

BOOK REVIEWS

Jerry Bannister. *The Rule of the Admirals. Law, Custom and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, www.utpress.utoronto.ca, 2003. 423 pp., maps, photographs, tables, appendices, bibliography, notes, index. CND \$65.00, cloth; ISBN 0-8020-8843-0.

Dalhousie University professor, Jerry Bannister, belongs to a group of Atlantic Canadian historians attempting to revise and reinterpret the history of Newfoundland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Given that the basis for study has frequently centred around such works as Judge D.W. Browse's 1895 *A History of Newfoundland* (woefully outdated yet republished in 2002) and the research of Memorial University historian Keith Matthews (who rarely published), such attention to early Newfoundland is needed and refreshing.

Based on the author's 1999 doctoral dissertation, *The Rule of the Admirals* is a reaction to the frequently-argued notion that eighteenth-century Newfoundland was a primitive and underdeveloped society because it possessed neither official colonial status nor the corresponding representative and administrative apparatus. A system had evolved based in part on the development of local custom and the responsibility given to the senior captain of the annual naval convoy (the commodore). This officer was required to answer a series of questions from the Lords/Board of Trade and to assist the fishing admirals in the settlement of disputes. The fishermen ostensibly policed themselves by granting the first three masters of fishing vessels to arrive at any sizeable harbour the privilege of addressing grievances, in practice, the system never worked and the task fell to the officers of the Royal Navy. Thus outlined are the two forms of "admiral" referred to in the title.

By outlining the process through which justice was dispensed Bannister reiterates the argument that, prior to the granting of a colonial assembly in 1832, law and order was controlled by the Admiralty and policed by captains and

lieutenants of the Royal Navy. With the growth of proper social infrastructures throughout the eighteenth century (such as a resident elite and a public press) Newfoundland interests were able to lobby for colonial status and representative government, thereby eliminating the need for naval officers as governors and their surrogate courts. Although the concept of naval officers running Newfoundland has long been a topic of debate in Newfoundland history, attempts to delineate how the system actually worked are rare.

The strength of the book lies in the analysis of the surrogate court system, its apex, decline and the transfer to colonial government. King William's Act of 1699 presented written jurisdiction for Admiralty control of Newfoundland in the form of publicly codifying the heads of enquiries and instructions to commodores and fishing admirals. In 1729 this system changed dramatically in two ways: the appointment of a naval officer to act as official governor separately from the commodore and the establishment of a civil magistracy. But it was not until 1749-50 that a series of reforms initiated by the governor, Captain George Rodney, established the surrogate court system that formed the basis of naval rule. Bannister pieces this system together using disparate sources in both Newfoundland and Great Britain and places his work within recent literature centred on law and order and on the British state. Bannister argues that naval rule was not as tyrannical or arbitrary (if not always consistently fair) as has been portrayed by many Newfoundland historians. Rather, patterns of justice and punishment conformed to those in Britain; the principal difference being that convictions for capital offences were more readily pardoned in Newfoundland. The use of whippings and fines were frequent and were employed primarily to ensure the deference of the predominantly Irish labouring class to the small merchant elite. Thus, a clearer picture emerges of how a maritime fishing community was governed and how peace was maintained.

From a maritime perspective, however,

some questions arise. Although Bannister argues persuasively that naval officers at the scene controlled the organized combination of law and custom, the Admiralty itself is surprisingly mute. If eighteenth-century Newfoundland was "A Fief of the Admiralty" as is indicated in the title of chapter five, then how did the naval administration view their fiefdom? Do the voluminous Admiralty Papers at the PRO say anything? The admiralty sources utilized here are restricted to Admirals' Dispatches (inbound) between 1766-92 and the High Court of Admiralty (Doctors' Commons) volume for 1747. Additionally, while reaching back to King William's Act of 1699, a watershed in Newfoundland written law, is in one sense a logical beginning, it represents a different epoch from the surrogate court years. The Royal Navy had been sending convoys to Newfoundland since at least the Restoration of 1660. The commodore system originated here, not in 1699, and was usurped by the reforms starting in 1729 because it altered the way the navy was deployed to Newfoundland.

Nevertheless, Bannister succeeds in his goal to upgrade early Newfoundland history and *The Rule of the Admirals* will provide a solid platform on which to discuss and debate Newfoundland within the British Empire and the Atlantic World.

William R. Miles
St John's, Newfoundland

Derek Lundy. *The Way of a Ship. A Square-rigger Voyage in the Last Days of Sail*. Toronto, ON; Alfred A. Knopf, Vintage Canada, www.randomhouse.ca, 2003, 449 pp., illustrations, map, CDN \$ 22.00, paper; ISBN 067697637 1.

Many of the great writers of the sea have adjusted their life experience to suit literary conventions. Derek Lundy has performed a similar feat, but at least twice removed. The letters of his seafaring great, great uncle have been transformed into a remarkable work of historical fiction. The uncle, Benjamin Lundy, left the sea and settled on Salt Spring Island, a

magical place off the east coast of Vancouver Island. He built a fine house that is still there, and he left behind letters and fragmentary memories that are a part of the oral tradition of the author's family.

In many respects, the life and times of Benjamin Lundy in going to sea and rounding Cape Horn provide a convenient handle on which to attach many a compelling digression without interrupting the flow of the narrative. The more sceptical among CNRS members might wonder whether an author of fiction can have it both ways. Lundy has of course done his homework in using many of the great archival and museum collections, in particular those at the Public Records Office and the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich. His account of navigational methods, the tacking of a ship, food rationing, and general life at sea are well researched, entertaining and integrated into the story. This book is a creditable late-nineteenth century history of the British Merchant Marine.

Dana, Melville, Cooper, Villiers, and of course Conrad; a short list yes, but among the great authors of the sea. Their books must continue to be read, but in this reviewer's opinion, Lundy should be read first. The language and assumptions of these and other nineteenth and twentieth century worthies has become more difficult for the modern reader. *The Way Of The Ship* will unlock many meanings that will in turn allow Conrad or the academic work, for example of the Maritime History Group at Memorial University to become more accessible. This is a highly recommended book that can be read as an adventure and as a refreshing history, but with personality.

Maurice Smith
Kingston, Ontario

Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Ellerman (eds.). *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century. An International Perspective*. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, www.frankcass.com, 2003. 288 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, index. US \$ 27.50, paper; ISBN 0-

7146-5456-6. Distributed by International Specialized Book Services, www.isbs.com.

Like other tales of mishaps at sea, stories of mutinies have a compelling fascination. The focus in this collection of searching studies, however, is not what happened but the underlying issues which resulted in group indiscipline between 1905 and 1949 in various navies. This is a groundbreaking collection of twelve case studies by academic historians from several countries.

Geoffrey Till, the series editor, points out in his preface that by the early twentieth century sailors were being drawn predominately from urban backgrounds and reflected societal norms. The German sailors who mutinied in 1918, their French counterparts in the 1919 Black Sea mutinies and the British lower deck, which paralysed the Atlantic Fleet at Invergordon in 1931, all came from societies which had experienced considerable industrial strife. Mutiny is collective disobedience and happens when the consensus between officers and their subordinates breaks down. The term describes a range of actions from refusal to work to violence and murder. Dissatisfaction with conditions of service including pay, food and leave were the most common causes of discontent in the twelve case studies presented. The incidents described show that acts of collective insubordination do, in fact, generally lead to improvements in the conditions which triggered discontent.

In addition to Chris Bell's examination of the Invergordon incident, three other studies concern discipline breakdowns in navies patterned on the Royal Navy. Indeed, in his analysis of disturbances in the Royal Canadian Navy in 1947 and 1949, Richard Gimblett cites the tradition of work stoppages in the British navies. He underlines that they have been undertaken to recover something lost or threatened by sailors who remain fundamentally loyal. While the circumstances and outcomes of the *Potemkin* mutiny and the 1949 Canadian incidents were hugely different, it's interesting that the proportion of petty officers in a warship's crew was a contributing cause in both navies. In the Canadian case, an arbitrary

restructuring by higher authority had changed the status of experienced working hands, making them petty officers. Housekeeping and other tasks now had to be done by a smaller pool of sailors, resulting in discontent. Gimblett's penetrating study is truly revisionist because it shows that the official Mainguy Commission which examined the disturbances missed key causes including manning turbulence. It overemphasized a perceived lack of Canadian identity in the Navy. More importantly, by the time it was established, measures to address the underlying causes of discontent were already in train. David Stevens' study of collective insubordination in the battle cruiser HMAS *Australia*, homeward bound from the Great War in 1919, is also revisionist. Interestingly, the end of the war had been accompanied by increasing industrial unrest in Australia. The incident happened as the ship was about to sail from Fremantle, the first Australian port of call. Ringleaders wanted the port visit extended and there was a general refusal to get the battle cruiser underway. The chiefs and petty officers were not affected, however, and they and the officers accomplished this task. Stevens rejects the portrayal of the disturbances by earlier writers as a manifestation of a class struggle. His study also argues that politicians were incorrect when they portrayed the incident in terms of egalitarian Australian sailors chafing at unsuitable and overly-harsh British standards of discipline.

