BOOK REVIEWS


This book takes what is largely Newfoundland kitchen lore about beating the revenuers (pardon the American slang) and turns it into a readable account of liquor smuggling off the French islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon and on the Burin Peninsula of Newfoundland. Many readers would be familiar with smuggling from St. Pierre and Miquelon into the United States, but the author also covers entrepreneurial smuggling from the same islands into Newfoundland from the post-Second World War period up to the present.

The book’s strength lies in its treatment of the Prohibition era of the 1920s and 1930s. Thanks to the long interval of time since then and the availability of historical records, Andrieux covers this period well from a historical perspective. St. Pierre and Miquelon have capitalized on their history by building a local museum about smuggling and Prohibition. Andrieux spends the first 15 pages of his book documenting the rise of prohibition movements in the United States (from 1919) and Canada. He then describes how the first smuggler-entrepreneur, Bill McCoy, moved his smuggling operations from Nassau, the Bahamas, to St. Pierre and Miquelon early in the Prohibition era. As Andrieux records, it did not take long for others to get into the business of ordering liquor from France or trans-shipping it from Canada, where it was still legal to distill alcohol for export. This proved to be a revenue boon for the islands’ government which could now undertake long-overdue public works systematically ignored by metropolitan France. Enlivening the first 141 pages of this book are accounts of visits by Al Capone to the islands, a local house built from discarded wooden Scotch whiskey cases, and even a murder. In 1933, repeal of the Prohibition Act in the U.S. ended the livelihood of the smugglers.

Andrieux then transitions to the post-war period where the trade shifted to smuggling alcohol from St. Pierre and Miquelon into Newfoundland for local consumption. Confederation with Canada in 1949 had brought Newfoundland increased regulation and taxation, making it worthwhile for local fisherman to stop over on the islands to pick up a few bottles. Smuggling was relatively limited through the 1950s to 1980s, with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) responsible for enforcing the liquor import laws. In 1989, when the RCMP did not replace their local patrol vessel, smuggling exploded as Newfoundlanders, already hurt by the failing cod fishery, sought to find a cheap source of alcohol and cigarettes while successive federal and provincial governments dramatically increased “sin” taxes. The RCMP faced a losing battle throughout the 1990s as they tried to fight the smuggling war on land.

For this reviewer, the best part of
this book was discussing it with my current employer who was from the Burin peninsula and familiar with the more recent smuggling events such as raids and parties.

The only negative aspect is the organization of the last part of the book, which examines the period from 1991 to 1995 on a year-by-year basis. This approach – and it fortunately accounts for only 35 of the 217 narrative pages – results in a great of repetition in contrast to the much more streamlined account of the 1920s and 1930s.

Bradley Shoebottom
Fredericton, New Brunswick


This slim volume is designed to bridge the gap in understanding between American citizens and American sailors, surely a worthy aim. It would appear, if the author’s insight is correct, that our American confrères are no more aware of matters naval than our own population. This seems a bit surprising given the massive scale of the U.S. Navy and its ubiquity on the world’s oceans and trouble spots, not to say its frequent appearance as a backdrop in movies and other exemplars of popular culture. Perhaps, however, this exposure is superficial and, for most Americans, the knowledge of the USN and navy culture apparently begins and ends with *Top Gun* and Tom Cruise (alas, much of this movie is devoted to naval aviators stationed at a land base).

This is an odd volume. A good third of the book is an appendix filled with quotations loosely associated with the subject matter of the main text. The index and bibliography take up another tenth of the book, meaning that the main text makes up only slightly more than half of the book’s contents. This is not necessarily a problem—many books are far too long and need a good paring down—but whether the space allotted to Barnett’s themes is adequate will be for individual readers to say. For this reviewer, the book feels cobbled together, literally, in the case of the appendix, from a series of loosely-connected articles or perhaps a thesis. The end result is not entirely satisfactory.

The book is divided into nine short chapters. The first, the introduction, covers definitions and makes the observation that the recent flurry of naval officer appointments to a number of joint commands is proof of the broad strategic outlook inherent in naval officers. The army and air force equivalents are, apparently, mired in day-to-day activities, whereas naval officers can see the big picture. This premise strikes me as founded on shaky ground, to understate matters. The discussion of how each of the three American armed services defines terms such as “strategic,” “operational” and “tactical” is confused. No doubt it reflects what is taught at the service colleges, and perhaps explains how the U.S. has had the recent experience of winning every battle and losing the war. I shall leave untouched any reference to the tireless public relations departments in bringing the message home of triumph after triumph.

These caveats (albeit significant) aside, the book’s declared purpose is to describe how U.S. Navy people think, what their assumptions are, and, implicitly, why many at the top of the naval tree, if such a metaphor can be excused, have been selected to assume command of a number of key joint-service commands. The book’s generally brief chapters touch on military
and naval culture, the maritime environment, naval warfare, expeditionary forces (army delivered ashore by the navy), technology, experience of the 1980s at the end of the Cold War, obstacles to the navy’s central war-winning role, and a summary chapter. The book succeeds in its aim of describing the cultural underpinnings and assumptions of U.S. naval officers. How well this is done is a separate matter.

On reflecting on this book and its intent, this reviewer had mixed reactions. At one level it is simplistic, tied up in jargon and replete with confusion about the nature of strategy, tactics, operations, war and the roles of the separate armed forces. All are huge topics which have had many a weighty tome devoted to their analysis. This book is not in the league of those more ambitious works. Indeed, despite dusty nineteenth-century language, von Clausewitz’ *On War* remains the exemplar and one that bears constant review and reflection. The aims and objectives of military and naval action require much more thought by our political leaders and the very senior officers who advise them, rather than the mechanics of getting the job done. The latter are generally accomplished very well indeed by the highly trained and well-equipped military in the Western world; the former, not so much. Mechanics, operations and tactics, to use Barnett’s words, are not the issue.

Barnett has provided a useful summary of why we in the West struggle to win our current conflicts despite a material superiority over our foes that should make victory a matter of marching and a band. I’m not sure if that was his intent.

We are in a period where the old ways of doing things may no longer be valid, although they might apply again in a future world where things have changed and a more conventional style of conflict arises. Right now, the asymmetry between the forces of the West, America in particular, and our opponents is so vast that conflict is not conventional and, from my observations, we are not doing particularly well. As a highly simplistic example to make the point, after the atrocity of the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, would the Americans have been better off going into Afghanistan, destroying the government that harboured the terrorists, taking out every camp that could be identified, and then leaving? This would have left the Afghans to sort out their own future without assistance. That reflects strategic thinking, agree or not, and a sounder assessment of the facts on the ground than our current never-ending and unwinnable counter-insurgency operation that we are still in the midst of, nine years on. The ability of naval officers to manage in such a world is not self-evident.

To conclude, Barnett has written an interesting book raising important questions that are difficult to answer. The book itself reflects views inherent in the standard USN officer path that over a career produces the admirals now in charge of various joint commands; this is, to be clear, exactly what the institution of the navy is structured to do. It does not, however, demonstrate the superiority of the naval officer at that level of command. It does raise important issues, albeit inadvertently, of how we in the Western world need to rethink our assumptions. For my money, we’re back to von Clausewitz, dull and dry perhaps, but a truly insightful analysis of war. For provoking those questions, even if the answers remain to be found, Barnett has provided a useful service. Other than that, there is little to recommend the book, notwithstanding the fulsome remarks on the dust jacket.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan

Nicholas Black, the current head of middle school at Dunwich College, has provided us with the latest instalment of the Sumida/Lambert revisionist approach to the history of the Royal Navy in the era of the Great War. For all the contributions made by Arthur Marder to our understanding of the maritime defence of Great Britain and its global interests, he seemed to be captured (as Black himself states) by the personalities of Jackie Fisher and the various critics of the service, especially Herbert Richmond and K.G.B. Dewar. Black is also quite right in questioning the competence of one of these vociferous critics, i.e. J. M. Kenworthy. Even Richmond later came to regret his association with him. One of the most serious critiques of the Royal Navy that Marder mounted was that the staff established in 1912 was a repository of naval has-beens who seriously mishandled the war effort. Dr. Black has offered a timely and necessary corrective to that interpretation in a superb study that should grace the bookshelf of any serious scholar of the Royal Navy of the period.

The chief contribution that Black makes is a systematic analysis of the personnel that made up the naval staff and this is nicely rounded out by appendices which provide names of various key office holders, as well as the Admiralty telephone directory, which gives an indication of how vast the organization had grown from very humble beginnings in 1912. The combination of text and charts gives us, for the first time, not just a snapshot of the staff but their background and training. This analysis of the officers assigned to the staff has put paid to the notion that second-rate men were assigned to the staff while the truly able men scrambled for sea appointments. This section alone makes the book a worthwhile investment.

After disposing of personnel issues, Black turns to his survey of the staff’s evolution during the entire war. He does a superb job of outlining how the major influences had an impact on the direction of the naval war, including how the personalities of the several First Lords, the Sea Lords, various commanders-in-chief, the staff themselves and the War Cabinet played out. In particular, Black’s work superbly lays out the decisions made over convoy in the crucial year of 1917. One of the chief problems in understanding the staff in this period is the myriad of changes that take place at the time and Black neatly divides up the war into different periods in order to retain a balanced perspective.

The research that Black brings to bear on the topic is impressive. He has left no major source untouched including those at The National Archives at Kew, the Admiralty Library and Churchill College, Cambridge. His use of evidence is also impeccable as he shows a profound appreciation for both the value and limitations of his source material. On the whole, this book is well worth the $115 charged by the publishers and it is essential to any scholar working in the field.

Robert L. Davison
Waterloo, Ontario


Despite having served in the Canadian Army for 37 years, John Boileau has turned his attention to the “senior service” to
provide an account of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)/Maritime Command of the Canadian Forces’ often tempestuous relationship with a city that mostly ignored it in peacetime and resented it when at war. While Second World War journalists and censors referred to Halifax as “An East Coast Port,” to most sailors it was known by the pejorative term “Slackers,” for its many civilian and military personnel who seemed to avoid any real participation in the war.

Many chroniclers of life in Halifax focus on its role as a “navy town” during the Second World War, but the RCN’s first century includes an additional 94 years and it is the entire period that the author surveys in this anecdotal and well-presented work. Drawing on many of the fine books published on the navy and many first-hand accounts of sailors who visited the port or who were stationed there in war and peace, the author focuses on the effect that the navy’s first hundred years had on the city that has been, as the author notes, its “major home port.”

The author’s brief note at the beginning entitled: “Naval Nomenclature for the Novice” provides the layman with a quick study of proper naval terminology and avoids the distraction of having to explain various seafaring terms throughout the rest of the book.

Boileau weaves together the well-known wartime stories with the sometimes controversial birth of the RCN, the Cold War Navy, integration and unification, the emerging role of women in the service and, through it all, provides glimpses of the array of fighting ships and aircraft and their crews that operated on, above and below the water. Their triumphs and tragedies, from the convoy escorts of the Second World War and their gunnery expertise during the Korean War to the VE Day riots and the fire aboard HMCS Kootenay, are told in a manner that will rekindle memories among those who lived through them and educate those who know little about Canada’s naval history and tradition. The 1954 voyage of HMCS Labrador is one of the triumphs of the peacetime navy.

The account of the Navy’s 30-year flirtation with hydrofoils, the origins of which he traces back to the work of Alexander Graham Bell and Casey Baldwin, reflect both the technical talent which has been a hallmark of the Navy and the penchant of politicians not to take risks, especially when it would cost money. Like most naval chroniclers, he has little time for Paul Hellyer, the father of the unification of the services, which he considers “one of the greatest frauds ever perpetrated on Canadians.”

The author is at his best in describing the courageous defense of the navy and its traditions which led to the “Admirals’ Revolt” against unification and the forced retirement of its most senior naval officers, most of whom had served their country heroically during the Second World War and the Korean War. Boileau not only laments the loss of these traditions, which were the hallmark of the RCN and what distinguished it from the other services, but suggests that the federal government should reinstate the three separate services with their traditional names as a fitting recognition of the navy’s centennial year.

With its emphasis on naval activities, the book tells the reader more about the navy than Halifax, and although glimpses of a sailor’s life ashore emerge throughout, the role of naval personnel as residents or citizens of Halifax could have been explored in more detail. For example, Halifax has always benefited from the large number of naval musicians who, when they were not playing in the Stad Band, were teaching music to young Haligonians or jamming with civilian musicians in the city’s jazz clubs. Also overlooked is the Navy’s contribution to sports such as
rowing, hockey, baseball and football. These are, however, minor omissions which detract little from the material presented.

The author and the publisher should be congratulated for both the quantity and quality of the images which enhance the text. Many of the over 150 photographs are from the rich photo archives of the Maritime Command Museum (a much under-used resource for naval historians) and one suspects that many appear in print here for the first time. Rather than merely decorate the prose, the photographs and their captions make the stories come alive and provide the reader with an appreciation of not only the narrative but also the material history of both the navy and the city.

This book deserves to be read widely, not only by those who are familiar with our naval history but even more so by the general public who may learn something of the importance of the navy as a proud Canadian institution and tradition.

David B. Flemming
Ottawa, Ontario


This latest offering from historical writer Stephen Bown examines the lives of six exceptionally powerful and influential merchant adventurers, or “merchant kings,” each of whom ran the affairs of some of the largest and most profitable global monopoly trading companies the world has ever seen. Within the pages of this engaging volume are the fascinating mini-biographies of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Pieter Stuyvesant, Sir Robert Clive, Aleksandr Baranov, Sir George Simpson, and Cecil Rhodes. Bown is masterful in his storytelling as he animates the lives of these men and their times, taking readers on a captivating journey from the English East Indies to the Dutch West Indies, and from Alaska and Hudson Bay to South Africa, through a formative period in modern world history he terms the “Age of Heroic Commerce.” His outstanding treatment of these larger-than-life characters within the contexts of profoundly complex events results in his best effort to date.

Shrewd and adept businessmen, these individuals were skilled manipulators of politicians and public opinion and could be ruthless with those who opposed or resisted their activities. They were hated by many, even those company shareholders who profited immensely from their unswerving ambition and severe tactics. Described as despotic, their lust for power, riches and fame elevated them to positions of authority that until then were reserved solely for monarchs. Coen, considered to be the first great merchant king, laid the foundation for the Dutch East India Company’s (VOC) empire, which by the end of the seventeenth century was the largest, richest and most powerful multinational company in the world. As governor-general of the VOC, Coen’s preferred tactic of violent force established the Dutch as masters of the Indonesian spice trade thereby ushering in a Golden Age. As commander of the strongest military force in the region, Coen exercised his fierce hatred of the English East India Company by launching a massive attack on Fort Nassau in the Banda Islands. Besides capturing, torturing, and imprisoning the English, Coen proceeded with the “ethnic cleansing” of the islands, whereby thousands of Bandanese were removed from their homes and sold into slavery.

