

## BOOK REVIEWS

Peter Steele. *The Man who Mapped the Arctic: The intrepid life of George Back, Franklin's Lieutenant*. Vancouver, B.C.: Raincoast Books, [www.raincoast.com](http://www.raincoast.com), 2003. 288 pp. illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. CDN \$39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55192-648-2.

In his book, *The Man who Mapped the Arctic: The Intrepid life of George Back, Franklin's Lieutenant*, Peter Steele examines the life of an Arctic adventurer who has never before been accorded a book-length biographical treatment. George Back was a nineteenth-century British naval officer who fought against the French and spent five years in a French prison before coming to prominence as an Arctic explorer.

Because previous historical work on Back has almost always focussed on his Arctic expeditions, little has been written either on his earlier or later life. Steele produces an enlightening portrait of Back's early years in the Royal Navy, and his capture and imprisonment by the French. Indeed this part of the book is perhaps its finest, for it gives the reader a very real sense of the young Back who, in essence, grew up as a prisoner.

Back's career in the Arctic began when he accompanied John Franklin on his first expedition in 1819-22. On two occasions, Back was credited with saving the expedition thanks to his epic snowshoe trips in search of aid. He subsequently participated in Franklin's more successful second expedition, before leading two further expeditions of his own.

On his first expedition, Back discovered and navigated the river that now bears his name to its conclusion at Chantrey Inlet. The ice made any further exploration of the coastline impossible, however, and he had to return the way he came, having added only modestly to the existing knowledge of the Arctic coastline. His second expedition aboard HMS *Terror* was an unmitigated failure: locked in the ice off Southampton Island over the winter of 1836-37, the ship was so badly damaged that, when released from the ice in the summer, she was forced to limp back to Ireland, barely afloat. Nothing whatsoever was accomplished.

Following the *Terror* expedition, Back effectively retired and spent the remainder of his life - the better part of thirty-eight years - as a member of the vaunted Arctic Council. This council (which never met formally) was highly influential in setting the goals of Arctic expeditions, and determining who would lead

them. Hardly anything has been written about this part of Back's life - a period lasting over three decades, yet Steele gives it a scant eleven pages.

Why did Back never again try to return to the Arctic; or did he apply, but was not chosen for subsequent expeditions? Few of Back's peers in Arctic exploration were content to effectively retire at 42, and particularly not after an unsuccessful expedition. The conventional view is that Back's health was broken as a result of the *Terror* expedition. But what does this mean, and was it just a cover for a more significant reason? Back was considered to be one of the physically toughest explorers; he was also well enough to marry, to tour extensively on the continent, and to live to 80 years.

The emotions that Back elicited were always strong, both for the better and for the worse. So was he influential in the latter half of his life? If so, how? If not, why not? No printed source gives any further detail, and Steele sheds no new light on the matter - a common theme throughout the book. Despite the extensive unpublished material available - much of which the bibliography indicates that Steele has studied, the lack of any footnotes is frustrating.

Historians, particularly New World historians, have long viewed the methods of British naval officers in the Arctic with some derision. Among other things, they have been criticized for their apparent refusal to adopt native methods of travel while in the Barren lands and beyond. In this Steele is no exception; he is highly critical - with some cause - of both Franklin and Back. Yet the records of those explorers who did adopt native methods of travel - Samuel Hearne and Charles Francis Hall come to mind - do not bear out the assertion that these methods were best, given the task at hand.

While Hearne did reach the Coppermine River and came close to its mouth, it took him many years of fruitless wandering following the caribou herds. Similarly Hall, in his search for relics of the Franklin expedition, spent over five years living with the Inuit, and was never able to complete his searches to his satisfaction. The Inuit and the Indians were adept at survival, mainly because they travelled only where food was to be found. The Royal Navy's primary aim was to find a North West Passage that was navigable by ship; and for this the Navy rightly chose large ships and sea-based expeditions. Detailed mapping and science were

always of explicitly secondary importance. The experiences of both Franklin's and Back's overland expeditions led the Navy, again rightly, to conclude that the water craft suitable for overland travel - whether York boat or canoe - were unsuitable for ocean travel. The fault, such as it was, lay in the goal, and not in the means used to achieve it.

Back was never placed in the first rank of Arctic explorers because the expeditions under his command did little to further the search for a navigable North West Passage. To the Royal Navy in the first half of the nineteenth century, the mapping of Barren land rivers - Back's greatest achievement - was of secondary importance, and consequently, so was he.

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Adam R. A. Claasen. *Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign 1940-1945*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001. xix+338 pp., illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. \$39.95 US; ISBN 0-7006-1050-2.

During the Second World War, aircraft became formidable instruments of sea denial in littoral waters and adjacent oceans. While the Americans, British, and Japanese developed equipment and tactics for carrier-borne aircraft capable of launching torpedoes, the Germans and Italians pursued land-based air fleets of high-altitude and dive bombers operating over the maritime environment. In each case, whether such activity properly belonged to an ancillary naval air arm or an independent air force occasioned much debate and antagonism. Hermann Goering's *Luftwaffe*, which for a variety of personality, bureaucratic, organizational, and operational reasons solidly followed the latter course, established a dedicated air formation specially trained in naval work, X *Fliegerkorps*, and kept a close hold over other related maritime air assets under its control. German ideas about independent air action at sea and cooperation with the *Kriegsmarine* found expression in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and Norway. The last war theatre proved particularly demanding in terms of enemy encounters, operating distances, geography, and climatic conditions. Adam Claasen, a lecturer in New Zealand who has revised his doctoral dissertation into this book, examines the campaign in Norway from the German invasion in 1940 until the end of the

war, adopting a predominantly maritime air perspective.

German interest in Norway was disproportional to its actual operational significance in a wider world war. The naval strategist Wolfgang Wegener had earlier seen Norway's occupation as a solution to the German navy's disadvantageous position in 'a dead angle in a dead-end sea.' Grossadmiral Erich Raeder eventually came around to this way of thinking in his promotion of offensive action against the Scandinavian countries, in order to acquire naval and air bases to strike into the North Sea and beyond into the Atlantic. Contingency planning for full-scale invasion, predominantly naval driven, proceeded at a pedestrian pace until Adolf Hitler's sudden concern over security of iron-ore shipments from Sweden and outrage over British flouting of Norwegian neutrality gave impetus to a quick snatch-and-grab military operation. Claasen devotes more than a third of the book to planning and conduct of Operation '*Weserübung*,' paying particular attention to the *Luftwaffe's* supporting role in seizure of key points with paratroops and air-landed infantry, attacks against British warships, and sustainment of far-flung troops in desperate situations. The Germans accepted considerable risk in the Norwegian adventure and miscalculated when sinking of unescorted transports laden with supplies, heavy equipment, and precious fuel and the *Luftwaffe's* inability to exert air control northward resulted in wholesale loss of destroyers during sea battles around Narvik. The Germans eventually won the race to build-up combat power ashore, but only because opening of the German offensive in France and the Low Countries drew off available British naval and ground forces. Even though the fleet carrier *Glorious* fell victim to German battlecruisers, the Royal Navy conducted naval operations and a successful evacuation under sustained *Luftwaffe* attacks. The invasion's ultimate success masked serious shortcomings in the power projection capabilities of the *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* to act together in a coordinated and joint manner.

Such limitations, Claasen argues, prevented Norway's full potential as a forward operating area against the British from being realized in subsequent years. Procurement decisions in the *Luftwaffe's* rapid rearmament prior to the war left a shortage of four engine aircraft suitable for maritime reconnaissance and strike roles and too much reliance on twin engine fighters and medium bombers ill-suited in range and performance for an effective

blockade of the British Isles. The prolonged struggle between Raeder and Goering over control of maritime air, finally decided in the *Luftwaffe's* favour, hardly improved matters. Whether Goering was truly as parochial as Claasen portrays seems less important than the many commitments that the over-stretched *Luftwaffe* faced as the war progressed. Front-line air strength dwindled in Norway with the steady transfer of aircraft and crews elsewhere, although the need to interdict Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union brought new torpedo and dive bomber reinforcements and entailed some measure of coordination with *Kriegsmarine* fleet units concentrated in the far North. The spectacular German success against convoy PQ 17 demonstrated the possibilities when the British made rash decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Nonetheless, additional Allied naval forces devoted to trade protection in the Arctic, including escort carriers and strong covering squadrons, quickly curtailed the *Luftwaffe's* operational effectiveness from Norwegian airfields. The small number of remaining aircraft proved insufficient to meet demands for reconnaissance, meteorological flights, offensive sweeps, and defence against increasingly strident sorties by Allied maritime aircraft and heavy bombers. *Luftwaffe* weakness in Norway played no small part in the catastrophic losses of the battlecruiser *Schamhorst* and the battleship *Tirpitz*. While Claasen may lament the lack of a single joint commander in Norway to better organize German efforts, unified *command* was still a novel and contentious notion even on the other side, as naval historian John Creswell shows in his *Generals and Admirals*. Whatever Hitler's own personal views and the resources expended by the *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe* there, Norway still remained a war theatre with marginal strategic and operational relevance with the forces available, the starkness of which only became readily apparent as Nazi Germany confronted final defeat.

Claasen's conclusions are, on the whole, solidly based in his research in primary and secondary sources. The book predominantly draws upon German documents available in US repositories, some of which may duplicate those found in other archives in Great Britain, Germany, and Norway. The *Luftwaffe's* incomplete documentary record, due to wartime destruction and scattering of surviving files, presents a major obstacle to writing such an operational history. Claasen, however, has used related *Kriegsmarine* records, captured intact at Tambach castle, to better understand the

Norwegian situation and fill in gaps. Although the book claims to be a comprehensive campaign history, little attempt is made to apply and analyse basic operational-level concepts, such as centres of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, sequencing, synchronization, and culmination, in the context of the Scandinavian campaign. In this regard, the book falls short among specialist historians and staff college students, but will still appeal to general readers interested in the background and details of the *Luftwaffe's* efforts in Norway. Claasen will need to go farther afield in his research and broaden his knowledge of operational art before attempting another like campaign history.

