses on white fishermen and does not mention Native American and black mariners who also worked in the industry. Magra does not dismiss these labourers out of hand, however, acknowledging that “it was theoretically possible for recruiters to have hired women, older men, African Americans…[and] Native Americans” (p.50). Unfortunately, he leaves the presence of these mariners of colour in the realm of the theoretical. Magra possibly did not explore their involvement because he did not examine the sources in which Native American and black cod fishermen are
mentioned quite frequently, such as the Mary Coffin Starbuck Account Book, found at the Nantucket Historical Association, and the court records of Essex County, currently held by the Peabody Essex Museum. Native Americans operated a successful cod fishery at Squam, Nantucket, and sold their catches to the Starbuck family, where they would be dried on flakes and shipped to overseas markets. The eighteenth-century court records of Essex County, Massachusetts contain numerous instances of merchants and shipmasters complaining that their enslaved black workers deserted their fishing schooners while on a fare. Had Magra examined these communities, it would have been interesting to compare whether Native American and black cod fishermen supported the American Revolutionary cause to the same degree as white cod fishermen. Nevertheless, Magra’s omission of Native American and black mariners should not detract from his overall points, which are both convincing and original.

The Fisherman’s Cause makes a significant contribution to the historiography of the American Revolution. Each chapter is expertly researched and documented. By re-orienting historians’ gazes toward the sea, Magra has shown the oceanic dimensions of a conflict that changed and shaped the modern world.

Kelly Chaves
Fredericton, New Brunswick


Eric Mills, who spent the major part of his academic career as a biological oceanographer, is now widely recognized as one of the leading figures in the history of oceanography. His first book, Biological Oceanography: An Early History, 1870-1960 (1989) is a modern classic in the field. He has also been a pivotal figure in promoting historical work in oceanography through his long service as president of the International Commission on the History of Oceanography, and as a major organizer of the important Maury conferences, in which historians gather to discuss topical issues in the history of oceanography. His new book, The Fluid Envelope of our Planet, represents one more example of his path-breaking efforts to detail the history of modern oceanography, this time tackling the history of physical oceanography by examining how oceanographers have grappled with the recondite problem of oceanic currents.

The Fluid Envelope of our Planet is the story of how physical scientists, who had largely ignored oceanic questions until the late-nineteenth century, began to mount research programs to delve into the myriad of questions surrounding oceanic currents, soon to be referred to generally as oceanic circulation. Early attempts using more qualitative approaches seemed only to reveal the complexity of the problem. As Mills has persuasively argued, it was not until new mathematical approaches, pioneered by several Scandinavian scientists to study fluid dynamics (first part of the Bergen School of meteorology), were used as research techniques that oceanographers were able to evaluate the ocean’s vast array of physical features to begin to understand the salient components of oceanic circulation. Credit for early innovations is extended to the Norwegian physical scientist, Vilhelm Bjerknes, who illustrated how mathematical techniques could provide a valuable framework for a more dynamic picture of the world’s oceanic currents.

The story Mills weaves, as he
emphatically states, is not a simple and linear one, but one dependent upon the contingencies of personal interactions among oceanographers, national styles and demands for understanding the oceans, and serendipity. For example, the Scandinavian approach first expanded outside of Europe when Canadian fisheries workers asked Johan Hjort to cross the Atlantic to assist them in understanding oceanic conditions important to fish stocks. As Mills notes, the technical import did not immediately take hold in Canada, in large part due to both the small size of its oceanographic community and the lack of federal research support. At the same time, similar research efforts in Germany and France were constrained by national agendas, including limitations imposed by the First World War and its aftermath. Finally, it was serendipity that led to the formulation of some of the best work in studying oceanic currents among scientists in the United States, both at Woods Hole and at Scripps. At Woods Hole, Henry Bigelow became aware of Hjort’s contributions through his friendship with the Canadian, A.G. Huntsman, and applied these to questions of oceanic circulation. At the same time, the US Coast Guard’s Edward Smith began to utilize similar techniques to investigate the movement of icebergs in the northern Atlantic. The combination of these efforts soon produced a strong cadre of researchers at Woods Hole, especially after the Second World War. Similarly, on the west coast, George McEwen began to study “upwelling” events, associated with currents along the coastline. While his approach proved to be limited, it did create a problem set for Harald Sverdrup, a Norwegian familiar with Bjerknes’s mathematical techniques who became director of the Scripps program in 1936. The combination of continued efforts at Woods Hole and Scripps after the war was to lead to path-breaking studies published between 1960 and 1972, especially by Walter Munk at Scripps and Henry Stommel at Woods Hole, leading to what is now referred to as the Global Theory of Circulation.

Mills does more, however, than focusing solely on the modern solution to the problem that serves as the central point for his book. For example, he carefully details the importance of the Canadian, Huntsman, for importing the dynamic model from Scandinavia. While this did not create a major research school along Canada’s east coast during the early part of the twentieth century, the ideas did percolate southward to Woods Hole and, even more importantly, served as the inspiration for the re-emergence of dynamic oceanography in Canada from 1930-50. Specifically, an important, but often-overlooked research program developed at the Pacific Biological Station in Nanaimo, British Columbia, led by Henry Hachey and Jack Tully (the Pacific Oceanographic Group or POG). Additionally, Mills skillfully integrates the story of the production of the major oceanographic text in the twentieth century, *The Oceans* (1942), written by Sverdrup and his colleagues at Scripps, a book that figured prominently in the creation of modern oceanography. The book was a “magisterial and definitive treatise in all the fields it surveyed, biological, chemical, geological, and physical oceanography . . . .” (p. 265). Despite its synthetic nature and crucial to Mills’ argument, over one-third of *The Oceans* was written by Sverdrup and dedicated to the new dynamic view of physical oceanography.

*The Fluid Envelope of our Planet* has been many years in the making, in large part due to Mill’s commitment to examine voluminous amounts of scientific archival and primary source material scattered throughout libraries and research facilities in Europe and North America. Readers will benefit, therefore, not just from his
narrative, but from his exhaustive notes and thorough bibliography. His studious mining of these resources has produced a rich “insider’s” view of the history of oceanic circulation. Although the book is not a difficult read, it is a book that demands the reader’s attention. Those who have more than a passing acquaintance with oceanography should benefit greatly from Mills’ scholarship. But the book will also be of interest to anyone with an interest in history of science, the history of oceanography, or just good historical work. Together with Mills’ first book, The Fluid Envelope of our Planet has now provided scholars with a rich, intriguing, and suggestive overview of the formation of modern oceanography.

Keith R. Benson
Seattle, Washington


Louis Arthur Norton’s new book is an engaging account which focuses on five American “dysfunctional sons of the brine” during the early years of the Continental Navy.

Norton begins with an informative context chapter on maritime naval service during the American Revolutionary War. He covers a great deal of ground in a single chapter and his breadth of knowledge is apparent. The bulk of the study concentrates on army commodore John Manley, privateer Silas Talbot, naval patrician Dudley Saltonstall, Lieutenant Commodore Joshua Barney, and the most famous of the group, Captain John Paul Jones.

Each captain came from a varied background and made his mark on the formative years of the new nation’s navy. The case study of Saltonstall demonstrates he had a most impressive New England pedigree which contrasts dramatically with John Paul Jones, whose father was a Scottish gardener. While they all had a significant impact on the events of the Revolutionary War, their actions did not necessarily help the American cause. Saltonstall’s naval career, for instance, ended in disgrace over his misguided leadership of the disastrous Penobscot Expedition, ‘one of the sorriest episodes in American naval history’. Although a case can be made for the fact he may have been the scapegoat for the poorly planned venture, there is little in Saltonstall’s naval record to suggest talent or good fortune, although he did have more success as a privateer.

