BOOK REVIEWS


Across four decades of the twentieth century, the U.S. Coast Guard continuously sent cutters and crews to positions hundreds of miles off-shore to make and report weather observations, to provide navigation and communication services, and to be available for search-and-rescue work. These positions were established in the early 1940s as weather observation stations and plane guard stations and after 1946, were known as ocean stations.

These ocean stations were made obsolete by the development of electronic and inertial navigation systems and weather satellites and buoys and by the reliability of modern aircraft. Most of the cutters that served on these ocean stations have been decommissioned, and nearly all of the Coast Guardsmen who served on the station have left the sea. But Michael Adams, a retired Coast Guard officer who served on the North Atlantic Ocean Stations, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo, and Hotel as a junior officer aboard the USCGC Absecon, tells the story of this significant chapter in the U.S. Coast Guard’s history.

A total of 44 Allied stations existed during the Second World War, with the Coast Guard primarily manning the Atlantic stations while the wartime stations in the Pacific were primarily manned by the United States Navy. The ocean weather information collected by the crews of the station ships provided invaluable support to Allied military operations. After the war, the number of stations was greatly reduced, and the United States Coast Guard continued to patrol the remaining stations in the Atlantic and Pacific.

An ocean station was demarcated by an imaginary square, 210 miles per side, drawn on the surface of the ocean. This square was subdivided into a grid consisting of squares 10 miles on each side. The square in the center of the grid was designated OS: “On Station.” It was common practice for ocean station cutters to conduct relief of station at the edge of OS. Once on station the cutter would generally go nowhere for at least three weeks — the typical period of a patrol.

Occasionally, an aircrew would report trouble that necessitated ditching the aircraft. Ditching is, simply, landing an aircraft not designed to land on water, on the water with no intention of returning it to the air. Though uncommon, ditching aircraft did occur, particularly during the decade after the Second World War. Coast Guardsmen on ocean station rescued 122 people from ditched aircraft, and Adams provides details of those legendary rescues.

Ocean station crews also conducted search-and-rescue operations for ships in distress. The story of the Coos Bay’s rescue of the crew of the British ship Ambassador in February 1964 is told in a gripping manner, as is the story of the Chincoteague’s rescue of the crew of the German collier Helga Bolten in October 1956 near Ocean Station Delta.
The very weather that the cutter crews were supposed to observe and report could become their enemy. Terrific storms could strike with ferocity. Coast Guard cutters on ocean stations had their hulls fractured, their topside structures smashed, their boats destroyed, and gear carried away by the sea. Although these cutters were comparatively small ships, they were not inherently fragile. They were built of steel to the standards of construction required for warships, and were sailed by experienced men, Coast Guardsmen who knew and understood the sea. The author provides details of the McCulloch’s 1959 Bravo patrol, and the Owasco’s 1962 Bravo patrol as examples of the challenges these Coast Guardsmen faced. As the wind and waves literally tore McCulloch and Owasco apart, their crewmen not only survived but were also prepared to save the lives of others.

During the 1960s these ocean station vessels saw service in Vietnam. In the spring of 1967, five Casco-class cutters and their crews were designated Coast Guard Squadron Three and participated in Operation Market Time off the coast of South Vietnam. By the time the Vietnam War was over for the Coast Guard, 30 of the ocean station cutters, or 62 percent of the post-Second World War ocean station fleet, had seen action in Operation Market Time. By 1974, only one ocean station remained and the Taney’s departure from Ocean Station Hotel on the last day of 1976-1977 season was the last time any Coast Guard cutter would leave any ocean station.

United States Coast Guard cutters still go to sea in heavy weather. Cutters conducting fisheries patrols in the North Atlantic and the Bering Sea are pummeled by breaking sea accompanied by freezing temperatures. Cutters searching out smugglers in the Caribbean are threatened by ship-sinking hurricanes.

Ocean Station is a welcome addition to small but growing number of books dealing with Coast Guard history. Michael Adams has produced a well-written and well-researched history, not only of the ocean station program, but also of the Coast Guard’s large cutters from the Second World War to the 1970s. Adams is to be commended for telling this much needed story. This book should be the library of anyone interested in the history of the Coast Guard, and in maritime history in general.

C. Douglas Kroll
Palm Desert, California


Graeme Wynn, general editor of the Nature History Society series of which this book is part, notes in the foreword that “thousands of trees have been sacrificed ... to produce countless pages of discussion” of the collapse of cod stocks off Newfoundland and Labrador in the late 1980s and early nineties.(p.xi) This may well be true, but if there is one sound to compete with that of trees crashing in the forest, it is the collective wail of historians bemoaning the loss of “a way of life” among North Atlantic fishermen. While many of these tortured souls would not know a fisherman if they fell over one, the same cannot be said of Dean Bavington, who comes from a Newfoundland fishing family and accordingly, brings unique skills to his subject. Unfortunately, a clear and balanced historical approach is not one of them.

The book’s main title borrows from the seminal article “The Managed Commercial Annihilation of Northern Cod,” by D. H. Steele, R. Andersen, and J. M. Green, published in Newfoundland Studies
in 1992. It is, therefore, not new to claim, as Bavington does, that this was a managed annihilation. What is new, at least in a scholar, is his venom toward fisheries scientists, their managers, and their political masters, at whose feet he appears to lay virtually all of the blame for stock collapse, an oversimplification if ever there was one. He is especially indignant that faith in fisheries science has become even more entrenched since the collapse, thanks to the emergence of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management that emphasizes complexity and risk. Bavington considers such faith an “absurdity.”(p.36) This animus also explains the book’s questionable subtitle, in which the use of the word “unnatural” stems from the author’s contention that “there is nothing natural about management.” (p.106) But are not managers human, and therefore part of nature?

Bavington seeks to “historicize” management by placing it in the context of the cod fisheries of Newfoundland and Labrador, and by exploring the possibilities for thinking before and beyond managerial ecology more broadly. He defines managerial ecology as “the particular version of managerialism that targets nature,” managerialism itself being “a generalized technology of control and caretaking.”(pp.7-8) The jargon, incidentally, is thick throughout, for which a glossary would have been helpful. Bavington posits the existence of two streams of managerial ecology in the cod fisheries, one neoliberal, and the other socialist-communitarian. Broadly speaking, the former is the old top-down, market-oriented style of management that preceded the collapse, while the latter, increasingly common afterward, is a more inclusive approach in which scientists, managers, and fishermen attempt to cooperate for the common good. Bavington maintains that both are flawed because they accept management as a given; they differ only as to the form it should take.

In tracing the historical roots of managerial ecology in the cod fisheries, Bavington resorts to cliché, portraying fishermen as puppets manipulated by evil merchants in the traditional fishery, and as victims of nefarious managers guided by science in the modern industrial one. He seems not to know, or to want to know, that fishermen needed merchants for otherwise unobtainable goods, and to sell their fish in unreachable (that is, to fishermen) international markets, while merchants needed fishermen to buy their goods and to supply them with fish. The reality, then, was a complicated mix of exploitation and co-dependence.

Similarly, fishermen welcomed the findings of fisheries scientists whenever the latter discovered new stocks, and they continue to embrace more efficient catching and navigation technologies that are the products of scientific research generally. Differences occur only when scientists give advice that stops or inhibits fishermen from catching fish. It is also worth remembering that history affords numerous examples of marine species that became extinct before anyone had a chance to apply scientific principles to their exploitation. This does not mean that fishermen, if left alone, would exploit stocks to extinction. Some might, and some might not. What it does mean is that not all fishermen are saints, just as not all merchants and scientists were or are sinners.

In the book’s final chapter, Bavington discusses alternatives to the current management paradigms, a prescriptive approach that is characteristic of much recent environmental and fisheries history. He insists that the oceans would be happier places if only we adopted an “ontological” or “post-normal” view of complexity, something that would entail “democratic political processes and
deliberation on appropriate ways of seeing, being, and living in particular places,” and which would open “possibilities for both discussion on and conflict over opinions, norms, and interests rather than straightforward consensus on the facts.”(p.121) If that is not a recipe for disaster, it is surely one for confusion. Moreover, he would have us embrace the new model even before the socialist-communitarian one has had time to prove itself. And say what you will about that approach, it did not cause the collapse of the cod fishery.

If studying the recent past demands that historians skate on thin ice, then deciphering the future requires something that only one man was said to possess: the ability to walk on water. How can Bavington know what will work best in the future, and how can he know, as he asserts at one point, that northern cod are permanently gone? People once thought that the Georges Bank haddock stock was commercially extinct; today, it is healthy. Somewhere along the way, Dean Bavington and others like him forgot that history’s role is to interpret the past, not to predict the future. As a result, much of his book is not history, unnatural or otherwise. James E. Candow Halifax, Nova Scotia


The loss of SS Atlantic, the White Star Line’s largest, most luxurious vessel in 1873 was the worst maritime disaster in the history of Nova Scotia. Miles off course from their intended port of call, the captain and officers ignored many time-honoured marine safety procedures and ran their ship aground near the small community of Terence Bay. Of the 993 passengers and crew, 562 perished in the frigid coastal waters, including all of the women and all but one of the children aboard. White Star endured a public relations disaster that cast a critical light on the company’s policies. In many ways, the tragedy would eerily foreshadow the loss of another White Star liner of note in April 1912.

Diver and historian Greg Cochkanoff had long been interested in the fate of SS Atlantic before deciding to write this fascinating book. Having combed the wreck on numerous occasions over a 25-year period, he realized that there was a compelling story to be told from the artefacts recovered from the site over the years and began piecing together a story of questionable decision-making, bravery in the face of nightmarish conditions, local heroes and those who sought to profit from tragedy, a grim march to Halifax some 35 kilometres from the wreck site, and a legacy that the White Star Line hoped people would soon forget. As it turned out, they were sadly correct. In an age when marine disasters were fairly common, the loss of a large vessel in a quiet community in out-of-the-way Nova Scotia did not attract much attention, save for biting condemnation in some quarters of the media. A monument to those who perished in the sinking was not erected until 1905 and even then, few noticed. The sinking of RMS Titanic was another matter entirely, and the world took notice. This time White Star did not escape censure and public scorn.

The book flows nicely; an opening chapter sets the scene during a period of immigration coinciding with the early days of the steam age. Companies such as White Star chose to focus their efforts on attracting not only the rich and famous but also those who hoped that North America’s streets were paved with gold. The book’s main focus is on the wreck of the great liner, its
aftermath and the current state of the wreck site.

Cochkanoff doesn’t hold back in assigning blame and praise and, while he doesn’t go in for overt sensationalism, he still paints a vivid picture of the local inhabitants combing the shore for items of wealth, often stripped from the corpses which had washed ashore. The initial party of survivors who found their way to the provincial capital, Halifax, were not immediately believed as the wreck took place on the evening of April Fools Day. Cochkanoff also explores the White Star Line’s reaction to the disaster and the telling clue that when the memorial was erected to the victims, the company chose not to send a representative to pay their respects. A brief epilogue explores the personal dynamics on the bridge that led Captain James Williams and his officers to disaster. By not questioning the decisions of a well-liked and respected officer, his men blindly steered a course to disaster that Williams long asserted was not his fault.

The strengths of the book include a solidly plotted narrative line and some splendid contemporary photos of the wreck and the heroes of the story. It also features some acerbic editorial cartoons which were published in the immediate aftermath of the sinking, which speak volumes about contemporary public opinion of the White Star Line. As an experienced diver, Cochkanoff also includes some wonderful images of the wreck, the artefacts which have been retrieved from it over the years and the community of Terence Bay today. There is also a detailed list of passengers and crew, the ruling of the board of inquiry into the disaster and a list of other White Star liners lost at sea.

This book is clearly a labour of love, carefully researched by a man with an intimate knowledge of the wreck and its legacy. Greg Cochkanoff unexpectedly passed away shortly before the book was ready for publication. Thankfully, his friend and colleague, Bob Chaulk, the author of a wonderful history of Halifax harbour, agreed to step in and bring Greg’s desire to tell the story of SS Atlantic to the publisher. The result is a book which will intrigue everyone with an interest in a tragedy that deserves to be better known and appreciated.

Richard MacMichael
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


As I sit at home looking out at Active Pass — named after the surveying steamer USS Active, which was involved in boundary work concurrent with the Pig War — in my house three kilometres south of Ganges, Salt Spring Island (the town named after HMS Ganges, the "magnificent, if outdated" 84-gun flagship of the Royal Navy Admiral on station at Esquimalt in 1859 (p.97)), E.C. Coleman’s concluding paragraph struck a chord. Had it not been for ordinary British and American "sailors, soldiers and marines" exhibiting "the value of co-operation and common sense" (p.212), and as Barry Gough has written, the quiet, confident and assured diplomacy of senior British naval officers, I might very well have been denied the opportunity of living in such an idyllic environment, at least as a Canadian. All for the sake of a pig!

While most readers might only be slightly knowledgeable of the convolutions of this "perfect war," which Coleman frankly admits was really only the proverbial storm in a tea-cup, they will certainly be more conversant with the many other episodes that make up much of this book. Events such as the War of 1812, the
Crimean War, the Alaska Boundary issue, the U.S. Civil War, the Fenian Raids around the time of Confederation are among those covered. All raised the hackles of Canadians for the way in which their interests were secondary to British real politik and to which Coleman gives his own particular interpretation. It is a breathtaking range of events with only a distant relevance to the subject at hand.

As to the Pig War itself, the dastardly deed that brought matters to a head in the frontier areas of the Pacific Northwest — the killing of a British pig by an American settler on the island of San Juan, in the Gulf of Georgia — made it imperative that the dilatory boundary commissioners finally sit down and try to settle the dividing line between British North America and the United States. While they struggled with their task, two armed camps shared the island, in defence of their countries' claims.

The pig is not shot until page 60, and then we are treated to some tens of pages, interspersed among the more far-reaching progress of negotiations, confrontations and finally arbitration, telling us how the two military encampments lived in harmony over the 13 years after 1859 while the deliberations were under way. Eventually the German Emperor, to whom the ultimate decision had finally fallen, received the Commissioners' recommendations, which he accepted, on Trafalgar Day, 1872. San Juan was awarded in its entirety to the Americans and the episode — though not the book — concludes with the poignant remarks of Sir James Douglas, intimately involved in the start of the proceedings but by then retired, on the loss of the territory.

There are neither footnotes nor endnotes to the book, and the reader is left to guess from which of the extensive archival sources listed in the bibliography the many quotations were taken. The selected secondary sources are hit-and-miss. For example, Coleman's reference to "Some open-minded historians" accepting the highly-dubious claim that Drake ventured much further north up the Pacific Coast than supposedly closed-minded historians (including this reviewer) accept (p.16) does not list the book that makes the most strenuous claim for this theory, Sir Francis Drake's Secret Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North America, AD 1579, (privately published, 2001). By amazing circumstance, the author, Sam Bawlf, shares Salt Spring with me. A recent "Web Extra" in the Victoria Times Colonist on 20 July 2010 touts a 413-year old globe as "irrefutable proof of Drake’s exploration of Canada's West Coast." I leave that to others to decipher.

In a work that draws attention to the importance of the common touch, the most obvious omission from the bibliography are colonial newspapers. At that time, Victoria's newspapers were highly competitive and more than willing to criticise and comment on current affairs. The 44 illustrations are good — although once again we are not told of their source. The book is devoid of typographical errors — if one ignores the egregious mistake of misspelling the last name of Canada's first prime minister!