Though Bown carefully contrasts
the motives behind the actions of the two merchant kings, he does indicate that Coen would be rivalled in his inhumanity and zeal for power by Cecil Rhodes some two centuries later. In his unbridled determination to strip the Cape Colony of precious diamonds and gold and subjugate its peoples, Rhodes embodied the imperialist, nationalist and racist beliefs of his age. As the founder of De Beers diamond company, eventual Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and “chairman” of Rhodesia, Rhodes became the wealthiest and most powerful person in South Africa while establishing the fundamental components of an apartheid regime.

The remaining merchant kings placed their particular stamp on other major parts of the world in, perhaps, less roguish fashion. As governor of New Netherland, Pieter Stuyvesant oversaw the operation of the Dutch West India Company’s colony along the Hudson River using a military dictatorship model that required absolute obedience. “The Little Emperor” Sir George Simpson, also arrogant with an insatiable zeal for profit and power, directed the Hudson’s Bay Company’s fur trading business over a huge territory as if it were his own. Unlike Coen and Rhodes, however, Stuyvesant and Simpson were not prone to brutality and steered away from alienating their companies from native populations. Sir Robert Clive’s successful military exploits in India and his unrelenting efforts of self-promotion in the service of the English East India Company vaulted him to hero status and incurred him a fortune traditionally reserved for a king. Aleksandr Baranov also pursued an aggressive strategy in his efforts to expand the trade and colonization of the Russian American Company over a territory covering much of present-day Alaska. Bown is to be especially commended for his well-balanced portrayal of Baranov, in which he is both appreciated for his personal donations for the education of Russian children and condemned for bombarding a Tlingit village from a Russian warship.

Readers of this journal will be particularly impressed with the regular attention given to developments at sea. The handsome jacket illustration, depicting East Indiamen in company with Chinese junks, river boats and a rich variety of smaller water craft on a crowded Canton River at Whampoa, China, not only emphasizes the emergent global nature of trade and commerce, but also underscores the vital function served by maritime transport and communication in creating, sustaining and enlarging a myriad of international relationships during the period. Bown is fully aware of the risks and uncertainty involved with long-distance overseas trade and the fact that commercial empires depended in whole or in large part upon their maritime capability. The military strength gained by the Dutch East India Company’s private fleet of 40 giant warships, for example, afforded Coen the advantage of protection and intimidation vital to the company’s existence. In addition to detailing the most relevant naval engagements, Bown is very good at providing the significant background information on navigation and voyages of discovery and exploration that led to the establishment of these companies.

One blemish on what is otherwise a solid book is the author’s irritating routine of introducing quotes from secondary sources rather than using endnotes. Of further disappointment is the absence of complete citations, particularly for the evidence drawn from a variety of valuable first-hand accounts. This aside, Bown gives readers much to enjoy and ponder, for the book is also intended to be a cautionary tale. In the present age of wealth and excess, corporate greed and scandal, an ingrained culture of entitlement shared by senior
executives and senior bureaucrats, and inexcusable poverty, inequity, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation, Bown’s stories resonate with us today on a much more immediate level.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario


This is a lively study of the development of one of the world’s greatest sea powers, chronicling the evolution of England from a minor political player to a dominant nation, all within the course of one royal dynasty.

The country that withstood the threat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was, a scant one hundred years earlier, pulling itself together after decades of internecine conflict. Henry Tudor, victor of the Battle of Bosworth Field, 1485, established the Tudor era and brought to an end the Wars of the Roses.

A frugal – some would say miserly – king, Henry VII knew the value of the consolidation of power. Determined to have a lasting legacy, his marriage saw a literal coming together of the warring Houses of Lancaster and York. His offspring, including Prince Arthur, Prince Henry and the royal princesses, were all neatly positioned to secure the throne and the Tudor reign.

Henry VII made shrewd moves, quickly eradicating personal standing armies among individuals who could be potential threats. He also made overtures of a maritime nature, not unusual given that England is an island and he himself had landed an invading force from across the Channel. The Tudor navy, at this point, consisted of a few vessels of mediaeval design. Their use was primarily to transport troops who fought on land, rather than to engage in naval warfare.

Childs does a fine job of detailing the adaptations of naval design from the early years of Henry VII through each of his Tudor successors. Henry VIII, who came to the throne as an ambitious seventeen-year-old, seized the day with vessels that were already under construction. One of these, the Mary Rose, has become the most studied of all Tudor-era vessels. The fledgling navy as begun by Henry VII blossomed under his son. Illustrations include many photographs and line drawings of aspects from the archaeological projects focused on the Mary Rose.

Childs’ writing comes most to life when he speaks of the personalities involved in the development of the English navy. From the peccadilloes of Henry VIII, who fancied himself a naval architect of some repute, through Edward VI’s short reign, to the often over-looked but important contributions of his daughter Mary (helped, ironically, by her husband, Philip of Spain) to the full throttled roar of the Tudor Lion under Elizabeth I, Tudor Sea Power is an engaging read. The famous families of English history, the Howards, Seymours, Burghleys and others are well represented. Flamboyant and well-remembered individuals, including Frobisher, Raleigh and Drake all make their presence known.

The book is arranged thematically, rather than in a strictly chronological order. This allows readers to pick up the book and read any of the chapters that are of especial interest and ensures that they will find a concise, easily understood background. It also means that there is a degree of repetition with some of the information, but this helps to make the book more accessible.
to those who do not have a fluent grasp of the time period and subject.

No detail is too small for the author, who has a well-established association with the Mary Rose Trust. From the styles of vessel design and development, to the size of munitions, even to an example of a personal grooming tool used by sailors to remove ear wax, Childs digs into his subject with diligence and delight. The book is large and sumptuously illustrated, although some of the material might be rather heavy-going for non-specialists. Repeated descriptions of carvel- and clinker-built vessels, with a strong focus on every aspect of construction from the keel upwards, may be more than the armchair sailor may require, but the all-encompassing scope of the work will still ignite a passion in those who truly love maritime history.

The section on the fighting fleet provides the reader with breathtaking visions of notable battles, ranging from fighting the French with the last battle of the Old Age, Pointe de St Matthieu, 1512, through the seizure of San Juan de Puerto Rico, 1598. These examples showcase the overall change in methods of naval engagement, from hand-to-hand killing of soldier-sailors to the destruction of actual vessels.

The thunder and excitement of the Tudor navy took shape with many interconnecting strands. Fishermen and their vessels helped to people the navy and contributed to the shifting shapes of the new age. The aristocracy, appointed to senior levels of naval power based on rank rather than ability, had an impact. The merchants and a natural outgrowth, the pirates, began to have influence as time marched on. The glory of the English navy came about with a marriage of all of these factions, with the modifications of vessel design coupled with the derring-do of men who proved themselves by deed and purpose.

Childs speaks of Tudor England as a time of “state-sponsored plunder.” Henry VII lessened the wealth and power of the aristocracy; Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries and profited by their sale; Elizabeth I, however much she seemingly protested, plundered enemy fleets and pocketed the wealth. The shift in the balance of power, from an insular country to that of sea-going and sea-dominating nation, was played out with magnificence under the Tudors.

_Tudor Sea Power_ is a commanding book, well worth the read. Chapters include: Building the Fleet, Arming the Fleet, Feeding the Fleet, A Sailor’s Life and Plunder, Piracy and Professionalism, Havens and Harbours and The Fighting Fleet. In this day of popularization of fictional aspects of Tudor history, it is good to have a book that is solid on facts and glorious in detail and illustrations.

Heather-Anne Getson
Lunenburg, Nova Scotia


With the exception of the charismatic John Paul Jones, American naval captains in the Revolutionary War are largely unknown. Abraham Whipple, a veteran mariner from Rhode Island, participated in noteworthy naval episodes during the Revolution, and became a commodore in his state’s navy. Although mentioned in passing in the standard accounts of the Revolutionary War at sea, Sheldon Cohen’s _Commodore Abraham Whipple_ is the first full-length biography of this stolid New Englander.

Whipple was born in 1733. Cohen,
an *emeritus* professor of history at Loyola University of Chicago, was unable to discover basic facts about Whipple’s early life, including such things as his upbringing, his education, or when and why he went to sea. Instead, Professor Cohen has to speculate and make generalizations about colonial ships and trading patterns. In 1758, amid worldwide British-French hostilities, Whipple commanded two privateers and took several prizes in the Caribbean, but Cohen is unable to trace the movements of Whipple’s ships or the results of his prize-taking. In the decade before the Revolution, upon his return to Providence, Whipple was the master of merchant vessels for the Brown family. Cohen uses this interlude as a springboard for a discussion of the Newport-Providence rivalry and the search for markets in the West Indies and South America. Whipple made three profitable cruises to Dutch Surinam. Cohen notes, imprecisely, that Whipple received “substantial commissions,” by which he may mean that Whipple served as supercargo, shipped his own cargo, or both.  

In any event, Whipple made enough money to come ashore for four years (1766-70), tending to his family and civic interests, before returning to sea in 1770 as master of a sloop sailing to St. Croix.

In June 1772, the Royal Navy’s 8-gun schooner *Gaspee*, enforcing trading regulations on the fractious Rhode Islanders, ran aground in Narragansett Bay. Whipple led a party of Providence seamen who rowed out and burned the *Gaspee* in the middle of the night. As the boats approached the *Gaspee*, Whipple hailed her commander, Lt. William Dudingston, that he (Whipple) was the sheriff of Kent County and had a warrant for Dudingston’s arrest. Whipple’s hail raises important questions, which Cohen does not explore. First, was Whipple the sheriff or was he trying some sort of ruse? Second, if he was the sheriff, when and by whom was he appointed, what was the role of a sheriff in colonial Rhode Island, and what does holding that office imply about Whipple’s social standing? Third, if he had a warrant, who (what judicial authority) signed it, and what was the ostensible charge? Fourth, what inferences should be drawn from the fact that Whipple and the proto-revolutionary seamen with him believed they needed to act under the colour of law? Cohen’s failure to engage with these (and other) questions is emblematic of his straightforward but unimaginative account.

Burning the *Gaspee* confirmed Whipple as a leading patriot in the coming conflict; when hostilities broke out in 1775, he became captain of the Rhode Island sloop *Katy*, and later a commodore in the state’s small navy. As Cohen details, Whipple’s naval service was mixed. He participated in the amphibious raid on New Providence (now Nassau) in the Bahamas, and played a lead role in the July 1779 attack on a British convoy in which ten merchant ships were captured. But his failures were equally marked. In a battle with HMS *Glasgow*, he displayed poor leadership, and a court of inquiry later found his judgment flawed. In the disastrous defense of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780, Whipple showed little energy or decision in commanding the maritime defenses; he was captured along with 5,000 other soldiers and sailors. Perhaps no one should have expected more from a captain with so little naval experience. Although paroled almost immediately, Whipple’s war was over.

The rest of Whipple’s long life was rather sad. He had continuing money problems. To make ends meet, he sold the properties he had purchased with his prize money, and he then waged a long battle to get Congress to pay his wartime salary and his expenses while on parole; Congress eventually gave him a certificate of indebtedness, and in 1810, a half-pay
pension. His post-war circumstances were so bleak that after one or two mercantile cruises, he uprooted his family and set out for a fresh start in the Ohio territory. In middle age, he became one of the original settlers of Marietta. Improbably, he built a square-rigged ship on the Ohio River, which he sailed down to New Orleans and then on to Philadelphia. In his last years, he became dependent on the kindness of his neighbours. Whipple died in Ohio in 1819.

Given the lack of sources, Professor Cohen’s ability to piece together a coherent narrative of Whipple’s life is a real achievement, and this biography will likely remain the standard account. Cohen largely succeeds in placing Whipple in the economic, maritime, and social context of his times. In dealing with the maritime world, Cohen’s writing is awkward, with references to “steersmen” on boats, cannon “emplaced” on a ship, and lieutenants as “mates.” Cohen’s understanding of prize law and procedure — critical for a privateersman and a captain in a guerre de course — is also uncertain, with his suggestion that prizes were Whipple’s to sell, a reference to prize sales as “confiscations,” and his patchy treatment of court processes. All in all, however, Commodore Abraham Whipple is a workmanlike rendering of the life and times of a seaman in peace and war, a man who knew success and failure, a stout-hearted sailor and devoted patriot.

Frederick C. Leiner, Baltimore, Maryland

Dan Conlin’s new book, Pirates of the Atlantic, is a beautifully illustrated account of the swashbucklers who plied the northern waters of the Canadian East Coast during the so-called Golden Age of Piracy. Much of our pirate history and mythology dates from the early modern period, more specifically the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. There have been a number of additions in the interim, most notably colourful but fictitious imaginings such as “walking the plank” from Robert Louis Stevenson’s novels. While there has been an explosion of recent works which have explored pirates during the Age of Sail, Conlin’s book is noteworthy in that it examines a theatre of piratical operations which has been largely ignored. There is a wealth of works on pirates in the Caribbean, for example, but one would be hard pressed to find a fraction as many comparable studies on the eastern seaboard of Canada.

That is not to say that the area is not rich in pirate lore and history. As a curator of Marine History at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax, Conlin is knowledgeable about this and has used a number of the artifacts from the museum and private collections as the basis for the plethora of illustrations for his book. Nevertheless, those who live in and outside the region may be surprised at the extent of piracy during past centuries in the North Atlantic: even a few of the “rock stars” of the pirate world sailed and menaced the citizens of the Atlantic provinces in the 1700s — most notably “Black Bart” Roberts. While there seems to be an endless appetite for stories about their exploits, the connection of such infamous pirates to the Atlantic region is far less known. Thus, Conlin’s book is a welcome addition to the historiography of pirates of the Atlantic world.