Certain mutinies had a serious political dimension. The most notable was the bloody uprising in the brand-new battleship *Potemkin* in 1905, analysed by Robert Zebroski. Like the other studies in *Naval Mutinies*, Zebroski's paper is based on exhaustive study of the literature, in this instance Russian-language accounts. The immediate cause was dissatisfaction about maggoty meat. Radical sailors of the Social Democrat Party throughout the Black Sea Fleet were already planning a fleet-wide mutiny which it was hoped would trigger revolts across Russia. When the Captain insisted that the infected meat would be "excellent" after being washed and ordered his crew to eat it, seventy to one hundred radical sailors in his crew of 763 decided to exploit the

situation. *Potemkin* was seized and held for eleven days as the mutineers steamed around the western Black Sea seeking provisions, eventually reaching Constanza, Romania where the crew was granted asylum. A modern warship like *Potemkin* required a cadre of experienced men to operate effectively. A lack of petty officers - there were only 12 in contrast with 763 more junior sailors - would have been a severe handicap in achieving fighting efficiency. More importantly, in 1905 the lack of a solid cadre of petty officers - the traditional "backbone" of modern warship crews - must have been a major factor in allowing indiscipline to spread. Zebroski notes that after seven years of naval service most conscripts left the service. The result was too few petty officers, one of the fundamental weaknesses in the Russian Navy. It is interesting that the Soviet Navy inherited this structural problem. It too used conscripts for the bulk of its personnel. Retaining long-service sailors was a chronic problem, which led to the employment of officers for technical and other responsibilities, carried by petty officers in western navies. The other mutinies described happened when a critical mass of sailors became disgruntled and initiated work stoppages. In two cases - a revolt in Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro in 1918, and in the French fleet in the Black Sea in 1919 - radical sailors tried to use mutinies once underway to achieve political aims.

These rewarding studies do in fact provide an international perspective and much can be learned from them. Bruce EUeman analyses the defection of a Nationalist cruiser to the Communists in 1949. Later the Communist Party decided to revert to ancient Chinese practice by dividing the navy into separate fleets. This measure to minimize the chance of crippling mutinies gives the Party internal control over the navy but results in serious systemic problems in achieving uniform operational efficiency.

Curiously, the only US incident examined is the Port Chicago Mutiny of 1944 involving black sailors employed as stevedores handling hazardous ammunition cargoes. While there are common factors in the incidents analysed in these papers, each case was

obviously the result of a particular context. At the end of the book the editors conclude that mutinies are a greater threat to authoritarian regimes than to democratic ones. This collection of well-founded studies is recommended for a better understanding of why group insubordination occurred in disparate navies during the first half of the twentieth century. It is hoped that Frank Cass will publish a further collection.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia

Gilbert Bossé. *Navigating the Lower Saint Lawrence in the 19th Century*, version 2.0. Métis Beach, QC: G.R. Bossé, www.gbosse@globetrotter.net, 2003. 4200 pp, table of contents with hyperlinks, maps, glossary, bibliography, index. CDN \$ 59.95, CD-ROM; ISBN 0 96984887 0.

An edition statement like "version 2.0" is rarely seen in the review pages of *The Northern Mariner*, but then again neither is work of this nature. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there was a significant movement among historical societies to publish editions, both great and small, of transcribed and edited manuscripts. The tradition is carried on in the publication programs of the Champlain Society and the Naval Records Society. More commonly, with the advent of microfilm, the great runs of manuscripts and of newspapers have been preserved as they originally appeared, without the value of editorial comment or searchability. Indeed, microfilm has more in common with the scroll than the book. In recent years there have been a number of attempts to reproduce the historical newspaper experience on the web with varied success, particularly with respect to reasonably accurate searchability.

In this astounding collection of documents, Bossé has charted a different course. He claims (and I'm not here to challenge the claim) that, printed out, this version contains about 4,200 8.5 x 11 inch pages. But printing the whole volume would significantly reduce the value of somewhere in the order of 18,000

hyperlinks between the various parts of the work.

So what do you get on your CD-ROM? Essentially, it is a web site on a disk. Drop it in your computer's CD-ROM drive (or make the one permitted copy on your hard drive) and you have the entire work in your favourite browser without going online. Should you, the author even points you to free online tools that can be used to index every word on the disk in a way that supplements his more precise indexing. The simple markup standards used in its preparation mean that the intellectual content of this collection will be of value for years, if not decades, after the over-designed CD-ROMs of the 1990s will no longer play on any device outside of a computer museum. In good design often less is more. That said, in similar projects started more recently, the underlying markup is less often in the HTML, and more often in the more flexible XML, but that's distinction that means less to the end-user than it does to the person charged with re-purposing the content over the longer haul.

Version 2.0 of *Navigating* brings the collection of data up to 1860 (ten years more than version 1.0). Bossé has set his sights on the end of the century. What would fill another shelf or so in paper has lots of room for growth in the CD-ROM format, largely because this is transcribed, searchable text and not pictures. The bedrock of the content is the result of a close reading of the nineteenth century newspapers published in Quebec City: the *Chronicle*, *Gazette* and *Mercury*. Beyond that are a fascinating collection of documents created when the mariner met the law: the deeds registered with the notaries public and the proceedings and judgments of the Quebec Court of Vice-Admiralty. Most shipwrecks involve at least the potential loss of property, and with money at stake, can the courts be far away?

Indeed, with that many lawyers in the room, Bossé has supplied a good glossary of terms which are as often obscure legal Latin as they are nautical in origin. The material is presented in its original language which means, more often than not, that the documents are in English, and so are the place names. Consequently, we are also supplied a very useful

list of equivalent places. In another edition a chart or two would not go amiss.

Interspersed with the original content there are some editorial notes and contemporary historical articles by people like Gaspé historian Ken Annett. What is not to like? My personal *bêtes noires* are ambiguous dates. "19/12/1854" is, with a minimum amount of thought, December 19th, 1854, but one has to look for an unambiguous date when confronted with "05/08/1858." Given that the rest of navigation elements of the CD-ROM are presented in English, rendering this as "5 Aug 1858" would not be inappropriate. That said, the citation that was one twitch of my mouse away was "*Quebec Mercury*, Thursday, August 5, 1858. Page 3, Col. 1B." and even I can't complain about that.

Beyond the date factor, the biggest challenge that Bossé has to face is marketing a product that is admitted to be a work in progress. Just as version 1.0 is subsumed in this release, so too can we expect all of this content to be contained in version 3.0 (along with a substantial quantity of material from the 1860s if the current pattern is followed). *Navigating the Lower St. Lawrence in the 19th Century* is a substantial work of private scholarship produced on a shoestring, offered at a very reasonable price and which will only become more useful as successive versions emerge.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario

Rob Ferguson. *The Devil and the Disappearing Sea. A True Story about the Aral Sea Catastrophe*. Vancouver, BC: Raincoast Books, www.raincoast.com, 2003. 267 pp., photographs, references. CDN \$ 39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55192-599-0.

In 1999 the author, a Canadian Communications expert, was hired by a French Consulting Group to lead a mixed bag of foreign experts in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on a small Global Environment Facility (GEF)-financed component of the \$250 million project to save the Aral Sea. Until 1960, this inland sea was as large as Lake Victoria (10% larger than Lake

Huron), but it is now only one-third of this size, leaving a huge expanse of salt and pesticide residues around its rim. The project objective was to raise public awareness about the importance of conserving irrigation water abstracted from its two main feeder rivers, in order to prevent the Aral Sea from disappearing. With a light touch and perceptive eye, and without dwelling overmuch on his many frustrations, the author recounts his adventures in the five former Soviet Union States that are members of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). He wrestles with the bureaucracy - led by the devil of the title - and the intrigues of his own locally-hired and international staff, amid scenes of seduction, sedition and murder.

This is a story about managing an international development project, convincingly recounted, and it exposes all too accurately, what actually goes on in the field. The setting is Central Asia, but the story is one that occurs too often, in too many places, with too much of one of the world's dwindling resources, overseas development assistance. Letters pledging commitments by recipient organizations are ignored (one such concerning IFAS, signed by "the devil" in question, lies beside my laptop); support from the funding organization is non-existent; review missions ignore the managers whose job it is to implement the vague objectives in the Terms of Reference; and the Consulting Firm's interest is purely financial, smoothing the way by paying the bribes and applying pressure on the manager to abandon principle for expediency. The story is the same, whether the objective is to alleviate poverty or an environmental disaster. As the book shows, it is all too easy for a few well-placed officials in the donor and recipient organizations to cooperate, using a shared resource (the Aral, the Nile) as a tool for milking the aid system. The Project Manager is caught up in this maelstrom of conflicting interests, and, as the author admits, is subject to human frailty.