Not sufficiently dealt with in the book was the way in which the Royal Navy dominated the North Pacific, and its ability to muster forces from far afield. The foresight in sending support to the civil authorities in anticipation of trouble on the Fraser River as a result of renewed Gold Rush fever stood the British and Governor Douglas well, and the concentration of forces from as far afield as South America and South-East Asia guaranteed that the Royal Navy was always present to counter whatever force the Americans possessed on the coast. This, one suspects, as much as the common sense of settlers, kept the peace...
there; that attribute extended farther up the chain of command than Coleman would have us believe.

Finally, in Coleman's telling of the subsequent generally friendly cooperation between Britain and the United States, he neglects two other relevant initiatives: the loose and informal practice on both sides of the border, under the name of "Cascadia." To consider this part of the Pacific Northwest as having close political, economic and cultural ties that might just transcend nationalism, and the very real decision to refer to the area over which the two countries might just have gone to war as "The Salish Sea." THIS was the perfect way to end a war.

Kenneth S. Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, British Columbia


The port of Portland, Maine, from its founding to the present day, has always operated on the fringes the United States. Geographically isolated from the dominant trade routes, great plans were nevertheless made in the nineteenth century by ambitious men who saw Portland, the closest American port to Europe, as a rival to Boston and New York. Plans are one thing, but the vagaries of the economy, war, and changing technologies worked to limit their influence. As a result, Portland continued to fall back upon the old standbys to survive: a winter port for eastern and central Canada; commercial fishing and, over the last century, tourism and recreation.

Most histories of Portland cover the maritime aspects of the city in an incidental way; a city with a port, rather than as a port-city. Thanks to Michael C. Connolly’s, *Seated by the Sea. The Maritime History of Portland, Maine and its Irish Longshoremen,* we now have a book devoted wholly to a single human part of its maritime realm. Here, in one volume, elements of the social, labour and economic history of the Irish longshoremen in Portland are brought together: battles with business interests for economic independence; the social battles for acceptance by the scions of old New England, the rise of militant anti-Catholicism in the form of the Ku Klux Klan in Maine in the early twentieth century and the longshoremen’s fight for better conditions and pay and the technologies they favoured.

The preface sets out very clear objectives for the six chapters that follow. Chapter 1 covers the general history of the port, particularly the niche black longshoremen filled in the community prior to the arrival of the Irish in the mid-nineteenth century; the rising ambitions for the port held by such men as the visionary entrepreneur John A. Poor, one of the city’s biggest boosters; the establishment of Portland as eastern Canada’s winter port and the changes the port underwent as the country changed during the nineteenth century. The remaining chapters chronologically pick apart the inner workings of the longshoremen’s life, organization, society, labour battles, as well as their adaptation to a changing economy and the new technologies, such as containerization, that were introduced in the twentieth century.

The work is well written and Connolly delivers. The first chapter is more of a popular history, although drawing in elements from many sources makes the chapter a bit busy. Connolly hits his stride in the remainder of the book; labour history is clearly his area of expertise. He carefully
places Portland’s story within the context of the larger longshoremen’s union battles occurring in other eastern American ports, particularly Boston, New York, Philadelphia and New Orleans. Connolly writes accurately and concisely, making useful comparisons with other east coast seaports. For example, while the Irish and Italian immigrants universally disliked and distrusted one another in Boston and New York, in Portland they eventually found a kind of common ground by way of their work and their common Catholic faith (p. 95).

The book is perhaps too narrowly focused. To make it more useful to the reader less versed in labour history, it could be expanded in two or three ways. First, rather than emphasize Irish longshoremen, with some reference to the black longshoremen in the early nineteenth century, it could have been broadened to cover the history of all longshoremen in Portland. Alternatively, Connolly could have studied not only the Irish longshoremen, but the influence of the Irish on other maritime activities, such as fishing. In Boston for example, Irish fishermen carved out their own niche, even building their own boat types for use in the New England fishery.

Second, Seated by the Sea could be more accessible by expanding its historical context. The first chapter makes some reference to the decline of commercial deepwater sail after the American Civil War in favour of steel-built, steam-powered vessels. A few more pages devoted to how sail and steam coexisted for nearly a hundred years before power vessels totally dominated the maritime world would yield a greater understanding. It was not simply that steamships were “better” than sailing vessels: they were made commercially viable through deliberate government efforts like providing subsidies to carry mail; improving port facilities to favour steamships; and opening the Suez (1869) and Panama (1914) canals. Indeed, steam, in the form of shipboard donkey engines and steam tugs to shepherd them in and out of port, made huge wooden and steel sailing vessels commercially successful at the turn of the twentieth century.

Finally, a brief description of the process and nature of the longshoremen’s work would have added a sympathetic element to the history. While we can imagine why it was difficult to hire longshoremen to discharge coal by hand, a job avoided by all but the most desperate for work, more attention to who these people were and how hard they worked would engage the reader and add a more human touch.

The book is well salted with relevant photographs and other illustrations. For those unfamiliar with the Portland neighbourhoods mentioned in the text, a map would have been useful, but given the plethora of maps readily available in print or online, this is not really an issue. The bibliography is impressive, listing suitable and varied works by the likes of maritime and cultural historians Jeffrey Bolster and William H. Bunting among many others. The book also has a wonderful appendix of longshoreman nicknames, a great resource for historians and folklorists alike.

Seated by the Sea is a timely addition to the cultural and economic history of Portland, Maine. It coincides with the recent establishment of the Irish Heritage Center, the ongoing restoration of the Abyssinian Meeting House (the third oldest African-American church in the United States) and finally, the continuing issues of race and ethnicity that make Portland one of the most diverse small cities in the United States. The historic standbys remain. Portland is still eastern Canada’s winter port, the tourist industry sails on with dozens of cruise-ship visits every season, the fishing industry continues to adapt to
new regulations and environmental conditions, and a tiny container terminal provides occasional work for Portland’s longshoremen.

Thaddeus Lyford
South Portland, Maine


We are indebted to Jane Slade, a nineteenth-century British shipbuilder and shipowner, for inspiring Helen Doe’s *Enterprising Women and Shipping in the Nineteenth Century*. The author’s discovery of her story provided the impetus to research the careers of similar entrepreneurial women, and the resulting book ultimately challenges the many assumptions about nineteenth century women and their role in the maritime world. Doe discovered independent women throughout Britain who were active entrepreneurs and investors successfully competing with their male counterparts in all spheres of maritime business. Laid to rest is the traditional perception that during the period 1780-1880 women were largely relegated to domestic roles, and if they ventured into business, did so as milliners and haberdashers. In her conclusion, Doe asserts few real obstacles existed to deter women who wished to invest in shipping or operate a business in the maritime world of the nineteenth century.

The book is conveniently structured for the reader, regardless of the knowledge they bring to the subject. The initial chapters describe the general legal and financial environment for nineteenth century women, and the specific maritime environment in which women invested and worked. Three chapters offer a detailed analysis of women who invested in shipping in the modest-sized ports of Exeter, Fowey, King’s Lynn, Whitby and Whitehaven. The chapters outline the broad findings of the analysis, examine the regional differences and describe investors based upon women’s marital status and their active or passive activity in relation to their shipping shares. Four subsequent chapters drawn on evidence from across England examine the role of women who owned and managed maritime businesses, such as naval and commercial shipyards, fleets of commercial vessels, and ancillary port businesses such as ship chandleries, sail-lofts and insurance agencies. These chapters are highlighted by in-depth case studies of eight maritime women. The final chapter brings together Doe’s research findings and draws some thoughtful conclusions, perhaps the most compelling being the overall question of women’s independent economic activity.

Traditional studies of the role of women in the maritime world have largely focused on their role as the sailing master’s wife, either ashore or at sea. Occasionally, we find references to women involved in vessel ownership, as passive investors, usually the result of an inheritance from a husband or father. In this book, Helen Doe embarks upon a decidedly more detailed examination of the role of women in the maritime world. As she accurately notes, researching women’s history is made more complex by the perceived lack of sources. Compounding this, extant business records are rare at best, and virtually non-existent for small businesses. The central chapters of this study rely heavily upon an under-utilized source of information, the Customs House Shipping Registers, in this case, for the ports of Exeter, Fowey, King’s Lynn, Whitby and Whitehaven. These records list ships registered in Britain, their ownership, and, important for this study, how that ownership changed over time. Tracking an
individual’s investment in ships can provide unique insight into an individual’s economic decisions. Through her painstaking examination of women’s ownership transactions as well as other related archival sources, Doe is able to determine the extent to which women invested in vessels and achieve an understanding of their managerial role. One excellent example is the story of Jane Slade from the Cornish village of Polruan, who became head of an extensive shipbuilding and ship-owning establishment upon the death of her husband, Christopher, in 1870. Although her sons possessed the technical and supervisory capability, it was Jane who was managing owner of the yard and the vessels owned by the firm Jane Slade and Sons. She remained head of the firm until her death in 1883.

Beyond providing a broader understanding of the managerial role of women in the maritime world, the book is a helpful primer for those interested in more general aspects of maritime business during the nineteenth century. In her background chapters, Doe provides an over-view of the legal rights of women, maritime law and vessel ownership, and a description of the role and responsibilities of the managing owner of a vessel, among other marine-related subjects. This scholarly book also includes an excellent bibliography of primary and secondary sources, extremely useful to anyone undertaking related research or wishing to read more about the historical role of women. The case studies of women add an especially appealing personal dimension. In general, the book will interest both the academic and the more casual historian.

For me the book left two unresolved questions. Was an enterprising woman’s access to male-dominated non-marine business and social networks restricted, and if so, did it limit her opportunities to broaden her investments or to raise capital? And, would a sampling from one of the larger ports, Liverpool or London alter the percentage of women involved in the maritime sector? Perhaps these will be avenues of future research.

Enterprising Women and Shipping in the Nineteenth Century is a thoroughly researched, thoughtful and stimulating analysis of an important theme in maritime history. It fills significant gaps in the historiography of maritime women and enhances our understanding of the role of women in the maritime world during this period. Hopefully, it will foster further study.

Marven E. Moore
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


A late-ninth-century Old English version of the late Roman-Christian world history called Orosius includes a travelogue by Ohthere and Wulfstan, who sailed the coastal zones of Western Scandinavia and the Baltic. These texts have aroused much attention since the 1980s. Research and discussions have subsequently been coordinated by the Viking Ship Museum in Roskilde, Denmark, leading to several workshops and books, including the book presently reviewed as well as a previous volume entitled Ohthere’s Voyages (Bately and Englert, eds., 2007).

These books are part of the proceedings of a seminar held in Wismar, Germany, in 2004. The Wulfstan text is a means to focus on the described coastal
zones in the Viking Age, and in the case of the seminar provided a tool and inspiration for combined research into the following subjects: the Western and Central Baltic Sea Region in the ninth and tenth centuries, navigating in the Baltic Sea, and exchange and control. The book clearly follows the seminar structure with 24 contributions by scholars from around the Baltic and from Ohthere’s and Wulfstan’s home country, the United Kingdom.

While all papers respect the framework set by the editors in time and space, obviously some do not refer to the original text at all, working instead from archaeological or other historical sources. At 375 pages, this book combines known and new research in a studious but attractive format. With so many authors contributing to a book with a multi-disciplinary approach, there is a real risk that the product would lack a clear message or goal. Remarkably, the editors have been able to keep everybody “in tune” without becoming boring. One of the secrets behind this is that all authors were forced to deliver their original texts well before the 2004 workshop so that they could discuss their work there together. The authors occasionally refer to each other in their contributions, which leads to a more coherent book. A true pity is the single contribution published in German, which probably will be skipped by most readers.

In Part III, six papers describe navigating on the Baltic Sea (about 100 pages). This part of the book is the most closely connected to ships and seafaring. Ole Crumlin-Pedersen asks what kind of ship Wulfstan may have been sailing. Part of the vagueness is due to lack of knowledge about Wulfstan’s business: was it trade, was he a missionary, or both? Crumlin-Pedersen shows some examples of known ship types, referring mainly to archaeology and contemporary ship pictures. We actually have very little to rely upon — a conclusive image of seafaring in the eight to tenth century cannot be painted.

One real adventure deserves special attention. In July 2004, the Skuldelev I replica ship, Ottar, sailed in the area. Such reconstructed voyages are social experiments and need to be carefully
planned and documented, like in this case. Of course, this was a newer ship-type than the one Wulfstan might have used, and some landscape changes (including low bridges and sedimentation) prevented the Ottar from sailing the full stretch. The article gives a welcome perspective on sailing the way Wulfstan might have enjoyed it; a very down-to-earth account indeed, including the day and night watch, cooking on board and so on.

In the last 60-page section, four papers focus on exchange and control, referring, for example, to metal trading weights or ninth-century Christian missions. There is even an article about piracy.

The book ends with a solid summary and a good index. All in all, Wulfstan’s Voyage offers a valuable overview of our present knowledge of seafaring and life in the coastal areas around the southern Baltic Sea in the ninth and tenth centuries.

Roeland Paardekooper
Eindhoven, the Netherlands


The economic rise of China, which has helped fund its military growth and modernisation, has polarised elements of the analytical community into two broad camps. There are those who see this military growth and modernisation as threatening and the annual report on China’s military, produced by the U.S. Department of Defense, falls clearly in this camp. The other camp focuses on China’s international engagement, its signing of international treaties and agreements, saying China is now part of the global community, a team player and supporter of correct international behaviour, and thus not a threat. And then recent events, such as China’s support of North Korea over the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and Chinese threats to the United States not to conduct naval exercises with South Korea off its coast and to get out of the South China Sea (an area of disputed maritime boundary claims, that albeit, had been relatively benign for the last decade), opens the divide between the two camps.

The issue that is causing the greatest concern is the growth and modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and while there are legitimate reasons for any state with a large coastline, and a reliance on seaborne trade to develop its maritime forces, there are commensurate regional concerns over whether such forces might be used coercively. There are numerous books, articles, opinion pieces and pure speculation over what China is doing and why. Importantly, this is not one of those books.

Rather, this volume brings together a number of experts to examine case studies of other land states that have undergone a maritime transformation. This is an important consideration — any state if it is wealthy enough can buy (and if it has the technology, can build) a navy. But it only becomes a capability (in defence-speak), if it can be used; that is, whether the navy has the associated doctrine, training, and logistics support to be used as a weapon. The aim of this volume is to explore how other states over time have transformed from a land (army-centric) power to a sea power; how did these states use the sea to achieve their aims?

There are four chapters in the “pre-modern era” section, covering Persia, Sparta, Rome and the Ottoman Empire. These chapters cover the beginnings of sea power, the creation of navies and their uses to protect trade, colonise other lands and
develop empires, but also move armies to achieve these tasks (rather than marching over land). The importance of technology is noted, in the design and building of warships and the logistics necessary to support these ships, as well as any army they might be transporting and/or supporting. Implicit in all this is the centralisation of power within the state and the ability to organise disparate resources (and finance) to create these navies. These chapters are heavy going, only because the authors (experts on their topics) provide so much information and analysis in such a relatively short space, but are nonetheless rewarding.

