
In the late 1990s, Malcolm Archibald gave up his job as a postman in the Scottish borders to become a mature student of history at Dundee University on the northeast coast of Scotland. During his research, he was drawn to the fascinating subject of whaling in the North Atlantic. He is now a history lecturer at a Dundee College and, in 2005, against a record 240 competing authors, he won the Dundee Book Prize with his first novel *Whales for the Wizard*, which portrays the whaling industry in the 1860s. The novel was described by crime writer Ian Rankin, one of the judges, as a rip-roaring adventure mystery with terrific detail of place, period and shipping lore.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, whale hunting was an important commercial activity for Northern Europe. England’s northeast coast had three busy whaling ports in the 1750s and its northern whaling fleet mainly hunted its prey between Spitzbergen and the Greenland Sea. *Whalehunters* is loosely based on the author’s fourth-year dissertation and examines in detail how the brutal business of Arctic whaling affected the seamen who engaged in it. Whaling men were traditionally represented as wild, drunken and riotous when they returned home, and they certainly were men of extremes, sailing to the remotest frozen seas in search of the largest animals in the world. The result could be either a ship overflowing with blubber or an empty cargo hold. Recently, historians of the transatlantic slave trade have likened the degradation of the sailors aboard slave ships to that of those on whalers. The author is sympathetic towards the whale-hunters and believes that most were not inhuman monsters who hunted their prey for bloodlust, but ordinary people doing what they regarded as necessary work. He has successfully attempted to rehabilitate their reputation by setting out a rounded picture of their working lives, skills, families, pleasures, superstitions and relationship to the awesome and gigantic creatures which provided them with their livelihood and occasional brief periods of prosperity.

Although all of Scotland’s whaling ports are mentioned in the book, the author focuses on Dundee as a representative example of whaling ports in Britain, since it was the main port for the Arctic whaling ships that voyaged far up into the Davis Straits. He is clearly very familiar with Dundee’s shipping lore, and his painstaking research into the local whaling industry is remarkable. He has drawn extensively from the few memoirs and journals that still survive locally, logbooks and local customs records, and has consulted company records and newspapers. The well-organized nuggets of information gleaned from all these sources must have taken many hours of research to uncover.

The author’s style is objective, informative and entertaining as he demonstrates that whaling was not only the unforgivable slaughter of a peaceful animal, but also a romantic period when men endured extreme hardships. Perhaps
he could have made more of two major developments in 1858 that affected the future of the whaling industry – Pennsylvania produced petroleum for lighting and lubrication, and a Dundee shipbuilder installed a steam engine in a wooden whaler. The new generation of whalers scoured more distant fishing grounds and the turning point came when the hunters acknowledged that the whale population in the North Atlantic was in serious decline, almost certainly from over-fishing. By the 1870s, many whaling ships on the east coast of Britain were idle and the industry was looking to the Southern Ocean as an alternative source for the highly profitable trade in blubber and whale oil.

In 1892, a Dundee whaling entrepreneur fitted out four redundant whaling ships with auxiliary engines and set sail for Antarctica. They found, however, no whales of the type they wanted and returned with only sealskins, seal oil and blubber. After 1893, out of all the British whaling ports, only Dundee retained a fleet of Arctic whalers. Its last vessel sailed in 1913 and, with this, the industry that had grown to become essential to the British economy in the nineteenth century had reached its end.

There have been many excellent books written about the whaling industry in the Arctic but until now, few have focused on the day-to-day life of the men. This remarkably competent book is not a dry industrial or economic history, nor does it attempt to argue the moral rights and wrongs of whaling as an industry from a twenty-first century viewpoint. Its contribution to maritime history will be welcomed by those who are fascinated by the search for whales and, because of the book’s comprehensive appendix, notes, bibliography and index, it will also be appreciated by historians interested in the daily lives of nineteenth-century seamen.

Michael Clark
London, UK


The *Log of Bob Bartlett*, as published in 2006 by Flanker Press, is a reprint of a book published in 1928 by G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, but also includes photographs and an index not contained in the earlier book. A foreword, by author and Newfoundlander Paul O’Neil, gives purpose to the Flanker edition by encouraging all students in Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as every other reader, to understand Bartlett and his myth through his own words.

“My log,” says Bob Bartlett, “is just a simple yarn of a plain man.” (p. xvi) This “simple yarn” covers his boyhood from 1875-1891 and is followed by almost forty years of ocean hazards, 1891-1928. Begun by describing his family background and their small fishing schooner going down the Labrador before the days of radio and air planes, Bob Bartlett’s yarn ends with his participation in a National Geographic survey for aircraft bases in Arctic regions, and conducting scientific and adventure cruises to the Arctic as owner/skipper of the radio-equipped, auxiliary schooner *Morrissey*. Against this background, Bartlett relates a sentiment for all things nautical closing with “There is nothing so satisfying as the sea.” (p. 310)

Bartlett’s achievements were many, but two, one when he was master of
the Roosevelt, and the other when master of the Karluk, were of such renown that he became a celebrity feted by royalty, press barons, book publishers, the National Geographic Society, and the Royal Geographic Society. From the popularity of recent publications detailing happenings of almost a century ago, it is evident that these two events still attract public interest.

Bartlett was appointed master of the SS Roosevelt, Peary’s North Pole expedition ship of 1905-6 and 1908-9 following his service as a mate in the Windward, Peary’s Arctic expedition ship of 1898 to 1902. For his service in Roosevelt, Bartlett was voted the Hubbard Medal by the National Geographic Society. In Roosevelt, besides his duties as shipmaster, Bartlett also led a sledge unit. This involved him in the international discussion that arose from Peary’s 1909 assault on the Pole, viz: Did Peary reach Ninety North and if so, was he first? The ensuing debate still produces comment from learned sources; see The Last Imaginary Place by Robert McGee, Curator of Arctic Archaeology at the Canadian Museum of Civilization (2005). Bartlett never doubted that Peary had reached the Pole and that he was the first to do so. (p. 222) For their parts in the 1909 polar epic, the Royal Geographic Society awarded medals to Peary and Bartlett. They were later honoured by the King of Italy. (p. 208)

Vilhjalmur Stefansson, leader of the 1913 Canadian Arctic Expedition, invited Bob Bartlett to be master of the expedition’s ship, CGS Karluk, which departed Victoria, BC, in June 1913. Eastward of Point Barrow, the vessel’s movements severely curtailed by ice, the expedition leader decided that he would leave with a party of five for the mainland on a projected ten-day hunting trip. Leaving written instructions to erect beacons ashore as guides for the returning hunting party, Stefansson departed on 20 September 1913. As events would prove, he was to have no further involvement with the Karluk.

Three days after Stefansson’s departure, the Karluk was unmanageable and being storm-driven into the polar pack. Beset, she drifted west until crushed and sunk on 10 January 1914. After two months camped on the Arctic polar pack, Bartlett led the Karluk survivors, “minus eight”, to a landing on Wrangell Island on 12 March 1914. The “minus eight” comprised a party of four lost in an attempt to reach Wrangell Island, and four men who had requested 50-days of supplies and equipment and left for Alaska in early February (p. 241). Six days after arriving at Wrangell Island, Bartlett and Katiktovick, an Inuit, together with seven dogs and a sledge, went on to seek help for the remaining survivors. Following 17 days sledging over and through 200nm (370km) of Arctic pack ice (see photo PA74027, p. 175), they reached Siberia on 4 April 1914. With local assistance, Bartlett and his companion finally made Alaska. Departing in early September 1914 for Wrangell Island in USCGC Bear, they met up with a local trading ship the King and Winge bound from Wrangell Island. On board were the remaining Karluk survivors minus three who had died on the island during Bartlett’s absence. Although Bob Bartlett’s effort to bring his charges to a safe haven was not totally successful, it was nevertheless an amazing effort.

There are several omissions of detail in Bartlett’s narration of the Karluk loss and the survivors’ ordeal. These omissions, owing perhaps to the author’s modesty, are detailed in at least two

Though readily understood, this 2006 issue of *The Log of Bob Bartlett* would be more easily followed with the inclusion of maps. The physical achievements of this “plain man” and his refusal to be dominated by circumstance, all described in his “simple yarn,” give substance to the Bartlett myth. *The Log of Bob Bartlett* is recommended reading for students of leadership, particularly personal leadership in dire circumstance.

Len Forrest
Ottawa, Ontario


Born in 1876, Erich Raeder would serve as C-in-C of the German Navy for over fourteen years, during the fateful period between 1928 and 1943. He was a year older than Dudley Pound, his British counterpart, and two years older than Ernie King, the wartime American CNO. Both Pound and Raeder outdistanced their contemporaries early in their careers by virtue of their intellects. Admiral Kurt Assmann, who served under Raeder for several years, observed that he had an impressive grasp of a wide range of issues and analyzed situations quickly. Raeder apparently expressed his decisions and opinions with particular clarity and force. While he was always formal and what the Germans call “correct”, he used social occasions to cultivate friendly relations with his subordinates. According to another former contemporary naval officer, he inspired the respect and admiration of his admirals who called him “Onkel Erich.” Unlike the charismatic Karl Dönitz, however, the fully fifteen-years-older Raeder did not have a gift for establishing easy rapport with others nor did he inspire personal loyalty. Keith Bird cites a contemporary who remembers Raeder and his wife being rather dour socially. The official photographs invariably seem to show the Grand Admiral properly attired in a wing collar – correct form was obviously important. In short, Rader was authoritarian, brainy and demanding, but aloof. The Grand Admiral insisted on maintaining his distance from Hitler. It has been argued that his formal manner and stiffness contributed to his difficulties in forging a productive relationship with the Führer. Dönitz, who succeeded Raeder, was far more effective in operating within the palace politics surrounding Hitler and skillfully cultivated party officials and individuals in industry who would be useful to him.

This new book by Keith Bird is touted as the first full-length biography of Erich Raeder in any language. In fact, it is not a biography, but largely a 226-page critique of German naval policy during Raeder’s career, and in particular, of the Grand Admiral’s decisions. Starting in the sixties, Dr Keith Bird has been studying and writing about German naval policy for over five decades. He compiled a comprehensive bibliography titled *German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature* (1985). His impressive familiarity with the literature is evident in *Erich Raeder*, which has 38 pages of dense endnotes in small print. These
entries do not provide complete information on the sources cited but readers are invited to consult an on-line bibliography which is an extraordinary further 38 pages in length. Much of the book is a synthesis of the writings of the authors cited in the endnotes.

Erich Raeder’s politico-military horizons began expanding while he was still a junior officer. Admiral von Tirpitz, the wily driving force behind the creation of the powerful Imperial oceangoing navy, had created a section of his staff called the Nachrichtenbüro or News Bureau. Its main purpose was to create public support for the navy. While still a lieutenant, Raeder was handpicked to serve for two years in this staff section, where he worked closely under von Tirpitz and observed his legendary skills as a “master bureaucratic infighter” (p. 15). Raeder later spent two years navigating the imperial yacht, where he observed the Kaiser in informal settings and came into contact with court and senior government circles. During the cataclysmic Great War, Raeder was Chief Staff Officer of the Battle Cruiser Force under Admiral Franz Hipper. He was present at two major actions, Dogger Bank and Jutland. The German Battle Fleet – and particularly the battle cruisers – were well handled at Jutland. Making correct tactical assessments rapidly and manoeuvring formations in the confusion of battle using the primitive signaling techniques of the time were formidable challenges. Hipper and Raeder obviously met the test. Bird points out that Hipper proposed operations on the high seas by heavy units against British shipping and that these concepts of raids on commerce were the genesis of Raeder’s interdiction attempts during the Second World War.

Raeder rose steadily in the tiny postwar Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic. A two-year appointment in charge of training enabled Raeder to put his stamp on the indoctrination of personnel and in particular, on the ethos to be inculcated in young officers. Raeder’s generation had experienced the breakdown of discipline in the High Seas Fleet during the war and the internal collapse which bought down the Imperial government. They were determined to forge a cohesive navy. Tellingly, Raeder insisted that an officer’s first responsibility was the welfare of his men. Raeder became C-in-C of the navy in 1928, just as the Republic was embarking on a more assertive foreign policy. He set out to maintain the cohesion of the navy on the one hand and to push for more resources from the government on the other. Raeder and his generation of naval officers, their minds formed by Wilhelmine Germany, shared a vision of an ocean-capable fleet as an instrument of a resurgent Germany. When Hitler’s National Socialists took power in 1933, much of their program of national renewal appealed to officers of Raeder’s generation and other members of a middle class which had been alienated by the parliamentary democracy of the Republic. This class had been scarred first, by the debilitating hyper-inflation of the early twenties which had wiped out savings, and then by the world-wide economic crash of 1929. The National Socialists promised to restore Germany’s greatness. Raeder saw himself as an officer whose constitutional role was to respond to his political masters. Like others, he was drawn to Hitler’s authoritarian style of governing and set out to convince the Führer why Germany again needed a powerful navy.

The sweeping social, political and economic changes that altered Germany during the successive decades of Raeder’s life receive scant mention in this book.
Nor does Dr Bird deal with the complex issues of complicity with the National Socialists by leaders across the spectrum of German society, the resonance of the Nazi ethos in the population at large, and the reasons why this was a popular regime. Instead, this book provides snapshots of various policy decisions and turning points. It is a running indictment of selected developments, starting with Admiral von Tirpitz, which emphasizes German strivings for hegemony and planning in peacetime for aggressive war. Each episode discussed is couched in terms critical of Raeder’s judgment; the tone is often carping. Germany’s successful aggression against Norway in 1940, for example, is portrayed as being of little strategic worth because the defeat of France subsequently provided Atlantic bases for U-boats. There is no mention of Norway’s strategic location in the campaign of attrition against the later convoys to North Russia. Moreover, until they were finally knocked out in mid-1944, the threat represented by German heavy units stationed in Norway tied down British major warships. Admiral Raeder is scourged for his role in expanding the navy and his involvement in contingency plans for war, but he is also held responsible for various problems. For example, the failure to bring into service the aircraft carrier launched in December 1938, and 85 percent complete in 1939 is blamed on the Grand Admiral who is said to have simply pushed to finish battleships instead (p. 198). The thrust of this paragraph is that Raeder was insufficiently air-minded and grasped the potential of carriers too late. As presented, this argument about completing the carrier is monocausal and hence, unsatisfying. It does not look at material and labour shortages, and the relative state of completion of the battleships (presumably Bismarck and Tirpitz).

Biographical information — details about Raeder’s family, personal pursuits and personality — is missing from this book, as are the contexts in which he pursued his career. On the other hand, Dr Bird’s summaries of issues as presented to Hitler during his periodic situation conferences are well done. There is an interesting discussion of Raeder’s ideas for a running Atlantic campaign against British shipping in 1937. (p. 118) The index has been well compiled — instead of merely listing page numbers after a name or topic, the various entries show where specific information can be found. The book has been bound in the trademark sturdy Naval Institute shipshape fashion. The photographs are reproduced in a grainy format but have been well chosen. There is a dramatic stern view of Bismarck (following p. 48) which captures why battleships were termed “heavies” by US sailors and “Dickschiffe” (ie, stout) by the Germans.