John Paul Jones was at the other end of the spectrum: his accomplishments against the British earned him international rewards and opportunities. Jones was created the Chevalier de l’Ordre du merite militaire by Louis XVI of France and made rear admiral in the imperial navy of Catherine the Great. Unfortunately for Jones, he was not a stranger to scandal and he would end his life under a cloud of dishonour for sexual impropriety (which he denied). Nonetheless, posterity has been abundantly more generous to Jones than Saltonstall.

Norton’s other subjects are hardly household names like Jones, nor did they suffer the same level of resentment and condemnation as the arrogant and inept Saltonstall. For example, John Manley was a deserter from the Royal Navy who went on to have a distinguished career in the Continental Navy. Manley was appointed Commodore by George Washington. Silas Talbot was a “seagoing soldier” who enjoyed a varied career in the maritime
world; Norton credits him as being one of the founders of the United States Navy, although Talbot rarely rates more than a mention in modern textbooks. By far the most interesting case study is the chapter on Joshua Barney, who has a very credible record of naval accomplishments as well as a string of jailbreaks.

What these men have in common is that all suffered serious setbacks throughout their careers as well as triumphs. Mutiny, combat, capture and escape feature prominently in their biographical sketches. Most importantly to the main theme of the book, these five captains spent their considerable energies chasing advancement which often brought them in to bitter conflict with other members of the naval world and the political elite of their time.

While Norton claims that the men of the Continental Navy were more inclined to dysfunction than their British counterparts, he offers little in the way of proof. Accounts elsewhere of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century portray a similar picture to Norton’s: one may easily argue that connections, ability, opportunity and good fortune were all essential elements of a successful naval career on either side of pond. Norton is correct when he says that all his subjects possess (to varying degrees) aggression, narcissism and perfectionism. While making these men difficult to serve under or with, these qualities could prove useful in the heat of battle. Again, such traits were no doubt present disproportionately among the upper ranks of the military and Norton’s contentious captains may be more typical than he acknowledges. Even if we accept Norton’s thesis that these men were more given to acrimony than their British adversaries, we don’t know how representative this naval quintet was among American captains. Although Norton’s subjects are certainly “characters” and their stories make for entertaining reading, we are not entirely sure why the author chose them at the expense of others. Regardless, it seems ill advised to make grand statements from such a small sample.

The book purports to be a psychological study. While commendable in many respects, Norton’s analysis lacks depth in this regard. No doubt this has to do with the brevity of the study. It would be difficult to deliver a thorough psychohistory of five men in 146 pages of analysis. The concluding chapter could go much farther in bringing the case studies together.

Despite these criticisms, the book is very well written and very readable. Norton has consulted a credible list of primary and secondary sources. These dysfunctional sons of the brine are guaranteed to entertain general and academic readers alike with their verbal and maritime battles.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick


Despite its modest size, this book provides considerably more than the sub-title indicates. It is an excellently researched description of a wide-ranging and often chaotic situation. The events described involve not only the last months of the Kriegsmarine’s U-boat operations but the wildly variable responses by at least six of the Allied forces. While 8 May 1945 was the official end of the Second World War in Europe, events involving U-boats from northern Norway to Japan were already in play, and the last of the boats, U-977, didn’t actually put into port to surrender — at Mar
del Plata, Argentina — until 17 August 1945. And not with Hitler or Borman or other escapees aboard, as some sensationalists still suggest.

There are tables within the text, including the locations of Flotillas as the war ended, and the 110 boats disposed of by sinking in the Royal Navy’s Operation Deadlight. In the appendices is a table listing the 59 U-boats still at sea when the order to surrender was issued, and those scuttled despite the surrender order. These are useful references. Paterson also describes and explains events in the final surrender of bases in Norway, the French Biscay ports, and boats elsewhere in the world. There is some order made out of the confusion, even chaos, which occurred as the German hierarchy tried to arrange unilateral surrenders to the western Allies, while Dönitz at first directed his U-boats to scuttle themselves, and then cancelled the order. In many boats, commanding officers and even crews made up their own minds as to what they would do, a highly unusual situation, even for the Kriegsmarine.

There is a chapter on Lieutenant-Commander Ian Fleming’s No. 30 Assault Unit, charged with trying to locate and send back any secret documents, codes, construction plans or messages that might help British technicians understand or even recreate German naval designs, including their latest high-speed “electric” boats. All those plans had been carefully destroyed, or lost in the bombing of the Shell-Mex House in Berlin which was being used as the Naval Construction Office. There is an assessment of the treatment of ex-U-boat crewmen in the immediate post-surrender years — fairly benign by the British and Canadians, and harsh interrogation by the Americans (leading to at least one commanding officer’s suicide and jail for two civilian interrogators) who were greatly concerned with the rumoured V1 or V2 rocket attacks on the U.S. from rogue boats. Treatment by the French was often vindictive. What most don’t appreciate is that these surrendered seamen and officers did not get back to Germany until 1947, even 1948 in some cases, some held in civilian jails until then. The rather reprehensible argument put forward was that, unlike POWs covered by the Geneva Convention, these were “disarmed enemy personnel,” meaning they fell outside that convention and thus could be held as long as they were useful or were felt to be a danger to their captors.

The whole and extremely variable process of U-boat surrenders went on for at least a month after the formal signing of the German surrender. The German naval forces were very much still a cohesive force under effective command, despite the obvious end almost upon them. In Denmark on 5 May, eleven seamen were executed for refusing to sail their minesweeper (M-612) to help evacuate eastern troops in the face of advancing Russians; two more S-boat men were also executed for failing to carry out orders on 10 May before Allied troops took over. There were protracted negotiations around the besieged U-boat ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire and La Rochelle which had been surrounded, but not captured, and left to wither when fighting for Brest cost unacceptable casualties on both sides. At St. Nazaire it was arranged well before the surrender that 20,000 civilians would be released and food brought in by train, through the Red Cross, in anticipation of a final Gotterdammerung battle, which in the event did not occur. In many surrender camps, in Germany and in British-captured territories, German naval personnel even retained their arms and were employed as local area guards, being an obedient, disciplined force still under their own officers.

The actual U-boat surrender arrangements were almost as confusing as the land ones. Some commanding officers took votes as to whether to scuttle (about
proceed to a neutral country and surrender, return to German ports (4), or just surface and await Allied instruction. The boat that surrendered to Canadian forces, U-190, did not have anything on board for the crew to make the required black flag, so they surfaced, flew the *Kriegsmarine* ensign and waited. The many boats in Norway, to which submarines from French Atlantic ports came once those ports were blockaded, were mostly sailed to Loch Eriboll with RN crews assisted by a few engine-room personnel (33 U-boats). Most boats at sea fired off all torpedoes and threw overboard secret equipment such as their Enigma machines, radar, charts and codes.

An Allied Commission was formed to decide what would become of all these submarines that had been a major concern for five-and-a-half years. All agreed — more or less — that this dangerous force was to be destroyed. Those vessels that went into Allied ports were retained there. In general, it was agreed that only 28 U-boats were to remain afloat, divided among the Allies. Most, naturally, went to the British, the Americans and the Russians, who were particularly interested in the new Type XXI and XXIII models and the odd specialty boat. Canada retained only one submarine; France kept six, one Type XXI lasting until 1967; Norway retained four, one of which (U-995) went back to Germany as a museum boat at Laboe, north of Kiel. Spain retained two that surrendered there, a Type VIIC lasting with their navy to 1970. The two U-boats that ended the war in Argentina were turned over to the Americans. The sinkings during Operation Deadlight between November 1945 and February 1946 were rather a fiasco for the RN. The boats had not been maintained at Lisahally and Loch Ryan in Northern Ireland, and quite a few sank while being towed out; the frigates and destroyers used for towing many were unsuitable, tows broke and the boats had to be sunk by gunfire; others, with open bridge hatches and unmanned, sank on their own. An inglorious end.

