
Joel Baer's new study of British pirates during the period from 1660 to 1720 uses six case studies of notorious or celebrated pirate captains in an attempt to explore some of the wider forces at work that led to their success and failure. These years experienced the growth of large-scale, organized maritime depredation which acquired a global dimension as a result of what the author describes as the "instability and opportunism of a new age" (160). Traditionally, the period has been presented as the golden-age of piracy when sea rovers of various nationalities, under the leadership of a succession of ruthless and resourceful captains, deliberately flouted and challenged the authority of monarchies and empires.

Baer's gallery of rogues includes such well known adventurers as Henry Morgan, William Dampier and William Kidd as well as other notorious rovers, including Henry Every, Bartholomew Roberts and Edward Thatch. It was Thatch who was immortalized as Blackbeard in *A General History of the Pyrates* by Captain Charles Johnson which was published in London during the early eighteenth century. Baer outlines the careers and seafaring activities of each of his selected subjects. As he points out, several of these adventurers operated in a grey area that was defined as much by politics as by maritime law, where piracy and privateering, illegitimate and legitimate plunder, were dangerously confused.

Henry Morgan's raids in the Spanish Caribbean during the 1660s and early 1670s, from his base on the recently acquired island of Jamaica, furnish a good example of the opportunities and problems this environment presented for an aggressive group of colonial seafarers whose numbers were increased by the social casualties and outcasts of English colonial expansion in America. Although the activities of men like Morgan were motivated by greed, and justified partly by a thin veneer of patriotism that was the product of lingering anti-Spanish hostility, according to Baer, they were the "shock troops of empire, (who) ... would also help to provide its legal rationale" (23), as indicated by the expansion of British jurisdiction to deal with the problem during the early eighteenth century. Morgan was certainly a highly successful colonial entrepreneur who acquired land and office in Jamaica. As the author points out, however, his career was unusual and paradoxical. While his raids in the Caribbean appeared to hark back to the 1580s and 1590s, the changing character of Anglo-Spanish relations undermined the political climate under which he and others operated. What might have been interpreted as legitimate reprisals in Jamaica were increasingly seen as unjustified buccaneering by metropolitan trading and political interests, who were concerned to promote and protect English commercial expansion with Spanish America at a time of intense rivalry with the United Provinces.

Although it is significant that several subsequent pirate leaders, such as Dampier and Kidd, claimed to be operating with lawful commissions, the changing nature of seaborne depredation is reflected in the career of Henry Every and the resurgence of piracy during the second decade of the eighteenth century. There were wide ranging developments in the organization, character and range of piracy during these years, though it is difficult to delineate such changes through an approach that focuses on selected case studies. Baer provides interesting accounts of Every, whose plundering ranged into the Indian Ocean, and of his successors. There is a striking portrait of Thatch who apparently simulated maniacal acts of aggression in a shipboard spectacle of pain and humiliation that was designed to terrify his own crew as much as his victims.

But this leaves little scope for an extensive or critical discussion of the broader social and economic characteristics or consequences of piratical enterprise during these years. Instead, the author explores the
relationship between piracy and the law, a relatively neglected aspect of the subject, partly as a means of establishing some degree of contextualization, continuity and cohesion. In the light of the case studies discussed in this book, Baer concludes that pirates did not simply reject the law outright; rather, they tried to acquire knowledge and understanding of the law and legal procedure as part of a strategy for survival. This has interesting implications for the understanding of pirate lives and identities, though it is not fully pursued.

Baer seeks to present a balanced discussion of his pirate captains that is free of the myth and legend that so easily veil the history of piracy with a gloss of appealing anecdote and misplaced nostalgia. In so doing, he draws extensively on modern scholarship since the 1960s and a range of published sources, including Johnson's General History. While noting the value of the latter, he reinforces recent critical comment regarding the author's tendency to exaggerate and sensationalise, and occasionally invent accounts of piratical activity. The General History is a remarkable, but enigmatic and complex book. In the past it was assumed to be the work of Daniel Defoe, but the attribution is no longer widely accepted. Baer adopts a cautious and sensible approach in employing material from the General History, though his comments on the work strengthen the need for a critical study of the elusive captain Johnson that would establish a firmer groundwork for understanding this important work as historical evidence. In accordance with his aims, Joel Baer succeeds in presenting a lively and informative group of case studies, grounded in modern scholarship, which demonstrates the compelling drama of the subject, while drawing attention to the wider forces that influenced piratical enterprise during the period.

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In 1978, Pamela Sisman Bitterman was about to become homeless and unemployed when her job as a naturalist on a wildlife and nature preserve in northern California ended. She answered a classified ad in the *Co-Evolution Quarterly* that changed her life: "Tall ship Sofia, cooperatively owned and operated 60-year-old schooner, returns to America to enlist crew for her second circumnavigation" (12).

It was not the call of the sea, but rather the magnetic attraction of the unknown that tempted Bitterman, who was 27 years old and seeking a new direction, to pay her share and sign on as a tall ship sailor, an adventure that ended four years later when the Sofia sank off the coast of New Zealand in a violent storm.

By the time Bitterman joined the Sofia, the three-masted, gaff-topsail schooner had been sailing to a succession of exotic ports-of-call with a perpetually rotating crew for over a decade. The aged Baltic trader had been rescued from a wooden boat graveyard in Sweden and reincarnated as a floating commune in the 1960s. Bitterman's tale is essentially an examination of the 1970s counterculture experience aboard a 123-foot ship she calls "a lifestyle that just happens to move by virtue of the wind and sea" (74).

Bitterman's maiden voyage is a harrowing sail from Boston to Bermuda in the teeth of Hurricane Kendra. We sail on with Bitterman to the Caribbean, through the Panama Canal, across the Pacific, and finally to New Zealand where the Sofia is hauled out for over a year before her final voyage.

The author's tale is as much about the "landlubbers" she meets in her travels and the political unrest of the 1970s, as about the sea. She takes us on a harrowing road trip through Mexico and Central America, and into a Panama City jail where the crew is unwittingly caught up in the political chaos surrounding the final stages of the US handover of the Canal Zone to Panama. With her, we make a rare visit to the Cuna Indians off the Panamanian coast, and
discover ancient tikis on the Marquesas Islands.

Bitterman recreates her story using journal entries and letters home, along with newspaper clippings and magazine articles preserved by her parents. She acknowledges that she has "reworked" the journal entries for the sake of the narrative and "embellished" many of the vignettes that had been merely alluded to in the original letters and journals. Unfortunately for the reader, this destroys some of the spontaneous immediacy one expects from a journal.

The book is awkwardly constructed; each chapter has an "Introduction," for example, and the text shifts backward and forward in time, in a confusing melange of first person narrative and passive voice. Simply drawing on her archives as a source, rather than presenting them as pseudo-journal entries would have made for a more coherent and enjoyable tale.

For the most part, Bitterman's language is laborious and cliché-ridden. As she embarks on her grand adventure, she muses: "A sound sense of ourselves will become essential. Fortitude will be absolutely mandatory. Dare we really go out there? Yes. Yes! Here we go. Out to the very edge. Out and away. Here I go!" (27).

Bitterman describes the Sofians' lifestyle with intimacy and a certain smugness: they are a motley crew of free spirits, thumbing their noses at propriety, and breaking away on the ultimate trip. They drink (a lot) and party (naked), and according to Bitterman, "walk that fine line between what intoxicates and what disturbs, what soothes and what scares the hell outta most people" (96). But despite the freewheeling lifestyle, sailing the ship is anything but undisciplined.

Bitterman's writing is at its strongest when she is describing the rigours of sailing an historical vessel with no "yachty" equipment or conveniences aboard. While a deep-water sailor might notice faults in her descriptions of navigation, ship handling, and equipment, there is nevertheless an authenticity to her voice as she describes the complexity of working the great square sails, the tedium of drills, and the grinding routine of keeping the Sofia ship-shape. She gives a gripping account of the Sofia's violent end and the desperate struggle of sixteen survivors - one crew member drowned - adrift for five days in a life raft before a Russian trawler miraculously rescues them.

Bitterman is the first to write of the Sofia's restless journey and tragic sinking, a "responsibility" she claims fell to her by default. She raises the question, which she maddeningly never answers, of why it has taken her a quarter century to write the story. Bitterman describes the book as a "memoir of intimate perception and sentimental retrospection"(4) that has helped her deal with personal tragedy. For her, the writing is an act of catharsis. Ultimately, the story is one of life, loss, and survival that's worth the read.

Joanne Ritchie
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In retrospect, it is odd that with all the books on British maritime power, and all the books on the British Empire, there has not been a book which thoroughly investigates the symbiotic relationship between the two. C.R. Boxer did classic studies on the Dutch and Portuguese seaborne empires, J.H. Parry supplied one on the Spanish Empire, and now Jeremy Black has filled this niche for the British experience. A moment's reflection will convince anyone of the enormity of this task. The longevity and extent of both this empire and this maritime experience make Black's task a Herculean one.

Two stated aims of the book are significant. One is to dedicate as much, or more space to the twentieth century as to the nineteenth century, because the theme of the decline of maritime dominance is seen to be of great importance. The other is to lay great stress on war and international relations, an approach which runs counter to much imperial history writing of the recent past. While not decrying the insights thus gained, Black makes the key point that the empire was established by a political and
commercial elite who sought national goals ruthlessly. No serious student of the empire can lose sight of that. From at least the mid-eighteenth century, and well into the twentieth, the British elite made conscious decisions to fund the most powerful navy in the world and to promote imperial interests in the cause of national greatness and prosperity. One can never fully understand British national values or political and social attitudes without grasping this connection. Of interest to Commonwealth countries is Black’s reminder that such attitudes were often exported with the settlers. The "Imperial experience" was lengthy, pervasive and very widespread. More specialized naval historians will have reason to applaud the author, because of the efforts in recent years to relate naval history to wider historical issues to rescue it from the academic margins.

Of necessity, the book is divided chronologically. Approximately 40 pages for the "Origines" of empire, 114 pages for the lengthy struggle with France to 1815, 77 pages for the nineteenth century Pax Britannica, and 90 pages for the gradual twentieth century decline. An introductory chapter and a conclusion round out the book. The sheer scale of the topic compels compression, and in many sections imperial historians will not find much that is new, except perhaps for naval details and issues involved; similarly, naval and maritime historians will find little new material in the details of the campaigns, except for the impact on imperial issues. If the book has any problems, this might be it. This overlap of familiar issues is also indicated by the bibliography and references which are overwhelmingly from secondary rather than documentary sources. That being said, the bibliography is vast, as are the footnotes (30 pages worth), which illustrate scholarship of the highest order.

The strengths of this book are many. Black is, of course, an established scholar of very high repute. One can depend on his scholarship, and be assured that his judgements are carefully considered. He maintains a deft touch when juggling numerous issues and locales, so that as a mini-history of the growth and maintenance of British imperial influence, this book will go a long way. There are also nuggets of insight about the imperial idea when Black is able to escape the narrative of acquisitions and challenges for some reflective comment. Hence, as a reference source for anyone interested in naval and imperial history, this is an excellent volume. Black has retold the imperial experience with a focus on the oceans, and for that all students of maritime and naval history can be grateful.

Perhaps as a result of his travels, Black never loses sight of the Dominions in imperial development. Britain remains the focus, and rightly so, but support or indifference to the imperial ethos in the colonies is always in the picture. An example is the ongoing analysis of Canada's active imperial role tempered by the growing benefits of the American relationship.

Black examines the end of empire dispassionately, but with a few provocative twists: it was not all caused by financial exhaustion post-1945. In practical terms, if one no longer needs a chain of coaling stations, and if much of one's goods travel in mid-ocean in supertankers and cargo ships, the need for coastal control is quite small. Thus the relinquishing of "formal" empire does not necessarily imply the end of "informal" empire. The trendy use of the term "American Empire" pops up as a useful example in current affairs, since the Americans control very little territory aside from the homeland. Perhaps there remains a very quiet and modest British Empire? Intriguing as that concept might be, Black does illustrate how the sea has declined as a national icon. Popular British culture marginalizes the sea, and fewer people each year make a living from it, particularly in the shipbuilding and shipping industries.

There is every reason to recommend this book. Specialists will find much that is familiar, but also much intriguing material from related fields. Students particularly will find it useful. It is the kind of synopsis which needs the touch of a mature scholar, and Black has succeeded admirably.

Paul Webb
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When three small books focussed on a variety of watercraft arrive together, and the Reviews Editor kindly allows some latitude in combining them but limits delivery time, they tempt comparison. The following reviews are offered to introduce similar subjects covered by three authors in widely separated locales. Varied boats of Donegal, Sado Island and Kintyre are the topics and the books range from a virtual DIY instruction manual to a simple illustrated and annotated catalogue.

Interestingly, when books come in bunches they become interesting by comparing them as objects. The Japanese book is a little jewel of a volume, almost Victorian in its compact solidity. Although soft covered, the dust jacket is cut so that the folded-in portions are tapered and a braided silken bookmark is sewn to the spine. The others descend in quality, size and format reflecting their disparate publishers.

Two books include outline maps to provide contextual settings for their subject, and all were illustrated with photographs of different quality depending on age of origin and the subject matter. Only two contain line drawings, but they all could all benefit from clear drawings, as these are often far superior to photographs for clarifying details.

*The Tub Boats of Sado Island,* an excellent little book, has a single well focused purpose. The American author studied the construction of the Sado Island tub boats, interviewed their builders, observed them working and eventually built two examples in Japan on his own. He describes exactly how to build the boat and the unique tools and materials needed for the job.

Sado Island lies in the Sea of Japan nestled into the cradle of Honshu, Japan’s largest island. The fishermen on the Ogi Peninsula, the southern tip of Sado, have used tub boats, or more correctly the taraibune since an earthquake in 1802 drastically altered the shoreline of their peninsula. The new rocky fissured coast encouraged the growth of seaweeds and sheltered fish in calmer waters, so only a simple craft was needed to harvest both species. Local coopers who worked making wooden fermenting vats or tubs for the miso paste producers on Sado, were asked to build the first taraibunes and though the first designs were round, use and latter refinements proved that a slightly elongated tub tracked better. The oval size of taraibunes was something over 1.5 m long, with a beam of about 1.2 m and was just over 0.5 m deep.

The traditional builders never used drawings or kept written records and only a few wooden gauges were kept for certain specific dimensions and angles. Apprentices were never instructed but were simply allowed to observe their master, and act as helpers as their confidence grew, so traditions were passed along. Taraibune builders or apprentices usually came from the cooperage trade.

The bottom of the vessel is conventional with a slight amount of rocker and reverse camber to keep bilge water away from the edges. The planking is all vertical "staving." All the cedar wood components are connected with handmade bamboo pegs in the centre of the plank thickness, and the tub is held together by three woven or braided bamboo staves. The deceptively simple craft has no metal parts. Beackets or rope rings are fitted through holes at each end of the taraibune for carrying handles
and act as a fulcrum for securing the single sculling oar. No thwarts or seats are fitted.