The Aral Sea is the backdrop of the story, but we learn little about it from this book, for the author professes no expertise in water management and skips lightly over the major

issues that are leading to the Sea's demise. Nor do we learn anything of the other IFAS activities, or of the competition between the European Commission and World Bank to pour funds into the area. The author amusingly describes the antics and intrigues of his counterparts as they struggle to identify mechanisms to bring about behavioural change among water users, but there is no exploration of the rationale of the project. Why should Tajik and Kyrgyz irrigators worry about a lake 1000 km downstream? Why shouldn't the Amudarya (Oxus) and Syrdarya (Jaxartes) rivers be used for cotton irrigation rather than to top up evaporation losses from the Aral Sea? Would water saved be used to expand irrigation rather than augment river flow? He makes offhand references [205] to falling water levels in the Nile basin, although recently Lake Nasser has been overflowing into the desert, and falling groundwater levels in Bangladesh, which, except under Dhaka, are fully recharged every year. This indicates a populist approach, which can only have exacerbated relations with the Chairman of IFAS, a dyed-in-the-wool irrigation engineer. There are good arguments on both sides for conservation and exploitation of water resources, and the book would have benefited from a more even-handed discussion of these issues, and reference to the other components of the project.

Rob Ferguson does us all a service by recounting his experiences so honestly and entertainingly, and although there is undoubtedly another side of the story, it should give pause for thought to anyone concerned about development issues. In some ways, it complements John Stackhouse's *"Out of Poverty, and into something more comfortable"*

There is little in the book directly relevant to Maritime Studies, as the historical and geographical information concerning the Aral Sea is readily available elsewhere, on relevant websites. But the problems of shared maritime resources - the Baltic, the Mediterranean - are increasingly the subject of similar projects financed by agencies such as the World Bank through the Global Environment Facility. This book should serve as a stark warning of how poorly designed projects are

destined to failure. If we want to protect these resources, we have to find a far better process than Ferguson was trying to implement on the Aral Sea.

Stephen Bricchieri-Colombi
Anghiari, Italy

Julian Gwyn. *Frigates and Foremasts. The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, www.ubcpress.ca, 2003. 206 pp., maps, illustrations, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. CDN \$75.00, cloth; ISBN 0 7748 0910 8.

While the role of the Royal Navy has been a feature of almost every study of North America in the 1745-1815 period, Julian Gwyn has carved out an unique historical niche by addressing the political, strategic and economic factors that influenced the deployment of Britain's naval forces in Nova Scotia during a formative 75-year period in the province's and the nation's history.

Eighteenth century conflicts over fishing rights between the French at Louisbourg and the British colonists in New England inevitably drew the Royal Navy into a defensive role, especially when the French attacked Canso in 1744 and their privateers harassed New England fishing vessels all along the coast. While Commodore (later Vice-Admiral) Peter Warren urged the government to press their advantage and attack French territory in North America, the fall of Louisbourg the next year and peace with France in 1748 meant that attacking Quebec was no longer politically expedient. In fact, as Gwyn succinctly puts it, the fall of Louisbourg was more of a French loss than a British gain. [36]

According to Gwyn, what really led the British to settle Halifax in 1749 was the need for a good deep harbour in North America where the Royal Navy could careen its ships and keep naval stores to repair damaged ships. As the navy's role shifted from defence against French encroachment to enforcement of colonial duties and import restrictions against its increasingly

rebellious American colonies, the need for a secure naval yard and access to timber and ship supplies became critical and the pivotal role of Halifax was secure. The creation of a naval establishment in Halifax led in turn to commercial growth and the interdependence of the military and merchant classes in Nova Scotia.

As the fourth volume of the Canadian War Museum's series, Studies in Military History, Gwyn's tightly packed volume makes an important contribution to our understanding of how colonial competition, naval policy, political ambition and administrative neglect were played out in the waters around Nova Scotia. Throughout the period under discussion, issues such as fishing rights, impressment and prize making reappear as the Navy is called upon to keep the peace or engage in war according to the politics of the day. While certainly able to rise to the occasion during wartime, the North American Squadron never seemed to achieve its full potential. One of Gwyn's most poignant conclusions is that not one sea officer with experience in North America ever produced a memorandum, suggestion or plan to help the Admiralty improve their understanding of Britain's North American colonies. [156]

The book is laid out in an easily accessible chronological manner that depicts the ebb and flow of British interest in North America and the accompanying deployment of Royal Naval vessels to reinforce this interest through two wars with France and two with the United States. What is particularly valuable is Gwyn's analysis of the Royal Navy's role from a variety of perspectives. He goes beyond the strategic contributions of various Admirals (for good and ill) to highlight the role of organizations like the Navy Board and the Commissioners of the Halifax Navy Yard in the overall history of Nova Scotia. His conclusion is that whatever success the Navy achieved in battle, convoy duty, blockade or customs enforcement between 1745 and 1815, it was largely in spite of the neglect and lack of understanding on the part of successive Boards of Admiralty.

From the creation of the first North

American Squadron in 1745 to the vast naval defence establishment developed in Halifax during the War of 1812, the Royal Navy left an indelible mark on the history of Nova Scotia. *Frigates and Foremasts* offers a refreshing new take on a period of Canada's history that needed to be retold in the light of recent scholarship. It is a story that Gwyn tells in an extremely readable fashion, based on a depth of research and scholarship that is always a delight.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario

Commander B. Ahlund, RSWN (Ret.). *Historia Kring Vara Sjökort* (History of Our Charts). Karlskrona, Sweden: Abrahamson, 2002. 126 pages, illustrations, appendices: ISBN 91 974015-2-8.

In 1941, Dahlgren & Richters published a two-volume work *Sveriges Sjökort*, (Sweden's Nautical Charts), a very comprehensive work with greater appeal to hydrographers than to the general public. Sixty years later, Commander Bertil Ahlund's book provides a history of the development of hydrographic surveys of Sweden's coastal waters and its major lakes in 126 more accessible pages.

The earliest description of Swedish waters is found in the Danish King Valdemar's *jordebok* about 1200 AD, describing fairways from Blekinge to Roslagen and Åland, based on the experiences of mariners. Until the beginning of the sixteenth century, most maritime trade in the Baltic area was in the hands of the Dutch and the Hansa. In 1535, King Gustav Vasa, founder of the Swedish Navy, was interested in the development of trade in Swedish ships and organized the first pilotage service for mariners' training. In 1603, King Karl IX ordered the production of a chart or map of the Nordic area. In 1626, Bureus published his six maps of Scandinavia using astronomical observations to determine the latitude of certain points. Land surveyors were also requested to include harbours with some soundings as part of their activities. Ongoing losses of naval vessels by wreck (10 in 1625 and 8 three years later)

increased demand for nautical charts and pilotage books.

In 1634, chief pilot J. Månsson and associates produced his book *Charts of the Baltic*. The etching on the title page which includes a compass, depicts the author standing holding a log line and lead in one hand, and an hour glass in the other. In 1655, as a result of the Månsson report on pilotage, the Crown ordered provincial governors to require pilots and other inhabitants of the inshore water to mark underwater rocks in fairways used by shipping.

During the reign of King Karl XI, the Swedish merchant marine began to expand in response to the Anglo-Dutch wars and in 1662, the Swedish Admiralty established a school for merchant masters, mates and pilots. The Crown appointed Admiral W. Von Rosenfeldt head of the hydrographic office for ten years. He was not only to supervise pilotage, but also to complete hydrographic surveys and the production of charts. To meet those requirements, Rosenfeldt required land surveyors to make geometrical observations of the coasts and skerries and then obtained the services of an astronomer and mathematician named Peter Gedda to chart them. In 1693, Gedda completed his book of ten charts, all of which had to be hand drawn, engraved and printed in Holland, as Sweden had neither engraving nor printing resources. Two of his charts - Kattegat and mid-Baltic - are reproduced in the book.

The author describes how during the 1700-1718 war, the lack of marine surveys of the Sound resulted in groundings in the Flintrennen channel. In addition, unsurveyed Finnish inshore waters caused difficulties for Swedish vessels trying to meet threats from Russian forces. After the 1721 Nystad treaty, Nils Strömcróna, in the sloop *Goja* and two small craft, began to take soundings of ports and entrances based on land maps. In 1737-39, the Admiralty published a collection of charts of the Baltic, Kattegat and Sound. These were so accurate that, two centuries later, in 1942, Sweden's hydrographer ran off 300 copies from the original plates of Strömcróna's chart of the east coast from Västervik to Gefle, and part of the west coast from Varberg to Strömstad.

In 1750, the Department of Commerce

appealed to Parliament to arrange for more and better charts. Improved accuracy required additional hydrological work such as astronomical determinations, locations, triangular and base saturation, some of which could be done during ice conditions. Between 1782 and 1797, a period of intensive hydrographie work resulted in the release of eleven general engraved charts covering the Swedish east coast. In 1805, the Crown established a hydrographie department to be manned by naval personnel and by 1823, the inshore fleet and the hydrographie department became part of the regular navy. An achievement was Gustaf af Klint's 1849 collection of ten charts of the Baltic in scale 1:400,000 Mercator projection and eighteen in scale 1:200,000 conic projection. At this time, the director of the pilotage branch was relieved of responsibility for hydrographie activities.

Commander Ahlund has provided summaries of the activities of all the Swedish Navy's hydrographers from 1853-1956 when responsibility for printing hydrographie survey charts was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation and Shipping. For much of this period, while naval officers and other personnel were often allocated to the hydrographie service, it seems this duty was not heavily sought after by naval personnel. The old naval vessels initially adapted for the surveying service were finally upgraded in 1941 with the addition of the 650-ton *Gustaf af Klint*, purpose-built for hydrographie operations. The hydrographie department produced charts for both merchant and recreational vessels as well as special charts for the Navy. While commercial charts of the inshore waters could contain blank spots indicating those areas barred to commercial shipping, it did not mean they had not been surveyed for defence purposes, since special charts of those areas were produced for the Navy.