The only real problem with the book is the rather sparse index, where essentially only U-boat’s and ships’ numbers and C.O.s are noted, but not locations or events — which made this review somewhat harder to prepare. This is but a minor problem for a valuable addition to the library shelves. *Black Flag* covers events in detail that usually occupy just a few pages in other histories.

Fraser McKee  
Toronto, Ontario


There is a foreword by R. Michael Wall, director of The American Marine Model Gallery in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and an introduction that provides a history of the model type and a list of Navy Board Ship Model Collections. The main body of the book then moves into an extremely detailed step-by-step photographic essay recording the building of a miniature model of *Royal George* of 1715 and its display case. Reed briefly discusses a number of his other models. Lines, body and deck plans and further research notes follow that, finally ending with a short bibliography.

The book is lavishly illustrated with more than four hundred colour photographs taken by Reed who, at one time, taught creative photography. He now uses his camera as a research tool and as a means of recording the various stages of his work; he also discusses his switch from film to digital cameras.

Navy Board, Admiralty, or Dockyard models are all terms that have
been applied to this type of model; the terms Navy Board or Admiralty suggesting their intended purpose, while the term Dockyard model suggests their provenance and perhaps their purpose. Today, Navy Board is the generally accepted term used to describe these models which were traditionally built to a scale of 1:48 where one-quarter of an inch represents one foot. Miniatures, however, are built to much smaller scales; in the case of Reed's *Royal George* discussed here, to a scale of 1:192, where one-sixteenth of an inch represents one foot. Yet the detail at the smaller scale will visually match the work seen on larger scale models, albeit frequently using totally different methods to achieve the end result.

The hull was built using a two-stage approach pioneered by Donald McNarry, the greatest miniaturist alive today, framed up to the middle gundeck and carved from a solid block of wood above it. A boxwood sheet for each frame was milled to thickness, width, and height, onto which frame profiles were marked, cut, and sanded to shape. A slot cut into the top of each frame blank aligned them when they were stacked together like slices in a loaf of bread. The layered and lightly-glued block was finished to shape using the frame edges as guides, the stern angle was set and cut, construction lines were marked on the hull and the frames were numbered to allow later re-assembly. Disassembled, the centres of the frames were removed and finished, then glued into pairs, after which parts of one face of each pair was removed to create the classic Navy Board framing style. When finished, the frames were reassembled and the bow, keel, sternpost and deadwood assemblies were made and installed. Positions for the lower deck gunports were marked, chain-drilled and finished.

A block of wood was marked to the plan and profile drawings, sawn and carved to create the upper hull and then hollowed out so that the thickness matched the molded dimension of the lower framing. Gunport locations were marked, drilled, and cut, and the top and bottom hull sections were dowelled to fit together.

Deck framing consisting of clamps, deck beams, ledges, carlins and planking sections, made by bonding cedar shavings to pre-stretched cartridge paper, marked to represent the planking seams, were installed in both hull sections while they were still separated, leaving planking areas open as is normal in Navy Board models. Capstans were made, fitted and installed and the lower and middle gun-deck structures were stained. Countless small assemblies were made and fitted while the decks were accessible, including gratings, coamings, planking, stairways, hand-rails, railings, ringbolts, and a number of bulkheads moulded from plastic card, fitted out, and painted to represent wood with decorative accents added. Pre-painted wood shavings (spirketting) were applied to the inside of the bulwarks and work on the quarter and forecastle decks commenced following the same approach used on the lower decks. Turned pillars were made and fitted, and the steering wheel was assembled from photo-etched components, painted and installed and the two hull sections were glued and dowelled together.

Exterior planking commenced with the main wales, made from pre-painted holly, while the rest of the hull planking was yellow cedar. The small cabin on the aft end of the quarter deck was made and installed allowing work on the stern galleries to proceed. These were built up from basic cut and shaped pieces of wood, card, plastic and wire. Windows and galleries were assembled and installed using simple but effective assembly techniques. The facade across the stern was made of card installed with the balcony rails, etc. The entry port steps, canopy, skid beams, bulwark cap rails, channels, chain plates and...
deadeyes, mooring bits, and gunport lids tended to use more traditional techniques, albeit at a small scale.

Headrails were shaped using traditional techniques, using wood, wire and paper and completed with built-up gesso. The beakhead bulkhead, including the roundhouses, was made and installed. The double equestrian figurehead was sawn and carved from boxwood while its rider was built up using gesso over a wire armature and carved, as were fine details on the figurehead and stern decorations. The stern decorations were roughed in using wood and an epoxy putty, then completed with gesso. Tissue paper was used to simulate clothing. In-process photos show the stern decorations, figurehead, and bulwark friezes finished with gesso, which is a stark white, yet final model photos show them painted or gilded. Strangely, Reed failed to describe the finishing of these important aspects.

Through its superb photographic presentation of the complex 1600-hour building process, this book opens up a new aspect to ship-model building and is highly recommended to anyone contemplating building a miniature, or simply wanting to explore the many unique techniques involved. Interestingly, with only a few minor exceptions, simple tooling was used throughout.

Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Despite the title, this is not a history of St. John’s, Newfoundland, and the Battle of the Atlantic. It is, rather, an anthology of excerpts from articles and books, along with a smattering of poetry and song. Senator Bill Rompkey takes credit as editor, although I think “compiler” would have been more appropriate. There is an introduction, afterword, and bibliography, and nearly sixty pages of photographs, leaving 131 pages for the excerpts themselves. Nearly one-third of those pages are from two well-known works by James B. Lamb.

That the book is a labour of love by a dedicated amateur is obvious from its disparate approach, and from its introduction and afterword, which scholars can safely ignore. That leaves the works themselves, which begin inauspiciously with an excerpt from Canadian author Leslie Roberts’ 1944 publication, Canada and the War at Sea, conveying his impressions of wartime St. John’s. The past cannot be undone, but one hopes the day is not far off when the word “Newfie” will join the list of ethnic and racial slurs that are socially unacceptable. Roberts gives it a full workout, replete with the superior attitude its use implies—hence his assessment of the Newfoundland economy as “What To Do About Newfie” (p.59). Clearly, he failed to observe that Newfoundland was enjoying full employment, and that its government, awash in budgetary surpluses, was sending millions of Canadian dollars to cash-strapped Britain in the form of interest-free loans or outright gifts.

I am going to assume that readers of this journal are familiar with Lamb’s The Corvette Navy and On the Triangle Run, both of which contain writing of the highest order. I must note, however, that Lamb’s use of the wartime nickname “NewfyJohn” in reference to St. John’s does not offend. Unlike Roberts, Lamb spent enough time in the city to develop a genuine admiration for its people, and that sense suffuses his work. It was, moreover, not NewfyJohn that subsequently stuck in people’s craws, but its
abbreviated form as applied to the island or its people.