Erich Raeder is undoubtedly a central figure in the history of the German navy from the First World War to 1943. Born into the burgeoning German Empire that had been formally proclaimed only five years earlier, he and his generation internalized Tirpitz’s visions of achieving international status as a major sea power. Raeder had close contact with senior officers and leading government figures beginning several years before war came in 1914. There is a remarkable continuity in his subsequent close proximity to the centres of power. Having experienced modern naval warfare at the sharp end between 1914 and 1918, Raeder became an Admiral in the small navy allowed to Germany after the First World War. He had been C-in-C for five years when Hitler became national leader in 1933.
Germany’s push for world power under National Socialism ended in unprecedented disaster. By 1943, Admiral Raeder, a key member of the Third Reich’s military leadership, expanded the 15,000 man navy of the Weimar Republic to a force of 680,000 while maintaining its cohesion, but fought a losing battle for more resources once war came. He provided overall strategic direction for the operations of his navy subject to priorities and restrictions determined by Hitler. Although he cautioned the Führer that Germany was not ready for war with Britain, and later argued against the attack on the USSR, the Admiral, like the majority of senior military leaders, supported the political leadership. Raeder resigned in January 1943 because he could no longer work with Hitler. He was subsequently tried at Nuremberg and sentenced to life imprisonment but released after ten years due to failing health. He died as a citizen of the democratic Federal Republic in 1960. Buttressed by extensive scholarship, Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich is an extended, but mainly hostile, commentary on naval policy decisions during the Admiral’s long career. A true biography of this important figure has yet to appear.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Even for a non-naval construction engineer, this moderately small and inexpensive book has proved a fascinating read. David Brown is a prolific author on the history of warship design and construction and an ex-Deputy Chief Naval Architect for the RN. After a foreword by Sir Stanley Goodall, the vital DNC from 1936-1944, whose very frank diary Brown frequently quotes, there is a brief introduction to naval construction as influenced by the treaties of 1922, 1930 and 1936 (the latter never ratified). For the rest of this book, Brown gets into the meat of the why and how of warship construction; and much more than just battleships like HMS Nelson. He covers not only Nelson’s successors, with remarks on predecessors, but moves on into carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, escorts, MTBs, and even ships of the fleet train.

Admittedly, there is initially quite a bit on the placing of battleship and cruiser armour, and arguments about the distribution of armour. But even here, the complicated balances required to meet (or not much exceed!) the treaty requirements show that naval construction design was, and remains, an art as much as a science. Brown exposes many a myth about pressures on designs, such as, “It is a convenient myth to blame the Treasury for shortage of funds; their role is to administer government policy, and ministers of all parties welcome the Treasury taking blame for unpopular measures” (p. 15). In fact, even pre-war, the Treasury was largely favourable toward the Navy. In 1937, when the Admiralty ordered 20 gun turrets for the Fiji class cruisers (of 1937), without obtaining consent from the Treasury, the latter obtained retrospective authority rather than criticize the Admiralty. Brown also provides support for the theory that shore bombardment was much less accurate than reported by the Navy. At Normandy, many battleship rounds missed by a mile or more; Ajax fired 150 rounds in 27
minutes at one battery with but two hits which were assessed as lucky.

Similarly, there are a multitude of examples that should still be taken to heart when looking at the future of ship design of any size, with stress, hull flexibility, and bridge placement being examples of which he writes on several occasions. The author points out a myriad of influences from outside the construction design offices that had an impact on arrangements. For example, he says “Director of Sr. Officers Technical Course came out strongly in favour of vertical funnels to make it more difficult for an enemy to estimate inclination” (p. 70) – hence Exeter and York. But then he notes that the Controller (to whom the DNC reported) decided on raking funnels, ostensibly to get smoke clear of the bridge, but most probably for aesthetic reasons (p. 75).

For the semi-non-technical reader, it is the small points in design, construction and operation that make for fascinating reading – I made four pages of notes! Brown’s footnotes in the margin of each pair of pages are often relevant, and make for far easier and quick reference than the usual arrangements. Some are personal asides from his post-war experience, many are humorous. When the ‘A’ class submarines required raised bows and a bow buoyancy tank added to improve seakeeping after operational experience, he notes “Shades of 1st War J & K classes. Designers should read history!” And in the 1927 ‘A’ class destroyers, a 30 kw generator was allowed, to permit lighting in the mess decks, but “It is said that there were objections to this as better lighting would enable sailors to read on the mess decks and they might get hold of subversive literature!” Also at that time, major destroyer design emphasis was placed on torpedo attack, which was to dominate their design into the Second World War.

Brown offers an interesting perspective on the limits posed by the various naval treaties. His assessment is that these were good for the RN, in that their limits tended to be taken as the accepted goal in building for both numbers and tonnage, born out by the Naval Estimates that shrank very little between 1929 and 1933. The Army and Air Force, under no such constraints, had to fight continually to prevent massive cut-backs. Another rarely considered point was weight of paint! An initial coating of paint in a destroyer, particularly the large Tribals, weighed 17 1/2 tons. In his post-war frigate, 80 coats of paint weighing 45 tons were removed when refitting. Some points are well appreciated by ships’ personnel, in that during the war, stability became a problem because most new equipment was added high up – guns, radar, reinforced masting. Since few ships were designed for any significant growth, all these items took up space yet required more hands.

The author makes many sensible suggestions that could have been adopted – hindsight being very clear – such as twin rudders for manœuvrability, particularly in A/S escorts, where destroyers tended to be poor at this, the ex-US Towns dreadful, corvettes excellent (770 yards vs. 136 yards turning circles). He suggests that old systems are not necessarily bad – ‘T’ class submarines were fitted with 1/4 metre wavelength radar, “Very useful as no radar detectors were working in this obsolete frequency” (p. 114). Bridges, particularly in destroyers and escorts, should be fitted as far aft as possible, to reduce the elevator effect in seas – the Tribals again being a good example. Those ships were not necessarily popular; Admiral Cunningham in the Mediterranean considered them too large. But the sea commands wanted that gun and torpedo capability, so it was, as usual, a saw-off. Also, because of their excellent and hardy design, the Tribals tended to be driven hard, “particularly by the Canadians,” he notes (p. 190)! This was also the case with MTBs – strengthening them to
withstand slamming only encouraged the COs
to drive them harder until they broke anyway.

The author is critical of British ships’ machinery, noting that American
destroyers in particular, as well as their
escorts, had far more reliable and lighter
engines, although they were vastly more
costly and often more complicated. But, he
adds, the RN engine room hands didn’t seem
to have a problem with the more complicated
‘Captains’ class the RN acquired. And the
Admiralty design section often did get it right.
Not one of the 370 RN destroyers was lost
due to stress of weather alone. The Mark VIII
torpedo came into service in 1930 and was
used to sink the Argentine Belgrano in 1982,
fifty years later!

There are a hundred smaller tables to
support Brown’s deductions and opinions,
many of them offering new evidence not
readily available elsewhere. For example,
there is a table of ships sunk as a percentage of
new ships built: battleships – 13.5 per cent;
sloops and frigates 37.6 per cent (p. 159; this
seems exceedingly high and probably should
be rechecked!). The most common cause of
sinking of unarmoured (smaller) ships was
structural collapse – back breaking; in
destroyers, 44 per cent. In the Atlantic,
looking at operational weather ships will face,
61 per cent of the time waves are on the
average ten feet in height, higher in northern
latitudes and in winter. As with pre-war asdic
trials, fair weather and easy going are not the
ways to design warships.

Altogether, this is a most
interesting and valuable book, one that it
is hoped every modern ship designer or
builder will use as a cautionary reference,
for little has changed in the basics. For
the seaman officer and user of these ships,
it would be an eye-opener.

Fraser McKee
Toronto, Ontario


This book tells two stories. One is about
undersea explorer Barry Clifford’s
expeditions to Ile Sante-Marie, off the
eastern coast of Madagascar, searching for
the remains of Captain William Kidd’s
ship, the *Adventure Galley* (Clifford was
backed by TV’s Discovery Channel). The
other is an account of the true history of
Kidd, and especially of his last and fateful
voyage. The two tales are related in
parallel: the narration keeps switching
back and forth, rather as it is often done in
television programs on historical subjects
of this nature. This technique is actually
effective: when the reader gets tired of the
problems of the dive team, caught
between their TV backers’ demands for
results within a given time frame and the
delays of Malagasy bureaucracy, we move
over to Kidd and his machinations and
problems, which were equally frustrating.
This is the best and most complete
account of Kidd and his history that I have
seen. Kidd’s early career was quite
successful. After serving in the Royal
Navy, he became a privateer captain
licensed to rob the enemy’s ships – in this
case, the French. Having made a
considerable fortune, he settled in New
York and married a wealthy widow. New
York in 1691 was a rough, frontier-type
town and as long as money was to be
made, its merchants and government
officials readily dealt with privateers and
pirates alike. The Kidds lived in a large
house his wife had inherited and they had
two daughters. Kidd conducted a business,
owning wharves and ships. By any normal
standard he was a success.
At that time, the Indian Ocean was infested with pirates. The Great Mogul complained bitterly to William III, but the King had no ships to spare. In 1695, a scheme was hatched to send a private ship to attack the French and the pirates in the Indian Ocean and to profit from the loot captured from both. A principal backer was Lord Bellomont, who had just been appointed Governor of New England, while King William himself was one of the investors. Who better to head the expedition than successful privateer William Kidd? An offer was made and Kidd could not resist. The syndicate had a new ship built for Kidd. Resembling a small warship of the period, the Adventure Galley was the perfect vessel for the job.

Kidd had been instructed to bring all the captured treasures back to New York or Boston where it would be divided, with the backers getting the lion’s share. This was quite unacceptable to Kidd’s crew, most of them former pirates, who were accustomed to a division of spoils on the spot. Furthermore, Kidd could not find anything he could legally capture. The crew wanted to attack any ship, including those of the East India Company, but Kidd refused. Eventually he captured a rich Turkish ship called the Queddah Merchant. It had an English captain but had a laissez-passé issued by the French which Kidd took as an excuse to seize her. Then, with the Adventure Galley leaking and in need of repair, he sailed for the pirate hangout of Ile Ste-Marie. The Queddah Merchant with a prize crew followed several days behind. These pirates were the very people he had been sent to attack but he now had no way to do so. The crew deserted and stripped the vessel. After the Queddah Merchant arrived, Kidd managed to get together enough loyal crew members to sail in her for Hispaniola. The Adventure Galley was burned.

When the dive team arrived in Madagascar in early 2000, they found they had permits to search for the wreck but not take anything from it. As this was a reconnaissance mission, they were not worried, but on a second trip in May, when they expected to get to work, permission was still withheld. It subsequently appeared that, while their group had the backing of some Malagasy government ministers, another underwater archaeologist, who suspected them of wanting to trespass on his own project, had the ear of the ambassador in Washington and of other government members. Nevertheless, they were able to take some coins and pottery shards from the first wreck they found – actually just a pile of ballast stones – and photograph them before returning them to the site. Experts in France dated the coins to a period twenty years after Kidd’s expedition. It was not the Adventure Galley.

To return to Kidd: on arrival in Hispaniola, he made arrangements to sell some of the Queddah Merchant’s cargo – valuable bales of silk and cotton. With more of the cargo transferred to a smaller vessel, he made his way back towards New York. At Gardiner’s Island, off the eastern tip of Long Island, he buried some treasure which was later excavated. This is known, but those who still think that Kidd may have had something to do with Nova Scotia’s Oak Island should give up that idea. He would never have had the time to reach there, much less install elaborate tunnels. Anyway, Kidd, joined by his family, went to Boston to confront Lord Bellomont. There was some bargaining with Kidd promising to go back to Hispaniola and return with great riches, but instead he was jailed and sent
to England where, after an elaborate trial, he was hanged.

Although I have not seen it, the television program of Clifford’s expedition was completed. They found what must have been the ballast of the Adventure Galley but there were no artifacts. The first wreck was identified as a much more important ship, the Fiery Dragon (wonderful name!), that had belonged to “One Hand Billy” Condon, a real “pirates pirate”, who roamed the Indian Ocean twenty years after Kidd’s time. The Dragon had burned by accident at Ile Ste-Marie in 1720, but Condon had made himself and his crew rich. He retired to St Malo in France, where he was regarded as a merchant of the utmost probity and honesty! We have not heard much about him in pirate lore because most of his activities were in the Indian Ocean. Kidd is more famous and this book gives a good account of him, while the TV program should be worth seeing.

Charles D. Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This book begins with generalities – about the importance of war in the history of Canada since 1914, and how memory is quickly fading about the great World Wars of the twentieth century. Then it shifts to its true focus and intent: how historians have interpreted Canada’s military involvement in two World Wars. In fact, Cook’s focus is not on the writing of the history of these wars but on those who have been tasked by government and its attendant departments to do so. “It has been the official historians of the Department of National Defence who, for much of the twentieth century, have controlled the academic writing on the two world wars...”, he writes. I doubt if that is true, and I doubt if controlled is the correct word – shaped possibly, but hardly controlled. The corpus of literature that has emanated from DND, though of undoubted value and authenticity, did not of itself monopolize the narrative, nor did it have the assumed influence in shaping the way Canadians and students of Canadian military history have looked at the past. This book is an insider’s book in a way; yet it has so many things to say about Canada and its military historical writing, both official and unofficial (professional and amateur). It is, too, a book about many friends and fellow researchers and, from this reviewer’s disposition, is undeniably a trip through memory lane. Cook is an historian in the Canadian War Museum and author of the acclaimed No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (2000).

I recall an occasion when the late Charles Stacey, a true centerpiece of Cook’s tome, was pronouncing on the laggards who were supposed to produce edited volumes on time for the famed Champlain Society. “Canadian historians have run out of steam,” he complained vehemently. The event in question was a day in the late 1980s, and Stacey had not yet run out of steam (if ever he did), but thought his colleagues had. In fact, he was wrong, for as Cook’s bibliography and notes attest, this apparent quietude and non-productive age was giving birth
to all sorts of new enterprises, especially in military history, and by *military* Cook means air, sea and land elements.

Cook has an ample field to survey, and in doing so, treats the subject from the inside. His Ottawa stance and his familiarity with so-called official history and academic or scholarly publishing provide a justifiably strong position from which to survey the historical battles of the past. His beginning point is really Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, and the search for an official history, or rather record, of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918. Cook shows that official history has invariably been cast in the shadow by politics and by fiscal appropriations to make such an official history possible. Beaverbrook was uniquely inspired by his age: the long-term results were astounding, including the collecting of documents (otherwise to be lost) and the formulation of the first annals of Canadian battlefield experience. Nowadays, history *à la “the Beaver”* has long since been re-written, but Beaverbook’s legacy is important. From the political football of military history’s interwar years came a new sort of historical game: how to convince Archer Fortescue Duiguid, the officially-appointed historian of the CEF, to get his work completed and in print. Cook’s discussion of dilatory Duiguid runs through the narrative, a sort of horror story about the progress of authorized Canadian military history. Duiguid fought a war of reputations. In the end, after justifiable political interference and non-production (the sort of thing Stacey later steamed about), Duiguid was relieved of his duties, and Canadian military history from the top entered a new era.