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Andrea Curtis. *Into the Blue - Family Secrets and the Search for a Great Lakes Shipwreck* Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd., [www.randomhouse.ca](http://www.randomhouse.ca), 2003. 269 pp., photographs. C D N \$ 34.95, cloth; ISBN 0-679-31135-1.

The Great Lakes shipwreck in the title is that of the *J. H. Jones*, a small mixed passenger and freight steamer lost on Georgian Bay somewhere between Cape Croker and Lion's Head on 22 November, 1906. The promised family secrets are derived from the fact that the author's great-grandfather, Jim Crawford, was the captain and owner of the *Jones*, and was lost along with twenty (or so) people, many of them neighbours from Wiarton, Ontario. The family tale stretches across the twentieth century and attempts to come to grips with growing up in a small town when your family is responsible for the biggest disaster in local history.

Indeed, this is first and foremost a family story. The shipwreck gives it a focal point, but this is not a volume of maritime history. It is written by a very competent story teller in the style of some of our best magazine writing, no surprise perhaps, given that the author is also a prize-winning magazine writer and editor. At one point she notes that she began her research into the wreck with a small booklet called *Warton's Great Disaster* (1972) and describes the slim volume as "a charming, folksy read" (93). In many ways the same can be said of this work, albeit with a more sophisticated writing style. When the historical content runs thin, the author often shifts into a personal account of her research efforts. At least once a chapter this shifts into a "you are there" block of

fiction. In fact, around the shipwreck there is more fiction than explication.

By the end, Curtis does not have a great deal more to offer in terms of understanding why the *Jones* was lost. What she does offer is substantial context: the founding of Wiarton, the aspirations of the Crawford family, the stories of the passengers and crew, the searches and mourning for those lost. By far the longest section of the work is the story of Captain Crawford's youngest child, Eleanor, as she struggled to put memories of her family and small-town Ontario behind her.

This is a comfortable read that should find its audience. Although that audience is unlikely to include students in a class focussed on maritime history, it does not diminish the power of its telling.

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Jochen Brennecke. *The Hunters and the Hunted: German U-Boats, 1939-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.usni.org](http://www.usni.org), (1957) Bluejacket Books, 2003. 328 pp., photographs, U.S. \$18.95, paper; ISBN 1-59114-091-9.

Jochen Brennecke's original version (*Jäger-Gejagte!*) was one of the first post-war books to recount the wartime history of the U-boat force to the German people, who previously had only heard heavily propagandized versions of events. It was the first of his four titles on the Kriegsmarine and preceded the 1959 autobiographies by Admirals Erich Raeder (*My Life*) and Karl Dönitz (*Memoirs*).

*The Hunters and the Hunted* launches directly into its 37 chronologically arranged chapters without the benefit of a foreword or introduction. This leaves the book without a stated purpose and no means of establishing the author's credentials. Each chapter begins with a "Situation Report" that varies in length between a short paragraph and nearly two pages. These are used to provide a strategic setting for the tactical vignettes that bring life and character to the period being recounted.

Writing in the early 1950s, Brennecke attempted to recreate an honourable reputation for the newly formed *Bundesmarine*. The author's recounting of events is a somewhat overblown testament to the character and spirit of the U-boat force. It is entertaining and, in some places, rivetting reading, but lacks credibility because of the absence of corroborating detail. Specific dates and locations are rarely used and the

identities of the convoys engaged are seldom given, although the author often lists the names of ships sunk. There is no index. The result is that many of the stories told read more like folk tales than historical events.

In some cases, the stories are told in the first person. The truly daring exploits of such famous U-boat "aces" as Otto Kretschmer, Albrecht Brandt, Reinhart Hardengen, and many others are reverently preserved. Other incidents are attributed to specific submarines but not to any commander in particular and are recounted in the third person. The effect is uneven text that is mildly disorienting to the reader. As is the case with most translated works, some of the original character has been lost in the process. A large number of obvious anglicizations seriously detract from the authenticity of the narrative. Passages where German officers use terms like "barmy," "bloody" and "bloke" are obvious examples where the translator has mutated the basic character of the text into an alien hybrid form. The substitution of the term "snort", in place of the widely accepted and understood "schnorkel," is another case of unnecessary corruption.

Brennecke's re-telling of events is romanticized and the thorny issues of wartime Germany are deliberately excluded. Admiral Raeder "retires." The profound philosophical disagreement and heated argument between him and Hitler that led to his extraordinary resignation are not examined (202). Raeder is frequently used as a scapegoat throughout the book and, in particular, is blamed for the unpreparedness of the U-boat force to engage in "tonnage warfare." As a naval officer, however, Brennecke should have known it was Raeder that overruled Dönitz and insisted on the development of long-range submarines that enabled highly successful operations off the coast of North America, in the Caribbean Sea, and in the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans. There is no mention of the National Socialist Party nor of Nazi ideology and its prevalence in the U-boat branch of the Kriegsmarine. The issue of Hitler's "Christian Navy," which figured so prominently in Raeder's *My Life*, is astutely avoided. The strong Nazi leanings of Dönitz and the long detention of many U-boat officers for their Nazi persuasions are also ignored. Individual acts of atrocity are also conspicuously overlooked. The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials are dismissed in a mere three lines of text. In the end, Brennecke concludes that Germany's war at sea "stands unblemished and immaculate. Every German sailor can hold up his head proudly" (320). Although his claim is

largely correct, Brennecke's emotional whitewashing cannot cover every blemish and the book ends with a hurried and unfinished feeling.

There is really not much to commend *The Hunters and the Hunted* as a worthwhile title except a few extraordinary photographs and its human interest aspects. The lack of balance, technical detail, and objectivity make this a work of very limited worth. Rather, it is a patriotic curiosity that was written as a new Germany began to rise out its ruined past. Brennecke's first book must be viewed in the context of the times in which it was written for it to be of any historical value at all.

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George E. Buker. *The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.usni.org](http://www.usni.org), 2002. 204 pp., illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 32.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-212-9.

What amounted to the bulk of the American rebel fleet in 1779, some thirty-nine vessels, the largest of which mounted thirty guns, was trapped and destroyed in Penobscot Bay by elements of the North American squadron, commanded by Commodore Sir George Collier, mistakenly called an admiral by Buker.

Perhaps the greatest humiliation in the annals of United States naval history, it is scarcely remembered except by those who visit the Searsport Maritime Museum, where a small exhibition briefly explains the circumstances. Nor has it even been assigned a so-called "battle honour" by the government of the United Kingdom.

Several useful accounts of the fiasco appeared around the bicentenary authored by Peter Elliott (MA thesis, University of Maine-Orono), John Faibisy (in *Maine Historical Quarterly*), William Fowler and Craig Symonds (each in *Naval War College Review*), Chester Kevitt, Dean Mayhew (in *Mariner's Mirror*), Jon Nielson (in *American Neptune*), and Foster Smith. More recently, James Leamon's brilliant *Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine* (1993) not only reproduces on its cover the image of Collier's force entering Penobscot Bay, but recounts the expedition's fate while providing as fine an account as we could desire of the impact of the war on Maine - its politics, society and

economy.

Among the sources consulted by Buker are the papers of Rear Admiral Colby Mitchell Chester, held in the Library of Congress. Included there is Chester's 213-page unpublished but well researched defense of Saltonstall. Entitled "Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, the Continental Navy and the Defeat of the Penobscot Bay Expedition in 1779: A Critical Analysis of the Campaign", it drew attention to, among other matters, the technical limitations of Saltonstall's square-rigged ships in the confined waters of Penobscot Bay and Bagaduce [Castine] harbour.

Only briefly referred to in *The Penobscot Expedition*, I believe that Chester's unpublished view steered Dr. Buker in the direction he adopted in this new book. Chester, a Civil War sea officer, later surveyed the Maine coast on behalf of the U.S. Hydrographic Office. Had Buker adequately explained in an introductory chapter the importance of Chester's interpretation, it would have greatly helped to place the topic in a suitable historiographical setting, which is otherwise lacking.

The American expedition, mounted in Boston, was a rapid response to an earlier British initiative, based in Halifax, which sent some seven hundred troops to the mid-Maine coast. Drawn from two Scots regiments with artillery, the men shipped aboard six transports escorted by a frigate, three 18- to 20-gun sloops, a brig and schooner. There an earthen fortification called Fort George was rapidly constructed - today the site of a baseball field. With the defenses in hand, the naval force was reduced to three sloops mounting fifty-eight guns, and the rest of the ships made for Halifax.

Five weeks after the troops had landed, the American relief force arrived in the bay. Consisting of perhaps 1,300 troops in twenty-one transports, it was accompanied by eighteen armed escorts mounting two hundred and fifty guns in all. Only three were of the Continental Navy, the largest, the 32-gun frigate *Warren* belonging to the commodore. For almost three weeks the Americans sought ways to take the fort and its covering flotilla of lightly-armed warships. At the numerous councils of war, the sea officers were more sanguine of success, while the senior army officers believed their militiamen would not stand and face the English muskets in the open, that the enemy was too well entrenched and too numerous to be defeated. Yet, just as a plan of attack was underway late on August 13, Collier's force - the 64-gun *Raisonable* and five frigates - entered the bay. When news reached the Americans, a retreat of

the transports began under cover of night and dense fog. The next day, with Collier's squadron coming in, the American warships began to sail up the Penobscot River. This panicked the militiamen aboard the transports. Beaching their ships, the American captains then ordered them to be torched. The militia fled into the woods and the rout engulfed the rebels as they made their miserable way to Falmouth (Portland), or deserted and headed home.

If the circumstances leading to the American humiliation are well known, controversy has surrounded the assignment of blame by the commission of inquiry, established by the Massachusetts House of Representatives. Saltonstall, or "sit and stall," as Castine citizens sometimes rudely refer to him, refused to testify, as he requested a naval court martial. All nineteen sea officers who appeared before the political committee testified that the American warships could have defeated the small British naval force before it was reinforced, though heavy casualties were anticipated. With such one-sided testimony - not reflective of the arguments advanced in many councils of war in Penobscot Bay - the committee acquitted the generals of all responsibility for the costly failure, while the commodore was "everafterwards deprived from holding a commission in the State." (113). This miscarriage of justice - a "conspiracy" to Buker - was orchestrated by the commanding general, who lied convincingly to the political committee.