Lamb is followed by a short piece on the origin of the expression “The Barber Pole Squadron” and the lyrics to “The Barber Pole Song,” both describing the ships of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Fifth Escort Group. Together, they make for interesting folklore. They give way to a selection from novelist Margaret Duley’s non-fiction account of the Caribou Hut, a servicemen’s hostel at which she volunteered. Her judgments of the fighting men from Britain, Canada, and the United States who intermingled at the hostel are generous and perceptive. Duley sees the big picture as well as the small, and offers real insight into why St. John’s and Newfoundland were vital during the war. The reasons? “Because Newfoundland had the most important geographical position between the two hemispheres. She was furthest away from [North] America, and the nearest to Europe. Her capital town was the most easterly port, stuck out in the North Atlantic. Other than that St. John’s had an almost landlocked harbour that could wrap comforting arms round the ships fighting the battle of the Atlantic” (p.109). Nobody has said it better or more succinctly.

The excerpt from Darrin McGrath’s Last Dance: The Knights of Columbus Fire is a straightforward account of the tragic fire of 12 December 1942 that destroyed the Knights of Columbus Hostel and claimed the lives of 99 men and women, mostly service members. Mercifully, the author spares us the speculation that the fire was the work of Nazi saboteurs. Helen Porter steps up next with a passage from her autobiography Below the Bridge, in which she recounts her memories as an adolescent in wartime St. John’s. She vividly reveals how servicemen were integrated into the fabric of the community. Anyone reading her contribution will understand why almost all who were posted to St. John’s fondly remember their time there: that is, they were made to feel they belonged.

The subject matter of Steve Neary’s The Enemy on Our Doorstep: The German Attacks at Bell Island, Newfoundland, 1942 is self-explanatory. The piece itself is useful enough, although Rompkey is wrong to describe it as “the only in-depth account of the submarine attacks on Bell Island” (p.51). He must not have read the excellent coverage in W. A. B. Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1945: Volume II, Part I (St. Catharines, ON, 2002), which nonetheless appears in the bibliography.

Otto Tucker ends the collection as it began, which is to say, bumpily. His “Recollections of a Newfoundland Roofer-Warden,” from his book That Nothing Be Lost, is less concerned with the war per se than with his service in a different fighting force, the Salvation Army. A master orator, Tucker proves that the spoken word does not always translate well to the page.

Idiosyncratic and uneven, Rompkey’s book manages simultaneously to frustrate and to inform.

James E. Candow
Halifax, Nova Scotia


People have always shown a fascination with disaster, especially when viewed from the outside rather than from amidst it. The allure of someone else’s tragedy is so common in fact, that we have invented a unique twentieth-century term to describe it:
rubber necking. How then, is Ken Smith’s *A History of Disaster* anything other than a catalogue of maritime misadventure and tragedy? The author is able to cross this difficult boundary by asking two rather simple questions: by what criteria are disasters measured, and what do they reveal about human nature beyond the ability to enthral us? To answer these questions, Smith has selected 43 disasters that occurred in Atlantic Canada since the eighteenth century, and presents them in chronological order; no small task considering more than 100 major disasters have occurred in the Maritimes during the same time period. *A History of Disaster* is divided into three sections: pre-1900, 1900-50, and 1950 to present. Smith believes these examples serve as a brief history lesson, opening a window to the past and offering a true understanding of humanity’s character beyond the stereotypical rubber-neckers.

*A History of Disaster* begins with the story of the Violet and the Duke William, two British transport ships carrying Acadian deportees, which sank in the November storms of 1758, with the loss of more than 700 lives (p.4). While Smith is unable to add an element of personal loss to these tragedies (the victims names remain unknown), he quickly overcomes this by introducing characters such as Alexander Rankin and “old” James Wright, two early-nineteenth-century Maritimers whose actions saved countless lives in the face of devastating fires in Miramichi and Newcastle, New Brunswick (p.12). Smith does not simply provide a detailed list of accidents that befell Maritimers, as illustrated in his treatment of the Great Fire of 1825 that destroyed Newcastle. Drought, wind, and panic, he explains, all helped seal the fate of the community. He also explores the aftermath, in this case the response of Lieutenant-Governor Sir Howard Douglas, who, when financial aid from the British government was not forthcoming, donated personal funds and helped create sufficient concern among British citizens to raise more than £40,000 for victims of the fires (p.15). It is by including examples of individuals who made a difference through their personal acts of bravery, sacrifice, and strength of character that Smith is able to transform his work from more than a collection of tragedies. When fire and other catastrophes destroyed ships and ravaged communities, it was the resilience of the locals that resulted in renewal and rebuilding.

Although losses at sea figure prominently, as one might expect from the cover photograph of a sinking vessel (the *Cape Bonnie*), he looks into industrial history through coverage of mining disasters. In so doing he provides a glimpse of working conditions and labour relations. The first such example was a methane gas explosion at the Drummond Colliery in Westville, Nova Scotia, on 13 May 1873, that took the lives of 60 miners (p.38). The balanced account of the Springhill, Nova Scotia, mining disaster demonstrates Smith’s ability to present an impartial historical account that does not judge the participants, whether the miners themselves or the government agencies responsible for monitoring the safety of the mines. The government inquiry and report that deemed the Springhill mining tragedy an “accident” perhaps touched upon a personal note for Smith, a retired mining laboratory technician familiar with the inherent dangers in coal mining.

The most persistent theme throughout *A History of Disaster* is the connection between Maritime Canada’s geography and the events described by Smith. The two are inseparable for the author, and are reminiscent of Theodore Binnema’s *Common & Contested Ground: A Human and Environmental History of*
the Northwestern Plains. Both authors rightfully claim that understanding Canadian history requires a firm understanding of the impact of geography on the inhabitants, and indeed, the symbiosis that exists between the two. “Mother Nature occasionally makes a mockery of our smug and overconfident attitudes... [But] we are not afraid of the sea, nor do we live in fear, rather, we continue to challenge the sea through fishing, oil rigs, aircraft, just because we don’t remain in our homes doesn’t mean we are smug or overconfident” (p.184). Connecting the Maritimes to the outside world is another strength of the book. Consider the tragedy of the Titanic, for example, which occurred far out at sea, with no apparent relation to the Maritimes. By relating the role of Maritimes’ ships (Minia, Mackay-Bennett and Montmagny) in the recovery of bodies, and the delivery of those lost to temporary morgues in Halifax, Smith accomplishes what Gary Collins does in The Last Farewell: The Loss of the Collett: placing the Maritimes and its residents squarely in the midst of international history as participants rather than observers.

A History of Disaster is an ideal resource for historians and general readers to expand their knowledge of both disaster history and the history of the Maritimes. Smith delivers a thoughtful and at times exciting collection of major events that helped define the people of a culturally rich region of the country. Images endure of Maritimers stringing rope to the HMS Atlantic as it sank in an 1873 winter storm, hanging lanterns and pulling survivors to shore; these nameless heroes who time may have forgotten continue to live in the hearts of the region’s descendents, and are brought to life in Smith’s work. The addition of a full bibliography would have strengthened Smith’s effort, and remains the only disappointment (albeit minor) in

an otherwise worthy addition to any Canadian historical library or database.

Nino Scavullo
Guelph, Ontario


Michael Stammers continues his established publication record in wooden sailing-ship history of the United Kingdom with this fond reminiscence of the great days of wooden sailing ships that frequented Liverpool from 1565 to 1930. This photo collection spends about 12 pages covering each significant period of time or sailing vessel type including: Ships before 1660; Fluits, Guineamen and Privateers; Early Nineteenth Century Square Riggers; Packet Ships and Clippers; Iron Tramps; Steamers under Sail; Coasters; Mersey Flats; Fishing Boats; Yachts; and Training Ships.

Each chapter begins with one-page introduction to the subject and then provides up to ten pages of photographs or artwork depicting vessels of the type or period. Each plate has descriptive text and paintings cite provenance. There is, however, no provenance for the photographs anywhere in the book. While there is no conclusion, the five-page introduction provides a good general overview of the port and types of vessels.