The author devotes an entire chapter to Ned Low who, although he isn’t as notorious as some of the other pirate

captains of the past, makes men like Blackbeard seem downright gentlemanly by comparison. Conlin’s examination of various pirate captains reveals a range of behaviour. Many pirate crews relied on captives’ fears to control them rather than employing widespread, indiscriminate violence. Low most certainly represents an extreme of cruelty: early in his career he abandoned the fairly standard “rob and release” strategy. Low’s pathological behaviour was so excessive that he caused a number of his own men to recoil from his deeds. Furthermore, Low’s career demonstrates that the reality of piracy could be quite different from our modern romantic notions. While all of this makes for a great read for those attracted to the bloodiest aspects of piracy, it is unclear exactly how his cruelty was symptomatic of the escalating war against piracy throughout the eighteenth century (p.48). While Low was most certainly psychotic, Conlin needs to provide a convincing argument if we are to believe that Low’s brutality has a larger significance.

Conlin also mentions female pirates in his examination but runs aground on lack of evidence. He discusses the infamous Mary Read and Anne Bonney, even though they lack any apparent connection to the Atlantic provinces. Similarly, Conlin tells us that Edward “Blackbeard” Teach never went farther north than Delaware, yet he mentions him very frequently throughout the book.

In his chapter on pirate folklore, Conlin deals with the persistent rumours of buried treasure in the region, especially on Oak Island in Nova Scotia. The rumours that Captain Kidd (or any of a number of well-known pirate leaders) buried booty there have led generations of treasure hunters to the island. Existing evidence suggests that Kidd was never in the area but his name remains connected to the region. The book contains a photograph of U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt: he, like many others, spent time on Oak Island in the futile pursuit of pirate treasure. Conlin briefly mentions the belief that there must be seven deaths before the island relinquishes its secrets; six treasure hunters have already lost their lives although we are given no details about how treasure-hunting led to their untimely deaths.

As well, the book contains a compact but serviceable chapter on pirate life. Conlin is right to emphasize the egalitarian nature of pirate ships; however, the “disability clause” in the pirate articles was not as rare as he asserts. Such clauses were part of the maritime world well before this (p.69). Conlin also deals with the connection between mutineers and piracy, as well as wrecking — an activity intimately associated with coastal communities such as those in the Atlantic provinces.

While the growth of states and navies vastly diminished global piracy in the modern era, Conlin does discuss the current spate of pirates, few of which have any connections to the Atlantic region, but it does demonstrate that illegal acts of violence and robbery at sea still occur in the present age.

This is an attractive, informative and very reasonably-priced account of a little-known topic. Conlin weaves a fascinating account which will hopefully inform readers about the role of the Atlantic region in pirate history as well as entertain them in the process. Unfortunately, the evidence he presents is not entirely convincing that the waters around the Atlantic provinces were central to the golden age of piracy (p.47), although it is clear that such activity warrants more attention than it has received in the past. In spite of a very limited bibliography, the book’s strength is the photographs of material culture which provides rich visuals for Conlin’s brief but enjoyable narrative.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay-Westfield, New Brunswick

When Able Seaman Geoff Cooper wrote letters home to his mother, from the Tribal class destroyer HMAS *Bataan* off the coast of Korea in 1952, he probably never suspected that one day they would form the basis for a book concerning the Australian warship’s role in the war. His son, Anthony Cooper, has used his father’s letters as the background for an excellent description of the ship’s service during its second deployment to Korea during February – August 1952.

This is, however, no ordinary ship history working its way through the day-by-day events of the ship and its crew. Cooper prepares the scene well, outlining how Australia became involved in the war and describing the trials and tribulations of preparing a ship, and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) for the conflict. The story flows easily through the experiences of the lower deck, wardroom and commanding officer (Commander Warwick Bracegirdle, RAN, DSC and Bar) alike and makes comprehensive use of first-hand sources, such as the ship’s reports of proceedings and captain’s night orders as well as private letters.

Cooper breaks the book down into interesting chapters that treat such aspects of naval life as; liberty in Japan, shipboard living, leadership and morale, air and subsurface threats, navigation in hazardous water, shore bombardment, refueling, and ship-handling. The mundane tasks of plane guard duty in support of aircraft carrier operations are described as well as the few moments of sheer terror when *Bataan* came under enemy fire. This resulted in the ship being straddled by several enemy shells, one of which hit the captain’s day cabin and tore a hole in his full dress uniform jacket — fortunately, the only casualty of the action!

Cooper also discusses the similarities and differences between the RAN warships operating off Korea and those of the Royal Navy, the United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy. The Canadian navy comes in for reasonably close analysis, both good and bad, because the Tribal class destroyers, HMCS *Athabaskan* and *Cayuga*, together with the ex-RN “V”-class *Sioux*, also served in Korean waters during *Bataan’s* first and second deployment to the war zone.

Books describing the Australian experience in the Korean War are few and those dealing with the RAN in the conflict are even fewer. This well researched and very easy to read book may signal the start of more written work concerning the Australian Navy during this often forgotten war. Highly recommended to all naval historians or those just interested in what it was like to serve in a warship during the Korean War.

Greg Swinden
Canberra, Australia


George C. Daughan’s *If By Sea* is a big and ambitious book whose purpose is two-fold. The first is to provide a modern account of the Continental Navy in the War for American Independence, one that properly
contextualizes and integrates the story of that sea service into the overall history of the Revolution itself. The second is to explain the nearly forty-year-long process by which Americans arrived at a political consensus on the necessity of maintaining a permanent navy—a process that, according to Daughan, began with the founding of the Continental Navy.

Had *If By Sea* delivered on either of these two laudable goals, George Daughan would have made a significant contribution to the historiography of the early American sailing navy. As it is, he fails to deliver on both counts.

In part, this is due to the book's uneven organization and questionable content. Daughan devotes a disproportionate number of pages to his treatment of the American Revolution, which takes up fully one-half (239 pages) of the narrative. By contrast, Daughan condenses his discussion of the War of 1812 into 65 spare and unsatisfactory pages, qualities which characterize the second half of the book. While portions of Daughan's narrative would have benefited from additional detail, the entire work is weighed down by passages that contain superfluous or unnecessary information. In a book on the forging of the American navy, do we really need to read the opening passage of the Declaration of Independence (p.346) or know the details of Napoleon's invasion of Russia (pp.408-9)?

Emblematic of these criticisms is the fact that the American navy often appears to be "missing at sea" between the covers of this book. Of the generous space Daughan accords the American Revolution in *If By Sea*, less than a third is allotted to discussion of the Continental Navy, the first mention of which appears on page 48. This is because much of his narrative is given over to tracing the military, diplomatic, and political events that form the backdrop of the navy's founding. In his desire to craft a history that is more contextual and less navy-centered than prior naval studies of this era, Daughan has created a work that, in the end, will interest neither the generalist nor the specialist.

More troubling than these structural weaknesses are the questionable, sometimes faulty, judgments that pepper *If By Sea*'s text. For example, Daughan condemns congressional lawmakers for slavishly following the British model and establishing separate departments to direct the affairs of its land and naval forces. As a result of this decision, the ships and men of the Continental Navy were left to the direction of a well-meaning but clueless Marine Committee, who wasted these precious resources on "largely meaningless, although at times spectacular and heroic, missions." (p.76) To whom then should Congress have given charge of the American Navy? Daughan answers George Washington, though he never explains how Washington, a man with no knowledge of ship handling, navigation, fleet tactics, or naval administration could be expected to competently manage the Continental Navy's affairs.

Daughan is fond of engaging in such "What if" scenarios throughout his book. Indeed, the central premise of his early chapters is his conjecture that the Continental Navy should have been composed entirely of whale boats and row galleys instead of ocean-going vessels, a force structure, he argues, that would have overwhelmed the Royal Navy in American waters. The problem with this approach to historical writing, of course, is that it substitutes speculation for thoughtful analysis. One wishes that the author had treated his readers to less of the former and more of the latter.

The most distressing aspect of *If By Sea*, however, is its poor scholarship. Some mistakes, such as spelling Thomas Macdonough's name three different ways,
appear to be due to simple carelessness and might have been caught had the book's publishers exercised a sharper editorial eye. Other errors are of a more serious kind and involve getting essential facts wrong such as dates, officers' ranks, ships' rigs and rates, and the like. These types of inaccuracies, and others, ultimately undermine the credibility of this work.

A similar slipshod quality characterizes the documentation that accompanies If By Sea. Examples of the types of discrepancies that appear in this portion of the book's content include: quotes with added, dropped, or altered words; quotes attributed to the wrong sources; quotes attributed to no sources; and incorrectly cited sources. By my count, 37 titles cited in Daughan's footnotes are not even listed in his bibliography!

Even the index of If By Sea disappoints. Given that this book is a work of naval history, it will surprise many to discover that it lists not a single American or foreign ship referenced in the text. Equally irritating are the important place names and events that should have been indexed but were not. And because Daughan's text contains both correct and erroneous spellings of a number of proper names, these mistakes are replicated in the index as well.

It is regrettable that If By Sea fails to navigate successfully the course its author charted for it. For the reasons enumerated above, readers should give this book a wide berth.

Charles E. Brodine, Jr.
Jessup, Maryland


This new study by Michael Franks is a detailed examination of the relationship between Sir Walter Raleigh and William Sanderson during the period from 1584 to 1595, a pioneering phase in English colonial enterprise when Raleigh promoted the first serious attempt to establish a settlement in North America. Franks argues that both men were at the centre of a small group of imperialists whose crusading vision of empire encompassed publicists and adventurers, including Richard Hakluyt. Yet the association between Raleigh and Sanderson broke down in 1595. Thereafter, they never worked together again. In 1611 they were embroiled in a suit before the courts of chancery and star chamber, the culmination of a longstanding financial disagreement reaching back to 1595, concerning the loan of £1,600 or £1,700. One of the underlying purposes of this study is to disentangle the issues at stake in the dispute, while evaluating the conduct and behaviour of both protagonists.

The relationship between Raleigh and Sanderson provides a fascinating case study of the wider links between city traders, courtiers and the development of Atlantic enterprise. Building on previous work, and focusing more closely on Sanderson, Franks presents a portrait of a friendly, but problematic relationship between two men of different social worlds who shared an interest in maritime expansion. The son of a successful London trader, Sanderson served as an apprentice to Thomas Allin who was engaged in trading with northern Europe and the Baltic. Franks furnishes few details of Sanderson's early trading interests, though his career in the city presumably depended on the profits he made from overseas trade. The inheritance of land and property may have given him
the security to invest in more speculative transatlantic enterprise. He was one of the leading supporters of John Davis, who led three voyages in search of the Northwest Passage from 1585 to 1587. Despite their failure, Davis made an important contribution to the exploration and geographical understanding of the region. Franks suggests that Davis’s voyages were part of a “hidden agenda” of the Elizabethan regime which included the establishment of a colony and commercial base along the west coast of North America (p.38). Little evidence survives to support the suggestion, however, and as the author notes, there is no sign that such ideas influenced Davis or his supporters. Davis’s discoveries were incorporated in the two globes made by Emery Molyneux in 1592. Both were paid for by Sanderson. His financial contribution to the production of the earliest English globes may well be his ‘main claim to fame’, as Franks argues, though whether it turned him into a figure of national prominence is arguable (p. 69). Their presentation to the Queen, at an entertainment arranged by Sanderson, provides an intriguing insight into his links with the court which might have been worth pursuing.

These interests were accompanied by the development of Sanderson’s close association with Raleigh. The relationship seems to have grown out of his marriage to Margaret Snedale, Raleigh’s niece, in 1584. In addition to managing his own burgeoning interests, Sanderson served as Raleigh’s business agent or treasurer, facilitating the ambitious, but ultimately abortive, attempt to colonize Roanoke, Virginia, from 1585 to 1590. It is highly likely that Sanderson was directly involved as an investor in these ventures. He was involved in the attempt to make contact with the abandoned settlement in 1590, but his interests as a shipowner in privateering created a potentially competing interest in the prospect of short-term plunder.

Sanderson continued to serve Raleigh as an unofficial financial adviser and agent, supporting and safeguarding his interests in privateering and Irish plantation. On the eve of Raleigh’s departure on his voyage in search of El Dorado in 1595, they quarrelled over the provision and security of a loan. Franks explains the collapse of the relationship and its aftermath in detail. Where others have been more cautious in their evaluation of this contested and complicated dispute, he comes down heavily against Raleigh, accusing him of acting in a cynical, if not wicked, way towards his kinsman. The legal suit of 1611 appears to have been triggered by Sanderson’s efforts to recover earlier loans, provoking counterclaims from administrators acting for Raleigh. The case also aroused allegations of fraudulent dealing and forgery, but its outcome remains unknown, possibly because legal proceedings were discontinued. By 1613 Sanderson was in a financially embarrassed position, apparently as a result of heavy losses sustained from investing in mining enterprises. He was imprisoned for separate debts from 1613 to 1622, while Raleigh was executed in 1618 following his ill-fated expedition to Guiana.

Michael Franks provides a clear and at times, compelling, account of the failed relationship between the two men. It is supported by several appendices, including an extensive discussion of the account presented by Sanderson’s son, Sir William Sanderson, in published works of the 1650s. It is not based on new evidence, but on a critical re-examination of existing materials. Unfortunately, the author has not been well served by his publisher. While lacking a contents page, the text contains an alarming number of errors, including variant spellings of Raleigh and Ralegh. This study contains some useful material on Sanderson’s career and his relationship with
Raleigh, but it might be seen as a missed opportunity for a more substantive and nuanced work that explored both within a more comprehensive framework linking court, city and Atlantic.

John Appleby
Liverpool, UK


Shortly after Labour Day in 2004, a new 65-foot fishing vessel foundered and capsized in heavy seas off the Bonaventure Peninsula, Newfoundland; two of her crew drowned. The saga of the building of this ship, the lives of the people who served in her, the accident and the aftermath are recalled and recorded by the sister of the lost fishermen. She involves the entire Ryan family in an emotionally rendered narrative, detailing their actions and feelings before, during and after the event. The account of the actual loss is clearly detailed as the survivors recalled the sinking and their rescue.

The author is too close to the tragedy to be entirely objective in her description and the details of surrounding events are coloured by these family ties. She prefaces the book by calling it “the diary of a madwoman” (p.xi) and her writing somewhat reflects that statement. This closeness prevents the book from being a valuable record of the incident and resulting protracted marine inquiry. On the other hand, it is a good overview of how such a twenty-first-century tragedy affects a small, isolated community and how reactions to this event are resolved. The paramount response is that blame must be apportioned and those involved taken to task for their perceived shortcomings. The designer and builder of the vessel and the various government departments involved in approving the vessel design and accrediting her crew are all selected to take a separate portion of the blame. The two former parties remain unidentified.