Though findings of Saltonstall's naval court martial remain unknown, he was not dismissed from the naval service, as many accounts assume. Buker believes that despite the commodore's role in Penobscot Bay, he remained a "competent" (162) sea officer. Perhaps his appointment had simply been a matter of Peter's principle at work, for before the war ended, Saltonstall again went to sea. As a privateer captain, his real metier, he took two prizes in 1781, one apparently worth £80,000.

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William Flayhart, *BL Perils of the Atlantic. Steamship Disasters, 1850 to the Present*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., [www.wwnorton.com](http://www.wwnorton.com), 2003. 288 pp., photographs, illustrations, notes, index. US \$ 28.95, cloth; ISBN 0-393-04155-7.

In a long and distinguished career as both a naval historian and aficionado of the age of the

great ocean liners, William Flayhart has already given us much to admire. *Majesty at Sea* remains the finest account of the era of the four-funnel liners and his history of the American Line is equally superb. Now we have *Perils of the Atlantic*, an excellent work detailing two hundred and fifty years of maritime disasters.

The book covers twenty-one nautical mishaps and Flayhart can be commended for resisting the temptation to focus on the more celebrated disasters, such as the sinking of RMS *Titanic*. Instead, each story receives equal attention. Lesser-known disasters, such as the sinking of *Vindobala* in 1898, are examined in the same way as the more familiar collision between *Andrea Doria* and *Stockholm* in 1956. The book begins with an account of the sinking of the large paddle steamer *Arctic*, in 1854, after she was rammed by the French steamer *Vesta*. Flayhart effectively employs some firsthand accounts of the disaster, including a letter written by Captain James Luce of the *Arctic*.

In each chapter, Flayhart's writing style is concise and involving. He is well aware that many of the tales he tells have been heard before, and in some cases are almost mythical. There is no need to write the definitive account of the RMS *Lusitania* or the sinking of the *Empress of Ireland*. Instead, what he provides is an encapsulation of each disaster, supported by excellent reference notes and an incredibly extensive bibliography. There are some good images for each chapter, including an amazing picture of the engine room of the *City of Paris*, showing the damage caused when her engines exploded in 1890.

Each chapter is, in a sense, a cautionary tale - as if something terrible had to happen in order for the progress of maritime safety to move forward. For example, the collision of the steamers *Florida* and *Republic* saw the first use of the new wireless service to call for assistance. By the time that RMS *Titanic* had her fateful encounter with the iceberg in 1912, *SOS* had replaced *CQD* as a distress call, but other lessons remained to be learned. The lack of lifeboat space is a running theme in many of these stories, as is a lack of attention to detail and in some cases a woeful lack of common sense. The sinking of the White Star liner SS *Atlantic* in 1873 is a great case in point. Running low on coal, she made for Halifax but instead of safely reaching port, Captain Williams and her crew made a number of serious errors that resulted in the ship going aground in Prospect Cove, some twenty-five miles away from their intended destination. Over five hundred and fifty lives were lost, including all of the female

passengers and all but one of the children aboard.

Two of the later chapters are particularly excellent. Flayhart's account of the fatal fire aboard the liner *Morro Castle* is a gripping read, detailing the sudden death of her captain only two days out of Havana and the blaze that left the ship aground off the New Jersey coast. The stunning events that took place after the sinking are also very well handled, including the official inquiry that paved the way for the ship's acting captain and chief engineer to be tried on criminal charges and jailed. The fact that the fire may have been deliberately set by her chief radio officer is also discussed.

The collision between the Swedish liner *Stockholm* and the beautiful *Andrea Doria* is examined in some detail. The new marvel of television captured the event live and people watched from their living rooms as the sinking of the Italian liner became the first major disaster recorded by the new medium. Flayhart's account is one of his finest and details not only the unbelievable mistakes that led to the tragedy, but also some of the equally amazing stories of survival and the rescue operations that kept the loss of life to a minimum.

Flayhart brings his book to a close with one last cautionary tale, the loss of the cruise ship *Seabreeze* in 2000. The ship sank in heavy weather while en route from Halifax to Charleston. The United States Coast Guard rescued all of her crew before she sank and, as Flayhart points out, proved that the North Atlantic is still a place to be respected in our age of technological marvels and supposed safety at sea.

*Perils of the Atlantic* is an excellent read and can be highly recommended.

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Otto Giese and James E. Wise, Jr. *Shooting the War. The Memoir and Photographs of a U-Boat Officer in World War II*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.usni.org](http://www.usni.org), (1994) Blue Jacket Books, 2003. xiii + 289 pp., photographs, maps, notes, bibliography, index. US, \$ 18.95, paper, ISBN 1-59114-298-9.

The US Naval Institute Press, under its imprint of Bluejacket Books, is reprinting paperback editions of what it refers to as "exceptional works on naval and military subjects," earlier works that were classics of their day, the best of their ship classes, the leaders, and so on. While this book is an interesting autobiography of a wartime officer in the German merchant marine and, from 1942 on, in the *Kriegsmarine*, Otto Giese's war was hardly

"exceptional." What is unusual is the selection of someone hundred and four excellent photographs, most taken by the author, or at least with his camera.

Giese first went to sea as a cadet in 1933 in merchant marine *Schubchiff Deutschland* for two years, became an "officer candidate" and joined the large North German Lloyd liner *Columbus* as a junior mate in 1938. When war was declared in September, 1939, the ship was at Curacao in the Dutch Indies. By December they were in Veracruz, Mexico, from where US naval ships could escort them up the coast. Shortly after altering eastward into the Atlantic, northwest of Bermuda, the ship encountered H M S *Hyperion* and the US cruiser escort *Tuscaloosa* was only able to stand by and ensure crew safety. *Columbus* was scuttled, as planned, and since *Hyperion* could not take her whole crew prisoner, *Tuscaloosa* insisted they take none. All the Germans were brought by their own boats aboard the cruiser and attendant destroyers and landed at Ellis Island in New York. This interesting diplomatic interlude is illustrated with several uncommon photos.

At the German consul's behest, most of the more than 450 crew were shipped to San Francisco in an attempt to get them back to Germany via the Pacific, hopefully aboard cooperative Japanese or Italian ships. Unfortunately, most of them sat there for six months, neither free nor prisoners. It was not until November, 1940, that six of the crew, including Giese, went aboard a Japanese freighter as "helpers" and finally arrived in Kobe. Although there were several German raiders and supply ships operating out of that port, Giese did not leave until June 1941, shipping out as a mate in the supply vessel *Anneliese Essberger*, disguised as a Japanese ship. Interestingly, they carried new Japanese-developed aerial torpedoes for the Luftwaffe, resupplied the raider *Komet* (in part with fire hoses for fuel transfer because of incompatible fittings) in mid-Pacific, rounded the Horn, changed disguise to Norwegian, meta U-Boat off the Azores and safety reached Bordeaux.

By the end of an inactive year, Giese decided he would rather be in the *Kriegsmarine* than underemployed, so although the ship's owners tried to prevent the departure of a well-experienced mate, he joined the Navy. He began as a seaman, obtained a commission, transferred to U-boats, and was at sea in a training boat by February 1942 - receiving hands-on submarine training aboard. Following several unremarkable war patrols, Giese went on officer courses in early 1943. In November, he was assigned as a watch officer in *U-181*, a larger Type KD boat. While concentrating on his maritime life, Giese periodically offers us (not unexpectedly) the "party-line" interpretation of events, although he was obviously not very interested in Nazi ideologies. In 1944 his ship was assigned to a long range patrol in the Indian Ocean, sank four ships in fairly

straightforward attacks, and arrived in Penang, Malaysia in August. Returning to Germany as a supply vessel for vital items destined for Germany, the ship was to carry only two torpedoes, plus raw rubber, 250 tons of tin, molybdenum, quinine and opium. Giese takes a relatively neutral attitude toward the Japanese, although there was patently very little true cooperation between the navies at the senior and diplomatic levels. Leaving Singapore in September, 1944, they joined operational boats briefly at Batavia, sailed for Germany on 19 October and sank the America-registered *Fort Lee*. Just off east Africa they developed engine problems and returned to Singapore for drydock and repairs. While waiting, they added a schnorkel system to their boat.

In May, the German forces in Europe surrendered, leaving the overseas U-Boats in a difficult position. Giese's crew were eventually turned over to the Japanese, who again controlled the freedom of their erstwhile allies, until the dropping of the atomic bombs brought about total surrender. At this point, the U-boatmen became British prisoners of war in the infamous Changi jail, returning to England in June 1946. Finally reaching Germany in August 1947, Giese was free to return home, such as it was. He devotes a brief epilogue to his post-war life, working at the docks at Bremen, then on a fishing boat as mate and skipper. He then bought a small local area freighter which he enlarged, thus moving into the ownership business of small freighters. Giese emigrated to the United States in 1963 and has lived there since.

The text is well translated from the original, although there are occasional odd direct translations from the German and, to English ears, a few unusual naval usages. The book's main value lies in its coverage of the uncommon incidents such as the scuttling of *Columbia* and the relationships of the German submariners with their Japanese allies in war and in post-war German armistice. A biography worth its shelfspace as an unusual, if unspectacular vignette of history.

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Terrell D. Gottschall. *By Order of the Kaiser. Otto von Diederichs and the Rise of the Imperial German Navy, 1865-1902*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.usni.org](http://www.usni.org), 2003. 368 pp., photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 36.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-309-5.

This excellent volume offers the first comprehensive biography of a naval officer whose name does not come readily to most minds when thinking of the nineteenth-century rise of the German navy. That

honour falls to Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930), with his dreams of an "all big-gun blue-water navy," his "risk principle" of power projection, and his famous Naval Bills that aimed at making all this a reality. Of course, he did none of this alone. Nor did he undertake it without facing the opposition of some of his peers. One of these peers was a fascinating officer whose career path from cadet to admiral at key points paralleled, intersected and confronted that of the ambitious Tirpitz: Admiral Otto von Diederichs (1843-1918).