The next four chapters cover the “modern era,” examining France, Imperial Russia, Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia. It is interesting to see how these land powers viewed the sea and how that changed over time, how they used the sea, and how they developed their navies and why (either as a force in their own right, to counter other navies, or as an adjunct to their armies). And this latter point becomes a critical issue: land powers have borders across which an invader would come, and thus require large armies (for defence, but also if they were to be the aggressor). What then is the rationale for such a state to have a navy, and how will it be used? More importantly, perhaps, is how will a navy be funded as they are very expensive institutions to create and maintain? Depending on the situation on land, navies are occasionally found to be too expensive for what they might deliver (if this has been thought through adequately) and wither away through financial neglect.

We now come to a consideration of China’s maritime historical past, with three chapters examining Chinese views on the sea, its use, and the need (or otherwise) for navies. A clear purpose or role of a navy is critical to justify the expenditure upon it; and in the case of China, from where is the greater threat — internally or externally. Internal stability might be more important to the state than foreign adventures, and thus the army is more important than the navy.

The final four chapters focus on contemporary China, examining its technological capabilities in shipbuilding (in the past this has been considered one element contributing to “sea power”), its aspirations for a blue water navy (which is what is causing concerns within the region and to the United States), and its own examination of global historical case studies of maritime transformation in order to learn lessons and avoid the pitfalls that other states experienced. Of course, geography, political systems, economics, culture (amongst others) all have a role to play in maritime transformation so it is always unclear what real lessons can be learned from such a large historical sweep.

This book is not just for China experts; it is for all those readers interested in the development of sea power at its most basic — that is, how did a number of states develop and use their navies, why did some keep them and others discard them?

Andrew Forbes
Queanbeyan, New South Wales


This is one of the most thought-provoking books about the American Civil War and naval affairs to appear in recent years. Howard Fuller has taken a story that naval historians like to tell, with the exception of Confederate commerce raiders, in an almost exclusively domestic context, and forced a reappraisal that integrates an essential international element into the narrative. The end result, although not without its
flaws, is a richer understanding of this pivotal period in American political, naval and diplomatic history.

Given the centrality of ironclads in the naval history of the Civil War, American scholars too often minimize the full-blown arms race underway in Europe between Great Britain and France and its potential impact on American affairs. Lip service is paid by noting the construction of the French Gloire and the British Warrior, but the story quickly swings back to the riverine and coastal encounters between Union monitors and their casemated Confederate counterparts. The emerging sophistication and scalability of the North’s industrial infrastructure is arrayed against the adaptability of the Confederacy’s weaker manufacturing base, but the outcome is rarely in doubt and the most interesting arguments are reserved for the contests between ships and shore fortifications. Lost in almost every account is Great Britain’s imperative to protect and preserve its empire while retaining its status as a dominant power worldwide. Fuller turns all of that on its head, arguing that the prospect of war between the Union and Great Britain had a constant and pervasive impact on naval affairs in both countries, and that one cannot hope to understand domestic and foreign policy in both nations without accounting for that potential conflict.

The Civil War posed an interesting challenge for the Royal Navy. The Trent affair and the resulting prospect of war with the United States made it clear that its shipbuilding programs had to account for war against both the French and the Americans. The Royal Navy also had to reconcile the multiple missions of home defense and power projection abroad with economic realities, triggering a contentious internal debate over the fleet’s force structure and the design of individual vessels. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Union was forced to consider defensive preparations against an external foe in addition to the offensive mission it wished to concentrate upon against the Confederacy. Coming at a time when the United States Navy’s design and shipbuilding capacity was already stretched beyond its abilities, this hastened reliance on private contractors in general and upon John Ericsson in particular. Naval leaders in both countries struggled to define the relationship between the private contractors who might or might not give them a strategic edge and their inherently conservative naval establishments. In the United States, Ericsson and the Navy Department worked out a tenuous but rewarding collaboration while the Royal Navy foundered with Cowper Phipps Coles but eventually found equilibrium with Edward J. Reed.

By late 1862, it was clear that the rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated American ironclad force had changed the Anglo-American discourse, altering the diplomatic relationship between the two nations in the process. The United States now had enough coastal ironclads to deter the threat of British power projection, with both numbers and lethality improving as the war went on. That, Fuller argues, was key in preserving American independence of action. Yet, unlike the threat implied by earlier French attempts to build an ironclad fleet, the coastal and primarily defensive characteristics of Monitor-style turretted ironclads did not challenge British security directly. This prevented tensions from ever reaching a critical point that might have resulted in hostilities.

This is a dense and complex book, but Fuller supports his argument with detailed examples that are the result of a truly impressive research effort. This reviewer is more familiar with the primary and secondary materials on the American rather than the British side of the story, but
it is clear that Fuller has effectively mined archives on both sides of the Atlantic equally well. One certainly can take issue with specific statements or claims he makes. For example, his contention that “the failure of a single [Union] ironclad in the midst of the Civil War might conceivably sink the entire Administration” is more a matter of conjecture than fact, and one should be cautious about assigning too much value to a statement like that (p.73). The few minor misstatements or exaggerations one might find sprinkled in the text in no way diminish the power of Fuller’s sophisticated argument. Anyone with an interest in American naval policy, British naval policy, or Civil War diplomacy will have to grapple with this book and should enjoy doing so.

Kurt Hackemer
Vermillion, South Dakota


Alison Games has migrated from Atlantic to global history in her latest book. *The Web of Empire* explores early modern English imperialism. Games argues that from 1570 to 1650, private enterprise and cultural accommodation dominated the expansion of a fiscally and militarily weak English nation. After 1650, state control and coercion became the hallmarks of a strong English nation’s expansion. Merchants, clerics, and consuls adapted to foreign environments, and this was the key by which England became a global superpower. Games explores the role the periphery played in influencing Englishmen overseas, while other world systems scholars have focused on the mother country/core. She also gives agency to the people who travelled around the world, whereas other historians have stressed the roles that structural elements such as market forces played in imperial expansion. While most studies of the English empire privilege one oceanic zone or another, Games makes the world her laboratory.

*The Web of Empire* is a provocative investigation of the historical connections between migration and empire that is aimed at an academic audience. Games’ efforts to demonstrate that the periphery influenced England’s expansion as much or more than the core dictated the terms of colonization will prove controversial, especially to postcolonial theorists. She insists that Tudor-Stuart England did not maintain the fiscal or military means to forcibly project its imperial vision on the world. Instead, a backwater nation relied on cosmopolitan travelers to adjust to foreign environments. In the author’s own challenging words, “My approach deliberately inverts the trajectory of an older style of imperial history in which Britons were capable of imposing their will on subject people and places.”(p.10) Military conquest, viral infection, racism, and economic exploitation did not pave the way for English expansion, according to Games. Rather, adaptation and accommodation primarily enabled the earliest English imperialists to weave a web linking various parts of a far flung empire.

Throughout the book, Games explores the ways in which global travel fostered cosmopolitan attitudes among colonial leaders (governors, military officers, ambassadors, merchants, consuls, and clergy), which aided the expansion of the English empire at the turn of the seventeenth century. The first chapter explains the fact that the nature of travel changed over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Going abroad and living among foreigners went from being a socially frowned upon, potentially corrupting and dangerous exercise to being
a socially accepted means of bringing home information vital to the mother country’s commercial and diplomatic success. Games skillfully uses travel advice manuals to demonstrate that as overseas travel became more socially acceptable, the experiences travelers shared altered public perceptions and converted the exotic into something understandable and commonplace. Chapter two establishes that many of these early English travelers went first to Mediterranean destinations. English joint-stock companies such as the Levant Company and the Barbary Company sent “hundreds” of ships and “thousands” of “merchants, ministers, statesmen, and mariners” to a variety of ports on an annual basis by the end of the sixteenth century. (p.51) The Mediterranean provided rich training grounds for English travelers. Merchants, in particular, first learned in the Mediterranean how to organize complex long-distance trade routes, and they “mastered a commercial demeanor defined by its style of accommodation and dissimulation.”(p.52) Englishmen then transferred these skills to ports around the world.

The first two chapters provide the foundation for the remainder of the book, which can be divided, for the purposes of this review, into three sections on English merchants, ambassadors, and clergy. Chapter three discusses English merchants as a group, while the following chapter focuses on businessmen involved with settlement in colonial Virginia. According to Games, these entrepreneurs immersed themselves in foreign cultures, adapting to “new languages, new holidays, new people, new fashions, new plants, new food, and new friends” wherever they went around the world.(p.83) Pragmatic adaptation, not state sponsored coercion, enabled experienced, early English merchants who traveled regularly to thrive in foreign lands. This learned commercial culture further enabled English investors to persevere through colonial Virginia’s well-known lean years. Only by placing Jamestown in the wider context of Mediterranean experiences, Games argues, can we explain why English settlement in North America persisted through difficult times. Chapter five discusses English governors, consuls and ambassadors who travelled around the world, while the following chapter focuses on politicians involved with settlement in Madagascar. Administering various colonies made these bureaucrats flexible and diplomatic, which aided the expansion of the English empire into new regions. Games does a good job of demonstrating how experiences and knowledge gained in one colony aided politicians in another place at a later time. Englishmen even attempted to recreate Barbados in Madagascar. This colonial project failed due to tropical disease, not a lack of preparation. Chapter seven discusses globetrotting clergymen, while the following chapter focuses on those puritan divines who left New England to settle in Ireland in the wake of Catholic uprisings in the Emerald Isle. Games argues that English clergymen should not be seen as an ecclesiastical army that forced English values on the world. According to the author, “English Protestantism was not a coherent faith that could function as a uniform and consistent arm of conquest.”(p.252) Yet, as the last full chapter demonstrates, fragmented and contentious Protestants rallied to the Protestant flag and returned back across the Atlantic to help quell Catholic dissent in Ireland.

Games ably demonstrates the larger historical significance of travel. On an individual basis, travel brought Englishmen into contact with foreign regions and peoples. Experiences overseas changed the traveler from a provincial xenophobe into a cosmopolitan. At the societal level,
travelers published accounts of their experiences and converted their countrymen to their way of seeing the world. At the state level, the movement of people overseas, and the actions of those travelers, added to England’s commercial and diplomatic prestige, and it led to the formation of an English empire. This book is a model for graduate students on how to address the daunting “so what” question. Readers of this journal will find scant discussion of ships and sailors in this book, however those interested in the social history of imperial expansion and a global approach to the past will find much food for thought.

Statistical analysis would have minimized the book’s controversial aspects. There is a noticeable lack of figures and tables here. This makes it very difficult to determine how many Englishmen travelled abroad at the turn of the seventeenth century and how many travelers accommodated foreign values and thereby assumed the mantle of cosmopolitans (at least as this mantle is defined in this book). The lack of quantification will make statistically-minded readers skeptical that cosmopolitans were so central to early English expansion. Yet, Games does explicitly state that she wants to focus on “people, not inanimate forces.”(p.83) Moreover, she does provide extensive eyewitness testimony testifying to the fact that accommodation was an important human element that helped give rise to an English empire. Her provocative book should inspire future debate and stimulate additional scholarship on the extent to which human agency influenced early modern imperial expansion.

Christopher P. Magra
Knoxville, Tennessee


Peter Hohnen and Richard Guilliatt have written a highly interesting account of what is perhaps one of the unique stories of the Great War at Sea. SMS *Wolf,* the former Hansa Line’s freighter *Gutenfels,* was purchased by the *Kaiserliche Marine* in April 1916 and outfitted as an armed merchant cruiser (AMC) with the intention of raiding Allied shipping in distant waters.

By late 1916, the war on the high seas was largely over for Germany. The last warship raiders stationed in foreign waters were mopped up by summer 1915. By that point, their counterparts, former liners outfitted as AMCs, were also either sunk or interned. The first unrestricted submarine warfare campaign had ended in a political fiasco, and an attempt by the *Hochseeflotte* to win a “Mahanian” victory against the Grand Fleet proved indecisive. The *Admiralstab* tackled this problem with a new course of action. Instead of using cruisers or massive passenger liners as AMCs, the new idea was to outfit inconspicuous merchant steamers as raiders, sneak them through the British blockade and attack Allied shipping in far distant waters. SMS *Wolf* was one of these raiders, its voyage eventually lasting 444 days and it was credited with thirty ships mined or captured directly.

Although written as a popular history, *The Wolf* does not lack in scholarship and is an exciting read for both the historian and the average nautical enthusiast. The authors conducted five years of research prior to writing the book and even the quickest glance at the bibliography shows evidence of this. Readers familiar with the topic will recognize the official histories from both
sides as well as Patrick Beesly’s work on naval intelligence. The authors made an extensive effort to track down as many memoirs as possible from German crew members (both officers and enlisted men) as well as those from former prisoners. They also included new Japanese sources, since Japan was heavily involved given the vessel’s operational area. Diaries from Wolf’s doctor and other members of the crew were made accessible by their families, bringing new depth to the voyage not covered by previous works.

The book provides excellent coverage of propaganda and censorship regarding the use of AMCs to attack trade, especially relating to SMS Wolf. The Royal Navy, by the time Wolf was nearing the halfway point of her cruise, was well aware that there was an enemy AMC somewhere in either Indian or Australian and New Zealand waters, but very little information was given to the press. When ships were mined off the Australian coast, these incidents were explained as internal explosions or sabotage by neutrals or immigrants from enemy countries. Secretly, the Australian and New Zealand navies began outfitting minesweeping units but the press took a different tack. The sabotage theory ran hot and quickly anyone foreign, especially German immigrants, was suspect. Many were harassed and several ended up in jail for wild offenses, thus bringing to light a nice case study on raiders and propaganda in Oceania.

By far, the most successful aspect of the book is the social history it offers of the interactions between a raider crew and prisoners from captured prizes. As time went on, and more and more prisoners were accumulated (including women and children), the problems of accommodating them all became increasingly difficult. Interactions between prisoners and the German crew were highly varied, while even the prisoners themselves formed distinct groups. Differences emerged and grew, especially once Japanese prisoners came aboard. These were treated less than cordially by their European counterparts. By drawing heavily from the memoirs from both sides, the authors reconstruct a vivid picture of exactly what it meant and how it felt for a German raider and its prisoners.

Unfortunately, the strategic analysis at times lacks a similar depth. This does not mean that it is not addressed, but the lens is mainly on Wolf. Many of the facts and details of the Allied attempt to hunt Wolf appear to be teased out of the German and British official histories and augmented with a few archival records. The goal of the raider was not just to sink shipping but also to displace and hinder the Allied war effort at sea. Episodic success in diversions or stoppages right after a mine-laying is mentioned, but not followed up. The questions as to when shipping resumed, what amount of shipping time was lost and what was delayed are left unanswered and quite often, unasked.

Readers will also find the style of endnotes less than pleasing. Although likely a publisher’s decision, instead of following the familiar number and note form, key phrases with their source are found in the endnote list that then have to be located in the corresponding chapter and page number, making it quite cumbersome for the scholar to track relevant sources.