The book contains five addenda, including: (1) A. Almlöf's paper on preparations and detailed methods for taking soundings; (2) Astronomical location determination - triangular measurement; (3) Land surveying methods; (4) Soundings work - illustrates all methods from log and lead to echo soundings begun in 1934, and (5) Mercators, Spens Geodic and Gauss' chart projections including explanatory diagrams.

In conclusion, the author has

compressed much thorough research into 126 pages to produce a fine history of the Swedish hydrographie service. I wish summaries in English could have been added.

Daniel G Harris
Ottawa, Ontario

John Rousmaniere. *Sleek: Classic Images from the Rosenfeld Collection*. Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport, www.mysdc.org, 2003. 122 pp., photographs, boat descriptions, biographies, bibliography. US \$50.00, cloth; ISBN 0-939510-90-1.

As a word, "sleek" derives from Middle English and has long meant "smooth," "unruffled," or "tranquil." And so it suitably applied to the sailing vessels that have been the subject of many photographs that are now securely deposited in The Rosenfeld Collection, Mystic Seaport, Connecticut. The photographs, selected by Connie Sullivan of Hummingbird Books and aided by Mary Anne Stets, Curator of Photography at Mystic Seaport, range over time from the late 1890s to the late 1930s, with at least one later day addition.

This is a collection about yachts, not about yachting or the social life of yachtmen. What we see page after page in splendid black and white photographs are yachts under canvas, coursing through the coastal seas. Some press on in solitary; others, in groups. But there they sail on, alone almost now in time and space, having left, or so it seems, the temporal world agreeably behind. One wonders how many of these vessels still survive. Fact of the matter is that the photographic record, if properly preserved, will keep the memory of such vessels alive forever, assuming no disasters. And hats off to the photographers, of uniform high professional status and quality: Charles Bolles, James Burton, Arthur Aldridge and Morris Rosenfeld or his sons. I am told that the Rosenfeld Collection has hundreds of thousands of such photographs and negatives. In fact, I have seen other published selections from these holdings. Mystic Seaport has always prided itself on keeping alive the art and photography of the sea (besides many other things), and this book

joins an illustrious pedigree.

There is no room for sloppiness in a book of photographs of yachts. Authenticity counts for everything in maritime history. And so it is with John Rousmaniere, noted author, editor and sailor, whose delightful text and suitable, well-researched notes on each and every photograph are a delight to read. These will be a source of reference for years to come. Such a handsome and comprehensive book could well serve for a model for a similar work on, say, the Great Lakes, or Atlantic Canada or the British Columbia coast. We are reminded by this book of the endless possibilities that the sea has given us in history research, and many are the paths of the sea still to be followed in our agenda. We need energetic leaders of maritime museums to unlock the secrets of our photographic collections, and much more creative thinking and energy to effect our projects.

The text is fine, engaging, and I close this review with one of the most interesting paragraphs: "Looking at these images, I am reminded of the historian Samuel Eliot Morison's observation about the creators of the best clipper ships. Like the architects of medieval Gothic cathedrals, he wrote, those American shipwrights had rare insights into creatively - insights that Morison called "visions transcending human experience, with the power to transmute them into reality." [25] This can also be said of Herreshoff, George L. Watson, William Gardner, and others who drew the lines of the majestic sloops and schooners shown here. They were urged on by creativity, not greed, for few fortunes have been made designing yachts. When A. Cary Smith was asked about a career in yacht design, he advised that happier prospects would be had by a street-comer peanuts salesman." The designers' work has new life in this lovely book, an attractively priced treasure of priceless memory.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario

Gabriele Hoffmann and Uwe Schnall (eds.). *Die Kogge. Sternstunde der deutschen Schiffsarchàologie*. (die Kogge von Bremen, Band

2), Schriften des Deutschen Schiffahrtsmuseums, Band 60. Hamburg: Convent Verlag, www.dsm.de, 2003. 288 pp., illustrations, photographs, maps, bibliography. Eur 39,90, cloth; ISBN 3-934613-50-0.

In this volume on Germany's *Bremer Hanse-Kogge*, discovered in 1962, twenty different authors describe the results of their research into the fourteenth-century Bremen ship in images and words. In contrast to the first volume published in 1992, which focussed on the archaeological aspects of the *Bremer Hanse-Kogge* and the way it might have been built, this book is not just meant for the ship archaeologist or would-be builder or model-maker. The articles here are presented in what the editors call an exciting manner, to describe the scientific adventure of researching the cog.

Editor Gabriele Hoffmann is both a journalist and a writer with a Ph.D. in history. Uwe Schnall heads the scientific board of editors of the Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum in Bremerhaven besides being responsible for the museum's departments of navigational history and whale hunting. By letting the authors tell their own stories, the editors ensure that the information is based on first-hand knowledge about specific research questions concerning the cog. Luckily, most of the original investigators were still alive to share their ongoing enthusiasm for the ship, in some cases forty years later. While trying to appeal to as broad an audience as possible, parts of the book may seem too "Indiana Jones" to some, while others might find the mention of all the people who contributed to the different research and results overly detailed.

In the end, the book strikes a fine balance, appealing to both the interested public (especially through tasteful graphic design) as well as to specialists (through detailed references to the bibliography). They have succeeded in spotlighting the Bremen Cog of 1380, nothing more, nothing less. Over the past decades, numerous scholarly and popular publications on cogs and cog-like vessels have been published. The present volume not only provides research results from the past decade, but also encompasses what we have learned about cogs over the past forty years. In this respect, this volume is a good

introduction to the theme and enables the less well-informed readers to put the newest research information into a proper historical context.

The book opens with one of the most spectacular aspects of cog research: sailing replicas. After reconstructing the line plan, sails, rope work and rudder, after tests in wind tunnels and in water tanks, two different ships were built, resembling the *Bremer Hanse-Kogge* in appearance. The pictures of these modern ships, *Kieler Hansekogge* and the *Ubena*, as well as the Dutch *Kamper Kogge* offer a great starting point for the book. The wreck of the unfinished *Bremer Hanse-Kogge* was first spotted on 9 October 1962. Archaeologist Fliedners' adventurous report on the find, illustrated with many black and white pictures, is as lively as if the ship was found a week ago. Besides that, a clear description is given of the characteristics of a cog.

The two tough parts of the book ("Scientists on the cog" and "Humanities and the cog") form two-thirds of the whole volume. Clearly, conservation of the ship hull using PEG or polyethylene glycol has been a major research experience for future conservators to build upon. In 1981, after the ship was reassembled, a steel basin was built around it and filled with PEG for a period of eighteen years at considerable expense. P. Hofmann clearly states: "Conserving a large ship find is always a luxury - it is culture" [104]. Nor was the process as simple and straightforward as it sounds. In some cases, the information is very detailed, which might be overwhelming for a first-time reader of ship conservation techniques! But it is an example of how the book tries to address several levels of audience knowledge.

In the section "Humanities and the cog", the *Bremen Hanse-Kogge* is put into the larger socio-historical framework of fourteenth-century Europe, the Hanse, trade and the cities. Thanks to this chapter, the ship gets more 'shape'. Who was living on board? What about historical and pictorial sources? What did these ships carry? What about the city of Bremen?

It is a pity that the authors do not make more effort to describe ongoing excavation and research on cogs in other countries. Although the chapter by Ole Crumlin-Pedersen does refer to Dutch, Danish and Swedish finds making it clear

that the *Bremen Hanse-Kogge* is a true cog, it doesn't deliver the blue print against which all cogs should be seen. While this book is meant to celebrate one of the highlights of German ship archaeology, it would have not taken anything away from the *Bremen Hanse-Kogge* and the research it triggered to mention more of the foreign cogs and cog-like vessels. It is a pity these points do not get any attention until the last thirty pages of the book.

In conclusion, this volume celebrates the *Bremer Hanse-Kogge* and all the work that resulted from its discovery. It is clearly a pearl in the crown of German ship archaeology, both scientifically and historically. The colleagues in Bremerhaven can rightly be proud of their ship and of this book.

Roeland Paardekooper
Eindhoven, Netherlands

Brian Lavery. *Jack Aubrey Commands: An Historical Companion to the Naval World of Patrick O'Brian*. London: Conway Maritime Press, www.conwaymaritime.com and Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, www.navalinstitute.org, 2003. x + 182 pp., photographs, illustrations, figures, tables, maps, notes, bibliography, glossary, index. £19.99, US \$34.95, CDN \$56.95, cloth; ISBN 0-85177-9468 (Conway), 1-59114-403-5 (NIP). Distributed in Canada by Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

Brian Lavery is well known to naval history specialists and enthusiasts alike. Curator of Ship Technology at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, he has produced numerous works that have become essential reading to anyone interested in the Royal Navy of the Nelsonian era, including the two-volume *The Ship of the Line: The Development of the Battle Fleet 1650-1850* (Conway Maritime Press, 1983-84), *Shipboard Life and Organization, 1713-1815* (edited for the Naval Historical Society, 1998, vol. 138), and perhaps most importantly in reviewing this latest work, *Nelson's Navy: Its Ships, Men, and Organization, 1793-1815* (Conway Maritime Press, 1989). Indeed, Lavery has been so

influential that an endorsement of his work by the late Patrick O'Brian, creator of the Jack Aubrey/Stephen Maturin naval fictions, appears on the dust-jacket, while Peter Weir, the Director of "Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World," the film realization of O'Brian's literary creations, opens his Foreword to *Jack Aubrey Commands* by declaring *Nelson's Navy* to have been a "prime source for all departments" in the making of the film. In short, this latest book has as strong a pedigree as one could hope to find. Why then, did it leave this reader with a sense of disappointment?