This engaging biography, a counterpoint to what we know of Tirpitz, provides a remarkable foil for examining Germany's distinctive brand of navalism. From his entry into the navy in 1865 to his retirement in 1902 (ten years prior to the resignation of Tirpitz in 1916) von Diederichs figured in major events: the transition from coastal defence force to deep-sea imperial fleet, from sail to steam, from muzzle-loading to breech-loading guns, from broadside firing to swivel turrets. Commensurate with his rank, he played many successive roles: cadet in the newly-founded Naval School (*Marineschule*) at Miirwik, midshipman, gunnery officer, executive officer, Admiralty Staff Officer, instructor of naval technology, commander of a cruiser squadron, chief of the East Asia Squadron, and the first flag officer appointed to the German army's General Staff under General von Schafflen. In all this he distinguished himself. He experimented with and adapted the Whitehead torpedo, promoted the concept of torpedo-boats (thus presaging the tactics of submarines), explored the China coast in the name of imperial expansion, and was responsible for recommending and establishing the German base at Tsingtau, China. With his five warships, he confronted US Admiral Dewey's six vessels during the famous standoff at Manila Bay (1898). Diederich's work with the innovative Naval War College (*Marineakademie*), a "postgraduate" school for experienced officers, would help him not only with the academic preparation of the German naval officer corps, but most importantly, with the development of strategic planning. He developed a fine reputation as a war planner. He was the first to brief the Kaiser on plans for war against the United States and foresaw the naval arms race between Germany and Britain. In short, Diederichs made major contributions to "mortalizing" Clausewitz's theories on war.

Admiral von Diederichs emerges from this thoroughly researched and crisply written biography as a versatile and effective officer driven by his sense of duty and loyalty to the state he served. Though not charismatic, he broke new ground in technology, geopolitics and training - despite the machinations of many of his largely conservative colleagues who resented technological changes that were challenging the traditional ways of naval life. Nor was he without

coverage: at one point he seriously considered court-martialing the Kaiser's brother, Prince Heinrich, for insubordination while under his command on the Asia station.

Anticipating the disastrous outcome of Tirpitz's ambitions, he was, in the words of his biographer, the last, best hope of preventing Tirpitz from dominating the navy completely. Appalled by the direction in which a 'ruthless' Tirpitz was taking the navy (with the Kaiser's blessings) by forcing the retirement of officers who stood in his way, von Diederichs himself frequently considered resigning. What had begun as merely divergent opinions about the navy's character and role, ultimately led to a political confrontation between the two men and caught Diederichs in a pincer between Tirpitz and the Kaiser himself. Vindication came when in 1916 circumstances forced Tirpitz to recognize the failure of his powerful "risk fleet" to prevail over the British and left the navy. From the perspective of von Diederichs, the Kaiser and his "gang" of Tirpitz's men had destroyed the very Germany which an Imperial Navy should have defended.

The author has succeeded admirably in drawing a graphic portrait of Otto von Diederichs, a pivotal figure in German naval history, who was professionally connected to the most powerful and influential personalities of the day. Fully contextualized, the balanced portrait reveals the subject's character in situations as varied as sea officer, advisor to the Kaiser, caring husband, solicitous and proud father of two naval sons, and reflective pensioner pondering the fate of a Germany he had served - in the words of the book's main title - "By Order of the Kaiser." That expression, a formula used by officers serving on foreign stations, reflected both a hierarchical structure and a professional ethos. The biographer has deftly captured this bygone era by reviving a man who has stood too long in the shadows.

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Nigel Steel & Peter Hart. *Jutland 1916. Death in the Grey Wastes*. London: Cassell, 2003, distributed by Sterling Publishing Co. Inc., [www.sterlinfipub.com](http://www.sterlinfipub.com), 480 pp., maps, appendices, notes, index. C D N \$46.95 US \$29.95, cloth: ISBN 0-304-35892-4.

The Battle of Jutland has not suffered from lack of attention from naval historians, interested amateurs and the naval profession itself over the nearly ninety years that have passed since it was fought. It is entirely legitimate to ask, therefore, "what on earth *new* is there to say about the battle, the admirals, the ships, the systems and to answer the by now hoary

question of 'who won'?"

Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, two historians working out of the superb Imperial War Museum in London, successfully answer this question by eschewing the well-trodden paths followed by most of their predecessors and emphasizing the human component of the battle. As noted in the Introduction, the authors "wish to... move attention away from the now sterile controversies] and to place it squarely onto the deeds of the men who fought and died at Jutland." Their sources are largely found at the IWM archives and are the "Letters, diaries, books, reports, unpublished memoirs, tape-recorded interviews . . . into which it has been [their] pleasure to dip" (8).

Given this premise, the book opens with an introductory chapter that swiftly sets the scene of the battle. A thumbnail sketch is provided of the developments in the Royal Navy as it evolved from a complacent and deeply flawed Victorian relic into the very much more effective and efficient Edwardian navy that fought the First World War. It touches on the contributions of thinkers such as Mahan and Corbett, as well as the cogitations of Tirpitz on the other side of the North Sea. It describes the technological revolution in naval architecture epitomised by the sudden arrival of HMS *Dreadnought* in 1906. It includes portraits of the protagonists as they moved through their careers, and a brief outline of the opening months and years of the naval war.

There is no pretence that this chapter adequately covers the issues it touches on, and indeed, the authors generously direct readers who wish to delve more deeply to such sources as A.J. Marder's *From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, John Campbell's *Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting*, and Andrew Gordon's magisterial *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*. I support the notion of further examination beyond this book, if only to provide necessary detail and context into the battle itself and the wider war at sea. Given the fundamental premise of the book, that is to bring to life the human component of the battle, this is no weakness. It is simply not possible to cover every aspect of the battle in one volume. To the authors' credit, they do not even try.

From this essential but brief introduction, the reader is launched into the drama of the battle at a rollicking pace. Each chapter that describes a phase of the engagement is liberally sprinkled with anecdotes and quotes from participants from both sides, although the vast majority are, unsurprisingly, British. The style is informal, gripping and moves the narrative along with ease. The key controversies are discussed as they occur to a depth that allows for easy comprehension by non-technical readers, as well as providing the essential kernel of the problem for the more knowledgeable.

As an example, I have always been astonished at the primitive signalling technology employed by the Royal Navy in the First World War. Nelson would have been at home in this regard. The story of how Beatty denied himself the crucial support of the 5<sup>th</sup> Battle Squadron in the opening phase of the battle is a case in point, but by no means the only one. It seems simply remarkable, at this distance from the events, that tactical manoeuvring was executed by signal flags at distances measured in miles. The smoke from the ships' funnels and guns, combined with the all-too-typical fog and greyness of the North Sea, argued against leaning on such a thin reed for one's tactical requirements. Nonetheless, despite the no-doubt flawless execution of signals under peacetime or exercise conditions, in the heat of battle the scope for blunder was substantial and this indeed is what occurred. As Beatty turned south-east, Evan-Thomas turned north-west in accordance with a pre-arranged *zig-zag* course. The end result was Beatty's battle cruisers coming under fire from Hipper's for a prolonged and fatal period, without the powerful 15 in. guns of Evan-Thomas' Queen Elizabeth-class dreadnoughts.

The above digression is not entirely chosen accidentally. The book ends with the traditional chapter of Who Won? Hart and Steel draw the fairly standard conclusion that the Germans certainly prevailed in terms of the material damage that they inflicted on the Royal Navy (largely due to the destruction of the three battle cruisers), but that the British held the field, that Jellicoe's handling of the Grand Fleet was superior to that of Scherer's management of the High Seas Fleet, and that the Grand Fleet was never really challenged again. While this resolution of the "hoary" question is balanced, Hart and Steel further conclude that Beatty's performance was wanting. Had he done better, and handled the ships in his charge with more skill and less élan, Jutland may well have had more satisfactory results from the British perspective than a mere win on points. The opening signalling blunder noted above set the scene in this regard, and that despite obvious courage, Beatty did not possess all the necessary attributes of a successful admiral at war. No doubt this conclusion will not be the last word on the subject.

Steel and Hart skillfully weave such stories of the battle using their sources to illuminate and illustrate developments with the human element that is their first objective. They succeed in describing the battle well, ably supported by remarkably clear and helpful diagrams of the action, and a useful selection of photographs. This is an excellent book and I have no hesitation in recommending it to the general reader as well as to the specialist. For the former, the human side of the battle is obviously of abiding interest; for the latter it perhaps provides a useful and

important reminder that naval battles are fought not by ships, but by the men in them. The sailors of both sides at Jutland, albeit largely posthumously, owe a debt of gratitude to Steel and Hart for resurrecting their stories that they might live on, as do we who can read anew of their exploits, their courage, and their experiences in the greatest battleship action of the twentieth century.

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Joel Hayward. *For God and Glory. Lord Nelson and his Way of War*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.NavalInstitute.org](http://www.NavalInstitute.org), 2003. xix + 251 pp., illustrations, maps, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 32.95, cloth; ISBN 1-59114-351-9.

In today's Canadian navy there is something of a backlash against Horatio Nelson, possibly arising out of a desire to demonstrate that the navy has cut the apron strings to its British counterpart, possibly because Trafalgar Day, 21 October, also falls on the birthday of a great Canadian institution, the Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment du Canada. There are those in Canada, however, who still toast "the immortal memory," and do so not just out of sentimental ties to the Royal Navy, but in the thought that the American historian A. T. Mahan may have been right when he called Nelson the embodiment of sea power. Joel Hayward, who comes from New Zealand, where there is less objection than in Canada to old imperial ties, certainly shares Mahan's opinion. Evidently a scholar well versed in modern military doctrine, Hayward has applied some of the principles and techniques laid down in US military manuals, and some broader analytical tools, to Nelson's career. It is an interesting approach, handled with intelligence and, although he tends to be in love with adjectives, a very decent prose style.