Nevertheless, the book is a fine work on the topic and provides much new insight into the raider Wolf, especially in terms of the social history of a 444-day raiding voyage and a case study of censorship and propaganda in war. The book is a recommended read and makes a valuable contribution to not only the history of SMS Wolf but to raider warfare during the First World War.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick

This book is a selection of papers given at the Trafalgar bicentenary conference, held at the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, in October 2005. This reviewer begs forgiveness for the delay in expressing his opinions on the subject, but in this instance he may have procrastinated to advantage. Richard Harding, who edited the collection with his usual skill, pointed out that the centenary had spawned the so-called Nelson Legacy Conference Series, “with the purpose of taking the study forward.” The Trafalgar bicentennial has generated a huge literature, but it can now be said that rather than “taking the study forward,” this 2005 collection was a final fruit of that celebration. The 1805 Club, (www.1805club.org), although still active five years after this conference took place, does not list any new monographs on its website. What it does do is publish the Trafalgar Chronicle once a year and the Kedge Anchor three times a year. Formed to preserve memorials to Georgian naval heroes, the club keeps alive the idea that the deeds of Georgian naval heroes, in what G. M. Trevelyan called the heroic age of naval history, are too much of a good thing to give up. Long may that sentiment thrive!

At the first Trafalgar centenary, the Admiralty endeavoured to settle controversy about Nelson’s tactics with the so-called Bridge Report, named after the chairman of a committee to “Examine and Consider the Evidence” relating to Nelson’s tactics. A hundred years later, a group of war gamers and historians calling itself “The Inshore Squadron,” (they had previously employed computer technology to analyze the battles of the Nile and Copenhagen) found that “successive historians placed great reliance on their predecessors’ works.” That is a familiar and polite way of casting doubt upon the efforts of scholars who have previously enjoyed the status of elders and betters, in this case Admiral Sir William James’ 1837 *Naval History of Great Britain* and Captain, later Rear Admiral, A. H. Taylor’s 1950 article on the Battle of Trafalgar in *The Mariner’s Mirror*. “The Inshore Squadron” has, by contrast, confirmed some recent scholarly revelations, such as Colin White’s 2002 evidence concerning Nelson’s battle plan. It concludes, with regard to Collingwood’s division, that “the Trafalgar myth of a rapid victory once the line of the Combined Fleet was broken bears little resemblance to the reality of the battle as experienced by Collingwood’s ships.” As for Victory’s penetration of the line some time later, James and Taylor both argued that when she broke through the line Victory was subject to intense fire from both Redoubtable and the French 80-gun Neptune, but the evidence shows Neptune was elsewhere at the time. Among various other findings, this team of war gamers and historians conclude that “The final injustice of the ‘traditional’ version of Trafalgar is that it does not reflect the tremendous resistance put up by many of the ships of the Combined Fleet.” Nor does it give sufficient credit to Nelson’s subordinates. At the same time, Nelson’s genius is confirmed. His conduct of the battle “still stands as an example of superlative leadership...” He and Collingwood both “drew on traditions dating back over half a century.” And that is precisely what Richard Harding and Peter LeFevre argued as editors of the book *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century*, published in 2000. It is an argument that deserves to be repeated.

Papers by Colin White and Michael
Duffy reinforce these conclusions, as do papers by the Spanish historian, Augustin Guimera, and the French admiral, Rémi Monaque. The inclusion of Spanish and French historians gives this collection additional weight, and it is instructive to hear from them that, although the performance of the Combined Fleet was better than traditional British interpretations have suggested, Nelson remains the great personality of the battle. Admiral Monaque observes that “Trafalgar was hardly Nelson’s finest moment of glory.” It was in his view an unnecessary battle, and Nelson had some traits that “remain obstacles for uniform admiration among us French... Nevertheless,” he goes on to say, “the great man has left a legacy of useful lessons for all the seafarers of the world...” Guimera’s take is that new interpretations of the battle “do not detract from the great achievements of Nelson and his commanders. On the contrary, they magnify them, as they had to face an enemy fleet that defended itself with more determination than had been expected...”

Placing these discussions of the battle into a larger context are three illuminating papers by Clive Elmsley on the defense capabilities of the British from 1803 to 1805 (in some respects following the footsteps of Richard Glover when he published Britain at Bay: Defence against Bonaparte 1803-1814 in 1973), Michael Broers on the Grande Armée of 1805, and Peter Hicks on the significance of Austerlitz. One can understand from these papers why Admiral Monaque called Trafalgar an unnecessary battle. “We at the Fondation Napoleon,” says Hicks, who is identified as the chargé d’affaires at the Fondation, in Paris, “hold that Napoleon (like Nelson) is a key figure in our common history — not forgetting, however, that there are certain national sensitivities.” Hicks’ final comment is worth remembering: “If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then commemoration is the continuation of history by other means.” As such, it is one of the best ways of juxtaposing, and trying to understand, the different conceptions of Europe and European society today.

Trafalgar is unlikely to be forgotten. Nelson is even less likely to be forgotten. There will no doubt be a tercentenary. And once again, commemoration will no doubt serve as the continuation of history.

W. A. B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


An interesting fact about ships is that a ship’s “life” does not always end when it is sunk. A famous example is the USS California lost at Pearl Harbor but refloated, returned to service and re-fought against the Japanese in the later part of the Pacific War. Königsberg is another one of those ships whose career was not over even after it was sunk at its moorings in Bergen during Unternehmen. It is the events around the ship after its sinking that Huxmann’s book chronicles.

During Germany’s invasion of Norway, Königsberg was part of Gruppe III, which along with its sister Köln, and the training ship Bremse, was tasked with the assault and capture of Bergen on 9 April 1940. Despite taking significant damage from coastal batteries on the approach to the harbour, Königsberg was able to successfully disembark the troops it carried. Bergen was subsequently captured but the damage to the cruiser was serious enough to
force it to remain in Bergen while the other German vessels departed. The next day British Fleet Air Arm Skuas located the cruiser and sank it at the pier.

The book provides a sound and detailed narrative of Königsberg’s post-sinking “career.” The wreck of the cruiser blocked the vital Skoltegrunnskaien piers and it was the Kriegsmarine’s goal to get the pier operational as soon as possible. Under the leadership of Marinebaurat Heinrich Friedrichs, the ship was sealed, floated, and finally righted in 1944 after a three-year process.

What immediately becomes evident and surprising is the significant Norwegian involvement in the entire operation. From an initial wreck survey to assisting with lift and pump-lighters, Norwegian salvors were involved in every step of the process. Even more interesting is the fact that, as far as the author could determine, not once was any form of sabotage conducted by the Norwegian resistance to hamper the operation.

The British themselves were not idle either and the book demonstrates the skill and thoroughness of RAF photo reconnaissance. Long before the ship was refloated, British photo interpreters concluded that salvage operations were underway. Once Königsberg was back on the surface, reconnaissance flights maintained a vigil on the process. Even when it became evident that the ship was no threat and would not re-enter service, British reconnaissance did not let up until the end of the war.

Although the title makes it obvious that the book is a “photographic documentary,” readers will be impressed at the number of illustrations, photographs and diagrams that are included. The entire salvage process is illustrated and when there are no photographs, detailed computer recreations pinpoint the ship’s underwater location and position, for example. The book is well founded on sound primary research from several German archives as well as from the British National Archives and the Aerial Reconnaissance Archives now in Edinburgh.

A remaining point that the book makes, perhaps inadvertently, is the complete disconnect from the war that Bergen provided. If one did not know the date, one could believe that the Königsberg salvage was conducted entirely in peacetime. This is perhaps best illustrated by Marinebaurat Friedrichs’ diary entry on his return to Germany in the summer of 1944 that during his time in Norway the war had simply slipped by (p.111).

What non-salvage specialists will find tedious and overwhelming, this reviewer included, is the highly detailed section on the theoretical pre-salvage calculations. A full ten pages are used to explain how the salvors calculated the buoyancy, centre of gravity, and required lift that would be needed for the actual salvage. This would be fine in a major work but, given the length of the book, it could have been reduced, as calculations, although they were used again at later periods of the salvage, do not enter the text again.

The major criticism is that the book is largely a micro-history of events surrounding the Königsberg and remains disconnected from the grand narrative. The basic and ever important “so what” question is left largely unanswered throughout and not until the conclusion is there much of a hint as to why this four-year salvage operation really mattered or why such an extensive effort was even mounted.

Nevertheless, the book is certainly worth a read as a case study of a very difficult wartime salvage operation, a look at co-operation between occupiers and occupied and at the effectiveness of British aerial intelligence. Also valuable is the
inclusion of a vast and unique collection of photographs that would ordinarily not be so accessible.

Christopher Kretzschmar
Upper Hampstead, New Brunswick


Warship 2010 once again offers fascinating and authoritative information about warship construction and naval history. This year there are articles on both technical and operational subjects as well as shorter notes and book reviews.

On current naval forces, Conrad Waters describes the latest air defence escorts of the navies of Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. These all derive from a proposed NATO frigate-replacement program of the early nineties but national requirements resulted in differences from the common design. Nevertheless, they are quite similar in appearance as well as capability.

Readers of Warship are just as interested in ships that were never built as in those that were. Such studies shed light on the development of warship design and it is interesting to speculate how effective the ships would have been, if completed. There are three such articles this year. John Jordan has provided an in-depth description of the French aircraft carrier Joffre. When compared with the contemporary carriers of the 1930s, the design had some novel features: the island superstructure on the starboard side was larger and longer than in British, American and Japanese carriers, and the straight flight deck was offset to port to compensate. Construction commenced at St. Nazaire in November 1938 and was 20 percent completed at the French/German armistice in June 1940. The hull was subsequently dismantled on the slips and a proposed sister ship was never laid down. A second short article on this theme by Ian Sturton discusses the three cancelled sisters of HMS Hood which would have had some improvements to protection and to the layout of the magazines. In the same vein, David Murfin describes a number of possible design modifications for the RN’s successful Fiji class cruisers. The final result was the Lion class.

Somewhat related to the Joffre article is one by Hans Lengerer on the last Japanese carrier to be completed in the Second World War, the Katsuragi. It saw no service in its intended role but was used post-war as a repatriation ship. There is also an item by Kathrin Milanovitch on the Unebi and the Chishima, two unfortunate Japanese ships of the 1880s. Another ship whose design, career and fate are described (by Phillippe Caresse) is the French battleship Suffren completed in 1902. After serving at the Dardanelles, Suffren was later lost on 27 November 1916. While steaming off the coast of Portugal, en route from Gibraltar to Lorient, it was sunk by a single torpedo from U-52, but the loss was due not to flooding, but to an enormous explosion. When the U-boat surfaced and closed the scene, neither survivors nor wreckage was visible. It was another victim of the touchy cordite of that period that destroyed several large French and British warships.

On the technical side, John Spencer has contributed the first of a series of articles on the development of centralized fire control in the French navy. A lot of work has been done on British systems by former CNRS member, the late Bill Schleihaufl, and by Christopher C. Wright on early American developments, and published in Warship International, so this initiative is welcomed. An unusual subject is the history of British Admiralty floating docks by Ian Buxton, while another
important article describes the raid on the Italian battle fleet at Taranto, by aircraft from HMS Illustrious, and its aftermath. The six Italian battleships outnumbered the British Mediterranean fleet and by putting three of them out of action, Britain restored the balance of power. More importantly, this is considered the turning point when the carrier and its aircraft superseded the battleship as the true capital ship. (The Japanese navy absorbed this lesson well.) The damage and salvage of the three ships is the author’s main theme.

The Battle of Jutland is always being re-fought, this time in a very interesting article with the intriguing title “Equal Speed Charlie London.” (This was the British signal with Charlie London being First World War phonetics for C.L.) Stephen McLaughlin describes the development of the methods of deploying a large fleet from cruising formation into line of battle that the Royal Navy had practised since 1900 and its crucial application by Jellicoe on 31 May 1916. There are many diagrams showing the systems of manoeuvre, what might have happened and what actually did. As all the more thoughtful analysts have agreed, Jellicoe, with scant information and little time, made exactly the right decision. He did not achieve the victory he hoped for because of varying, and generally poor, visibility and the skill of the German ships in turning their whole battle line 180 degrees under fire. The toughness of German ships and weakness of Britain’s defective shells also played a part.

Book reviews and a photo essay complete Warship 2010, a most valuable addition to any naval book collection.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This book has not just one historical theme or plot, but three intertwined plots. The first and main part of the story is the history of the so-called “death ship” of Halifax, the SS England, which had to cut short its trans-Atlantic immigrant run in April 1866 and put into Halifax because of a cholera outbreak on board the overcrowded ship. The second story is what was on the minds of Haligonians at the same time — primarily the Fenian raids of 1866 and Halifax’s preparations. The last part is the author’s quest to visit McNab’s Island in Halifax harbour where the quarantine location was set up for the 1202 passengers and 100 crew.

The author keeps us on tenterhooks using this technique of plaiting the three plots together in each chapter. The reader never quite knows what will happen next. In fact, Laffoley is quite circumspect in the main plot about the SS England, and like a good detective novelist, he makes you want to read right to the end. Based on newspaper accounts, he discusses what is happening in Halifax while the SS England is quarantined, and eventually, the two stories intersect when the cholera spreads ashore. Letters written by local public health doctor, John Slayter, who set up his command post on the island, help one visualize him spending the day treating victims and then writing his daily reports late at night.

The author does a very good job recounting the history of cholera, myths about treatment in the early days of understanding germs, and how public health authorities responded to it, in this case executing sometimes urgent and necessary but drastic measures, such as burning down
an infected house. In fact, it is quite amazing that the outbreak did not consume Halifax as well. Largely, this is thanks to Dr. Slayter, who had the support of the city, the Royal Navy, the army garrison, and the province in containing the outbreak. Halifax provided work crews, police and special constables for patrolling the division between the quarantine camp, the inhabited part of the island and the surrounding water to enforce the quarantine and ensuring that public health authorities could carry out their plans. The Royal Navy provided a hulk vessel to act as a floating hospital. The province, in the form of Sir Charles Tupper, MD, the provincial secretary, provided a strong coordinating authority.

The only criticism I had was that Laffoley did not clearly state how many crew, passengers and locals actually died. This may be due, in part, to the fact that some died at sea without their names being known or recorded, while other unknown victims died ashore on McNab’s Island. The best clue is the author’s statement that 80 bodies had to be reburied on the island. (p.83) Earlier in the book (p.88), the author notes that there was no official tally kept by the ship’s captain but those buried at sea numbered about 49 of the 149 cases on board when the ship arrived at Halifax. Amazingly, only three locals died. (p.182)

This book is definitely a worthwhile read, especially for anyone visiting Halifax in the summertime and wanting to visit this off-the-beaten-path island.

Bradley Shoebottom
Fredericton, New Brunswick


Despite a rich literature on Spanish overseas trade from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, there remains much to be understood about many of its aspects. Xabier Lamikiz offers both new knowledge and insight in his study of eighteenth-century Spanish trade and the vital role that trust among merchants and shippers played in the growth of that trade. Participation by Spaniards in overseas trade increased notably in the eighteenth century after they had left much of it to foreigners in the previous two centuries. Lamikiz examines how Spanish merchants overcame their previous limitations, focussing on two very different examples: Bilbao’s trade in the North Atlantic and Cádiz’s trade with the Viceroyalty of Peru. After a nice review of Spanish and Portuguese trade in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, based principally on secondary works, this thoroughly documented work consists of three parts. The first describes the merchants and sea captains involved in Bilbao’s trade with northern Europe, in which the author pays special attention to the relationship between local and foreign merchants residing in Bilbao. A second part describes the merchants (both Spanish and foreign) involved in the trade between Cádiz and Lima, focussing on the changes that occurred in the trade routes and communications throughout the eighteenth century and how those changes affected the networks between Spain and Peru. A final section examines various topics (such as confidentiality, enforceability of contracts, use of credit, decision-making and competition) that affected the merchants described in the previous chapters.