The author clearly describes the building process and precedes his construction text with a short outline of the history of the craft. Taraibume building is described by following Brooks' mentor, the late Koichi Fujii as he builds a boat, with added notes expanding details from the methods later used by Brooks. This technique works well as no minor task has been overlooked because of assumed simplicity or triviality. At the end of Brooks' description some information is provided about the use of the boat and the equipment which goes with it, perhaps the most interesting being the "sight glass" - the glass bottomed box the fishermen use to look beneath the surface of the water.

There are many small but clear photographs and dimensioned drawings and sketches. All are included in the "back" half of the book, the 107 page Japanese section, numbered from the back (to western readers). So the many sequential construction photos and drawings have to be read in reverse. English captions for the illustrations are grouped at the end of the English section and are clearly numbered, although it would perhaps have been helpful if these photo numbers had also been inserted in the appropriate places in the English text. There are also many full-page colour photographs, though strangely the book's index is only in Japanese!

This is an excellent monograph about an unique fishing vessel, another on the list of rapidly vanishing wooden watercraft. No more builders are taking up the labour-intensive building task. All the existing boats are deteriorating except for a few in museums or private collections. Most of the remaining working boats have been covered with fibreglass and this has only served to increase the rate of rotting! Strangely the most popular current use for taraibunes is to take tourists out on short tours for which a glass section has been fitted to the bottom to observe the life on the sea bed.

The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

The Zulu Fishermen. Forgotten Pioneers of Donegal's First Fishing Industry is about an industry resulting from a potato famine. Due to failing potato harvests, living conditions in Donegal in the late 1880s had deteriorated at an alarming rate. Not since the Great Famine of the 1840s had conditions been so bad, and that earlier crop disaster had also ruined the local fishing enterprise. It was claimed that the coastal Irish did not eat fish unless served with potatoes, so interest in the fishery fell - small yaws and curraghs were the preferred vessels.

In an attempt to alleviate some of the many problems associated with poverty and to improve the food supply in the region, (Donegal and much of the west coast of Ireland) the British Government established the Congested Districts Board (CDB). The book deals with the problems of the fishery and the way that the board attempted to solve them. The Chief Secretary for Ireland, Arthur J. Balfour, made a tour of the district in 1890 to assess the appalling situation and form a base line from which to grow.

The immediate solution was to bring in larger, improved fishing vessels, the Zulu luggers of Western Scotland. These vessels did not evolve as most indigenous craft but were purpose-designed and came into Scottish operation to coincide with the South African Zulu Wars - hence their strange name. With the boats came a much wider expertise, experienced Scottish fishermen also came to train and demonstrate how to use the boats and effectively fish. Each boat carried a Scot, while with the fishermen came boatbuilders to teach the craft and to build new boats locally. Fish filleters, smokers, curers; and coopers were among others brought in to create and train a holistic fishery. The author relates the chronology of the operation very well and details the building and management operation.

The CDB saw that the operation was funded and actually bought the processed catch for onward transit to Dublin as well as to larger English markets. Suitable buildings and wharves were constructed to support the enterprise. To expedite the operation a railway was built along the coast so that fresh product could be moved rapidly.

Like many of these types of project there were good aspects and unforseen problems. Those who devised them were well intentioned but could not always determine the scale of the problems or factors which did not parallel
conditions elsewhere. When the fishery became viable and started to improve the lot of the local people, fishermen from outside the region came with bigger boats to exploit the stocks. By the time the men became familiar with their boats and the fishery, new craft with steam engines and small internal combustion engines had come into use and the local sailing fleet became more inefficient. There was a reluctance to adapt to the new reality and it is not clearly stated but perhaps the funding was not available for the new complex vessels.

After the introductory chapters we are taken through a quarter of a century of the history of this noble enterprise until it finally succumbed to the increasing pressures elsewhere including the First World War. Each chapter/year describes the new boats, movements of the fleets, catch types and quantity, and boat losses. The many details clearly illustrate the progress and social impact of the fishery and while they are comprehensive, they also suggest that much more could have been done with the available sources. The new trade skills enabled expansion, boats and barrels were sold outside the district, fish was processed and the value-added of all this activity increased revenues.

The only possible suggestion for improving this comprehensive volume would be to move the Appendices to the front of the book and make them a prologue or introduction. They detail the Congested Districts Board’s mandate, and the description of the share and loan system goes a long way toward explaining the whole process. This information, combined with the excellent details in Chapter One, would improve the reader’s concept of the operation. The final Appendix, a letter to the shareboat crews advising them of the termination of the share system should remain at the end. Altogether, The Zulu Fishermen is a first class example of the social history of an introduced industrial infrastructure for a limited period of external influence.

Tarbert Fishing Boats, 1925-75 is a fine example of the kind of publication the British seem to do so well. It is an enthusiast’s outpouring of collected information about his favourite topic. It appears to be a self-published book, the type which the computer has made relatively simple to compile and take to a printer. Unfortunately it also contains some drawbacks of the genre - a List of Contents without page numbers and spotty editing, and it was even difficult to decide which of the two Scottish Tarberts was involved! The author's familiarity with the topic suggests that there could have been much more information about the boat's design, building and fishing methods.

After the introduction, each boat in the fleet is chronologically listed and described, in many instances with a photograph. The differences are clearly related to the various local builders who put their own design signatures to a more or less common class. The photographs and artistic illustrations come mainly from the author's collection, the artistic renderings are very clear and appealing but unfortunately all in black and white. The vessels are listed in ascending order of their registration numbers, all preceded by "T. T." and an added list in five year chronological steps is added, as the author felt more clarity was needed. But it is still a little difficult to detect design developments of these attractive double-ended craft.

It is a commendable, dedicated local work and the appendices contain useful information on the many builders and their bow and stern design idiosyncrasies, as well as acknowledgements and a bibliography. Altogether this book could be of interest of the Scottish fishing vessel enthusiast, but the lack of depth would make it frustrating to the serious student. However, these craft have not had much recognition and this work is a welcome introduction to their world.

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Roger Chesneau. King George V Class Battleships. London: Chatham Publishing,
These, the first two books in a planned series, state that "The aim of this innovative series is to provide model makers and warship enthusiasts with a new standard of primarily visual reference to both the full-size ships and their models, using detailed line drawings, plans and photographs, many in full colour."

Both books use crisp, clear graphics, photographs, text, and tables. A few photographs lack crispness, but their rarity probably warranted their use. Two-page spreads generally occur at the centre page of a sewn section. When a spread crosses a page join, the join is almost invisible and alignment is invariably superb. In both books the last page contains references, a bibliography, plan sources, videos, and websites.

**German Pocket Battleships** examines the Deutschland Class, **Deutschland** (later **Lutzow**), **Admiral Sheer**, and **Admiral Graf Spee**, were designed as commerce raiders, displacing 10,000 tons, with a length of 185.7 metres (609.25 feet). Their primary armament was six 28cm (11.0 inch), secondary of eight 15cm (5.9 inch), close range armament and six torpedo tubes aft. Diesel powered, with armour and armament sacrificed in favour of speed and range, they were capable of 6 knots, well suited for their purpose. British journalists derisively called them Pocket Battleships. In February 1940 Germany reclassified them as heavy cruisers. On their first combat sorties, **Admiral Sheer** took, or sank, seventeen ships; **Admiral Graf Spee** accounted for nine; **Deutschland** sank two in an aborted sortie.

Critical reviews reveal that quality and historic accuracy vary kit to kit. Anyone considering a purchase should study these reviews; Italeri, Fujimi, Airfix, and Heller provided kits. Scales range from 1:350 to 1:720; 1:1250 kits are available for war gamers. Kits come in plastic, or resin cast, and in either waterline or full-hulled models. Hints and tips are offered and photos of the kit boxes are provided.

After-market, etched brass frets, available from Eduard, Gold Medal Models and White Ensign Models are reviewed. While none are designed for the Deutschland class, others can be used. Scale figures, decals for flags and pennants, and 20 mm weapons are available from other suppliers.

An inspiring colour photo gallery of models is included. Some are kits; others are semi- or fully scratchbuilt models - one is operational. While individuals built most models, one was by a team.

Camouflage schemes, including those on catapult-launched aircraft are provided, as are line drawings for the aircraft. As it was seven years from the laying of the first keel until the last ship commissioned, design changes occurred between ships. Superb line drawings highlight the differences, with close-up photos; refit summaries are also provided. Plans of Graf Spee as in 1939 include a plan and outboard profile, sixteen station drawings, but no body plan.

Using the same format and section sequence as the first book, the **King George V Class Battleships** presents **King George V**, **Prince of Wales**, **Duke of York**, **Anson**, and **Howe**. Displacing 35,000 tons, with a length of 700 feet, armament consisted of ten 14-inch, sixteen 5.25-inch, thirty-two 2 pdrs, with a planned speed of 28.5 knots. They were laid down within seven months in 1937, with all five commissioning between December 1940 and August 1942.

While few changes occurred to these ships during the war, those that did are discussed or shown in drawings. Kits are available from Réveil, GHR, Navis-Neptun, Eaglewall, Lindberg, Tamiya, Aurora, Airfix, and Heller. Pulling no punches, these reviews give credit where it is due, and are recommended reading for anyone considering the purchase of a kit.

A range of etched brass packs and accessories including figures, decals, 20 mm Oerlikons, railing, ladders, etc are available from the same suppliers mentioned earlier. Most are for **King George V** (or KG V), and **Prince of Wales**, but some can be used for any ship in the class.

The photo gallery includes the magnificent official builder's model of **King
George V, which is in the National Maritime Museum; kit models and dioramas include a superb model of Prince of Wales from an Airfix kit by Peter Hall, a designer for White Ensign Models, and a superb scratchbuilt model of Anson by Brian King. These represent some of the finest models of this class of ships anywhere.

Colour schemes are provided for King George V as she was in 1941 and 1943. The appearance section is well equipped with photographs, and refit summaries. Plans and outboard profiles at 1:700 scale are provided for King George V as she was in 1940 and in 1945. Of use to scratch builders, a body plan, with a profile and waterline, plus twenty-four stations are included.

With more books planned for the series, Chesneau has created two superb and useful additions to model builders' libraries. Both books are highly recommended.

N. R. Cole
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The barque Picton Castle is one of the few success stories in the long list of projects that have sought to rebuild or recreate ships from the golden age of seafaring under sail, and then make them paying propositions by taking amateur sailors to sea, there to suffer the rigours and dangers of square-rig seamanship while paying handsomely for the experience.

Registered in the Cook Islands, homeported in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, but conceived and run by Americans, Picton Castle departs regularly on lengthy circumnavigations from Lunenburg to such exotic landfalls as Tahiti and the lesser-known islands of the Indian Ocean in its wandering way around the world. Commanding the vessel and its heterogeneous crew of boomers in crisis, rootless youngsters with tattoos, and all the wounded or questing souls such adventures attract is an odd but highly qualified visionary, Daniel Moreland. Moreland learned his extraordinarily complete set of mariner's qualifications in the harsh world of European sail training ships, yet in person is more like a Greenwich Village poet. He has a disconcerting way of looking off at the horizon or a nearby wall while talking with anyone, and parting with a surprisingly soft handshake rather than the expected steely grip of a square-rig master mariner. But for several years Moreland has successfully brought the big, converted North Sea trawler home to Lunenburg after each voyage, and always to a waiting list of applicants for the next trip.

Fair Wind And Plenty Of It is the highly subjective recollection of a young Nova Scotian, Rigel Crockett, who became involved with the ship's conversion along with his father, and who then sailed alone with the ship when his father withdrew. The book follows the ship and its people throughout an eventful circumnavigation, and documents in sometimes painful detail the enormously difficult task Moreland faced in not only getting Picton Castle safely around the world, but making a wildly diverse, undisciplined and turbulent group of individuals into a competent crew. The sea, particularly in square-rig ships, is no place for self-absorption or incompetence, and in the era when ships like Picton Castle plied the world's trade routes, they were manned by crews of a conservative nature forced by law, circumstance and inclination to self-discipline and immediate obedience to orders.

What Rigel Crockett reveals in his account is a paying, not paid, crew who were anything but malleable to discipline or inclined to the staid conservatism of seamen of the nineteenth century. Deprived of the use of iron discipline or the fists of a bully mate to run his ship, Moreland is depicted as a strange mystic who uses psychological games and manipulates relationships to achieve his ends. Whether Crockett's portrait of him is a fair one is difficult to determine. Certainly one wonders what tools Moreland could possibly use to captain a vessel awash in sexual interaction, personality disorders and all the libertarian values of the "children of the sea" - the homeless young people who drift from boat job to boat job in the
yacht harbours of the world. The crew are as wildly different from the world of gruff fishermen or square-rig hands of a past era as it is possible to imagine. That Moreland pulls it off is astonishing, and suggests that there is more steel in Moreland's softness that meets the eye.

The book never quite achieves a consistent voice or point of view in presenting the author's struggles to become a competent seaman and resolve his relationship with his difficult and other-worldly captain, although there are signs that Crockett has it in him to become a fine writer. Fair Wind And Plenty Of It is more an expunging of personal ghosts than the account of a circumnavigation, and may convince the lay reader that only very strange people willingly go to sea in traditional sailing ships these days. For those interested in one young man's often painful process of self-discovery, the book offers all the angst to dissect one might wish. For those interested in traditional seamanship or who value the continuing survival of archaic vessels and sail training as a means of personal growth, the world of Picton Castle as Crockett presents it is a disturbing reminder that those ancient seafaring arts are more often kept alive today by odd people at the edges of society rather than the prosaic citizenry at its core. That by the time Picton Castle dropped its anchor at the voyage's conclusion the crew knew what to do and did it well only serves to illustrate that the sea forces prudence and self-discipline upon even those least inclined to accept either.

Victor Suthren
Ottawa, Ontario


Adventures of a Sea Hunter is just that - a compilation of shipwreck and other stories told in a clear and popular manner. This book describes the author's visits to more than fifteen different dive sites, mostly shipwrecks, mostly famous, and a few less famous. The sites range from Kublai Khan's fleet, to the Titanic through to several Second World War vessels sunk at Pearl Harbor. The human element underscores all of the writing as applied to both the site visits and the original historical events. These stories are told with a sense of adventure and a strong element of the author's understanding of past events and his commitment to share this experience with the reader.

Jim Delgado is a consummate storyteller and communicator. Combined with his love of historical research, he is a master at bringing the past to life and giving it real meaning. In discussing his personal background, he states that one of his mentors, a museum curator, taught him at the early age of 14 that "collecting the past meant nothing unless you share it with others and make it relevant and exciting for them" (217). Delgado has carried this lesson with him into adulthood as he spins his real-life tales of adventure. His ability to evoke an emotional response from the reader is well illustrated in his description of visiting the wreck of USS Arizona where we are introduced to the evocative memories of the sailors and their loved ones. Delgado's emphasis on what those associated with each site might have felt draws the reader into the site itself.

The real adventure of the book comes when the author describes diving on the sites. He includes not only what he is experiencing as a diver but also how he feels about the people and events associated with the site. Divers can identify with his admissions of simple diving mistakes that all divers make, and how they can potentially end in disaster. In pointing out what he should have done on a dive, he goes on to tell how he used his training to correct the situation. All of this is done with a sense of humour and an ability to laugh at oneself.