This book is not just about vessels under sail, but also includes photographs of port facilities, including wharves, storehouses, lighthouses, breakwaters, moles, and shipyards. The author also illustrates the archaeological history of Liverpool by providing many photos of wrecks and excavations. There are also several photos of figureheads that have found their way ashore.
The only real complaint I had about the book is the lack of a map of the Liverpool area. One supposes that the book was intended for a local audience who would be familiar with the city, and therefore not need such an orientation. Luckily, you can find maps of Liverpool online to fill in this one omission.

This book will appeal to those who need a general overview of Liverpool or those who need a good set of photographs to show the evolution of vessels and their types for a typical United Kingdom port. It complements his previous books on vessels of Suffolk, Norfolk, West Coast shipping, figureheads, nautical archaeology and the Liverpool Docks.

Bradley Shoebottom
Fredericton, New Brunswick


For the first time, fisheries historians from Europe and North America have published an overview of the history of North Atlantic fisheries in one volume. This book is the first of a two-volume series on the North Atlantic fisheries. It covers the period from the early times to the mid-nineteenth century, before industrialization and mechanization fundamentally changed the nature of the fishing industry. The second volume, which is in progress, will bring the story up to the present.

The North Atlantic contains some of the world’s most productive marine ecosystems, most of which were heavily fished from earliest times. The book is spatially structured, commencing its narrative in the White and Barents Sea, progressing southwards to Portugal, then moving across the North Atlantic via the Faroese, Iceland and Greenland to the east coast of North America. Spanning 455 pages, the book covers a vast area and a long time period and 21 leading scholars, both historians and archaeologists, have contributed to the volume. It is indeed an achievement to bring together such a wide field of research into one volume. Undoubtedly, the book will serve as the obvious starting point for fisheries historians and it is a very welcome overview of this advancing field of maritime history.

The book does not attempt yet another compilation of national fisheries histories. On the contrary, it represents a successful attempt to write fisheries history from an international perspective. It also contains a comprehensive and useful bibliography of fisheries history literature.

Most chapters discuss changes in fishing technology, identifying the main vessel types and types of fishing gear. The authors also cover organizational issues, such as changes in ownership and conflicts about access to fishing grounds. Furthermore, the papers focus on catches, discussing which species fishermen targeted and what the scale of the fisheries was. For the period prior to 1850, few official fisheries statistics are available, so quantitative assessment is generally a difficult task. It is an important one, however, because it can improve our understanding of the changing significance of fisheries within European and North American economies. Many authors do adopt a quantitative perspective and thus contribute to this significant endeavour.

Several articles address issues related to markets and trace changing
trading patterns. The authors successfully demonstrate that fisheries were not a peripheral economic activity on the fringes of European and North American economies. In fact, fish were a key commodity in the Atlantic economy which emerged between 1500 and 1800. The papers by Candow, Carmona, Lopez and Barkham analyze the interaction between fisheries in the western North Atlantic and Europe and demonstrate how markets, ecology, politics and technology on both continents interacted. Papers by Lajus, Kraikovski, Yurchenko, Hansen and Nielssen document how distant regions along the Norwegian and Russian coasts were integrated into the European economy at an early time thanks to an expanding fish trade. Similarly, after 1300, as argued by Thór, Iceland was integrated into the European economy through the fish trade.

The book also evaluates the significance of environmental changes to the development of the North Atlantic fisheries. Being top predators of the oceans, fishermen have always depended on ecological changes and changing fish stock abundances. The ecological perspective is still a relatively new one within fisheries history, but it promises to enhance our understanding of drivers of change in fisheries. By integrating ecology into the historical analysis, this book breaks new ground, but there is certainly scope for further integration of marine science into fisheries history.

Changing consumption patterns and their impact on the fisheries are also addressed by several authors. While changes in religious practices following the Reformation clearly influenced the demand for fish in Northern Europe, little is still known about the drivers behind this development. In short, further research is required in order to assess changing food preferences and their influence on the development of European and North American fisheries.

Despite the massive size of the book, there is no synthesis of the individual chapters. The editors have done an excellent job editing the book into a coherent whole, but they have not attempted to take the analysis further towards an overarching history of the North Atlantic fisheries. Thus, a grand synthesis of the North Atlantic fisheries history is still waiting to be written. Maritime historians have good reason to look forward to the second volume in the series. If the second volume maintains the high level of excellence of the first, fisheries history will have two new key references. A History of the North Atlantic Fisheries is indeed a major step forward for fisheries history, and the last word is not yet said.

René Taudal Poulsen
Esbjerg, Denmark


This book is mainly a photo essay collection of never-before-published photos from the First and Second World Wars from the perspective of a German sailor. Chapter one covers general Kreigs marine life in the First World War including training while chapter two features First World War photographs from the collection of WO Freiderich Pohl who served on U-boats SM-25 and SMU-33 and U-boat commander Otto Wünsche. The Second World War photographs in chapter three are from the collection of Kapitän-Leutnant Herbert Brüninghaus who served as navigator in U-38 under Heinrich Liebe and as commander of U-6, U-148, and U-1059. There are also other photos from
Commander Günther Prien of *U-47* returning from the attack on Scapa Flow in 1939.

While Second World War German-source photographs are well-known among historians, the collection of First World War photos is most interesting. There are some spectacular photos of sinking ships. The target vessels appear quite clearly because most of the submarine-on-ship engagements used guns as opposed to torpedoes. What the author does not say is why the submarines were so close — to inspect the cargo and ships’ papers to determine if war material was aboard. These differences from the Second World War make for an interesting contrast. One series of photos is the inspection of neutral Norwegian vessels and the sinking of several of them (*Bras Norge*) when their cargos of pit props for mining were deemed war-related material. Unfortunately, the author does not take a moment to discuss this aspect of the restricted submarine warfare. There is also an interesting picture of a seaplane resting on the hull of *U-25*. There is no indication in the text if the submarine could carry a seaplane or if it was being ferried to a launching place.

The Second World War photos do not contain any action shots. Most involve shore activities or training. The most interesting photos include several pictures of social activities and ceremonial parades to show that the Kreigsmarine had these kinds of activities too. The most interesting semi-operational photo is one showing a pre-1939 floatplane (not identified). The caption indicates it was launched by catapult, but does not clearly indicate if a U-boat could launch it (they could not).

Each chapter starts with an essay of several pages which does not cover new ground, but provides context for the photos that follow. While there is adequate explanation of training and a sailor’s life during the Second World War in the introduction and chapter three, there is no equal treatment of First World War training and U-boat life. These weaknesses aside, its reasonable price makes it a worthwhile addition to a library with a focus on twentieth-century naval warfare.

Bradley Shoebottom
Fredericton, New Brunswick


The “Mead-Dark Sea” in the title is an homage (or variation, if you like) to Homer’s “Wine-Dark Sea,” frequently mentioned in his compelling epos *Odyssey*. While Homer sees the Wine-Dark Sea as a metaphor for the Mediterranean, Szabo’s Mead-Dark Sea refers to the North Atlantic Ocean. Setting the geographical context within which the monstrous fishes are being studied, the author aims to present a picture of medieval whaling — a picture that differs from what is generally considered. In medieval times, she claims, whales provided crucial subsistence resources (p.4). With her study, Szabo wants to illuminate the economic impact of “the invisible” (whales as invisible resources, p.6). In order to come to terms with the impact of the whale hunt and use of whale products, Szabo takes the reader on a journey through time and imagination in a number of well-composed chapters, or rather, a rendition of images.