It certainly was not on account of the handsome illustrations that adorn its pages. Most, though not all, come from the National Maritime Museum's own collections. They include contemporary illustrations, photographs of museum dioramas, several reproductions of Geoff Hunt's superb paintings created to illustrate both Lavery's and O'Brian's books, as well as a variety of maps and figures in support of the textual analysis, all enhancing the author's explication of life on board, and in service to, the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1815. Nor was it on account of the organization of the book itself, which is sensibly arranged with ten chapters that begin with a discussion of the world of "Naval Fact and Naval Fiction," then explain the life of the sailing warship, including crew, officers, the ship itself, below decks, the culture of ship-board life and service, before surveying the wars, the opponents, the allies, and the experience of combat at sea during this period.

The sense of disappointment does not even stem from the realization that very little in *Jack Aubrey Commands* is truly new. Lavery has said it all before (with the possible exception of the "fact and fiction" chapter) in his other works, and in so much more thorough a detail, so that specialists in the naval history of this period are better off sticking to those earlier works. Yet that is hardly grounds for criticism, for this book is clearly intended for the novice and the generalist, the readers who are drawn into this world, perhaps for the first time, thanks to Peter Weir's film, or those who were already converted by O'Brian's novels and had been looking for a convenient, well-illustrated single-volume account of the naval context to those novels.

Still, even general readers could have been better served by this book. For starters, Lavery refers them too often to his own works for more specialized or detailed information rather than to other, equally significant sources. Too many key books are missing from the all-too-brief list of "other works": Daniel Baugh's *Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole*, an essential study despite its focus on an earlier period; N.A.M. Rodger's *The Wooden World*; Dudley Pope's *Life in Nelson's Navy*, to name but three. Where space obliged Lavery to limit his treatment of naval signalling to two paragraphs, he might at least have pointed out that Brian Tunstall devoted an entire book to the topic.

The context of naval operations, while generally good, is superficial for those who will take the subtitle to heart. The three paragraphs on "protection of trade" [148-149] are insufficient to explain how diverse and wide-ranging British maritime commerce could be. Those who are intrigued by the film will find nothing here about the British whaling industry in the Pacific, the target of Aubrey's nemesis in the film, the French warship *L'Archeron*. For specialists, such clarification may not be necessary, but to the novice or general reader, it surely does little good to focus on the "naval world of Patrick O'Brian" if too little attention is given to the reasons why the naval world was deployed where and as it was.

The text also suffers by indifferent proof-reading and some casual mis-treatment of factual details. Thus, we are told that in 1775, John Paul Jones commissioned the first US warship [13 7], that Newfoundland was part of the North American station in 1795 [146], and that the "merchant navy" was "owned by many thousands of small investors,"[28] a misleading remark given the significant proportion of shipping that was individually owned. Though the minuscule font made reading a chore, I still managed to discover an embarrassing number of spelling mistakes, typographical errors, words repeated, words omitted, and so on; I can only imagine how many more I managed to overlook.

In conclusion, specialists in eighteenth-century naval history can pass this book by, for its greatest appeal will be to those drawn into the field by the writings of Patrick O'Brian and by Peter Weir's film. I can only hope that such

readers will be sufficiently intrigued by the material to pursue their interest into books of greater thoroughness and depth.

Olaf Uwe Janzen
Comer Brook, Newfoundland.

James E. Wise Jr. and Scott Baron. *Soldiers Lost at Sea. A Chronicle of Troopship Disasters*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, www.NavalInstitute.org, 2003. xi + 284 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. US \$29.95, cloth: ISBN 1-59114-966-5.

They were dangerously overcrowded and the rations often pathetic, but troopships have always been a valuable component of any military campaign. The need to transport vast numbers of men and supplies has been of great importance since the days of the Roman Empire and the Greek Wars. The loss of a troopship was a major concern to commanders and a variety of methods were devised to try to protect them. In this new book, James E. Wise Jr. and Scott Baron examine the history of troopships and detail some of the disasters that befell them.

The authors are well qualified to tackle the subject matter. James E. Wise is a former naval intelligence officer and commander and has already written a number of excellent books for the Naval Institute Press. Scott Baron is a veteran of the Vietnam War and teaches history in California. They have a keen interest in their subject matter and begin the book with a comprehensive look at the history of the troopship, starting with the Egyptians and the Phoenicians.

Troopships were used during the Viking Invasions and the Crusades and Wise and Baron continue into the nineteenth century and the effective use of these ships by the Royal Navy. There was no getting around the uncomfortable conditions on these vessels and it is easy to see that casualty rates could be staggering if one of them were to be lost. The Cunard liner, *Queen Mary* was designed to carry 2,100 passengers in comfort yet regularly was the home to over 15,000 men on a typical run during the Second World

War.

The first disaster that Wise and Baron describe is the nineteenth century loss of the British steam paddle frigate, HMS *Birkenhead*. After disembarking some of her compliment near Cape Town, the ship proceeded to her final destination, Port Elizabeth. Disaster struck when the ship struck a reef on the night of 26 February 1852. Thanks to the heroism of her troop commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Seton, all of the women and the children on the ship were saved. Of the 638 lives aboard, 445 were lost. Unfortunately, while it was one of the first troopship losses to be recorded, it would prove to be far from the last.

The chapter dealing with the Second World War is by far the most effective in the book, probably because of the wide range of stories and experiences that are related. The chapter begins with the sinking of the Blue Star liner, *Arandora Star* by the great U-boat ace, Gunther Prien. Throughout the book, Wise and Baron provide a glimpse into the careers of some of Germany's best submariners, providing a balanced look at the war at sea. Some of the sinkings during the Second World War remain controversial to this day. The loss of the liner *Lancastria* is still covered under the *Official Secrets Act* and the full details of its sinking by German aircraft in 1940 will not be released in 2040.

Other disasters involving troopships in the Second World War include the heroic tale of the four army chaplains who lost their lives in the sinking of the American troop transport *Doncaster*. This is one of the most celebrated tales in the history of the American Navy and is particularly well handled by the authors.

Less well known to non-historians is the tale of the German liner *Wilhelm Gustloff* which was torpedoed by the Russian submarine SI 3 in January 1945. The actual number of refugees on board the German ship will probably never be known, but it is estimated that over 10,000 were crammed onto the vessel as it left Gotenhafen. Captain Alexander Marinseko fired three torpedoes at the ship and all found their mark. Only 996 survivors were pulled from the icy water, in what is the greatest maritime disaster in history.

Wise and Baron fill their book with fascinating bits of maritime history and each section makes for compelling reading. There are many photographs and an excellent bibliography. There are a few minor errors that could easily be corrected in a second edition. For example, the name of the Cunard liner *Mauretania* is spelled correctly throughout the book but not in the index. One of the photo credits is also incorrect. The photo of the Union-Castle liner *Dunottar Castle* (12) is of the 1935 version of the vessel and not the original, 1890 incarnation of the ship which was used during the Boer War.

These few quibbles aside, this is an excellently written book, which would be a welcome addition to the library of any maritime enthusiast. Wise and Baron clearly enjoy the subject matter and their handling of each story is very effective.

Richard MacMichael,
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Hermann Ludwig von Lowenstem. (Victoria Joan Moessner, trans.) *The First Russian Voyage around the World. The Journal of Hermann Johann Ludwig von Lowenstem, 1803-1806*. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. www.uaf.edu. 2003. xxx + 482 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US \$35.95, cloth: ISBN 1-889963-45-3.

Between 1803 and 1806, two Russian vessels, the *Nadezheda* and the *Neva*, completed the first Russian circumnavigation of the world. Though their return to St. Petersburg was celebrated with considerable fanfare, including a visit by Tsar Alexander I, the feat made little impression elsewhere, for ships of many countries had recorded many circumnavigations since the Magellan era. The Russian voyage came a century after the Bering explorations and signalled a growth of interest in the North Pacific due to the rapid expansion of the Russian-American Company's fur gathering activities from the Aleutians and Kodiak Island to the Gulf of Alaska and the Pacific coast of North America.

Though the company was flourishing

and brought handsome profits to investors, its ability to supply its enterprise in such remote locations demanded sea-borne logistical support. The *Neva*, commanded by Yu. F. Lisiansky, was commissioned to carry supplies to the company and to conduct hydrographic studies in order to advance knowledge to the Pacific coast of North America. The flagship *Nadezheda*, commanded by Captain Adam Johann von Krusenstem, carried supplies destined for the Russian base at Kamchatka, along with Count Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov who was travelling to Japan to be the first Russian ambassador. He was a highly-placed courtier and a driving force behind the Russian-American Company's expansion across the Gulf of Alaska to the coast of northern California in pursuit of sea otter fur. The expedition sailed from the Baltic in July of 1803 and called at Copenhagen, Falmouth, Tenerife, and Santa Catharina in Brazil before rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The two ships sailed on to the Marquesas and then the Sandwich Islands before parting company.

