BOOK REVIEWS


This most recent collection of David Quinn's essays on the early European exploration and settlement of North America follows his Explorers and Colonies: America, 1500-1625 (London, 1990). Like its useful predecessor, European Approaches brings together Quinn's contributions to several disparate publications. Although most of the essays in the present volume have appeared in scholarly journals or conference proceedings since the late 1980s, that previous exposure does not detract from the usefulness of this book. The topics range from imagined Atlantic islands, to perceptions of American ecology, the French fur trade, the settlement of Bermuda, editing Hakluyt, and so on. All are in the Quinn style: methodical, thoughtful, and authoritative without condescension. Three of the longer essays are published here for the first time, and in these Quinn takes on more general sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century themes: the literature of travel and discovery, the English abroad, and early settlement patterns. These are, in a sense, views from the summit of a long life of scholarship and as such merit a different kind of attention than we might accord, for example, a discussion of the early cartography of Maine or an essay on the Rotz Atlas of 1542.

Those familiar with Quinn's work would likely agree that his is an empirical muse. Because he approaches early European expansion through meticulous examination of the extant evidence, he incidentally generates valuable bibliographic essays - "The Literature of Travel and Discovery, 1560-1600" in the present volume being an excellent example. Quinn will sometimes find a document here or an implication there, heretofore overlooked, and often proposes ways in which more might be squeezed from familiar evidence, modestly framing such insights as interpretative possibilities rather than as mandatory reinterpretations. As he admitted in 1987, he is noted "for writing and speaking more about what happened rather than why, for failure to analyse social and demographic trends and so have been unfashionable for more than a decade" (221). It is, however, useful for historians and others interested in the past to know what happened, or at least what is likely to have happened. Quinn may be no exponent of the latest Paris fad but he remains a scholar whose interpretation of events inevitably commands respect, precisely because he is always more interested in making sense of the document than in validating a theoretical preconception.

What of the longer essays in this volume, in which Quinn cautiously dons the unfamiliar analytic robe? "Englishmen and Others" is a blunt and therefore interesting assessment of how Quinn's compatriots viewed themselves and other Europeans on the eve of colonization. The final essay, "Settlement Patterns in Early Modern Colonization," is an analysis of the state of early European colonization by 1700. Here, as elsewhere, Quinn provides a corrective to textbook positivism by providing a clear sense of the continued fragility of contemporary European settlement abroad. These are thought-provoking essays and welcome from a scholar so widely read. The newly-published essays are not, however, properly edited, resulting in repeated text (157), redundant or obscure notes (166-167) and other minor infelicities in style or notation (319).

As usual with Ashgate Variorum editions, the book is a series of photo-reproduced texts, but these are generally legible and the whole volume has been given consecutive pagination, thus making practical the short index of personal and place names. Several of the cartographic essays are illustrated and although a gray-scale fog has descended on some of the charts, most are clear enough for the purposes at hand. Given the author, the range of material covered, and the synoptic ambitions of the longer essays, this is a volume that in the best of worlds would belong in any collection devoted to early European maritime enterprise in the Americas. The very steep cost of this reprint will unfortunately limit its circulation and therefore prevent it from getting its proper recognition.

Peter E. Pope
St. John's, Newfoundland
Rich in records, every old French town waits like a box of chocolates for young historians to come and gorge themselves. Kevin Robbins was already deep in the notarial and parish records when I first met him at La Rochelle in July 1992 and this book is the PhD thesis he was then writing. Though many valuable old papers were lost or destroyed when the armies of Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu besieged and crushed La Rochelle in 1627-1628, that event and a previous royal siege in 1573 make the town particularly interesting. It was the most independent stronghold of Protestant heresy in France, fortified as it was in swampy terrain on the Atlantic coast well away from Paris and linked by its seaborne trade with Protestant Holland and England.

The structure and politics of municipal government are what interest Robbins and there is originality in his modern study of the town's history between the two sieges. No one had worked carefully through that half-century since Louis-Estienne Arcère published his Histoire de la ville de La Rochelle et du pays d'Aulnais (2 vols., La Rochelle, 1756-1757), although recent doctoral theses by Katherine Faust, Judith Meyer, David Parker, and Louis Pérouas have dealt with the earlier and later periods. Robbins leaned on these theses wherever possible but for most of this book he was very much on his own in difficult manuscript sources.