In chapter one she dwells on the medieval perception of the natural world. Classical precursors played their role in depicting images of whales not merely as economic resources but rather as symbols of
good and evil. Religious influence on the
perception of nature is paramount as well.
As Szabo puts it: “The Jonah tradition and
the Physiologus and bestiary whales, with
their roots in biblical and classical thought,
etitomize the monstrous whales of
medieval Europe” (p.51).

Perceptions of whales changed
dramatically around the mid-thirteenth
century when the Dominican friar and
bishop, Saint Albertus Magnus (ca. 1195-
1280) published his De Animalibus. In this
fabulous work, Magnus focuses on the
importance of whales in the fields of
economics and science. Whaling methods
and techniques as conducted in various
countries are discussed in chapter two. The
third chapter contains references to the
North Atlantic ecological systems in which
whaling could blossom. Next to Albertus
Magnus, Olaus Magnus (1490-1557) is
quoted with regard to various whale
products and the use thereof, such as oil for
lamps “for altars and other holy places”
(p.89).

The fourth chapter discusses the
hunting techniques practised on the Faroese
islands. Here, pilot whales were (and still
are) driven onto the shore. Szabo assumes
that this technique has been adopted by
many other North Atlantic whaling
communities. Osteoarchaeological
evidence suggests that, in most instances,
smaller (and thus possibly younger)
specimen must have been hunted. This
evidence coincides with Szabo’s assumpton
that in medieval times it was beyond the
capability of technology to hunt whales at
sea. Instead, there must have been scavenging on shore. In chapter 5,
however, Szabo elaborately discusses the
shortcomings of using osteoarchaeological
finds to explain medieval hunting methods
and the scale thereof. She questions what
happened to the bones and meat from the
whales once they had been processed on
shore. In some instances, evidence has been
found of whale bone used in household
articles or in games. After a long treatise on
sites where whale bone has been found, the
author rather abruptly — and unsatisfactorily — states, “Regardless of
their precise treatment or use, it is
undeniable that whale bone was a
significant resource across many North
Atlantic sites”(p.161). Furthermore, she
suggests that “interdisciplinary analysis of
text and archaeology allows great insight
into local patterns of whale use in the
medieval North Atlantic” (p.176).

This statement is the ideal stepping
stone for chapter 6, where Szabo draws
attention to references to monstrous fishes in
North Atlantic history and literature using a
number of important texts as evidence. One
of the first authors to document Norse
whaling strategy was the Spanish/Arabic
geographer Al-Údhiri (circa 1058). About a
century later, another Islamic author, Al-
Idrisi, in his geographical treatise
Entertainment for One Desiring to Travel
Far (1154) describes in detail, among other
things, the use of whale bones and vertebrae
in Britain (p.196). The King’s Mirror, a
thirteenth-century didactic Norwegian
narrative between a father and a son
discussing the northern world, provides quite
a new image of whales. The anonymous
author does not use the text for moral
edification. Instead, the account leans
towards natural history rather than moral
allegory” (p.190). The book does not,
however, contain data on hunting methods.
In his Carta Marina (1539) and, to a larger
extent, in his Historia de gentibus
Septentrionalibus (1555), Olaus Magnus
presents a detailed look at the fishing
industry in Norway in the sixteenth century.
Unfortunately, his books do not contain clear
descriptions of pelagic whaling, or coastal
whaling for that matter. Most references to
whales are related to the use of products. For
example, as a result of the lack of wood in
the harsh North Atlantic climate, whale
bones were used often used in house construction. Some illustrations reveal how flensing was conducted. With her description of one of the better known images in the Historia, Szabo clearly points out the importance of Magnus’ work: “the monstrous whale has been defeated and graphically emasculated, not by a faithful monk in a small coracle, as seen in high-medieval narratives, but by industry and butchers and finely-dressed tourists” (p.274).

The last two chapters (seven and eight) contain masterful overviews of contemporary laws in Norway and Iceland, and their application to cases of whale hunting, whale stranding, and, subsequently, whale scavenging. Despite the complex nature of the sources, their applications and implications, Szabo manages to describe their contents most entertainingly. This holds true for the book in general. Old Norse sagas, laws, material culture, ethnographic evidence, archaeological sources all contributed to this fine book — and thus, to a better understanding of the relationship between whales and men in medieval North Atlantic communities. In October 2009, during the 34th Annual Whaling History Symposium at the New Bedford Whaling Museum (New Bedford, MA), Vicki Ellen Szabo was awarded the prestigious L. Byrne Waterman Award for the scholarship displayed in Monstrous Fishes. Rightly so, it seems.

Joost C.A. Schokkenbroek
Amsterdam, The Netherlands


Dan van der Vat is a well known historian who has written numerous books on naval matters involving both world wars of the twentieth century, as well as other topics such as a biography of Albert Speer, and experiences of life in East Germany. He has dealt with some aspects of the current book in his earlier volume on the history of SMS Goeben (The Ship that Changed the World: The Escape of the Goeben to the Dardanelles in 1914). The basic theme of this latter book, acknowledged as a prequel to the present one, is the same — that the events of the First World War directly involving Turkey were world-shaking in their effects. Indeed, it is van der Vat’s contention that British reverses in the Mediterranean, and specifically at the Dardanelles, constituted their greatest strategic defeat of the twentieth century, if not the past five hundred years.

This is a big claim — many people do not know that much about the Great War in general terms, let alone the significance or the details of the Dardanelles Campaign, both naval and military. While there are certainly other campaigns (i.e. the submarine campaigns of both wars) that threatened graver consequences for Britain, van der Vat marshals his arguments very persuasively.

The diplomatic jostling for position among the great powers during the twenty or thirty years prior to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 had much to do with the fate of the faltering Ottoman Empire. Constantinople’s grip on its various territories was uncertain and more vigorous powers were circling the dying empire greedily. Russia’s interest in securing both Constantinople and the sea routes to the Mediterranean was long-standing. Indeed, France and Britain had joined ranks against Russia in the Crimean War, 1854-56, to prevent that very outcome. Germany, as a unified nation state, was a new factor on the world stage in the late 1800s, and Kaiser Wilhelm II worked assiduously to secure the alliance of Turkey
against both France and Russia. Without touching on the many complicating details, suffice it to say that the arrival of SMS Goeben in August 1914 was enough to tip the balance of the wavering Turkish leadership in Germany’s favour. It need not have been so.

Winston Churchill was Britain’s first lord of the Admiralty. As minister responsible for the Royal Navy, Churchill held the strategic direction of the war at sea in his hands. To his credit, in this reviewer’s opinion, Churchill realised the strategic significance of Turkey and sought to reverse the setback that Turkey’s adherence to the Central Powers occasioned. Unhappily, Lord Kitchener, secretary of state for war, and hence responsible for the Army and its strategic direction, was of the view that while Turkey was important, it paled in significance against the titanic struggle in France and no resources were available to do anything about it. This view is not as purblind as hindsight suggests. The struggle in France was titanic — defeat there in 1914 or early 1915 would have rendered success elsewhere moot. The war’s outcome in those months was anything but assured. Churchill then sought to achieve his aim of securing the Dardanelles, Constantinople and the Bosporus with the Royal Navy alone. This misjudgement haunted Churchill for the rest of his life and justly so.