The *Neva* sailed to Sitka and then Kodiak and in 1804, and played a key role in subduing the rebellious Tlinget Indians in Sitka, which permitted the Russia-Company Director, Alexander Baranov, to transfer company operations there. After considerable scientific work, the *Neva* returned home. Lisiansky's account of the voyage was published in 1814 as *A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1803, 4, 5, and 6, Performed by Order of His Imperial Majesty Alexander the First, Emperor of Russia in the Ship Neva*. (Facsimile reprint by the Gregg Press, Ridgewood, New Jersey, 1968).

The *Nadezheda* was fraught with strife created by the haughty Rezanov who disputed the command of the expedition with Captain Krusenstem and made himself and his entourage insufferable. The details of the dispute are not well known because Krusenstem's own account, *Voyage Around the World in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, & 1806* (London, 1813) and that of Georg Heinrich von Langsdorff, the scientific officer assigned to the *Nadezheda*, were both heavily censored in order to cover up the turmoil that plagued the expedition until Rezanov's departure. Von Lowenstem's journal is the first account of the expedition that reveals the discord

in its full dimension. Originally written in German, Von LÖwenstern's journal was never published or translated in any language until Victoria Joan Moessner translated it into English to celebrate the bicentennial of the voyage in 2003. Moessner, who also translated and published Langsdorf's journal, *Remarks and Observation on a Voyage around the World, 1803-1806*, 2 vols (Limestone Press, Kingston, Ontario) in 1993, argues that the von LÖwenstern's journal begs for a revision of the "glowing appraisals of the Russian ambassador's character and statesmanship and his expansive vision"[xi] of Russia's future in the North Pacific.

What makes this publication even more valuable and credible is that von LÖwenstern never attempted or intended to publish his revealing journal. Professor Moessner has added to the knowledge of the Russian presence in the North Pacific during this era, which should provide historians with a new and corrective view of the first Russian voyage around the world. The volume is nicely done by the University of Alaska Press and contains excellent maps and illustrations and a superb bibliography.

Richard H. Warner
Fredericksburg, Virginia

Robert K. Massie. *Castles of Steel. Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War at Sea*. New York: Random House, www.randomhouse.ca. 2003. 866 pp., maps, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 35.00, CDN \$ 53.00, cloth; ISBN 0-679-45671-6.

Castles of Steel is author Robert Massie's long-awaited sequel to his acclaimed and highly popular *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War*, published in 1991 and still in print. Massie, an American historian, Rhodes Scholar and Pulitzer Prize winner, is an expert in European history and an acknowledged master of narrative writing. It was always Massie's intention to write about the Great War at sea and *Dreadnought* was initially expected to cover the war years. *Dreadnought*, however, ended on the day war was declared in August 1914 - likely just as well, as the book was over

900 pages to that point. A further 800 pages in *Castles of Steel* complete the story (both tabulations do not include bibliographies or indices).

Given this evolution, it is difficult to assess and review *Castles of Steel* without reference to *Dreadnought*, but I will simply note that *Dreadnought* is a remarkable book and covers the pre-war period and the events leading up to Anglo-German enmity with a clarity and completeness that makes it a pleasure to read. Anyone who wishes to gain a thorough understanding of how, in 1890, two friendly powers, culturally and traditionally aligned, albeit commercial rivals, could find themselves at daggers drawn twenty years later could not do better than to turn to Massie's truly impressive work. Indeed, dispassionate observers in 1890 would be hard pressed to justify a prediction of eventual Anglo-German enmity, particularly given Britain's isolationist policy and historical hostility with both France and Russia, her eventual allies in the Great War. The Kaiser's central role in achieving the inconceivable is well told in *Dreadnought* and serves as a reminder of the contingent nature of history and how 'great men' can move events in new, not always happy, directions.

Castles of Steel, the phrase is Churchill's, opens with an introductory chapter that quickly sketches out the naval background to the war, concentrating on the events of July 1914. As with *Dreadnought*, Massie's skill as a narrator is immediately apparent. In this chapter, among many examples, the vignette of the machinations surrounding the fate of two Turkish battleships under construction in British yards (the *Sultan Osman I* and *Reshadieh*—in due course HM Ships *Agincourt* and *Erin*) is presented succinctly and with verve. The role of this event in bringing Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers, and all the dire consequences thereof, is well told.

From this necessary introduction, the book moves into a series of chapters comprising three-quarters of the book, that cover the main events of the war at sea, commencing with the pursuit of SMS *Goeben* in the Mediterranean and ending with four chapters covering the Battle of Jutland. Succeeding chapters lack a similar level

of detail - developing naval policy, control of shipping, working with allies, naval organization, facilities and other details would have rounded out the story more comprehensively. However, the groups of chapters covering the major events are wonderful stand-alone narratives that weave together human detail, ship design, grand strategy and tactics and the personal foibles and strengths of the admirals and ship captains at sea. The four chapters on the drama of von Spee, Craddock and Sturdee at Coronel and the Falklands are superb.

The seminal event of the Great War at sea was the clash of the battle fleets at Jutland on 31 May, 1916. Massie's narrative of the battle is sound and written with his customary energy and attention to telling detail. Of particular merit is his discussion of the Jutland Controversy - a controversy over the battle's outcome that commenced in early June 1916 and remains alive to this day. Massie's discussion of some of the engineering aspects is most useful, even if somewhat repetitive from similar essays earlier in the book. The common assertion of the superior construction and design of the German ships is challenged, without denigrating real German achievements in this critical area. The cause of most of the British losses is placed more on gun-drill habits designed to boost the speed between salvos, rather than on prudent attention to safety - a lesson the Germans learned fortuitously at Dogger Bank in 1915. In the review of the actions of the two British admirals in the drama, Jellicoe comes off rather better than Beatty; notably in the former's simple and dignified conduct as the dispute simmered on into the 1920s, in sharp contrast to the latter's rather distasteful self-promotion and self-justification.

Notwithstanding these undoubted strengths, *Castles of Steel* is not entirely satisfactory. In stylistic terms, despite the author's Pulitzer pedigree, there occur a sufficient number of awkward sentences to be slightly disconcerting and disappointing. A little more careful editing would have saved clangers such as this one: "No Briton would argue; after the Battle of the Bight, no British sailor ever belittled German bravery." [119] The antecedents to the sentence don't help. Massie also has the irritating habit of referring to a ship's displacement as its "weight." This is a small detail without question, yet not one

that any naval writer would commit. There are others. As well, the maps let down the general quality of the book, as do the photographs selected. The former are few and far between and not well executed. The latter are poorly placed within the volume, and are not imaginatively chosen. A number are iconic, but a far wider selection is available and in a modern book need to be taken advantage of. Finally, it needs to be noted that the book is entirely based on secondary sources, and that the notes are unnumbered and consequently difficult to sort out. This decision was no doubt made to simplify production and for most readers will not matter. For others this shortcut is annoying.

It needs to be said that the book is a little unbalanced and the conclusions as to the significance of the story weak. The main events, as noted, are brilliantly covered and described at length, with much pleasing detail; but anything that falls outside is glossed over. The battles fought by the "castles of steel" were without question highlights, but the key was in sweeping the seas of German commerce, and defeating the U-boat menace - the German riposte to blockade. The significance of the High Seas Fleet was its impotence. Its creation led to implacable British hostility, and in the event was quite incapable of wresting the trident from Britannia's sturdy grasp. As policy German nautical adventuring was a disaster from which Europe itself is still feeling the effects in the early twenty-first century. More work on the "so what" of the Great War at Sea and its conduct would have been most welcome.

I must conclude by emphasizing my clear positive recommendation of *Castles of Steel*. It is extremely difficult to write a one-volume history of a subject as complex as that of the naval war of 1914-18 and satisfy all readers. Compromises must be made and areas of emphasis will certainly vary by author. On the whole, Massie is a good guide and his unquestioned narrative skill will make this book essential and pleasurable reading for all students of the Great War.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan

G. V. Scammell, ed. *Seafaring, Sailors and Trade, 1450-1750*. Aldershot and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, www.ashgate.com, 2003. x+310 pp., notes, index. US \$ 105.95, cloth; ISBN 0-86078-897-0.

In 1995 Variorum published, as *Ships, Oceans and Empires*, a collection of papers by the well-known maritime historian G. V. Scammell; the present book continues the laudable aim of concentrating his work, dispersed over forty years in a wide range of learned journals, in a single accessible form. The twelve papers fall into two groups, the first covering British maritime matters from late medieval to early modern times, including Tudor warfare at sea, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century shipbuilding and ownership, the quality of life afloat, and the skills required of a ship master. The second group examines the cause and effect (and, one might add, the rise and fall) of European expansion into South America and Asia, especially the endeavours of the Portuguese in India; smuggling in and out of South America, and an analysis of the less-than-enduring English chartered companies. The themes of the two groups are markedly different, but together they trace the commercial and military importance of ships and sailors, from early inshore trading to the development of the overseas empires.