It is interesting to compare the analysis in this book to the index headings listed under Nelson's name in Mahan's biography: Charm ... Vanity... Courage ... Love of glory and honor... Religious feelings ... Sense of duty ... Exclusiveness and constancy of purpose... Diplomacy, natural aptitude for... Administration, preservation and management of the fleet... Strategic ideas, indications of... Tactical ideas, indications of... There is, in other words, nothing particularly new here, although the chapter on Nelson's spiritual beliefs goes beyond the formal acknowledgements one finds in most biographies, and Nelson's marital infidelity is seen in terms of his religious beliefs, his avowal that he and Emma were married in the sight of God. (Mahan, whose own spiritual journey was so profound, says little of religion other than documenting Nelson's well

known prayers, and he gives short shrift to the liaison with Emma Hamilton. Carola Oman, generally acknowledged the best interpreter of Nelson's personal character, pays little or no attention to his religion, and Christopher Hibbert's 1994 biography, which he calls a personal history, is the only recent account I have read that touches upon this aspect of Nelson's life. It must be said, as well, that Nelson's conduct of amphibious and land operations receives much more pointed and effective criticism from Hayward than from other biographers, even Geoffrey Bennett, who does admit Nelson's foolhardiness at Tenerife. Indeed, the book's organisation allows the reader to reflect on Nelson's genius for war, and to question perhaps more rigorously than in a biography that dwells on the great drama of Nelson's life as it developed chronologically, whether his genius transcends time, whether the way Nelson thought and acted, always leading from the front, with his not infrequent mistakes, would have been as effective in another age, and whether modern military and naval establishments would have allowed Nelson the freedom of action he enjoyed in the Georgian navy.

Hayward uses modern military jargon, normally a dreary litany that students are tempted to learn by rote, to iUrninate the timelessness of Nelson's way of war. "Manoeuvre warfare," "directive control," "Lead Nation Command," "CODA" (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), "reconnaissance pull," describe some of the crucial decisions made by Nelson with remarkable accuracy. Hayward deflects the accusation that these terms might be anachronistic in a discussion of eighteenth-century naval operations. "Lord Nelson's war fighting style closely resembles the modern Manoeuvre Warfare paradigm. He wasn't fighting to any paradigm, of course, much less one that dates from almost two hundred years after his death. He understood naval tactics and battle according to the norms and behavioural patterns of his own era and continuously experimented and tested ideas, rejecting some, keeping others" (101). Nevertheless, the United States Marine Corps definition of Manoeuvre Warfare - "a variety of rapid, focussed, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope" - sounds very like Nelson's own comment to Captain Robert Keats of the *Superb* when he explained the tactics he planned to use against Villeneuve's combined squadron: "What do you think of it? I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They wont know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and that is what I want."

Hayward never loses sight of the world in which Nelson lived, but does make comparisons with the two twentieth century commanders (neither of them sailors), who in his view were equally great

captains of war, Patton and Rommel. Napoleon was, in Hayward's view the only eighteenth century commander to equal Nelson in the psychological magic of his presence on the field of battle. Wellington, although a great commander, falls short in his failure to empathise with his troops and reluctance to delegate authority. Hayward makes other comparisons with those who were less sensitive to their coalition partners in war, Norman Schwartzkopf, Lord Louis Mountbatten and Douglas MacArthur. These are all provocative suggestions that invite challenge. There were, after all, sailors who merit comparison with Nelson, if indeed comparison is possible in the changed circumstances of war. And there is a very curious omission. Nowhere is there a single reference to Sir Julian Corbett. The two-volume *Campaign of Trafalgar*, *asSome Principles of Maritime Strategy*, and the seminal Navy Records Society volume *Fighting Instructions, 1530 -1815* all have significance for any study of Nelson. Why they should not have been included in Hayward's otherwise impressive bibliography is puzzling.

*For God and Glory* is not a major reinterpretation of Nelson, but it raises legitimate questions, is a good read, and gives military professional food for thought.

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Harry Kelsey. *Sir John Hawkins: Queen Elizabeth's Slave Trader*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003. xiv + 402 pp., appendixes, maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$35.00, cloth; ISBN 0-300-09663-1.

It would seem that Harry Kelsey has staked out his place in the historical arena as a giant killer: he did so very ably with his recent book, *Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate*, and is attempting it again with his new biography of Drake's kinsman, John Hawkins.

Hawkins has remained in his protegee's shadow from their day to this. Yet, within the field of maritime history, Hawkins has always enjoyed quiet respect for his work as Treasurer of the Navy Board and his improvements to the Elizabethan Navy. His accomplishments, while less flashy than his corsair cousin's, were arguably as - or more - important in terms of defeating Philip II's Enterprise of England.

While he had his share of detractors and admirers in the late sixteenth century, many of the negative aspects of Hawkins' career have been downplayed in the succeeding centuries. J. A. Williamson's first scholarly biography of Hawkins in 1927 solidified Hawkins' place as the skillful

architect of the Elizabethan navy. Subsequent historians have largely towed the line in putting a positive spin on Hawkins' career - that is, until Kelsey.

Kelsey portrays Hawkins as an unlikable personality — ruthless, greedy, hot-tempered — although he does accord a certain admiration for his drive and determination. Hawkins' resolve to trade legally or illegally, with the unwilling or the coerced, is a case in point. His repeated attempts to free his captured seamen from the clutches of the Spanish Inquisition have usually been seen as an example of Hawkins' loyalty but Kelsey argues that these diplomatic overtures lead to some questionable exchanges with the King of Spain.

Unlike Williamson's Hawkins, Kelsey's version is more apt to be a traitor than a patriot. While Kelsey leaves room for doubt, Hawkins may have been willing to switch sides in the protracted commercial and religious conflict between England and Spain, as long as the price was right. Perhaps this was a ploy to regain his crew but it seems in keeping with the unscrupulous Hawkins that Kelsey paints.

Even as Hawkins struggled to disassociate his name from the suspicion of treason - whether justified or not - he also battled charges of corruption in his dealings with the naval administration. While these allegations have endured for over four hundred years after his death, Kelsey is right to mention that, if true, this was an expected perk of office during this era. The author does seem to have a modicum of sympathy for the aging Hawkins who cannot convince the Crown to let him resign his post in the naval bureaucracy and a guarded admiration for the fruits of his labours.

Kelsey shows his distaste for his subject most overtly when discussing Hawkins' involvement in the slave trade. Certainly, Hawkins did deal with slaves in the earlier part of his career - they were only one of a number of commodities he traded in. While readers will no doubt recoil from this odious part of Hawkins' commerce, Kelsey pillories Hawkins for being a man of his day. One would be hard pressed to find early modern Englishmen who did not share Hawkins' sensibilities. Sixteenth-century anti-slavery activists like the Dominican preacher Bartolomeo Las Casas were really the voices crying in the wilderness. Yet Kelsey expects that Hawkins should share our modern abhorrence of the slave trade which strikes me as being ahistorical.

Despite this weakness, there is no denying Kelsey's work is very well researched and his use of English and Spanish sources is impressive. There is also a solid index and annotated endnotes as well as interesting appendices and useful maps. Of special note is the enlightening chapter on the Hawkins historiography which, to my knowledge, is not found elsewhere.

The problem with revisionist history is that sometimes it tends to overstate its case in an effort to counter long-standing (mis)conceptions. Kelsey's book is an apt example. Firstly, the subtitle of the book, *Queen Elizabeth's Slave Trader*, only tells a very small part of the story. Yet, to give homage to Hawkins the bureaucrat in the title would not be nearly as provocative or enticing to a prospective reader. One can justify the thrust of Kelsey's work as a counter-balance to the almost hagiographical tone of some of the biographies on Hawkins. We definitely needed an updated biography to question and possibly re-evaluate the place of Hawkins in history. In Kelsey's zeal to demythologize, however, he has seemingly demonized an aggressive entrepreneur and able naval administrator.

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Ludwig Kohl-Larsen. Translated by William Barr. *South Georgia: Gateway to Antarctica*. Bluntisham, UK: Bluntisham Books, [www.bluntishambooks.co.uk](http://www.bluntishambooks.co.uk), 2003. xviii + 294 pp., maps, photograph, £24.95, US \$ 45.00, cloth; ISBN 1 85297 075 8.

The book describes an exceptional expedition conducted on the south Atlantic island of South Georgia in 1928-29, by the author, Ludwig Kohl-Larsen (1884 -1969), his wife Margit (1891-1990) and the cameraman, Albert Benitz (born 1904 -who later became an international known star of his profession).

The expedition, co-financed by the *Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler* (Coalition for German Science), consisted of various excursions, sometimes lasting several weeks, to unknown parts of the island including the central area. Their primary goal was to study and film the life and behaviour of birds and seals. Biological and geological samples destined for scientific institutions were taken systematically, and whenever he had the opportunity, Kohl-Larsen also made geodetic surveys.

Only one edition of the original book, *Am den Toren der Antarktis*, exists. It was not popular when it was published in 1930, probably because of its carefully written but unwieldy language, rather than the theme, content or intention of the book. The original text is hard to read; the content is uneven as very clear and colourful presentations alternate with eccentric and clumsy turns of phrase. (This is less obvious in Kohl-Larsen's two other books on polar themes.) For example, exciting accounts of the group's adventures are interspersed with considerations on geology and geography, along with general reflexions which are not always very

profound.

Kohl-Larsen is a fascinating author. He first visited South Georgia in 1911, as a physician for a German Antarctic-Expedition. When he arrived, he was a sick man who had just survived an emergency appendix operation on the high seas. Later, expedition leader Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957) had to leave him at the whaling station Grytviken. Six days before the expedition proceeded to Antarctica, Margit Larsen, the daughter of Carl Anton Larsen (1860-1925), the founder and leader of the whaling station, arrived. Instantaneously half of Filchner's men fell in love with the young lady. This amusing instance is reflected by an unpublished diary of the meteorologist of the expedition. But Margit married Kohl, and she later accompanied him on many expeditions.