This book is not about detailed archeological research but rather, the excitement involved, when for example, he discusses his plans to dive and explore the flooded depths of Mittelbau-Dora, a Nazi concentration camp and rocket factory. "Our goal is to venture into some of its forgotten rooms and bring back film footage to share with the world" (154). It is about storytelling, film making and entertaining.
It is about brief encounters with a great variety of interesting sites as seen through the eyes of the author.

Although the book is not archaeological in nature, it carries an important archaeological/conservation message. Right from the introduction, the author emphasizes that any non-scientific, non-archaeological recovery of materials destroys the story that these materials, in context, can tell us. Archaeology needs this sort of boost in promoting preservation and the quest for knowledge of people, places and events in a popular readable format.

While this book does not provide detailed analytical research of a shipwreck or event, it does offer an interesting, highly entertaining snapshot of events as taken by the author and his team. It reaches out to the lay audience and draws them into the adventure. And, as has been succinctly stated by Donald H. Keith in "The Importance of Myth, Magic and Stubbornness in Underwater Archaeology": Underwater archaeology needs, "Stubborn people who can tell the difference between a good myth and a bad myth, between science and magic: and who can tell a tale that will prevail in the style of its telling, as much as by the soundness of its facts." The author's stubbornness or lack thereof was not evident to me in the Adventures of a Sea Hunter. What was evident was his ability to bring an historic event to life by telling a first-rate story.

Peter Waddell
Ottawa, Ontario


Peter Earle's study of the pirate wars is a wide-ranging examination of the rise and fall of European and American piracy from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. Its central theme, which provides an underlying continuity to the complex and varied development of maritime prédation, is concerned with the ultimate eradication of piracy by increasingly effective state navies. At the same time, in discussing the ambiguity of attitudes towards pirates, both past and present, it seeks to dispel the romantic myths and fables that the subject is prone to cultivate. The book is conveniently organized, with six chapters covering pirate activities and customs and five dealing with naval and admiralty responses. It is firmly focussed on the development of piracy in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, though there is some discussion of its spread into the South Sea and the Indian Ocean. The growth of English piracy and privateering during the later sixteenth century serves as a foundation for the subsequent discussion, which consequently tends to be weighted in favour of English and Anglo-American activity. Earle argues that the rovers operating during this early period were not "real" pirates, in the sense that they either acted or were identified as members of an outcast community, who were the "enemies of mankind" (25); instead they were patriotic "protestants" whose plunder of Iberian trade and shipping was widely supported, and at times even encouraged by the monarchy.

As this study indicates, the development of English Atlantic piracy was both cause and consequence of the pirate wars. A new type of piratical enterprise emerged during the early seventeenth century, in which well-organized fleets cruised between North Africa and south-west Ireland, occasionally crossing the Atlantic to plunder in the Caribbean or off Newfoundland. For a variety of reasons, this outbreak of piracy did not last long. By the 1620s, organized, large-scale piratical enterprise appears to have been in terminal decline in north-west European waters. While the growing efficiency of the Royal Navy was instrumental in this success, it was reinforced by changing attitudes towards pirates which can be detected among royal courts and local communities. Nonetheless piracy continued to flourish, though under different conditions in the Caribbean during the 1650s and 1660s, and in parts of colonial North America at least until the 1720s. In these contexts there were also striking developments in pirate customs and behaviour, including the emergence of remarkably
democratic practices among some groups of rovers. The author insists that piracy remained a business; however in the hands of commentators such as captain Charles Johnson, the lives of pirate captains, real or imaginary, could be used to project an image of an Utopian society which questioned the values of an emerging bourgeois society. During the early eighteenth century, indeed, piracy seems to have acquired a political and ideological edge that can be detected in the way in which some pirates described themselves as "Robin Hood's Men" (169). Such was the complex nature of the problem, that maritime states, led by Britain, ruthlessly hunted down pirate groups in what some historians, including Earle, have seen as a ruthless war of extermination. Some pirate leaders like Edward Teach, the Blackbeard of legend, were killed in battle; many others were captured and executed.

By contrast, Mediterranean piracy continued to be a problem until the early nineteenth century. But, as Peter Earle makes clear, this was different to the kind of venturing that developed in the Atlantic, though there was an overlap between the two, as demonstrated in the careers of renegade mariners from northern Europe who provided the Barbary corsairs with some of the skills to undertake Atlantic raiding which extended as far north as Iceland. There was a long-standing tradition of maritime plunder within the Mediterranean, but it was confused with volatile religious and cultural rivalries between the forces of Christianity and Islam. Although the Barbary corsairs were well-organized and business-like in approach, they also tended to identify themselves as legitimate warriors in a holy war which justified the plunder of Christian shipping and the seizure of Christian slaves. In these circumstances, as Earle points out, the Barbary corsairs fit awkwardly into the history of piracy, though their raids inspired widespread terror among maritime communities which helped to undermine support for locally-based pirates.

This is a valuable contribution to maritime history. It is a judicious, sympathetic but unromantic survey of an important seafaring activity which, at varying times in the past, involved thousands of mariners. It is firmly grounded in modern scholarship, while the use of the records of the British Admiralty, particularly in the discussion of the surprising, though short-lived, revival of piracy during the early nineteenth century, draws attention to a body of evidence that deserves to be more effectively mined by students of the subject. In addition, the brisk commentary on some modern interpretations of English and Anglo-American piracy should provoke further discussion of an enduringly fascinating issue in maritime studies.

John C. Appleby
Liverpool, UK


In an attempt to capture the richly laden Spanish Treasure Fleet from the Americas, Lord Thomas Howard sailed his ships to the Azores in April 1591 to await its arrival. The Treasure Fleet had not returned in 1590, so doubled fortunes were anticipated by the crews and masters on board the English ships. Unfortunately for Howard, four of the six treasure ships had already reached Cascais at the mouth of the river Tagus while his fleet was still being fitted out in London! In this way about one and a half million English pounds were safely procured for King Philip II. Meanwhile, rumours spread across the Iberian peninsula, finally arriving at the Escorial in Simancas. From the onset, thanks to his intricately woven web of intelligence, Philip II knew that Howard's fleet had only been provisioned for four months. Accordingly, he postponed the departure of the remaining ships of the Treasure Fleet from Havana. At the same time, the King issued orders to assemble a large armada and within several months, some 50 ships and over 7,000 men (soldiers and sailors alike) were ready! Only three years after the disastrous Armada campaign against England, another large Spanish fleet under the command of Don Alonso de Bazán was prepared to meet its English opponents; this time not in the Channel, but in the Azores, just off the island of
Flores. The Spanish fleet made the crossing from Portugal to the Azores in a remarkably short time. Suddenly, while only fifty miles away from the English, Bazán ordered his captains to shorten sail. One of the most important ships of the fleet, San Andres, had broken her bowsprit and De Bazán thought it wise to adapt the pace of the fleet to that of the damaged ship. This allowed the English more desperately needed time to prepare themselves, since many of their crews were sick, tired and hungry, as provisions ran very low.

Due to recent English raids on the Azorean islands, the local inhabitants were not inclined to provide assistance and food voluntarily. The main focus of their hatred was the vice-admiral of the English fleet, commander of the galleon Revenge, and former ringleader of the raids on the islands: Richard Grenville, or Don Ricardo de Campoverde, the "great heretic and persecutor of Catholics," as the islanders called him. They also did not warn the English about the nearby presence of the Armada. In Earle's words: "As they stared at the armada of Spain, they could only hope that the English, and especially Don Ricardo in the Revenge, would reap the fate they so richly deserved" (111).

On the early morning of 30 August Admiral Lord Thomas Howard received news about the course and presence of the armada. "This was devastating news. Here was the English fleet at anchor, with half its men ashore and many of the ships still without their ballast, and an armada of fifty-three ships only hours away" (110). The galleons had to be reballasted as quickly as possible or they would be unable to carry full sail for fear of capsizing. In order to confuse the enemy even more, Bazán decided to have his fleet split up: one squadron would approach the English from the south-east, another one would sail from the southwest, the direction from where the English expected the Treasure Fleet to come.

All but one of Howard's ships managed to escape from Bazan's trap. For reasons still unknown after over 400 years, Grenville and the Revenge were the last to leave the roadsted. In so doing, he faced Spanish men-of-war coming from both sides. "Sir Richard Grenville had two courses open for him: the course of honour and the course of discretion." (117), or, as the romantic, nineteenth-century poet Alfred, Lord Tennyson put it in his "Last Fight of the Revenge": "Shall we fight or shall we fly? Good Sir Richard, tell us now, for to fight is but to die!"

The ensuing battle - known to many maritime historians as "the battle of one against fifty-three" - is the subject of the book reviewed here. Luckily, Peter Earle offers much more than "just" a dry account of the events that took place during the afternoon and very long, dark night of 30 August, 1591. He masterfully intertwines the political, military and personal backgrounds of the battle, the situation in situ (that is; on and near the islands of the Azores, as well as the in the minds of the inhabitants) and the compellingly ironic aftermath of one of the greatest maritime epics of mankind: the battle of Sir Richard Grenville and his famous galleon Revenge against an overwhelmingly superior Spanish fleet. In the end, after fifteen hours of intense fighting of one against five (not fifty-three!), the Spaniards managed to capture the ship. Although Richard Grenville died three days later of the many wounds he had received, the remaining crew was treated respectfully.

Earle wrote this book for two reasons. First, because he was brought up on naval history and considers the story about the battle "just about the best and certainly the craziest in the long annals of England's maritime history. How could one ship fight fifty-three?" The second reason bears a less personal character, as Earle claims: "I have more to tell about the fight and its background than any previous writer, since this account is the first one to make full use of the abundant source material in the archives at Simancas in Spain." (9). It is, therefore, a great pity that the author, while displaying his skills in using the divers sources in the text, does not list the primary sources at the end of the book, next to the secondary sources he has used in abundance.

Whatever one may think of the rather blunt statement quoted above, Earle has managed to provide more insight into the armaments, goals, activities or frustrations of the Spaniards involved whether it is based on personal accounts or an impressive mass of
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official records piled up in the archives at Simancas. In this respect, much more so than in the repetition of quotes from Sir Walter Raleigh, Jan Huygen van Linschoten or others so familiar to us from other secondary sources about the Armadas, Earle's book is a well-researched, masterfully written contribution to our knowledge about maritime Europe during the last decade of the sixteenth century. It will also serve to balance the stream of publications about the Revenge which focus almost solely on the achievements of the English, disregarding (or at least belittling) the involvement of the Spaniards. In that sense, Peter Earle's book takes "revenge" for a lack of impartiality in previous accounts: nomen est omen.

Joost C.A. Schokkenbroek
Amsterdam, The Netherlands


Anyone with a Ph.D. purports to have made an original contribution to knowledge, and almost all academics readily acknowledge their great debt to other scholars. In the case of Christopher Columbus's landmark voyage, how original was "his" idea to sail west to get the east? James Robert Enterline attempts to answer this question in his book, Erikson, Eskimos, and Columbus: Medieval European Knowledge of America.

Trying to reassemble the scholarly treatises, travellers' tales and maps that Columbus may have been exposed to is a tricky business. As the author readily acknowledges on several occasions, such a construct is difficult to build and almost impossible to prove. We must deal almost exclusively with historical theories and likelihoods and even drift into speculation on occasion. This will never suffice to change some existing views about Columbus. Yet, Enterline's evidence may suggest Columbus and other European explorers were privy to some Eskimo and Norse experience of the lands to the west. It is very possible that seafarers and geographers heard rumours of distant landfalls well before rapid European expansion began in the Renaissance. If this is the case, Columbus's leap of faith was more grounded in the natural than the supernatural.

Enterline's work deals mainly with Norse and Eskimo knowledge of northern regions, Greenland and beyond, that may have seeped into European consciousness. The foundation of his argument rests on a significant number of European maps and texts which he uses as a barometer of contemporary geographic information. There are some helpful illustrations, but in some cases it is difficult to discern "the visual" which should accompany Enterline's comments about various cartographic bumps, inlets and peculiarities. His argument is hampered by the fact that many medieval maps no longer exist: all historical sources struggle to survive but outdate maps are routinely destroyed as a matter of course. The author attempts to glean from other sources what has vanished in the interim, a problematic but an interesting exercise. The existence of the extremely controversial Vinland map, if authenticated, would tie many of Enterline's fragile threads together. This is no doubt why he includes an appendix which deals with the dating of its ink (or possibly "inks").

Enterline candidly sets out his methodology and indicates various areas where he knows his evidence is wanting. Given how elusive his prey is, his best chance for success lies with a sheer preponderance of evidence that contact among the Europeans, Norse and Eskimos occurred in some fashion. While the maps and texts help bolster aspects of his theory, Enterline also makes tantalizing allusions to material findings. Viking artifacts unearthed in North America, as well as material evidence of European and Eskimo influence in Norse communities in Greenland clearly point to Europe-Norse-Eskimo contact. From my perspective, these fascinating references to material culture are an under-utilized aspect of his argument.

And so, the Eskimo-Norse-European
link can be made, but its relationship to Columbus and "Asia" is far less certain. Most of the book is given over to stressing the former connections. Yet, there is a tantalizing possibility that Columbus may have made a voyage to Iceland during his early days as a seafarer. If this supposition could be supported, Enterline's chain of connections is far sturdier.

Enterline senses that his evidence is not sufficient to change the traditionalist view of Columbus as a fortunate bumbler who played fast and loose with his astrolabe and found land on a wing and a prayer. Yet, Enterline sees his work as a beginning step and outlines areas for future research, much as he thinks Columbus "tapped into" extant sources about what might lay outside the European world. The author hopes to deflate the "great man theory of history" in favour of a "joint uncovering" which started with the Norsemen and various other ethnic groups.

Globalization is a trendy concept right now and the author argues for medieval dissemination of information among disparate groups. What he never addresses, however, are attempts to hide exploration data from rival merchants, sovereigns and seafarers, especially those from other nation-states. Political, academic and commercial competition made such information much sought-after but also fiercely protected. How might have this have influenced the sharing of such details?

Whether we buy Enterline's theories completely or in part, it is well worth pondering the place of the Norse and the Eskimos in inspiring widespread European travels westward. Efforts to use cartography to chart European intellectual history are fraught with hazards, but the process certainly leads to some lively debate. Eventually scholarly and general opinion may fully endorse the image of a more calculating Columbus whose "leap of faith" was more of a hop. The author goes on to assert that Columbus may have been the first man to use something approaching the scientific method, even though much about his views was grounded in ultraconservative medievalism. This might be a more difficult pill to swallow than Enterline's very reasonable argument that the discovery of America owes much to those in northern climes and goes well beyond Christopher Columbus. Nonetheless, history (and exploration!) thrive on those bold enough to challenge and change existing paradigms.

Cheryl Fury
Saint John, N. B.


If your life depends upon your equipment, it is best to know all you can about it. In this book the author, himself the coxswain of a lifeboat, has made a most thorough study of his chosen profession.