There is mention of a pending family lawsuit against the federal government (specifics not noted) and the builders of the vessel. It would be interesting to see a second edition of this book when that lawsuit is settled. More details from the Department of Transport report would also be a useful addition.

Tragedies among fisherfolk have occurred in small coastal communities ever since men braved the unforgiving seas in their quest of food. In the past, families retrieved their dead, where possible, and bore their losses. As the bounty of the seas has become ever scarcer, fishermen have perhaps pushed the boundaries of boat and fishing technology too far; and those in charge of regulating the design and operation of those boats have been overwhelmed. The true value of Guy’s book may lie in the dramatic way she has called attention to these modern problems.

David A. Walker
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Usually one doesn’t think of military and civil statistics as compelling reading, but amazingly enough, this compendium of nine papers/chapters on medicine at sea by
twelve different authors, founded largely on simple naval accounting records and their implications, is actually a page-turner. A rather expensive one, at its published price of $105, but you won’t find anything like it elsewhere.

The earlier chapters cover medical records in the Royal Navy and related government hospitals and medical boards, and educational and hiring protocols for naval surgeons, charting two centuries of gradual progress and organization as sailors’ health became an increasingly important issue politically, socially, and economically. Many of the issues revolve around the insufficiencies of medicine itself — the real causes of diseases (bacteria in the case of fevers, diet in the case of scurvy) were mostly unknown, so everyone was making decisions based on the outdated theories of Galen, Hippocrates, and Aristotle going back to classical times. Fevers were thought to be caused by “miasmas” (best approximated as bad or fetid atmosphere) and treatment attempted to rebalance the wet and dry, hot and cold “humours” of the blood in order to put the patient back into balance. Yet, much was actually accomplished since clearing and cleaning the atmosphere and reducing heat and crowding in ships actually did help reduce disease and mortality, which particularly crippled on-station blockaders, squadrons long at sea abroad, and patrols off disease-ridden Africa and Asia. Without knowing the underlying causes, doctors, using trial and error, managed to go a long way toward relieving the situations encountered through changes in quarters, fiddling with (and eventually eliminating) quarantine, and redesigning diet and victualling procedures. Over 200 years, the condition of the seaman and the skill and training of shipboard doctors and their assistants improved markedly, a triumph of practical health “engineering” over bad or useless medical theory.

All of this was achieved by a combination of surgeons, officers, politicians, and government bureaucrats driven by evolving sets of personal, economic, and political pressures that are perfectly suited to analysis via the meticulous records left by those individuals and departments involved. With some basic background about the historical settings, the numbers tell you everything from where the surgeons came from and why, to how the sickness and mortality rates averaged on a daily basis, by voyage and location, linked with nature and frequency of supplies and medicines. The text explains it well, but it is astonishing how the story leaps right up at you from the simple tables of figures themselves. It is analytical mathematics fleshing out history, much as it has been used in recent genetic approaches to paleontology and anthropology.

No less amazing is the way this approach in the later chapters gets to the heart of the appalling health problems and their causes in the matters of criminal transportation, voluntary and indentured migration, and most of all, slavery. The chapters covering these flesh out and dispose of many older theories of why so many died (so often) and yet others sometimes survived surprisingly well (more than rarely) — not only among passengers and slaves, but the officers and crews that oversaw them. Much sickness and mortality, for instance, is statistically demonstrated to have resulted from the preparations for the voyages (slave ships sat for months offshore, slowly filling up with slaves, taking children first and then men). In some cases the voyage itself was only a setup for mortality after arrival at destinations where there were poor conditions, little treatment available, and new and often fatal disease pools. It’s a complex and fascinating set of overlapping issues, all laid bare by simple tables and numbers, along with the imagination to pull
deductions out of what they tell.

Ultimately, the solution was both socio-political (such as ending the innate brutalities of transportation and slavery) and scientific (discovering the real medical causes, and then cures, of what was sickening and killing those at sea). In hindsight, those steps were all that were really needed to improve health at sea. But that was no answer for those who suffered (and died) before improvements came into force. What this collection highlights, mainly through the use of fairly simple statistical tabulation of historical records, is how well those involved managed to stumble through it all and significantly ameliorate conditions before better practices were proven and implemented. Both individual efforts and, strangely, the evolutionary pressures on the related bureaucracies involved, conspired slowly, incrementally to improve the lot of seagoing humanity, until the underlying issues were elucidated and resolved.

All in all, an unexpectedly refreshing read, and a window into what is itself a new and evolving methodology used to throw light on history by using a primarily statistical approach.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, New York


Going to sea in the nineteenth century was not for the faint hearted as casualties to seafarers were on a par with those of coal miners ashore, and most of the mariner’s tales were of maritime disaster. This book, however, is a fascinating journal kept by an enthusiastic young shipwright during a clipper-ship voyage from Boston to San Francisco at a time when most Americans knew little about California and the Pacific world.

Philip Hichborn was born in Boston in 1849 and after completing high school and then an apprenticeship at the Boston Navy Yard in 1860, he was offered a post in a U.S. Navy yard near San Francisco. In order to get there, he signed on the seven-year-old *Dashing Wave* as ship’s carpenter and wrote a diary of his voyage. This was discovered by William Thiesen, the Atlantic-area historian for the U.S. Coast Guard and former curator and assistant director of the Wisconsin Maritime Museum, while researching his own book, *Industrializing American Shipbuilding*. Hichborn’s memoir is now part of a series *New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology*, edited by James C. Bradford and Gene Allen Smith, which takes the view that human development is inextricably linked to the seas that dominate the earth’s surface and explores the significance of the earth’s water without limits of geography or time.

The delight of Philip Hichborn’s excellent journal is his natural skill as a writer and his astuteness as an observer. Despite his initial unfamiliarity with life onboard ship, each Sunday he wrote about the hierarchy on *Dashing Wave*; he also reminisced about boyhood friends and family members and favourite places in Charlestown. Since he had already decided to leave the vessel in San Francisco, he was unusually candid and his conversational style provides the reader with a unique window on a mid-nineteenth-century mariner’s everyday life. For most of the voyage, he remains remarkably optimistic and, in addition to his official duties of caulking, scraping and painting, he willingly
goes aloft to reef and furl sails, although not obliged to do so, and even enjoys taking part in the daily pumping of the bilges of the leaking hull.

Other voyagers such as Lubbock (Round the Horn before the Mast, 1902), Newby (Last Grain Race, 1949) and Villiers (Set of the Sails 1981) became maritime historians, and Clemens, whose nationally-published tale of survival by some of the crew of Hornet in 1866 led to his transformation into Mark Twain, became a novelist. Hichborn did not, however, although he was possibly more akin to Richard Henry Dana (Two Years Before the Mast, 1834), whose book he may well have read. Like Dana, in later life Hichborn only put pen to paper to write manuals and textbooks including Standard Designs for Boats of the United States Navy and Naval Constructor: Report on European Dockyards published in 1886.

The Dashing Wave and its rival lumberman, War Hawk, frequently competed to make the fastest voyage from the East Coast via Cape Horn to California, which was achieved by the former in 107 days in 1858. Not so Hichborn’s cruise, which lasted 143 days during summer in the southern hemisphere. Strangely, he accepts the sailors’ superstition that killing a pig onboard led to the devastating gales, ice and snow, the death of a crewman and the near-mutiny that followed two weeks of attempting to round the Horn. He also complains that the master saw him as a one-man lumber yard, blacksmith’s shop and hardware store and, in the end he calls Dashing Wave the meanest old tub that ever floated.

The objectivity of the editor’s handling of Hichborn’s diary encourages the reader to sympathize with the author’s predicament on board and the text is perfectly complemented by the carefully chosen appendices. These include a sail chart, a typical bill of fare on board, comments by a passenger and an interview with the daughter of a former master, together with a summary of both Hichborn’s life and the ultimate fate of the clipper ship that was his floating home from August to December 1860.

After the American Civil War, Hichborn had a successful career in the United States Navy. In 1875 he was a naval constructor with the rank of captain at a shipyard in Maine and in the 1890s he concluded his lengthy career as chief constructor of the U.S. Navy overseeing the transition of the navy’s fleet from wooden sailing ships to steam-powered steel warships. He retired in 1901 as a rear admiral. A year later, in a neat coincidence, Dashing Wave was sold to new owners who cut down the masts and converted the once-proud tall ship into a utility barge.

While this is not a tale of catastrophe and survival, those who enjoy high-seas Cape Horn adventures will not be disappointed. Philip Hichborn was an educated observer and his rank as carpenter allowed him to mingle with both officers and ordinary seamen. Maritime historians will therefore appreciate this rare account of the social and professional interactions of a small team of strangers during the highly stressful circumstances of battling against the elements.

Michael Clark
London, UK


These two volumes complete the Hakluyt Society’s project of publishing the Arctic whaling journals of William Scoresby the Younger (1789–1857). They live up to the promise of the first volume that appeared in 2003 and are edited and introduced once more by Ian Jackson. The first volume carried information about the journals themselves, housed at the Whitby Museum, the Scoresby family and early-nineteenth-century Arctic whaling in general. In the second volume, Jackson’s introduction focuses on Scoresby as a scientist, with an appendix by George Huxtable on the method and accuracy of his navigation. An extra dimension is added with the inclusion of Charles Stewart’s journal of 1814, a manuscript held by the New Bedford Whaling Museum, which allows one to compare Scoresby’s journal with the observations of a crew member on the same ship. Scoresby is shown to write at length, sometimes joining the events of a few days together, whereas Stewart pens just a short paragraph each day. Occasionally, Stewart adds extra details such as “Captain S. and myself went unto [sic] the ice to examine this place” where the captain makes no mention of anyone accompanying him. Scoresby’s attention is focused less on his companion than on the ice and sometimes his curiosity takes the ship perilously close to disaster. The reader is rewarded with dramatic and powerful observations. For instance, the noise of the overlapping floes is compared to “that of complicated machinery or distant thunder.” Scoresby is a fine observer and writes in a clear and enquiring way. He draws the reader in despite the journal’s daily repetitive structures built around the position of the ship and the weather. There is always some remarkable observation, whether it is concerning whaling practice, meeting other ships, the colour of the water or bird or marine life. Virtually any subject of interest relating to the Arctic finds its way into the journal and is discussed and analysed.

Jackson’s notes are always clear and illuminating, sometimes helping to explain a specialist whaling term or referring to other sources that clarify what is being described. Humour is not lacking. For instance, where Scoresby notes that it was “a fine day, though dull and showery,” Jackson explains that this was “another statement that would appear contradictory, except to the British.” He goes on to quote from Susan Coolidge’s children’s book What Katy Did Next whose main character, an American, learns of “the peculiarities of the English climate” and “to call days not absolutely rainy ‘fine,’ and to be grateful for them.” The indices supplied are quite short with regular types of activity such as navigation and whaling omitted. This makes it difficult to return to an interesting passage in the journals unless one notes or marks the page in some way. References to ships mentioned on the voyages appear in separate indices. Personally, I would have liked more information in one of the introductions on the whaling ships, their captains, owners and home ports. The relationship between the captains of the ships remains somewhat unclear. Captains tended to stay loyal to their home ports though they did move from one local shipowner to another. Scoresby’s break with Whitby and his move to Liverpool as a home port was unusual. The decline of London as a major Arctic whaling port is unexplained in the introduction. How much information did captains share about the whaling grounds and their fishing strategies as they met for coffee or tea on each other’s ships in the Arctic? Life was hard and crews depended on each other especially when caught in the ice or when supplies were short. One suspects that such
meetings helped to build unwritten support partnerships and more general bonds of common friendship. When an unfortunate disaster strikes another ship, one can sense Scoresby’s sadness and shock, such as when a boat from the Leviathan (a Newcastle whaler) that had been alongside the Esk was lost with six or seven of its crew onboard. It had set off to secure planks and spike nails from the British Queen, another Newcastle ship, which was just two miles off, but was not seen again.

The eventful journal of 1816, where the hull of the Esk is holed, remains one of the great adventure stories of Arctic whaling. Scoresby devoted a whole chapter to this incident in the second book of his Account of the Arctic Regions (1820). It is fascinating to read the journal alongside his published account. Six ships came initially to Scoresby’s aid after “a signal of distress” had been displayed but only the crew of the John of Greenock, captained by Thomas Jackson, Scoresby’s brother-in-law, remained to help with the pumping. A formal agreement was drawn up between the two ships and captains. Scoresby’s anger was somewhat constrained about the actions of the other ships nearby that could have helped. He clearly felt let down, however, when he wrote in his journal “I cannot say much in favour of the humanity of some of our neighbours.” Even at this moment of crisis, Scoresby still had time to observe peculiarities in the weather conditions noting the “curious effect of fog in magnifying objects” (vol. 2, p.258).

The third volume marks an important turning point in Scoresby’s life. His 1817 whaling voyage was unsuccessful and led to him breaking with Fishburn and Brodrick, the Whitby owners of the Esk. In the following year he took command of the Fame, a ship that his father had purchased in Liverpool. By 1819, having fallen out with his father, he settled in Liverpool and found new backers. He oversaw the building of a new whale ship to his own specification and noted this in his journal. In a very useful appendix, Fred M. Walker outlines the construction of an early-nineteenth-century Arctic whale ship drawing on and interpreting the information found in Scoresby’s journal. The Baffin’s maiden voyage in 1820 was very successful with 17 whales caught, filling all the casks onboard. Some of the most interesting passages towards the end of the third volume relate to the mutinous behaviour of John Wright, a sailor who had been “long in the navy,” and a number of other crew members. For a few days, Scoresby felt that the safety of the ship was “extremely precarious.”

These two Hakluyt Society publications frame William Scoresby’s An account of the Arctic Regions, a book that still remains the standard introduction to the history of the northern seas. This work has stood the test of time and, even though scientific research and knowledge have moved on, it still offers many insights, reflecting Scoresby’s wide experience as an explorer, scientist, observer of nature and captain of an Arctic whaler. It is difficult to judge the book’s influence and standing during the nineteenth century. As Ian Jackson explains in his introduction to the third volume of Scoresby’s journals, it was an expensive title when first published and the Quarterly Review failed to review it while other journals were somewhat critical. In 1833, Charles Darwin, writing from Maldonado, Rio Plata, to his sister, Catherine, listed a number of books, “those most valuable of all valuable things,” that he would like forwarded and included Scoresby’s work. The book was not reprinted until 1969 but now has a new life through its availability on Google Books. Gordon Jackson in The British Whaling Trade (1978) stated that Scoresby’s “monumental work...will never be surpassed” and Philip Hoare in Leviathan
(2008) called it “the work by which all others are measured.”