The English version of the book, published in 2003, includes a very empathetic and informal introduction written by D. W. H. Walton. He refers to the life of the couple and states that Kohl-Larsen attended the first whaling-expedition to the Ross Sea (1923-24) under the command of his father-in-law (who also was the inventor of pelagic whaling) and that he was on board the airship LZ 127 during its Arctic campaign in 1931. It is a pity that there was no photo of Margit and Ludwig Kohl-Larsen participating in these adventures.

That the book is a must for readers who deal with the history of Antarctica is self-explanatory. But who else could be interested? Certainly, it documents the enormous physical and psychological strength of the Kohl-Larsens and Benitz. For weeks they camped under unbelievably bad conditions - they had picked the worst summer in nearly two decades. They made several journeys into the interior of the island, but they had to abandon an attempt to reach the whaling-stations in the Stroemness- or Cumberland Bight from their campsite in the north-western part of the island (45-60km beeline). Nevertheless, they twice crossed the island on a line close to the route taken by Ernest H. Shackleton and his men in 1916, a feat every outdoor expert will admire this.

The focus of the expedition was the study and filming of animals. From middle of May 1928 to mid- September 1929, they explored nearly all of the rugged, often glaciated areas of this one hundred and fifty by thirty kilometre km island. Kohl-Larsen was also a man of great good humour. Their observations of penguins, albatrosses and elephant seals should be of great interest for experts as well as for lay people - particularly because Kohl-Larsen reveals his keen love of the animals he encounters. Only once did sheer hunger force the three to betray the objects of their affection.

The book is a remarkable source, not just for the history of shipping, but for its contribution to

the history of whaling and sealing. It must not be overlooked that Kohl-Larsen objected to whaling in general, and to the slaughtering of elephant seals in particular. Of course, the most prominent whaler was his admired father-in-law. Moreover, the success and even the toleration of his expedition depended on the good will of the whalers and sealers. So Kohl-Larsen tried to resolve the conflict by describing not only the hardships of whaling and sealing, but also the good character of the men who did this job (and earned a lot of money doing it).

The problem of the unwieldy language of the German original is less significant for the translation. William Barr has given a factually correct and a linguistically good translation. The English version of the book is much easier to read than the German one. As well, the original maps included are rather better than the ones found in the 1930 German edition. The numerous photographs do not achieve the quality of the original, but are sufficient. The printing, the paper and the binding meet high quality demands - a felicitous book one wishes success.

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Thomas (Tom) D. W. McCulloch. *Mandalay to Norseman. Childhood on the River Clyde and Service at Sea 1925-1948*. Victoria, B. C.: Trafford Publishing, [www.AV.Trafford.com/robots](http://www.AV.Trafford.com/robots), 2003. x +232 pp., photographs. C D N \$ 25.99, paper; ISBN 1-4120-0071-8.

Without question there must be a mountain of memories lurking in the minds of former mariners which will never see the light of day. This book is one man's effort to see that parts of his colourful life will be preserved for future generations. He has done this at the urging of family and friends who have no doubt been regaled by his salty stories over the years.

By way of introduction, the early chapters of the book cover McCulloch's childhood years in Greenock, Scotland, and how this influenced him to become a seafarer. His actual seagoing commenced in 1941, at the age of fifteen, when he joined the 5,500 ton *Mandalay*, a thirty-year old veteran of the much-maligned P. Henderson fleet of Glasgow. Any glorified view of life at sea was soon dashed by the austere conditions he experienced on his first voyage in the Indian Ocean and on the hot and sticky Burma Coast. Rationed fresh water, cockroach and rat infestations plus the notorious "Paddy Henderson" diet on a nine and a half month voyage, was far different to his boyhood life on the Clyde. To his credit, he stuck out his apprenticeship over the next three years serving on four more ships of the Henderson fleet. While most of the time was spent on

the relatively quiet Indian Ocean, his last ship, the *Ocean Viceroy*, survived a December voyage to Murmansk. Further enlightenment for young McCulloch was that instead of being an understudy to the navigating officers, most of his time was spent working on deck with the seamen. He frankly admits that he received little instruction that would prepare him for a career on the bridge.

Lack of training notwithstanding, McCulloch decided to leave Henderson's and was accepted as an uncertified third mate on the *EI Ciervo*, an eight thousand-ton tanker owned and operated by C. T. Bowring. The three months on this ship, although all spent in coastal waters, provided him with both the navigational skills and sea time to study and sit for his foreign-going second-mate's certificate. Thus qualified, he served on two other vessels of this company, one of which was a cargo ship trading in both the north and south Atlantic, a far cry from the Indian Ocean of his early days. Promotion to second mate and a youthful marriage followed.

His next two ships strained his new marital status to the fullest. The *Recorder* and the *Norseman* were cable ships, the first of which he joined in Singapore. In keeping with other such ships, they were noted for extended periods at sea and equally lengthy stays in distant ports. Although as fourth mate, the pay was better and the comfortable living conditions just the opposite to his "Paddy Henderson" experience, being far away from home was hardly conducive to marital bliss. That the marriage survived after an absence of twenty-two months, with admitted infidelity on both sides, is a tribute to the power of unconditional love and forgiveness.

This phase of McCulloch's life, and the book, conclude with him obtaining his first mate's certificate and he and his wife emigrating to Canada in 1948 and starting anew. This then is the chronicle of the early sea-career of the author, but that is not all he wants to record. Digressing from his own experience, he provides geographical details of most of the ports he visited as well as tracing the history of such cities as Alexandria from the time of the Ptolemies to the Second World War. He comments extensively on the conduct of the war in all theatres and is frank in his criticism. For example, he feels that those responsible for the lack of air cover for the *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*, should have been shot! (94)

An inordinate amount of space is given to his experiences on the seamy side of many ports. He makes no attempt to hide the fact that he was well acquainted with both booze and brothels. One can only hope that readers will not conclude that such behaviour is common to all seafarers, then or now!

Personally, I would have preferred more space devoted to describing the exact navigation

required on cable-ship before the days of GPS. There are photographs galore, but many are of poor quality. There is also one glaring mistake in the position of the sinking of *the Athenia*. The book states that it was in the North Channel, between Scotland and Ireland, when in fact, it was much farther west and closer to Rockall (25).

This reviewer will leave the judgement of other historical material to the more qualified. The author's family will no doubt enjoy this book, others might not be quite as enthused.

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Blue Rocks, Nova Scotia

Jak P. Mallmann Showell. *German Naval Code Breakers*. Hersham, Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing; Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [www.NavalInstitute.org](http://www.NavalInstitute.org), 2003. 160 pp., map, photographs, appendices, bibliography, index; £ 24.38 / US \$ 38.95, cloth, ISBN 1 59114 308 X.

Jak P. Mallmann Showell. *What Britain Knew and Wanted to Know About U-Boats, Volume 1*. Cuxhaven, Germany: International Submarine Archive (U-Boot Archiv), and Gosport, Hants: The Royal Navy Submarine Museum, [www.msubmus.co.uk](http://www.msubmus.co.uk), 2001. 103 pp., index £16.50, paper; ISBN 0854 200 428. Available in USA from Military Books Express, Mercury, 45250 Severn Way, Stirling VA, 20166

German successes in reading Allied naval radio traffic and, in particular, how this intelligence was used in positioning U-boat lines to intercept convoys has been comparatively neglected in the literature on the Second World War. In 1942, when the Allies were unable to read U-Boat radio traffic, German code breakers were reading a high percentage of convoy traffic, often in less than 24 hours. It is the dramatic breaking of the more sophisticated German codes by Bletchley Park and how this enabled convoys to be routed around the waiting U-boats that has received more attention. One of the reasons for this imbalance is the paucity of sources on German code breaking. Mallmann Showell's latest book, *German Naval Code Breakers*, therefore addresses a fascinating topic. Disappointingly, this is a popular history which sheds no new light on its topic.

The author, who lives in England but has made extensive use of material in the *U-Boot Archiv* in Cuxhaven, has established a solid reputation since the late 1980s based on a number of books on the German Navy and in particular U-boats. *German Naval Code Breakers* follows a now-standard format of attractive production illustrated with arresting photographs. Many tend to illustrate points -

direction finders or transmitting aerials in U-boats, for example - which are peripheral to German code breaking. As pictures of German wartime radio intercept stations or the establishments where signals were analysed are apparently not available, photos of still-extant British radio stations are shown.

The text, a loose history of the war at sea, is the weakest element in this book. The author does not provide documentation and his narrative appears to be largely conjecture as to how the code breakers might have operated. He occasionally cites *Seekrieg im Ather* (1981) by Captain Heinz Bonatz, who headed the signals evaluation section of the *Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst)* for most of the war. However, this authoritative source is not used systematically. There are only haphazard cases where oddly-selected information found in Bonatz is worked into the text, such as in May 1943 when a British aircraft reported an unexplained sighting of a lifeboat from a ship which *B-Dienst* could not correlate with any intercepted distress call (108). It is perhaps worth noting that Bonatz established after the war that in 1942, when the Germans were achieving their highest percentages of reading convoy traffic, they heard distress calls from only one quarter of all Allied ships lost.

There is no attempt at synthesis or analysis in *German Naval Code Breakers* and thus the reader learns from a photo caption that schnorkels caused "incredible discomfort for the crew and provided only the difference between death and bare survival" (111). This is nowhere balanced by the fact that schnorkels gave the U-boats a lease on life in the face of omnipresent Allied aircraft and made possible a tenacious inshore campaign around the British Isles during the final phase of the war. The narrative also carelessly asserts that *B-Dienst* dragged explosives through Soviet minefields - surely this was an operation executed on the basis of intelligence provided by *B-Dienst* (114). The bibliography ("Further Reading") provides clues to the lack of context in the narrative. While it does include Rohwer's *The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943* (1977) which demonstrates how German code breaking was used operationally, it does not feature other books which provide analysis such as Kahn's *Hitler's Spies* (1978), Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (1988) or Gardner's *Decoding History* (1999). In summary, this book unfortunately cannot be recommended as a credible or insightful source on German naval code breaking.