The Stacey era is another centrepiece of this book, and is a preliminary account of what someone else might take up as a biographical project, if it has not already been undertaken. Stacey, who joined the historical branch in 1940, was the guiding light of official history of the Second World War for so much of the period down to our own times, and S.F. Wise, Alec Douglas and Serge Bernier are only three persons of many who worked with Stacey and were inspired by him. The legacy endures in the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, in the Canadian War Museum and elsewhere. Stacey was Toronto and Princeton, had a PhD, and was fully qualified in scholarly methods and eligible for senior rank in the Canadian Army. Tough-minded and independent, he nonetheless had a keen political sense (as displayed in his response to the writings of others about Dieppe); and his views became the official line, so to speak, and served his masters well. He knew that the Canadian public deserved authentic, general accounts of field operations of the Canadian forces and he took measures to lead these books forward – three on Army operations, one on the RCN (*Joseph Schull’s Far Distant Ships*) and others. The making of Canadian military history “for the public” continued well into the 1990s, before severe economies put a stop to such ventures. Meanwhile, work on the official histories of the three individual services (though now under unified command) continued.

Cook presents insights into the naval historian, Dr Gilbert Norman Tucker, and his difficulties. Not only did the naval historian not have full access to Admiralty papers as they related to Canadian naval operations, he continually lost talents to academic life; besides, admirals did not seem as conscious of History as did generals. Further, Tucker had to deal with a good deal of political
interference from the Minister of National
Defence, Brooke Claxton. Tucker was
sloth-like and methodical, but he provided
a strange benefit. His laggardly
production left an official history of the
Canadian Navy for a later time, the first
fruits of which were born in 2003 as No
Higher Purpose: The Official Operational
History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the
Second World War, 1939-1943, volume 2,
part 1 by W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty
and Michael Whitby. Other volumes to
complete the set are promised.
Meanwhile, Tucker’s two-volume Naval
Service of Canada remains the standard
treatment for the early years of the Royal
Canadian Navy.

Stacey’s influence, meanwhile,
was long-standing in yet another sense:
his understanding of the techniques of
historical research and writing were based
on the necessity and advisability of hiring
talents well educated in academic history
and trained in historical methods. Despite
the tendency of Canadian universities not
to include military history in curricula, a
corps of military historians developed in
Canada’s universities at just the precise
time military history was, according to
received wisdom, about to expire. Many
universities have helped educate and train
the current crop of military historians, but
the credit goes not only to the universities
in question (Wilfrid Laurier, Calgary,
New Brunswick, Waterloo and Victoria
being among them) but to those people
who lit fires under their students. The
respective names of Terry Copp, Tim
Travers, Holger Herwig, Marc Milner,
Geoff Hayes and David Zimmerman are
familiar here, but there are many others. I
should like to think I played a personal
role in this, with courses on the history of
sea power and on maritime strategy.
These crusaders for military and naval
history are the true heroes of the
profession, and they helped inspire the
students of the current generation whose
grandfathers and grandmothers fought or
otherwise served in the Second World
War. The journal Canadian Military
History, edited by Mike Bechtold and
published by Wilfrid Laurier University’s
Military Strategic and Disarmament
Centre (Marc Kilgour, director), filled a
huge void and gave respectability to
academic publishing in the field of
military history from the essentially
Canadian perspective about the Canadian
military experience.

I have been asked to comment
about the book under review from a
professor’s standpoint, with particular
reference to its utility in the classroom.
Clio’s Warriors is the first full survey of
the subject it addresses, and makes for
good reading and discussion. But I could
have wished for better development of
themes and for clearer expression. As to
coverage, it is strongest on Army history;
weakest, on Navy. It seems uninspired in
its treatment of Air history. I see the book
as an introduction to the general topic
rather than as an encyclopedia about the
same. I am not so sure that Cook is right
in advancing the general argument that
official historians still provide the central
narrative of Canada’s world wars. I
would have thought it was the other way
round: it is the private scholars who have
advanced the agenda. The official history,
more often late than not, has the
advantage of taking, or gathering, private
scholarly work unto itself and using the
official records, including interviews and
memoirs, to advance the general line. The
formative writings on the history of the
famed corvette Sackville, or the legendary
destroyer Haida, did not come out of
Ottawa. The process is rather symbiotic.
It also explains the curious benefit that
more latently produced official history has
as to authenticity – and it is better to err on the side of caution, even if late in production.

This book, too, gives students of Canadian historiography much to consider, for it is not just for readers of military history. Because of its undoubted academic merit and its historiographical bent, *Clio’s Warrior* deserves a place in courses about the History of Canadian Historical Literature. Thus, it will be a matter of curiosity, even intrigue, to see if this book becomes suggested, even required, reading in Masters’ and Doctoral seminars in Canadian historiography. I would not hold my breath on that score, not because Cook’s book is not worthy of inclusion, but because of longstanding resistance to the inclusion of military topics in Canadian university curricula. The role of military forces in Canadian social history remains to be written, and who will write the true history of the WRCNS (the “Wrens”) before the last of them has gone to the naval Valhalla? Though I am dubious about its success in this sort of venture, there can be no doubt but that this work merits careful examination by all serious students of Canadian national history.

Barry Gough
Victoria, BC

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The book is excellent, both well-written and skillfully organized, on a chronological line. Maintaining chronological reliability is rendered extremely difficult by the fact that parallel timelines necessarily run simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific theatres as well as in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, simultaneous attacks may have occurred anywhere on a given date at a given time. The author has managed to overcome this impediment admirably. Each segment, chapter, and appendix is agreeably headed by the profile drawing of a ship. Appropriate photographic illustrations, interspersed throughout, represent most of the vessels whose final moments are described, as well as a far larger number of personal photographs of both victims and survivors than might have been expected. Looking through the text, one is also consistently amazed that the author acquired so much eloquent first-hand testimony about the sinkings, when the primary subjects of his study were, by definition, deceased.

The book begins with extensive acknowledgements, and an introduction explaining the seven services in which his subjects served. These were the Merchant Navy, WRNS, First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), Auxiliary Territorial Service, WAAF, Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service, and Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service. In this introductory section, one or two women who served Britain as agents in the Secret Service are also honoured. There is, perhaps, less detail on many individuals than one would have wished but, given the circumstances, and the considerable passage of time since the events chronicled, the research is amazingly inclusive.

Some chapters in the body of the book are general in content, while others
deal with just one specific incident, although the chapter titles do not always make clear which is which. The more comprehensive chapters are divided by the symbol *** between narratives of individual vessels. This conceit significantly reduces confusion. All sorts of wartime vessel losses are covered, from attacks by submarines, raiders, and aircraft, as well as mines, and one chapter deals solely with the loss of hospital vessels.

Extensive appendices, beyond the usual bibliography (which includes a significant number of unpublished sources), photographic credits, and index, include all available relevant details about the women and vessels lost, lists of honours and awards, a list of known memorials, lists of ships lost in three specific convoys, details of injuries of Khedive Ismail survivors, a list of naval hospital ships and carriers, and a general list of British merchant vessels lost 1939-45. Surprisingly, with all this well-organized secondary data, there is no glossary. In connection with lowering lifeboats, not only “falls,” but also “gripes,” “frapping lines,” and “hobblers” are mentioned, with no indication of what their differences or similarities may have been.

Printers’ errors, grammar and punctuation faux pas, inappropriate word choice, and awkward constructions occur with fair regularity but, while they definitely constitute a minor annoyance, do not significantly detract from the worth of the textual content. A notable exception to this occurs on page 81, where the third paragraph leaves one in total confusion as to the actual fate of Captain Christian. It is ironic, under these circumstances, that the author’s acknowledgements include one for “meticulous” copy editing.

Much of the content, which could have been sensationalized, is treated so skillfully that the tabloid feeling which so often attaches to survivor narratives in wartime and immediately post-war publications is, for the most part, avoided. Among notable inclusions are a passage on the superb seamanship that brought a vessel under the counter of a sinking ship to better advance rescue efforts (p. 43) and another on the then-common practice of actually removing recently-installed armaments from some vessels in order to supply others. (p. 53) There is even a bit of comic relief, as when a survivor opens a packet of biscuits from a lifeboat’s supply and finds a note reading: “If the contents of this package are not satisfactory please quote No. 293.” (p. 102)

Crabb’s interest in his subject was engendered by the research for his first published effort, a book about the loss of the SS Khedive Ismail, in which he had a personal family interest. Although Crabb’s father survived this sinking, the son, in chronicling it, realized that there were quite a few female casualties. That led him to further investigations, culminating in Beyond the Call of Duty. The research for the present book also gleaned some further data on the Khedive Ismail incident, and these are presented in the final chapter, called “A Passage to Destiny” after the previous work. Perhaps the most interesting new material is correspondence from a medical/scientific petty officer who spent time with the author’s father in a survivor leave establishment.

On the whole, I believe this book constitutes a significant contribution to the knowledge of any reader, whether it be specific useful data for serious academic research or merely a general understanding of the sorts of perilous
situations faced by both men and women at sea during the Second World War.

Morgiana P. Halley
Suffolk, Virginia


The establishment of any society on the fringes of civilization is usually fraught with dangers from within and without. The Pirates of Newfoundland is the story of such a society. It is the history of the island’s early years, of the laws it lived by and survived by, and of those who broke those laws and got away with it. It was an era of incredible hardship for the early settlers, lured to an inhospitable land by the greed of aristocratic entrepreneurs and adventurers – and often abandoned by the same people who promised them a richer life in the New World than the old. The book tells the story of both the settlers and the aristocrats and how, in many cases, they both turned to piracy through the necessity of survival.

The popular image of piracy is of swashbuckling robbers on the Caribbean’s Spanish Main, not the northwestern Atlantic Ocean around Canada’s Grand Banks and the island of Newfoundland. Here, author Crummey sets the stage for tales of pirates to rival any of the deeds by their southern Brethren of the Coast.

In four chapters, Pirates of Newfoundland, Buccaneers of Newfoundland, The Age of Piracy, 1689-1729 and The Golden Age of Piracy, 1713-1729, the author covers the early discovery of the island during the fifteenth century and the riches in fish and whale oil that could be found there. Once seasonal fishing settlements became permanent, the sea rovers from England, France, Spain and Portugal arrived, plundering the ships and settlements alike for rich pickings to be sold to any nation with the silver to pay for them. Crummey mentions Sir David Kirke, who brought his family to settle, and whose wife defended their home against buccaneers while he was away in England. Nor does he neglect adventurers like Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Henry Mainwaring and Peter Easton, who was later to be known as the “Pirate Admiral” with a fleet of ships at his command. He recounts attacks on the French capital of Newfoundland, Placentia, and Pierre Le Moyne Sieur D’Iberville’s raids on the English settlements along the coast. It is a history of greed, corruption and violence, of heroes, heroines, villains and most of all, of ordinary people with a will to do all that was necessary to survive.

The sources for Pirates of Newfoundland are quoted in the acknowledgments (p. 1) and include material from the British Colonial Office, The Piracy Act (1722), The Newfoundland Act (1699), and first-hand accounts of the settling of the island from Edward Hayes, Sir William Vaughan and Sir Richard Whitbourne, among others. The author, however, goes on to say that the “St. John’s Record Office burnt to the ground in 1745 and with it went all the government records. Most that remains is folklore, old receipts and a few scant letters from England’s Colonial Office.” (p. 8) He also cites the works of novelists Daniel Defoe and Robert Louis Stevenson, saying “If not for these dramatic accounts, many of the pirate tales
in this book would have been long forgotten.” (p. iii)

It is a pity that the author did not include a more complete bibliography and that he failed to include footnotes. This would have enabled the reader to separate fact from folklore. The author’s style is somewhat choppy and the history does not flow as well as it could if the events were laid out chronologically. There is a propensity for the storyline to repeat itself, as well as a tendency to blend the definition of pirates, privateers and buccaneers into one. There are ship-loads of drama, however, as Crummey describes eighteenth-century French corsairs boarding an English ship with “...blunderbuss’ slung across their backs and daggers clutched in their teeth”(p. 251); and the “mooning”, by Basque whalers, of English buccaneers. (p. 75)

And what would a book about pirates be without buried treasure? The book has many references to pirate loot in Newfoundland, including how “...beach combers were supposed to have found their treasure: two casks filled with Spanish doubloons which were neatly wrapped and tied with coloured ribbons.” (p. 117)

Crummey presents the Pirates of Newfoundland with enthusiasm and energy. The book is packed with swashbuckling deeds and characters. The author obviously has a passion for his subject and manages to bring his story alive, so much so that his grandmother, whose stories this book commemorates, would be proud.

Ross M.A. Wilson
Ottawa, Ontario


In October 1931, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s steamer Baychimo was imprisoned in the ice off Wainwright, Alaska. There was hope that it might be possible to sail it out in the spring but the Arctic had other plans for the ship. A storm in late November carried it away, and so it began its life as the legendary ghost ship of the Arctic. For at least four decades (the most recent sighting was in 1969), Baychimo wandered the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.

Writing a book about the Baychimo must be like writing a book about an individual best known for the manner of his death. How do you keep the interest of readers who think the good stuff all comes at the end? It is a challenge Anthony Dalton meets head on. His very first chapter begins with an eerie description of the abandoned Baychimo drifting in the ice. In the rest of the book he then tells what he rightly calls the “rich story” (p. 9) of the Baychimo, a story which led from its homeland of Sweden to an icy fate on the other side of the world.

Baychimo was a steel-hulled steamer built in Göteborg and christened Angermanälven after a river in northern Sweden. Launched in 1915, it was engaged in the Baltic trade for its German owners. At the end of the war, it was one of the German vessels confiscated in payment of war reparations. The vessel passed into British hands, and in 1921 was purchased by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), which had recently expanded its fur trade into the Arctic in pursuit of the newly fashionable Arctic fox. The HBC had sustained significant losses of ships and cargoes in the course of its shipping business as the chief purchasing and
shipping agent for the governments of France, Russia and other Allied nations. It was its wartime subsidiary, The Bay Steam Ship Company, which introduced the practice of the ‘Bay’ names.

The *Baychimo*’s career with the HBC lasted only from 1921 to 1931, but in this short space of time it saw a lot of the world, especially the Arctic world. In the first year, the vessel voyaged to posts in the Eastern Arctic and in the next two years to Siberia, where the HBC was attempting to enter the fur trade. From then on, its annual voyage was to posts in the Western Arctic. In 1924, *Baychimo* sailed from London to the Pacific by way of Suez rather than through the Panama Canal, thus sailing around the world in the course of its career.

From early 1923 until the end, the master was Captain Sydney Cornwell (1876-1950) from Maidstone in Kent. The two great constants in the life of Captain Cornwell and his ship were ice and the Hudson’s Bay Company. In the end, the ice was to prove the more powerful force. Having lost the *Baychimo* and the *Lady Kindersley*, whose wreck in 1924 is also described by Dalton, the HBC was to give up on the route around Alaska. The Western Arctic posts were instead supplied by sternwheelers sailing down the Mackenzie to Tuktoyaktuk, from where goods and passengers were transshipped by schooner.

Dalton makes excellent use of Cornwell’s detailed and vivid reports to the HBC in London, now in the HBC Archives in Winnipeg. What comes through is just how demanding these annual supply voyages were on both the ship and those who sailed in it. *Baychimo* fought against the ice and the ice battled back, popping rivets, buckling hull plates, tearing off propeller blades. Officers, crew and HBC employees had to contend not only with the ice but with inaccurate charts, the lack of adequate anchorages for such a large vessel and the constant anxiety that they might not escape the Arctic before season’s end.

In the final chapters, Dalton discusses the sightings and possible sightings of *Baychimo* after 1931, with clear explanations of the oceanic forces, such as the Beaufort Gyre, which would account for its wanderings. He thinks it likely that *Baychimo* has met a lonely end in recent decades, crushed at last by the ice.