Unsupported naval attacks against shore-based defences usually end in disaster. Exceptions certainly exist — one thinks of the 1882 bombardment of Alexandria by the Royal Navy for example — but the principle is sound much more often than not. Churchill certainly knew this. Yet he persisted in advocating a purely naval assault against Turkey’s Dardanelles forts with the object of forcing a passage to Constantinople, something that could only be achieved if the guns of the fleet alone could compel an abject surrender by the Turks. The likelihood of success, even discounting hindsight, was vanishingly small. Indeed, the hubris inherent in the whole scheme inevitably calls to mind present-day airforce generals imagining “winning the war on terror” or in the Balkans by airpower alone. Armies win wars; everything else is support.

In Churchill’s defence, he adopted this approach on a faute de mieux basis: that is, Lord Kitchener was adamant that military forces were not available, and, in Churchill’s judgement, the prize was worth the desperate lunge by the navy alone. Churchill maintained his position despite the opposition of his first sea lord, the admittedly cantankerous Admiral Sir John Fisher, and other professional advisors. Occasionally, ignoring professional advice is necessary and, if proven right, a triumph and vindication of the principle of civil control of military and naval matters. If proven wrong… The Dardanelles Campaign was the graveyard of not just Churchill’s political career — it never fully recovered until the days of Britain’s national peril in 1940-41 — but also Fisher’s tenure as first sea lord. Moreover, it was, one must note, the physical graveyard of tens of thousands of British and Empire troops, as well as Turks. Indeed, Australia and New Zealand have commemorated the campaign as their iconic sacrifice and military coming of age, in much the same way Canada has adopted Vimy. The geo-political ramifications of the campaign on Middle East politics reverberate to this day — truly a world-shaking event.

Van der Vat has written an excellent, highly readable account of what he has rightly called the Dardanelles disaster. He has properly underscored the role of Germany in the region, a role that for many is neither understood nor appreciated. The direction and management of much of Turkey’s war effort was German, without
which it seems unlikely that events would have unfolded as they did. The author has also described the issues at stake, arguing that Churchill was not fundamentally misguided in his thinking about Turkey’s importance in the war and how the prize of knocking it out was indeed worth a major effort. What is a pity, of course, is how badly conceived and managed that effort was, and the knowledge that, had the resources eventually committed been made available at the start, the results would have been more satisfactory. The blunders described are legion and van der Vat is of the view that they prolonged the war for approximately two years as a result. This is a grave charge that not all will accept, but for this reader, it is compelling.

The book is tightly organised and a relatively quick read — it is barely more than 200 pages, albeit the font is small. It is composed of three parts: the Turkish “alliance” with Germany (it was loose in 1914); the Allied handling of that alliance; and a quick description of the failure of the campaign and its aftermath. It concludes with a discussion on what happened to the key participants and how the Middle East was affected by the campaign’s outcome. While certainly more than the Dardanelles Campaign has contributed to Western perceptions of the enigmatic “mess” that is the Middle East and the Muslim world, it is important for any modern understanding. This book is therefore a valuable addition to the literature.

A final comment on the illustrations, maps, notes and bibliography is necessary. The photographs included are good, with a number not commonly found elsewhere. There are no maps, which is a significant omission. If one’s geographic knowledge is excellent, perhaps maps are superfluous. That is not a common attribute and a few well chosen ones would have been helpful. There are no footnotes. Van der Vat is of the view they are annoying to most readers and generally unhelpful to boot. The bibliography is select and short, prefaced with some useful notes on the archival sources used. These are quite adequate.

I found this book to be one of the best on the campaign that I have seen in a good while. Its brevity is a welcome change from so many tomes produced these days — the author has a point of view, he presents it, he marshals his facts accordingly, yet sparingly, and leaves it to the reader to accept or reject the thesis. It is well done and a model of its kind.

Ian Yeates
Regina, Saskatchewan


Anyone searching Admiral John Byng on the website of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich is greeted by Voltaire’s comment in Candide about the British navy: In this country it is thought well to kill an admiral from time to time pour encourager les autres. The website adds gratuitously that it has not been necessary to shoot an admiral since Byng. Chris Ware is a former curator at the National Maritime Museum and is a visiting lecturer at the Greenwich Maritime Institute and the University of Kent. He regularly gives seminars on the subject of John Byng and has published articles on both Byngs, father and son. His other books are The Bomb Vessel: Shore Bombardment in the Age of Sail and First Class Cruisers and he is currently working on a study of submarine warfare during the First World War.

The last major biography of John
Byng was written by Dudley Pope in 1987 and this book is a long-overdue reappraisal of Byng’s naval career and not just the event for which he is best known—his execution. As a son of Admiral George Byng, a First Lord of the Admiralty, he was destined for a glittering career in the Navy. His first fleet action was at the age of fourteen, at Cape Passaro in 1718, his father’s greatest hour. Ware’s meticulous examination of Byng’s letters and logs charts his steady rise to Admiral of the Blue by the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756. Ware has also untangled the complex events surrounding Byng’s failure to relieve the British colony of Minorca from the French in May 1756 and has clarified the politics that led to accusations of cowardice and ended in Byng’s court martial.

Ware points out that most literature on Byng either blames or excuses him for his failure at Minorca to the exclusion of any other view. Smollett wrote that Byng was unpopular because he had never had the opportunity to signal his courage and illustrations in this book highlight how mercilessly he was lampooned. During his trial, pamphleteers vilified him and ministerial hacks whipped up mobs to hang and burn him in effigy. (Continuation to the Complete History of England 1757-58) Some of Byng’s contemporaries blamed Admiral Anson for approving him to lead the mission, but Anson in turn blamed Byng for his decision not to embark troops at Gibraltar on the grounds that Minorca was bound to be lost. Since the opposing forces were roughly equal, most naval officers blamed the failure on Byng’s cowardice and, out of all his followers, only three stood by him in his disgrace. (Rodger, Wooden World, 1986) It is now suspected that Byng may have been suffering from mental stress, since the Admiralty was already worried by a placid despondency revealed in his letters. (Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 2004) By the end of Byng’s trial, public attitude towards the navy had fallen severely and, in an effort to redress this, Smollett staged a two-act comedy The Reprisal: The Tars of Old England contrasting a salt-of-the-earth English sea-dog with his ineffectual French counterpart. (Lewis, Tobias Smollett, 2004)

Ware’s enthusiasm for his subject is such that general readers of history will not fail to be moved by Byng’s predicament. Maritime historians, however, may feel that the text would have benefited from more rigorous editing and, in spite of eighteen pages of British-sourced notes, there is only a one-and-a-half page index. Ware has also missed an opportunity in the three-page bibliography to include French or Spanish views on the Seven Years’ War in general and the Battle of Minorca in particular. Nevertheless, it is a neat coincidence that after his arrest, Byng was first brought to the Greenwich Hospital and put under close guard in Queen Anne Court, the building where, 250 years later, the author lectures on naval history.

John Byng was acquitted of physical cowardice but found guilty of moral cowardice, preferring the certainty of failure to the risks of success. Ware’s view is that Byng was an honourable man both in his life and in the manner of his death and that his execution was the result of political persecution. Others have noted that Byng died while his political friends were in office, yet they were unable to save him from the anger of the king, the fury of the public and the disgust of his naval colleagues. Ware believes that, in the longer term, the execution gave the Admiralty the means to impose discipline and strengthen the professional standards of naval officers.

Byng’s epitaph in his family’s vault refers to his martyrdom to political persecution as a perpetual disgrace of public justice. Following a recent decision by the UK Government to pardon First World War
soldiers for cowardice, Byng’s descendents petitioned the Ministry of Defence for a posthumous pardon. Not only was it refused, but the Ministry reinforced the ethos that a naval officer is expected to do everything humanly possible to execute his mission.