The book is divided into four distinct parts, each one expanding the reader's knowledge and understanding of rescue at sea. The first section reviews the history of lifesaving with each chapter ending with an account of a particularly harrowing or heroic rescue at sea. From here the author moves to a detailed examination of the evolution of the modern lifeboat, starting with the earliest craft. This section is undoubtedly the "guts" of the book, for no other class of vessel has had so many years of careful thought and experimentation put into its evolution. A brief third section touches on peripheral fields, since shore-based breeches buoys, modern airborne techniques and offshore rescue systems cannot be viewed as entirely separate. The final part, a country-by-county analysis of various approaches to rescue, begins with a description of each nation's coastline and storm conditions which influenced their choice of craft and the rescue organization best suited to their local needs.

Lifesaving at sea is an ever-developing art, benefitting from each new technical advance and from experience with earlier designs. The author has wisely limited himself to coastal rescue craft, but such is the complexity of the subject that it was only by trial and error (and there have been many errors), that the modern
lifeboat has been evolved. And even that is constantly changing. In recent years for example, the explosive growth of pleasure craft has necessitated a whole new class of rescue vessel, and this rate of change, slow at first, has quickened with increasingly complicated equipment and modern back-up systems.

Until two hundred years ago, a shipwrecked mariner, cast on a stormbound shore, had little hope of survival, for nowhere in the world did facilities exist for his assistance. At the heart of the book is the story of how coastal communities slowly began to respond to major catastrophes in their midst. It is an inspiring tale with many local variations, not surprising considering the extreme range of rescue situations. Inshore conditions in a storm vary greatly, depending upon the nature of the bottom. Thus it is impossible to compare, say, the rockbound cliffs of the Pacific Northwest with the shifting shoals and channels of the Netherlands' North Sea coast.

Lifesaving craft were first designed to meet very local conditions, mostly by adapting existing boats to better survive extreme weather conditions. A successful rescue naturally encouraged other localities to do likewise. Soon national organizations began to spring up in a handful of countries. Success followed success, and in recent years many others have followed suit. This has not necessarily always resulted in the creation of the ideal form of craft. The first lifeboats were oar- or sail-powered, but by the turn of the century, with the introduction of the internal combustion engine, powered lifeboats began to evolve. Even today the debate continues. Are unsinkable or self-righting lifeboats the best?

Crucial to the development of the modern lifeboat was the institution, in 1924, of the first International Conference for the Saving of Life at Sea. The nineteenth such conference took place recently. Participants sometimes bring their own lifeboats to the venue, and these valuable exchanges of ideas have in turn led to a more standardized form of craft, suitable for the more common type of rescue conditions in other countries. But one single type of lifeboat is unlikely since the critical importance of saving lives at sea will always produce strong differences of opinion, a most healthy characteristic, auguring well for design improvements in future years.

National rescue organizations have grown up in different ways, some developed by government and others entirely volunteer, so that their financing and structure vary appreciably. Recently, with new and better communication systems, operational control is becoming centralized, enabling marshalling of widespread resources with the minimum of delay.

Virtually unknown is how sophisticated the modern lifeboat has become, for most often they are locating far from the madding crowd. Our latest Canadian 47-footers have a multiple-man system to con the craft. Linked by headsets, each person is responsible for different aspects of the controls for in lifesaving situations every second counts. Seating too is specifically designed to lessen the continuous spine-jolting shock from the vessel jumping off metres-high wave tops at 30 knots.

The book is full of wonderful surprises. Who would have supposed that the tiny, landlocked nation of Switzerland has one of the most highly developed marine rescue services in the world, or that in Chile, enthusiasm is so great that volunteers actually have to pay to join a crew?

In Canada we have our own special needs. Sable Island is unique, and figures prominently in the story, but our coastline, by far the longest of any nation in the world, has such extreme conditions that sometimes the only means of rescue is by Search and Rescue helicopter.

Behind all lifesaving operations are the magnificently dedicated men and women who risk, and occasionally sacrifice, their lives to save others. This is a most hazardous profession and warrants the extreme thoroughness that has gone into the creation of modern lifeboating organizations.

Criticism of the book is invidious, but a few weaknesses were noted. The system of referencing by part and chapter numbers is cumbersome; a little extra time spent on editing would have eliminated the problem. The casual reader may balk at the multiplicity of acronyms and abbreviations, but the small effort of
referring to the appendix soon simplifies the text. An unfortunate oversight for Canadian readers is the paucity of coverage of the Great Lakes, disappointing because of the importance of this great body of water to our maritime affairs.

But this is mere nitpicking for a book that is undoubtedly destined to become a major international resource. Canadian readers of The Northern Mariner should be proud that Clayton Evans, who has produced a work of such humanitarian importance, is himself a Canadian.

John Crosse
Vancouver, British Columbia


Maritime History as World History is an edited collection of essays that seeks to place two millennia of maritime history into the context of global interactions and interdependence. With contributions from acknowledged leaders in the field, including John Hattendorff, Richard Unger, Carla Hahn Phillips and Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, the collection boasts instant credibility. The diverse range of topics covered from exploration to naval engagements, and from deep-sea exploration to literature, offers fresh perspectives and cogent analysis of both maritime and world history. Published jointly by the University of Florida and the Peabody Essex Museum, Maritime History as World History will appeal to the specialist as much as it will to the casual reader.

Each of the dozen contributors attempts to demonstrate that "the story of human development as told through maritime exploration, commerce, or warfare, is intricately linked to the oceans, seas, lakes, and rivers that dominate the earth" (ix), and that "human interaction with the sea is a fundamental factor of world history" (1). One of the overarching themes is that waterways served as highways for ships, people, and commodities and that these paths led to greater global dependency. Many examples are given to show that man's connection to the sea is not limited to littoral communities; even those far removed from the shore are affected by the transmissions of culture and transfer of goods that reach them by sea. As one contributor stated: "sea routes became the highways... on which genuine global history was built" (22). Global history, then, replete with exchanges of biota and culture, could only have been possible with a significant maritime component.

Contributors then trace the history of maritime exploration, from ancient times through the middle ages and into the modern era. Advances in technology, economic imperatives, intense political rivalries, and a desire to know what lay beyond the horizon (or beneath the surface) rank as the most important, although by no means the only motivations behind the ventures. The reader is shown how advances in ship design, cartography, and navigation allowed various cultures to expand their reach and usher in a new era of global interaction and interdependence; both European and non-Western cultures are examined. The relative importance that disparate cultures placed on the sea, and their relative impact on both maritime and global history, is then assessed. Even the seemingly unrelated topics of deep sea exploration in the twentieth century and early modern voyages of exploration are presented as part of the same process: political rivalries, whether the Cold War or the rise of nation states, ushered in a new round of maritime activity.

Another major theme of Maritime History as World History is that maritime affairs and developments were largely the extension or reflection of terrestrial events. For too long, it is argued, maritime history has been studied as sui generis; something apart from the traditional understanding of economic, legal, diplomatic, or military histories of various political entities. But "effective analysis of the use to which the oceans were used requires more than just the obvious needs of ship, cargo, and crew. What takes place on land has as much bearing on maritime history as what happens on sea" (112). Activities at sea, from commerce to warfare, are depicted as being closely toed to events on land.
This leads to a new appreciation for maritime history: no longer confined to that which floats and gets wet, it has been expanded to all those aspects of society that are affected by maritime commerce, warfare, or policy. As John Hattendorff aptly puts it: "The events and issues of sea history need to be seen in the light of events and developments ashore at the same time that events ashore need to be complemented by the perspective from the sea. Linked in this way, maritime history becomes the vehicle of true global history" (137).

Maritime History as World History is a useful addition to the literature on this subject. Written in an engaging and accessible manner, this slim volume is a welcome complement to staid monographs that cause bookshelves, (and undergraduates), to groan. The addition of a number of illustrations from the Peabody Essex Collection is a nice contribution, though one questions why the placement of certain illustrations in chapters that have seemingly little connection to the subject being discussed. (The most egregious examples are a print of "Battle at Sea" located in the middle of a discussion concerning Ocean Exploration in the Twentieth Century and an anti-U boat campaign poster in the midst of Bud Foulke's essay on Sea Voyage Narratives). While not suitable as a textbook per se, Maritime History as World History does illustrate several themes that can be the foundation for further inquiry. Most importantly, it points out lacunae in both maritime history and global history and challenges historians to address these issues in a new light. By calling for a new perspective and increased awareness of the interplay between global and maritime history, the contributors to this volume have performed a notable, and noteworthy, task.

Timothy G. Lynch
Vallejo, California

With the passage of over sixty years since the events of the Second War, the major histories and assessments have been published and analyzed many times. But the multitude of events still fascinate and draw forth yet more smaller stories, minor histories that in the larger tales only warrant a line or two or nothing at all. The story of the November 1941 loss of the cruiser HMS Dunedin is one such tale. Researched and well written by Stuart Gill, the diplomat son of Royal Marine William Gill, who was one of the few survivors of her torpedoing, it is largely a wartime biography of his father and his ship, told in three relatively equal segments: his father's story, from joining up as an 18-year-old in December 1939 until his survival a year later; memories of others of her crew taken from surviving letters or actual interviews; and connecting explanatory pages detailing wider events that came to affect Dunedin's fate.

Launched at the end of the First World War, by 1939 Dunedin was considered elderly, although still effective, and was allocated mostly to "watching" patrols, convoy escort and general duties. This was typical of a useful ship when such vessels were in short supply and when the German Navy still had ships roaming the oceans and causing major concerns. After his briefly described general Marine training, Gill joined her in April 1941 and participated in mid-Atlantic and Northern patrols, ending up mostly working out of the hot, smelly, uninteresting way-point of Freetown on the west African coast. This part of the story gives a straightforward and well depicted view of life at sea on mostly dull patrols, with infrequent boardings of suspicious vessels and occasional, very occasional excitements. It was typical, not very interesting, and author Gill renders a pretty fair and familiar description of about 80 per cent of life aboard a warship. There were several boardings of suspicious ships, often Vichy French, which were sent into an Allied port if their destination was occupied or unoccupied France. In June, Dunedin and her compatriot HMS Eagle's Swordfish were scouting aircraft when they captured the German tanker Lothringen, posted in mid-Atlantic to refuel U-boats bound for South America and merchant

raiders roaming the southern oceans. The seizure was part of a larger Allied plan to stamp out these support ships, without giving away how it was achieved.

This in turn accounts for the connection between Dunedin and Enigma of the sub-title, although the decrypts of German naval code messages at Bletchly Park (BP) back in England, known as "ULTRA" traffic, were completely unknown to Dunedin's compliment and even her Area OICs. In the summer and fall of 1941, BP was reasonably successful at breaking these coded signal transmissions back and forth, although not as swift as they later became in 1943. As a result of reading between the lines of some German traffic, the Admiralty dispatched Dunedin and other cruisers and destroyers on hunting missions for the enemy tankers, supply ships and even the U-boats and armed raiders supposed to meet up with them. While BP could not tell the exact coded reference points, they could advise the searching ships of general areas and sometimes even latitudes. It was through these leads that Lothringen was found, and then the raider Atlantis, located and sunk by the larger cruiser HMS Devonshire, and the supply ship Python by another cruiser. And these in turn led to Dunedin's loss and a very real concern at BP that the Germans might begin to suspect that their Enigma codes were being broken and read.

When Atlantis was sunk, two U-boats in the area began towing her boatloads of survivors toward South America, and two other boats were ordered to either assist them or locate Python and get her to take them on. One of these U-boats was U-124, KL Johann Mohr, who came across Dunedin strictly by chance and put two torpedoes into her, sinking the ship within a few minutes. None of her boats got away and only 250 survivors were able to survive in three or four Carley floats or clutching some debris. Over the next four days, due to injuries, dementia, sharks and loss of flotation devices, the total was reduced to 72, their sufferings vividly described in Marine Gill's words to his son years later. The survivors were eventually found, again by chance, by an American merchantman, and even then another five died on board before they could reach safe haven and hospital in Trinidad. Stuart Gill lets his father's words, and those of a few others, tell the harrowing tale of survival, death of friends and unknowns, both in the torpedoing and subsequent floating about, including 19 Boy Seamen and a Marine Band Boy, four Marine pensioners who had re-volunteered and four civilian NAFFI staff who had manned the ship's canteen. In Gill's raft, only three survived of the 25 men who got away from the ship.

Apart from the loss of the 419 men and a valuable cruiser, the Admiralty and those at Bletchly Park were most concerned at the possibility that the sinking of Python, who was supposed to be left alone, and the U-boats discovering warships in the area might make the German naval staff think that the Enigma coded messages regarding rendezvous were being read. While they did indeed become suspicious, those in the signals and technical branches in Berlin assured them that such a thing was absolutely impossible and after a few months, the British relaxed.

The book is well edited with almost no errors, particularly for someone not himself a Marine or a sailor. If one might add a regret, it would be that the story just ends with Gill's survival and the Enigma secret maintained. It might have been a nice codicil to know what happened, at least to Gill, for the rest of the war. The only brief reference is to a reunion of some 150 relatives and a very few survivors that took place in 2001. But better to wish for a bit more than, as often happens in memoirs, receive too much. An interesting and well done tale.

Fraser M. McKee
Toronto, Ontario


Henry Kent Hewitt is one of the less well known members of an incredible stable of outstanding admirals produced by the USN during the Second World War. His list includes a number
of notable accomplishments: the planning and execution of Operation TORCH, the amphibious landings in North Africa; Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily; Operations AVALANCHE, the landings at Salerno; Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON, the invasion of Southern France; and command of the US 12th Fleet in the postwar years. With such weighty responsibilities, the list of truly important personages with whom Hewitt had close dealings before, during and after the war was stellar. The admiral was not a flamboyant character and the editor of this work is of the opinion that this is the reason Hewitt is not as widely recognized as some of his contemporaries, despite the fact that he rose to the rank of vice-admiral and was highly decorated for his accomplishments. The memoirs of such an important figure in history had the potential for providing important insights into major events, people and, above all, the reasons behind some of the pivotal decisions of an era. Unfortunately, Hewitt remains true to the "quiet and unassuming" characterization of him given by Evelyn Cherpak (xii). This autobiographical work is one of the most disappointing of its type.

Memoirs reads like a personal diary but without the slightest hint of scandal, rumour or intrigue. The early years of Hewitt's life and career make for passably interesting reading with stories of his youth in New Jersey, entry into the Naval Academy in 1903, and participation in the round-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet in 1907. Contemporary readers will be interested in the description of the emergency aid provided the battleships Indiana and Missouri after a devastating earthquake at Kingston, Jamaica, in February 1907 (16). The ability of warships to render assistance following a natural disaster is not a new concept but is one that seems to have been rediscovered only recently. Hewitt's time in his first command, the converted yacht Eagle, while conducting cartographic work in the Caribbean Sea, has some good examples of the utility of minor warships in low-intensity, counter-insurgency warfare in littoral areas; the exact theoretical construct of today's "Three Block War" (47-61).