Despite such accolades Scoresby remains a marginal figure. His books do deserve to be better known and those writing about the Arctic today need to take some account of his descriptions of the region. Sadly, for instance, Charles Emmerson’s *Future History of the Arctic* (2010) makes no reference to Scoresby’s observations. Scoresby does have interesting things to say about climate change and seasonal variations in the position and nature of ice flows. In his 1817 journal published here, Scoresby noted “the singular state of the ice…square leagues of water bare of ice which is generally covered with it.” He reported this unusual retreat of the ice to Sir Joseph Banks and hoped that it might lead to him undertaking an Arctic naval exploration voyage. Jackson’s introduction includes a re-appraisal of Scoresby’s alleged mistreatment by John Barrow, the second secretary of the Admiralty. Scoresby declined the offer of a “subordinate” role in the mission, but his observations and writings did contribute to the resumption of Arctic exploration with the promise of a Northwest Passage. Global warming has now made such a route possible. The Hakluyt Society must be commended for making Scoresby’s journals more widely available and Ian Jackson praised for his role as editor. All in all, these are highly recommended volumes, essential reading for anyone interested in the history of the Arctic seas,

Alex Werner
London, UK


“The [German] surface forces are so inferior in number and strength to those of the British Fleet that, even at full strength, they can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly…”: *Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, September 3, 1939*. This gloomily prescient reflection by the German Navy’s C-in-C on the outbreak of war encapsulates what would happen to the battleship *Scharnhorst* when she was intercepted and sunk four years later by a powerful British fleet off the North Cape on 26 December 1943. Only 36 of the 1,968 men on board survived; those who lived were all younger sailors with an average age of 21. *The Battle of North Cape* is a straightforward telling of this epic episode, the last engagement between battleships, in just 166 pages. *Scharnhorst*, lurking in the Alta Fjord above the Arctic Circle, had been the major surface threat to the Allied convoys to North Russia which had recently been restarted after an interruption of eight months. Germany’s other powerful battleship in north Norway, *Tirpitz*, had been crippled by midget submarines and was being laboriously repaired. The Boxing Day action thus removed the most potent immediate surface threat to the convoys.

*Scharnhorst* had two skirmishes with British cruisers on December 26 while attempting to close with a convoy off North Cape and subsequently, while again trying to locate the convoy, was brought to battle by the battleship *Duke of York*. All three encounters were fought in an 11-hour period in total or semi-darkness and in heavy seas. (Destroyer officers are quoted describing their ships as “surfing” and at times close to unmanageable in the mountainous waves.) The British had the edge in numbers, signals intelligence and radar. (Indeed *Duke of York*’s radar detected *Scharnhorst* at a range of 22 miles when only a small portion of the
German battleship’s upper works were above the radar horizon.)

The operations off the North Cape were complex, involving two Allied convoys coming from the west and east, covering cruiser forces, the Duke of York and her screen and the German battleship and her destroyer force, aerial reconnaissance, the activities of U-boats, and on the Allied side, ULTRA intelligence derived by reading German radio traffic. While they never sighted the enemy, all four of the Royal Canadian Navy’s new Tribal class destroyers were part of the numerous formations. Author Angus Konstam apparently trained for the Royal Navy at Dartmouth and then served as a naval officer for a year. He handles these ship movements in a competent narrative, conveniently breaking the story of 26 December 1943, into four-hour time periods named after the watches kept in ships.

Despite the imbalance between the two sides, chance played a role. An 8-inch shell fired by the cruiser Norfolk put Scharnhorst’s forward (and higher) radar antenna out of action during the first skirmish. The German battleship’s superior speed enabled her to shake off the shadowing cruisers for a time. Later still, after exchanging broadsides with Duke of York in the darkness, Scharnhorst opened the range steadily. Just as she had reached the limit of Duke of York’s salvoes, a fortuitous direct hit to her machinery space reduced her speed. It took a while for the British to appreciate that the range was now closing. Admiral Fraser, C-in-C Home Fleet, signaled to his cruiser Admiral, “I see little hope of catching Scharnhorst and am proceeding to close the convoy” (p.132). It was all over 80 minutes after the hit at extreme range. Scharnhorst took a prodigious amount of punishment before sinking. According to Roskill in The War At Sea (1960) she took at least 13 hits from the Duke of York’s 14-inch guns, possibly a further dozen shell hits by cruisers and probably 11 torpedo hits. An impressive total of 55 torpedoes had been fired in the gloom by cruisers and destroyers. The wreck, lying upside down, was located by the Norwegians in 2000.

According to the dust jacket, Angus Konstam is a military historian with over 50 titles in print, but this book shows signs of carelessness. There are numerous cases of confusion between courses being steered and geographic direction; for example, a force is said to have steered a course of 080 degrees to the west (p.88). Mentions of radar performance are inconsistent — Scharnhorst’s radars are said to be able to detect enemy ships at 12 miles on a good day (p.60) but later on, her theoretical radar search capability is given as 10 nautical miles (p.103). British destroyers are said to have “basic radar sets” (p.36) while most Allied escorts are described as having powerful radar sets (p.54). These inconsistencies undermine the reader’s confidence.

There is a basic index but no bibliography, nor information about sources used or passages quoted in the text. Pen and Sword Maritime, the publishers, presumably have decided that citing sources makes a work like this less accessible to a general reader. There is a section with well-produced photographs; the track charts are clear and the book is in a sturdy binding. The Battle of North Cape is a slim action-focused book of popular history. There is minimal analysis of why events unfolded as they did. John Winton’s readable The Death of the Scharnhorst (1983) based on thorough research using British and German sources remains the best book in English on this dramatic mid-winter battle above the Arctic Circle.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia

Jim Lamb’s iconic tale of the “little ships” in the Atlantic battle first appeared in 1977, published by Macmillan of Canada. A subsequent pocket book edition was published around 2000, and now, as noted on this issue’s cover, appears the “Third Edition.” The author died in 2000, at Big Harbour on Cape Breton Island, having retired many years before as Editor of the Orillia, Ontario, *Daily Packet and Times*. In 1979 he wrote another fine memoir about his life as a newspaperman, *Press Gang*, also published by Macmillan, and several other books as well — a novel about the war and reunion with a survivor, *Man From The Sea* from Lancelot Press, an historical story of the 1620s French Fort St. Anne in Cape Breton, called *The Hidden Heritage*, also from Lancelot, and several others, all worth the reading.

It is hardly conceivable that anyone interested in Canadian naval history has not at some stage read *Corvette Navy*, and most will own or have owned a copy. This reprint would seem to be an exact and nicely-done reproduction of the original except for three rather minor adjustments. The typeface is slightly larger (because interested readers are aging, with somewhat poorer eyesight?); it includes 27 photos, whereas in the original there were none except on the back outside of the dust cover; and the introductory paragraph referring to HMCS *Sackville* has been updated to note that she is now moored at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax, rather than lying derelict at a wharf in the harbour.

Lamb’s finely crafted original chapters still evoke his own life experience in command of the Bangor class ‘sweeper’ *Minas* and the corvette *Camrose* for over two years, and the photos in this edition are mostly of those two ships and their crews. He talks of the characters that the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (RCNR) and the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) tended to throw up both as C.O.s and as his friends and acquaintances; men like “Foghorn” Davis, Pavillard “The Mad Spaniard” (whom Lamb succeeded in *Camrose*), “Two-Gun Ryan,” “Tiger” Turner, the characters adopted from Damon Runyon, such as “Liverlips” MacNeil and “Harry-The-Horse,” and many others. Lamb sets an imaginary but very true-to-life scene on any corvette or other escort vessels such as the Bangors and Algerines as they would sail into the cruel seas of the Atlantic in normal, crummy weather. He has a chapter specifically on that “cruel sea” and the tribulations of such a small vessel on it. He cribs (presumably) a chapter’s worth of mostly hilarious signals from Capt. Jack Broome’s *Make A Signal*, since his tale is largely written with much humor throughout: PLEASE SEND YOUR ARTIFICER TO SEE OUR FORWARD GUN... Response: OUR ARTIFICER CAN SEE YOUR FORWARD GUN FROM HERE. There is a very real description of *Minas*, as one of the minesweepers present on D-Day off Normandy, being fired at by German shore batteries, another of life aboard the convoy-escorting corvettes that were “but warriors for the working day.”

Lamb’s heartfelt epilogue is retained, and the whole is well worth re-reading and retaining on its shelf. Although I have a signed original, this edition is also a nice memory of a great story teller and wartime “Old Man” of 24-years of age when he first took command.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario

Donald Launer holds a U.S. Coast Guard captain’s licence, he is a writer whose byline has appeared in several boating magazines, and he is an author of nautical books. Currently, Launer is contributing editor for the magazine, *Good Old Boat.* For many years he has given presentations to United States Power Squadrons (USPS), yacht clubs, historical societies, libraries, and nautical museums, titled *Navigation Through the Ages.* This book, bearing the same title, is in response to the question, “Why haven’t you written a book on the subject?”

Launer has organized his book into six chapters: Ancient Navigation; Navigation in the Middle Ages; The Age of Discovery; The Electronic Age; Navigation and the Environment; and Emergency Signalling. It is loosely chronological in order except where he discusses the historical development of a device or technique.

The first chapter, Ancient Navigation, proceeds from the concept of latitude and longitude as first proposed circa 200 BC; details the discussions regarding the prime meridian (0 degrees Longitude, i.e. Greenwich meridian) finally agreed to at Washington D.C. in 1884; defines lines of position (LOP) and discusses their various forms as determined by visual observation, celestial navigation, radio or radar means; and the Geographical Positioning System (GPS). The presentation then describes the technique of sailing a latitude, a necessity caused by the inability to determine longitude at sea until the introduction of chronometers. Here Launer steps back in time to the art of navigation as practiced 4,000 years ago by the Polynesians. As a people without a written language, they had reached nearly all the islands of the Pacific by 1000 BC, long before Magellan “discovered” these remote places (p.9). Similar treatment is given to the voyages and navigational tools of the Vikings and the Arabs. This first chapter closes with a description of the lead or sounding line, as known in Roman times, and in service today. It is well supported by illustrations with drawings showing the Vikings’ use of a polar -stick, and the noon sun-shadow board, and Arabs using the kamal for matching the latitude of a particular place with the altitude of the North Star. A photograph of a contemporary hand lead line completes the first chapter.

In a similar vein, Launer proceeds down the ages describing the advancement of the art of navigation. With the introduction of a new instrument, its origin, description, employment, development and currency of present usefulness, is given so that the book also serves as a text for would-be navigators. As an example in outline, the magnetic compass:

**Origin:** circa 1088 AD first authentic mention of the compass in China; adopted by Arab mariners who in turn introduced it to Europeans; mentioned in a literary work by Alexander Neckham in 1187.

**Description:** Lodestone, used to make magnetized compass needle; Compass Card, markings; True North, Magnetic North, Compass North, Variation and Deviation; Compass correction by bar magnets and soft iron spheres; Compass styles. Magnetic Earth, animal navigation, wandering poles, variation, isogonic lines and polar reversion.

**Diagrams:** i. Compass Card showing 32 points as well as 360 degrees; ii. The compass rose [with local variation and annual rate of change] appears on all nautical charts; iii. The [magnetic] compass at a steering position; iv. Relationship of deviation and variation to compass,
magnetic and true headings; v. The movement of the magnetic pole over the last 400 years; and vi. A world view of isogonic lines [lines joining places of the same variation].

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the electronic age has incrementally provided electronic systems such that today it is possible to resolve all issues of marine navigation from a single position in a vessel, generally termed the nav-station computer interface. Here, readouts are displayed from electronic depth sounders, anemometers, marine-radio communications (ship to shore, inter-ship, weather facsimile and search and rescue), radar (pilotage, in all conditions of visibility and anti-collision), electronic navigation systems (eLoran, Global Positioning System (GPS), gyrocompass, fluxgate compass, Automatic Identification System (AIS) and electronic navigation charts). These devices, as presently in general use, and their predecessors, are described in technical detail sufficient to understand the operation and usefulness of the device.

Donald Launer has produced a most engaging book. His “hands on” descriptions of how navigation should be performed are illuminated with his own experiences and those of others. For example, when describing the usefulness of a logbook, Launer refers to Captain Bligh’s logbook of a voyage made in a small boat with 18 men after being cast away by the mutineers of HMS *Bounty*, across 3,618 nautical miles of ocean, as arguably the most famous logbook in history. A copy of an excerpt from Bligh’s logbook shows the amazing detail he recorded, such that the Admiralty used the information to produce charts of these largely unknown islands (p.78). To make his case for keeping a logbook in a recreational vessel, the author tells of an acquaintance, a Captain Bligh historian, who named his boat *Bligh’s Spirit*, and kept a logbook of voyages made in a 25-foot sailboat on Long Island Sound, thus following a long tradition of log-keeping at sea (p.79).

*Navigation Through the Ages* is designed, it appears, to embrace the syllabus for navigation certificates awarded by the USPS. For other recreational mariners, it will be of interest and definite usefulness, particularly if they intend to accept the charge of command responsibility for the safety of life and property at sea.

Len Forrest
Ottawa, Ontario


In June 2010, the Hamburg shipping company, Rickmers Gruppe, added a number of ports of call in Japan, South America, the Caribbean and along the U.S.
east coast to its very successful Pearl-String service, a fortnightly, around-the-world, break-bulk cargo line, founded in 2004. It constitutes the most recent business achievement of Bertram Rickmers (b. 1952), representative of the fifth generation of a family originating from the North Sea island of Helgoland, the members of which were long active as pilots, fishermen and/or smugglers. From 1834 until today, the family has been involved continuously in shipbuilding and shipping activities in Bremerhaven and Hamburg.

Two of the books under review here tell us about the ups and downs of the German business family, Rickmers, and of the maritime enterprise that for 175 years was run by members of that dynasty. The publications result from the decision of the management of the German maritime museum (Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum) in Bremerhaven to organize an exhibition in 2009 to commemorate the 175th anniversary of what is today the Rickmers Group. Hence the exhibition catalogue. The museum requested two researchers to collect all the available records (much material was destroyed on purpose, or as the result of acts of war in 1940-45) and to compose the first scholarly history of the Rickmers firm. In consultation with the Institute for Social and Economic History at Hamburg University, Melanie Leonhard and Jörn Lindner were found willing to do the job. Both historians graduated in 2009 in Hamburg on their research topics.