Dalton and his publishers are to be congratulated on this well-researched, thoughtful and entertaining book, which is an example of what popular history should be. The book is attractively designed and easy on the eyes, with many photographs, helpful maps and a good index. The HBC’s marine activity was an essential part of its fur trade yet it has been comparatively neglected by historians. A book such as this adds considerably to our understanding of the fur trade and Arctic navigation in the twentieth century.

Anne Morton
Winnipeg, Manitoba


The late Edwin L. Dunbaugh’s *New England Steamship Company* is for ship lovers. It was not written for an academic audience. This volume is a detailed narrative account of Long Island night
boats in the twentieth century. The author spent most of his adult life as a professor of European and ancient history at Hofstra University on Long Island. But his true passion was the passenger ships of Long Island Sound. Long Island Sound steamboating came naturally to Dunbaugh. His grandfather had been the co-founder of one company serving the route between New York and southern New England, and the sole founder of a second. What he did not know about these vessels was hardly worth knowing, as the New England Steamship Company amply demonstrates. Readers looking for an academic economic history of the largest line, the New England Steamship Company, a subsidiary of the New Haven Railroad, should consult William Leonhard Taylor, A Productive Monopoly (Providence, RI, 1970).

Although the New England Steamship Company is the third in a trilogy on the Long Island Sound steamers that Dunbaugh either wrote or co-authored, it stands alone. Enough background is provided in Chapter One to enable the reader to understand the evolution of the service up to the end of the nineteenth century. The company’s vessels were employed between New York and points on the north shore of Long Island Sound. They provided overnight passenger and freight transport to such cities as New Haven and New London, Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; and Fall River, Massachusetts. From the last two cities, the company’s parent firm provided early-morning train service to Boston. It was not until the Cape Cod Canal was opened in 1916 that steamers from a competitor, the Eastern Steamship Company, regularly sailed direct to Boston.

The best chapter in Dunbaugh’s work is the second, where he describes in detail a trip aboard the Priscilla from New York to Fall River in 1900. The sidewheeler left the company’s pier on the North River early in the evening, arriving in Fall River in time to meet the train to Boston at 7:10 in the morning. The train itself reached Boston by 8:30. The return train left Boston at 6:00 pm to connect with the Priscilla, which then arrived back in New York at 7:00 the next morning. In glowing prose the author describes the trip from the time the horse-drawn cab deposits the mythical passenger on the pier to the breakfast he (certainly, before the 1920s, the large majority of the line’s clientele were male) eats before catching the boat train in Fall River. Every aspect of the vessel is described, from the ship’s elegant grand salon to her spartan cabins, and from the captain on the bridge to the stoker in hold. The reader can almost feel the power of the Priscilla’s engines and smell the cigars in the grand salon. The only question unanswered is why was the Priscilla, launched in 1893, and most of her fleet mates, still driven by paddlewheels long after the propeller had shown its efficiency.

The post-war world of prohibition, the automobile, and the flapper saw the New England Steamship Company faced with challenges that it, as the subsidiary of a railway, found hard to meet. Passenger traffic peaked on the New York-Fall River route in 1920 at 398,000, while freight tonnage fell after 1916. No more new vessels were added after the Commonwealth of 1908. The company’s vessels were stately Victorian ladies that could not match the amenities offered by the ships of its most serious competitor, the Eastern Steamship Company. The latter firm added new vessels in 1924. The Boston and the New York were more like miniature ocean liners than night boats that operated a
direct service from New York to Boston via the Cape Cod Canal. The thoroughly modern pair boasted such facilities as hot and cold running water in staterooms: some even had showers. Gone were the elegant grand salons, replaced by airy lounges and dance floors with their own bands, but neither carried a bar because during prohibition American-registered vessels were dry. Scheduling was also more convenient as the direct route did away with the need for early morning transfers to the Fall River boat-train. The New England Steamship Company also faced competition from steamers at the other end of the price spectrum. Frank Dunbaugh’s Colonial Line operated older, second-class vessels on the New York-Providence route at lower cost than the New England company’s Fall River steamers. While Colonial’s vessels could not be described as elegant, they were cheaper to operate than those of its older competitor.

Pinched from both sides, the New England Steamship Company could not survive the Great Depression. One by one, its routes were dropped and vessels were laid up and sold off. Finally, in July 1937, the Priscilla was struck by stokers tired of double shifts and poverty-level wages. The railway’s response was to terminate its marine activities. The Priscilla and the Commonwealth went to the breakers and the steamship company was no more. The author blames not only the Great Depression for the firm’s collapse, but more fundamentally a management that was out of touch with both with the shipping business and the changing times.

The single difficulty presented to Dunbaugh’s intended reader is the lack of detailed maps. Only one is included in the volume and it is insufficient when the author is describing accidents. Locals may know where Mamaroneck or Execution Light are but others readers need a large map. The New England Steamship Company was not written for an academic audience but rather, for the general reader. When taken on its own terms as narrative history, the volume is a success.

M. Stephen Salmon
Orleáns, Ontario


Autobiographies form a class on their own, good ones in particular. Some have been written for the authors themselves and their offspring, and are not meant for publication. Others have a purpose and are a sort of defence or clarification of the words and actions of the person involved. Those authors want their texts published. In most cases, the first category is more interesting. The reader often comes across unintentional details and strictly private information. Jens Jacob Eschels’ autobiography belongs to both categories. It was first published when he was still alive in 1835, seven years before he died. Although he wrote his story for his children and grandchildren, they considered it too instructive to keep it only for themselves. A full reprint appeared in 1995 and apparently sold out. In 2006, a second edition of the reprint came from another Hamburg press, this time the Convent Verlag, instead of the previous
Kabel Verlag, thanks to the great interest nowadays in the history of whaling and the mercantile marine. Albrecht Sauer, a staff member at the German Maritime Museum in Bremerhaven, has carefully edited the text and added a short evaluation of Eschels’ career plus a survey of all his voyages between 1769 and 1797.

Eschels was born in 1757 on the North Frisian island of Föhr. He died in Altona, near Hamburg, in 1842. His autobiography is good reading, written in a compelling style, lively and full of noteworthy details. The male population of Föhr had to go to sea, as the small island did not offer sufficient sustenance. Early in the year, hundreds of men used to sail to Holland, to Amsterdam in particular, in search of employment, a so-called “hire”. Those Föhringer were badly needed by the Dutch whaling fleet, particularly those who were whaling captains. Escorted by an uncle, the barely eleven-year-old Eschels travelled to Amsterdam and was enlisted as a junior cabin boy. At the end of the whaling season, he returned home to his mother. His father was at sea as well, and later died in a hospital at Batavia. Eschels made no less than seven consecutive whaling voyages. In 1776 and 1777 he joined the Danish whaling fleet in Copenhagen, which offered better financial facilities. The next year he switched over to the mercantile marine, not returning to Föhr for more than ten years. He first boarded in Amsterdam, and later in Hamburg and Altona. His trips took him to the West Indies, Charleston, Archangel, Cadiz, the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In 1782, he was promoted to captain at the age of twenty-four, when his captain died in the Caribbean. Eschels stopped sailing in 1797 and settled in Altona. He became a shopkeeper (together with his wife), a tobacco manufacturer and an expert on shipping affairs. His memoirs are the oldest surviving German captain’s autobiography.

Eschels’ Lebensbeschreibung derives its unique value from the profound insight it offers into the practice of whaling and mercantile seafaring at the end of the eighteenth century. Moreover, it is very human. A few examples may suffice: the value of charter parties, the calculation of the loading capacity of a vessel, how to operate as a captain in freighting one’s vessel on a booming West Indian island like St. Thomas; how to deal with the ubiquitous privateers, how to handle debts, freemasonry among captains, the rules of Mackerschaft in whaling, the presence of dogs on board, and the scarcity of food during the winter on Föhr. It is striking how many direct and indirect relatives found a living at sea, helping and meeting each other in the most distant ports. Though sometimes repetitious, Eschels tries to instruct his offspring to learn whenever possible, and to be honest and brave. He was a devout Lutheran who, at first, truly believed that Roman Catholics could only have sad lives because hell was waiting for them. Later, he overcame his superstitions and even dared to go to a comedy, which turned out to be not as sinful as he had been told. His career was not unique, for several of his contemporaries on Föhr followed more or less the same path. But they did not write such nice memoirs.

Jaap R. Bruijn
Leiden, The Netherlands

No other vessel in Canadian history has achieved the same level of popular appeal as the great racing schooner, Bluenose. Built at the Smith and Rhuland shipyards in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, the ship was constructed as much to salvage national pride as to be a part of the fleet of vessels that plied their trade on the Grand Banks. Designed by the virtually unheralded William Roue, she became an icon for all that was great about Canada during a twenty-year career. Immortalized on the dime, and as popular as ever, the ship’s history is detailed in this new book by Heather-Anne Getson.

Bluenose was built during an age of highly competitive racing at sea. Many different types of vessels were involved in ocean racing during this era, from the yachts of the rich and famous to the hardworking fishing vessels of the North Atlantic. The America’s Cup, The Lipton Cup, The Brittain Trophy and the International Fishermen’s Series were all hotly contested. The Canadian government, none too pleased with recent results by Canadian entrants, was particularly interested in a new schooner being built in Lunenburg. Traditionally, fishing vessels built in Lunenburg emphasized cargo and hold space, allowing for a greater catch but reducing the overall speed of the vessel. The new Lunenburg schooner promised to be both a superb fishing vessel and an ocean racer as well. She was launched on 26 March 1921, and for the next twenty years would leave a lasting imprint on the history of the North Atlantic fisheries.

Heather-Anne Getson, an historian with the Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic, places the emphasis of her new book on the great schooner’s racing career. Competing against some of the finest vessels of any era, Bluenose amassed an impressive record of victories against only a few defeats. The secret of its success, Getson points out, came from both the design and the crew. Chief among these was the cagey and canny Angus Walters, the captain during the ship’s racing career. He handpicked his crew for the fishing season and expected and achieved the best. Getson chronicles some the best known tales surrounding the great ship, from a calamitous near miss on its first voyage to many of the high points during a long racing career. Throughout the book, she makes wonderful use of the awe-inspiring photos of the ship in its prime, taken by the great marine photographer, W.R. McAskill. The images add a great deal to the narrative flow of the book and, in some cases, Getson lets the pictures speak for themselves.

The finest images are taken during the races, whether in qualifying or in actual competition. One gets an immediate feeling for the sense of struggle and power taking place as the ships strain against the winds and each other.

The final chapters of the book detail the end of the ship’s career. With the decline in the fisheries in the late 1930s, interest in the races also fell away. In 1937, Bluenose was honoured by being engraved on the dime, where it remains today. The 1938 race series was contested between Bluenose and the ship’s archrival, the Gloucester-built Gertrude L. Thebaud. It was the end of an era for the great Grand Banks schooners, culminating in victory for Bluenose. Saved from a sheriff’s auction in 1939, the ship was
purchased by Captain Walters in 1940, and then bought by American businessmen for $20,000 in 1942. In January of 1946, *Bluenose* was lost on a reef near Haiti and a nation mourned. Getson concludes her book with the construction of *Bluenose II*, a fairly faithful reconstruction of the original and Canada’s sailing ambassador.

Getson’s book is the perfect marriage of text and imagery and will evoke memories for those lucky enough to have seen the ship in its prime. Nimbus Publishing has adopted a larger, soft-covered format, allowing for larger images, often tinted either sepia or blue. The images and text help to capture an era of great ships and great captains and make for a wonderful reading experience.

Richard MacMichael
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Early modern naval and maritime history suffers from the paucity of comprehensive books; most extant works deal with one aspect of maritime history, and are usually confined to one nation or a specific conflict. Because of this, it is difficult to form more than a fragmented view of the period. Editor Jan Glete has chosen 24 essays, penned by various historians over the last half-century, for his anthology: “The essays in this collection have been selected with the intention to show new perspectives and promising departures for historical studies of navies, warfare at sea and important contexts of naval history.” (p. xiv)

This volume is one in a series of anthologies about warfare at sea and on land. Although the title proclaims the book is about naval history during the period 1500 to 1680, the essays veer outside those boundaries. In addition to old and new research about early modern navies, some of the authors also deal with trade, privateering and the fishing industry. This information serves to enhance our view of maritime matters for the era and places the navy in a larger context.

The first section focuses on technology and features articles by John Guilmartin, Richard Barker, Geoffrey Parker and Andrew Thrush. Collectively, they ask us to re-evaluate the nature of early modern ships and ordnance. The “policy and administration” section is handled by Andrew Hess, Ruggiero Romano, Tom Glasgow, I.A.A. Thompson, David Goodman, and James Wheeler. Section II demonstrates that national crises can have fruitful, as well as disastrous, consequences for their respective navies. N.A.M. Rodger, C.R. Boxer, M.A.J. Palmer and R.E.J. Weber focus on battle tactics. This section adds much to the debate about the early modern “military revolution” as it pertains to maritime warfare. The section on “strategy and operations” features Palmira Brummett, James Tracy, Elizabeth Bonner, R.C. Anderson, and Glenn Ames. By examining specific operations, they seek to illuminate the nature of early modern naval capabilities. The final section on trade warfare and privateering is handled by R. Baetens, R.A. Stradling, John Appleby and Nuala Zahedieh. While it is debatable how effective privateering was against enemy ships and trade, it was extremely popular and sometimes
The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

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The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

lucrative for those who were at the top of the privateering hierarchy. While privateering was sanctioned by the state, it rarely saw its fair share of plunder. The chapters examine English, Flemish, and Jamaican examples as well as the Spanish Dunkirkers.

All these areas are vital to our understanding but one should question the total absence of chapters on the social history of early modern seamen. Glete has completely ignored some of the groundbreaking work done in this area.

It is commendable that some of the essays focus on non-European maritime matters. Palmira Brummett’s “The Overrated Adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman Naval Power”, Glenn Ames’ “The Straits of Hormuz Fleets: Omani-Portuguese Naval Rivalry and Encounters, c. 1660-1680” and especially Andrew Hess’ “The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525,” broaden our perspective considerably. They offer important insights and points of comparison which are not available in more Euro-centric offerings.

Not only are we given a wide range of topics within the volume, the various historians also demonstrate different methodologies. Historians of the early modern period are often limited by their sources: statistics are not as readily available as they are for later periods. Nonetheless, these historians have tried to weave together a tapestry of quantitative work when possible, in conjunction with more anecdotal approaches.

Glete has gathered diverse articles which he considers landmarks in the field of naval history between 1500 and 1680. For those of us who do research in the area, a number of them will be familiar. Although some have been in print for a long time, Glete claims they still have much to offer us. This is no doubt true. There are, however, articles which are very specific in nature and, despite Glete’s explanation in the preface, the reader could well question their inclusion. One suspects that if we were editors of similar projects, we would select at least some different articles from the plethora that have been published over the years. Hopefully, there will be similar volumes in the future which draw attention to other seminal articles.

Overall, we must applaud Glete’s volume for demonstrating some of the important work that has been done over the past half century. Without a doubt, such essays deserve to be republished (in many cases, at least) and contained within one volume. Together, they form a complex portrait of the early modern maritime world, but they also show us that much remains to be done.