Hewitt's descriptions of major events and the important persons he encountered become less revealing as Memoirs advances in time. His participation in the pivotal USN Fleet Exercises of 1927 and 1928 provides no information on the staff activities involved in the formulation of those exercises or their important influence on American war plans. Although intimately involved in staff work, Hewitt gives the reader no hints at Hewitt's abilities as a staff officer, or of his intellectual capacity exhibited by his writings while a student and staff member at the Naval War College in 1929-30. Hewitt provides no justification for his high praise of such historically important admirals as De Stigeur, Pringle, Sellars, Kimmel, Spruance, and Kidd.

Hewitt's lack of detail in his description of central figures is not limited to the naval officers that shaped his career or his better-known classmates Raymond Spruance and Isaac Kidd. There is no photograph of Hewitt's wife, Floride, (although there are several of Hewitt) and his two daughters rate only the briefest mention, with his second daughter not introduced until acting as the maid of honour at her elder sister's wedding in 1938 (103). General George S. Patton and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, surely two of the most colourful American figures of the Second World War, receive the same cursory treatment from Hewitt. Evidently, Hewitt was as timid with his opinions as he was "quiet and unassuming."

The reader is compelled to plough through many pages of plodding narrative to glean even the smallest nuggets of insight from this highly capable and experienced officer. A very few such "pearls of wisdom" are offered. Based on his experienced during the North Africa landings, Hewitt does comment on the inadvisability of combining amphibious command functions with the combat functions of a warship. He also advises that it is unwise for the overall commander of a task force to assume command of a sub-unit of that force. Beyond this, his description of the TORCH landings are extremely sketchy. The only time anything approaching a commander's insight into major events is provided comes in the admiral's considerations for giving permission to unload
transports in poorly protected anchorages at Casablanca and Fedala, despite indications of gathering enemy submarines. His explanations sound more like excuses as the torpedoing of three ships at each location resulted from Hewitt’s decisions. Regrettably, Hewitt gives more detail about staff accommodations ashore being mandated by service and rank than the vastly more important details of operations planning.

The second half of the book is entirely unsatisfying. Hewitt’s narrative provides no clarification about the problems experienced during the landings at Anzio, and incredibly, the landings in southern France receive absolutely no treatment at all. Instead, Hewitt launches into an absolutely dreadful description of interminable official visits and the protocol issues associated with his travels. This pattern of meaningless listing of who-was-there carries over into Hewitt's post-war duties as a fleet commander in northern European waters, where, it seems, he did little more than meet royalty, receive awards and decorations, and attend state dinners.

It is absolutely lamentable that such an accomplished and important person as Admiral Hewitt missed the opportunity to record candidly his insights into the important events and people to which he must have been privy. Sadly, there is practically nothing in this work to commend to any reader other than a family descendant of the author.

Ken Hansen
Toronto, Ontario


The purpose of Operation Apollo, as related in a foreword by Vice Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, was to provide Canadians with an accurate survey of the Canadian navy's contribution to the war on international terrorism from 11 September 2001 to November 2003 "through the eyes of an informed but independent author."

This goal clearly has been achieved. Richard Gimblett, a veteran of twenty-seven years service in the Canadian navy, coauthor with Jean Morin of the definitive official history of Canadian naval forces in the first Persian Gulf War, and leading military analyst, had produced an especially informative and timely work. While later studies may provide a more detailed and nuanced analysis of the strategic, diplomatic, and political aspects of Canada's involvement in the global war on terrorism, Operation Apollo arms readers now with a focussed, balanced appraisal of naval operations in the North Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

In seven chapters, Gimblett traces how the Canadian navy reinforced North American defences in the wake of the New York and Washington attacks, and deployed warships for operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan from November 2001 to April 2002, May to December 2002, and January to November 2003. Separate treatments focus on life at sea in the Middle East for Canada's naval warriors and the nature of naval boarding operations. The clear, concise text is complemented with a wealth of colour photographs, original paintings by naval artists, maps, charts, deployment schedules, organizational charts, and other relevant illustrative materials. A CD-ROM version of the book is attached to the back cover.

Operation Apollo provides not only a compilation of photographs and a description of warship deployments, operations, and command relationships, but an insightful analysis of the Canadian navy's participation in the multinational effort. Gimblett emphasizes that despite its small size in relation to the US Navy and even the British and French navies, the Canadian navy possessed special attributes. As a fully integrated member of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the Canadian navy operated command, control and communications systems that enabled the service to function as a "gateway" between the
Americans and the other less well-endowed allied navies. Moreover, US naval leaders placed such trust and confidence in their northern counterparts that soon after 9/11 the Americans agreed to Canadian command of a task force of coalition naval forces that protected US warships in the North Arabian Sea, searched suspicious vessels for terrorists and contraband, and escorted merchant ships through the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf. As during Desert Storm, the Canadians understood that most likely their contribution would be recognized only if they maintained their few ships in a discrete national formation and exploited their unique capabilities. Gimblett acknowledges that while Ottawa and Washington had serious differences over the Iraq War, the two navies adjusted their operations in the Persian Gulf almost seamlessly to avoid needless political complications.

The author pursues another theme: the importance of sea power to Canada's ability to operate as part of international coalitions, deploy overseas, and promote the country's global interests. Gimblett devotes an early chapter in the book to a summary of the navy's history in the last half of the twentieth century during which time it "lost its bearings in a struggle for survival" over unification of the armed forces and experienced periods of growth and decline. The author credits the Canadian navy's success against the terrorist threat to the "New Golden Age" of naval development that began in 1995. But he closes the work with a warning that unless the naval service continues to receive new warships and other essential resources, the Operation Apollo experience might prove to be the "apex of the modern Canadian navy."

Despite a few minor glitches such as a photo with everyone's face bearing a pink hue (129) and misspelling of MacDill Air Force Base (130), the work is first-rate. Operation Apollo should grace the shelves of all serious students of naval operations during the ongoing global war on terrorism. All but two of the navy's major surface combatants took part in the effort, the "largest prolonged Canadian naval operation since the Korean War." Gimblett does credit to the service of the men and women of the Canadian navy—almost all of whom served at one time or another from 2001 to 2003 in the dangerous waters of the Middle East.

Edward J. Marolda
Washington, D.C.


Nelson's Royal Navy was the world's pre-eminent fleet. It was a blue-water force that gained and maintained command of the sea by staying on station at all times in all weather, the better to contain and destroy enemy vessels. Opposing forces, whether Spanish, Dutch, French or American, justifiably feared "the violence of the enemy", losing 377 vessels to the Royal Navy during this period. In striking contrast, the Royal Navy lost a mere 10 ships to enemy action but 354 to the "dangers of the sea", and suffered up to 14 times as many casualties caused by disease and individual accident as by enemy action.

Professor Lewis and other historians, such as N. A. M. Rodger, Christopher Hall and John Keegan, to name but a few, have elsewhere dissected strategy, tactics and the operations of the Royal Navy during this period. This excellent social history by Professor Lewis, which first appeared in 1960, examines the shipboard and Royal Navy society that generated and sustained its wartime performance, from the social origins of its men, to the shipboard hierarchy and the service itself.

Basing his account on a vast array of contemporary sources, including official documents and records, accounts of shipboard life, as well as personal memoirs, histories and letters, among Prof. Lewis's underlying themes is how closely the navy mirrored contemporary British society and how the navy's own practices reflected and interpreted those of wider national custom and practices. Inevitably, perhaps, there is an element of the "In Which We Serve" view of the parallel between wartime (Napoleonic of
course, not Second World War) British society and a well-run ship of the line. But there is nothing smug about this book. Rather, it is a deeply respectful account of an organization and individuals who gave the organization its distinctive character as a fighting force in a Great War of national survival.

One real value of this book lies in the careful use the author makes of his data. The social and geographical origin of the sailors showed the Royal Navy to be drawn from every region of Britain, but those counties that touched the sea contributed the most men. The divisions between Quarter Deck and Lower Deck reflected those of British society as a whole, each with a trajectory of its own into naval service.

Professor Lewis analyses the operation of the press gangs, carefully charts the use of "Interest" in promotions, a system that could accelerate the rise of talent to command but, more often than not, had the opposite effect. Pay structure, prize money and conditions of service also receive extensive exploration.

Yet the work is definitely a work of history, not sociology. There are no regression analyses attempting to link ship's performance to crew make-up or any other "variable". No "general theories" are tested. Instead, careful documentary analysis is used to develop cross-sectional portraits of ships and the service as a whole. Moreover, the prose is graceful and the narrative sprinkled with illustrative citations from participants.

The picture that emerges from the study is one of two interrelated complex organizations, British society and the Royal Navy, the former supplying the context for the latter which, as the ultimate defence of the nation, had to attract enough of the right talent and conceive and execute the right strategies to defeat the enemy. The choices and the solutions were alike complex exercises in optimisation.

Seamen had to be "prest" to serve, yet somehow induced to face not only the enemy but the far greater hazards of long duty at sea. While the pool of merchant seaman made good crewman, the merchant marine was also essential to British survival, so a balance had to be found. Enough officer material had to be inducted in order to generate the required wartime population of captains...and then after the war, drastically reduced. In a war of ideas against republicanism and Bonapartism, it may perhaps be argued (although Lewis himself does not do so) talented men had to be enabled to make their way. But those that advanced had also to show loyalty to the existing structure. For better and often for worse, "interest," personal patronage, helped square this circle.

Fundamentally, however, the peril of sea duty played the ultimate role: welding together the company of men (and occasional women) into a shipboard "family" that "belonged" to their ship and served it happily under the leadership of a tough, ultra-competent sea dog of a captain. Once a captain got a ship, competence mattered. "Hero" promotions followed victory in hard fights, prize money could also whet an appetite for action, especially after reforms that left a sizeable portion to the captors.

Nothing in the Nelsonian Navy followed a grand design. Change was incremental. The practices of the service evolved slowly in response to challenges and changing circumstances. One of the charms of this book is the author's ability to illuminate the threads of evolution throughout the period under review, in some cases going back to the navy of Cromwell and link the evolution of practice within the navy to those of British society as a whole. Professor Lewis has a great deal of valuable information to impart in this book, not only for students of maritime and naval history but also for students of organization. They will find in its pages a great many insights into the subtle relationship between an organization and society and the boundaries that unite and divide them.

Guy Stanley
Ottawa, Ontario

Allied victory in two world wars was built on the bedrock of sea control, and the ability to move men, raw materials, machines, fuel, food and ammunition across the world while the Central Powers and the Axis fought in isolated fragments. The biggest problem for the allies was the provision of adequate numbers of standard warships, and even more numerous, and simpler, merchant vessels, both to increase the stock of shipping and to compensate for the serious losses inflicted by German U-boats. In this book, the authors set out to examine the impact of locational factors on the development of existing, and new shipbuilding facilities, employing tools developed by economic geographers.

The theoretical basis is set out in the first chapter, where locational theory and other concepts are defined. Locational theory suggests there are advantages to be obtained by developing large agglomerations of connected industries at the same point: the book is an exercise in assessing the validity of the theory. The evidence for the study comes from the wealth of shipyard and industry histories, naval policy and related works. Canada does not warrant an index entry, let alone treatment appropriate to its contribution. The footnotes are almost entirely derived from secondary sources, and reflect a sustained and wide-ranging approach. Four further chapters examine the two World Wars, using the First World War as a key stage in the development of the mature system employed in the second conflict, with the Inter-war era representing a down turn in work, before concluding with the postwar collapse of Anglo-American shipbuilding.

There are few surprises. Useful advantages could be gained from agglomeration, but ultimately these were countered by other factors, notably labour and power shortages. New yards were costly, and often failed to deliver the ships in time, while the expansion of existing yards was often hampered by lack of space. The astonishing success of Allied shipbuilding in the two world wars emerges from this study as a remarkable effort that boosted output by astonishing levels for the short term. Building on the experience of the First World War and exploiting massive investment, the United States produced striking results, but the standard designs and mass-produced ships required to win the war were rapidly rendered obsolete by the more complex demands of peace, and the rapid pace of technological development. The expansion in industrial capacity was not created for the long term, and consequently did not create a sustainable industry in either country. A comparative study which compared shipbuilding with other areas of strategic wartime production would be rather more revealing.

The simple answer to the question posed by this book is that shipbuilding proved a very difficult task to place with other industrial units, while aircraft, engines and other smaller items could be handled by inland factories. Shipyards were limited, site dependant and costly to build. As the authors conclude: "Agglomeration theory, although still applicable to certain industries, holds little relevance to the naval shipbuilding industry of the twenty-first century" (204).

Although this is a useful overview of an industrial phenomenon of the first half of the twentieth century, reflecting the strength of economic and industrial history in the field it contains few surprises. In the total wars of the twentieth century, nations like Britain that depend on the sea to survive, or like the United States that need to dispatch their forces across the oceans, had to increase their shipbuilding effort to an extent that bore no relation to peacetime requirements. Their success reflected many things, but one suspects that locational theory was not high on the list of priorities.

Andrew Lambert
London, England

Collisions involving passenger ships have long been a dramatic and tragic part of our maritime history. Fifty years ago, the loss of a passenger ship transfixed the general public much the same way that the loss of a large airplane, such as the Swiss Air disaster off Nova Scotia or the Air India bombing off Ireland, does now. But back then there was no CNN to provide instant digital images, on-the-site reporting, experts over cell phones or home video images. Instead, the news images of shipwreck sites would be grainy photos of floating debris and ashen-faced survivors in storm-tossed lifeboats from rescue ships or hovering helicopters. The reporting was sporadic and the true story took days to unfold. Now the story is instant and stays in the press for only a couple of days.

Typically, the shipwreck story next hit the press when the public inquiry or criminal and civil trials unfolded years later. The courtroom drama can be even more transfixing than the drama and tragedy of the initial event. The reporting on those trials, however, is sporadic and rare, except for the large disasters. Few studies have been done into the courtroom drama. Algot Mattsson's book Out of the Fog, about the Andrea Doria collision, gives us a rare glimpse into that arena, but it is an uninspired account of the tragedy and of the legal drama. It leaves much uncovered and fails to bring out the drama of the event or to fully develop the personalities of those involved.

On 25 July 1956, the Italia passenger liner Andrea Doria was inbound for New York off Nantucket when it collided with the outbound Swedish America liner Stockholm. Eleven hours later, the Andrea Doria sank with a loss of 51 on the Italian ship and five on the Swedish, while more than 1700 people were rescued. The tragedy was one of the first shipwrecks to be reported live from helicopters with reporting on black and white televisions. Many have written about the loss, notably Alvin Moscow in his 1959 Collision Course. Mattsson brings out a new aspect of the story. He was the information officer for the Swedish America Line. He was on the inside of the public relations battles and of the legal battles over who was at fault.

The book contains observations from the Third Mate, Johan-Ernst Carstens-Johannsen. It covers in fair detail the events leading to the collision, from the first sightings with the bridge officers coming to opposing views on the developing situation. Many questions abound out of the collision. Was fog a factor? Was the Andrea Doria properly designed and ballasted? Did the crews respond properly after the collision? Did the bridge officers react properly? What was the percentage of fault? Why did they settle? These and other questions are covered in the book, but in the format and style of a review of a court reporter's transcript leaving the reader grasping for more of the nuance and drama of the courtroom or legal strategy.