According to Robbins, an oligarchy of rich merchants and Calvinist clergy ruled the town from the middle of the sixteenth century, but was gradually challenged and then toppled by a resentful "bourgeoisie" in league with artisans and shopkeepers. Things reached a crisis when an armed uprising on 9-12 August 1614 brought to power a permanent advisory Council of Forty-Eight from the town's eight militia companies. By close examination of these events Robbins has succeeded in naming the leaders, tracing their affiliations, and establishing who they were in the social scene. The most prominent was Jean Tharay, who became powerful enough to organize piratical attacks on royalist shipping and to raise funds for Protestant armies resisting Louis XIII in the southwestern provinces. Tharay even represented the bourgeoisie of La Rochelle in Paris at the famous meeting of the Estates General in 1614-1615, to which the town sent no Roman Catholic clergy because it had driven them away. So intolerable to the French monarchy were such municipal independence and religious heresy that Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu travelled to give personal direction to the fateful siege of 1627-1628. And it was there, in the military camp, that they founded the Company of New France, with headquarters at La Rochelle, to take control of Canada.

Robbins's study has a special importance in Canada because Québec historians, led by Marcel Trudel and Lucien Campeau, have stubbornly ignored the religious element in the story of La Rochelle's special link with New France. Most English Canadian historians go along with this because they do not know any better. Is it too painful, even as late as the year 2000, to admit that Québec was part of the French monarchy's system of imperial religious oppression?

If the twisted Canadian version of events survives the publication of Robbins' findings, it will be because this book is so hard to read. For all its elegant typeface, excellent maps, and scholarly footnotes, it is essentially a raw, unedited thesis. Latinisms and clumsy phrasing abound on every page. Wills are "redacted," events are "imbricated;" the reader wilts in thickets of adjectives and the "synergy" of "socio-political" "confessionalization." There is a lot of good stuff in this book but you have to fight for it. Bon courage!

J.F. Bosher
Ottawa, Ontario


On 18 November 1606, a small Dutch vessel sailed from the Dutch East India Company post at Bantam, in the East Indies, for a voyage of discovery to the east. Named *Duyfken*, or "Little Dove," it was a relatively small "pinnace" of sixty
tons which had been used by the Dutch as a despatch vessel and minor warship in support of their exploitation of the Spice Islands and East Indian trade in general. Under the command of Captain Willem Jansz, its task was to search out the island already known as New Guinea. In the event, the remarkably well documented and charted voyage brought a European vessel to the first probable contact with the mainland of Australia, at the mouth of the Pennefather River on the western side of the Cape York Peninsula. Duyfken moved south along the coast after landfall as far as Cape Keerweer before turning northward again to regain Torres Strait and work back westward along the New Guinea coast, leaving behind a number of crew, killed in a clash with aborigines. An English observer at Bantam, Captain John Saris, in his journal gave the first known written account of the European discovery of Australia:

The fifteenth [the 25th in the Georgian calendar] of June, here arrived Nockhoda Tingall, a Cling-man [of the east coast of India] from Banda in a Java Juncke laden with mace and nutmegs, which he sold to the Guzerats. He told me that the Flemings Pinasse which went upon discovery for Nova Ginny was returned to Banda, having found the island: but in sending their men on shore to intreate of Trade, there were nine of them killed by the Heathens, which are man-eaters. So they were constrained to return, finding no good to be done there.

The Duyfken continued to provide sturdy service to the Dutch in peace and war until, damaged by a tidal wave and riven with rot and decay, its career ended at Tenate. Captain Jansz went on to a creditable career, which included service as the Governor of Banda before he returned to the Netherlands in 1629. He died about 1638, apparently unaware to the end that, instead of New Guinea, he and Duyfken had discovered Australia.

The story of Duyfken and its role in the discovery of Australia might well have remained obscure had not three Australians, including James Henderson, decided in 1994 that a replica of the ship should be built in Western Australia. In the thirty-eight years since the M G M replica of the Bounty slid down the ways in Lunenburg, NS, over a dozen serious replicas of historic vessels, ranging from the Hudson Bay Company's Nonsuch to Hudson's own Halve Maen, have been launched, of which Australia's replica of Cook's Endeavour is arguably the finest. Drawing on the sentiment and skills of the community which had built Endeavour, Henderson, his companions, and a resulting Foundation put together a remarkable campaign to raise funds for and undertake the construction. To draw attention to it, Jansz's charts of the voyage were found, and an expedition mounted to the mouth of the Pennefather River to revisit the arrival site. In perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the story, Henderson found an apparently accurate oral tradition of the Dutch visit, and the fatal fight, still extant in local aboriginal oral history.

Sent Forth A Dove can well stand alone as a tale of how determined research and a passion for history can bring a forgotten but important event back into memory. But it is also about the desire to make history "live" once more through the means of a replica that would recreate in tactile solidity a world almost four hundred years in the past. It takes true believers like Henderson to make this sort of thing happen in a preoccupied world, and his ardently-written, engaging little book shows how such true faith brought Duyfken back to life.