In *Die Unternehmerfamilie Rickmers 1834-1918* (shipbuilding, shipping, trade) and *Schiffahrt und Schiffbau in einer Hand* (the firms of the Rickmers family 1918-2000), the authors present a very detailed, sometimes even exhaustive, but in my opinion, definitive history of a German shipping and business concern that has played an important role in the economic development of that country, most notably in the twentieth century. While significant, their role is not comparable with those of such German industrial giants as the inland navigation company Haniel (Duisburg), or the shipbuilder Blohm (Hamburg). Characteristic of both studies is the authors’ revelation, as a result of their examination of hitherto-unknown family papers and their talks with members of the dynasty, of the sometimes-intricate mutual influence of family and business matters.

The Rickmer story begins in 1832 when Rickmer Clasen Rickmers (b. 1807 on Helgoland), a trained shipbuilder and sailor, decided to leave his place of birth for Bremerhaven because his family and that of his fiancée denied them permission to marry. Rickmer was mindful of the device chosen at his confession in 1822: “Fear God, act justly and dread no one.” Bremerhaven, at the mouth of the river Weser, is the place where the maritime saga of the family really begins in 1834 when this member of the Rickmers family became the owner of a piece of land along the river Geeste and started his shipbuilding activities with the construction of the “Weserkahn” Catharina, a river barge.

The family saga seemed to be nearing its end in the years 1986-88. In 1986 Rickmers quitted their shipbuilding activities and closed the yard. At the time, crippling worldwide competition and price-cutting in the industry along with the German government’s economizing financial rules led to their decision. Then, in 1988, the Rickmers family had to sell their shares in the “Rickmers-Linie” to the Hamburg-based shipping company Hapag-Lloyd. The principal reasons were that the Rickmers fortune was insufficient to cope with the financial crises of the 1970s and 1980s, while the management of the firm (in this case, the fourth generation of the family) was too arbitrary to meet the conditions of the government guarantees that were meant to lighten the problems. In
the end, the next generation of Rickmers, in the person of Bertram R.C. Rickmers, took care of the revival of the family business. From the 1980s on, he had developed independent shipping activities and started a new company, the “Schiffahrtsgesellschaft B. Rickmers.” He became so successful that in 2000 he was able to buy back the old “Rickmers-Linie” from Hapag-Lloyd. Together they form the nucleus of today’s Rickmers-Gruppe.

In an ample 500 pages, Melanie Leonhard and Jörn Lindner unravel the sometimes rather complicated history of the Rickmers family business between 1834 and 2000. That is a big achievement with all aspects of that history passing in review. To name just a few: the successfully-pursued ambition to retain control of the branching activities of the concern in the hands of the family—despite the many quarrels; the growth of a shipbuilding industry into a shipping and trading company; the life-long focus on shipping to East-Asia; the booming activities of Rickmers in the rice-trade while becoming the biggest rice-hulling business in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century; and Rickmers’ exploitation of a shipping line for inland navigation on the Yangtze River.

Of course, the relationship of Rickmers with the Nazi authorities receives some attention. In 1938, Peter Rickmers was already paying lip-service to the Nazi-party (without being a party member himself) by thanking the “Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler” for his support in rebuilding their yard. During the war, Rickmers only built small vessels for the Kriegsmarine. The company’s merchantmen were chartered to the German government.

Both studies have been written for specialists in the (maritime) economic history of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even readers with mastery of the German language will find that the studies are no easy reading. But after struggling—that is the right word to use here—through the pages of both books, the reader will know everything there is to know about the Rickmers family and their shipbuilding and shipping activities. The books have useful enclosures and the illustrations are well chosen and of good quality.

A strange phenomenon is the near invisibility of ships. Of course, a great number of ship’s names appear in the texts of both books, but the ships are players in the context of the business. They don’t ever figure as “personalities.” The barque, Rickmer Rickmers (1896), widely known as the Portuguese sail training vessel Sagres (II), and now a museum ship in the port of Hamburg, does not exist in the books. The people that run the shipyards, the ships and the offices of the companies are invisible as well.

Leo M. Akveld
Rotterdam, The Netherlands


Some perceive the period covered by the book to consist of increasingly victorious and dramatic actions by the English navy bracketed by the loss of Mary Rose and the last fight of Revenge. Loades portrays a more complex story involving the personalities of the monarchs, administrative history and technical advances by the English, and how that contributed to the establishment of England as one of Europe’s major naval powers by 1588.

In the half-century examined by the author, the Royal Navy (then termed the
Navy Royal to differentiate it from the civilian maritime vessels known as the Navy) was transformed in a variety of ways. Along the way Loades indicates that while an administrative structure developed for the Crown’s naval forces, gaps in the documents prevent detailed fiscal comparison within or between reigns. In this respect, the book is good example of how the early modern European period truly straddles the medieval and modern eras. In addition to missing financial accounts, the dissolution of the clear distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary expense categories over time, and the lack of explanation in the sources as to why what was once clearly defined became opaque are other examples of the issues facing historians of the broad period. Despite the documentary lapses, sufficient material survives to narrate the growing professionalization of English naval administration and its dockyards. (That anything exists at all is partly due to Samuel Pepys, the seventeenth-century Royal Navy administrator whose plan to write the service’s history never materialized.)

Loades reverses the assumption that early modern European rulers always followed a state policy of monopolizing armed forces. Henry VIII had actually extended his father’s policy in that vein from land to sea forces, but his daughter Elizabeth embraced private naval forces—whether pirates like John Hawkins or Francis Drake, or combat ships provided by merchants. Loades indicates that, had Edward VI lived, the change in royal policy would have occurred in the 1550s.

The period covered by the book chronicles a series of changes that foreshadowed British naval dominance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Initially, the scope of English naval operations from the Channel to the Firths of Forth and Tay, which were largely defensive, transformed to offensive ones in the Atlantic and Caribbean. That transformation arose not only because of the decline of French naval power, but also because of the aggressive stance adopted by the English. During peacetime (a word that became highly elastic in light of the provocative actions of the English maritime community) royal warships changed from being available by rent for private ventures (due to carrying capacity or convoying ability) to serving as partners in private operations. While in the 1580s merchant ships still joined the fleet by being “taken up” (drafted), they frequently served voluntarily, since the seed of Crown-London commercial cooperation planted in the later Protectorate, flowered under Elizabeth. This cooperation was notable not only in Crown-led defensive operations as in 1588 against the Spanish Armada, but also in England’s offensive on Cadiz in 1596, as well as in privately-commanded campaigns in 1589 (Portugal) and 1595 (Caribbean). In fifty years the number of Royal Navy warships grew by 25 percent, but more impressively, ship size increased and the design (the race-built galleon) improved. Equally important was the revolution in armament from foreign- to English-made, and from a variety of shot sizes to predominantly 18- and 9-pounders. The battle of Gravelines serves as an exemplar of these developments. Contrary to the general perception that, in 1588, English warships caused little damage to Spanish ships in the Armada, the effective battering at Gravelines (sinking ten to twelve ships) foreshadowed the later success of the Royal Navy as a force dedicated to sinking enemy warships. Equally prescient was the concept and limited practice of blockade (as opposed to patrols) which was applied in 1560, 1589 and 1601.

As Loades observes, the rise of the Royal Navy was not a steady course—setbacks occurred even during years of
success in the 1580s as the weed of corruption began sapping naval finances. In the absence of procedural instructions, the personality of the Crown’s officials still counted for much. The total and inexplicable confusion of the accounting lines of ordinary and extraordinary expenses serves as an example of the former.

The author has produced a work soundly based on manuscript and printed primary sources, as well as on numerous secondary studies. He masterfully weaves both together in framing the narrative. The writing is accessible, whether describing administration or operational aspects. Loades’ failure to discuss the strategic elements of the destruction of Leith during England’s “Rough Wooing” of Scotland is an unusual lapse. (Preservation of the port would have given the English a secure base and stranglehold on the Firth of Forth.) The absence of images is lamentable. Annoyingly, the illustrated Anthony Rolls are discussed, but only a fragment of an image appears on the cover. Likewise, the lack of maps, other than of the Channel and southeastern Scottish waters, makes the coverage of operations mysterious to those who have not internalized Iberian or Caribbean geography.

Loades has produced a corrective for those who assume that the Royal Navy followed a simple trajectory from Henry VIII through Elizabeth. He also turns a fundamental premise of The Prince on its head, since Elizabeth proved that for the most effective results in naval affairs, it was better to be loved than feared. A solid grasp of English political history will assist potential readers. Students of governmental and naval history will find the book illuminating.

Edward M. Furgol
Silver Spring, Maryland


In the last few years, there has been a spate of books about the Confederate raider CSS Shenandoah, including memoirs from several crewmembers and even a book psychoanalyzing the Southern officers. Most revolve entirely about the ship’s cruise as a commerce destroyer, second only to the CSS Alabama, the latter part of which voyage involved the decimation of the Yankee Arctic whaling fleet in the North Pacific. Like the Confederate raiders Alabama and Florida, Shenandoah was English-built, but was not constructed as a war vessel. Initially, it was an advanced-design, steam-assisted, full-rigged ship intended for transporting British troops to India, originally named Sea King. As the Civil War advanced, it eventually became impossible to order custom-built warships in officially-neutral Britain. Instead, Confederate agent James Bulloch managed to purchase Sea King and simply refit it with sufficient armament for the purpose, renaming it Shenandoah. Because of its full and fast sailing capacities, entirely separate from its steam propulsion, the ship was ideal for roaming far from port and chasing Union commerce in the most distant reaches of the world’s oceans. This Shenandoah did quite successfully, being the only Confederate vessel to circumnavigate the globe. Beginning a cruise near the end of the war, the ship went so far afield and out of touch with the rest of the world that it sank many of its victims, especially whalers, after the war was actually over back home. It wasn’t until newspapers turned up on a passing vessel with stories confirming the war’s end that Shenandoah finally stowed its armament and began a
long voyage from the Bering Strait all the way around Cape Horn back to its starting place in Liverpool.

Although other books have focused on the ship, the voyage, and the officers’ exploits during its tour, this is billed as primarily a biography of the captain, James Iredell Waddell, with the author’s clear intention to right some of the perhaps wrongful impressions of him given in other accounts of the voyage. Waddell has sometimes been painted as indecisive or vacillating, particularly on the return voyage when he faced a near-mutiny by officers and crew, all of whom were afraid of being labeled pirates and hanged for sinking ships after the war was officially over. They wanted to make the nearest friendly landfall and escape to either Australia or South Africa, but Waddell insisted on bringing the ship all the way back to England where a formal surrender directly to the sympathetic Crown would ultimately give them all greater legal protection. Rather than peremptorily make this command decision alone, he actually took council with his officers, gave a convincing argument, and let them vote on it, narrowly carrying the day. He claimed he did this because he was no longer officially in command of a warship — but unofficially, it was done to make his officers share responsibility for their fates and thus quell a potential mutiny. Curiously, he had successfully taken this approach as a junior officer in an earlier desperate situation in the U.S. Navy and had saved the day by doing so. Indeed, it was Waddell’s legalistic mind and careful manipulation of port protocols that helped him protect Shenandoah from seizure by Australian authorities, similar to the way lawyer/captain Raphael Semmes successfully managed the Alabama in international diplomatic dealings.

For those unfamiliar with the cruise of the Shenandoah, this will be a good read, as most of the book is of necessity spent on the events of the voyage. Others who have already read the story told from various viewpoints may be more interested in the early and later portions of the work which are about Waddell’s early life—his upbringing in North Carolina, his marriage and early career at the fledgling Naval Academy and at sea, and particularly his life following the war. Unlike Semmes, who returned to his land-side legal career, Waddell (like Florida’s John Newland Maffitt) continued his career at sea, despite difficulties with former enemies inside and outside of the Federal government. He eventually became a widely-acclaimed hero for some of his later commands, including his appointment to head the Maryland Oyster Navy which ended the notorious Chesapeake Bay Oyster Wars, in which armed watermen literally battled over lucrative fishing rights among the oyster beds. He was the only Confederate officer to be given a state funeral and later, to have a U.S. Navy destroyer named in his honour (1964).

Despite a few technical background errors, this is a deservedly sympathetic book about one of America’s great mariners, who unlike many noted Civil War commanders, never published his memoirs (they appeared posthumously) or promoted himself personally or politically. He was a strong, principled and intensely private man as well as being a wise and skilled officer under fire in both peace and war.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, New York


Starting with a foreword by Simon Stephens, curator, Ship Model and Boat
Collection, National Maritime Museum, the first chapter opens with a history of the Thames Iron Works from 1846-1912 along with a piece on the importance of ship models; chapter 2 covers hull building, metal plating and finishing touches to the hull; chapter 3 discusses the creation of the propellers, decks and decking; chapter 4 is on armament and electronics; chapter 5 discusses masts; chapter 6 covers ship fittings; chapter 7 is on auxiliary craft including boats and aircraft used by the ship; chapter 8 compares HMS Thunderer and USS Texas and their many similarities. A postscript discusses what happened at Jutland.

This, Mowll’s second book regarding the building of a model of an early iron warship, discusses his approach to the creation of Thunderer, the final ship of the Orion class, and contains a wealth of photographs to support his text. His previous book discussed the building of Warrior; both ships were built by the Thames Iron Works, 51 years apart, Warrior in 1860, Thunderer in 1911; both were launched from the same slipway. They were both iron-hulled and spanned the transition period from Warrior, a fully-masted sailing ship of war with free-standing weaponry, to Thunderer, a steam-driven weapon of war capable of destroying an enemy so far away that they could barely be seen. HMS Thunderer was unique in that it had what was essentially a canoe-shaped hull with no keel, with a slightly protruding forefoot and a slight swelling of the hull just aft of the bow, a forerunner of the bulbous bow.

Mowll built two models of Warrior, both to a scale where ¼ inch represented one foot, creating models 95 inches long. Thunderer was built to a scale where 1/8 inch represents one foot, producing a model 72 ½ inches long. While the smaller scale makes construction significantly more challenging, the model, produced by a superb builder, is magnificent! Mowll, as is true of most advanced model builders, is really a model engineer, in that his use of advanced tooling takes him far beyond the abilities of most ship model builders; this is reflected in his tooling and techniques.

Built using “plank on bulkhead” construction, the hull was planked with individual mahogany planks, followed by a double layer of glass fibre on the inside for strength and waterproofing. Once the exterior hull planking was faired, it was plated with copper strips, embossed to represent riveted plating. This daunting task can be appreciated in a superb photo of the finished model. With the hull plating complete, the hull was painted, inside and out.