Cheryl Fury
Saint John, New Brunswick


The international dimensions of the American Civil War are inextricably intertwined with Scotland’s Clyde River. One-third of the vessels running the blockade into the Confederacy were Clyde-built, and Clydeside entrepreneurs made fortunes building ships and transporting goods to Southern ports. It is this business that Eric Graham’s new book explores.
Graham has uncovered some interesting new material, “gleaned,” as he describes it, “from local Clydeside customs accounts, newspapers, and business records.” (p. 5) Most interesting are 1,000 letters discovered in 1986, the correspondence of Thomas Stirling Begbie, whose two companies – Albion Trading Company and Universal Trading Company – received orders for many ships destined to be blockade runners and an armored ram that was twice the size of the Laird rams. Graham includes a selected bibliography but no footnotes or citations, which he justifies by saying that his target reader might “find footnotes a distraction from the narrative.” (p. 221)

Graham’s book makes its greatest contribution where it examines the Scottish side of the story. The close examination of the operations of Glaswegian entrepreneurs demonstrates a high level of Scottish involvement in the Confederacy’s struggle for independence and reveals just how apolitical those entrepreneurs really were. Their involvement had to do with profit, not support for the Confederacy’s political goals or slave-holding racial ideology.

The book’s other significant contribution is its detailed examination of the Clydebuilt ships that were so central to the story, including a list of all the vessels, by builder, with basic technical information and ship histories. The narrative focuses on a number of representative vessels “whose careers illuminate different facets of this ‘peculiar business.’” (p. 47) The Giraffe, the most famous of the “channel-class” steamers “was considered,” according to Graham, “the ultimate compromise between the ‘sea boat’ and the racer.” (p. 48) The Ruby, a “river-class” steamer, was a typical “river paddle steamer,” lightweight and fast, with a long hull, narrow beam, and shallow draft. The Thistle, a composite (wood on iron frame) channel-class screw steamer, illustrates the situation after late 1862, as Union commanders increasingly began to stop and search vessels in international waters.

Clyde Built also provides illuminating details about the business side of blockade running – at least from the European end – and the business of constructing, operating, chartering, or selling the ships that were the Confederacy’s lifeline. Graham is particularly solid in his discussion of technological issues: ship designs, construction materials, boilers, and engines, for example. His narrative highlights how the demands of the trade pushed technological innovation forward – especially innovations in high-pressure steam technology (significantly improving fuel efficiency). Ultimately, the two key technical considerations for these vessels were speed and draught. As the blockade tightened, the specially designed (and fast) Clydebuilt runners became increasingly important.

Graham, however, is less sure-footed in his understanding of American Civil War diplomacy or mid-century American naval history. He gets some basic terms or facts wrong, such as the titles of some key figures in the Union government, the name and title of the British minister to Washington, and the name of Lincoln’s proclamation ending slavery in the seceded states (Emancipation Proclamation). His understanding of details of American foreign policy-making can be problematic at times: the Lincoln-Seward relationship (close, between two men who respected each other), Lincoln’s role in making policy (very engaged), the standard executive branch practice of sharing documents with Congress, and the
Department of State’s program of publishing volumes of diplomatic correspondence. He accounts for a post-war improvement in Anglo-American relations by pointing to British awareness of supposed American naval superiority. It is true that European naval powers were fascinated and impressed by the innovations in naval technology during the Civil War – especially the ironclad. Nevertheless, the post-war American navy quickly sank into technological backwardness and cannot be considered a significant factor in the “great rapprochement” between America and Britain that actually did not occur until far later in the century.

Graham is apparently fascinated with Jules Verne’s 1876 novel *The Blockade Runner*, beginning with a paraphrase of parts of Verne’s story, and returning to it later. An appendix offers a one-page summary of Verne’s visit to Glasgow. Although Graham admits “The details of his storyline are…a mixture of fact and fiction” (p. 173), he fails to explore what is fact and what is fiction. Rather, he declares that Verne merged fact and fiction “probably…to avoid a libel suit” (p. 173) but offers no evidences for this conclusion.

Graham’s book has seven appendices, some useful, others less so. The list of vessels by builder is particularly valuable, as is an appendix discussing various technical notes and ship measurements. Another appendix includes a “Sample Blockade Cargo Sale Notice,” instructive because most of the cargo is not war materiel. On the other hand, the appendix on the “Black American Community of Glasgow” is misleading. It is not really a profile of the black American community of Glasgow, but rather profiles of several black Americans in Glasgow, particularly Frederick Douglass. Similarly, another appendix reproduces a letter from a blockade-running captain to Thomas S. Begbie, but provides no explanation why Graham has chosen to include the full text of this particular letter. Appendix 7 provides what Graham calls “A Guide to Sources,” but they are all Internet sources.

Despite its shortcomings, *Clyde Built* offers an important look at a critical chapter in the maritime history of the American Civil War. The sections of the narrative that derive from his Scottish sources make a useful contribution to our understanding.

Kenneth J. Blume
Albany, New York


This important collection of essays builds upon the work of Bryan Raft’s book, *Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860-1939*, which was published in 1977. That being said, it goes beyond a narrow examination of technology to explore the issue of innovation, more broadly defined, in the Royal Navy through the period. As Harding notes in the preface, “Over the last twenty-five years the question of change has remained a constant feature of naval warfare and a matter of discussion for historians and analysts. Furthermore, the concept of innovation has become a major subject of investigation by scholars in other disciplines.” (p. xv) Indeed, few concepts are as important to naval history as innovation. How navies adapt to
innovation often determines victory or defeat.

Traditional scholarship explores this issue primarily from a technological viewpoint and has focused, more often than not, on the role played by individuals. More recently, however, academics have employed an inter-disciplinary approach borrowing from a number of disciplines, including systems analysis, organization development, and economics to name a few. Regardless of the chosen methodology, an understanding of the inter-relationship of the various factors which facilitate innovation is the key to understanding change. Nevertheless, the question remains: is innovation an evolutionary or revolutionary process? Most would agree that innovation can be both evolutionary and revolutionary. Harding suggests that “its nature will depend on the relationship innovation has to fundamental science. Revolutionary innovation is likely to be far more successful if it emerges from fundamental science. Where innovation is taking place in response to change in the environment, evolutionary innovation is more likely to succeed.” (p. 8) Even this straightforward definition belies the complexity of the process however. While science is an essential component, it does not occur in a vacuum. In fact, all innovation – technological, structural or operational – takes place within a social context.

This collection of essays does not furnish an overarching theory of innovation. Rather, it delineates a variety of contexts – including institutional politics, the national economy and the impact of war – that influenced the process of innovation in the Royal Navy from the 1930s to the present day. The authors present case studies of individual weapon- or ship-types through particular technologies, such as welding and electronics, to mission capabilities, such as amphibious operations, naval aviation, and anti-submarine warfare, both during and following the Second World War. As Harding observes, “they demonstrate just how difficult it is to pin down the essential or consistent characteristics of innovation over the period of about seventy years” (p. 11). Nevertheless, they do add to our knowledge about innovation in a complex and multi-layered organization.

Philip Pugh shows that while the Royal Navy responded in the early 1930s to the emerging aerial threat and was, in fact, quite innovative in terms of its scientific analysis, the Navy failed to apply that research appropriately and improve the anti-aircraft capabilities of its surface fleet to meet a specific threat, namely dive-bombers. The methodology employed by the Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Committee of 1931 was, according to Pugh, one of the first examples of modern operational research which employed hierarchal mathematical modeling to an entire system; namely, the anti-aircraft system. The problem, according to Pugh, was that the RN focused almost exclusively on the threat posed by bombers and torpedo-bombers and failed to consider that aircraft specifically designed to carry out a dive-bombing role were just over the horizon in terms of their development. The RN’s solution was myopic since it failed to account for evolutionary and incremental changes taking place in the aviation field. Consequently, “Having dismissed the possibility of dive-bombing, there was no advantage to be seen to compensate for even a modest loss of effectiveness in traditional (anti-surface) destroyer roles.” (p. 37) The RN paid dearly for this mistake during the war.

Unlike the experience of shipboard anti-aircraft defence during the
1930s, the RN fared far better in relation to anti-submarine warfare during the Second World War. As both W.J.R. Gardner and Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones demonstrate in their respective chapters, the Royal Navy successfully adapted ASW equipment for war fighting by linking its operational experiences at sea to ongoing Operational Research (OR). In the case of wartime and post-war ASW, the tools were embedded in the organizational procedures which allowed for the effective flow of information in order to innovate. Gardner argues that, from an organizational and collaborative perspective, the British and Americans were better placed to win the Battle of the Atlantic than was Germany. He cites the key role played by the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee which “brought together representatives of government (both political and officials), the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force together with scientists and delegates from the United States” to prosecute the war (p. 130). As he observes, however, “all of this resourcefulness” would have meant little without the ships, weapons systems and aircraft operated by the men and women of the respective militaries engaged in that campaign. Jones focuses on the challenges presented by the fast submarine in the first decade after the war. As he notes, the RN, through its operational commands, training and research establishments, adapted its tactics and improved upon existing A/S gear to counter the fast submarine. Financial constraints also served to focus the efforts of the RN during this period. The creation of “a high-level, inter-departmental committee ... kept anti-submarine warfare at the forefront of British military priorities” (p. 161). Innovation in this case was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

As the authors of this collection clearly demonstrate, the ability to recognize a changing environment – be it technological, structural or operational – and integrate its essential elements into organizational activities and purpose is at the core of the Royal Navy’s success. This is not to suggest, however, that the RN succeeded in all cases. As Eric Grove and Norman Friedman, among others, have shown, innovation within the Royal Navy was often retarded by the failure of inter-organizational collaboration, inter-service rivalries, doctrine, limited budgets, and alliance considerations.

This book is an important contribution to the scholarship and provides a wonderful overview of some of the problems and issues faced by the Royal Navy since the 1930s. It will be a welcome addition to this reviewer’s collection and is highly recommended to anyone interested in naval history. Finally, this volume is an excellent complement to Bryan Ranft’s book.

Shawn Cafferky
Victoria, British Columbia


In the fall of 1805, Admiral Horatio Nelson was required to choose a list of captains to accompany him against the Franco-Spanish fleet. T.A. Heathcote suggests the celebratory publications that accompany the 200th anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar (21 October 1805) have
lavished attention on Nelson himself at the expense of the captains who made up his fleet. *Nelson’s Trafalgar Captains & Their Battles* employs operational biographies of the thirty captains, three lieutenants and two admirals who served under Nelson to view the battle from an alternative perspective. Heathcote argues that the Trafalgar captains represent a cross-section of Royal Navy officers. Their careers typify the youthful age at which most officers went to sea, and the time spent as lieutenants and frigate captains from the American Revolution through to the War of 1812. When the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Barham, discussed commanding officers for the upcoming Trafalgar campaign with Nelson, it was agreed there was little point in switching any captains as the uniformity permeating the navy assured equality of competence. Nelson utilized two vacant commands to ensure posting for a cousin and his friend, Sir Edward Berry, but left all commanders in their positions when assembling the fleet.

The biographic entries of *Nelson’s Trafalgar Captains* are designed to be read individually and are supplemented by a section containing synopses of every engagement containing two or more sea officers who would serve at Trafalgar. The biographical and battle entries are then cross-referenced. Twenty-eight actions are outlined, beginning with Grenada in 1779 and ending with Tarragona in 1811. This layout is intended to reduce repetition, but as each essay is meant to stand alone, a certain amount of overlap nevertheless creeps in. Although the book claims utility for both academic and general readers, the format is geared towards the latter. The employment of a number of modern terms, such as “major (and minor) surface combatants” suggests such an orientation.

Although it is evident Heathcote has made use of primary source materials in the form of letters and log books, these are not referenced or differentiated from the information gleaned from secondary sources. By comparison, 21 of the 35 of Heathcote’s Trafalgar officers have individual entries in the new *Dictionary of National Biography* (online version, 2004) while three more are found within those of relatives. The *DNB*’s shorter, but often more analytical, articles are of greater utility to scholars since they clearly identify the relevant primary and secondary sources. In addition, the *DNB* provides a companion analytical piece by Michael Duffy outlining Trafalgar’s importance to British culture and society.

As a reference for general audiences, Heathcote has more to offer. Although the desire to report ship movements and acknowledge awards interrupts the narrative flow, some truly interesting anecdotes emerge. While at Trafalgar, for example, Captain Henry Digby of the *Africa* sent his nameless first lieutenant across to the dismasted and quieted *Santisima Trinidad* in the interest of taking it as a prize. The lieutenant managed to reach the quarterdeck only to discover that the crew had not surrendered but was awaiting ammunition from the magazine. The Spanish understood the mistake and politely allowed the boat crew to return to *Africa* unharmed (p. 53). Unfortunately, many of Heathcote’s anecdotes are employed to supplement the limited source material for some captains. For example, the entry for John Cooke, who was killed during the battle, overwhelmingly reflects the viewpoint of his first lieutenant, William Cumby, whose own account appears to be a primary source for the entry. Indeed, in an effort to flesh-out Cooke’s entry, Heathcote provides as much information
about Cumby as he does for Cooke (pp. 49-51). The entry for Robert Moorsom recalls the instructions to the men of the Revenge that the signal to open fire at Trafalgar would be one round from a designated carronade. The carronade, familiar to most readers of Anglo-American naval history, is then defined as “a heavy, close-action gun” (p. 125). In contrast, the entry for James Morris makes reference to an attack on a “polacca” while Morris was captain of the Phaeton (p. 128). This reviewer was on his third dictionary when he discovered that a “polacca” was a three-masted Mediterranean vessel. While the difficulty might stem partly from this reviewer’s Anglo-centrism, the inclusion of such unexplained details reflects Heathcote’s attempts to achieve a balance in the size of the entries. As a result, every possible fact is employed to fill out the biographies of some lesser-known captains while useful explanatory passages are omitted from some of the longer entries. This leads to a crowded and disjointed text.

These comments aside, the biographies do facilitate the reader’s ability to follow the careers of the captains, most of whom already had lengthy résumés by the time they reached Trafalgar, and many of whom had crossed paths on a number of occasions. It reinforces the truism that the captain who commanded a battleship spent decades training in smaller vessels scattered throughout the globe. There is a certain attractiveness to a quick reference for discovering who was where and doing what at Trafalgar, although perhaps tighter editing and placement of references would make the volume even more useful. In the end, this work did inspire questions and ideas for further research, and Heathcote’s point that larger-than-life characters may overshadow objective analysis of broader events should always be taken seriously.

William R. Miles
Halifax, Nova Scotia


In the popular imagination, pride of place as the noteworthy flying boats used during the Second World War goes to the Consolidated PBY Catalina/Canso family of twin-engine aircraft and the larger four-engine Short Sunderland. Both types have received extensive published coverage. Other types have fared less well, though in the case of the PBM Mariner, this omission has been largely rectified with the publication of The Fighting Flying Boat by Richard Hoffman. This nicely produced book provides a clear explanation of the genesis of the type and its subsequent use by American and other Allied forces in both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres and Korea, as well as its use by other military and civilian operators until as late as 1964, almost twenty-five years after the prototype’s first flight in 1939.