Michael Clark
London, UK


The subject of this book has been covered again and again, one might say “over cooked.” Biographers, ethnographers, anthropologists, literary critics, deconstructionists and others have taken the murder of Captain James Cook on the rocky beach of Kealakekua Bay 1779 as their subject. Cook has been seen as a bungling fool, an irritated and irrational commander in desperate straits, a racial imperialist, and a god, Lono, who returned at the wrong season and therefore, suffered the fate of a poor arrival time. In fact, Cook had returned to this bay out of necessity. One of his vessels was in need of a mast, and the wise captain did not want to chance a long ocean passage on the next part of his grand voyage of exploration. It takes a firm and courageous historian’s hand to enter the heavy lists of Cook scholarship and musing. A long bibliography could be compiled just on the works published since 1990, and it is a testament to the author’s reputation that publishers still think there is room for some sort of new treatment.

Professor Glyn Williams has been writing about James Cook for some considerable time, principally in conjunction with the South Pacific voyages and Cook’s cross-cultural encounters. His attachment to the Hakluyt Society, of which he is a past-president, has placed him at the centre of discovery studies in relation to the Pacific. He is less secure in his knowledge of ships in the North Pacific sea otter trade. Williams holds to the view that by 1779, Cook’s long voyages at sea had weakened the explorer’s capacities. The thorough work of Gavin Kennedy, The Death of Captain Cook (1997), regarded by many who study the event as the best book on the subject, is noted by Williams but the latter hardly deals head-on with the issue that Kennedy had posed: that men of the landing party and those who should have been in locations of close observance to what was going on ashore were culpable in the circumstances, and in the death of their captain. Kennedy has not been superseded in this regard. What Williams provides is an overview of the grand story, judiciously weighing various views, providing useful illustrations, and presenting an up-to-date bibliography. That the story will continue is beyond doubt.

On a recent visit to Hawaii and, in fact, to Kealakekua Bay, I saw a bumper sticker that read: KILL CAPTAIN COOK. Upon inquiry, I discovered that Hawaiian nationalists are seeking nationhood: they want to throw off the imperialist yoke, seize control and manage their own affairs, thank you very much. History becomes the whipping boy of the disaffected. How Professor Williams’ book is to be greeted in such hands it is hard to say. But for the scholarly world he had done a great service, for he has reasserted the historical perspectives that the ethnologists and literary wizards had somehow confounded in forms of scholarly transfiguration and transgression. Williams owes a great deal to the learned scholarship that he lists in his bibliography, and a student looking at this complex subject for the first time can do no
better than to consult this work in the first instance.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia


Considering that this is only the second of apparently three volumes, presumably covering other coasts of the U.K., it is a rather startlingly detailed coverage of its subject — the located wrecks of all submarines along just the south coast of Britain, from Land’s End in Cornwall to about Beachy Head, east of Portsmouth, plus a couple of wrecks farther afield closer to the French shore. Within that area alone, Young deals with 60 sunken submarines in great detail; 19 from before and during the First World War, 10 lost or deliberately sunk as targets between 1919 and 1938, 24 lost during the Second World War, and six post-war losses. There are 16 RN boats, 43 German U-boats, and one French submarine, their Minerve. The wartime losses were nearly all due to anti-submarine action or mining while about half of the peacetime ones were due to accidents. But since he is covering submarine wrecks, Young also includes boats that sank during towing operations to ship-breakers (such as the Minerve), and a few deliberately sunk as part of gunnery and anti-submarine exercises. One soon gets the impression that submarining was, and is, a dangerous trade.

There is an extensive glossary of both submariner terms and general words, both English and German, including some RN naval slang terms, and descriptions of the German Albericht coating to reduce asdic return and Runddipol and Wanz radar outfits. There are a few rather minor errors in some descriptions (RN and Canadian “Hedgehog” units were fitted in most ships in single mounts, not the American “split hedgehog” type, and the authors persist in repeating the story that ASDIC stood for the inter-war Anti-Submarine Detection International Committee, when the term was in use by 1918 and was simply the Admiralty’s ASD+ics. (Don’t believe everything Churchill said in the House!)

But it is Young’s record of every single located wreck and the expanded narrative that goes with each which makes these stories more than just a listing. In every case there is a description of the boat — when and where launched, commissioned and lost, the builder, how fitted from armament to fuel capacity, range and often additional features. This is followed by a detailed narrative of apparently all the boats’ patrols before their loss and what ships they sank, even for later peacetime sunken submarines. Young indicates the circumstances of the final patrols of the boats engaged in war missions, and provides a description of the wreck site and its dive-ability. In fact, this book is largely a “divers” guide to submarine wreck visiting. Young cautions that many boats were lost with their crews and are now war graves and should not be further disturbed. As well, many lie 280 feet deep and in strong tidal streams, so are very much for the diving expert. The author has relied upon — and quoted assiduously — British Admiralty and German official records, along with reports from research divers who have been down to most of the wrecks to verify their authenticity or, for U-boats, their identity. Some nine submarine wrecks, because of damage, marine growth or a diver’s inability to absolutely identify it, are still open to some doubt. Also covered
are 13 known wrecks that have not been found, one that was raised and scrapped (the RN’s early A-8), and one German boat that was found but has disintegrated. All this information is covered carefully in assessing the story of each wreck.

An interesting and, one supposes, useful tool for some researchers is the extensive lists of those killed and/or wounded when a submarine — German or British — sank a merchantman or opposing warship. Also included, naturally, is a listing of all the crews who died in the wartime and accidental sinking of the submarines themselves. Some descriptions extend for up to 14 pages because of this additional narrative and lists. Their value is limited in many instances, however, since a good number are headed “Some of the men killed” (for a ship described as sunk by the boat in question). While not every reader will need or want all this detail, one can pick and choose the portion of each story that is of particular interest. For anyone capable of fairly deep diving along England’s southwest coast, Silent Warriors would make for fascinating reading, especially the “Final patrol” and “Wreck site” portions completing each narrative. There are frequently extensive quotes from the attacking commanding officers’ reports of proceedings in the case of U-boats destroyed by anti-submarine forces, Admiralty Courts of Inquiry records for peacetime losses, and survivor interviews from both sides.

There are photos of 22 of the submarines, mostly the RN boats, and several shots of the internal layout of the typical Type VIIC U-boat from U-995, a shore-mounted memorial at Laboe, outside Kiel. For such a carefully crafted book, there are surprisingly few photos of actual wrecks — only three or four — but maybe the ethical question of respect for war graves suggests they not normally be included. There are several general maps of locations, and a few sketches by Pamela Armstrong of wrecks such as the RN’s M-2 which sank in 1932 (probably due to flooding through its aircraft hanger which had replaced a 12-inch gun turret.) The mention of M-2 leads to a rather surprising problem, for in this and a few other narratives, there are both factual and editorial errors that, given the extensive research that went into these cases, are striking. In describing M-2, Young says it was to be fitted with a 1-inch gun, when it was patently a 12-inch; later (p.193), there is a duplicated sentence. His description of a Royal Navy “fore-ends” as “all forward of the conning tower” (p.19) needed a submariner’s review, and there are some other similar examples. Some terms could have been added to his extended glossary — RNHB?, for example. The 60 boats are covered in no identifiable order — by time, location or service (RN, Kaiserlichtmarine or Kriegsmarine), and the index lists the boats in the same order, so some searching is required. There are not a lot of errors, but they are noticeable.

Silent Warriors is a reference book, but it can also be dipped into again and again for the individual stories, not just the circumstances around the loss and the status of the wreck, but for just plain “submarining” tales from before the First World War to 1983. Well worth its shelf space for anyone with an interest in submarine histories.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario