

## BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Key Divergences Between English and American Law of Marine Insurance*. Centreville, Maryland: Cornell Maritime Press, 1999. xxxi + 185 pp., tables, notes, bibliography, index. US \$40.00, cloth; ISBN 0-87033-522-7.

Marine insurance law is easily one of the most important, yet complex areas of maritime law. Marine insurance itself is an ancient institution and has evolved over time as a service to domestic and international maritime trade. As a result there is a high degree of uniformity in this law, mostly inspired by the venerable UK Marine Insurance Act of 1906 (6 Edw. 7, ch. 41, § 1). This legal instrument has long served as model or source for marine insurance law in the Commonwealth and almost everywhere else, including the United States. Much of the maritime underwriting incorporates directly or indirectly, the spirit, rule and experience with applications of provisions of the Act.

Given the importance and prevalence of uniformity in great part, it is particularly interesting to see a book that examines in a comparative manner the differences (occasionally divergences) between UK and US maritime law. Both states are major maritime powers and trading partners with a rich maritime law. In this respect there are significant similarities in how interests in maritime adventures are underwritten. Whereas the UK has a dedicated statute, the US has no federal marine insurance statute. But the US is a federal state, whereas the UK is unitary, and this constitutional difference has indeed provided the context for an anomaly in US maritime law. In general, the US, like Australia and Canada, has a maritime law which is federal, although admiralty jurisdiction may be concurrent with provincial or state courts. In the case of marine insurance, however, the US Supreme Court in *Wilburn Boat Co v Fireman's Fund Ins Co* (201 F2d, 5th Cir 1953) preferred to treat marine insurance as "insurance", which is a state

prerogative, rather than as a "marine" institution that would have pertained to matters of commerce and navigation, i.e., a federal prerogative. The danger here has been that legal development of marine insurance law at the state level has threatened uniformity within the country, let alone at the international level. Interestingly, a similar case by the Supreme Court of Canada (*Zavarovalna Skupnost Triglav v. Terrasses Jewellers*, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283) was decided in favour of federal jurisdiction, thus preserving the unity and uniformity of Canadian maritime law.

Schoenbaum's book looks at *Wilburn Boat* and subsequent practice in the US with a critical eye. The discussion is enriched by a comparative analysis focussing on jurisdictional and definitional considerations, formation of the contract of marine insurance, the duty of utmost good faith and warranties. The author does indeed identify some significant differences in practices between the UK and the US, especially the state of Florida (e.g., because of this state's Direct Actions Statute, enabling a victim in a third party liability suit to proceed directly against the insurer). There are also differences in the strict application of the doctrine of utmost good faith and consequent warranties in the UK, and the US approach to consider the due diligence of the assured.

The discussion in the book carefully explores causes for the divergences and in a law reform tradition proposes possible solutions, especially an American Marine Insurance Act parallel to the UK counterpart. The hope behind the proposal is a return to uniformity in Anglo-American marine insurance law but with modernized principles. The American prescription is contingent on a parallel law reform effort at the UK end in terms of updating the Marine Insurance Act. To conclude, the author puts forward an interesting recommendation in support of the establishment of a Joint Marine

countries. This last recommendation is intriguing as it would make more sense, in the interests of global uniformity, for such an initiative to be launched through the International Maritime Committee/Comité Maritime International, a highly respected body with solid contributions to the development of international maritime law.

This is a relatively small book for the subject, and yet the author has managed not only to discuss complex legal issues, but also to introduce the law of marine insurance in a very readable manner, even for the layperson. At times, the writer steps back from in-depth comparative analysis to provide a textbook-like survey of an issue-area. As a result, this book has a wider appeal than the normal marine insurance work.

On the technical side, the book has good tables of cases and statutes that conveniently divide American and English sources. The book falls somewhat short on other matters. The index, with the paucity of keywords on less than a page, hardly does justice to the rich content of the book. Also, although containing an excellent list of secondary materials, the bibliography does not provide the full bibliographic citations normally expected of a scholarly work, such as details on the publisher and city of publication. It occasionally misses the full initials of authors, thus detracting from the expected consistency. Although these are minor faults, the mundane tasks of good indexing and full sourcing would have provided an appropriate finishing touch to what is otherwise a very good book.

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Michael Duffy and Roger Morriss, (eds.), *The Glorious First of June 1794: A Naval Battle and its Aftermath*, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2001, 179pp., illustrations, notes, index, £14.99/US\$24.95

This book is the result of a conference

devoted to one naval battle, and it is a model of its kind. The editors are of course old hands at this sort of thing. Michael Duffy, who as editor of the *Mariners Mirror* became friend and confidant to so many naval and maritime historians, was the editor of the proceedings from another ground breaking conference *Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850* (Exeter, 1992). Roger Morriss, one of those productive naval and military historians - a veritable North Atlantic triangle of scholarship - from Ian R. Christie's graduate seminar in the 1960's at King's College, London, is one of the foremost authorities on the Royal Navy during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Both these fine historians teach at that relatively new and highly successful centre of naval history, Exeter University, in Devon, England.

Admiral Lord Howe earned his exceptional measure of trust on the lower deck of the Royal Navy over a long career, particularly while in command of the Channel Fleet in 1793-4, and after his famous victory on "The Glorious First of June", a battle so named because it was too far from land to associate with any landmark. It was in fact a series of encounters, by the fleet under Howe's command, with a French fleet of similar strength under Admiral Louis-Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse, a running battle that began on the 28<sup>th</sup> of May and culminated on the first of June 1794. It became one of the pillars of the British naval tradition. John Knox Laughton, the single most influential figure in British naval history during the late nineteenth century, "was prepared to sacrifice patriotic exhortation on the altar of historical evidence" and took aim at both John Jervis and Howe - each of them, Jervis at Cape Vincent, and Howe on the Glorious First of June had "bungled his battle" (to use D.M. Schurman's phrase) - and if Laughton's successors did not completely follow his lead this collection of papers and documents suggests that there are grounds for criticising Howe, partly when looking at the actions of Rear Admiral George Montagu that brought an end to that officer's sea-going career, partly when looking at the French celebrations following the

battle. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse did what he was supposed to do, ensure the safe arrival of a vital convoy by preventing its interception by British naval forces. Moreover the French, who sailed under the banner "*Marins, la republique ou la mort*" and suffered dreadful casualties (one ship sunk and seven captured) although relatively inexperienced and untrained, fought with great valour.

The contribution by André Delaporte, written while he was Chief of the historical section of the *Service historique de la Marine* at Vincennes, places the battle firmly in context : "Howe had doubly failed, as he neither succeeded in destroying the naval power of the Republic, nor in capturing Vanstabel's convoy, which was a considerable tactical failure in view of Britain's command of the sea"(22). The discussion takes off from this point, enhanced by the selection of documents from British naval sources (French documents would have been useful as well) that allow the reader not only to see exactly what orders were given to Howe but to read what key witnesses, especially the artist Nicholas Pocock (the first officially commissioned war artist?) Had to tell us about the battle. Pocock's notes and sketch book make this perhaps the only eighteenth century naval battle carefully documented by an unbiased witness. The importance of this is clear from Richard Harding's comment that "... in some of these battles crucial movements are guesswork or supposition." (cited in Gardner, *Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra*, (Annapolis, 1999), 90) There is no guesswork for the Glorious First of June.