The Glenn L. Martin Company was well known as a producer of large and successful flying boat designs by the time the United States Navy called for proposals for a new four-engine flying boat patrol aircraft in 1935. This competition did not produce a winner for series production, but it ultimately led to the development of a smaller, cheaper twin-engine type with greater payload and
speed advantages over the standard PBY type then in use. The Martin Mariner was placed into production and by late 1940 the first PBM-1 variants were entering service. Many were employed over the North Atlantic for Neutrality Patrols throughout 1941. Between February 1939, when the first prototype was built, and March 1949, when the last machine was completed, 1,367 PBM aircraft were produced in four main variants. Two sub-types were contemplated but did not proceed. Hoffman succinctly summarizes the development history of the flying boat as a backdrop to the more extensive coverage of the operational use of the PBM family which constitutes the main purpose of the book.

Though initially operated from Newfoundland and Iceland, the bulk of the Mariner’s Atlantic activities took place from Bermuda southwards to Rio de Janeiro. These planes were responsible for the destruction of ten U-Boats and the rescuing of several hundred airmen and sailors. Three aircraft were shot down by submarines and eight damaged. Sixteen were lost in operational accidents including many due to engine failures.

Far more intensive use was made of the aircraft in the Pacific, both by the USN and the U.S. Coast Guard. The first series of Mariners were adapted from their patrol bomber configuration to serve as long-range transports in the absence of many other alternatives. Subsequently, most of the aircraft served in patrol squadrons with a few used for rescue operations during the last two years of the war.

The Mariner fleet was run down rapidly following the end of hostilities in the Pacific, but as the most advanced flying boat available, it served in a number of capacities in the period between VJ-Day and the Korean War. It provided SAR duties for the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, monitored Chinese operations in the Yellow Sea after the end of the civil war and supported USN forays into the high Arctic and Antarctica.

Many Mariners stored after completion were made operational upon the outbreak of conflict in Korea and served continuously in that theater until the armistice. Several Mariner crews successfully evaded attacks by Chinese and North Korean MiG-15 fighters though others were lost as a result of equipment failures and weather conditions. The Mariner did not last much beyond the end of the Korean War in first-line service, though it lingered on in support duties for several more years.

Complete though the treatment of the Mariner in US service is, the more interesting sections of the book deal with the little-known use of the Mariner by other services and by several civilian operators. There is a full treatment of use of the Mariner by the Royal Air Force which lasted only a short time, and by the Royal Australian Air Force which made extensive use of the type in the south-west Pacific. Postwar, the navies of both Argentina and Uruguay used the aircraft, the latter service being the final operator in the world. The Dutch also employed Mariners extensively as a useful platform for the protection of their interests in Netherlands New Guinea prior to its hand-over to Indonesia. The Dutch experience was not a happy one, however; they suffered a high proportion of losses from pilot error and mechanical failures.

Finally, the book deals with the obscure story of Mariners for civilian use. Seven went to Columbia in the late 1940s to provide freight services to towns in the interior where there was water communications but no airports. The service did not last long owing to the costs
of maintaining the necessary infrastructure. Closer to home, the unusually named “Flying Lobster of Air Lanes Inc.” operated a service from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Lewisporte, Newfoundland, to supply fresh lobsters to restaurants in New York. This lasted about three years until the aircraft were sold in 1952, one ultimately going to Argentina. The last use of note was a short-lived venture to provide flying boat services from mainland Portugal to Madeira pending the development of landing facilities. This initiative ended in tragedy when the initial flight was lost without trace and the scheme was abandoned.

As a supplement to the main Mariner operations, Hoffman adds interesting sections on the USN seaplane tenders, which supported the use of the Mariner throughout its service life, as well as information on experimental uses made of individual aircraft including hydrofoils, spar buoy development for ASW work, and hull development for the successor Martin Marlin and Martin Sea Master flying boats. We are also provided with a full account of the crash landing and recovery of a Mariner from the Arizona desert in 1944, and the unsuccessful attempt to raise one from the bottom of Lake Washington in Seattle. Only one example remains. Owned by the National Air and Space Museum, it is on loan to the Pima Air and Space Museum in Tucson, Arizona.

Overall, this is a highly informative and readable account written by someone who flew the Mariner towards the end of its service life. The service history of the Mariner is dealt with in a sensible fashion with a nice mixture of personal accounts and official records. Details not hitherto available are provided, such as the civil use of the Mariner, and finally, an extensive table of all 108 losses and personnel casualties sustained is included as an appendix.

There are one or two quibbles. A two-column newspaper format has been adopted which some may find distracting. The use of several conventions for describing numerical values such as “nineteen hundred” instead of “1,900” to describe horse power ratings for engines do not belong in a serious work like this. A few copy-editing errors were not picked up but they do not detract from the overall result. Perhaps more regrettable, is the lack of maps showing the operational areas for the Mariner.

The book’s production values otherwise are excellent, photographs are well produced and incorporated into the text and an extensive bibliography is included. For anyone interested in one of the less well known, though significant, flying boats, this book is well worth its reasonable price.

Christopher Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


On 26 October 2006, in the open ocean waters south of Okinawa, a Chinese Song-class diesel-electric submarine surfaced approximately five nautical miles from the American carrier USS Kitty Hawk. According to open press sources, the submarine had not been detected until it surfaced. What message was Beijing sending? And why? As one of several
case studies and policy-relevant analyses devoted to an Asian Security Studies series edited by Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University and Andrew Scobell of the US Army War College, this recently published strategic analysis work focuses on China’s naval force structure, in particular its submarine forces. While the author does not address the Kitty Hawk incident, he most ably explores and examines difficult and challenging questions such as: What does China intend to do with its growing capability in submarine forces? And, how might the strategic stability in the Asian theatre change in the coming years?

Dr Peter Howarth, an Australian diplomat with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and recently, a senior strategic analyst with Australia’s foreign intelligence assessment agency, provides us with a fascinating and insightful look into the culture and growth of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. He explores the development of both the PLA Navy’s modern leadership as well as its doctrinal development; he shows how centuries of continental experiences and customs have shaped the modern Chinese strategy and force development, in particular its maritime forces; and, he summaries his analysis and observations with a concise set of concluding statements, providing “food for thought” for future strategists and analysts.

In developing the foundation for his analytical work, Howarth manages to quickly strike a balance between “… the main pillars of maritime strategic theory…” (p. 7) as viewed through western experiences and the need to apply these concepts and analytical models to Asia with due regard and respect for cultural differences. The study is divided into two parts; the first section uses the rational-actor model form of analysis to explain the strategic choice of the PRC to develop a submarine capability, while the second section uses a different model, the organizational behaviour model of analysis. Here Howarth highlights the “…more subjective dimensions of the Chinese predisposition to a naval force structure geared towards undersea warfare.” (p. 12) Throughout both sections, he successfully reminds the reader of the need to examine Asian security issues through a non-western lens, a reminder that serves his developmental analysis well, while simultaneously allowing the reader to consider strategic issues from a less-biased perspective than might otherwise be the case.

The book is not written solely for the strategic expert: it is a solid piece of work for anyone interested in developing a better understanding of East Asian strategic development. Throughout the text, Howarth effortlessly weaves in opinions and perspectives from a wide variety of authors and strategic thinkers (a few examples being Castex, Brodie, Gray, Hezlet, Blair, Doenitz, Chong-Pin, Chow-Hu and Vego). His work is replete with cited texts of these and others, and the extensive reference section at the back of the book will provide students of strategy with a good addendum to their personal collections.

What this reviewer found missing from an otherwise outstanding piece of work was a complete lack of maps or illustrations. While the East Asia theatre and the strategic implications of geography are well known to experts, a few simple maps would have added immense value to the interested amateur reader. This is particularly true when attempting to understand the PLA Navy’s geographical issues and why oceanography and geography are playing
a role in the ongoing development of China’s submarine forces.

Did the event of 26 October 2006, occur as part of China’s evolving strategic growth in the Indo-Pacific ocean regions or was it just a case of “ships passing in the night?” Does Beijing see itself as a regional maritime power? Is the PLA Navy positioned to take on the USN in the contested waters surrounding Taiwan? These, and many other similar questions may not be answered directly by Dr Howarth, but he does examine such issues in some depth. In reading and reviewing this book I was able to develop some interesting perspectives on this important global maritime common arena. I unconditionally recommend this book to all students and scholars with an interest in security and strategic studies, Asian politics, geo-politics and naval strategy.

Eric Gregory
Ottawa, Ontario


Aircraft assumed a leading role at sea during the Second World War. The United States, Great Britain and Japan developed and maintained dedicated naval air arms capable of carrier operations, as well as substantial shore-based maritime air assets for patrol and strike roles. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, used aircraft predominantly from land to attack shipping, warships, ports and bases, either independently, or in conjunction with naval forces. From a comparative perspective, the struggle for control over maritime air activity and organization in the face of inter-service rivalry and dramatic changes in technology, technique, and doctrine to meet the demands of modern naval warfare were strikingly common, though the responses and results in the respective countries were not. Hermann Goering’s Luftwaffe was a prime example of an air force that assumed maritime roles as part of its mandate and proved its mettle against the British in Norway, the British Isles, the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, in spite of competing demands for material and personnel elsewhere in the German war effort as the years went by. David Isby, known for his previous compilations on the German army in Normandy and the operational Luftwaffe, has again culled translated German source documents and post-war historical reports from selected German officers available at repositories in the Washington, DC, area to bring into focus the maritime air war from the German side.

The assembled and edited source materials, as Isby readily acknowledges, remain biased and at times lop-sided, by virtue of the fact that more naval than air force records survived the war. In addition, senior German naval officers were more vocal in condemnation of the Luftwaffe’s efforts in the maritime sphere. Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, fought and lost a bureaucratic battle within the Nazi structure for retention of a separate naval air arm under the navy’s auspices. War conditions, and Goering’s insistence that “anything that flies” belonged to the Luftwaffe, overturned existing agreements. The navy’s floatplane squadrons were progressively reduced and eliminated in favour of building up
formations such as the IX and X Fliegerkorps specially trained for maritime work. The Luftwaffe undertook aerial-laying of magnetic ground mines, attacked Allied warships and shipping with dive bombing, and exercised sea denial, surveillance, and patrol in littoral waters close to German-held airfields. Lack of materials and suitable aircraft in the face of higher priorities meant that work was stopped on Graf Zeppelin, an aircraft carrier first laid down in 1936, and another unnamed sister ship. Support to land armies on the Eastern Front and defence of the Reich against the Allied strategic bombing campaign drew off resources from the over-committed Luftwaffe, which could devote less and less attention to maritime air activities. Belatedly, the Luftwaffe had taken a serious interest in air-launched torpedoes and made significant strides in developing anti-ship glider bombs, the forerunner of the guided missile. Although successes could still be scored against individual convoys, such as PQ 17 in the Arctic, available long- and medium-range maritime aircraft under the senior air officer in the West were eventually relegated to mostly reconnaissance and limited strike functions. The converted commercial airliner Focke-Wulf Fw-200 Kondor and better armed follow-on aircraft such as the Heinkel He-177 Greif and Junkers Ju-290 were too few in number and suffered terribly against strengthened Allied air defences both en route and over target. Proposals for coordinating maritime air reconnaissance with U-boats, pressed forcefully by Admiral Karl Dönitz, became moot from mid-1944 onwards once the advancing Allied armies deprived the Germans of operating airfields along the French coast. Isby tries to balance out the heavy German naval bias with selected Luftwaffe historical reports written during wartime when events were still transpiring.

Many of the historical reports are already available on microfiche from the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and likewise commercially on microfilm as Essays by German officers and officials about World War II under the Scholarly Resources imprint of Thomson Gale. Isby’s section explaining the source and arrangement of the edited documents is hard to follow, for those readers inclined to seek out the originals themselves. Cross-references to other relevant German records in Record Group 242, particularly those from the Kriegsmarine’s Tambach archive and the less extensive Luftwaffe holdings on microfilm, might have been helpful. On the whole, Isby’s introduction and accompanying commentary need to be much more substantial to draw out the significance of the selected documents and put German maritime air activities into a comparative context. The photographs, however, many of them original, are well-chosen and used with good effect to illustrate or highlight points made in the documents.

The book includes a bibliography of relevant secondary sources in English and German with a preceding discussion. A notable omission from Isby’s listed references for further reading and research is James Corum’s The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (University Press of Kansas, 1997), which is perhaps among the best books available in English on the origins of the wartime German air force and describes briefly the growth of the naval air arm in the context of the Luftwaffe’s thinking on leadership, doctrine, and organization. Isby, at the outset, explains that restrictions on space and cost to make his book affordable for a general readership precluded inclusion of
more references and photographs to satisfy academics and specialists in Luftwaffe war history. Yet, by being so narrowly conceived, the book misses the logical target audience since the broad market for the topic must necessarily be limited. In the absence of something better, this book will suffice until the Luftwaffe’s maritime air war gets the scholarly treatment it deserves in English language studies based on thorough analysis of the available documentation or translation of really good academic work now appearing in Germany on the subject. At the very least, the selected documents and postwar reports are made a little more accessible in print form for readers to decide for themselves the import of maritime air operations.

Chris Madsen
Toronto, Ontario


Warship started as a quarterly in January 1977, issued by Conway Maritime Press. In 1989 Warship became a hardcover annual. The first editor was the distinguished nautical scholar Anthony Preston, author of several books on naval history. Preston died just before Warship 2005 went to press, and the publisher and several colleagues pay tribute to him in the foreword.

From the start, the contributors to Warship have included the leading experts in the field of naval history and this issue is no exception. David K. Brown, formerly the head of the Royal Navy’s Constructor Branch, reviews the development of steam torpedo boats in the Royal Navy from the invention of the mobile torpedo in 1866 to 1905. He includes an interesting analysis of torpedo attacks in naval actions before 1914: the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars and Brazilian and Chilean civil conflicts. (Torpedoes fired: a lot – hits made: very few, and all against slow and damaged ships or unprepared stationary targets.) The First World War showed that the really effective torpedo firing craft was the submarine.

The first item in the book, by Iain McCallum, is the last of a three-part series examining the disappointing (to the Royal Navy) results of the battle of Jutland (1916), where the British scored many more hits on the Germans than they received, but the damage to the British fleet, including the loss by explosion of four large ships, was much greater. German armour, subdivision and damage control was excellent, but the article places the principal blame on the British heavy shells, which tended to explode on impact, while the German shells first penetrated the British armour and then exploded. The fuses were to blame, and it was nearly the end of the war before the problem was rectified. Another article on a similar theme, by Stephen McLaughlin, is based on the report of Vladimir Polichtovich Kostenko on the damage inflicted on the Orel, the only Russian battleship not sunk at the battle of Tsushima – it surrendered after the battle in a badly damaged state. Kostenko, who was the damage control officer of the Orel, can be credited with insisting on the removal of wooden fittings before the battle. The other Russian battleships which did not do this, all suffered from uncontrollable and catastrophic fires. From his hospital bed at Maizuru, Kostenko could see his old ship and made
diagrams of the damage. He went on to serve as a senior constructor in the Imperial and Soviet shipyards, in spite of being arrested from time to time for revolutionary or counter-revolutionary activities. The same author, Stephen McLaughlin, also contributes a discussion, the first of a series, on the pumping and drainage systems in warships in the pre-Dreadnought era.

Three of the items in the book are typical of Warship’s approach: the description of the design requirements, actual construction and subsequent alterations in specific warship classes or individual vessels, together with short operational histories. Those in this issue are the French Navy’s first two Washington Treaty cruisers, Duquense and Tourville; the last two British pre-Dreadnoughts, Lord Nelson and Agamemnon; and the Yugoslav destroyer, Split.