*What Britain Knew and Wanted to Know About U-Boats*, edited by Mallmann Showell, is an eclectic collection of extracts from the wartime *British Monthly Anti-Submarine Reports*. Many of the original items were based on interrogations of U-Boat crews taken prisoner. Others were analyses of anti-

submarine tactics. The preliminary results of trials of *HM Submarine Graph* (the captured type-VU *U570*) is included. This is a fascinating cross-section of the type of clear and direct material disseminated internally by the Royal Navy to ships fighting the Atlantic campaign. The quality of the material and the insights gleaned through painstaking effort by British intelligence speak volumes about why the resources applied to such analyses were so fruitful. The Allies learned steadily over the long haul, studying individual encounters, devising new tactics, and providing accessible feed-back to ships and aircraft squadrons engaged in operations. Recommended for providing insights into U-Boat operations and the quality of Allied wartime intelligence.

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Peter Padfield. *Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom. Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World 1788- 1851*. London: John Murray, [www.johnmurray.co.uk](http://www.johnmurray.co.uk), 2003. xii + 451 pp., illustrations, maps, glossary, notes, select bibliography, index. UK £25, cloth; ISBN 07-195-5665-1.

Peter Padfield's latest book picks up on the themes introduced in his penultimate effort published in 1999 — *Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1588 -1782*. And, like its predecessor, Padfield's thesis is bold, original and wide ranging. This is certainly not a modern retelling of the glorious days of the Royal Navy in the Homblower era; instead, it is a defence, and almost a plea, for the virtues of the Anglo-American way of life, of freedom of expression, of government and commerce, and a condemnation of the Continental devotion to absolutism and its modern manifestation - dirigiste tendencies regarding the commanding heights of the economy and a weakness for an Orwellian "Newspeak" in public life.

The book opens with three important chapters that introduce and develop his theme. Padfield is particularly scathing of the traditional view of the French Revolution's place in modern thought as being a huge leap forward for humankind. Rather, it was founded on muddled thinking, largely theoretical in nature, and hence untroubled by real world practicality. Moreover, it was based in a country that was unsuitable for such an experiment given the parlous state of its economy, industry and government. One might counter fiat revolutions rarely prosper in countries

without these attributes, but that would serve to vindicate Padfield's point. States that possess sound finance and progressive economies, are open to trade (in goods and ideas), and the rule of law will inevitably prosper and revolutions will not be required or develop. In the case of France and its epochal and eponymous "revolution," the result was despotism grimmer and more complete than anything the hapless Bourbons could contemplate. The states that are the mirror image of this unhappy picture are Great Britain and her unruly offspring, the United States. It is the British triumph in the Napoleonic Wars that is the subject of this book - a triumph made possible by her virtually unbroken string of naval victories over France and her allies.

Padfield makes it quite clear where his sympathies lie and readers who might prefer a gentler reading of the joys of government activism, bureaucratic control, and the imposition of official views and "right thinking" may prefer to review the naval history of this period elsewhere. For the rest, Padfield is an entertaining and perceptive guide. His descriptions of the various naval actions - commencing with The Glorious First of June, 1794 and ending with Trafalgar in 1805 are vigorous and compelling. From there the more grinding, but ultimately decisive, aspects of blockade and counter-blockade, and Napoleon's doomed Continental System are described, as well as a pair of chapters on the "unnecessary" War of 1812. While the book's title proclaims the end of the study is 1851, detail is thin on anything after the Napoleonic period. Passing reference is made to the Royal Navy's largely unsung suppression of the slave trade in the decades immediately after the war and of the trade war with China known as the First Opium War, but one would look in vain for references to the War of Greek Independence, or to the Battle of Navarino - the last sWp-of-the-line engagement.

Instead, the book's last chapter is a summing up of the themes introduced in the beginning, with the bookend year of 1851 representing Britain's apotheosis at the Great Exhibition. It is a wide-ranging examination of what made Great Britain different and so dramatically successful in this period. A success, it likely need not be noted, that was made possible by the triumphs of the Royal Navy, and the sheer robustness of Britain's economy, her finances, her inventiveness, and her political freedoms.

What does Padfield have to say to Canada (or to Great Britain, the United States, or any other country for that matter) in the early years of the twenty-first century? Without wanting to spoil the journey for those who choose to take it, Padfield's research has led him to the conclusion that a more limited form of government is to be preferred, one with appropriate checks and balances, transparency

and oversight of its activities, and that Adam Smith's identification of the "invisible hand's" role in ensuring the greatest happiness for the greatest number through simple self-interest, industry and opportunity, is the correct one. Politics that prefer the guidance of a self-appointed elite to settle such matters as to what, where, how, when and why, will almost certainly prosper not at all, particularly in the long run, and will suffer a "democratic deficit"

It is not difficult to commend this book. It is well written. It describes its subject well and has made use of much recent scholarship in so doing. It also presents its thesis in a compelling, wide-ranging, and gripping manner. More than the mere prosperity of England's shopkeepers rested on the salt-streaked and battered hulls of the Royal Navy's warships. The future of freedom itself and the shape of the modern world was equally at stake, even if its participants had but the faintest idea of what the long-term effects of their ultimately successful and triumphant labours would be.

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Joseph P. Slavick. *The Cruise of the German Raider Atlantis*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, [VAvw.NavalInstitute.org](http://www.navalinstitute.org) 2003. xv + 260 pp., photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US \$ 32.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-537-3.

The remarkable wartime voyage of the raider *Atlantis* is a case of truth being stranger than fiction, though indeed much fiction has surrounded the tale from the very beginning. Since her commissioning in the German navy on 19 December, 1939, until her sinking in the South Atlantic by British cruiser HMS *Devonshire* on 22 November, 1941, the exploits of this 7,862-ton armed auxiliary cruiser - the former Hansa freighter *Goldenfels* - were rooted in deception, disinformation and ruse. That was the very nature of this unique type of cruiser warfare, in which heavily-armed former commercial vessels roamed the seas under various disguises, luring unwary merchant ships to their destruction or capture. *Atlantis* is arguably the most famous of the nine such vessels in German service.

Disguised as the Dutch *Abbekerk*, the Norwegian *Knute Nelson*, the Japanese *Kasii Maru* and others, *Atlantis* pursued her goals: high-seas raiding of Allied shipping, disruption of the enemy, and intelligence-gathering. Harmless-looking whatever her disguise, she packed a punch with weapons ranging from six 15-cm (5.9-inch) guns, to torpedoes, mines, and a Heinkel seaplane. In a record-breaking voyage that covered 622 continuous days at sea, *Atlantis* steamed 110,000 miles around

the world, sank sixteen Allied merchant ships for total of 145,697 tons, and captured six others. After her loss, her crew sailed some 1,000 miles in lifeboats; some of them endured almost 5,000 miles in the submarines that rescued them. Her skipper, Captain Bernhard Rogge, emerges from a variety of accounts as a highly competent and honourable seafarer, an astute tactician and compassionate leader, a man of probity and courage with a strong sense of duty.

The *Atlantis* story first appeared in 1944 as an illustrated book by one of the ship's officers, Ulrich Mohr. American versions followed in 1956 and 1975, but the personal account of the ship's captain, Bernhard Rogge, remains the most memorable. Written with pulp-trade author Wolfgang Frank, it appeared in 1955 when Germany had been without a navy for a decade, and was now building the new Federal German Navy. (Highly decorated for his exploits, Rogge returned to service in 1957 in the rank of admiral). Entitled *Schifflo* - the code designation for the *Atlantis* - the memoir offered a unique and balanced perspective, limited only by the author's memory, and his co-author's imagination. It enjoyed a second printing that year, and a third in 1968. American pulp versions appeared in 1955, 1957, and 1979. Retold in articles and books by other writers - German, English, American - it became a Paramount movie in 1968.

Joseph P. Slavick now gives us the first comprehensive version. He does so by drawing on a variety of primary and secondary sources, many of which were unavailable to the early writers. In crisp and vivid language, his linear narrative largely follows the captain's memoir, but frequently includes the all-important perspective from "the other side of the hill." Thus Slavick weaves a tale consisting of various important threads, both German and Allied, as well as eye-witness accounts. The result is a highly readable, entertaining and balanced reconstruction of an extraordinary naval enterprise.

Yet the book has disconcerting shortcomings, due largely to the author's unfamiliarity with the naval milieu. Striving for effect, he creates shipboard situations and relationships that will make mariners wince: the skipper works the engine room telegraphs, and is excused a grounding because he himself was not "at the helm;" excited lookouts leave their posts to rouse "the entire crew," and the officer-of-the-watch attempting to zigzag his ship away from enemy guns "directed the helmsman to continue to flee." When a storm is approaching Force 11 - storm force of 55-65 knots - we are told that "whitecaps" - not green seas - were breaking over the cruiser's bow. And when the dying ship is ablaze, flames are seen "peeking out from portals" (port holes?). Nor is the

author clear about German naval organization. For example, when speaking of orders from higher authority he frequently uses an incorrect German abbreviation to claim "the SKL" as the source. (It stands for *Seekriegsleitung*, or Ski.). With equal vagary, he elsewhere calls "SKL" either the "German Naval Command," "the High Command," or the "admiralty" instead of the correct Naval War Office. He sometimes misconstrues: Grand Admiral Raeder gets the imaginary rank of "Naval Supreme C-in-C," and we are told that Grand Admiral Doriitz worked at the '*Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote*' - which was his title (C-in-C, Submarines), not his place of business. Slavick's constant use of unexplained German terms - doubtless to give foreign flavour - is unhelpful. Just who or what one might ask, are *Steuermannsmaat* Rudolf, *Oberfunkgefreiter* Ernst, and *Stabsobermechaniker* Willi? Better simply to say "navigator's yeoman," "leading signalman" and "warrant engineer."

Still, the tale is so complete that the *Atlantis* story need not be rewritten. To that extent it is definitive.

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Max Reid. *The Arming of Canadian Merchant Ships in the Second World War*. Quoyon, QC: Chesley House Publications, [www.chesleyhouse.com](http://www.chesleyhouse.com), 2003. vii + 156 pp., photographs, illustrations, bibliography, appendices, index. CDN \$20.00, paper; ISBN 0-9693580-9-1.