The four propeller bosses were turned on a lathe, then slotted using a milling machine fitted with a dividing head. This allowed accurate cutting of the slots into which the blades would fit. The blades were cut, fitted and silver-soldered in place and completed by hand forming the blades into the desired curve. The front and rear edges were filed to shape, polished and eventually gold-plated, as were the mounting pedestals. Holes for the propeller and rudder shaft tubes were drilled using a series of jigs to allow accurate alignment. Support brackets were fitted and the work area was faired and repainted.

A sub-deck of three-ply birch was laid followed by an individually planked obeche-wood deck, including one strake cut from a strip of teak from the original ship. The positions for various structures, such as gun emplacements and superstructure, were all plotted and incorporated into the deck.

The work of fitting out utilized many interesting ideas and techniques including heat-bending moistened thin plywood to make formers for funnels and other structures over which metal would be
applied. The five turrets mounting ten 13.5 inch guns were laid up in glass fibre. A former was carved and sheathed with pewter sheet embossed with rivet heads and other detail, then a mould was made of this pattern and used to lay up the turrets. One gun barrel was turned and fitted with trunnions to make a mould from which the barrels were gravity cast. Once finished, they were mounted on carriages fitted underneath the turrets.

As the smaller, highly repetitious parts of the model, such as the guard rail and awning stanchions, secondary armament barrels, etc., did not lend themselves to gravity casting, centrifugal casting was used. Patterns for each part or assembly were made and used to make the mould. Cast parts were finished, painted and installed. Despite the fact that casting was used where convenient, all of the one-of-a-kind assemblies were built using conventional scratch building methods. These included breakwaters, the tripod mast and the upper platforms, searchlights and their platforms, the boarding ladder and the wire radio transmission aerials along with the flags. The boats and aircraft used by the ship were superb miniature models in themselves, especially the aircraft built of metal using highly innovative approaches. The beauty of Mowll’s writing is that not only does he describe his techniques crisply and clearly but he supports his text with excellent photography.

This book is recommended to anyone interested in the ship, HMS Thunderer, the techniques involved in building a superb model of it, or those wishing to look at techniques beyond normal model building.

Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


The Struggle for the Middle Sea is an ambitious work which sets out to present “a complete history of the five-year naval war in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, emphasizing the fifty-five surface actions involving major warships.” The author strikes a balance in history, whereby sources of information from all major combatants are reviewed: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In setting the stage, he tells us that the Mediterranean Sea was the cradle of the warship and from ancient times has been an arena of conflict.

The book consists of introductory chapters on the approach to the Second World War and the strategic framework of the Mediterranean theatre, and a chapter on each of the major phases of the war with headings such as, “The Defeat of France,” “The Red Sea 1940–41” and “The Axis Resurgent 1942” in which the individual actions are described concisely with the salient facts given in a table. Large scale maps accompany the descriptions of the more complex actions, along with ingenious graphics to create an effect like time-lapse to plot the movement of vessels and their changing dispositions through time; and their eventual fate in battle in terms of damage and loss.

The author relies on primary documentation, such as the logs of the warships, diaries and correspondence of individual force and ship commanders as well as leading figures like Count Ciano,
Marshall Badoglio, and Admirals Iachino and Cunningham. Primary sources impart immediacy and orient action making the text direct and readable. In addition to covering the major navies, the author also includes information on vessels of the participating minor navies: Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and New Zealand. While including some material on the Italian and German effort in the final chapter, “Germany’s War,” O’Hara excludes the small boat efforts of the Allies. This coverage neatly omits Canadian activities in MTBs and antisubmarine warfare although, tantalizingly, the abbreviation CDN appears in the list for Canadian.

Information on the vessels is confined to a single plate which presents a very small plan (line drawing) of a few representative types of cruisers and destroyers with only the most basic information on size, displacement, and weapons. The small scale maps of the theatre help orient the reader to the action while the notes and index are also useful. The photographs are dramatic but suffer from too small a scale. By concentrating on measurements like tonnage of cargoes and numbers and size of warships, O’Hara tries to present objective measures of success.

The author uses simple bar graphs to communicate information, like tonnage shipped versus arrived. Using another graph he puts the strategic importance of the Mediterranean theatre into perspective by comparing the number of actions fought in each ocean. The author perhaps sets the bar too low for the definition of a major warship, describing it as being any vessel of at least 500 tons mounting a 3.5 inch gun and larger. This has the effect of cluttering the text with detailed information about very small vessels. More information on units of at least fleet destroyer size and especially capital ships would have been helpful.

The author presents controversial conclusions; for example, although the Italian forces never solved issues such as aerial co-operation and radar, they fought well for the most part and attained their major objectives. Nevertheless, it was a potent force in being at the disposal of the Italian government when that country joined the Allies in 1943. O’Hara assesses the performance of each navy throughout the war and, finally, muses about the possibility of the Mediterranean as a theatre for conflict, given its increasing economic and strategic importance.

The book contains a few mechanical errors, which perhaps can be attributed to an overly complicated presentation, such as repeating the year in every heading, which increases the possibility of errors and makes them more difficult to locate. The use of two lists of abbreviations and acronyms, one general and one for vessel types, is confusing and complex, even to the author, we suspect. For example, the letter F is used in the text to indicate which vessels are flagships, while FS is listed in the abbreviation list. An error, which must be aggravating for the author since it is not his, occurs on the dust jacket where there is an advertisement for another book by this publisher, which has Napoleon alive in 1905.

This work is a refreshing, geographically and temporally balanced account of the sea war. It successfully presents the whole sweep in time, including the period after the Italian armistice, as well as looking at major navies, and all branches (army, navy, air force). While tracing the ebb and flow of war in the entire Mediterranean basin, the author portrays the Italian navy as the victim of successful propaganda, mostly generated by the winners. He successfully demonstrates that countries were willing to risk their navies to achieve their ends and the risks they took were a reflection of the pressure and intensity of their strategic imperatives. At
£20, this book is good value. It would be of interest to any student of the Second World War and especially the war in the Mediterranean. It would also be a useful addition to libraries devoted to the history of the world’s navies.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


Pirates are back. Almost every week the media report the seizure of a trading vessel somewhere far away from the industrialized regions of our globalized world. Recent pirate activities have been centred in the waters off Somalia, but shipping in the Malacca Strait and other parts of oceans near less-developed countries has also been affected by maritime depredations. For the general newspaper reader it is often difficult to make sense of pirate attacks. Reports are choppy, and both pirates and victims are usually not interested in publicizing their stories. Consequently, only a tiny portion of present-day piracy cases is reported to the authorities or the press. No doubt, piracy is a lucrative business. According to John Payne, a recent shift from traditional robbery at sea to hostage-taking has increased the spoils. The typical ransom in 2005 averaged between $100,000 and $200,000, whereas by 2009 it had soared to more than $2 million.

While Payne’s aim is to provide his readers with an introduction to modern piracy, he uses an odd structure to achieve this goal. He begins by making some brief remarks on trends in piracy, which include a comparison between historical and present-day piracy. He then moves on to providing lengthy descriptions of selected pirate attacks in recent times. There are no footnotes or endnotes provided, and many examples are based on anecdotal evidence or internet-based research. The only reference to a printed source is to Klaus Hympendahl’s *Pirates Abroad*, published by Sheridan House in 2003, which evidently served as the role model for the present book.

For readers who are interested in the causes and wider background of modern piracy, this book offers few insights. It lacks analytical depth, and the focus on depredations that occurred after 2000 by and large leaves the historical context to the rise of present-day piracy untouched. Furthermore, the book contains various factual errors. For example, the remark that Germany’s post-war constitution does not allow any active military operations overseas is incorrect. The author also fails to mention that fighting piracy, defined as robbery at sea, is actually a police operation rather than a military one, even though governments usually employ naval forces for this difficult task. The advice on how to avoid capture by pirates at the end of the book seems misplaced.

Despite several shortcomings, this book provides a useful introduction for the casual reader interested in contemporary piracy. Some cases described by the author contain intriguing details that deserve further journalistic or scholarly attention. Political scientists, sociologists, and economists have only begun to look closely at this form of crime. Piracy is sometimes described as one of the oldest businesses that still exist. It probably will not disappear in the near future. For that reason, Payne’s book merits, at the very best, some of our attention.

Arne Bialuschewski
Peterborough, Ontario

For a battle which decided the fate of North America, the Battle of the Chesapeake in September 1781 was a curiously anticlimactic affair. The defeated British suffered a total of 90 deaths and 253 wounded, and the only ship lost was the *Terrible,* which was scuttled four days after the battle, when her damage was deemed irreparable. British naval officers had often sought the enemy’s annihilation as a means to a decisive victory, yet here the French achieved it with strikingly little bloodshed. In doing so, they assured the Franco-American victory at Yorktown and the surrender of the largest British army operating in the mainland American colonies.

It was also remarkable that the conduct of the British officers at the battle was not subject to a formal investigation or court martial. Certainly there was keen contemporary debate, and historians have also examined the central question of “What went wrong?” The evidence points to significant problems of command, control and communication: the initial attack on the French fleet as it emerged from its anchorage in disorder could have been more aggressive and direct; when the British van did close with the enemy, it did not follow the line intended by Rear-Admiral Graves, thus inhibiting subsequent manoeuvres and firepower; and most crucially, Rear-Admiral Samuel Hood failed to understand Graves’ intentions and signals, and so never closed with the French. Had he done so, British firepower might have been concentrated on the French centre to decisive effect before the French rear could engage. The role of Hood, his relationship with Graves, tactical ideas, and the problems of signalling between the two lie at the kernel of why the British lost control of the Thirteen Colonies.

Colin Pengelly’s new book began life as a biography of Hood, and is based upon extensive archival research. The University Press of Florida, however, wanted a book which would provide a new account of the Battle of the Chesapeake, as the editors’ foreword makes clear. Both these objectives are to be lauded, for Hood still has no full-length biography, while the American War of Independence, especially its naval dimensions, have also been somewhat neglected. The marriage is not, however, an entirely happy one.

The focus of the introduction rests initially upon the battle, but then shifts, first to the role of Hood, and then to a broader evaluation of Hood’s record, with the suggestion that he should be evaluated in the context of other contemporary British admirals, such as Howe and Rodney. This discursive and analytical introduction does not entirely prepare the reader for what follows, which is essentially a thoroughly traditional biography, except that its coverage of the Battle of the Chesapeake is significantly “over-weighted” at the cost of giving much less attention to other aspects of Hood’s life.

There is much to be commended about the biography itself. The author has quite a clear and engaging style of writing, there is a fair level of detail, and Pengelly succeeds in conveying something of the character of his subject. The account is chronological, recounting Hood’s rise from a junior officer to captain, and then on to flag rank and death in 1816, but is more than a mere catalogue of Hood’s actions or correspondence. In particular, the account of his first significant “command” responsibilities, as the commissioner of the dockyard at Halifax, Nova Scotia (1767-
1770), contains much of relevance both to the difficulties of dockyard management, and to the Royal Navy’s role in relation to the rising political tension in the New England colonies. Hood’s next major appointment was commissioner of Portsmouth dockyard (1778-1780), and while Pengelly’s narrative here gives less insight into the managerial challenges, it does place Hood in the political context of the naval officer corps, which was shaped by divisions between Whig and Tory sympathies and wracked, in these years, by the fall-out from the bitter dispute between Keppel and Palliser over the latter’s failure to follow orders at the Battle of Ushant in 1778.

The greatest level of detail is reserved for Hood’s role in the campaign in North American waters from 1780 when he was despatched with five ships to support Rodney. Pengelly’s narrative is quite broad in scope, touching upon issues of logistics and maintenance as well as strategy, politics and the difficult character of Hood’s superior, Rodney. Hood’s role in the Caribbean is covered in some depth before the focus switches to the late summer of 1781, when both French and British fleets were to leave that theatre for the hurricane season. The crucial development here was that de Grasse, the French admiral, sent no ships back to France, but took his entire fleet north and thus had the numerical preponderance when the British and French fleets met at the mouth of the Chesapeake in September. Pengelly gives a very detailed account and analysis of the battle itself and the aftermath, as the British army and naval officers tried to work out how to redeem the situation. His verdict on Hood is critical, for he sees Hood’s failure to engage the French as at odds with Hood’s own aggressive tactical tendencies, at odds with Hood’s assessment of the strategic situation, and at odds with the intentions of his superior officer, Graves, even if Graves’s signals were less clear in meaning. Conversely, Graves, criticised by generations of historians, is treated sympathetically by Pengelly, who also points out that this view was shared by the Admiralty, for his career did not suffer subsequently.

There is further detailed examination of Hood’s performance in the campaign once he returned to the Caribbean in December 1781, “the high point of his professional career,” in which he demonstrated talents “that make his actions at the Chesapeake all the more inexplicable” (p.195). This includes his outrageous tactic of luring the French out of a secure anchorage at St. Kitts, only to return and steal it from them, and his role in the Battle of the Saints in April 1782, which largely ended French offensive operations in the theatre. The “last and by far the most difficult” (p.220) command of Hood’s career was as commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Squadron from 1793 to 1794, where Pengelly gives a mixed verdict on Hood’s handling of the defence of Toulon.

There are a number of frustrations with the book. Aside from several minor typographical errors, the only map is a road map of the Chesapeake Bay area from 1916; this does little to help the reader. Nor is there a chart of the Caribbean where the geography is most complex. Diagrams of the major engagements would also have been of assistance. This reinforces the impression that the book has been written for a quite specialist audience, for there are many names of people, places and battles which are not explained, there is no glossary or reference section, and there are numerous names of ships, people and battles which are not listed in the index. Even the editors’ foreword will catch the unwary, for they refer to the Battle of the Virginia Capes,
without explaining that this is another name for the Battle of the Chesapeake.

More significant problems arise from the difficulty of trying to fulfil the aims of providing both a biography of Hood and an account of the Battle of the Chesapeake. Firstly, the early biographical chapters have little of direct relevance to the actual analysis of the battle. Secondly, the battle has the obvious consequence of skewing the biography itself, since over 150 pages are devoted to Hood’s time in American waters in 1781-3. One obvious and regrettable casualty of this is that Hood’s command of the Mediterranean squadron in the French Revolutionary War is covered in just six pages. For a full examination of Hood’s abilities, this command must surely have been of central importance.