A surprising piece by George Moore is “From Daring to Devonshire”, which traces British destroyer development between the completion of the “D”-class just after the Second World War to the County-class of the mid-to-late-1960s. I say surprising, because there is absolutely no resemblance between the two designs: the Darings were clearly in the direct line of Royal Navy practice though an unbroken developmental evolution, while the Counties were an entirely new type – the first British combatants of the missile age. Furthermore, no ships were actually built in the interval between the two classes but apparently all kinds of designs were considered, and these are what the article describes.

All Warship issues contain a special pictorial section in addition to very comprehensive photographs, plans and tables that are integral to each article.

This issue features Australian cruisers of the inter-war and war years. Finally, recent naval books are reviewed and there is a survey of world naval events in the previous year, 2004, which at this date needs no comment. Warship is of the greatest value to students of the technical aspects of naval history. Those that like it, like it a lot.

Charles D. Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


This work is the logical sequel to both authors’ previous works on other major German warships of the Second World War. The subjects in this case are the five heavy cruisers that formed the bulk of the Kriegsmarine’s proposed complement of “treaty-class” heavy cruisers. In the end, only three of them entered service, but their careers were certainly varied and distinctive. One could say that their successes and shortcomings clearly reflected those of Germany’s political and naval leadership.

As was the case with its predecessors, this volume is essentially divided into three parts. The first offers a relatively informative but concise overview of the design and construction history of the class and its members. The second offers a more technical description
of their design and equipment, complete with a number of technical illustrations of their equipment, as well as an extensive collection of camouflage schemes for the Hipper and the Prinz Eugen. The last section provides a separate history of each vessel in this class. Understandably, the text devoted to the Hipper and the Prinz Eugen is more substantial than that of the others. The Blücher was lost very early in the war, while the remaining ships were launched but never completed. All of these sections feature a splendid array of photographs, and where applicable, maps and other illustrations. This volume also features a very brief preface, a conclusion, a bibliography and an index of ships names.

The text is, strangely, the weakest element of this work. It is, in part, a fine narrative and interpretative account of the careers of the ships and their significance. The brief mention of the presence of Soviet officers aboard the Hipper during its gunnery trials in October 1939 is very significant, as is the visit by a Soviet naval delegation to the Blücher in September 1939. These two events were clearly the prelude to the Soviet purchase of the incomplete Lützow in 1940. Unfortunately, the parts devoted to the ships that actually saw action are marred by the use of unnecessarily lengthy quotes from their war diaries and action reports. In general, military logbooks and reports do not make for exciting reading, and translations of these documents tend to be even less appealing. In particular, one must question the decision to incorporate lengthy citations from the 1918 war diary of Admiral Hipper. Furthermore, the quality of the translation is questionable at times. The conclusion is particularly disappointing because the authors again quote extensively from a post-war critique of Kriegsmarine warship construction instead of providing a more balanced essay. In addition, the design variations for the last two ships as either “large light cruisers” with twelve 150mm guns or the Seydlitz as an aircraft carrier are certainly under-represented.

While the equipment drawings are excellent, the copies of the original plans are just too small to be of much use to any reader or scale modeller. The collection of camouflage schemes for the Hipper and the Prinz Eugen is perhaps the most comprehensive available. Nonetheless, at least the mid-1941 to February 1942 scheme for the Prinz Eugen is not substantiated by the photos in this volume. Also, all the camouflage drawings are black and white, while the actual schemes were undoubtedly much more complex. The real strength of the volume is in its fine collection of photographs. Yes, many of them have appeared elsewhere, but this volume still offers the most comprehensive photographic coverage of these ships currently available to the English language reader. The authors have chosen well, and provide us with an excellent variety of “glamour” and action shots that should appeal to most readers and modellers. What are lacking are credits for the photographs and a comprehensive table of photographs.

Overall, while this volume may be the best single volume English-language history of these ships extant today, it does have its weaknesses. Serious Kriegsmarine scholars or readers will learn very little about these ships in this work, but modellers will certainly benefit from the fine collection of equipment drawings, camouflage schemes and photographs.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Dollard des Ormeaux, Quebec

This book offers a detailed account of the development of the Royal Navy’s approach to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) from the end of the First World War through to the introduction of the fast, modern, conventional submarine in the immediate post-Second World War period. Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, himself a former Royal Navy (RN) ASW specialist in the Fleet Air Arm, convincingly challenges popular misconceptions of an inconsistent western approach to ASW, and clearly shows both the Admiralty and the RN were much further ahead than most accounts of this period would suggest. Capitalizing on his 26 years of experience in the RN, the author delivers a well-researched monograph that highlights the enormous behind-the-scenes effort by professional naval officers to counter the constantly evolving submarine threat, which became the foundation of post-war ASW doctrine in the RN. *The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49* concludes that the Admiralty was a “flexible and responsive organization” that, despite limitations in equipment and intelligence, was able to succeed because of a solid foundation built on seasoned professionals, honed by six years of war experience.

Published as part of the Cass Series on Naval Policy and History, which is made up of primary manuscripts by research scholars, the author acknowledges, from the beginning, that his work is complicated. He explores the detail of a very well covered subject representing a significant period of modern naval history. While the prime focus of the book is on the period 1944-9, the author explains early ASW efforts in the first two chapters, which are a useful summary of post-First World War activities and the initial anti-submersible initiatives of the convoy battles up to 1943. He then devotes the remainder of the book to countering the modern submarine threat – first exemplified in the schnorkel-fitted U-Boats of 1944 – through to the emergence of the Soviet threat based on captured German submarine technology. Though it is extremely detailed, I found the book to be well structured and easy to follow. It has a succinct list of abbreviations at the beginning and is accompanied by an extensive notes section and a comprehensive bibliography of both primary and secondary sources. Regrettably, there are no photographs or illustrations which would have been useful, particularly when explaining the technical difficulties associated with modern ASW.

Acknowledging the role of mine warfare and submarines in modern ASW, the author deliberately focuses on the development of surface ship ASW doctrine, intentionally excluding the role of aircraft. While being a key player in modern ASW, aircraft, he explains, had temporarily lost their effectiveness with the introduction of the schnorkel, and would not regain this until the late 1950s, with the advent of new technology. Furthermore, a major theme that Llewellyn-Jones effectively debates is the perennial argument of defensive versus offensive ASW, and where the priorities should lie. Because different communities, even countries, could
dramatically affect results vis-à-vis technological and doctrinal development, he shows that, in the end, the solution must encompass both ideologies, as you cannot have one at the expense of the other. This debate underpins his central argument of a lack of comprehension, by historians and researchers alike, in coming to grips with how complex a warfare discipline ASW really is, from both the tactical and technological standpoint. The result, as he puts it, is “a widespread misunderstanding of the application of ASW doctrine”.

This widespread oversimplification of ASW – used to ease explanation to the uninitiated – is further brought home in his position that ASW is a thinking man’s game, where no technological panacea alone would solve all the problems. His research shows that waiting for a scientific breakthrough in technology was not an option, and the RN was quick to realize the urgent need to adapt tactics to existing equipment fits, to defeat the modern submarine. The quote from Captain (D) 4th Flotilla, “the fast Submarine is not so much a new problem as a serious development of the old problem” (p. 173), neatly sums this up. To complete the circle, Llewellyn-Jones shows how far ahead the British actually were in countering the fast, modern submarine and, contrary to exaggerated claims, these submarines would not have overwhelmed extant equipment, as there were well-founded operational solutions in place.

An extremely well researched and balanced work, geared towards the serious historian, this is not a light read and nor is it intended to be. *The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49* is a refreshing look at a complex subject, from the eyes of a seasoned professional, and sheds light on some popular misunderstanding as to the complexity of modern ASW. I firmly believe this book is a key reference document for naval historians and future maritime strategists, as it brings to the fore how difficult this warfare discipline is and how this has not changed over time.

Norman H. Jolin
London, England


One of the often overlooked aspects of convoy operations during the Second World War is that of the troopships. These ships were almost exclusively ocean liners, predominantly British- and Dominion-owned (including 23 Canadian), which were commandeered by the British Admiralty and later, the US Government. They carried soldiers, airmen and sailors to all the theatres of war and at times, they carried civilian refugees and evacuees out of harm’s way. Troop transport was a massive operation and millions of personnel were transported. It was an extremely complex undertaking from an organizational point of view, but had it not been as successful as it was, Rommel may not have been beaten in North Africa and the Allied invasions of mainland Europe in 1943 and 1944 might have been delayed until much later.

In this book, the author examines one aspect of the overall trooping
movements – the special convoys which ran to and from Britain around the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East, India, Australasia and the Far East. Although this route was almost twice as long as that through the Mediterranean, after Italy entered the war in 1940 Axis domination of the Mediterranean made the direct route far too risky.

Designated as the WS convoys, they were quickly dubbed the “Winston Specials,” both for the British Prime Minister and also for the particular attention which he gave to them. The first convoy left Britain in June 1940, and the final one in August 1943, for a total of fifty-two convoys to make the passage. The total number of British and Allied personnel carried into the Indian Ocean in these convoys was 1,173,010. An unknown number of civilians were brought back to Britain in ships on their return legs, as well as several thousand prisoners of war moved from Egypt to camps in South and East Africa. Troops were also lifted from ports in Australia and New Zealand to reinforce the armies in North Africa.

At the outset of the Second World War, Britain had a small fleet of dedicated troopships. They were mainly employed in the routine movements of the British Army between home bases and the far-flung outposts of the Empire. In total, the entire fleet could only just transport one infantry division at wartime strength, and in the 1930s, commercial passengers ships were often chartered during their slack season to provide a surge capacity. A shortcoming of the existing troopships was their lack of speed – none was capable of more than 15 knots. This would be a major weakness under wartime conditions. Only one dedicated troopship would be built in Britain during the Second World War.

The author clearly illustrates the difficulties facing both the War Office and the Admiralty in assembling enough ships to transport the troops, converting them to carry the numbers required, and then scheduling convoys to ensure timely delivery of much needed reinforcements to North Africa, and later into the Far East to counter Japanese advances. When the need to transport Canadian, and later US, forces across the Atlantic was factored into the equation, the obstacles facing the planners were enormous.

The complexities of routing alone were immense. The convoys would usually steam westwards far out into the Atlantic before turning south towards Freetown in West Africa. Each convoy was heavily escorted by cruisers, destroyers, armed merchant cruisers and often an old battleship. The combination of routing, the strong escort and the speed of the convoys kept losses to U-boats and the Luftwaffe relatively low. Of the 456 ships employed in the WS convoys only 36, or 7.9 per cent, were lost to enemy action.

This is a very comprehensive book. It is not an easy read because of the wealth of previously unpublished factual information and an almost exclusive use of an old style passive voice. The author, a retired Master Mariner, researched convoy and warship reports of proceedings, regimental histories, individual ship logs, records of the Admiralty and the agencies involved in all aspects of the trooping process, as well as records of the owners of the passenger ships involved. It must have been a monumental task and the publisher states that the author began his research in the 1960s. Each convoy is described fully from loading to discharging. The events of each passage are told in detail and the stories of individual ships are added as
well. One reads how many of the ships that sailed from the Clyde in these convoys reached Capetown or Durban in South Africa, and then proceeded up into the Suez Canal to unload troops and military cargo. Then they would turn around and proceed back into the Indian Ocean, divert to Australia or India to load more troops for Africa, return to the Canal zone, go back to East African ports to load cargo for Britain, proceed to Trinidad for fuel, steam up the east coast of the USA en route to New York or Halifax, where they would embark US or Canadian military personnel before returning to the UK in an eastbound fast convoy. In at least one case, this voyage lasted six months. All the various routes used for the convoys are shown in the comprehensive set of maps.

The photographs are a delight. Some of the most beautiful passenger ships in the world, all except the Queen Mary now long gone, are shown in their wartime drab grey paint which does little to hide their elegant lines. In one photograph, the P & O liner Strathnaver is shown under repair in the harbour at St John’s, Newfoundland, almost on the other side of the world from her peacetime routes to India and Australia.

In revealing a previously little known aspect of the convoy system in the Second World War, the author makes an important contribution to maritime history.

Michael Young
Ottawa, Ontario


Always take internet sources with a grain of salt. Pioneers of the Pacific has a deeply confusing identity, having apparently begun its life under a different title with different authors and contents. Advertising the book as a companion to its earlier volume, Captain Cook in the Pacific, the website of the National Maritime Museum (NMM) in Greenwich shows a dust jacket reading Pioneers of the Pacific: Six Voyages, 1787-1810. Less trivial an error, perhaps, than being unable to spell the word “received,” the NMM blurb also claims that the book is by Nigel Rigby and Pieter van der Merwe alone, “with an introduction by Glyn Williams.” Confusion grows when one reads the list of six explorers: William Bligh, George Vancouver, Matthew Flinders, Le Perouze (would this be La Pérouse/Lapérouse?) and Arthur Phillip. I make this five explorers, not six. The University of Western Australia Press, distributing the volume in the antipodes, promotes Glyn Williams to a full author in the blurb, but not on the dust jacket, and there are still only five explorers listed.

I pressed on in search of the elusive sixth man, finding a clue on the University of Alaska Press site. It avoided the word “received” and wins my vote for the best attempt at Lapérouse’s name: “the Comte de Laperouse”. Although only five explorers are listed, Bligh is described as voyaging “first in the ill-fated Bounty but then successfully in the Providence and in a Spanish expedition forgotten in the oblivion of his later political disgrace.” The latter will surprise all Bligh biographers, and was, in fact, a clue to the identity of the missing sixth man: Alejandro Malaspina.
The goal of *Pioneers of the Pacific* was to rescue neglected explorers from the shadow of Cook. Lapérouse has already received some attention from Pacific specialists interested in early-contact Samoa, but Nigel Rigby delves deeper to highlight his extensive exploration of the northwest coast of North America. Particularly interesting here is Lapérouse’s neglected ethnography of the Tlingit and other West Coast peoples; this explorer should be better known to Canadianists.

Malaspina is beginning to emerge from undeserved obscurity due largely to the efforts of Glyn Williams. Malaspina was despatched to the Pacific with two goals: to survey conditions in the existing Spanish colonies, and to secure additional interests. We meet the Tlingit again as Malaspina sought signs of the fabled Strait of Anian and its northwest passage. Like Lapérouse five years earlier, Malaspina worked his way down the coast in increasing frustration. Later, after calling at the Philippines, the expedition sailed through Melanesia to New South Wales. Calling next at Vava’u in the northern Tongan islands, Malaspina made the first detailed European observations of the area before proclaiming possession for Spain. Like similar acts of possession on the northwest coast, this one would come to nothing in the end but, in the wake of the Nootka Crisis, Spain was still a Pacific power determined to assert its claims. After writing up a vast and detailed report, Malaspina made various pointed recommendations which alienated powerful Spanish officials. In March 1795, he was arrested, stripped of his rank, and imprisoned for a decade. “Only in the last fifteen years have the records of the expedition been published on the scale envisaged by Malaspina in 1794.” (p. 95)

The other essays in this book, though well written, deal with well-known men. What a shame that the most original parts of the book are so cleverly disguised by its publishers. This simply highlights the long road ahead before “foreign” explorers receive the same professional treatment as their British brethren. This is as political in its own way as the occlusion of Malaspina’s accomplishments by his own government so many years ago. Since there seem to be a range of books available with different subtitles, authors and contents, readers who wish to purchase this book should take care to ensure that they are getting all six explorers and their essayists. The book’s publishers already know what they have to do.