Much of the earlier work on Spanish merchants has focussed on their *consulados* (merchant guilds), an institution dating from the thirteenth century in
Catalonia and from the end of the fifteenth century in Castile. These institutions provided merchants and mariners with their own private tribunals to litigate commercial and maritime disputes, but they also gave merchants an institution to promote and defend their interests. The consulados regulated trade and provided other services to the merchants including insurance and notarial services. While of major importance in the history of overseas Spanish mercantile activity, the institution was waning by the end of the seventeenth century, as Lamikiz correctly points out, and histories of the institution in each commercial centre have often overlooked the role of individual merchants (both members and non-members of consulados) in the development of trade. Lamikiz emphasizes that more important than ties to the consulado were the reputation and trustworthiness of their contacts in overseas ports, trust being the essential element that permitted the trade to grow and prosper, as he demonstrates how individual merchants developed trading networks apart from the consulado connections.

Drawn from the author’s 2006 University of London Ph.D. thesis, this study rests on a wide array of primary sources. Records from the Bilbao, Cádiz and Lima consulados are important, but these include relatively little of the correspondence of individual merchants.

For that, Lamikiz turned to documents from the archives of the British High Court of Admiralty, where he found significant individual Spanish merchants’ correspondence captured from Spanish shipping. Such private correspondence provides many of his specific examples of the kinds of trust that developed between merchants in Cádiz and Bilbao and their colleagues overseas. Printed primary materials, such as commercial handbooks, economic treatises and government publications, supplemented the archival sources.

Cádiz and Bilbao had in common that merchant communities in both ports rose to primary importance in the eighteenth century, successors to earlier consulados in Seville and Burgos respectively. Bilbao’s consulado, dating from 1511, was nearly as old as that of Burgos (1494), but Burgos dominated the export of Spanish wool until well into the seventeenth century. Bilbao, however, as the principal Basque port of Spain, had developed a rising network of trusted relations with foreign merchants, many of whom had resided in Bilbao for several years and then returned to northern Europe. It was these close relations with foreign merchants that permitted Bilbao’s rapid growth in the eighteenth century. Lamikiz provides a particularly effective description of the rise of the Basque traders throughout northern Europe and the Spanish colonies, as he gives a sympathetic account of Basque trading in that century. Although he focuses particularly on Peru, the Basque diaspora in the second half of the eighteenth century was important in other places as well, notably in Chile, Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, and Cuba. In the case of Cádiz, Spaniards there increased their involvement in overseas trade as they were able to develop better correspondence with Peru. Especially important was the shifting of the trade route from Panama to around Cape Horn in the 1740s. The presence of Peruvian Creoles in Cádiz also contributed to this. Yet Lamikiz supports David Brading’s theory that most merchants involved in transatlantic trade in America, from the Conquest to Independence, were peninsular-born Spaniards. Lamikiz provides ample evidence that peninsulares were dominant in the Lima trading networks with Cádiz.

Ralph Lee Woodward Jr.
Fayette, Missouri
The first fleet battles fought by U.S. naval units and their personnel following their many skirmishes during the Civil War finally came at the end of the nineteenth century. In the interregnum warship design had undergone many dramatic changes. Sails had disappeared, iron had come and gone and steel was the new medium for warship construction. The Americans who led, and to a great extent manned, the modern fleets of this short two-ocean conflict were the same men who had been blooded in that earlier, bitter war. The author dramatically introduces these colourful characters as they came together in 1864 at the second bombardment and final capture of Fort Fisher, the guardhouse to Wilmington, and the last port open to Southern commerce.

From that dramatic opening we are led through the decades of the naval doldrums with their slow promotions and aging vessels, until Americans noticed that they were slipping behind world powers in warship development. Rearmament came and the aging officers and crews were assigned to the novel steel steam warships. One of these vessels, USS Maine, an armoured cruiser commissioned in 1895, blew up and sank in Havana Harbour in mid-February 1898. She was there to protect American interests during a Cuban uprising against the colonial Spaniards. The hastily convened board of enquiry charged to assign cause for the disaster, initially found that an external mine or explosive device had precipitated the demise the warship. The still-mysterious explosion, now generally considered to have been accidental, became the catalyst which precipitated the Spanish-American War.

The new ships and their aging personnel were rapidly deployed and on May Day, 1898, Commodore Dewey and the U.S. Asiatic Fleet cornered the Spanish far-eastern fleet in the southeast part of Manila Bay. The ensuing three-hour battle ended in a foregone conclusion. The U.S. fleet was larger, of greater tonnage, and carried heavier guns, while the disadvantaged Spaniards were also unable to manoeuvre; they had exchanged sea room in favour of the protection of the guns of a defensive gun battery on Sangley Point. These heavy guns proved useless as they could not be accurately trained because of the high embrasures of the battery walls. Dewey’s ships made three devastating attacks past the Spaniard line; the fleet was destroyed with minimal damage to the Americans. The American public’s thirst for a first-hand account of such events was satisfied by a number of journalists being “embedded” aboard the warships in this and at the Battle of Santiago.

The second naval battle of this war took place off the coast of Cuba, and came after a Spanish fleet under their defeatist commander, Admiral Cervera, made a dramatic crossing of the Atlantic. The Spaniards hunted through part of the Caribbean before finally coming together in Santiago Harbour where they were blockaded by the superior American force. Finally, on the third of July, the Spaniards emerged to meet another superior American force and met a fate that had been anticipated and predicted. Again, the greater number of ships, guns and tonnage prevailed. This battle was scrappy, ill-directed and sometimes an almost farcical running encounter, but the peace which followed in a little over a month was precipitated here.

A major shortcoming of this book lies in two maps which fail to compliment
the vividly descriptive text as they could. The Manila Bay map shows the routes and times of Dewey’s fleet manoeuvres, but not a single Spaniard ship location — they were fighting a ghostly enemy. And while Leeke lucidly describes the fleet’s furtive entry into Manila Bay, skirting Corregidor and other island batteries, we have only a verbal picture. The Santiago map shows all the combatants in a static state, the U.S. ships ranged at the mouth of the inlet to Santiago, before the battle, and the defeated Spanish fleet lying ashore after the fight. Carping aside, Leeke has produced a modern, easily digested, descriptive work which was truly hard to put down.

The jingoistic American war which Randolph Hearst’s press journalized and made publically popular, lasted a little over four months. But in that short period, the new and modern U.S. naval fleet was blooded. In these two disparate battles, the aging Spanish Empire in the Americas came to an end and, perhaps, it was the start of the American hegemony. Leeke relates the events leading up to these battles, the clash of arms and its aftermath in an easy journalistic manner putting life into both the officers and their bluejackets who physically served the guns. The work is very derivative as the author draws heavily and quotes freely from many more scholarly, though perhaps less erudite, writers. He is non-judgmental and presents little, if anything new, to this sea war. His reference in the title to the new steel ship navy is perhaps his major, though obvious, observation.

David A. Walker
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Numbering just over one hundred pages of text, and bound in an uninspiring sepia dust jacket, this volume at first glance could be easily dismissed as an antiquated narrative of no more than a minor, isolated episode in the annals of Spanish colonial maritime history. Such a rush to judgment would prove regretful, however, for in reality this book delivers an animated, thoroughly researched tale of the Spanish treasure fleet’s tragic encounter with an Atlantic hurricane off the coast of Georgia in the late summer of 1750, and the plight of both its survivors and wreckage against the backdrop of mid-eighteenth century Anglo-American geo-politics and twenty-first century international law and diplomacy.

“The Spanish convoy of 1750” refers to the Spanish flota, or convoy, of seven ships that set out that year for Cádiz from Havana during the height of the hurricane season and within days, struggled for survival as one terrifyingly bore down on them. Four vessels succumbed to the stormy seas while the remaining three were scattered along the coasts of North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland. Here began a series of further challenges for the survivors, as they encountered a mixed bag of reactions from colonial communities and British administrators ranging from piracy and greed to apathy. Efforts to protect Spanish ships and their valuable cargoes prompted much diplomatic wrangling, which revealed itself once again some 250 years later when salvage companies discovered the wreckage of the La Galga, the convoy’s flagship.

For comparative purposes, readers should be aware of another recent and spirited study focusing on the 1750 convoy, reviewed in this journal several issues ago (vol. XVIII, no. 1). Donald Shomette’s Shipwrecks, Sea Raiders, and Maritime
Disasters along the Delmarva Coast devoted a chapter and a portion of the conclusion to the subject; effectively relating the story of shipwreck and survival in about half as many pages as in Lewis’s study. Shomette also explored the tangled web of legal issues dealing with private salvage operations and state, national and international jurisdictions. Though enjoyable and solidly researched, it does not match the readability of Lewis’s offering.

Using compact, yet clear and concise language, Lewis writes with a passion and vibrancy that ushers readers back to the grand old era of the historical narrative. Out of fashion in scholarly circles for several decades, and abandoned to the discretion of journalists and “popular” writers, the narrative style that initially attracted so many historians to the field, including this book’s author, has since returned in force. Of course, telling a fascinating story is different from telling one that is also historically accurate and defensible. The “new” narrative is bolstered by clear evidence of thorough and rigorous research, which the present study does so well. In fact, a separate section devoted to endnotes tallies over 33 additional pages, thus lengthening the overall book by nearly one-third. Brimming with useful explanations and suggested sources for further research, the notes reflect the broad range of archival materials, including those from Spain’s Archivo General de Indias and Archivo General de Simancas, newspapers, and printed sources, upon which the story is so solidly built.

Lewis, a retired professor of history at Western Carolina University, is no stranger to the genre of lively yet meticulous maritime scholarship. His Neptune’s Militia a decade ago provided an account of the actions of the frigate South Carolina during the American Revolution that was both rousing and thoughtful. The author’s expertise in the early modern histories of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States is evident here, for Lewis always has an eye to the wider stage on which his historical actors participate.

That said, it is wished that he provided more context in areas to flesh out portions of the story. Notably absent is an attempt to “track” the 1750 hurricane from its origins off the west coast of Africa to the Caribbean and then northward up the eastern seaboard of the British American colonies. As noted by the series editors in the foreword, erratic weather and natural disasters tend to be lost to history unless they result in substantial numbers of casualties or massive physical destruction with associated enormous economic costs. Some attention to the hurricane’s effect on colonial shipping and coastal communities over a considerable area of the Atlantic world is warranted here, for it would give readers a fuller sense of the scope of this particular storm and how it differed from others that annually struck this region. Other topics lending themselves to further discussion include the steady growth of the port of Havana from the early to mid-eighteenth century as part of a wider Bourbon strategy that also involved Louisbourg to the north. Finally, this reviewer would have liked to learn more about the preparations routinely performed in readying the flotas for their annual voyages and of the intricacies and challenges concerning the sailing schedule and the favoured route.

Despite these few snips, the cost of the volume, which may put it beyond the reach of some, and a dreary dust jacket that does nothing to capture the remarkable story contained within its pages, Lewis’s book has much to offer readers. Its manageable length, active prose, comfortable pace, and sound research make this book a fine example of the “new” narrative style. As such, it would be welcomed by popular audiences as well as professors and
undergraduate students. The University Press of Florida must be commended on its publication of yet another valuable addition to the fields of maritime history and nautical archaeology.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


Ruddock Mackay and Michael Duffy, two senior naval historians, wrote this book to resurrect the career of Edward Hawke. It was inspired by the bicentennial of Lord Nelson’s triumph in the Battle of Trafalgar in 2005, especially the many books that were published on Nelson and his famous conquest. The authors contend that Hawke and his victory at Quiberon Bay in 1759 deserve similar accolades. Like other naval heroes, however, Hawke is overshadowed by Nelson, who has resonated with the British public in a way that no other admiral ever has. In their opinion, Hawke was the prototypical admiral of the age of sail; not only was he Nelson’s equal in maritime warfare, but it was Hawke who first developed the qualities and tactics that Nelson used with such great success during the French and Napoleonic Wars — aggressiveness, close combat, and the ruthless ambition for total victory in battle. Hawke emerges in this book as the key figure in British naval strategy during the eighteenth century.

The authors set out to re-evaluate British naval leadership in the eighteenth century. They begin with Hawke during the 1740s and end with Nelson in 1805; in between they discuss the qualities that were necessary to become a “great admiral,” and use biographies of leading naval figures to explain why they did not measure up to Hawke and Nelson. Their main argument is that Hawke set the bar for leadership during the Seven Years’ War and that until Nelson rediscovered these qualities in the 1790s, the Royal Navy stagnated and lacked direction. Subsequent admirals ignored Hawke’s blueprint for success in blockade and battle and they paid a heavy price for it in wartime, particularly during the American Revolution.

This analytical approach to naval leadership should be applauded, but the book suffers from a number of structural problems. This is not a biography of Hawke, but in many ways it is exactly that. Nearly half of the book is a strategic or operational biography of Hawke, while the chapters on leadership and contemporary British admirals are framed around Hawke; he is always part of the discussion and he is present on almost every page. As stated already, the authors do not hide the fact that they believe Hawke has received short shrift from historians and the public. The result is a defensive tone throughout this book, whereby no admiral or naval victory can be discussed without disparaging them in some way in relation to Hawke’s accomplishments — this includes celebrated names such as Anson, Rodney, Howe, Jervis and Duncan. Their careers are detailed (built up) and then critiqued (broken down) in a very predictable pattern. Only Nelson, who is the subject of an entire chapter near the end of the book, emerges as Hawke’s equal, but again the authors point out that the key to Nelson’s success was the leadership attributes that Hawke had pioneered and honed a half-century earlier.

The section on leadership is the most intriguing part of this book. Mackay and Duffy list twelve criteria of leadership excellence and use them to evaluate prominent admirals during the eighteenth
century: obtaining a decisive victory, operational originality, seamanship, aggression, tactical flair, preparation, grasp of strategy, moral courage, personal leadership, health and stamina, communication skills, and a “zealous concern for the effect of the commanding admiral’s conduct on the morale, effectiveness and cohesion of the service as a whole.” (p.97) There are some obvious pitfalls here. The authors state clearly that all twelve of these qualities are based on the career and persona of Hawke (and to a lesser extent, Nelson), which makes it a flawed methodology from the outset — how can others measure up to Hawke when Hawke is the yardstick? Second, most of these characteristics are too subjective and open to a variety of interpretations; things like moral courage and personal leadership cannot be compared or measured in a satisfactory manner. Third, the authors joke that luck should have been a thirteenth characteristic, and it probably should have been. Patronage and promotion, the timing of appointments, and wartime assignments all played a pivotal role in Hawke’s and Nelson’s careers and how and why they are remembered today. Many captains and admirals who were just as capable as these men are forgotten because they served in peacetime or because they commanded far away from the European theatre of operations. Finally, the authors use the term “great admiral” on a number of occasions. This is a problematic concept, more celebratory than critical, and it cannot be evaluated in a meaningful way. It also edges dangerously close to “great man history,” which is the focus of popular rather than academic history.

While this is a handsomely-produced volume, it also has editorial problems. For instance, there is a range of typographical errors — “chef command” instead of “chief command” (p.36) is an obvious one. The use of contractions is another frustrating issue; frequently the authors alternate between contractions and spelling the same words out on the same page. Finally, scores of exclamation points are littered throughout the book; this reviewer has never seen them employed so often (and so needlessly) in a scholarly monograph. These drawbacks take away from the book and give the appearance that it was rushed through publication.