The editors’ desire to provide a broader history of the battle also leads to what seem to be tangents. A short chapter on French strategy sits uneasily within an essentially biographical text, and there is no equivalent chapter for the British side. There are also diversions within chapters, which break up the flow significantly. For instance, the chapter on the battle itself begins with ten pages of potted biographies of various leading officers on both sides, extending through to their deaths decades after the battle. Similarly, later in the same chapter, the battle narrative is disrupted by a discourse on the problems of coppering the Terrible and, later, a biographical sketch of a British captain, Molloy.

There are also stylistic tensions between the biographical narrative which characterises most of the book and a more discursive and analytical mode of writing. Thus, Pengelly analyzes the significance of the French victory just after the opening shots of the battle of the Chesapeake have been described, despite having the rest of the battle yet to outline. He poses the question as to why the ships of the British van did not follow Graves’ order as he had wishes, but never answers it. More significantly, a number of questions set up in the introduction are not addressed in the body of the work. There is relatively little discussion of the significance of the battle for the land campaign in North America, and no engagement with the counterfactual questions raised in the editors’ foreword. The comparison of Hood with his contemporaries is not extended beyond the introduction and there is no conclusion to draw together an evaluation of the man or the battle of the Chesapeake.

Despite these criticisms, Pengelly’s book will prove valuable for a specialist readership, for it offers a detailed account of Hood and the battle of the Chesapeake, in which Graves emerges largely rehabilitated as a commander, if one of by no means the first rank. The frustrations with the book arise mainly from the efforts to convert a biography into a critique of a particular battle. Two hopes arise, however. The introduction does identify a fruitful line of enquiry in the examination of command culture and systems of the Royal Naval officer corps for the origins of British failure at the Chesapeake. A work comparable to Gordon’s, The Rules of the Game. Jutland and British Naval Command (London, 2000), surely beckons. More modestly, it is to be hoped that Pengelly can be persuaded to write the full length biography of Hood that they both deserve.

Oliver Walton
London, UK

This is a well-presented book about a long-forgotten topic. The First World War saw the loss of Germany’s Asia-Pacific Empire while, after the Second World War, territory that Japan had acquired legally in 1919 and subsequently grabbed in 1941 also disappeared. Many people may not recall that before Adolf Hitler and the long period of a divided Germany from 1945 to 1989, Kaiser Wilhelm II had his “place in the sun,” a colonial empire that, if it did not rival that of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, at least equalled that of France, Belgium and the other colonial powers. Those who remember Bismarck’s unification of Germany, his anti-colonial stance and the naval race between Germany and Great Britain leading up to the First World War, may have little recollection of Germany’s former empire.

On the first page of a somewhat disarming introduction, Charles Stephenson sets out his intentions for this book. Firstly, that it is not based on careful scrutiny of primary sources, or rather it is, but the scrutiny is not his. Instead, the book “is a work of synthesis, which takes or perhaps ruthlessly plunders, the original work of other eminent scholars and attempts to weave it into a narrative concerning the colonial and naval policy of Imperial Germany.” There cannot be a better description of what this book is about and by the author’s own words, I think it is a fair reflection of how far he has gone to achieve his aim.

Stephenson also answers the questions “Why does it exist?” and “What is the purpose of the book?” by stating that it is aimed at those interested in the colonial and naval history of the Asia-Pacific area, but also for anyone with an interest in Kaiser Wilhelm’s *Weltpolitik* and Imperial Germany in the lead-up to the First World War.

The book is arranged in ten chapters based on Churchill’s “chronology is the key to narrative” axiom. Stephenson carefully explains Wilhelm II’s changes to Germany’s Asia-Pacific empire in the post-Bismarck period. The former chancellor’s anti-colonial policy was reversed, first in what we now call New Guinea (*Kaiser Wilhelm’s Land*) and the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago and in the Caroline Islands to the north of it, initially by German exploitation companies from 1885-1895. The book then shifts geographically to Shantung province in north-east China, and the acquisition of Kiautschou and its port Tsingtau, close to the Yellow Sea, where it would eventually come into conflict with another emerging power, Imperial Japan.

Having thus established Germany’s “place in the sun,” Stephenson describes the scramble for concessions by the other powers in China, then the German threat to the Spanish possessions in the Pacific and the U.S. reaction to this. There follows a second, of what Stephenson refers to as a tectonic shift, this time between Japan and Russia. He also explains how the establishment of the Kaiser’s East-Asiatic Cruiser Squadron at Tsingtau affected the Royal Navy. It was this latter event which led New Zealand to propose that the Dominions should take a greater share in their naval protection, and Australia to create the Royal Australian Navy. The book then covers naval operations prior to the First World War and the capture of Germany’s island colonies at the start of the war by Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Two chapters are then devoted to the
Stephenson is quick to point out the benefits that Japan achieved as Britain’s ally in the Far East, even if it did little to provide support in the European theatre when a flotilla of destroyers was sent to the Mediterranean in 1917. The book ends with an Aftermath, which examines events later in the war and also leading up to the Washington Naval Conference and the fate of the German colonies which had been invested by Japan at the start of the war and which the Allies did not feel able to take away at the end of it. He correctly points out that the two British Dominions at the geographical sharp end were much quicker to appreciate Japanese intentions than Great Britain.

What Stephenson has set out to do is to pull together all the various secondary source material available in a well ordered and carefully considered way. He has also been meticulous in recording nearly 900 endnotes providing details of his source material along with a 25-page bibliography and a 13-page index. There are nine excellent maps which show the location of the island colonies and details of the campaign against Tsingtau, together with six tables on various aspects of the siege. Although there are only ten photographs, these are different from those usually found in works on this period and we are informed that they come from Stephenson’s personal collection.

It takes a writer with wide knowledge to handle a topic in this way and Charles Stephenson is already well known for his previous works on a range of subjects including works on various fortifications in both the Channel Islands and Malta, and a completely different book on Zeppelins, 1900-1940. His knowledge of island fortifications proved invaluable in the chapters on the capture of Tsingtau. The main criticism of this book lies not in the scholarship or writing, which is excellent, but in the publisher’s price — $115 is a steep investment for a book about a less-than popular topic of the day. While many libraries and institutions will no doubt acquire a copy, it may well be beyond the means of many otherwise interested people.

John Francis
Greenwich, UK


Glenn Curtiss is justly acknowledged as one of the true pioneers of early aviation. His efforts in developing and improving the early technology are well known to aviation historians. Somewhat less prominent is his role as a key player in the development of American naval aviation. In *Hero of the Air: Glenn Curtiss and the Birth of Naval Aviation*, William F. Trimble focuses on Curtiss’s role in creating naval aviation.

One problem in any study of Glenn Curtiss’s life is his rivalry with the Wright Brothers. Curtiss and the Wrights engaged in extensive patent litigation over the years (and Curtiss filed other suits against them) which has cast him, in the eyes of Wright proponents, as the great villain. Trimble deals with this issue in the Foreword: he acknowledges the Wrights’ supremacy in the basic invention of the airplane while still giving credit to Curtiss for the improving the basic airplane concept. This, as Trimble states, matters to modern readers as one of complementary developments, not of competing developments. One hundred years ago, this was a subject of intense controversy. At the time of the Curtiss/Wright conflict, technology control via patents was a critical factor in obtaining market supremacy.
"Hero of the Air" can be viewed in two different ways: chronological and topical. The book can be broken down chronologically into two almost-equal parts: Curtiss’s early years and his early efforts in aviation development. The first part of the book deals with his early life in Hammondsport, New York, his experiments with early motorcycles, and the work he did with Alexander Graham Bell and the Aerial Experiment Association (AEA). The second part of the book looks at Curtiss’s work with the United States Navy and his later business career.

Curtiss came to Bell’s attention through his work with airship engines. Quickly known as a leader in aviation propulsion, Curtiss was contacted by Bell and involved in Bell’s early efforts at gliding and then powered flight. These activities, and the formation of the AEA, a factor in early aviation development, are fully described in detail in the text.

The second portion of the book looks at how Curtiss worked with the USN to develop flying boats for maritime patrol. The reader of "Hero of the Air" will learn that the U.S. Navy, so often considered a bastion of technological conservatism, became involved with aviation quite early, thanks to Curtiss’s development of the flying boat. Curtiss-designed flying boats were heavily used by the USN in the First World War. This section is the most interesting for the naval aviation enthusiast.

The topological approach consists of four threads intermingled throughout the text; Curtiss the inventor, Curtiss the early aviation inventor, Curtiss and the military, and Curtiss the businessman. Curtiss’s work habits and approach to development are thoroughly delineated. Unlike his adversaries, the Wright Brothers, Curtiss did not always adopt a systematic approach to experimentation, frequently making more than one change to a design at a time. That practice made it difficult to isolate variables and the causes of design problems. Again, the work he did with Bell and the AEA is fully related.

The military aspect of Curtiss’s story is surprising. Because of his early work with the USN, he helped them develop San Diego as a key port. His work on flying boats came naturally to him; Curtiss’s home town of Hammondsport lies on Lake Keuka, one of the Finger Lakes. It was only logical for an inventive hometown boy like Curtiss to wonder how to enable an airplane to takeoff and land on water.

Finally, the business side of Curtiss is explored. It is noteworthy that many of the problems Curtiss faced are similar to problems facing today’s businesses: the need to produce quality product, what happens when too much growth occurs, and what happens when a company needs restructuring.

In the 1920s, Curtiss cut back on his aviation efforts and moved to south Florida, where he was caught up in the famous Florida land boom of the period. The reader associating Curtiss with aviation only will be surprised to learn that he played a major role in developing Miami-area suburbs such as Hialeah and Opa-Locka. Tragically, Curtiss’s life was cut short; he died in 1930 following an appendectomy (a still-risky procedure even then).

"Hero of the Air" has something for nearly everyone. The inventor will enjoy reading the accounts of Curtiss’s work. The technologist will appreciate the many details contained within. The military aviation enthusiast will enjoy the story of Curtiss and the USN, while the businessperson will like the accounts of Curtiss’s business dealings. The illustrations add clarity and bring meaning to the narrative, while the bibliography and notes provide sources for further study of this aviation pioneer.

Still, "Hero of the Air" is not for the casual reader: some of the technological
information can be daunting. Although the book contains many personal anecdotes and insights into Curtiss’s character, personality, and personal life, the emphasis throughout is on his inventiveness, his work in early aviation, and his contacts with the USN. The reader seeking a fuller account of the man’s life would be advised to look at one of the other biographies of Curtiss, some of which are noted in the bibliography. The tone of the writing is scholarly, in keeping with Trimble’s background as a professional historian. Also, the price of US $47.95 could be prohibitive.

Still, this book succeeds in its purpose: presenting Curtiss as instrumental in early naval aviation endeavours. While the flying boat left USN service in 1968 and is largely an obsolete concept, one thing must be kept in mind: today’s highly sophisticated maritime patrol aircraft are the descendants of Glenn Curtiss’s efforts nearly 100 years ago.

Robert Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was one of the major European companies active in Asia during the Ancien Régime. An abundant literature is available about its trade and shipping, as well as several studies on its overseas capital, Batavia (Jakarta), and the Cape of Good Hope as its refreshment post, halfway between Europe and Asia. Kerry Ward (Rice University, Houston, Texas) takes a new and interesting line of approach to the VOC’s history. She analyzes and describes what happened to those on the fringes of the Company’s overseas society. Their ultimate fate was often forced migration within the network of the Company’s empire. Ward focuses on penal transportation, slave trade and political exile. Her study is based upon extensive research into primary sources, in particular, criminal records from Jakarta, Cape Town and The Hague, plus a voluminous literature.

The book’s title is a little broad. Its subtitle should have mentioned forced migration between Batavia and the Cape of Good Hope, since Ceylon, Banda and Ambon were other settlements where forced migration took place, but they are not discussed. What the author has to tell is very interesting and often new, but the book has one great disadvantage; it is repetitive in its main arguments and formulations, with the same sentences returning in subsequent chapters. Not before p. 49 does the reader begin to feel what the book is really about. Networks of Empire is also a bit unbalanced, for crime and punishment in Batavia are only covered for the period 1730 to 1750, while the Cape is studied from 1652 to the beginning of British rule around 1800.

The High Government in Batavia had its own judicial administration within a codified legal system expressed in numerous ordinances and decrees and issued by the Gentlemen Seventeen of the Company and the High Government itself. The States General of the Dutch Republic had granted the VOC the right to create its own legal system and to punish offenders and it used this system to develop a pattern of forced migration. Around 1740, Batavia offered ubiquitous and multi-ethnic social interaction within a constantly shifting population. When it came to crime and punishment, next to the standard public punishments of beating and branding, banishment and exile were the most
frequently imposed severe penalties, for freemen or slaves. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Company’s slave trading was only for its own labour needs and those of its settlers since it was illegal to enslave indigenous population within its territories. The author provides figures for the number of Company servants in the major settlements for the period 1720 to 1780. (p. 79)

From 1658 on, the Cape of Good Hope became the place to which Batavia transported its convicts and exiles. About half of the Cape’s population was slaves, imported from Madagascar and the East-African coast. The growing influx of sentenced people from Batavia who required surveillance often threatened to disturb the critical balance within the Cape’s own population of Company personnel, free burghers, slaves, and the indigenous Khoekhoe and Khoisan people. Those sent from Batavia were a motley group: Asian criminals (free and slaves), European VOC servants and political exiles. Robben Island was a penal colony where one had to work in the quarries, but its population was rather mobile. Long-term imprisonment was less the case than the frequent transfer of prisoners to work on different VOC public works, including Robben Island. The author cites a description of the island from 1751. Order among the convicts, in Cape Town and in smaller urban settlements, was often kept by the so-called “caffers,” the executioner’s assistants and a nascent police with power of arrest and corporal punishment. They were Asian political prisoners and criminals sentenced to banishment.

The Cape’s primary function was to serve as a strategic provisioning post, but it also became a jail. The free burghers, in particular, complained increasingly about the growing stream of convicts. It became one of the arguments used by the opposition movement of the so-called Cape Patriots around 1780. Another interesting aspect is the impact of Muslim religious priests, banished from the Indonesian Archipelago, upon the indigenous population of the Cape. Another sort of political exiles were several Javanese royal princes living with their court entourage on farms in the outskirts of Cape Town.

Two minor points: Traveler Stavorinus (p. 101) was not a Swede but a Dutchman from the province of Zeeland and a naval officer as well as a VOC commander, who published about his voyages to Asia; regrettably, in her description of daily life and the health situation in Batavia around 1740, the author overlooked the book *Malaria and Malaise.*

De VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw by P.H. van der Brug (Amsterdam 1994).

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