Duffy, Morriss and Christopher Ware demonstrate this in excellent analytical articles on the battle and the failure to intercept the convoy. Lawrence Evans, who unfortunately did not live long enough to give his paper (it was read by Roger Knight), adds an important dimension by questioning, on sound evidence, the strategic value of the convoy itself. Peter Van der Merwe and Barbara Tomlinson round out the volume with two delightful papers on the art and the memorials inspired by the battle.

This is a thoroughly good read if a little pricey. Force your local library to procure a copy.

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Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., *Shield and Sword – The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001.xxi + 517 pp., maps, illustrations, photographs, tables, notes, bibliography, index. US \$36.95, cloth; ISBN 155750-485-7.

Marolda and Schneller's book is an authoritative review and analysis of the actions of the US Navy during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. The author's aim is clearly to engage the reader in a comprehensive chronological history of the events from 2 August, 1990, through to May 1991, from the viewpoint of US (and allied) naval forces involved. The emphasis is on comprehensive and in-depth analysis and history. The reader comes away feeling considerably more informed on just what the US Navy did in what was largely seen by the public – through a media eye – as an air war, with a supporting act in the finale from ground forces. Thus the authors succeed in their purpose of writing this book.

The book begins before the outbreak of hostilities with a short section summarising the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990. This important section then leads to discussions of the immediate and short term international reaction to the invasion and the *Desert Shield* period. This begins the first substantial portion of the text, which goes into very significant detail about naval operations during the period of 7 August, 1990, through to 17 January, 1991. Everything is covered, from the nature of sanctions enforcement operations through to the establishment of naval command and control hierarchies and inter-service management of roles and missions, which clearly generated some problems from the outset.

The analysis moves from the high strategic level in the White House and the Pentagon down through the operational level from CENTCOM command centres in Riyadh and at sea aboard USN flagships to the tactical level from the viewpoint of individual ships and units involved in operations.

The section on naval aspects of *Desert Shield* is long – though very interesting. There is a good deal of analysis on logistical operations and the immense task of deploying large numbers of ground force units from bases in the continental United States and Europe into the Middle East. But the section prepares the reader for the main part of the book that looks at naval operations during the outbreak of offensive military operations by the Coalition during Operations *Desert Storm* and *Desert Sabre* (the ground war).

From the first Tomahawk cruise missile fired from USN vessels to the last shot fired before a ceasefire came into effect, Marolda and Schneller treat the reader to a first-hand account of war from the naval perspective. It quickly becomes clear that the US Navy and US Marine Corps contribution to Coalition operations during the Persian Gulf War was far more than a mere supporting role. Marolda and Schneller take the reader on to the decks of aircraft carriers as wave after wave of aircraft are launched, into the cockpits of those aircraft as they fly their missions, onto helicopters attacking Iraqi shipping and landing special forces on Iraqi islands. Their analysis of the challenges of operating in a truly joint and coalition environment is first class, with extensive consideration for command and control challenges.

Unlike many other historical accounts of the Persian Gulf War, *Shield and Sword* seeks to take the reader beyond the end of the war, to explore the Navy's on-going role once hostilities had been concluded at 0800 local time on 28 February, 1991. This section includes support for Operation *Provide Comfort* and continues into the Navy's role in post-war military attacks on Iraq in 1993. and the precautionary deployment

of forces in response to Iraq's massing of forces along the Kuwaiti border in 1994. The book concludes with an excellent summary section which analyses the main issues and 'lessons learned' from the naval perspective. This section should be required reading for those wishing to understand the relevance of seapower within the joint or coalition environment.

*Shield and Sword* is an excellent study in modern naval warfare in what most analysts conclude is the likely model for large scale high intensity warfare in the future. Specifically it highlights the key issues arising in coalition operations against a regional adversary equipped with modern capabilities. It demonstrates the challenges of operating in the littoral environment. It makes clear the difficulties that remain in undertaking joint operations – particularly from a US perspective. Above all, it makes clear that in spite of airpower being seen as 'decisive' in bringing the war to a successful, and low cost, conclusion, seapower is still vital if military force is to be used effectively to counter threats to national security. The current debate over the importance of an increasingly airpower orientated military, that is focused on minimal or zero cost 'post-heroic' warfare – as was seen in Kosovo in 1999 – needs to consider the value of seapower as an enabling capability. Marolda and Schneller make this case superbly well. *Shield and Sword* should be on the bookshelves of any student of modern military affairs.

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A.J. van der Peet and R.D.H. van Velden, *Rotterdam in Veelvoud. Illustere Marineschepen*. The Hague: Instituut voor Maritieme Historie, 2000. 104 pp., plates, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 90-6707-531-0.

J.M. Mohrmann, *Marine-torpedodienst, 1875-2000*. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2000.

176 pp., photographs, plates, illustrations, diagrams, tables, charts, notes, index. ISBN 90-6707-517-5.

In 1998, the amphibious Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Hr.Ms. *Rotterdam* was commissioned by the Royal Netherlands Navy to be used by the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. This is a most appropriate name for an amphibious ship. The marines are nicknamed the 'black devils of Rotterdam' and between the marines and the city of Rotterdam a long-standing relation has developed. For over two centuries, the marines' boot camp has been situated in Rotterdam. During the German attack in May 1940 on the bridges over the Meuse River in the heart of Rotterdam, the marine training battalion defended the city.

As is the custom in the navy, the ship was provided with a copper plate with its name, predecessors and some of the vicissitudes of those predecessors. The Institute of Maritime History of the Navy Staff did some research into all of the former navy ships that were named 'Rotterdam'. Although such research had been carried out in the past, this time many more ships were discovered bearing the name Rotterdam. After some painstaking research, 25 ships emerged named in some way or another as 'Rotterdam'.

The authors have not restricted themselves to describing the ships and their adventures, they have placed the ships in their historical contexts. The concise outline of the maritime conflicts since 1568 until the Napoleonic time and a brief sketch of the tasks of the Royal Netherlands Navy since 1815 forms a suitable background for the course of the ships' lives.

Although this booklet for the Navy and Hr.Ms. *Rotterdam* would make a good PR present, this publication has a value in its own right as a maritime historic study and it forms a useful addition to the existing literature on Dutch navy ships.

In 2000, it was 125 years ago that the Royal Netherlands Navy established its own

naval torpedo service, the Marine-topedodienst. Nowadays most of the different branches related to the use of torpedoes have been phased out and have been taken over by the weapons-engineering branch.

During the last hundred years or so the application of the torpedo have dramatically been altered in the course of which the emphasis changed from sinking surface ships to mainly an anti-submarine weapon. Technologically, torpedoes evolved from completely mechanical devices to entirely digital state of the art lethal guided missiles.