Shortly after the case settled, the Swedish America Line was due to take delivery of its newest passenger vessel, Gripsholm, from the same shipyard that built the Andrea Doria. Having the Andrea Doria's stability design being questioned in court would have added to the Swedish America Line's public relations nightmare. Mattsson's book details these allegations for the first time. Although the case never went to trial, pre-trial discoveries were held two months after the sinking. More than 60 lawyers took part in these proceedings and about 50 reporters covered them. After four months of hearings, the case settled. Settlement was prudent. The Swedish-America Line agreed to cover the $1 million replacement of the Stockholm's bow, and Italia absorbed the loss of the $30 million Andrea Doria.

Mattsson's review of the hearing contrasts the divergent styles of the maritime attorneys and the different personalities of the ships' captains. Much more could have been done, however, to develop those differences that would have made it much less plodding read. The overlay of the legal analysis, by Swedish America Line's maritime lawyer, Gordon Paulsen, is interesting but it adds to that dryness instead of enriching the story. Nevertheless, Paulsen's comments will be of interest to a maritime lawyer who can come to an opinion on the issues raised in the analysis. Both Mattsson and Paulsen have carefully endeavoured to leave their Swedish America Line bias and present a neutral perspective, but in so doing, they have
lost a cutting edge turning a great story into an uninspired review.

The Andrea Doria continues to be in the press, as a Mecca for technical divers. The dive is deep (225 feet) and difficult (offshore, dark waters, current swept). The site has claimed over a dozen divers in the last 20 years. Despite that tragic record, the shipwreck continues to draw divers from around the world, and despite increased safety procedures and better equipment, it will continue to claim more divers and stay in the press for years.

As the 50th anniversary of the sinking is only a year away, stay tuned as well for anniversary reviews (check out http://www.andreadoria.org/) and more books and articles on this tragic event. Perhaps an investigative reporter will come forward and take up the challenge of a hard-hitting analysis of who was at fault.

Tom Beasley
Vancouver, British Columbia


This book is an account of Tom McCulloch's experiences at sea and in the Canadian Hydrographie Service (CHS). It is his second book: the first, Mandalay to Norseman, described his youth in Glasgow, his experiences in British merchant ships during the Second World War and his postwar service in cable ships. This story starts with his arrival in Canada in 1948 with his wife Doreen, as nearly penniless immigrants, and ends in 1979 when he had become, as he says, a comfortable bureaucrat.

Autobiographies, other than those by the shapers of great events, politicians, statesmen and suchlike, are very largely written for one's family; not so much the children, who were around when most of the events occurred, but the grandchildren, great-grandchildren and subsequent generations. Tom's lively account of a maritime world, even now fading into the mist of history, will be fascinating to his descendants. As well as describing the professional side of a sailor's life, he tells us, in colourful language, about the nightlife of the world's ports and "runs ashore," complete with consequent hangovers. (You may call this "social history" if you wish!).

The book can effectively be divided into three parts. It begins with a first-hand account of conditions in Canadian merchant ships in the postwar period. In the second group of chapters, we learn about the life of a hydrographer in the fifties and sixties, a time of expansion in the Canadian Hydrographie Service. Finally, the author deals with administrative changes in the CHS and international conferences, reflecting his rise to senior positions.

From 1948 to 1952, Tom was sailing in lakers and in Canadian foreign-going ships on worldwide voyages. This was a time when the seamen's union, backed by the communists, was supplanted by a new union supported by the Canadian Government, aided by thugs from south of the border. The outcome was the near extinction of the ocean-going Canadian merchant marine. Tom was living in Port Arthur, now Thunder Bay and, with a growing family, he was always seeking permanent employment ashore without ever finding anything suitable. Then, in 1953, he had a stroke of luck! The Canadian Hydrographie Service decided to recruit ships' navigating officers as hydrographers. The service was expanding and the traditional sources of staff, (land surveyors and people with appropriate degrees straight from university), had to be augmented. Tom McCulloch was one of the first navigators to join. This was an interesting job that included some shore time processing the previous season's surveys, far preferable for a family man than the round-the-world voyage he had just completed in his last ship. The new hydrographer went to the West Coast where he learned his trade in the well-known survey ship Wm. J. Stewart. He was soon sent north to work in the western Arctic: the DEW line of radar stations was being built.

From 1958 to 1961, the survey team had to rely on ships of the US Coast Guard, RCMP and Canadian Coast Guard, which all had
their own tasks to perform. In 1962, however, a new small survey vessel, the Richardson, was built, largely on Tom's initiative. He was both Master and Hydrographer of the Richardson during its early Arctic deployments, including an exciting event in 1967 when the little vessel was nearly crushed in the ice. Tom resolutely refused to abandon the ship and it took two Coast Guard icebreakers, one Canadian and one American, to extricate the Richardson. This section of the book is a valuable adjunct to the series of articles on the Canadian Hydrographie Service published in the January and April 2004 issues of The Northern Mariner.

The last chapters (1968 to 1979) deal with the development of the Hydrographie Service and increasing international cooperation, both areas in which the author had important roles. He rose to the position of Regional Hydrographer Central Region and retired as Director General of the Bayfield Laboratory of Marine Sciences at Burlington, Ontario. This section is of value to those interested in the bureaucratic changes of the period but it is not solely about administration. During the many overseas conferences he had to attend, it appears that Tom's enthusiasm for parties and nightlife remained undiminished.

The book has several useful maps and interesting photographs. Moreover, the author in recounting his own experiences takes pains to put them in the context of current events and the political situation of the time. From Navigator to Hydrographer is an interesting addition to any nautical library, providing a personal view of many developments in the Canadian marine scene from the early postwar years to 1979. No one with this amount of energy would live quietly in retirement and a third book is promised.

C. Douglas Maginley, Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Despite the fact that the protection of trade is one of the oldest and most essential functions of navies, little is known about the Canadian merchant vessels lost to hostile action in the Second World War beyond their names and gross tonnage. To address this glaring deficiency, Fraser McKee has followed the same general format of his earlier acclaimed work, The Canadian Naval Chronicle (co-written with Robert Darlington), to record the loss of 67 Canadian- or Newfoundland-registered merchant cargo ships. Through extensive use of primary sources, McKee has assembled an excellent descriptive work that provides a wealth of overlooked information about the ships lost, the companies that owned them, and the crews who manned them.

The book is divided into 18 chapters, the organization and content of which varies quite significantly. Some chapters identify the ships lost by their parent companies, including such familiar names as Imperial Oil, Canadian Pacific, and Canada Steamship Lines, as well as lesser-known operators, for example, N.M. Paterson and Maryland Shipping. The introduction to each of these particular chapters has a concise but informative description of the company and its activities in the years leading up to the war. Other chapters are organized by the type of ships lost (Great Lakes bulk carriers, fishing vessels), the reason for their loss (German major surface warships, accidents), or the origins of the ships lost (captured, requisitioned, emergency construction). The particulars of each ship are given in a short opening paragraph, followed by a short summation of the ship's fate, its final resting place, and the number of crew members lost. Thereafter, two to three pages of narrative provide more details of the ship's employment, the circumstances of its loss, and the ultimate fate of its attacker and commander. The names of the sunken ship's crew are memorialised in a notation that concludes each passage.

The actions McKee describes contain many riveting stories of heroism, survival, and tragedy. A fascinating collection of photographs is an excellent complement to the narrative.
These images bring home forcefully how desperate the shipping shortages must have been to compel the employment of such small vessels as 1,800-ton Great Lakes bulk carriers on trans-Atlantic convoy routes. The fact that so many of these ships were not even equipped with radios seems startling by contemporary standards.

McKee's admits his work is intended to be principally descriptive: "This book is not an academic assessment of why the ships in these stories were sunk, nor of the impact of the sinkings on world events" (ix). The solid factual basis of this work suffers noticeably, however, when McKee ventures into analysis. Unfortunately, the author perpetuates many of the myths of the Battle of the Atlantic. He characterizes the Flower-class corvette as a doughty little escort, instead of the inadequate product of an emergency construction program that lacked even the basic endurance or seakeeping characteristics to function effectively (50). McKee categorizes the German armoured ship (panzerschiff) incorrectly by its widely-used and highly misleading common name, 'pocket-battleship', claiming, "the Deutschland class was the epitome of the Kriegsmarine's plans for armoured, high speed, long range commerce raiders" (106). Eric Grove's recent work, The Price of Disobedience, has refuted categorically any battleship connection for GrafSpee and her cruiser-like sisters and has shown that they were not originally designed for trade warfare at all. McKee goes even further in this erroneous vein by referring to the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as "pocket battle cruisers" (108, 110). He also has great difficulty explaining convoy evasive manoeuvring, confusing repeatedly the concepts of evasive routing (to avoid known submarine danger areas), long-leg and short-leg zigzagging (to cause submarines difficulty in obtaining an attacking position or to throw off their torpedo firing solutions), emergency turns (to break contact with pursing submarines), and weaving (to throw off gun firing solutions). McKee's use of the expression "threat-in-being" to describe the strategic concept of Fleet-in-Being is a typical indication of his weakness as a naval analyst (102).

Unfortunately, the narrative of the text also suffers from an annoyingly large number of editing oversights. The word "ship' is missing from a great many sentences, which causes the reader to break stride and decipher the meaning of the text. One example reads, "the twenty-nine-convoy HX-52 from Halifax" (42). A number of other words are also missing, misused, misspelled, or run together. Another distressing irregularity is the author's tendency to both use and not use the article "the" before the proper names of ships (68, one example).

Readers will find that the factual reporting of the events surrounding the sinking of each ship to be very enlightening and compelling. The details and images of the ships are reverently recorded, as are the names of the crew members lost. The preservation of this vital history is a worthwhile endeavour and a significant accomplishment that far outweighs the book's other numerous shortcomings.

Ken Hansen
Toronto, Ontario


This is a detailed "rivet by rivet" study focussed firmly on the design of successive battleships starting with Pëtr Velicky of 1870 and ending with projects for gigantic 60,000 ton vessels immediately following the Second World War. Stephen McLaughlin, a regular contributor to the journal Warship International, apparently worked on this project for a decade. His preface explains that the book is based primarily on published Russian sources, rather than on archival research. Since the collapse of the former USSR, he has been able to take advantage of the welcome appearance of new Russian journals devoted to warships. Sergei Vinogradov of Moscow, long a student of Russian dreadnoughts, collaborated with McLaughlin and supplied several evocative
period photographs. Readers of Warship International will find the format of this book familiar, with its exhaustive coverage of the history of how individual ships were conceived and built. It is copiously illustrated with line drawings and pictures.

While McLaughlin's detailed treatment concentrates on individual designs, fascinating common threads emerge. Russian naval planners had to contend with the formidable geographic handicap of maintaining fleets in widely-separated seas in harsh climates, and the Baltic and the Black Seas are landlocked. At the time the first ships discussed were constructed Russia lagged behind other major naval powers in industrialization. But it has often been remarked that Russian warship designers were innovative and tailored their projects to national requirements. The iron-hulled Pëtr Velicky of 1870 illustrates some of these threads. The concept of a large turret warship was a bold leap by Russian designers as the new ship would be far larger than any earlier iron warship built in their country. Ocean-going turret warships evolved from the monitors used successfully during the American Civil War. Their trainable turrets enabled fire over a wide arc on both sides, while earlier iron-hulled warships had guns in casements which meant that they could fire only over a relatively narrow arc on one side.

Pëtr Velicky, built by a St Petersburg yard which would continue producing warships for over a century, had to be towed to Kronstadt outside the harbour because a deep-water channel was yet to be dredged. Her principal designer was A.A. Popov, best remembered today for his eccentric proposals for round warships. But "technology transfer" would be a consistent theme in Russian warship concepts and Sir Edward Reed, the Royal Navy's chief constructor and the leading naval designer of the time, also had a hand in Velicky's final concept. The guns and turrets were manufactured near Petersburg in new factories which also would remain involved in naval projects down through the Soviet era. Quality control in the manufacture of Pëtr Velicky's Russian-built main engines was poor. The machinery proved unsatisfactory in service and was subsequently replaced in Scotland. Remarkably, this pioneering warship's well-built hull survived for almost ninety years. In her final years, the hull was used for accommodation and not scrapped until 1959.

By the dreadnought era Russia had become a major industrial power. Eight modern battleships were laid down prior to the Great War. Interestingly, foreign firms were invited to submit designs. British, German and Italian experts all competed and both British and German firms would also transfer knowledge to the various Russian manufacturers involved in this major project. At the time, Vickers had a commanding role in the naval armaments field and participated in several Russian projects. The text cites Basil Zaharoff, the well-connected principal Vickers agent for Russia, who will be familiar to aficionados of the 1980s television series Reilly Ace of Spies.

McLaughlin has worked carefully through the literature by enthusiasts on battleship design. His measured weighing of differing opinions presumably reflects his background as a San Francisco librarian. For example, the final design for the four dreadnoughts built in St. Petersburg was produced by the Baltic Works, one of the shipyards, with considerable input by John Brown & Co. McLaughlin notes that some Russia sources have minimized the John Brown contribution, while certain western publications have asserted that the Russian yard used a John Brown design. After describing the scope of the John Brown involvement, McLaughlin concludes that the truth is probably somewhere between the two assertions. Mounting the main armament of these dreadnoughts in triple turrets was groundbreaking. On the other hand, because these ships did not have superimposed turrets like contemporary German and British battleships, their armour had to be distributed over a longer portion of the hull and could not be of similar thickness because of weight considerations.

During the Great War the three dreadnoughts completed in the Black Sea were involved in operations until the February 1917 Revolution. While McLaughlin covers these events only briefly, there is a marvellous picture
(305) showing shell splashes from the German battle cruiser \textit{Goeben} bracketing but falling short of a Russian pre-dreadnought in May 1915. All three Russian battleships shown are belching copious smoke. Unfortunately, this rare shot of battleships in action is reproduced only in a small format. In order to support a planned amphibious operation to seize the Bosphorus the pre-dreadnought \textit{Sinop} was fitted with anti-torpedo bulges below the waterline in 1916. These are shown in an interesting photograph on page 312.

There were various schemes to modernize the three dreadnoughts built in the Baltic and eventually operated by the Soviet navy. Contacts with western designers and firms largely ceased when the Soviets seized power. But one of the fascinating stories in McLaughlin's dense narrative is that of technical contacts with foreign designers between the wars. Soviet naval missions made annual visits to Fascist Italy starting in the late twenties. Italian experts eventually worked at the main Soviet naval design bureau and at several yards. The destroyer leader \textit{Tashkent} was ordered from Italy, and in addition, the leading Russian designers received Italian assistance in the concept for a new battleship class.

McLaughlin comprehensively covers the little-known saga of Soviet attempts in the late thirties to obtain American battleship designs, components, or even to order warships in the USA. The US Navy managed to stonewall progress by exerting pressure on industry. The notable firm of Gibbs and Cox produced designs for a gigantic hybrid battleship-aircraft carrier. McLaughlin notes that President Roosevelt "unambiguously" approved the construction of a 45,000-ton battleship for the USSR in the United States (369) in June 1938. Detailed designs for this project, however, were never produced.