Jane Samson
Edmonton, Alberta


Many books have been written about the history of Scotland’s passenger steamers and this is certainly not the first book about MacBrayne Limited. It is, however, a remarkably comprehensive tribute to David MacBrayne whose name was synonymous with River Clyde and West Highland shipping. On the centenary of his death, the book takes a fresh look at the external factors that contributed to the success of his company and his place in the history of British passenger and cargo shipping.

Nick S. Robins is a hydrogeologist with the British Geological
Survey and his previous books on the history of British shipping include *The Evolution of the British Ferry* (1995) and *The Last Steamers* (2005). Professor Donald E. Meek lecturers on Scottish and Gaelic Studies at the University of Edinburgh and was formerly Professor of Celtic at Aberdeen. He writes from an Inner Hebridean vantage-point and his Gaelic-language account of West Highland shipping *An t-Aiseag an Iar* (The Passage West) was published in 1977.

Steam power made it possible to predict when ships would arrive at their destinations and, with timetables becoming a reality, steamers played a crucial role in the railway system. Resorts on the Clyde prospered and the Highland and Island communities derived much economic benefit from the development of steamboat communication. Gentlemen of standing saw travel as mind broadening and the composer Mendelssohn, the painter Turner, and the poet Wordsworth, each visited the Hebrides by steamer in 1823, 1830 and 1833 respectively. A different attitude prevailed on the island of St. Kilda, a community which had stood still for centuries. When the first steamer arrived in 1838, with billowing smoke and a brass band playing on deck, the islanders were reported to have rushed for shelter among the rocks.

Existing literature has traced the history of Clyde steamers from their heyday in the 1860s and 1880s (*Victorian Summer of the Clyde Steamers*, Patterson, 1972), through their pivotal role as blockade runners in the American Civil War (*Clyde Built*, Eric Graham, 2006) to the nostalgia of their decline from the 1950s (*Sunset on the Clyde*, Duncan Graham, 2005). This book, however, explores the changing social fabric of the West Highlands from a relatively neglected perspective, namely, how steamers eroded the geographical and cultural isolation of the Gaelic people in Scotland’s west coast communities, and what impact was made by the tourists and seamen who arrived on their shores and the migrants who departed by steamer. The authors conclude that the Hebrides were central, not peripheral, to nineteenth-century maritime history.

Popular demand for day-cruising on the Clyde grew rapidly, although cynics claimed that this was because only on water was the holiday-maker safe from the notorious midges, and by the late-nineteenth century, there were over 120 ferry piers in the Clyde estuary. The turning point came in the 1950s when the amalgamation of the railway-owned steamer companies in Scotland coincided with paid holidays becoming the norm for Glasgow’s industrial workers whose previously limited horizons expanded beyond the Clyde. Yet as the numbers of passengers began to decline, the demand for cars to be transported across the Clyde grew, despite the fact that unloading the cars often took longer than the ferry trip itself. It was MacBrayne Limited which led the way with new ferries that could adapt to the tidal ranges and differing heights of the remaining piers.

The authors admit that they have not unearthed fresh sources in their research on David MacBrayne nor his predecessors, rivals and successors. There is, however, some new material in the book as observers and travelers are allowed to speak for themselves, and the authors have assigned some degree of personality to ships they know well. Gaelic primary documents are extensively quoted in both Gaelic and in translation.

The MacBrayne ships are lavishly depicted in words and images. There are numerous sketches, paintings, models,
advertisements, brochures and, since the company was a world leader in the development of the motor vessel in the 1930s, there are many meticulously-drawn plans of hulls and engines. The photographs are mostly from the authors’ private collections and many are published here for the first time. The book would be enjoyed by the general reader, but although it pays due attention to MacBrayne’s contemporaries in West Highland shipping, the index covers only ships’ names. This could limit the book’s usefulness to maritime or economic historians, who may be better served by the excellent bibliography.

The book records the enormous difficulties encountered by David MacBrayne and his successors across more than 150 years. It concludes with a long essay about the future of Hebridean shipping. In the past, tenders for the ferry routes and new ship construction were awarded to the company that asked for the lowest subsidy and, until recently, MacBrayne Limited and its successor since 1973, Caledonian MacBrayne, usually secured the contracts because it controlled the existing infrastructure. This has left little incentive for others to invest in new vessels that would encourage passenger traffic or develop, say, hybrid ecologically-friendly means of propulsion. It is not clear how the current debate on tendering under more open European Union directives will affect the future of MacBrayne’s kingdom.

Michael Clark
London, UK


Oliver Hazard Perry was one of the heroes of the early US Navy. Although Perry’s naval career spanned three decades, and he served in all the wars of the early republic, his name is forever linked with the War of 1812 and the Battle of Lake Erie.

Born in Rhode Island in 1785, Perry joined the navy as a midshipman in April 1799, and saw service during the Quasi-War with France (1798-1800). During 1802-3 and 1804-6 he was on Mediterranean service and took part in the War against Tripoli. From 1806 to 1809 he supervised gunboat construction at Newport, Rhode Island, winning promotion to lieutenant. In 1809, he received his first independent command, the schooner *Revenge*. In January 1811, the *Revenge* sank when it struck a reef, but Perry was cleared by a court of inquiry.

Commanding the gunboats at Newport from 1811, and promoted to master commandant in 1812, at the beginning of the War of 1812 Perry actively sought a more important command. Finally, in the spring of 1813, he was assigned to Lake Ontario under Commodore Isaac Chauncey. A naval builder’s war was then in progress on the Great Lakes, and Chauncey sent Perry to Presque Isle (Erie), Pennsylvania, with orders to construct a fleet on Lake Erie. Whichever side controlled that lake would control the old Northwest. Perry accomplished his task by summer, but apparently alienated his second-in-command, Jesse Duncan Elliott, who had been in charge prior to Perry’s arrival and resented the intrusion.

The battle for control of Lake Erie occurred on 10 September 1813,
when Perry's ships fell in with the British squadron of Captain Robert H. Barclay. During the initial part of the battle, Perry's flagship, the brig *Lawrence*, was separated from the rest of the American ships and engaged the entire British squadron almost alone. For whatever reason, Elliott, with the second American brig, the *Niagara*, remained apart and offered no support. At length the *Lawrence* was forced to strike, but not before Perry had transferred his flag to the *Niagara* and had led it into the battle. The Americans won the battle and seized the half-dozen British ships, the first time that an entire British squadron had surrendered. Perry's laconic report on the battle, “We have met the enemy, and they are ours,” became one of the most famous after-action reports in naval history.

Perry’s victory brought US control of Lake Erie and was arguably the greatest American naval victory of the war. Hailed as the “Savior of the Northwest,” Perry was promoted to captain to date from the battle. He then transported Major General William Henry Harrison's army to Canada, where it won the Battle of the Thames. After that Perry transferred to Baltimore, where he served during the September 1814 British attack.

Perry next saw service in the Mediterranean in the brief war with Algiers, when he commanded the frigate *Java*. Meanwhile, Elliott chafed under accusations of misconduct during the Battle of Lake Erie. Although Perry did what he could to end it, the Perry-Elliott feud split the naval officer corps and raged on for a quarter-century after Perry’s own death.

Following a return to command of the Newport gunboat flotilla during 1817-1819, Perry then commanded the corvette *John Adams* on a successful diplomatic mission to Venezuela. He died of yellow fever during the return trip on 20 August 1819. A highly effective combat leader, Perry was not without flaw, particularly when honour was involved. Admittedly, Perry had a short temper, and his command and control procedures during the Battle of Lake Erie were hardly the best, but he had never commanded a squadron before. Although he remains one of the greatest US Navy heroes and has had two dozen towns and a half-dozen ships named for him (including the Perry class of guided missile frigates), until the publication of this book, Perry has lacked a scholarly biography. Indeed, the last major biography of him appeared more than two decades ago.

Highly regarded naval historian David Skaggs, emeritus professor of history at Bowling Green University, has produced a splendid study. Skaggs, who has written or edited thirteen books, including *A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1813*, has concentrated his scholarship on the naval war on the Great Lakes. It is, thus, fitting that he would undertake the study of Perry for the Naval Institute’s Library of Naval Biography, edited by James Bradford, for which Skaggs had already written an important study of Captain Thomas Macdonough.

Understandably, Skaggs concentrates on Perry’s role in the War of 1812 and the ensuing feud with Elliott. Painstakingly researched, well written, and engagingly presented, Skaggs’ informative scholarly examination of Perry will remain the standard biography for the foreseeable future.

Spencer C. Tucker
Lexington, Virginia

*Navies in Modern World History* is a collection of nine case studies of navies from the early nineteenth century to the dawn of the twenty-first century. With sweeping brush strokes Lawrence Sondhaus first draws a clear and convincing portrait of the British navy, 1815-1902, in only forty pages, which is a tremendous feat. Against a perspicuous historical background of national and global politics, the challenges of the fleet in assembling *matériel*, in enlisting and training personnel, and in performing its mission, are presented in a lucid and fast-paced narrative, in which no detail has been omitted, no major subject left untouched. At an equally breathtaking pace, the author then applies himself to the French navy, 1840-1900, the Brazilian navy, 1822-31, the United States navy, 1861-5, and the Chilean navy, 1879-92. He enters the twentieth century with the German navy, 1894-1945, the Soviet navy, 1956-91, and finally the United States navy since 1991. Each well-researched case is outlined along the same vein: hardware, manpower and finally, operations, followed by a short conclusion. Effortlessly, Sondhaus places technological developments in (inter)national economic and political contexts, analyzes the changes in career opportunities, racial and gender influences, and finally recounts all decisive actions which determined the course of events. Fluently written and with obvious academic command, each chapter is a pleasure to read.

Apart from the perspicacity with which each case is presented, the additional value of this collection lies in the choice of subjects: where else can one find regional navies such as the Brazilian and the Chilean treated with the same attention as the world’s leading fleets? The systematic approach ensures that each case is presented with the same clarity and attention to detail. Curiously, at the same time, the author makes little effort to motivate the choice of his case studies or to explain their coherence. One glance is enough to understand that he is not out to recount the world’s naval history of the last two centuries. Neither is he presenting exciting new material based on pioneering archival research, as is plain from the bibliography. The main theme of the book, as disclosed in the introduction, is to demonstrate that “the timely application of naval force has helped to determine the fate of nations and empires, establishing the balance of power on a regional level or even globally,” a point that seems blatantly obvious. Oddly enough, almost every case study concludes with the ultimate failure of the navy in question to consolidate the power it had aimed to underscore.

After some reflection, I have come to the conclusion that the selection was made in order to demonstrate the application of naval force in its widest variety. Thus, Sondhaus convincingly shows how the Cisplatine War (1825-1828) between Brazil and Argentina, and the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) between Chile on the one hand, and Peru and Bolivia on the other, decisively helped draw the map of the South American continent. His comparison of the impact of the Boer War on Britain’s international leadership with the damage of the war in Iraq on America’s reputation is an exciting thought, as is the similarity of the
role of the French and Soviet navies in the periods he discusses. Sondhaus repeatedly draws parallels and makes cross-references between his cases, yet a final wrap-up of the collection as a whole is missing. This is a pity, as Sondhaus displays a sound global perspective and a mastery of the entire era. This criticism therefore is not intended to detract from the remarkable force with which the author displays his command of naval history, but should be read as an invitation for him to crown his otherwise brilliant performance with a final academic analysis. In every other respect I have thoroughly enjoyed Navies in Modern History: a highly recommendable read! I am eagerly awaiting his next book.

Alan Lemmers
Amsterdam, the Netherlands


The golden years of shipbuilding in the United States have now gone. Most commercial ships of any significant size are built off-shore, increasingly in South Korea, China or Brazil, and those shipyards not long idle or closed are devoted mostly to government work on public and naval vessels as well as catering to specialized niche markets. Yet, American shipbuilders were once renowned for quality and workmanship in wooden shipbuilding during the decades prior to the mid-nineteenth century, and again led the world for quantity production in the early days of steel shipbuilding. Over the course of little more than a century, the transition of American shipbuilding from a practical craft basis to more scientific lines incorporating the latest industrial techniques took on unique forms. The burgeoning US Navy, a key catalyst in this process, embraced influences from abroad, particularly Great Britain and other European countries, toward professional and material improvements. William Thiesen, formerly the curator at the Wisconsin Maritime Museum, and now historian for the Atlantic region with the US Coast Guard, puts forward the premise that the change involved a complex intersection of social, cultural, economic, and technical factors.

The book begins by describing the development and persistence of a practical orientation in American shipbuilding as the industry elsewhere in Europe proceeded along a scientific and engineering basis. Master craftsmen, aided by workers and apprentices with specific skills, constructed wood ships in yards of small-to-moderate size, according to traditional methods and techniques of production. Use of the half-hull scale model remained standard for design and calculations, whereas tools and machinery reflected a proud democratic notion of craft. This wood shipbuilding culture reached its pinnacle during the years preceding and during the US Civil War, at which time numerous urban shipyards opened in US East Coast cities to fill demand. In the hubris that followed the war, American shipbuilders carried over existing practices and knowledge associated with wood into the new medium of iron. Resulting ships were often a mixture of wood and iron construction; and, corresponding design changes in favour of the improved
material strength of using metal were almost ignored, though all-iron construction was by then common across the Atlantic. It was at this point that the small US Navy began sending engineering and other officers for training, observation, and collection of information about the latest warships in Great Britain. The effect on American shipbuilding, according to Thiesen, was pivotal: “This systematic approach, which we look upon as modern naval architecture methods, did not begin as an outgrowth of American industrialization. It was a strategic response by the navy to the rapid advances in weapons technology witnessed overseas in the late nineteenth century” (p. 167). Assured professional advice from within the Navy Department and encouraged by the prospect of contracts for warships in an expanding navy, American shipbuilders gradually adopted a theoretical and rational approach to shipbuilding. Blueprints were prepared and consulted, larger shipyards with dedicated facilities and lifting apparatus were laid out, and new means for the provision and distribution of power installed to ease production. For reasons of climate and preference, pneumatic rather than hydraulic means of driving rivets became commonplace in most American shipyards, a notable difference from practice in Great Britain. As American shipbuilders applied broader advances in efficiency and productivity culminating in the remarkable production record under the Emergency Fleet Corporation in the First World War, the transfer of technology and information went the other way back to Europe. Shipbuilding was by then a leading heavy industry and employed hundreds of thousand workers in the United States, if only for a short time before the general scale-down after 1920.

The book is impressive in scope and draws upon the available secondary literature, contemporary accounts, as well as considerable research at archives and other local repositories holding corporate records and personal papers. Within the individual chapters, interesting background behind well-known and obscure personalities, important in the shipbuilding industry, and representative companies stands out as among the strengths of the book. Nonetheless, one must be careful about drawing generalizations from the experiences of a few individual companies and selected writings in professional journals. At times, some repetition and occasional misspelled words creep into the text, which might have been caught at the proof-reading stage. For the later chapters, records held at the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison from the American Federation of Labor, whose craft unions benefited in numbers and influence from wartime conditions in the shipyards, might also have been consulted. Good use is made of photographs from the Wisconsin Maritime Museum’s collections and other illustrations. Thiesen has made a valuable and original contribution. The book is highly recommended for specialists working in the field, as well as informed general readers interested in the rise of American shipbuilding from wood to steel.

Chris Madsen
Toronto, Ontario