In the big picture, Mackay and Duffy succeed in rescuing Hawke from Nelson’s shadow. Their book revises our understanding of British naval leadership in the age of sail and it will generate much more debate on this popular subject.

Keith Mercer
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Naval warfare has spawned imaginative ideas based upon new technological advances. Submersibles have had a long history, dating from 333 BC and Alexander the Great’s shallow descent under the sea in a glass-bottomed barrel through Leonardo da Vinci’s 1515 conceptual sketch of a submarine, to Cornelius Drebbel’s 1620 oar-powered, leather-covered submersible vessel that was successfully tested in the Thames River. A century and a half later, David Bushnell’s “sub-marine,” as it was called, was a design breakthrough that enabled the waging of asymmetrical maritime warfare on several levels. In writing this book, Manstan and Frese attempted to uncover the conditions and the likely knowledge Bushnell and a small band of men had available to them when they created the truly unique vessel; then the
authors systematically set out to recreate it. In doing so, they subjected their replica to a myriad of rigorous tests and data examinations, and finally related it to the fragmentary records of the vessel’s history. The narration of this shipbuilding project mostly takes the form of an adventure story emanating from the thought processes, creativity and persistence of Bushnell and his collaborators during 1775-1776, the early years of America’s Revolutionary War.

The book, written as a series of tales woven together, somehow exceeds the sum of its parts — interpretation, replication, investigation, and speculation. Manstan and Frese tell of their attempt to replicate the form and function of the original submarine based upon their interpretation of the contemporary accounts available to them. The reader becomes a surrogate detective, naval architect, mechanical engineer, physicist, chemist, oceanographer/cartographer, historian, and finally a speculator while navigating through this engaging book.

It is a tale of retro-engineering and exacting testing of what the authors believed to be the original propulsion mechanism, solutions to air supply and evacuation, ballasting, navigation, depth-gauging, three-dimensional mobility and control conundrums while submerged. In addition, there were issues concerning vessel structural strength and integrity, and buoyancy in waters that were part fresh and part saline during tidal and current variations. Manstan and Frese used data from their tests to solve the many problems they encountered while designing the replica.

The vessel was popularly known as the Turtle, largely because it was described as looking like two oversized dorsal tortoise shells fused together. Its innovations were numerous. Arguably, the most important was the invention of the screw propeller to allow the submarine to manoeuvre through the water both fore and aft, as well as up and down. (Until then, ships moved by either sail or oar power. Drebbel had used oar-power on his submerged vessel which was obviously very inefficient.) Bushnell adapted a propeller to supply this locomotive power, with its many design options to be tested and worked through. For example, propeller blade-shape design (triangular, rectangular, ellipsoid), two-bladed or multi-bladed, angle and pitch of the blades, blade length and materials, (all needed to find the critical blade angle to create and maintain thrust), and material efficiency so a man cranking the propeller could work under water with limited oxygen. Many other considerations also had to be tested and evaluated including hull design to minimize drag, variable buoyancy considerations, the crank and trundle design, manometers, flywheel to assist cranking, pilot ergonomics, etc. They had to invent a watertight metal hatch with glass ports so that they could see their objective and find a way of illuminating the submarine’s few vital instruments in the dark. Also Bushnell had to invent a workable “torpedo” (clock mechanism to control an underwater mine), plus a way of attaching it to a hull. All these tests had to be done with few sophisticated devices. In addition, the British restricted the importation of, or kept a tight reign on, many items needed to complete their project and the building and testing had to be done under the not-too-distant eye of the British navy patrolling in Long Island Sound. Therefore pilots had to be trained in secret in order to preserve the surprise factor.

Manstan and Frese took the unique approach of using local high school students to build prototype components and then tested them very near where the Turtle was constructed in 1775-1776 at both the Connecticut River Museum and the Mystic Seaport Museum. They had help from the Engineering and Diving Support Unit of the
Under Sea Warfare Center. Much of their data are presented as tables for the reader’s evaluation. The first roughly seven-eights of the book recounts how the authors did their research, testing and came to build a reasonable prototype vessel. The book then shifts to a short well-written narrative summarizing the historical record; the failed but imaginative attempts at sinking British ships, together with speculation about why these attempts failed. In spite of the repeated lack of success, Bushnell and his supporters were certain that the submarine vessel was an effective and dangerous weapon. They were also concerned that if the details of their design got into enemy hands, submarines could find their way into general use. Submarine warfare might develop into an eighteenth-century “weapon of mass destruction” and be used against American ships.

The book does have some minor flaws. The manuscript appears to have been written in sections and stitched together, a style variation that yielded “literary seams” that show in places. Also, one might quarrel with the author’s use of modern data to work out of the currents, depth and salinity of the New York harbour during the Revolutionary War. The Manhattan, Brooklyn and New Jersey shores and certainly the harbour’s channels bear little resemblance to that of 1776. Still, one should give them credit for addressing the problems that these variables presented to Bushnell and his team.

In summary, Turtle is an unusual maritime history book that is both engrossing and a pleasure to read, particularly to historians with a physical science background. This is a historical-mystery story where the reader knows the outcome. The authors cleverly turn it into an intellectual adventure by letting the reader think about solutions to the Bushnell team’s many problems — a sort of puzzle-solving maritime journey. I recommend Manstan and Frese’s book to those interested in this history-making vessel’s probable construction, the prototype of one of the world’s most innovative class of warships.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


The U.S. Navy of the 1850s is a fascinating subject in itself, but it has never been so well integrated into the broader political, social, and cultural history of the antebellum United States. In Warship under Sail, Lorraine McConaghy uses officers’ journals, deck logs, and medical and disciplinary records to examine the operations of the sloop of war Decatur on the Pacific Station from 1854 to 1859. McConaghy, who is the public historian at Seattle’s Museum of History and Industry, asks the right questions and offers fascinating answers. She is primarily interested in placing the sloop and the navy in the context of antebellum Manifest Destiny. In Warship under Sail, the Decatur becomes a lens to examine broader issues of American expansion. These include the use of military force on the maritime frontier, the social relationships among officers and enlisted men, and the cultural interactions between the crew and people ashore. Ultimately, McConaghy concludes that the perception of naval power in the Pacific West was often different from the real challenges the navy faced there.

The book begins with two chapters that provide the political and naval context
for the *Decatur*’s cruise. McConaghy examines the development of Young America as a political ideology in the Democratic Party. Its masculine, expansionist rhetoric belied growing concerns over slavery and other sectional differences. In the navy, technological changes were slowly precipitating the obsolescence of sail. Social reforms such as the abolition of flogging and the forced retirement of officers also destabilized the service. McConaghy reminds us that the *Decatur* sailed within this world, not away from it.

She divides the rest of the book into four episodes, which illuminate the interconnected forces at work on the Pacific frontier. The first of these episodes details the *Decatur*’s passage through the Strait of Magellan, a daring move by Captain Isaac Sears Sterrett, which was designed to bring glory to himself and his ship. Meeting with contrary winds and violent storms, the *Decatur* had to be towed free by a steam warship. This was the first of many instances during the cruise that suggested the sail navy’s growing obsolescence. The affair also reflected poorly on Sterrett, who was later relieved of command by the Naval Efficiency Board of 1855 on more dubious charges.

McConaghy then follows the *Decatur* to Seattle, a small logging town on the Pacific frontier, which the sloop helped to defend against Indian attack. Mounting threats culminated in the Battle of Seattle on 26 January 1856. McConaghy contends that settlers and naval officers portrayed the battle as a heroic stand in the familiar vein of the masculine frontier narrative. McConaghy, however, exposes other counter-narratives—the confused and contested defense of the town, the use of Indian allies, the inept piloting of the *Decatur* in Elliott Bay, and the penchant among the enlisted men to undermine naval authority ashore. Over time, Seattle’s founding memory “was made and remade,” amplifying some voices and silencing others. (p.287)

In the third episode, McConaghy examines the *Decatur*’s cruise off Nicaragua and Costa Rica, attempting to contain the political fallout of William Walker’s most recent filibuster. The ship ferried William Carey Jones, President Buchanan’s inept secret agent, to Costa Rica while caring for the sickly remnants of Walker’s army. Here, the *Decatur* disappears almost entirely from McConaghy’s narrative, an apt allegory for the navy’s role in the growing perplexity of sectional politics. Nevertheless, this is a rare place where McConaghy seems to lose the balance between deck level history and broad thematics.

In the fourth and final episode, the sloop anchored off Panama as a floating hospital for Walker’s wounded and to guard the rail connection over the isthmus. The stationary ship became a breeding ground for disease and boredom. Desertion, disorder, and drinking were endemic, even among the *Decatur*’s officers. “The ship itself,” McConaghy writes, “became a criminal space.” (p.236)

Despite these problems, and sometimes because of them, the *Decatur*’s crew played an important role in shaping the frontier society of the Pacific West. McConaghy shows that the enlisted men were extraordinarily opportunistic. They subverted the order of the shipboard hierarchy, creating their own social spaces based partly on alcohol, sex, and crime. Others simply used the *Decatur* for passage to the West. Once in California, they quickly deserted, “pursuing their best opportunities all along the Pacific coast.” (p.173) The officers had other concerns. Their identity was tied to the East, with the naval establishment and the administrative reforms that were transforming their profession. Nevertheless, their careers
could be made or broken on the frontier and they struggled, sometimes with one another, to insure their own success. The presence of the navy also brought economic and environmental changes to the region. It boosted local economies and supported the infrastructure that made Seattle, San Francisco, and Honolulu part of America’s Pacific empire.

Warship under Sail is an ambitious book, asking questions that will interest a diverse audience. McConaghy’s portrayal of the U.S. Navy is bleak. If the Decatur is any indication, it was a service spread thin across a vast frontier and wracked by professional jealousies, disciplinary problems, and disease. The extraordinary technological changes and social reforms of the 1850s only compounded these problems. McConaghy’s more focused examination of issues among the officers and enlisted men fleshes out earlier syntheses by naval historians Peter Karsten, Donald Chisholm and James Valle. As McConaghy admits, there is a need for more ship-level histories from this era to determine how many vessels were afflicted by similar problems. The book, however, never loses sight of the broadest questions. The Pacific frontier proved messy and chaotic. Warship under Sail illuminates the contradictions and interactions that characterized this period of American expansion. It should, therefore, be read not only by military and maritime historians, but also by scholars interested in the American West, antebellum culture, politics, and imperialism.

Jason W. Smith
Frederick, Maryland


This volume is a delight to read. The story it tells is astounding and one well worth telling, or I should say, retelling as the broad parameters of the incident have been noted in other histories. But it is no exaggeration to describe the events recounted by MacIntyre as “astounding,” as they truly are in all senses of the word.

There seems to be something about how the British go about fighting a war that brings out the eccentrics and the amateur who are keen to do their part in the most unconventional ways. One simply doesn’t find more “serious” war-fighting nations develop such off-the-wall efforts to defeat the enemy as Britain seems to revel in. The story that MacIntyre relates involves MI5 and MI6 and their active deception tactics designed to mislead the Germans as to Allied intentions. While deception is always part of war, the initiatives undertaken by the British seem to be in their own class. (In a similar way, the stories associated with POW escapades also seem to be peculiarly British.)

The case at hand was one element in a complex effort designed to confuse the German High Command as to the Allies next point of attack once the North African campaign concluded. The obvious next step was Sicily, and hence, the desire to implant the notion that the next step was in fact anywhere but. Of course, in the end, the “obvious next step” was just that: Sicily.

The author, Ben MacIntyre, had written an earlier book, Agent Zigzag, about a double agent who had as his handler the remarkable Ewen Montague, a naval reserve officer, a lawyer in civilian life, who served in MI6 as an intelligence officer. In the course of researching this previous book, MacIntyre came across the papers that described Operation Mincement. This book
builds on these papers, as well as additional material provided to the author by Montague’s family. Montague, himself, had written of the incident in his book, published in 1953, *The Man Who Never Was*, a highly circumspect and less than complete account.

Montague was the principal character in the story, but he was but one of many colourful individuals who were involved in this particular deception effort. Montague was ably assisted by Charles Cholmondeley (helpfully pronounced as “Chumley”) of MI5. The two crafted the exotic idea of taking a corpse (surprisingly difficult to secure in time of war, as it turned out), equipping it with a false identity, providing it with false documentation pertaining to the supposed Allied plans for Greece and Sardinia, then dropping the body off Spain to be picked up by Spanish authorities, with the material transmitted thence to Germany and, hopefully, Hitler’s desk. Astonishingly, the plan worked.

The story is incredibly colourful, populated by an almost unbelievable cast of eccentric characters, British, German and Spanish, as well as incidents that stretch credulity. I will not spoil the tale by divulging the details in this review, save to note that Ian Fleming was peripherally involved, as was Churchill, Eisenhower, Alexander, Mountbatten, Nye and a host of others with bit parts. Some of the latter included a racing car driver who transported the corpse to the River Clyde where the Commanding Officer of HMS *Seraph*, who was to drop it off the coast of Spain, picked it up. It is an astonishing story.

In a touching epilogue, MacIntyre records that the Spanish authorities had the body reverently buried in a local graveyard. As is normal, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission now maintains the site. The original name on the marker was the false one used in the deception. The true name was uncovered in the 1990s by an amateur historian, and the correct name added to the bottom of the marker — it is sad to relate, yet no doubt self-evident, that the individual who was at the heart of the deception, was without family or friends, and died alone and unloved. His name: Glyndwr Michael. Entirely unwittingly, he did his part for King and Country.

The book is well written and researched. The notes are comprehensive. The appendix is helpful and interesting. The photos used are excellent and support the narrative well. I heartily endorse the book as both an excellent story, and a means of shedding light on an aspect of the Second World War, the world of shadows and lies, that is little known or understood. It is well worth the money. I might add, it provides that verisimilitude that Fleming later used in his James Bond novels. Occasionally, fact can truly be as strange as fiction.

Ian Yeates, Regina, Saskatchewan


Dirk Meier’s latest book, *Seafarers, Merchants and Pirates in the Middle Ages* is a revealing look at the ports, ships, navigation, trade and pillage patterns of the North Sea and the Baltic region. Despite the title, it is not a book which emphasizes the human element in seafaring and mercantile history.

Meier begins his study by examining the state of navigation on rivers and seas in the Middle Ages, which was primitive at best. As we see later in the book, navigation changed during the broad expanse we know as the Middle Ages; this
is especially true of the use of the compass which, along with advances in shipbuilding, made possible the European Age of Expansion at the end of this period.

In his discussion of shipbuilding, Meier explores a number of different vessels — from the cog to the carrack. The archaeological information he provides on the extant remains of various types of ship, as well as modern day reconstructions adds much to the chapter. Of particular interest (to this reviewer) is his discussion of the religious symbolism of seafaring craft in northern cultures: “ships were far more than mere means of transport.” (p.26)

Much attention is paid to the various ports of the Baltic and North Sea region — some of which went on to be formidable ports, and others which no longer exist except in historical texts. Meier examines trade patterns and goods in some detail. Although the author has employed manuscripts in his research, there are many gaps in our understanding of this period. The author is adept at using geographical information and archaeological findings in the absence of written sources. This is the great strength of the book.