\textit{Russian & Soviet Battleships} fully covers in great detail the designs for more than 40 battleships and various other projects which were never realized. Partly because reliable documentation was not available, western material on Russian warship design has often been imaginative rather than authoritative. McLaughlin has taken advantage of material which has only appeared in Russian journals in the last decade and is careful to limit speculative comments. This large volume has the usual US Naval Institute sturdy binding. Recommended for students of battleship design.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


"Lieutenant Commander Ferrini had delivered what must be one of the most devastating single-salvo torpedo attacks of the war" (73). That's Michael Pearson's apt summary of how four torpedoes fired by the Italian submarine \textit{Auxun} crippled both the tanker \textit{Ohio} and the cruiser \textit{Nigeria}, and sank the anti-aircraft cruiser \textit{Cairo}. This happened during the evening of August 12, 1942, as a convoy carrying critical supplies to Malta approached the narrows between Tunisia and enemy air bases on Sicily. \textit{Nigeria} had to return to Gibraltar. These two cruisers had the force's only fighter direction controllers and specialized equipment. Their loss robbed the force of adequate fighter direction for the rest of its tortuous passage to Malta. Over the next two days, Italian and German aircraft and torpedo boats sank eight of the convoy's merchant ships and another cruiser. Eventually only the battered tanker \textit{Ohio} and four other of the original 14 merchant ships reached Malta. The hard-fought effort to get this famous convoy through was known as Operation \textit{Pedestal}. Immediately a celebrated saga, its story has been recounted many times. This competent new re-telling focuses on \textit{Ohio} and her tribulations.

Michael Pearson apparently had a career in shipping and has published other popular accounts of naval actions. His shipping background shows in the welcome detail he provides about \textit{Texaco}, \textit{Ohio}'s owners and operators during her weeks under British registry, Eagle Oil. This book is based on
contemporary British documents, information from the daughter of Ohio's master and six Pedestal survivors who occupied junior positions almost six decades earlier.

Ohio was one of a class of five splendid tankers built for Texaco by Sun Shipbuilding in Chester Pennsylvania. Incorporating such design features as extra speed, which would enhance her value in hostilities, Ohio and her sisters were the largest (14,150 deadweight tons) and fastest (17 knots) tankers in the world when completed in 1940. With nine centre tank spaces they were quite similar (but two knots faster and slightly smaller) than the capable T-2 emergency tankers, of which 525 would be built to another Sun Shipbuilding design starting in 1941. The British lacked large, fast tankers and had already chartered Kentucky, one of Ohio's sisters, for the heavily-defended Malta convoy in June which preceded Operation Pedestal. Kentucky had not been sunk and Pearson writes that Ohio's charter for the follow-on attempt in August was personally negotiated by Churchill and President Roosevelt during his visit in June 1942, after the British had discovered that she was scheduled to reach the Clyde that month with the first US cargo of oil since Pearl Harbor. When the ship reached Britain, her American crew turned the ship over to personnel supplied by the Eagle Oil Company. Pearson describes how the British seamen were astonished by the standard of accommodation in their new American-built ship. The facts given about Dudley Mason, the new master, speak volumes about the longevity of this company's officers. Mason had been with the company since starting as an apprentice 22 years earlier and had been qualified as master for 11 years. Now 40, he was the most junior and youngest master in the Eagle Oil Company and Ohio was his first command. Mason was given the pick of the company's officers for Ohio and his selections of Chief Engineer Wyld (with Eagle Oil since 1918) and Chief Officer Gray proved astute. While in the UK, Ohio was given additional anti-aircraft armament and was fitted with an innovative Eagle Oil compressed air system designed to push air into tanks that had been holed. Like fast tankers, fast freighters were also scarce in 1942. Thirteen fast cargo liners with speeds between 16 and 17 knots, including two US-flag ships, were assembled for Operation Pedestal. Interestingly, each was provided with a naval officer, signallers and radio traffic decoders.

During 1942, the Royal Navy fought several crucial convoys through in the face of heavy combinations of air, submarine and surface threats. Convoy PQ 16 to North Russia in May had lost one-fifth of its merchant ships to air and submarine attacks. In June, simultaneous convoys to Malta from the west and east were badly mauled. Only two of the six merchant ships of the convoy from the west which had included Kentucky, (and none from the other convoy), reached Malta. Then in July, PQ 17 to Russia lost 23 of 36 ships to aircraft and submarines. No northern convoy was run in August so that units of the UK-based Home Fleet could help provide Operation Pedestal with what would be the most powerful British naval force assigned during the war for a single operation, three aircraft carriers (with a fourth ferrying Spitfires to Malta), two battleships, seven cruisers and 24 destroyers.

Stephen Roskill, the British official historian, would later comment that the only form of attack not made on the Pedestal convoy was by surface warships larger than motor torpedo boats. In fact the Italians even tried launching a radio-guided flying bomb which failed because of radio problems. The Italian battleship force was immobilized due to fuel shortages, but a force of cruisers and destroyers sent to intercept the convoy were recalled when air cover could not be arranged. Several hours after the torpedo hit, Chief Engineer Wald and his crew got Ohio underway but the damaged ship was stopped the next morning some 60 miles short of Malta by several near misses by aircraft bombs. The exhausted crew was taken off several hours later after attempts by a destroyer to tow the hulk failed and it was feared that the ship would founder in the ongoing air attacks. Captain Mason and a handful of his crew subsequently re-boarded Ohio after a good rest, along with a collection of volunteer survivors from at least four Pedestal ships that had been sunk and a party from an escorting destroyer. Eventually, with a destroyer secured
The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

alongside, a minesweeper towing from ahead and a second destroyer on a line from the stern to help maintain a steady course, Ohio again inched toward Malta where she discharged her valuable cargo. No longer seaworthy and not repairable by the dockyard there, Ohio was used as a stores hulk for the remainder of the war and later towed out to sea and sunk. Captain Mason (awarded the George Cross, the highest decoration available to a civilian) and Chief Engineer Wald (the first merchant service officer made a member of the Distinguished Service Order), remained with Eagle Oil until retiring from senior positions in the 1950s.

The fuel transported by Ohio helped sustain the aircraft based on Malta and enabled a submarine squadron to return to the island. At the time and in the decades immediately after the war, much was made of the critical effect attacks by submarines and aircraft based in Malta had on the flow of supplies southward across the Mediterranean to the Axis armies in North Africa. More recent studies have concluded that the Axis' logistical problem was more complex. Keeping the armies supplied depended more on the capacity of the North African ports to handle arriving cargoes and the distances to be covered in getting supplies to the front than on attacks by Malta-based forces. The Ohio and Malta is a crisp and straightforward account of a well-known saga. Pearson's new dimensions are the background on the oil companies who owned and operated the ship and details about the building of Ohio. This book has been attractively produced with good maps, useful annexes and well-chosen glossy photographs.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


Interest in polar history has surged in recent years in response to luxury cruises and a spate of books, films, and exhibits about the great explorers, the great adventures, and the great tragedies. This publication, which reveals the marvellous diversity of polar aspirations, success, and failures, will feed the frenzy.

Exploring polar frontiers encompasses more than two millennia of exploration, from the voyage of Pytheas about 325 B.C., to the first solo crossing of the Arctic Basin by Borge Ousland in 2001. The geographical scope is left unstated, perhaps intentionally. No attempt is made to define the term "polar" or to discuss the climatic, biogeographical, or océanographie boundaries of the Arctic and Antarctic regions.


While continuing this admirable tradition of facilitating polar research, Mills has also attempted "to provide a book that will serve as an introduction to new readers" (xlvi). To this end the encyclopaedia's entries are written in clear narrative style, followed by references to other relevant entries and suggestions for further reading. Unlike the earlier chronological lists, this encyclopaedia is alphabetical, covers the entire polar world, extends right into the present millennium, and is very readable. These are important advantages.

When I first saw a reference to this publication, I assumed that one volume would be dedicated to the Arctic and the other to the
Antarctic, but the entries relating to both regions run through the two volumes and the work sells only as a set. Persons who are interested in only one of the regions will need a powerful commitment before paying the hefty price. Treating both together does have some advantages, however. It recognizes the common physical characteristics of what early geographers termed the "Frigid Zones"; it enables the reader to draw comparisons of many sorts; and it makes it easy to follow the achievements of explorers and adventurers who have travelled in both regions, for example, James Clark Ross, Road Amundsen, Richard Byrd, and Ranulph Fiennes ("the world's greatest living explorer").

The entries cover expeditions (under leaders' names or title of military operations), regions explored, countries and companies that sent out expeditions, methods of exploration, and a variety of other important themes. Readers are well served by a list of entries at the beginning of each volume, a breakdown of entries by geographical location and subject, two chronological lists of expeditions (one by region), and a comprehensive index. These aids enable the reader to look up information on specific topics, consider the general flow of polar exploration through time, or examine the sequence of expeditions in a particular area. Twenty clear location maps are provided for reference, twelve for the Arctic and eight for the Antarctic.

The selection of entries for such a work can never satisfy everyone. I note that although there are entries for airplanes, airships, balloons, and dogs, there is none for snowmobiles. Bombardier Ski-Doos carried Ralph Plaisted and his companions to the North Pole in 1968, and as this was probably the first expedition to reach the Pole over the ice (the claims of Cook and Peary being unproven), it would seem appropriate to discuss the machines and their use in exploration. (The omission seems curious, considering that a Polaris snowmobile used in Antarctica during the 1960s is displayed in the museum of the Scott Polar Research Institute). And as there is an entry for submarines, discussing their evolution and role in exploration, why not a corresponding entry for ships, including icebreakers?

I was disappointed to find no reference to explorers of the Canadian Barren Grounds, such as the Tyrrell brothers and David Hanbury, and surprised that there was no entry for Frederick Schwatka, who spent two years in the region and, with Inuit guides, accomplished a sledge journey of record length from Hudson Bay to King William Island and back. I also felt that Willy de Roos, who in 1977 completed the first solo transit of the Northwest Passage, and the first by yacht, deserved an entry.

The index is extremely thorough but has one awkward feature. Some subjects are not listed alphabetically on their own, only under headings. For example, August Petermann (German geographer) can only be found under "Theorists and scholars," Akaitcho only under "Amerindians," and Ouligbuck under "Inuit and Greenlanders. Locating references to expedition leaders and participants is even more frustrating because one has to know their nationality. A Canadian reader who failed to find John Franklin in the index might eventually discover that he is listed under "British explorers", but he might not know whether Joan Russell is American, Australian, British, Canadian, or New Zealand, or whether Mikhail Babushkin is a "Russian explorer" or a "Soviet explorer." I tried to find Hadow, (Table 15) in the index but a frustrating search of all two dozen national groupings failed to turn up his name.

The headings are useful, but the reader must know in which category a subject is likely to fall, and this is not always obvious. Who would think of looking for Sir John Barrow (Second Secretary of the Admiralty) under the heading "Sponsors?"

A few errors, typos, and inconsistencies were noticed (especially unfortunate in a reference work). On the very first page of the Introduction we read that Scott headed back from the South Pole in 1925 [thirteen years after his death] and that the book constitutes "an informative [sic] resource." The 1850 expeditions of Austin and Penny are mistakenly said to have "explored from the west." (243) "Cumberland Bay" (698) should be Cumberland Sound. Caedmon Press is not located at "Whitby, Ontario" (762, 764) but in Whitby,
Yorkshire. Some individuals are listed with all their given names (for example, Charles Francis Hall) but others are not (for example, Bedford [Clapperton Trevelyan] Pirn).

Despite the above criticisms, this is an impressive work which describes many little-known expeditions and aspects of polar exploration, and I found it fascinating reading. Having noticed only eight articles attributed to the six contributors acknowledged on the title page, I conclude that the remaining 500 or so were written by Mills himself, a remarkable achievement.

W. Gillies Ross
Lennoxville, Quebec


The United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842 was one of the most ambitious voyages of discovery carried out during a century of great maritime endeavours. Its exploits were numerous and lasting. Its members not only sighted Antarctica, but gave the seventh continent its name and mapped about 2,400 kilometres of its coast. They charted hundreds of islands in the Pacific Ocean, including the Fiji Islands group, for the first time. They were the first Americans to chart the mouth of the Columbia River and Puget Sound on the west coast of North America. The thousands of specimens collected during the expedition's four-year circumnavigation of the world later formed the foundation of the scientific collections of the Smithsonian Institution at Washington, D.C. Yet, while the expedition ought to be well known and as celebrated as Lewis and Clark's famous exploration of the American West, the US Ex. Ex., as it was known, vanished from national memory. Nathaniel Philbrick has written a wonderful history of the expedition explaining why it disappeared from the nation's ken.

Nathaniel Philbrick is very well qualified. He is the author of the award winning book, In the Heart of the Sea, The Tragedy of the Whaleship Essex, which appeared in 2000, and is a leading authority on the history of American whaling. Sea of Glory brings to life the tension-filled story of the self-destruction of a magnificent maritime expedition brought down by age-old conflicts between learning and experience, and between the search for knowledge and self-aggrandizement.

The author has carefully crafted four well-connected parts of three or five chapters each that might well be called Genesis, Antarctica, Pacific Reaches, and Reckoning, into a superb history and exciting thriller. Philbrick introduces the reader to the long political origins of the expedition, the fitting out of six fine ships of the US Navy, and the selection of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes to command its 346 officers, men, and scientists. After every captain in the USN had refused to lead the expedition, command fell to Wilkes who was a driven man: ambitious, proud, insecure, petty, abusive, and self-destructive. Possessed of little sea experience, he was jealous of those officers who were practical mariners. Later, he assumed the unauthorized rank of acting captain and commodore of the squadron and the persona of a martinet to insult, humiliate, and terrorize his brother officers and men.

The expedition sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, on August 18, 1838. During the first stage, Wilkes in command of the flagship, USS Vincente, was to investigate imaginary shoals in the South Atlantic Ocean en route to the southern tip of South America. From Cape Horn the ships sailed south to the South Shetland Islands off the Antarctic Peninsula, returning to Cape Horn in March 1839. He then sailed into the Pacific Ocean, but only six months later did the expedition sight and survey its first island in the Tamed group. By then the expedition had been reduced to four ships. Afterwards they sailed to Tahiti and the Samoa Islands before heading south into the ice once more, this time below Australia. In January 1840, members of the expedition sighted land for the first time.
During the next few weeks, the ships experienced furious gales as Wilkes moved ever deeper into the ice in a desperate attempt to become the first man to land on the shore of Antarctica. It was not to be, but Vincente coasted a sufficient length of the coastline to enable Wilkes to claim Antarctica was a continent. Later that year, the British explorer James Ross, who had just completed his own Antarctica voyage, denied the American accomplishment, claiming to have sailed over what the Americans asserted was land. Ross also insisted that the so-called continent consisted of a number of islands. It was easy to make errors in Antarctica.