Mainly because of the secrecy and mystery surrounding this weapon, until now no overall history has been written about the naval torpedo service. Former torpedo officer LTZ 1 b.d. J.M. Mohrmann picked up this challenge and produced a down-to-earth coffee-table book without any academic pretensions. It is a nicely illustrated book with a lot of detailed information. For instance, in the Netherlands, the torpedo was introduced first by the army and only later adopted by the navy. About one-third of the book comprises appendices on ships used for maintaining and testing torpedoes, all the torpedoes used by the Royal Netherlands Navy, all ships, helicopters, submarines and aircraft armed with torpedoes and a selection with trials and failures.

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James W. Essex, *"Mutiny": The Odyssey of HMCS Uganda*. Cobalt, Ontario; Highway Book Shop Publishers, 2000. ix + 139 pp., photographs, plates, prints, index. CDN. \$38.00, cloth; ISBN 0-88954-417-4.

It is maybe unfortunate that Essex chose for his lead title "Mutiny", as that simply perpetuates a too often perceived and repeated calumny that the RCN's first true cruiser left the final battles for the Japanese home islands due to a mutiny. She did not. there was no vestige of a mutiny.

She left the British Pacific Fleet at the end of July, 1945 as a result of political opportunism in Ottawa. In fact, due to hard fighting and steaming, she was about due to depart anyway for a badly needed refit for her 6" guns which due to wear would only fire at about 80% of their designed range and her boiler tubing was failing. Her speed on the way home to Esquimalt was a modest 18 knots compared to her previous sessions at over 30.

*Uganda* went home because 625 of her personnel, almost 70%, in an open vote mandated by the Defence Department in Ottawa and slightly amended by the ship's commanding officer, Captain E. Rollo Mainguy, signed a printed form announcing that they did "not volunteer for service in the war against Japan... or in the Pacific Theatre..." [104]. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, concerned with the potential of a very negative Quebec reaction to Service personnel continuing their service after the war in Europe ended in May, 1945, and looking for the Servicemen's and their families' support, insisted that the Cabinet pass the regulation that all those going to the Pacific Theatre of operations must specifically volunteer for that continuing service, including Regular Force personnel. This was done on April 4th. This policy, when word of it reached the fleet through news media, not only antagonised most of the loyal and dedicated RCNR and RCNVR seamen and many officers, all of whom had initially volunteered "for the duration", no strings attached, but put them in a most invidious position. In particular those who had been away from home for five years and more, exposed to the dangers of the Atlantic battle. If their wives and families heard that given the opportunity to return home, even for embarkation leave, they had volunteered for what might be another year or more away, the effect on those families could have been catastrophic. The Navy Minister, Angus L. MacDonald resigned over the issue and the order was passed out to all ships by the new King appointee, Douglas Abbott.

In addition to this perceived

unnecessary agreement, there were already more minor but very real problems in the ship. A request to identify *Uganda* as Canadian despite her name by painting a maple leaf on a funnel, like most RCN corvettes, frigates and destroyers, was refused; a Canadian jack for the foc's'le was never provided; the food was largely based on British supply, and too often of very poor quality, when USN food was readily available and on offer from their excellent Fleet Train. Again, refused.

So to the considerable surprise of Captain Mainguy and the fury of his executive officer, Commander Hugh Pullen, most of the crew, given the free vote, opted to not serve further. With that result reported back, the ship was ordered home after several weeks of bombarding Japanese held islands and fighting off *Kamikaze* air attacks.

This book is really the story of Chief Petty Officer Jim Essex's time in *Uganda*, from her acceptance into the RCN during a refit in Charleston, S.C., in June, 1944. He covers in the first 25 pages his career in the Navy up to that time, and the book is well illustrated with many of his own snap shots. His narrative tends to jump about a bit - previous service in the Pacific in the AMC HMCS *Prince Robert*, his training as a radar operator - and his descriptions of the policy crisis that lead to the unfortunate "volunteering" requirement is interspersed with vignettes of the ship's actions in the theatre. The narrative suffers from a lack of careful editing by a knowledgeable naval editor, and even a publishing editor, for there are quite a few annoying mistakes: throughout the narrative the use of RCN(VR) and RCN(R) for RCNVR and RCNR (in that time period); *Kings Rules and Admiralty Instructions* for Kings Regulations; Cdr(E) Elliott credited with an OBE not gazetted until mid-June, 1945; the use of the American term "battlewagon" for HMS *Rodney*; the sinking of *Prince of Wales* in 1941 by *Kamikaze* rather than just air attack, three years before the *Kamikaze* arrived on the scene. Some nicknames are italicised, others are not, and there are a few cases of duplication of stories that an editor

should have picked up.

But on the whole, a worth while addition to a Canadian naval bookshelf, giving a very valid picture of not only a naval seaman's wartime career but the problems caused in the ship by political expediency, one hopes as an object lesson for the future. Jim Essex is also the author of the excellent book on the U-boat battles in the St. Lawrence, *Victory in the St. Lawrence* (Boston Mills, 1984).

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Gordon Bell( ed.). *We Went Where They Sent Us and Did As We Were Told (Most of the Time)*. Lantzville, British Columbia: Oolichan Books, 2000. 290 pp., photographs, plates, documents. CDN \$39.95, paper; ISBN 0-88982-194-1.

The theme of this handsome book is to provide a cross-section of the personal experiences of average Canadian participants in the Second World War. There are almost 150 different entries, providing a broad selection of incidents for readers interested in the human dimension of the war. Beyond their war experience, the only other common theme in these accounts is that the authors (for autobiographical accounts) or subjects (for biographical sketches written by the editor, friends, or families of the subjects) all either served as Canadians in the war or came to live in Canada after the war. The diversity to be found in Canada's population is therefore well demonstrated. Accounts by veterans who served in the Polish, German and British forces are well represented in addition to those born and raised in Canada.

The stories told by (or about) the veterans attest to the infinite variety of wartime experience. Many note the grim and brutal side of the war, but humour and compassion are found in most, if not all, the accounts. The first recollection, written by a Polish veteran who fled his homeland after the brutal German invasion, then served with the British Army in North

Africa, and ended up with the RAF as a fighter pilot (surviving the torpedoing of his merchant ship en route England) sets an appropriate tone for the volume. Few subsequent accounts can match the breadth of this man's wartime experience.

The book is organized into fourteen different sections. The main criteria for the sections is geographical, with accounts and incidents from the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Africa, Italy, Canada, England, Germany and the Pacific. In addition there is a section devoted to the opening days of the war, and several on battles or campaigns: Battle of Britain; Dieppe; and the Liberation of Europe. Finally, there are sections on prisoners of war and a single story in the section entitled 'After'. This organization reflects the challenge of grouping such a diverse selection of accounts and anecdotes into meaningful order, and the final result is not entirely satisfactory. Nonetheless, readers will spend time with this book not for the flow of the volume but for the quality and interest of the different entries.

One of the best aspects of this book are the pictures, drawings and copies of documents that are found every few pages. Some of the pictures show authors as they are today, but most show them in as they were during the war. There are several letters written during the war that are copied verbatim in the original handwriting. These capture the period very well. One of the most poignant ones is the last letter home of a soldier killed as he drove across the Rhine river during the final push into Germany.

For the most part, the selections are worthwhile reading. There is repetition in some aspects of the accounts, not unsurprising given the focus on relating incidents that a general audience would find of interest regarding experience in the same war, but the editor has made a reasonable effort to minimize this aspect. The book is clearly written for a general and not an academic audience. Footnotes are rare and, when present, provide minimal information regarding sources. Several notes provide reference to a book that provides a fuller account

than that published in this volume, but the information provided is just barely enough to find these other works.