Its great weakness is that the title suggests that the true focus of the book will be seamen, merchants and pirates yet there is very little about people until chapter 7 of the 11 in the book. For the majority of the work, we know more about the landscape and waterways than about the groups and individuals who tried to settle and build these (often rugged) terrains and navigate the waters. In fact, one could say that geographical factors are the real protagonists and antagonists in this book — in a Braudelian fashion.

Even when Meier turns his attention to the Vikings, he uses much of chapter 7 to discuss the geography of their sphere of influence in the north. By chapter 8, he focuses much more on the human component as he examines the ebb and flow of centuries of Viking raids. He also dedicates a chapter to the “medieval superpower,” the Hanseatic League, which dominated much of northern European trade well beyond this period. The influence of the League was wide-ranging — extending beyond trade and wealth to the development of ports, trading procedures and maritime law.

Meier’s discussion of onboard life is sadly limited as well. He claims “we know little about how men lived by and on the sea, what their feelings were or what life on was like.” (p.125) This is an odd statement, given the title of the book. He makes references to incidents such as the flogging of apprentices from the eighteenth century and claims it was likely to have been similar in the Middle Ages. (p.128) This is probably true, but there are studies of European seamen’s shipboard life which are much closer to his period which he could have employed, rather than simply projecting backwards from the eighteenth century. There is archaeological evidence which reveals information about shipboard life as well. Furthermore, on the basis of the title, we are promised an examination of pirates, which is not forthcoming. There are brief, scattered references to pirates in the text and there is a single chapter on the Vitalienbrüder privateers. A more broad-ranging discussion would have been an asset.

The book is very handsomely illustrated with contemporary images, present-day photographs of archaeological sites discussed in the text as well as maps. There is also a glossary and index. There are no references for the text so we may assume the work is intended for a general readership rather than an academic audience. Meier’s discussion of ports, ships and trade is informative but falls short on the human element of medieval trade and seamanship.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick
Between 1939 and 1945, the German naval war effort became largely concentrated on, and by far best known for, the Atlantic U-boat war. Apart from the depredations of their armoured ship, *Admiral Scheer*, large German warships were rarely successful except by tying down a disproportionate number of RN and RAF forces in watching and trying to destroy them. By comparison, several of their disguised merchant raiders, such as the vessel *Atlantis* featured in this book, caused considerable losses to the Allies as well as involving them in a continuous effort to try to catch the vessel, at a minimal investment in both finances and naval personnel on the part of Germany.

After a plethora of books on the U-boat war that is still growing, it is worth the re-read of this first-person story of how at least this one ship wandered four oceans and sank 22 Allied merchantmen before her eventual demise in November 1941. Even at that, a large proportion of the crew survived to return to Germany after being rescued by Italian submarines. There were other similar raiders whose tales have also been told. They sank 830,000 tons (133 Allied vessels), and all that by mid-1943, at the cost of but seven German ships lost. As the Allied navies grew and were able to choke off the egress of such disguised raiding vessels from Germany, the program had to be abandoned. But one would judge it had assuredly been worth the effort.

Known as “Ship 16” by the Allies, the 1937-built diesel merchantman *Goldenfels* was taken in hand in early 1940, armed with six 5.9” guns, four torpedo tubes and a small *Arado* aircraft, all carefully hidden behind collapsible bulkheads, commanded by the very experienced Kapitän-zur-See (subsequently Vice-Admiral) Bernard Rogge. This book was written not long after the war by his first or executive officer, Lt. Ulrich Mohr, and augmented by other interviews with some of his victims by A.V. Sellwood. Mohr admittedly gives the impression he is sometimes putting a humane face on attacks that had, in fact, caused loss of life, especially during the ship’s later depredations when Rogge knew from radio intercepts that the Allies were assuredly hunting him and he had to be quick in a ship’s capture or destruction. But he and his crew were essentially able to seize their varied victims by subterfuge rather than using *force majeur* to batter them into submission. One of the masters captured by Rogge even provides a complimentary foreword, noting they were always treated as well as circumstances allowed.

Rogge opened his almost year-and-a-half expedition at the end of March 1940, sank six ships in the Atlantic (going and returning), 15 in the Indian Ocean and one in the South Pacific on his way home via the round-the-world route because the South Atlantic had become too hot to risk a return that way. One is impressed with how versatile these raiders were, given their lack of a single friendly port. At one stage, in the southern Indian Ocean, Rogge was even able to repair a significant gash in his ship’s hull when it grounded on a rock trying to enter a narrow passage in the Kerguelen Island for water. He drew fuel from captured tankers, sent six vessels back to German-controlled Europe, often with valuable cargoes, and prisoners, obtained useful secret information when able to board a ship before messages could be destroyed, and even provided fuel and food to U-boats when directed to do so. He met up with other raiders on occasion and even the *Sheer* in the southern ocean. Eventually,
the RN’s predominance at sea led to the sinking of *Atlantis* when the cruiser HMS *Devonshire* caught her refuelling a U-boat in mid-Atlantic. Afraid of becoming a victim of that U-boat, *Devonshire* departed, leaving Rogge and his crew to be towed toward South America in their boats by the U-boat. Within days, this group was met by another similar raider, *Python*, who took the shipwrecked mariners aboard. *Python* was then caught refuelling another U-boat and sunk by HMS *Dorsetshire* which likewise departed. The *Atlantis* boats reached the Cape Verde Islands almost three weeks later, where they were picked up by four Italian submarines and the survivors eventually reached France. Although this part of Mohr’s story takes up only four pages, it would seem to be a story in itself.

*Ship 16* is an interesting tale, patently for public consumption, even in 1955, and Mohr tends to wax somewhat lyrical on occasion about the empty ocean spaces, lovely sunsets, and the sadness mariners feel at the destruction of a handsome ship. But it serves as an excellent object lesson of what can be done with minimal outside support, a well-equipped phantom raider, a clever and compassionate leader to cause maximum damage with relatively minimal effort.

F. M. McKee
Toronto, Ontario


The Society for Nautical Research was founded in 1910 by a group of Edwardian gentlemen who wanted to create an organization as scholarly as the Naval Records Society in order to counter the current heated debate in the popular press about British naval expansion. The SNR’s membership soon included many illustrious figures in naval and merchant marine history and its early activity was largely underwritten by the shipowner, Sir James Caird.

The authors of this book are Hugh Murphy, an honorary editor of the SNR’s journal, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, and visiting reader in maritime history at the National Maritime Museum, and Derek Oddy, emeritus professor of modern economic and social history, University of Westminster, and author and editor of books on food history. Both are to be congratulated on their imaginative and authoritative research into the Society for Nautical Research.

This elegant book commemorates the centenary of the SNR, whose accomplishments in nautical archaeology during the first four decades of its existence could justify a book in itself. These included pressing the Admiralty to preserve for the nation Nelson’s flagship HMS *Victory*, developing the Royal Navy Museum in Portsmouth Dockyard, and creating the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich. By the end of 1923, the Society’s funds had reached £80,000, which included £50,000 from Caird, the first of many substantial contributions made by him. The authors relate how, in the later twentieth century, the society’s achievements were more modest. Yet in spite of personality clashes and some bitter arguments between its members, it weathered the period of austerity and economy between 1946 and 1965, although was financially unable to initiate any of the era’s heritage projects to rescue such vessels as *Cutty Sark*, SS *Great Britain* and *Mary Rose*.

Today, the role of the society is still to encourage research into maritime history and nautical archaeology, to sponsor events,
to preserve nautical artifacts and to buy paintings and other works of art for the NMM, as well as to publish on maritime subjects. To this end, the SNR not only generously supports the British Commission for Maritime History’s seminars at King’s College in London, but also publishes a quarterly, double-blind refereed periodical, *The Mariner’s Mirror*. One of the authors’ recurring themes is how this journal, which will celebrate its centenary in 2011, has survived through its many funding crises. Containing original articles, notes, queries and drawings intended to encourage research into the language and customs of the sea, it first faced competition from other international English-language refereed academic journals in the 1970s, when the Australian Association for Maritime History published *The Great Circle*, and then in 1991 when the Canadian Nautical Research Society began publishing its quarterly journal, *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*. Additional competition arose in the early 1990s with the publication of *The International Journal of Maritime History* by Memorial University of Newfoundland, and there is a planned re-launch next year of the *Journal for Maritime Research* online. *The Mariner’s Mirror*, however, with its wide spectrum of material relating to seafaring and shipbuilding, as well as original articles from both academic and non-academic authors, still has more subscribers than all other similar journals combined.

The Society for Nautical Research had neither its own headquarters nor even a regular office to house a library or a comprehensive archive of its records and the authors have been unable to determine whether the subject of a fixed base was ever discussed by its members. They argue, however, that it would have given the SNR a focal point at the heart of the Empire and, incidentally, would have made their research much easier. Notwithstanding the lack of a central repository, the authors have successfully managed their sources and have tracked down some excellent illustrations for the book. They have also explored how *The Mariner’s Mirror* has not just been a means of recording members’ research and thoughts, but has created an international forum for the interchange of knowledge on maritime matters that has been copied by many others. In addition, while over the years the journal found little space for the obituaries of many of its distinguished members and individual contributors, the authors have devoted more than 50 pages of the book to acknowledging their efforts. It is reassuring to know that the society is now cash-rich as a consequence of its judicious investments and can continue to act as a stalwart supporter of maritime research.

The history of the Society for Nautical Research and the well-respected *Mariner’s Mirror* deserves to be told, not only for its members but for a wider audience interested in maritime history. This is an entertaining book which illustrates how seafaring was a basis for Britain’s former political and economic strength and how Europe’s continuing prosperity and its role in international affairs still largely depends on naval power. Although it is worrying that the future health of maritime history in the United Kingdom depends on wealthy benefactors, we will benefit next year from the remarkable generosity of another shipowner, Sammy Ofer, who is funding a new wing of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich.

Michael Clark
London, UK

The three major expeditions to the South Pacific led by Captain James Cook, RN, were so monumental in both execution and achievement that they have tended to obscure other efforts at exploration and scientific inquiry mounted in the extraordinarily expansive last half of the eighteenth century. Released from the burden of incessant competition with France by the success of the Seven Years’ War, Britain had embarked on a programme of maritime exploration and inquiry of which Cook’s voyages formed only part. In 2010, the Captain Cook Memorial Museum at Whitby, Yorkshire, mounted an exhibition of another effort in that programme, the 1773 voyage toward the North Pole led by Constantine John Phipps and his colleague captain, Skeffington Lutwidge. *Northward Ho! A Voyage Towards the North Pole 1773* is at once a folio of three scholarly essays on the voyage, and a catalogue of the principal artefacts in the exhibition. And at first regard, it is a most handsome work indeed.

In the initial essay, Ann Savours provides a detailed examination of the process whereby the expedition was conceived and assembled. Under the direction of the Earl of Sandwich, two sloops-of-war, the small, ship-rigged warships, *Racehorse* and *Carcass*, were selected for the expedition, the first to be commanded by Phipps, and the second to be commanded in a supporting role by the sonorously named Lutwidge. The theory was that ice only formed close to land masses or the outflows of fresh water rivers, and that the open ocean was free of ice. The reasoning held that the Arctic Ocean would be found to be an ice-free, navigable body of water once a surrounding mantle of ice created by the land masses to the north and west of Europe could be penetrated. This would then allow a direct, cross-polar sailing route to China and the Indies, an advance over the requirement for trading voyages to the East to round either Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, both in the Southern Ocean. Savours reveals how the idea of such a voyage had already been suggested by the French exploratory navigator, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, and that parallel thinking led to the idea surfacing in England. What also becomes evident is how experience in the mounting of adventurous exploratory voyages such as those of Cook led to the Phipps-Lutwidge voyage being extremely well prepared in all respects possible in the eighteenth century. The ships were strengthened and extensively equipped for Arctic voyaging; the crews’ wants and needs anticipated in everything from warm clothing to foodstuffs; and scientific equipment provided to allow Phipps to comply fully with his orders to observe “very interesting particulars in Geography and other branches of Science,” to be collected “as may be useful to navigation or tend to the promotion of natural knowledge.” In the event, the voyage did not achieve its primary aim, as the pack ice to the north of Spitsbergen (Svalbard) blocked any northward progress. The voyage nonetheless returned safely and successfully in scientific terms, albeit having had a brief scare when it seemed the ships would be crushed in the ice. Much scientific knowledge had been gained, and the young midshipman Horatio Nelson, along for the voyage, had rashly attacked a polar bear and luckily survived to begin a legend of personal bravery.
The second essay, by Sophie Forgan, is a diversion from discussion of the voyage to an examination of the library belonging to Phipps, evidently one of the finest in the eighteenth century world and revealing a great deal about Phipps’ character as a philosopher — the period term for a man of science — as well as a sea officer of uncommon erudition. A friend and confidante of Joseph Banks, Phipps was a far cry from the typical sea officer of a century earlier, whose qualifications were essentially a string of oaths and a strong rattan. Out of that milieu, Phipps’ contemporary, James Cook, had risen as the new model of an inquiring, investigative expedition commander. As Forgan relates, Phipps’ own writing on his voyage was “highly regarded, not only for its narrative, but for its numerous scientific appendices containing the results of a wide range of experiments and observations. These indeed proved a model for later accounts.” A final note of interest was that Phipps was fluent in French, as were many of his contemporaries, demonstrating that even though national politics made them rivals, scientific inquiry made the civilized men of Britain and France part of a true Enlightenment, and “part of the web of friendships and interests that sustained it.”

The final essay, by renowned Pacific historian Glyn Williams, is a cogent discussion of the place of Phipps’ voyage in the wider context of the revelation of the world’s uncharted spaces in the late eighteenth century, and its place in the on-again, off-again efforts to find a practical Northwest Passage. It is written with Williams’ expected clarity, and forms a useful summary for the little book as it places Phipps’ courageous voyage in its proper place in the lexicon of British exploratory navigation. All three essays are well-written, with a command of English that is a relief to read in an age when such command is painfully in evident decline.

As well, the museum has produced a physically handsome publication full of colour illustrations that in themselves are a delight to view, and found usually in more expensive works. Along with excellent photographs of objects in the exhibition, they contribute to the success of this well-designed small work that would grace any historical library even if the exhibition was never seen. The student of eighteenth century navigation and exploration will find it a small treasure.

Victor Suthren
Merrickville, Ontario


As a guide book, this slim volume has the straightforward aim to “make it easier to recognize the fish quickly and with an enjoyable sense of discovery” for recreational fishers, managers, and outdoors types. The authors link fish diversity to the health of the water in the lakes: “Fish species are our most readily observable guides to water quality in nature. To know what species are under the boat is to know how suitable the water is for a variety of human uses.” In a wider sense, they state “The goal is to enable accurate assessment of fish life in the Great Lakes.” (Preface)

Simple colour coding is used throughout the book for the major groups of fish. There are succinct, but illuminating, general sections on fish characteristics and adaptation, how to identify fish with this guide, and the external anatomy of fishes. Then there is a section featuring pen and ink illustrations. One page shows the external anatomy of fishes; another, a representative...
fish with the basic parts labeled; and five pages of small drawings of each species within the major groups. Those groups are: long, usually slender fishes; fishes with jaw teeth absent or reduced, and only one fin on back; fishes with an adipose fin; fishes with spiny and soft-rayed dorsal fins; and fishes that might stray into the Great Lakes.