With less than a year to go, two more tasks remained to Wilkes. First, he was to survey the Fiji Islands, and then, after sailing across the Pacific to Hawaii and the northwest coast of America, to survey the mouth of the Columbia River. Then, he was to sail westward to return home. The Fiji Islands survey proved tragic. Wilkes was ill-equipped to deal with the fierce native islanders, and after his nephew was killed, a massacre was a near inevitable consequence. Time was insufficient and a fourth year was necessary before the final mission could be accomplished. The USS Peacock was lost in the mouth of the Columbia River before Wilkes finally departed the American coast for the long voyage home via Singapore and the Cape of Good Hope. He reached New York in June 1842.

The expedition's accomplishments were numerous and enormous, but what should have been a proud national legacy disappeared under the weight of recriminations, charges, and five courts-martial involving Wilkes and the officers of the expedition. In shaping the human drama, Philbrick is aided by the heretofore unused journals of William Reynolds. Against the monomaniacal Wilkes, stands Passed Midshipman William Reynolds whose youthful admiration for Wilkes and enthusiasm for the expedition turned to disillusion and finally to blazing hatred. This is a great tale, superbly told; highly recommended to all.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


This is one of the most important works on the history of Newfoundland to appear in the past twenty years. Pope supplants previous views of the marginal and tenuous nature of the European presence in seventeenth-century Newfoundland. He establishes that the English colonies and settlements placed Newfoundland at the centre of the cod fishery as one of the most important and early capitalist European industries. This book shows that the early colonies were more socially complex and economically diverse than previous scholarship has suggested. An older historiography, preoccupied with the political history of sponsored colonization and fisheries regulation, exaggerated the importance of the institutional failure of colonies. While the colonies failed, many of their settlers remained, comprising the first stable base for a permanent population of European descent. Rather than being isolated, people living and working in Newfoundland were an integral part of a "Greater New England," and of the great trades of London and the English West Country. Far from being impoverished, fishing folk used their wealth to participate in the emergence of a new consumerism that was beginning to change the nature of capitalism.

Some of Pope's findings build on the pioneering works of Keith Matthews and Gordon Handcock: that English authorities accepted residence as necessary to the possession of Newfoundland and the operation of the fishery; that mercantile investment in the Newfoundland fishery established the pathways by which some fishing masters and servants could become permanent settlers; and that the growth of female settlement was crucial to the growth of residency. However, Pope's book is the first sophisticated examination of life in
seventeenth-century Newfoundland. His pioneering examination of the relationship between the resident fishery and the English sack trade in southern European wines focuses on the role of the Kirke family, whom Pope describes as the planter gentry of Ferryland. Their well-documented careers, and the wealth of information generated by the archaeological sites at contemporary Ferryland, allow Pope to provide a detailed examination of the kin-based organization of the sack trade. The Kirkes settled at Ferryland because they appreciated the importance of having a stable supply of fish to operate in the sack trade, but the colony's greatest success was as an entrepot in the trade between Europe and the North American colonies. The Kirkes aspired to be a gentry in the New World, and combined their mercantile operations and social aspirations to patronize a thriving and substantial colony. Pope uses archaeological evidence to recreate a fascinating sense of what seventeenth-century Ferryland was like. His analysis ranges from the better-known description of the substantial physical infrastructure of the Kirke's house, storehouses, wharves, roadway, and other colonial facilities to the more intimate reconstruction of hearths and smithies as places of sociability and conviviality as well as work. More impressive, Pope explores the intellectual and emotional world of settlers, such as when he discusses the significance of the surviving remnants of plates used to bear rings during marriage ceremonies (218-9).

Pope's innovative perspectives raise important questions. He finds older theoretical examinations of the role of merchant capital in Newfoundland development to be unsatisfactory. Unlike historians such as Gillian Cell, Pope argues that the fishing industry was always capitalist, so there is no transition to explain. He further rejects the notion that the logic of merchant capital led fish merchants to oppose the development of a permanent local society and economy. Pope argues that the best way to think of the seventeenth-century fishing industry is as a vernacular one. While the fishing industry was international in scope, it was essentially an aggregate of many local markets for supplies of labour and capital, as well as for demand for fish. According to Pope, such local, or "vernacular," markets fostered enterprises organized without much direction, or planning based on abstract notions of labour and capital as market factors. Such non-directed businesses were a flexible, sensible adaptation to the vagaries of transatlantic market formation in the seventeenth century. Without "modern mass markets," the many local consumer preferences for fish were best met by locally organized fishing methods (31). Merchants and planter gentry used a vernacular form of shipping, deploying many small trading ships in their trade. Local communities of English fishers and merchants traded and worked with growing local settlements at Newfoundland, their contact providing the structure for a vernacular migration stream.

Pope uses the concept of vernacular capitalism to argue that the fishing industry could not serve as the basis for a directed or planned West Country opposition to a settled society at Newfoundland. His description of fishing enterprises establishes that merchants and fishers depended on year-round residence to protect their investments from each other and the Beothuk. Residents found other activities in the fur trade, lumber, and boat-building to complement the seasonality of fishing. The emergence of regional specialization in fishing outports, and the overall growth of settlement and the fishery encouraged the local trade and the development of housekeeping and hospitality as economic activities in their own right. While transiency continued to be a part of settlements, Pope points out that such transiency was not unusual in any North American colonial setting, and that communities in Newfoundland, like those in New England colonies, comprised a small number of resident planters living amidst a "sea of servants" (212). Pope argues that Newfoundland settlements enjoyed levels of development that were comparable to their mainland neighbours by almost any measure; they suffered no retarded development.

By stopping at this point, Pope prompts the question: if seventeenth-century Newfoundland was so similar to its neighbours, why did it subsequently diverge so much from them in terms of economic development?" He does not
hesitate to speculate about long-term trends in the nature of payment for service in the fishery, and comes close to the problematic assertion that the capitalist organization of labour through shares remained essentially the same from the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries. Lack of evidence does not restrain Pope's book on this point; he might as well have taken a further risk in extending the implications of the entire book's arguments. Pope suggests, for example, that colonial agriculture in Newfoundland was more successful that earlier studies of the directed colonies suggested. He admits, however, that the ecological conditions that made Newfoundland idea for cod fishing limited farming to subsistence requirements. While residents raised more crops and livestock than has been previously acknowledged, such production remained insufficient to encourage import substitution. Seventeenth-century Newfoundland remained dominated by a successful trade that provided the bulk of its population, fishing servants, with incomes that were better than most of their counterparts elsewhere in the Atlantic world. Pope demonstrates that servants tended to spend their incomes on the small luxuries of tobacco and good wines made readily accessible by the fish trade. By "making fish into wine," servants contributed to the early development of mass consumer markets, but by encouraging the production of consumer goods elsewhere. In short, Pope's analysis lays the basis for a staple-based interpretation of the manner in which Newfoundland would continue to depend on the fishery, and that this dependency would mean that local consumer markets would be satisfied primarily by the industries of other regions.

Sean T. Cadigan
St John's, Newfoundland and Labrador

The author of this memoir, Dr. Harry Paddon, worked for the International Grenfell Association between 1912 and 1938 as its principal physician in Labrador, a posting which required enormous energy, dedication and considerable seamanship. The main content of the memoir extends well beyond the realm of Paddon's medical practice and describes how Labradorians, including the Innu and Inuit, experienced the First World War, the Spanish Flu epidemic, and the postwar industrial changes which he saw as fundamentally threatening a traditional way of life. This memoir, originally submitted to an English publisher in 1938 only a year prior to Paddon's death, was rejected and never published. It now appears in print mostly due to the efforts of the editor Ronald Rompkey, himself the author of several important books on the history of the Grenfell mission. He provides a helpful introduction, photographs, maps, a profusion of endnotes, and a comprehensive bibliography to place this memoir into context.

Harry Paddon intended his memoir "first to portray something of the interest, the adventure, the pathos, and, thank Heaven, the humour of frontier medical practice during a quarter of a century in sub-Arctic Labrador, with its small, scattered and mixed population." (p.3) Equally important, he wanted to draw the reader's attention to the linkages between medical and social conditions which he saw—the ties between ill-health, malnutrition, substandard housing, unhygienic workplaces, ignorance and the need for social, economic and political reform. Paddon continuously links the problems of individual ill-health with a need for better public welfare services and political representation in Labrador. He illustrates his points using the travails of trappers, fishers, sealers and mariners and describes the scourges of tuberculosis, antisepsis, typhus, hypothermia, gangrene, dental disease, accident, "night blindness," and other conditions as well as their possible remedy. In many instances, Paddon believed that these "diseases" might have been prevented had better attention been paid to proper nutrition and hygiene.

Of interest to the maritime historian, Paddon journeyed on water to reach his patients in all types of weather. He travelled an estimated

50,000 miles by means of a 30-foot open motor boat, 40-ton crude oil burner, and 100-foot steamer. Several chapters reflect the centrality of these maritime journeys in his professional life: "Down North" along the Labrador Coast in a Newfoundland Icebreaker; The Passing of the Yale from the Service; The Coming of Maraval: Extended Medical Cruising, and others. In addition, the editor provides endnotes with information on the length, tonnage, and ownership of these vessels.

Adept at description, Paddon vividly recalls wandering from harbour to harbour, especially the trips from Cartwright into Lake Melville to North West River and his voyages northward along the formidable Labrador coast toward Nain. He offers a highly literate and engaging commentary of these voyages including the physical state of his vessels, their structural components, how and where they sailed, their encounters with squalls, gales, hurricanes, blizzards, icebergs, pack ice and shoals, how they handled under these conditions, the mariners who crewed them, and the many sailing strategies he employed. Sometimes he also speaks about the inner world as a crew member who was called upon to repair or salvage a vessel. His memoir also offers observations on Labrador bankers, dories, and aboriginal craft, as well as the difficult living and working conditions of the fishers and sealers. The lure of the sea is palpable in his writing: "The end of the season's cruising has ever been a sad occasion for me. The good fellowship on board; the endless variety of the sea, which to me is never monotonous (231)."

This book, however, is not primarily about the sea. Throughout his memoir, Paddon's primary focus is on the complexity of medical practice in Labrador. His role as physician was to provide basic medical services to persons in childbirth, those suffering from illness, or victims of accident. He would not, and did not, separate the personal circumstances affecting individual patients from the attendant problems of a sparsely settled population living amidst a fragile subsistence economy with the virtual absence of necessary public institutions and other amenities.

In closing, Rompkey has managed to rescue from near oblivion an obscure but memorable account of a life well lived. It is evident that much effort has gone into preparing this edition. Despite the richness of its content, however, one never learns much about how Labradorians (especially native peoples) perceived Paddon, except for what Paddon himself or his family members tell us. In leaving out other voices, the editor risks presenting a skewed interpretation of the events embodied in this memoir and of writing hagiography more so than biography. That this memoir is not a presentation but a representation of history (xliii) is insufficient justification for not searching out and embracing other viewpoints and perspectives. Aside from this interpretative limitation, this is an excellent book and a major contribution toward our understanding of Paddon's life, Labrador history, and the place of the International Grenfell Association within it.

Rainer Baehre,
Corner Brook, Newfoundland and Labrador


The western river steamboat had a profound impact on the settlement and development of the vast area drained by the Mississippi River and its major tributaries, including the Ohio and Missouri rivers, in the central United States. Following the introduction of the first steam vessel to these waters in 1811 at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, thousands more followed. This informative book focuses on the period between then and 1860. This was the time of major advances in American inland steamboat technology including hull, engine and boiler developments, that led to the construction of the classic steam packets commonly associated with this period in American steam navigation. Typically, these vessels featured lightly built,
shallow-draught, flat-bottomed hulls, stern or side wheels for propulsion and towering cabins. Cargo was most often carried on the main deck, because holds were too limited to be effective cargo carrying spaces. They were a different type of vessel from the sound and lake vessels, developed on the east coast and also used on the St Lawrence River and other eastern Canadian waterways. The western river steamers were ideal frontier craft that could be built quite quickly and cheaply, carry substantial cargo, and take considerable punishment, yet be repaired and maintained far from sophisticated shipyards.

This detailed book, based on the author's master's thesis, brings together many aspects of the design, construction and use of these fascinating and important vessels. After placing the region and the development of steam navigation in context, the author describes the archaeological record developed from work on 17 wreck sites. The western sternwheeler seldom survived for more than 20 years and many ran aground, hit snags or simply wore out due to the harsh conditions in which they worked. Sometimes machinery and equipment, or even the cabins were salvaged, but frequently the hulls were abandoned. Sometimes, if the boats sank in deeper water, nothing was recovered and a historical treasury of early steamboat information and cultural artifacts remain.

Hundreds of wrecks litter the river channels of the Mississippi system. Interestingly, some of these sites are now located well away from the river channels because a meandering river like the Mississippi frequently changed its course, leaving abandoned channels where the wrecks remain, covered with soil and river bottom sediments. The earliest of these investigated wrecks likely dates to 1830 and is located on the upper waters of the Red River in Oklahoma. The results of work on these sites, as demonstrated by the work at the wreck of the steamer Bertrand, can be very rewarding, producing thousands of artifacts.

Drawing on the information developed from these studies, and the documentary record, the author explores the development of the steamboats. Original documentation of the early vessels is very sparse and structural descriptions very rare indeed. The early shipwrights and steam engineers seldom made detailed drawings or recorded specifications. Instead, they often worked from sketches and by eye, to refine and improve their vessels. Nonetheless, with the archaeological material, a surprisingly informed and detailed picture is emerging of these important vessels. In three chapters, covering the periods, 1811-1820, 1820-1835, and 1835-1860, the author discusses their development, use, and the innovations that improved their design, functionality, safety and efficiency. I enjoyed this discussion and found it particularly informative. The explanations of design innovations are clear and logical. A final chapter summarizes the discussion and outlines the importance of these wide ranging and numerous vessels during this fascinating period of American expansion.

I found much information that applies to Canada's history of inland navigation. Shallow draught steam vessels were used extensively in western and northern Canada, and similar vessels operated in other parts of Canada as well. Although the construction and operation of most of the vessels discussed in this book predate the era of inland steam navigation in western and northern Canada, the early Canadian steamboats owed a great deal in their design and engineering to the earlier developments in the United States. By the late 1850s, when the first river steamers began service in British Columbia, for example, the vessels were already fairly sophisticated, and generally well suited to the mining frontier along the Fraser River where they were first used. The technology did not come directly from the western rivers, but was modified in the American west for the fast flowing rivers and to carry the cargos more typical of the mining and farming frontiers of the Pacific Coast. The steam vessels employed on the rivers of the American Pacific coast states and in British Columbia, Alaska, the Yukon and the Canadian North were generally of a different design from the classic Mississippi packet steamer, but nevertheless, they still had a great deal in common with the western river vessels, particularly in hull form and engine and boiler design. Moreover, there was an important migration of steamboat men north into Canada bringing with them expertise and experience. On
the rivers of the Canadian prairies, some vessels of the western rivers type were used with little modification.

Adam Kane has produced an insightful, well-written, thorough book that brings together a great deal of carefully integrated information, combining recent archaeological discoveries with early, documentary sources. It highlights the value of archaeological work on wreck sites and the potential those future discoveries have for increasing our understanding of this very important type of vessel, and of the social and economic conditions of the times when the western river steamboats were the most important form of transportation in this vast region of the United States.

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