Readers interested in understanding the personal experiences of Canadians (and those who now live in Canada) will find this a very worthwhile book. It was designed to capture the experience of veterans before it is too late – we are now in the sixth decade after the war, and age is reaping its inevitable harvest. The Royal Canadian Legion is affiliated with the publication of this book, and the editor notes that proceeds from sales of the book will contribute to the Royal Canadian Legion's Senior Housing Program. The book and the cause it supports are both worthwhile.

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Lennarth Petersson, *Rigging Period Ship Models*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 118 pp., diagrams, index. US \$42.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-970-0.

The author sets out to show the rigging of a model of a 36-gun frigate HMS *Melampus*, 1785, explained by the need to provide him with answers to the apparent complexities of a fully rigged ship. He accomplishes this well in a book which other modellers will find useful. With the exception of a single page of text as its Introduction, the book's pages consist entirely of clear line drawings, at a suitably large scale, showing the details of every line used in the rigging of the particular model presently located in the Bristol Industrial Museum, and which is said to be a reliable representation of that used on the original ship, for which a brief history is provided.

There are several standard works on rigging to which the model maker may refer, such as *Steel's Art of Rigging 1818*, James Lees *The Masting and Rigging of English Ships of War 1625 – 1860*, and C. N. Longridge *The Anatomy of Nelson's Ships*, and the author

acknowledges their usefulness in the development of the present volume. This book is a useful supplement to them, its distinguishing feature being the clarity of the drawings which the author uses to isolate each line and demonstrate the true simplicity and utility contained in the visually complicated web of lines used to support the masts and yards and to control the sails on a square-rigged ship. Where Steel provides highly detailed lists of dimensions of rope and blocks, and provides text descriptions of the rigging of types of ships, and Lees provides a wealth of detailed text descriptions and drawings with valuable extensions to show how changes evolved over time, this particular book provides a companion to the details provided by Longridge for rigging HMS *Victory*, but does so in a series of pictures, not words, for a particular ship. It is probably coincidental that some of the drawings bear likeness to those by Longridge, but this would be an expected result from two gifted artist authors.

The book does not describe the dimensions or type of rope used. It does not describe how rope can be made, nor does it describe a sequence of rigging which a modeller might use to simplify the task of portraying the complex in miniature, other than that which is inherent in the location of the lines, such as the sequence of laying shrouds over the mast head. These subjects are justifiably excluded since there are several other publications which provide the necessary details.

The line drawings are excellent and show a combination of artistry and technical draughtsmanship which ensures success in achieving the aims of the author. There is a logical flow to the presentation of the drawings, starting with mast-supporting shrouds and stays, moving on to yard lifts, halliards, slings and braces, and then to sail control lines. Each page is limited to one or two illustrations, ensuring that excessive detail is excluded but ensuring the required context. The run of rigging is therefore clarified by isolating each control line. The Author includes clear illustrations of the specialized knots and blocks used at defined

locations on the masts and spars. Of particularly high quality are the drawings of the block and knot combinations at sail tacks. Where necessary there are short notes to explain special points and make reference to other drawings for further clarification. Of special interest are the locations of eyes fixed around the hull for belaying lines whose anchoring points are seldom obvious but for which advance knowledge can assist considerably in ensuring appropriate reinforcement is provided during the construction of the hull. These details supplement the belaying plans, which show anchoring points for lines not just at deck level but also in the tops. There are also several diagrammatic representations to ensure lines run fair.

While it would be advisable to make reference to the other specialized rigging books to ensure accuracy in rigging for another ship and era, this book is a valuable addition to the library in helping greatly to "clear the decks" and give a better understanding of the reasons for the complexities of rigging on a square rigged ship.

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Jean Merrien, *Histoire des Corsaires*. St. Malo, France: Editions l'Ancre De Marine, 2000. 239 pp., index. FF98, paper; ISBN 2-84141-156-7.

'In this work the author has sought to do as little "literature" as possible. The facts have sufficient flavour of their own.' So advises Jean Merrien in an initial warning before launching into his *Histoire des Corsaires*, a history of privateering from the middle ages to the nineteenth century. His point is well taken, since his adoption of a biographical approach allows him to present a series of characters, some swashbuckling, some more business-like, and the odd accountant, all of whom add a large helping of humanity to what is already an exciting topic.

To those seeking analysis whether

social, tactical or geopolitical, of the privateer and his impact on naval affairs, a word of warning - you will not find it here. *Histoire des Corsaires* is story-telling pure and simple, though there is something in the stories from which the historian can learn. For example, Merrien describes the privateer as a warrior who in some regards acts as a pirate, but who is not subject to hanging, a reasonable working definition. [9] He provides some basic rules privateers were generally expected to follow, such as the need to bring prizes into friendly ports while respecting the ships of neutral nations. [29] We discover the importance of the *armateur*, the individual who provided the privateer with the tools of his trade, as well as supplies, and then shared in the profits - if any. [50]

Still, many historians may be uncomfortable with the complete lack of footnoting or any other indication of the sources the author relied upon to tell his stories. How much of what appears in these pages is myth and legend? Such questions can only be answered through further research - perhaps some graduate student reading this review will be willing to take up the challenge.

Meanwhile, one can enjoy the stories and accept the author's commentary at face value, for the time being. Leaving the story of English privateers to others, Merrien focusses mainly on the French sailors who took letters of marque to conduct their semi-private wars against France's enemies. Occasionally, they were out of favour, especially under the centralizing Richelieu, who objected to the initiative they were allowed to wield, but for most of its history France favoured *la guerre de course* as official government policy. Vulnerable at many borders on land, this very continental nation, according to the author, could not make an ocean-going fleet a high priority.

Occasionally, Merrien looks further afield, as in his examination of the Barbary privateers (not pirates, as they had letters of marque from the Ottoman Empire, [58]), his look at the Dutch during their war of

independence (successful, according to Merrien, due to privateering, [56]), and, of course, the US' own separatist campaign, with John Paul Jones as the archetypal privateer of his age [157].

It all ended in the mid-nineteenth century. Britain, in the early days of the Crimean War, fearful that the US could provide privateering support to Russia and possibly strangle trade, proposed that *la guerre de course* be abolished [220]. The idea came to nothing at the time, but two short years later, in 1856, France, to maintain cordial relations with Britain, agreed in the Declaration of Paris that 'La course est et demeure abolie.' [221] The reasons why France agreed to such a course - if the reviewer may be allowed such an expression - is a topic requiring more research, but may well have been the result of the internal politics of Napoleon III's empire.

To conclude, Jean Merrien's *Histoire des Corsaires* is a highly readable book, though based on unknown sources, which has much to offer the historian willing to read it with a somewhat skeptical (though not cynical) eye.

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Raymond B. Lech, *The Tragic Fate of the USS Indianapolis: The Navy's Worst Disaster at Sea*. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001. 309 pp., illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. US \$18.95, paper; ISBN 0-8154-1120-0.

The tragedy of the USS *Indianapolis* has been the subject of many books since the 1950's and was brought to general public attention in the memorable soliloquy by "Quint" in the movie *Jaws*. Interest has remained unabated in the story of sailors attacked by sharks; Lech's book, *The Tragic Fate of the USS Indianapolis: The Navy's Worst Disaster at Sea*, is a reprint of an earlier 1982 publication. It is good that it once again appears on bookstore shelves.

To recan the story: USS *Indianapolis*

under the command of Captain Charles McVay, USN, was tasked with delivering the first atomic bomb to Tinian Island for its eventual delivery over Hiroshima. Due to the extreme secrecy surrounding the atomic bomb, much of its journey was unknown to US Naval Headquarters in the Pacific. After delivering the atomic bomb, *Indianapolis* was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine *I-58* on July 30, 1945. Those sailors that survived the sinking faced another danger: five days lost at sea. The survivors were frequently attacked by sharks. Finally, the survivors were rescued. In all, some 883 of the almost 1200 crewmen perished, either in the sinking or during the five days lost at sea. Captain McVay was the subject of a board of inquiry and his career was ruined.

Lech's book is a solid recounting of *Indianapolis's* journey, its sinking, the ordeal of its survivors, and the aftermath. Although accounts of this tragedy were published as early as the 1950's, Lech was the first to make use of then newly declassified documents. The result is an account that literally moves as fast as the sharks that attacked the adrift survivors while vividly depicting the chaos of the torpedo attack and the agony of the sailors at sea. Many vivid acts of heroism and other deeds are recounted. The efforts of the officers and crew of *Indianapolis* to maintain unit cohesion and discipline under unimaginable circumstances draw the respect of even the most cynical reader.

Certainly, Lech organized the narrative to emphasize the most human element—the struggle for survival. But the latter portion of the narrative dealing with Captain McVay's court-martial and subsequent clemency is equally well done. Lech portrays McVay as the innocent victim of a terrible situation: the US Navy could NOT let him off scot-free, but could not admit its own institutional negligence. Such monumental personages as Navy Secretary James Forrestal, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King, and Pacific Fleet Commander Chester Nimitz all take a spot in the drama. In the end McVay was convicted of failing to zig-zag his ship but was acquitted of negligence. He was sentenced to

lose seniority in both his temporary rank of Navy Captain and his permanent rank of Commander. Due to his outstanding service record, the Navy granted clemency and restored him to duty. That was not enough; McVay's navy career was ruined and he would be forever known in the public mind as "The Captain who lost his ship and caused his men to be eaten by sharks."

The scholar will delight in the appendices: sailing orders, routing instructions, organizational charts, and the testimony of Commander Hashimoto, skipper of the submarine that sank *Indianapolis*. (Hashimoto was found and taken to the court-martial venue. This in itself caused a controversy, as did the mere fact of the court-martial itself. Many thought, at the time, that McVay was being made a scapegoat for higher-up negligence. There is, it seems, nothing new under the sun.) Further appendices contain Inspector General's reports and press releases.) The bibliography contains a useful chronology of dispatches to/from *Indianapolis*. In short, the thoroughness of these materials adds to the narrative and makes it unnecessary for any but the most diligent reader to track down the original documentation.

In the last few months, this reviewer has seen two new books on the *Indianapolis* tragedy appear on bookstore shelves. It will be for book purchasers to decide for themselves which volume on *Indianapolis* suits their taste, but one cannot go wrong with Lech's book. It can easily stand on its own merits with any other account of this horrible twist of fate. It is recommended.

As a postscript: McVay was haunted for the rest of his life by the tragedy that befell his crew. He was respected in retirement, but the horror never left him. On November 6, 1968, after tidying his garden for winter, McVay shot himself. He was the last victim of a tragedy that went far beyond a failure to zig-zag a ship.

Robert L. Shoop  
Colorado Springs, CO

Dwight L. Smith, (ed.), *A Tour of Duty in the Pacific Northwest: E A Porcher and HMS Sparrowhawk, 1865-1868*. Fairbanks, Alaska: University of Alaska Press, 2000. xvii + 172 pp., maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$34.95, cloth; ISBN 1- 88996 3-06-2.

This lavish and skilfully edited book contains the journal and watercolour paintings of Commander Edmund Augustus Porcher RN while he was posted to the North West Pacific coast of Canada for three years between 1865-1868.

Britain had a long history of involvement in the North Pacific. Captain James Cook had explored the region in 1778 and the publication of his accounts increased British commercial interests. The crisis over Nootka Sound in 1790 had signalled the end of Spanish involvement in the region, however, the decline in Anglo-American relations leading to the War of 1812 and the continued strained relationship in the post-war period led to instability in the region. Furthermore, the valuable fur trade, whaling industry and the news that gold had been discovered in British Columbia provoked immense American interest and contributed to the formal establishment of a Royal Navy Pacific Squadron in 1837 and the beginnings of a naval base on Vancouver Island in 1855. It was to this base, at Esquimalt, which had become the headquarters of the RN Pacific Squadron in 1865, that Porcher and the *Sparrowhawk* were stationed. Porcher and his vessel were the very visible symbols of the global reach of British seapower, promoting and protecting British diplomacy, commerce and influence.

Porcher was the consummate Victorian gentleman and HMS *Sparrowhawk* was a typical Victorian Imperial gunboat. She was a steam/sail screw sloop of the *Wanderer* Class, laid down in 1855, and designed for coastal operations, specifically in the Baltic. Converted to a three masted barque in 1861 she had a complement of 90 and mounted five guns. For three years she served as the comforting symbol of British imperial protection on the Canadian

Pacific coast. Porcher entered the navy in 1837 and saw service in the East Indies, Mediterranean and the Baltic during the Russian War, 1854-1856. During these postings he made several scientific expeditions including examining Australia's Coral Reef and assisting archaeological excavations at Carthage and Cyrene in Libya. In these missions Porcher's skill as a watercolour and sketch artist provided visual records and displayed his knowledge of Classical history. He lectured to learned institutions after returning from his various expeditions and was keen to promote scientific investigation into a range of topics while he was at Esquimalt. As the official face of British power in the region he was a diplomatic and military representative as well as an integral member of the colonial community.

The journal presented here provides first hand evidence of the military and peaceful roles that a warship can perform through its very presence alone and the important role that an individual can play in the wider scheme of events. Isolated in a remote region, Porcher strove to 'do his duty' as a citizen of the British Empire at its zenith. His scientific mind ensured that his years in the Pacific would be recorded in great detail. For instance in describing the capabilities of the *Sparrowhawk* he meticulously records an average speed of 10.4kts, a consumption of 24 tons of coal a day which at full power would give a speed of 10kts and even the revolutions of the screw propeller. Porcher's mission involved him in a wide range of duties from social entertaining, to escorting colonial officials (on one occasion to Russian America), rescuing vessels and men in distress, carrying official dispatches and more general post, settling colonial disputes and even preparing to defend the region from Fenian threats. Of course the day-to-day naval duties of a warship continued and were recorded by Porcher; gunnery training, enforcing discipline, maintenance and victualling. The record of his varied duties, whether they were routine or ceremonial, provides an insight into colonial life at the edge of empire.