Marianne Wokeck's new book describes the development of a market "devoted principally to a transoceanic migration" of immigrants from Europe to the American colonies, (xxvii) According to Wokeck, the market developed during the first half of the eighteenth century in response to increasing numbers of Germans who began immigrating to the Delaware Valley. Neither the earlier movement of English migrants nor that of slaves was organized in so consistent a fashion. In
The Northern Mariner

contrast, "[t]he trade in German emigrants combined some shipping technology of the slave trade, ethnic networking for recruiting and marketing, and more-efficient cargo planning, ship rental, and passage payment." (xxi) Wokeck further argues that developments in the German trade set the pattern for the operation of subsequent migrations, including both the Irish later in the eighteenth century and the mass migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Wokeck's book focuses primarily on German immigrants during the colonial period. It contains two unnumbered chapters - the introduction and conclusion - and five numbered chapters, four of which examine the Germans. Among other uses, the first two numbered chapters provide needed background for the book. Chapter 1 examines the reasons for the increased flow of German immigrants during the eighteenth century. Chapter 2 describes the variation in the flow and the changes in the composition of the immigrants.

Chapters 3-5 are the key chapters in Wokeck's argument. In chapter 3, she describes the interconnections (and competition) that developed among merchants in London, Philadelphia, and the Dutch ports (mainly Rotterdam) that resulted in the adoption of standard methods of outfitting, provisioning, and insuring ships, as well as finding, loading, and settling the accounts of German passengers. Chapter 4 then completes the description of German immigration by examining how the immigrants travelled to the embarkation ports, how they fared at sea, and how they settled their accounts upon arrival in America. In chapter 5, Wokeck describes how the Irish adopted certain features of German immigration and how the two movements differed.

While Wokeck's book breaks important new ground concerning the development of a market devoted primarily to moving immigrants, it also contains a variety of additional information and data that many readers will find even more valuable. In particular, she uses chapter 2 to discuss a wide variety of issues involving colonial German immigration. The discussion in this chapter is based on a comprehensive compilation and presentation of the available ship list records of German immigration during the colonial period. The table containing these data is presented as an appendix which, with the accompanying explanatory notes, encompasses thirty-seven pages. Information is provided on 389 ships carrying Germans that arrived in the Delaware Valley, and 157 that arrived elsewhere, between 1683 and 1775. Wokeck uses this data base to analyse a wide variety of immigrant characteristics: the number of immigrant ships and their destinations; the total number of immigrants and the variation over time; the breakdown of the immigrant population by family, gender, age, and skill levels; and the shipboard mortality experience of the immigrants. In many areas, her analysis reaches conclusions different from those of other researchers.

Wokeck's book could be improved and clarified in a few places. For example, she says there were three periods of Irish immigration during the eighteenth century but never clearly specifies the dates. In addition, the discussion of the development of the market in German immigration suffers from the lack of any introductory information on how Germans emigrated during earlier periods. Finally, her discussions of the causes of German and Irish immigration do not refer to important recent theoretical work in this area, such as that by Hatton and Williamson. Even so, these problems serve as only minor distractions to an important new work, one that should be read by any researcher interested in historical immigration issues.

Ray Cohn
Normal, Illinois


This is an important book. Alison Games' study of 4878 mainly English migrants to the Americas in 1635 (a few were Scottish, Irish, or Welsh) is founded on a detailed analysis of the London port register for that year. Games is quick to acknowledge that London was "only one of many possible ports of departure" (3), and observes that focusing on the cohort of 1635 gives her work the "static air" of an investigation of "a slice of society at one moment in time." (8) That scientific metaphor, however, does less than justice to the dynamic elements that emerge from Games' highly effective efforts to follow through on the 1635 travellers' struggles (unsuccessful more often than not) to survive and even prosper in the
nascent colonial societies they joined. Historiographically, this study is avowedly a contribution to our understanding of an "English Atlantic World," and the author acknowledges intellectual debts to such predecessors as Bernard Bailyn and Richard Dunn. Within that tradition, what distinguishes this book is its combination of painstaking research in often fragmentary sources with broad and stimulating conclusions on the significance of migration as a transatlantic phenomenon of the early-to-middle seventeenth century.

Games begins, logically, with an analysis of the backgrounds of the travellers from London to the Americas, and (insofar as the evidence allows) of their purposes in undertaking the voyage. They were young by comparison with passengers to continental Europe, with some fifty-nine percent between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. Males predominated, and - notably among those bound for the Chesapeake, Bermuda, or the Caribbean - young men travelling as servants were especially numerous. Travel in family groups, unsurprisingly, was more characteristic of migration to New England. Later chapters examine mortality rates among the travellers after their arrival, the dilemmas that faced those in servitude, similarities and differences of experience in the various colonies, the role of Puritanism in New England and elsewhere, and the cultural and societal results of geographical mobility. The concluding analysis emphasizes the extreme cultural heterogeneity of the colonies, and the unusual accommodations demanded of those who managed to survive in the "wild and chaotic place" (216) that was the English Atlantic world.