Scammell has the gift of writing up scholarly research in a particularly lively style. 'War at Sea under the Early Tudors' epitomises this skill; it combines a rattling good tale of maritime derring-do with a thorough assessment of the naval resources of England during the wars with France and Scotland. That paper and his review of ship-owning after 1450, both written in the 1960s, have since been amplified by N. A. M. Rodgers, by Scammell himself and by others, but together with a later paper on merchant shipbuilding from 1500 to 1750, they give a clear overview of contemporary English maritime activities.

Ship-owning was an attractive, if risky, investment; it attracted not only merchants for obvious commercial reasons, but also representatives from a broad social spectrum with money to invest. As Scammell points out, the shipping industry must have absorbed a high

proportion of the country's industrial capital and employed a large number of people. Although he touches on the marketability of shares in ships, he does not investigate the early manifestations of "part" and "shared" ownership, although ship-owning was one of the first enterprises to combine capital and "know-how" in *commenda-type* contracts.

In one of the papers are discussed the many demands made on the early modern merchant shipmaster, whether owner or employee, while another recounts management failures leading to mutiny. The latter paper sets out to examine trouble in British ships from c. 1500 but the examples of breakdowns of discipline go back no earlier than around 1600. This is a pity since it would have been interesting to trace the descent of the (apparently) paternalistic man-management system enshrined in the fourteenth century Laws of Oleron into the "hang 'em, flog 'em" disciplinary code of many ship masters two hundred years later. A paper on the conditions on board European ships bound for Asia, goes a long way to explain the unrest amongst the crews; prolonged periods of boredom interleaved with exhausting work and extreme fear were poorly rewarded by appalling food and accommodation - situations not foreseen when the Oleron code was drawn up for short-haul, in-shore, profit-sharing voyages.

Scammell gives interesting accounts of the contemporary development of smuggling by British merchants in and out of South America, and the rise and fall of the regulated and chartered companies. Smuggling was profitable, as were most of the activities of the smaller regulated companies, but the chartered companies were held back and eventually mined (except the still surviving Hudson Bay Company) by bad management and the disloyalty of members and employees trading on their own behalf. In contrast, those European individuals who survived shipwreck piracy, disease and mutiny to arrive on the subcontinent or beyond, and there traded or sold their skills to local potentates, had a much higher standard of living than was ever possible in Europe; it was a short ("two monsoons," it was said) but good life.

This collection of essays offers both a crash course in the development of merchant

shipping and its importance to the empires of European states, and also a salutary account of the dangers to life, capital and material in the exploitation of overseas markets. The book's value is greater than one might expect from the age of the older papers, but some readers might be irritated by type faces and formats varying from paper to paper and the lack of serial pagination.

R. M. Ward
London, UK

John Bunker. *Heroes in Dungarees*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, www.NavalInstitute.org. 1995. xiv + 369 pp., glossary, photographs, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 36.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-093-2.

The blurb for *Heroes in Dungarees: the Story of the American Merchant Marine in World War II* indicates that it is "the most complete study of the wartime merchant marine ever published" and that "the focus of the story remains on the men who served." The book makes a valiant effort to live up to these claims, but falls a little short. Like its author's earlier works, it is a magnificent compilation of numerous data from multiple sources. As a resource for scholars interested in Allied shipping during the Second World War, it is of enormous value. The primary subject, as the subtitle indicates, is the US merchant marine, but there are interesting sidelights dealing with ships and men from several other Allied nations, as well. Less academically inclined readers will find the book interesting, but probably not mesmerising.

While no one can fault Bunker's archival research, live input from first-person sources is sparse. Even data referenced "personal communication" are mostly old, evidently from notes and memories of conversations Bunker held with shipmates when he was still actively sailing, rather than from recently conducted interviews, and the only media citations were printed sources. The overwhelming bulk of the information comes from Armed Guard voyage reports held in the National Archives, and from trade union records. Because of the author's own union affiliation, the Seaman's International Union (SIU) predominates

in the majority of the latter. It is unfortunate that the bibliography cites only one volume, *Bloody Winter*, which could be described as having truly ethnographic content. With the extensive use of the Armed Guard material, it is rather surprising that Gleichauf's *Unsung Sailors* was not referenced.

Like many who wrote on similar subjects during and immediately after 1945, Bunker focuses on the dramatic aspect of the wartime merchant seaman's experience - torpedoes, bombs, collisions, sinkings, exploding tankers and ammunition ships, lifeboat sagas, daring rescues, tragic losses, and heroism. Everyday experiences of the ships' personnel are seldom mentioned, except for details of routine procedures, described in a rather dull and desultory fashion. A good deal more attention is paid to the tactics and logistics of wartime shipping in general and less to the men than one would expect, given the theme cited.

Naturally, considering the author's background in the media, the writing style is essentially journalistic. Unfortunately, this renders the general tenor of the piece less than gripping, despite its dramatic content. Only in the first half of the chapter entitled "Fighting Fleets" did he actually present a "written picture" rather than a "report." The overall style lent itself admirably to the subject matter of his previous book on the Liberty ships themselves, but is less well suited to dealing with the crews and their experiences. I was, however, pleasantly surprised to find a complete account of the loss and return of Captain Wilham Clendaniel's artificial leg [298-302]. The brief mention in *A Careless Word...A Needless Sinking* had whetted my appetite to know the whole story.

The colourful chapter titles may have been editorially assigned, rather than chosen by the author himself, as it was somewhat disconcerting to find that a major portion of the chapter entitled "Caribbean Carnival" dealt with action in the Gulf of Mexico. There was also a lack of consistency regarding vessels that earned the Gallant Ship Award. Not all were discussed, and some that were mentioned were not cited for their achievement. It would have been rather nice to have had more complete details of some of the lesser known actions leading to this award, such

as the action in Leyte Gulf. The Liberty ships *Adoniram Judson*, *Marcus Daly*, and *William S. Ladd* were mentioned only briefly. The *Daly* was the first vessel in the Pacific theatre to be named a Gallant Ship by the US government, but this is not noted.

I was amazed to find a US Naval Institute Press publication had apparently been handled by staff so unfamiliar with nautical usage that common terms were "corrected" to inaccuracies. An example is the description of an incident in which a survivor on a raft narrowly misses being fired on by the crew of a naval vessel who then rescue him. Describing their near mistake, they say they were told to "Delay that!", when the command clearly should have been "Belay that!" [185] Later, a ship is described as "outboard bound", rather than "outward bound." [188] There are also spelling errors that should have been caught. While it may have been the author's personal choice to use "Libertys" as the plural for the standard ship, certainly "Gibralter" should have been corrected. Other such errors occurred, as well. These are clearly the fault of editors and proofreaders.

On the whole, the book is worthwhile and readable, despite minor shortcomings.

Morgiana P. Halley
Suffolk, Virginia.

Victor Suthren. *To Go Upon Discovery: James Cook & Canada, 1758 to 1779*. Toronto/Oxford: Dundurn Press, www.dundurn.com, 2000. 224 pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography. CDN \$35.99, cloth; ISBN 1-55002-327-6.

The story of Canada's connection with Captain Cook is well worth telling, and Victor Suthren does an excellent job of doing so. Both cut their teeth at Louisbourg, Cook in the 1758 siege and Suthren as a former curator of the reconstructed fortress in more recent times.

It was on the beach at Kennington Cove, hard by the French stronghold, that James Cook first set eyes on a survey instrument. He was hooked. Thereafter his life was devoted to surveying, first as a master of one of the many small vessels buoying the passage through the

treacherous shoals of the St Lawrence for the British fleet moving up for the assault on Quebec, and then afterwards, with his magnificently prepared chart of the St. Lawrence, which is now one of the treasures of our National Archives. The ability he had demonstrated made him a natural choice for the first full survey of Newfoundland, made necessary by the 1763 Treaty of Paris, and his outstanding work on this project, sailing each year out of England, soon brought him to the notice of the Royal Society.

It was natural, therefore, that after the Admiralty had rejected the Royal Society's suggestion that Alexander Dalrymple should command a proposed expedition to observe the transit of Venus, Cook's name should have been put forward as an alternative. But M'Lords could hardly have conceived how successful their selection would be, nor their choice of the slab-sided North Sea collier that Cook was so familiar with.

Suthren is in less familiar waters once Cook reaches the Pacific. He gives us a beautifully encapsulated summary of what it took Beaglehole three large volumes to describe, but he misses Cook's real contribution to Canadian west coast history. It was not so much his three-week stay at Nootka that was important, but the subsequent sale of a sea-otter pelt for \$100 in Canton, that brought fur traders from around the world to the Pacific Northwest, which thus precipitated British Columbia's eventual incorporation into Canada.

As an established author, albeit mostly historical fiction, Suthren does a good job of portraying Cook's early life from a farm boy in the Vale of Cleveland to his subsequent acceptance of "the king's shilling" to enlist as an AB in the Royal Navy, instead of taking command of the collier he had been offered. At 26 years of age, and with his towering height and an already impressive record as a mariner, he rose rapidly, and only three years later found himself the Master of the 64-gun *Pembroke*, Capt John Simcoe, on the North American station. Suthren's description of this connection with the father of an early lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada is one of the best reads in this book.