Smith's commentary and explanatory notes provide a helpful and informative guide to the narrative, utilising all available documentary sources including Admiralty files from the PRO to expand on the context of the journal and to confirm and clarify Porcher's account. However, despite the excellent text, the most immediately striking component of this book are the fabulous 54 watercolour illustrations which provide a visual record of the people, places and experiences of life at the very far flung edge of the British Empire.

Smith has plucked Porcher's journal from relative obscurity and placed it in an accessible and user friendly format which is now an important source for all scholars interested in the maritime history of the nineteenth century.

Martin Robson  
London, UK

Otto Erich Deutsch, *Admiral Nelson and Joseph Haydn*, Slinfold, West Sussex: Springfield Press, The Nelson Society, 2000. 169 pp., plates, illustrations, notes, appendices, bibliography, index. £21.45, cloth; ISBN 09537-200-0-4.

Thomas Blümel, *Nelson's Overland Return in 1800*. Slinfold, West Sussex: Springfield Press, The Nelson Society, 2000. 44pp., plates, illustrations, bibliography. £4.50 ISBN 0-9537200-1-2.

A major part of this book is a lovingly detailed account of musical life at the Courts of Central Europe in the age of the French Revolution. Its second strand is the overland journey made by Nelson and the Hamiltons from Trieste to Hamburg between August and October 1800. Nelson's brief contact with the eminent composer marks the intersection of these themes. Explaining his motives in writing this unusual work the author, who was an eminent Austrian musicologist and Anglophile, wrote, 'As an episode of interest in the life of Britain's greatest sailor and thus in the annals of Britain's

glorious history, it was thought worthwhile to throw full light on these sixty eventful days.' [142] The project began in 1929 when the author was asked for a short piece on Haydn's so-called 'Nelson Mass'. Research threw up such a quantity of neglected material that the wider scheme was adopted and, after varying fortunes, became a finished work by 1945.

Apart from an account of Count Batthyani's experimental vessel 'having machinery for working against the powerful stream of the rapid torrent' (of the Danube AWS) the trials of which were witnessed by an apparently unimpressed Nelson (pp 86-90), the real maritime interest of this book is the light it throws on Nelson's public character as a European hero and, above all, the extent of his domination by Lady Hamilton.

Having, at long last, resolved to return to England after his dalliance at the Court of Naples, Nelson requested passage in HMS *Foudroyant* but this was refused by Lord Keith who felt she might still be needed in the Mediterranean. Nelson rejected a smaller ship and so the overland journey in company with the Queen of Naples was planned. Nelson ashore and Nelson afloat might well have been two different men and the overland journey exposed him to public attention, not to say adulation, in a way that only highlighted the major flaw in his character.

Nelson was already popular in Austria after Aboukir and it was triumphal themes in the Mass Haydn was working on at the time that led to its later popular association with Nelson. The ties between the courts of Naples and Vienna paved the way for what turned into a virtual royal progress. (It was only because she came in company with the Queen of Naples that Emma was accepted in formal society.) Portraits of Nelson were soon on sale in Vienna. Two piano sonatas celebrating the Battle of Aboukir appeared, a distinguished orientalist wrote an Aboukir poem and a similarly inspired Latin work appeared in Hungary. Fashionable ladies wore 'Nelson bonnets', a 'Nelson topcoat' and anchor earrings. And all this before Nelson had

even set foot on Austrian soil!

The Nelson party (Nelson, Emma, Sir William Hamilton and their entourage) landed at Trieste on 1 August 1800, the second anniversary of Aboukir and, as they travelled towards Vienna, were met with every mark of honour. Emma was received as 'the unconsecrated consort of an uncrowned potentate' [76]. At Laibach a musical soiree was held and at Graz Nelson 'went into the street among the people and...most kindly satisfied their desire to see him' [70]. They reached Vienna on 18 August where Lady Minto, the British Ambassador's wife, commented on Nelson's habitual ribbons, orders and stars which he persisted in wearing even for his informal interview with the plainly dressed Emperor to the latter's embarrassment. The crucial meeting with Haydn, the *raison d'être* of Deutsch's work, took place at Eisenstadt in September 1800. Haydn as Court Musician arranged some celebratory concerts. He accompanied Emma's singing, set to music for her an English Nelson poem (the so-called Nelson Aria) and gave her the manuscript. He gave Nelson the pen he had used and Nelson gave Haydn his watch. Nelson plainly loved the adulation he received but perhaps outdid himself by presenting people with copies of the 'Aria' glorifying his achievements (p.114) and, when in Prague, he 'called more vociferously than usual for songs in his own praise' [132]. It is a sad picture and Emma must take much of the blame. 'She puffs the incense full in his face, but he receives it with pleasure and snuffs it up very cordially' [131]

Beautifully produced, fully sourced and with foreign language passages translated, it is essentially a book for Nelson enthusiasts to whom any crumb of detail is as gold-dust. To such readers, at £21.45, it is value for money.

Although it was Thomas Blümel who secured for the Nelson Society the right to publish the Deutsch text he still felt moved to write his own account of this hitherto neglected episode in Nelson biography. He travelled the route, examined the surviving records for himself

and has produced an attractively concise account for the general reader in which the smaller scale perhaps permits a sharper focus. *Nelson's Overland Return in 1800* is a well illustrated booklet that has maps and is strongly recommended.

Alan W. Smith  
Chigwell, UK

Ann L. Griffiths, Peter T Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett, *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*. Dalhousie University: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2001. x + 374 pp., notes, index. \$18.95, paper; ISBN 1-896440-33-9.

This book is the product of another in the series of maritime conferences held, this time in June 1998, by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Despite the title there are in fact two major themes coming out of this collection of essays.

The first is expected – namely the meaning and purpose of "gunboat" or, as it is more usually known these days, "naval" diplomacy – together with an examination of the manner and success in which this activity has been put into effect by the Canadians. Readers will find here a useful collection of articles which describe Canada's experience in naval diplomacy and which go on to speculate about the reasons for it. These range from a conscious desire to influence the perceptions and behaviour of larger and more powerful allies, first the British, then the Americans; to demonstrate that Canada has a right to be consulted; to back up wider Canadian peace support operations ashore and to serve Canada's economic interests. Perhaps amongst the most original and stimulating pieces in this part of the collection is Nicholas Tracey's account of the so-called Turbot War with Spain, in which naval activity is quite properly seen as but one aspect, important though it might be, of a variegated web of ocean management, fishery protection

and diplomatic tasks. The general conclusion is clear enough – naval forces have an inherent flexibility, both collectively and individually that makes them particularly suited for use as an instrument of diplomacy. They can sail into action relatively quickly, contribute immediately, and limit national liability by virtue of their easy "withdrawability" and limited footprint ashore. None of this is intrinsically very new of course. Moreover, as is the case with most other such studies, there is a marked tendency to avoid tackling the awkward questions that derive from this – namely how cost-effective is naval diplomacy, and how permanent are its effects? But the Canadian angle on all this is interesting.

This in fact takes us on to the second less clearly advertised theme of the book, namely what, if anything, is distinctive about the Canadian approach to naval diplomacy in particular and naval power in general? This collection of articles provides many fascinating insights into this question. The Canadian navy is shown to be the product of a largely continental nation, subject to a constant pattern of waxing and waning, conscious of its national dependence on a greater ally and torn between its desire to be an independent force on the one hand and a significant and recognised contributor to a collective effort on the other. What gives you more influence over the larger powers that shape your destiny – being a close and loyal ally, or being more of an independent actor?

What comes out of this discussion is the conclusion that the Canadian navy is unique and worth studying in its own right. This emerges in a different way from another essay in the collection as well, one that seeks to compare a number of medium navies (such as Argentina, India, South Africa and so on). The reader is left with the clear impression that it seems very difficult to make generalisations about medium navies that go much beyond banality. They are all unique and hard to compare. Perhaps, then, the academic industry of attempting to classify navies is misguided. Indeed, the whole approach of using real world examples to illuminate

concepts, instead of the other way around, sometimes seems "academic" in the worst sense of that word.

To summarise – one book, two major themes, both valuable, and the second – the distinctive Canadian approach to maritime power – especially interesting. My only serious complaint is the physical quality of the book itself Mine fell to pieces before I had finished reading it. The unfortunate consequence is that it is not going to have the shelf-life that most of its contents deserve.

Geoffrey Till,  
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John W. Lynn, *Confederate Commando and Fleet Surgeon: Dr. Daniel Burr Conrad*. Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: Burd Street Press (White Mane Publishing Co.), 2001. x + 197 pp., illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. US \$29.95, paper; ISBN 1-57249-220-1.

Daniel Burr Conrad (1831-1898), a surgeon in the United States and Confederate States navies lived in interesting times. A native of the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, Conrad attended the medical school at the Winchester Medical College and the University of Pennsylvania. In 1854, he earned a commission as an assistant surgeon in the United States Navy. He served in the USS *Congress* as part of the Mediterranean Squadron, and was later assigned to the USS *Plymouth*. His last assignment in the U.S. Navy was in the USS *Niagara*, which returned the first Japanese diplomatic entourage from Washington DC to their Asian homeland.

Shortly after the *Niagara's* return, the United States divided as the American Civil War (1861-1865) unfolded. After Conrad was unwilling to take an oath of allegiance to the United States government, authorities in Boston arrested him but Conrad escaped detention and headed South. He followed his native state into

the southern Confederacy and was awarded a passed assistant surgeon's commission. Drawn to Conrad's eventful life, dentist and historian John W. Lynn authored *Confederate Commando and Fleet Surgeon: Dr. Daniel Conrad* with the expectation that Conrad might now receive "the recognition that was due him" (p. 175).

Lynn concentrated on Conrad's war service, from the surgeon's participation in the first battle of Bull Run and detachment to army followed by his service in North Carolina and assignment to the C SS *Tennessee* during the battle of Mobile Bay. Following the war, Conrad served as a physician and superintendent at mental health hospitals in Virginia and as an allopathic practitioner in Missouri. In 1898, he returned home to Virginia and shortly thereafter died of a kidney ailment.

Unfortunately Lynn's effort has many flaws. For starters, the book is mistitled.

Conrad's medical support role in the night attack on the USS *Underwriter* on the Neuse River in North Carolina hardly rates the modern sobriquet "commando." Lynn also failed to provide details or context for Conrad as a nineteenth-century naval medical officer. In closing the effort, Lynn's endnotes and bibliography need editing.

In addition, the author claimed that

Conrad was a "pioneer in the infant science of modern mental health" (p. viii). There is no mention, however, of Conrad's medical writings, theories, students, teachings, lectures, positions held in national organizations and publications that might justify such a statement. Instead, Conrad wrote of his naval experiences and American Revolution era heroes. Likewise, Lynn, calls Conrad "one of three or four principal medical officers of the Civil War" (p. 175). Certainly, the surgeon's service to the

Confederate cause was heroic, but thousands of male and female healers served with the same valor on both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, Conrad held no high rank to influence naval medical policy. Therefore, the pronouncement of a Conrad being a principal medical officer is also

unsubstantiated.

The book is more than sixty- percent quotations. Most of the passages are taken from Conrad's daybooks and postwar articles, but the quotes also include letters, dispatches, and accounts written by Conrad's father and brother, physicians and fellow Confederates. Such a treatment leaves the biography one-dimensional with the author drawing upon a single source throughout much of the text.

Finally, there is a great deal of padding, such as extemporaneous sidebars of vessel histories and biographical sketches. Chapter four on a Confederate submarine operation does not even relate to Conrad's war experiences. Many of the forty-six illustrations are filler. Lynn is in possession of Conrad-related manuscripts, which together with the surgeon's writings, is the foundation for a lively article, but there is hardly enough material for a two hundred-page biography.

Benjamin H. Trask  
Williamsburg, Virginia

Arthur Nelson, *The Tudor Navy, 1485-1603: The Ships, Men and Organization*. London: Conway Maritime Press, (distributed by Naval Institute Press), 2001. 224 pp., maps, plates, photographs, diagrams, bibliography, appendices, index. U.S. \$56.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-816-X.

This attractive popular survey of the Tudor navy presents a visual guide to complement the text. The numerous black and white illustrations provide a picture not readily available from other works. Author Arthur Nelson served in the Royal Navy during WWII. His lifelong interest in the early English navy resulted in a volume worthy of his efforts. The survey of Tudor naval history with emphasis on selected engagements, is vividly written, though evaluations and conclusions by the author are not supported by

reference to sources consulted. There is a very brief bibliography of books only, unfortunately omitting standards such as David Loades, *The Tudor Navy* (1992).

The volume is divided into only two parts: six chapters on the early English navy through Elizabeth I, and eight chapters addressing specific campaigns: Cadiz, (1587), three chapters on the Spanish Armada, the Portuguese expedition, the last fight of the *Revenge* (1591), the last voyage of Drake and Hawkins, and the end of the dynasty, followed by an epilogue.

The historical summary in Part One provides a general survey of the Tudor "Navy Royal." The focus of part of the study is very much based upon the monarchy at the expense of other factors or forces. The opening chapter on the navy before 1485 identifies the major ship types from the Vikings to cogs, caravels and carracks. Henry VII receives credit for expanding the navy through the building of the great ships *Regent* and *Sovereign*, two other ships, the purchase of a ship and two Scottish prizes.

Henry VIII' s reign receives predictably more space and attention. The focus is on armament with numerous illustrations from his unfortunate *Mary Rose*, lost in 1545 while facing a French fleet in the Solent. The hull and contents were recovered by 1982 providing a rich collection of artifacts for study and illustrations for this volume. Nelson summarizes a great deal of information on Henry VIII' s navy which is often reduced to tables. There are 38 tables in the book. Examples include additions to Elizabeth's navy listed in a four-page table (Table 18), while the official list of Elizabeth's Fleet at her death (42 ships) appears in the Epilogue as Table 34.

The author takes considerable effort to identify the composition of the Navy Royal throughout the work, and to list ships by type, size and complement. This is a critical element in the discussion of naval power and conflict since the number, type, and size of ships is a principal factor in the explanation of the rise of

the Tudor navy.

Sir Francis Drake wildly successful raid on the Spanish fleet of about sixty ships at Cadiz in 1587 is singled out as is the dramatic action to capture the richest of prizes, the *San Felipe*, homeward bound from Goa. Drake was not well received at court, collected his prize money, and was dismissed. He had "singd the beard of the king of Spain," but only delayed the assembly of the Spanish Armada of 1588.

The chapters centered on the conflict with Spain form the core of the volume. "England Prepares" focuses on the steps taken to ready the Navy Royal for an engagement with the Spanish Armada. Chapter Nine, "The Channel Battles," recounts the engagements in the running conflict in the summer of 1588. The following chapter, "The Armada: Gravelines, Victory and the Aftermath," carries the story through the engagement off the Dutch coast in late July 1588 and the Spanish Armada's fateful journey around the British Isles to Spain. England's decision to attack while the Spanish fleet was out of action is surveyed in "The Portuguese Expedition" (misspelled on the Table of Contents page). A failure strategically and financially, it provided some small advantages to the English. It put greater pressure on Philip of Spain's resources, created unrest within the army and further reduced his naval stores.

Nelson's concluding segment is a trilogy of "lasts": The last fight of the *Revenge*, the last voyage of Drake and Hawkins, and the end of the dynasty. A discussion of the battle of the *Revenge* includes a reference to the American naval historian John Guttman's views on Grenville's charge through the Spanish line (190), but only Jon Guttham appears in the bibliography.

*The Tudor Navy* will not satisfy readers who expect primary sources behind every conclusion or full discussions of naval historiography. The virtues are in the succinct summaries and extensive illustrations. Drake

disclosed that half a victory in all martial actions could be won by the advantage of time and place. This timely and well placed volume succeeds to that degree.

Timothy J. Runyan  
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Stephen W.H. Duffy, *Captain Blakeley and the Wasp: The Cruise of 1814*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. xiv + 348 pp. illustrations, plates, notes, bibliography, index. US \$34.95, cloth: ISBN 1-55750-176-9

This first, full biography of one of the United States' most notable naval commanders, Johnston Bamey, is a welcome addition to the naval history of the early Republic and to the literature of the War of 1812 in particular. Barney went down with his sloop-of-war *Wasp* in 1815, and most of his papers went down with him. Still, with painstaking certainty, Mr. Duffy, an independent scholar and electrical engineer, has compiled a great deal of data and fashioned the whole into a serviceable biography and record of a unique naval career in the Age of Fighting Sail.

In 1814 Blakeley made an historic cruise to waters of the British Isles. He made a *swift* passage, encountered the *Reindeer* and the *Avon* of the enemy, and took both vessels. That episode, and the taking of two enemy vessels of similar size in a single cruise, is sufficient to give Blakeley's name a place in the history books. The action, as described, presents a picture of speed and destruction, and the author is good at explaining the face of battle. Blakeley, unlike some other American naval commanders, had no compunction about engaging the enemy closely. Blakeley had been a student at the University of North Carolina when duty called, and his well written reports provide an excellent source for the historian. Much additional material has been gleaned from memoirs and

British and American naval sources. War of 1812 enthusiasts will want this book for their collections and will find the treatment of the engagements to have authenticity. For myself, I found the book overly long, and, as with much history, too much evidence and fulsome detail tends to detract from the importance of theme and narrative. On the other hand, for those who want a comprehensive and exact recounting of Blakeley's career and the Wasp's stinging victories and fateful demise this book is beyond compare and is to be highly recommended.

Barry Gough  
Waterloo, Ontario

Ludovic Kennedy, *Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of Bismarck*. Annapolis, Maryland; Naval Institute Press, 2000 (original 1974). 230 pp., maps, photographs, endnotes, bibliography, index. US \$34.95, hardcover; ISBN 1-55750-472-5.

Much has been written of the pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck*, arguably one of the most fascinating naval actions of the twentieth century; yet all have their individual perspectives and positions. With this in mind, Ludovic Kennedy is no different from previous authors in his desire to tell his side of the story. However, he does it in a wonderfully uncomplicated way that is a pleasure to read, be the reader a professional or amateur historian. Written from the perspective of a young naval officer caught up in an incredible adventure, the author pragmatically relates the story of the short life of *Bismarck*. Commencing with her sailing from occupied Poland, in consort with the cruiser *Prinz Eugen*, through the on-again, off-again detection and tracking of her breakout into the Atlantic sea-lanes. He describes the emotion filled engagement with HMS *Hood* and HMS *Prince of Wales*, the almost frantic efforts by the British Fleet to stop her escape and the final

almost chivalrous, destruction by the Royal Navy ten days later.

The book is a reprint by the US Naval Institute Press under the guise of the *Classics of Naval Literature* series. Originally published in 1974, it is completely unabridged and only differs from the original with a new introduction by the author. True to the original, the book has extensive endnotes and an excellent bibliography. Handsomely bound in cloth, my only negative comment on the reprint is that the photographs are not as crisp as the original monograph.

To explain his story, the author succinctly describes the key players, both ships and men, and how they came to interact on the world stage. This account of the action appeals to all readers as it is completely self contained; one does not have to know anything of the battle to understand fully his story. Moreover, because he was a junior officer in the destroyer HMS *Tartar*, part of the pursuing British naval forces, his position as an eyewitness allows serious historians an unfettered glimpse into contemporary naval history. That said, because his account is concerned only with the pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck*, he does not delve into the why of certain decisions that are better explained in other, and more detailed, accounts of the action. Foreshadowing his calling as a writer and broadcaster, he masterfully weaves in the personal nature of this action, explaining how the death of his father influenced his appreciation of the situation when, as Captain of HMS *Rawalpindi* he was sunk by the German battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in 1939. He is most adept at describing why HMS *Hood* was so important and the full meaning of her loss to the British people.

I was impressed in the manner in which he recounted the battle, thirty-three years later, without displaying the overt hindsight that is so often prevalent in history written well after the fact. Having access to an impressive list of sources, he brings together heretofore-

unavailable information explaining how others contributed to the destruction of *Bismarck*, including the Americans who were neutral at the time. He astutely identifies Kapitän zur See Lindemann's inexplicable decision not to top up fuel as the key reason the British were able to catch *Bismarck*. Specifically, he quite reasonably surmises that had *Bismarck* seized the opportunity to fuel, with *Prinz Eugen* at Bergen, she would have not been forced to reduce speed. Thus, it is likely that she would have outrun the pursuing British naval forces and reached the safety of the Luftwaffe air umbrella off occupied France. But most importantly, he shows clearly how the destruction of *Bismarck* was only a matter of time, as this action heralded the beginning of the end of the battleship because aircraft had turned the most impressive of surface combatants into vulnerable targets that

needed air support for survival.

I think it fair to say that the author is completely captivated with anything to do with *Bismarck*. He freely admits that the six days of which he participated in the pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck* were the most exciting of his life; a most telling comment almost sixty years later. This passion flavours, but does not colour, the events he describes, which are related in a historically correct manner. Supported by simple, yet effective, charts of the action, this book describes one of the last classic naval actions and truly deserves to be included in the series of *Classics of Naval Literature*.

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