The wartime service of Canada's merchant mariners has finally gained a little public attention during the past decade - deservedly so! Serving alongside of them, sharing the same hazards, and same lack of post-war recognition, were the naval and military forces who manned the ship's armament: the "DEMS" (Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships) gunners and signalmen. In his earlier *DEMS War* (Ottawa: Commoners' Publishing Society, 1990), Captain Max Reid summarized the DEMS effort. His new book, co-published by the Royal Canadian Naval Association/Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships Branch, both expands and complements the earlier work. Reid is a former DEMS gunner, and his first-hand knowledge of both DEMS and the Canadian merchant marine is obvious.

The DEMS programme was a sizeable undertaking. Reid estimates that the cost of the armament for a Park ship was about eight percent of the total cost: fully equipped, she would mount a 4-inch gun aft; a 12-pounder forward; rocket launchers; and 20-mm Oerlikons - all made in

Canada - by companies that included Bata Shoe, Massey-Harris and the Canadian Pacific Railway plus several penitentiaries. The personnel were a mixture of army (in June 1944, there were roughly 14,300 in the British Maritime Royal Artillery alone), Royal Marines, and sailors from the various Commonwealth navies. Nearly 2,500 Canadians were involved.

Although he has not written a large book, the author has still managed to cover all the key points, with background material sufficient to allow even today's general reader to follow along. There are chapters devoted to the DEMS weaponry, the people and their training and how the scheme was organised. The human element is not neglected-the small selection of first-hand accounts adds a very personal insight into the routine aboard a wartime merchant ship.

Of particular importance are the nominal lists in the appendix - the results of what must have been many hours trying to decipher the handwriting on ship's agreements and crew lists. Reid lists all known Canadian naval personnel (2,368 ratings and 22 officers) who served in merchant ships; 18 soldiers who served in British coasters in April and May of 1940; 446 Commonwealth gunners in Canadian merchant ships; and the 29 Canadian DEMS personnel buried at sea during the war. There is also a list of all armed Canadian merchant ships, and a list of Canadian-registered ships sunk.

It is difficult to quantify the DEMS return on investment. In his concluding chapter, Reid suggests that the total RCN DEMS effort was the equivalent, in cost and personnel, of about twenty escorts. On the other hand, the fact that merchant vessels were armed did make it more difficult for the enemy to make his attacks. Moreover, being able to fight back was a tremendous positive factor on crew morale. The author notes that until the 1960s, the Navy kept up a small reserve of weapons for arming Canadian ships, and that even today, there are parts of the world where ships could benefit from being able to defend themselves. This reviewer thinks that Captain Reid is quite right when he says that "we may not have heard the last of DEMS" (90).

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Karl Heinz Marquardt. *The Global Schooner. Origins, Development, Design and Construction, 1695-1845*. London: Conway Maritime Press, [www.conwaymaritime.com](http://www.conwaymaritime.com), 2003. 239 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. £ 30.00, cloth; ISBN 085177-930-1.

Mr. K. H Marquardt is an internationally-known ship modeller and author of eight books, four about schooners, and that excellent comprehensive volume *Eighteenth-Century Rigs & Rigging*. His new book, *The Global Schooner*, is the result of twenty years' research.

Seven well-documented chapters describe the schooner's origins, different types, uses and armaments, while four appendices provide the dimensions of timber, masts and spars, and rigging dimensions for different types of schooners and boats. In the introduction, the author holds that two questions need to be answered: first, what is a schooner; and second, where did its name originate? Falconer's 1769 *Universal Dictionary of the Marine* defines a schooner as a small vessel with two masts with sails suspended from gaffs. Some hold that the rig was an American invention for coastal vessels but the author disagrees.

In Chapter 1, "Origin of Schooners," Marquardt claims that in 1526, a Spanish mariner was the first European to observe the rig of two raking masts each wearing a triangular sail, on a balsa raft off Peru. A Dutch seaman reported seeing a similar craft in the same area a century later. Dutch ingenuity adapted the rig for inland waterways although the Peruvian vessel's primitive centre boards may have also been the origin of the boards fitted to Dutch trading and pleasure craft. A 1629 yacht illustration shows the fore and aft rig with the fore mast being 7/10th of the main's length, as well as lee boards fitted to the hull. The gaff-rigged Dutch *boeijer* with lee boards is among several Dutch ancestors. England's King Charles II owned twenty-five sailing and yachts and William III, successor to James I, continued the practice. Wars with France stressed the need for fast-sailing craft to maintain connections between England and the Netherlands. In late 1695, the Chatham dockyard launched a new 300-ton royal yacht named *Royal Transport* designed by Admiral Osborne. The vessel's fore and aft masts, gaff-rig, and hull form made it the navy's fastest ship.

No draughts of *Royal Transport* exist, but the author prepared drawings of it from a contemporary model in the St Petersburg museum of a similar vessel from 1698 presented to the Russian Czar. Boston port records for 1716 mention a "schooner" for the first time and several years later, an American engraving of Boston shows a two-masted fore and aft rigged vessel. Most American-built schooners of the mid-eighteenth century were smaller than the *Royal Transport*, in the 10- to 46-ton range.

The author discusses the development of schooners, topsail schooners and sloops. I found his use of numerous examples to support his opinion that the schooner rig was first developed in Europe both convincing and well documented. Among these were the drawings in F.H. of Chapman's *Architectura*

*Navalis Mercatoria*, published in 1768, that show only the Bermuda sloop, English cutter, French tartane and Dutch fly boat wearing "schooner rigs." He considers claims that the name originated from the Dutch word *schorme* - meaning beauty or a gaelic expression to be remote.

The second chapter, "Yachts, Navy Sloops and Privateers" contains a wealth of historical and technical information including thirty-seven drawings. Tracing the development of schooner rigs, the author mentions that in 1699, eight 65-ton armed schooner-rigged vessels were on patrol off the Scottish and Irish coasts to prevent French supplies reaching Jacobite rebels. In the 1720s schooner rig was being fitted to sloops and by the 1730s, the sloops *Spence* (120 tons) and *Shark* (201 tons) were built for the British navy at Deptford and at Portsmouth with raked masts and gaffs. The arrival of the 36-ton Portuguese topsail schooner *St. Ann*, so interested Portsmouth naval authorities in 1736 that her lines and sails were recorded.

In 1764, the Navy Board first used the word schooner on the Navy List when it authorized the North American Station commander to acquire six sloops or schooners for the preventive service, all fitted with schooner rig. Two draughts from af Chapman's *Mercatoria*, numbers XLII and XL12 are of armed topsail schooner-rigged privateers. The draught of an early American privateer, *Berbice*, exists because she was taken into Royal Navy service in 1789. Draughts of later American vessels are in Steel's 1808 *Elements and Practice of Naval Architecture*.

The author has included descriptions and draughts of Samuel Bertham's experimental schooners *Millbrook* (125 tons) and *Net ley* (76 tons) built in 1797. Both had decks without sheer and a new method for securing beams, similar to that used in comparable French-built vessels. By 1812, American schooners had achieved such a reputation for speed and ability to sail closer to the wind that in 1813, the Swedish navy acquired one to use as model for new construction.

In Marquardt's third chapter "Coast Guard and Gunboats," thirty-eight draughts illustrate several uses of the schooner rig in customs vessels and minor power gunboats, the latter employed to guard suzerainty in confined waters. This usage may date from 1763 when the Governor of Quebec's concern about smugglers' activities prompted him to ask for naval assistance to enforce customs regulations. The Admiralty authorized the local naval commander to purchase six Marblehead schooners or sloops for customs service. In 1776, that fleet comprised twenty-four vessels, one of which was built at Boston. Denmark used similar gunboats to attack British and Swedish merchant vessels in the 1807 war.

In 1789, America's Congress established a revenue service, comprising ten 35- to 70-ton schooner-rigged vessels. During the war between Britain and France, seizure of American flag vessels in American waters by French privateers encouraged Congress to authorize the construction of nine 187-ton cutters and four frigates to maintain suzerainty in its waters. The text includes descriptions and drawings of three classes of revenue cutters designed by the American, U. Doughty.

In Chapter 4, "Merchantmen and Slavers," the author argues that the hulls of most schooner-rigged merchant vessels had forms similar to all eighteenth-century vessels. He refers to the use of swift schooner-rigged vessels in the fruit trade in the 1800s, and in the slave trade between Africa and Brazil. He tells an interesting story of the small schooners assembly, sent in frame to Australia in 1792, and the later construction of trading schooners, including the Tasmanian-built *Enterprize* that brought the first settlers to the Melbourne area. Not only was Marquardt's research instrumental in building a replica of *Enterprize* in 1996, it is his drawing of the vessel on the back of the Australian \$20. bill.

In Chapter 5, "Construction and Fitting," the author quotes eighty-five different sources for his detailed text. These include Bobrik, af Chapman, Falconer, Klawitter, Monceau, McKay and Steinhaus. The text covers the construction of all sections of a wooden vessel from keel to heads. He explains the differences used in scarfing of keels and stems used by English, Danish and French shipwrights. Six of the chapter's twenty-five pages describe steering gear for eighteenth century vessel that I found of special interest.

Marquardt provides the thirty-nine page chapter "Masts & Rigging" with some twenty drawings. His text includes parts of rigging and sails, and explains the purposes of such items as "hounds" and "dabblers."

The book's seventh chapter, "Anchors, Boats and Other Furniture" describes the types of anchors used by eighteenth century and earlier vessels and the rules for determining weights and types. In addition, it includes other fittings from binnacles to windlasses. In ten pages with seven drawings, the writer describes the ordnance appropriate to schooner-rigged vessels and the Danish, English and French methods of arming. Four appendices provide dimensions of timbers for merchant and light craft employed between 1768 and 1858, masts and spars, rigging, including blocks, and boats and oars.

Marquardt's book, with its wealth of information and drawings will be a master work about schooners and a "diamond mine" for model makers and researchers. I learned so much. My only