Cook has assumed a outstanding position in the history of discovery, but Suthren

slips into a few errors. Cook was never a "sailing master," the official term was "master." Not a commissioned sea officer, the lowest rank of which was lieutenant, a master was appointed only as long as a ship was in commission, thereafter he had no status. Also the term "warrant officer" was never used in Cook's time; it was a later nineteenth century creation. Suthren's use of the term "Pacific basin" jars. Thus to describe the largest ocean of the world, compared with his own Atlantic "duck-pond" is a little disconcerting.

Nevertheless, there is an unusually convenient system of sequentially-numbered endnotes, and a bibliography. The book is of sufficient value as a reference to warrant an index it unfortunately lacks. Aside from these small quibbles, *To Go Upon Discovery* will make a worthy addition to any bookshelf.

John Crosse
Vancouver, BC

Geoffrey Till. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, www.frankcass.com, 2003. xvi+430 pp., maps, illustrations, figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index. US\$27.95, paper; ISBN 0 7146 8436 8.

The lure of seapower has long driven maritime countries and their navies. Seapower has triggered deep reflection on the geopolitical import of oceanic warfare, trade and politics. Now, with an eye to the twenty-first century, Geoffrey Till offers an omnibus, internationalist evaluation. Brilliantly conceived and executed, this lucidly written and comprehensive volume offers much more than the "guide" its subtitle promises. As such it both re-examines the thinking of previous centuries and looks ahead for new principles and implications. In his earlier volume, *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (1994), Till had given us a preview of this approach. There his concluding chapter "Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Century" had argued, among other things, that global change since the Cold War obliges naval

planners to return to basics. Only in this way could one responsibly evaluate the evolving roles of navies and the impact of globalization and information technologies. An internationally respected authority on strategic issues, and Dean of Academic Studies at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, Geoffrey Till is eminently qualified.

Till, of course, is not the first to engage in futurist speculation. For example, noted scholar Eric Grove addressed many of these issues in his important *The Future of Seapower* (1990). Continuing the pattern of his earlier volumes on air power and land warfare, Grove had understood seapower essentially as military power; that is, the form of military power that is deployed on or from the sea. His indebtedness to Mahan is clear. Thus, while acknowledging the varieties of ways in which people understand seapower - mythologically, romantically, and patriotically - Grove analyzed the lessons learned from twentieth-century naval warfare, and the evolving uses of the sea. His book remains a valuable and helpful landmark. Till draws on such seminal thinkers, but expands both the concept itself and the perspectives from which he examines it. Exceptionally rich in theoretical and practical scope, his examples reflect a wide range of thinkers and countries. In short, the book offers a global critique, and a wisdom drawn from many sources.

Seapower, according to Till, is the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people by what you do at or from the sea. Seapower, he argues throughout the book, is about the sea-based capacity to influence events both at sea and on land. Thus the concept is not limited to war-fighting, but includes trade and commerce, foreign policy, environmental concerns, globalization and even environmental law. Quoting Sir Walter Raleigh with approval, Till argues convincingly for the continued centrality of seapower: "He that commands the sea, commands the trade, and he that is Lord of the trade of the world is lord of the wealth of the world" [17]. At issue is the means of exercising what Raleigh understood as 'command.'

Till sets the stage by what he calls the four historic attributes of the sea: the sea as a natural resource; as a means of transport and exchange; as a medium for information and exchange of ideas; and the sea as a means for exerting dominion. His examination then focuses on such issues as the constituents of seapower (population, geography, economy), and then upon such topics as navies and technology, naval diplomacy and command of the sea (ie maritime communications and modern forms of battle), and expeditionary operations. His chapter "Good Order at Sea" explores the "historic attributes" in light of current concerns (integrated maritime governance, policy implementation), while the concluding chapter "Future Seapower" skilfully draws all the various leitmotifs and thematic patterns together.

Occasionally, however, Till gives the neophyte no quarter - for example by sometimes failing to explain his acronyms. Thus we learn of the Confederate Army's "decisive failure of STOM," or that "advocates of OMFTS" [212] held a particular point of view. A check in the glossary explains that one acronym means "ship to objective manoeuvre," and the other "operational manoeuvre from the sea," all of which tells the inexperienced reader little. Assuming that his readers will grasp historical allusions, he elsewhere demonstrates a point by alluding without clarification to 'the Bluff Cove disaster'[205]. Those acquainted with the Falklands War (1982) will of course grasp the connection. Still, these cosmetic issues will not dissuade the serious reader, among whom Till hopes to find "future sailors and those interested in their ways"[378]. But readers will appreciate his graphic presentation of complex issues. Thus when explaining the impact of information technologies and globalization on strategies of seapower, he writes cogently: "Future engagements seem likely to be more related to chess (where the position and value of all the pieces are known) than to poker (where they are not)" [131].

Till's insightful and thought-provoking

work offers a wealth of well-organized material suited both to private study or university course. The book is a delight.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, BC

S.C. Heal. *Ugly Ducklings: Japan's WWII Liberty Type Standard Ships*. St. Catherine's, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, www.vanwell.ca, 2003. xiv + 180 pp., illustrations, tables, bibliography, ship index, mdex. CDN \$ 32.95, cloth; ISBN 55125-047-8.

The Second World War merchant fleets and submarine campaigns against them have spawned an entire literature, from graphics-laden reference books and personal memoirs to scholarly monographs and synthetic analyses. It is a little difficult to decide where *Ugly Ducklings* belongs amid that mix, since it is quite a mix itself.

S.C. Heal served in the Royal Navy in the Second World War before devoting most of his working life to the marine insurance industry and then "retiring" into another career as a maritime historian. The book reflects his rich and varied life in matters connected with the sea, for there are parts that have been written as a careful researcher, as an astute businessman, and as a reminiscing veteran. The problem for the reader is that these perspectives are randomly selected, with the result that the text reads as a jumbled compilation of notes rather than a coherent narrative of the subject. Adding to the confusion are frequent digressions into tangential topics, such as Japanese submarines, the saga of the U-234, and the experiences of those imprisoned by the Japanese. The author himself describes the book as "an accumulation of available information," but one would hope for a more carefully analyzed and organized presentation of that accumulation.

The volume is handsomely produced, with myriad tables, photographs, and other illustrations. More care was required in the

editing, as numerous errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar managed to wend their way into the final text. Among the more glaring are the use of a reflexive pronoun as a subject [75] and several instances of commas placed between subjects and their verbs. More substantive are the errors of fact concerning Japanese history and the Second. The narrative has Matthew Perry visiting Japan in 1865 [15], equates the *shogun* with the *daimyo* [25], places the China Incident in 1934 [31,44], repeats the hoary myth about Singapore's guns pointing only to seaward (45), and locates the "death railway" on the Kra isthmus [69]. A photograph caption describes Ypres as a French battleground [24], though the battle was fought in Belgium and by British troops.

The factual inaccuracies are emblematic of a more serious flaw, that of questionable historical interpretations. For instance, the author places "manufacturers" at the bottom of Japan's neo-Confucianist social order in pre-modern times as if it refers to the great industrial concerns of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whereas in fact it was the merchant class who occupied Japan's lowest social rung, with the group more commonly rendered as "artisans" a step above. This, combined with a misunderstanding of the Meiji Restoration as a literal restoration of the Japanese emperor to political power, partly explains the extraordinary contention that after the Restoration the *zaibatsu* came to dominate imperial Japan, including the military and the government [17]. Other sweeping but quite questionable interpretative claims are that warfare drove technological development [18], that steam power drove industrialization [18], that the Industrial Revolution "swept the world" in the nineteenth century [18], that in the Second World War era the Japanese relied on the Germans for technological innovation [64-65, 71], and that it was a shortage of skilled labour that led wartime American shipbuilders to develop mass production, assembly-line methods [90]. Even in the narrower realm of the Japanese shipbuilding programs, the author

concludes that it was the great effectiveness of US submarine operations in 1942 that panicked the Japanese into launching the "ugly duckling" and other standardized designs, even though American submarine force inflicted only 12 per cent of the war's total that year, burdened as it was with several severe material and doctrinal shortcomings not corrected until mid-1943 or so.

What Heal does best is examine the ships themselves, and this he does with the experienced eye of a mariner and insurer. Copious illustrations with learned analysis help to delineate the Japanese A-2 and other standard designs. It is especially fascinating to have these wartime products placed in a larger historical context by examining their postwar careers against the background of Japan's remarkable recovery in shipping and shipbuilding, and here is perhaps the book's most useful contribution to the literature.

There is one other intriguing observation that the author has to offer based on his rare combination of life experiences: tonnages seized by the Allies at the outbreak of war are so low as to suggest that the Japanese must have been withdrawing their shipping from wide service for months before Pearl Harbor, a fact those in the maritime industries could not have failed to notice, but whose import seems to have escaped everyone's attention. Heal does not suggest yet another twist to the conspiracy theories, but it is an enticing new morsel in a debate that has raged for decades.

Look elsewhere for an understanding of Japanese and Second World War history, but if you are a hard core maritime or Pacific War enthusiast, you will want to add *Ugly Ducklings* to your library.

Mark P. Parillo
Manhattan, Kansas