The acknowledgements give a clue to the extensive effort required to publish this work. It shows the huge cast of contributors from Elisabeth Porte at the Michigan Sea Grant, who organized this project, to the author of the text, artists, illustrators, and subject experts. Obvious pride in book production and presentation of information illuminates the work. It becomes clear that this book is a labour of love as well as the product of considerable physical and intellectual resources.

The bulk of the book is a species-by-species description of the fish in the Great Lakes. The species are arranged by type of fish, which corresponds to their anatomy and type and to the period in history in which the fish appeared, from prehistoric up to the most recent times. Each species has its name in English plus its biological name at the head of the major illustration, which is a large water colour painting of each fish. These paintings are simply beautiful; worth a thousand words each at least. The other illustrations include photographs, pen and ink drawings, and diagrams of the parts of the fish and how they function, especially in feeding and spawning. Each full, two-page spread also has a small inset map of the Great Lakes Basin showing the geographic extent of the species. The photographs are useful, although a few are well-used stock shots. The textual information on each can include sections on behaviour, body, colour, conservation status, fins, food, habitat, head, life history, and similar fish. The work integrates native and introduced species.

The book is intended to be tipped on its right side during use, so that each two-page spread becomes an information panel. Each panel’s layout is the same so that minimal time and energy is spent on the identification process. The colour-coding system, for the species within major groups of fish, is intended to speed identification. The more the user consults it, the faster the process will become.

Three, single-page, colour diagrams complete the illustrations: food pyramid Great Lakes; habitat: Great Lakes; habitat: bays, estuaries, and rivers. The food pyramid shows the flow of energy through the food web. The habitat diagrams show the species at their average depth within the water column. Unfortunately, the two habitat diagrams lack a scale when showing even approximate depth in metres/feet in the open lakes.

The book concludes with a complete checklist of fish species from the Great Lakes and tributaries with their biological names and geographic extent in rivers and lakes inside and outside the Great Lakes Basin; a brief bibliography with a list of websites; and a glossary. The glossary is minimal as befits a guide book, and assumes some scientific knowledge on the part of the reader. Photography credits finish the book.

Physical production is excellent. The use of waterproof paper means the book need not spend all its life inside but can live in the bottom of the boat without fear of damage. Be aware, however, that while the guide can be dropped into the water without damaging the paper or binding, the reviewers discovered that it does not float in fresh water.

The work succeeds far beyond its stated role as a guidebook and enhances and emphasizes the creators’ “devotion to biodiversity and clean water” set out in the preface. The work is also a wonderful introduction for non-scientists both to the water and to some of the main inhabitants of our Great Lakes. Important insights
connect the dots for non-scientists from people in the street to the people who lead us. The book imparts a thirst for more knowledge of the lakes and their ecosystems.

Every vessel from canoes and kayaks on up could use a copy. The Guide to Great Lakes Fishes belongs in the libraries of outdoors people, fishers and certainly administrators. It would be helpful in city, town and village libraries all around the Great Lakes to help community leaders, particularly, to understand what is happening in the Great Lakes. A copy in the back pocket of every provincial, state and federal legislator would be a step toward achieving cleaner water. As Canadians and Ontarians, we can only look with envy at the Sea Grant logo, knowing that the political leadership in the U.S.A., and Michigan in particular, is more enlightened about ecology than our own.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Bruce Stagg, the author of The Blackwood Schooner, is a retired high school teacher, a published playwright, and a published author. He was born in 1952 in Catalina, Newfoundland, just three miles (5 km) south of Little Catalina, where, on the night of 6 December 1926, the Ella M. Rudolph was driven onto the rocks in a violent winter storm and was totally destroyed. Seven men and a woman, from the crew of nine, perished. The lone survivor was the skipper’s youngest son. This tragedy was first written as a locally-flavoured play by Stagg, in his role as artistic director for Tip-A-Vista Arts Inc., Bonavista, Newfoundland. He redrafted the play as a story, so as to include many details and digressions that were unworkable in a dramatization. In a “Note about the Author,” the work is described as a book of creative non-fiction (p.226).

This shipwreck is different from many similar events in that of the crew of nine, eight were related by kinship. Specifically, the crew comprised the skipper, Eleazer Blackwood; his eldest son, Bertram, aged 29, who, by right of birth, was the 2nd hand; Harry, his middle son, aged 26, a crewman, married just three months; and Duke, the youngest son, aged 20, also a crewman. The other five members, four crewmen and the cook were: a brother-in-law, Sam Carter; a relative by marriage, Noah Vivian; a nephew, Joe Vivian; a niece, Mary Jane Abbott; and a family friend, Walter Atwood. The cook, Mary Jane Abbott, aged 18, was the fiancée of Blackwood’s son, Bert, the 2nd hand. Thus, it was a disaster that nearly eradicated one family, caused extreme grief and hardship to five others, and left a devastating mark on several communities (p.1).

Stagg builds his tale based on 24 written records; 29 interviews (pp.213-218); and the tapes of an interview, given in 1972, by Duke Blackwood to his cousin, Roland W. Abbot. From this interview, Abbott later wrote Ten Minutes to Eight, a short story which recounts the loss of the Ella M. Rudolph in the language and dialect of the times. Bragg’s interviewees related family stories up to the present day: family legends; details of apparitions of the Rudolph, and of those drowned in the tragedy; plus personal reminiscences of their connections with the Ella M. Rudolph and her crew.

The Blackwood schooner, Ella M. Rudolph, a wooden sailing vessel: length 20.2 metres [66.2 feet]; breadth 5.8m
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[18.9ft]; depth 2.5m [8.2ft]; and tonnage 49 metric tonnes [53.95 tons]; was built by Harold W. Allen at Allendale, Shelburne County, Nova Scotia, in 1912. She entered the Newfoundland Register of vessels in 1915 and was purchased in the fall of 1925 by her fifth Newfoundland owner, Skipper Eleazer (Leaze) Blackwood.

The author, in making a claim for the ability of Newfoundland seamen propounds, “No amount of experience or expertise could prepare them for what the North Atlantic could, and often did … was the case with Captain Eleazer Blackwood…” (p.5).

Briefly, on 6 December 1926, shortly after sunrise, in reasonably settled weather, the *Ella M. Rudolph* departed St John’s, for Catalina, Trinity Bay, from where, after a customary overnight stay, she would proceed to her home port of Port Nelson, Bonavista Bay (p.75).

The favourable weather outlook of the early morning did not hold. With the darkness came storm force winds and snow. Neither the light nor the fog-horn in the approaches to Catalina were detected, as and when expected. The attempt to make Catalina was therefore aborted, and the vessel’s course altered offshore, to a heading of north-east, with the intention of rounding Cape Bonavista and seeking shelter in Bonavista Bay (p.86). Thwarted by the violence of the storm, the *Rudolph* was unable to set a riding [storm] sail. Continuing under foresail and jumbo [fore-staysail], the skipper remarking that was all they could do, and for all hands to keep watch (p.90). The crew, in the appalling conditions of that night, were unaware of the nearness of the disaster that awaited them until the initial shudder of the vessel, as the port side [leeward] of the *Ella M. Rudolph* struck rocks near Little Catalina, resulting in her total loss and the loss of eight of the nine souls onboard (p.94).

The problem facing the skipper, how to conduct a vessel on a lee-shore, has been with us since man first ventured on the sea. Skipper Leaze, if the facts are not fiction, forfeited the opportunity to reduce sail under favourable circumstances, and carried on towards a lee-shore despite the lack of visibility and the presence of storm force winds and rough seas (pp.81-82). Why he did so, one can only guess. It would appear that he fell into the trap of overconfidence, in his ship and in himself, of being able to manage a worsening situation. Skipper Leaze made his decisions in the most dire of circumstances. Regrettably, for him and his gallant crew, those decisions proved inadequate for the prevailing circumstances and conditions.

A map identifying “The Route Taken by the Ella M. Rudolph” (p.xiv), shows the vessel originating at Port Nelson and ending at the Rocks in the vicinity of Little Catalina. It is a complete misrepresentation of the facts that has escaped an editor’s eye. The appendix, glossary, bibliography and index, however, fully fulfill their roles.

This is a book that would be of interest to high school students, and particularly to those studying life in the outports of Newfoundland, during the first half of the last century. For those engaged in the principles of the practice of command of wind-driven ships, there is much to be gleaned.

Len Forrest
Ottawa, Ontario


While the title of this work indicates a dual nature as both narrative and reference work,
the succinct historical overview comprises barely six pages, and is primarily aimed at describing the use of the reports for claims for damages and salvage filed by masters, owners, insurers, consuls and naval officers during and after the French “Quasi-War” with the United States. It also describes the organization of the summaries of these “French Spoilation claims,” as they became known, which in 1827 were evaluated at some $6,005,649 for 444 vessels seized between 1793 and 1800. These claims were ultimately resolved via the U.S. Court of Claims and the 1885 French Spoilation Act, resulting in some 6,479 claims involving 2,309 vessels being examined by the Court (pp. 2-3).

Those readers who purchase works based on their titles, and expect a lengthy historical treatise or narrative will be somewhat disappointed. Most of the 42-page introduction simply comprises a chronology of the period in question, summarizing major political and naval events of the time. While this would be useful to those not familiar with the basic outline of Franco-American relations in this period, both political and maritime, it provides no analysis, contains no citations or additional reference bibliography, nor a “notes for further reading” section that one might expect in a work such as this. Nor does it provide any background as to why the debates and struggles over merchant shipping were important to the European and global struggle between Revolutionary, and then Napoleonic, France, and its continental and British opponents, or what effects French efforts at undertaking la guerre de course against the United States actually had. For these topics, the reader will have to seek out the (unmentioned) works of Michael A. Palmer (2000), Howard Nash (1968) and Alexander DeConde (1966).

The reference section of the work is itself divided into three parts. It begins with an alphabetical list of reported losses, each of which contains a brief description with details of the vessel, its master when known, and an overview of its last voyage drawn from court records. It then moves on to a listing of “Cases Illustrating Important Questions of Law,” and is completed by a compilation of claims made under the 1885 act, which simply indicates the outcome of each case. Three appendices provide a glossary of legal terms, a list of geographical locations, and 14 useful pages of relevant excerpts of Acts of Congress, Proclamations, Treaties, and Foreign Decrees relating to maritime trade between France and the United States between 1744 and 1885. A half-page bibliography followed by a comprehensive 39-page index completes the tome.

The most intriguing of the three main parts of the work is by far that concerning cases illustrating questions of law, but it again assumes that the reader already has a good grasp of the legal issues at play and the historical context. No real analysis or summary is provided as to why the editor believes these cases were important, or if they were correctly decided or otherwise controversial – they are again simply summaries (albeit lengthier than those in the first part) of the decisions at hand. Many simply state whether or not a prize condemnation was eventually held to be legal, either initially by French prize courts or later by the various American proceedings. For example, armed resistance to searches by lawful French privateers or warships was deemed by the American Court of Claims to be legal cause for prize-taking of a neutral vessel (brig Amiable Matilda, pp. 373-4). Rules of cargo ownership and manifests (to avoid accusations of neutral vessels smuggling) were key in many of these cases (brig Dolphin, pp. 380-2). Yet a summary of these and other reasons behind such decisions here would have aided in drawing
out these points, and in highlighting differences between French and American legal approaches and their understanding of neutrality more generally. For example, would an American court have decided that a neutral American vessel carrying French prisoners, but not part of a formal prisoner of war cartel, was aiding the British, and therefore a valid prize, as the French did? (brig Betsey, p. 376).

Publishers still seem to be struggling with the use of digital media both for academic monographs and in general. As this reviewer has recently been wrestling with other narrative digital tomes of similar length to the work here (for which digital formats are not always best-suited), it strikes him that a searchable Portable Document Format (PDF) version of the reference section of this work would have been an apt use of such no-longer-new media. While substantially reducing the print version in length and allowing for a more extensive printed historical analysis, the use of such media for reference works of this nature would also greatly reduce the overall cost of limited-run reference publications. It could make them more accessible and available beyond the academic specialist and university libraries. The US $125 price of this work in its current form would be a major obstacle to such an audience.

While an impressive compilation of primary source records of use to maritime law scholars, The French Assault on Shipping unfortunately contains little actual legal or historical analysis of either individual cases, or of the wider importance and debates over neutral merchant shipping during the French wars. Useful as a reference work to specialists seeking precedents or information related to specific incidents of American merchant losses, international maritime prize law, and related treaties and conventions, the book largely fails in its advertised claim to also be a

history of the French assault on American merchant shipping. The larger story of the legal, naval, political and economic effects of that assault to the global conflicts raging throughout these years, including a comparison with British and Dutch views on neutrality and international prize law at this time, awaits its twenty-first century historian.

Martin Hubley
Halifax, Nova Scotia

In Volume XX, no. 2, the April 2010 issue of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, we published a review of The Cockleshell Canoes: British Military Canoes of World War Two by Quentin Rees. Mr Rees objected to some of the reviewer’s comments and was invited to respond. Owing to space concerns, his reply has been edited by the reviews editor. The reviewer was invited to reply but declined.

To the reviews editor:

I feel bound to reply to the review carried in your publication. I believe that the reviewer is out of his depth on this subject and has not read the book properly.

For example, in my book I write that “[o]f the outline plan, the nature of the operation was, initially, for a small six-man party in three canoes to be taken to a position nine miles from...” I also write that, “these four individuals had paddled a total of some 105 land miles or 91 nautical miles.” I even give evidenced reference for this data. Somewhere, the reviewer has managed to find that HMS Tuna surfaced off the French coast, “ten nautical miles” from the estuary, and that the men “paddled some 70 miles.”

He also states “The canoes used in this raid were designed and built to specifications developed by ...[Hasler].”
Despite the fact that I have given evidence of the true facts [the reviewer] completely ignores these and resorts to fiction. In the book I explained that Fred Goatley had designed the canoe a year before Hasler came on the scene, and show how Hasler only added to the design already produced by Goatley.

The reviewer goes on to say that “the Mk 2 replaced the earlier folding kayaks in use by the British forces, known as the ‘Folbot’ (which, oddly enough was a German design!).” Completely wrong. He uses the term kayak despite my explanation that these craft were designed and designated as canoes – it’s even in the title! He then criticises the usage of the term canoes; despite a very clear explanation within the book to clarify the position. And he then goes on to be quite confused with the “marks” of canoes. There were more than ten marks. He fails to explain this adequately.

The reviewer obviously did not like my criticism of the DNC and says that “on the evidence presented, this may be an overly harsh judgement. The DNC staff as naval architects had a vested interested in the design and procurement process” etc... He goes on supporting the DNC by relaying the picture on p. 135.

I painstakingly quote how Mr. May and Commander Luard were treated by the DNC and what Luard said in his letters about the DNC and what he said should be done about them. I also show quite clearly how the users managed to get rid of the DNC as a procurement body which led to MAP taking over. All is clearly evidenced.

Other reviewers have offered a different perspective:

“An excellent and ground-breaking work...one can sense the author’s enthusiasm and excitement in setting the record straight...one of the most original, interesting and informative books to have appeared recently.” Prof. Eric Grove, Navy News, May 2009.

“Much of the information here has never been published... (this book) will take its rightful place in Naval and Military history.” The Globe & Laurel, March 2009.

My new book out in the autumn is The Cockleshell Heroes - The Final Witness. Simply put, it is the complete story of the Frankton raid that has never been told before.

Quentin Rees