The strengths of Games' book are many. The charts and tables, providing both collective and individual data regarding the travellers, are valuable in themselves. The author's handling of geographical mobility is nuanced and sophisticated. Mobility, it is argued, was "normative" (189) in both old and New England, and this was a point of resemblance between the two. In the Americas, however, mobility was more arduous and resulted in the creation of local populations much more heterogeneous than any normally found in an English parish. Games' treatment of Puritanism is instructive and refreshing, while the judgment that "the majority of travellers, especially those who found an early grave in America, would have been better served staying in England" (105) is presented rightly as reinforcing Nicholas Canny's previously-expressed scepticism of the notion of seventeenth-century America as a place of opportunity for most English migrants.

More debatable are certain other interpretive questions raised by this study. While it is commendable that Bermuda and the Caribbean join North America in the analysis, areas northeast of Massachusetts are given much shorter shrift. Maine - erroneously identified (172-173) as part of Massachusetts by 1650 - and Newfoundland rate occasional mentions, but insufficient even to appear in the index. Insofar as the study is concerned directly with the 1635 London port register, the absence is justified. The wider interpretive conclusions would have been strengthened by a more explicit recognition that the view of the English Atlantic world from, say, Poole or Barnstaple was conditioned by multiple voyages to these northeastern parts on which the duration of absence and the conditions of service were quite different from those experienced by the London travellers. The native American role might also have repaid closer scrutiny. While native inhabitants are properly included among the diverse non-English populations that influenced the shaping of colonial life, the analysis might have been pushed further into areas where the fiction of an English colonial claim came up against the reality of native control. It can even be argued that European life in North America was noticeably less "wild and chaotic" in places where native ascendancy was an acknowledged and inescapable reality.

The raising of such broad, challenging questions indicates a bold and engaging book, and is a further indication of the quality of this study.

John G. Reid
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Peter Galvin is an historical geographer, and his purpose in this revised doctoral dissertation is to analyse piracy in the Caribbean between 1536 and 1718 from a spatial perspective. He argues that
piracy in colonial Spanish America developed neither randomly nor discretely, but in a distinctive pattern as a consequence of specific spatial phenomena. He emphasizes the importance of prevailing winds and currents, the locations of choke points, and the presence of food and water supplies, repair facilities and markets. Thus, pirates tended to be active in the same specific places over time, and their notorious strongholds - Providence Island, Port Royal, Curacao, New Providence, and Tortuga - shared common spatial features. Alongside the development of his argument, Galvin presents abundant information on piratical adventures and misadventures. This is drawn, with extensive direct quotations, from the standard accounts, published narratives, and secondary literature. This is a unique perspective from which to view Caribbean piracy, and one full of promise and worthy of extended treatment. Unfortunately, due to a lack of rigour, Galvin has provided at best a tantalizing glimpse of what might be achieved via this approach to the subject. The tone of this study is discursive rather than analytical. The description of the deeds of pirates - told better and with greater authority elsewhere - will not establish his thesis. Moreover, the argument as presented is too general to command respect. Why is it that some turtling grounds became pirate lairs and others did not? Why were some careening spots preferred? What combinations of geography, politics, opportunity, whim and necessity figured in these choices? It is not sufficient merely to establish that locations identified with pirates possessed fresh water, provisions, ready access to targets and markets. Many other Caribbean places possessed all these attributes and did not acquire pirates. And did markets follow pirates, or the reverse? We are never informed of the answers to these basic questions. Moreover, while the stated spatial requirements were necessary preconditions, were they also sufficient? What of disease? It was well established in the literature of the time that some locations were deemed to be inherently unhealthy. What was the geography of disease in the region, and how did this figure in the spatial distribution of piracy?

A fundamental limitation of this study is the lack of rigour in the basic definition of piracy. In consecutive sentences, Galvin will describe the same group of individuals as freebooters, corsairs, privateers, buccaneers, or pirates. Precise definitions are difficult or problematic, but this semantic carelessness stands in the way of understanding. Are the geopolitical determinants of a privateering base identical to those necessary for piracy? In what circumstances might the latter be transferred into the former? Could the geography of privateering be distinct from, but share some of the features of, the geography of piracy? Questions such as these are consistently avoided, to the detriment of this investigation.

The author has produced a study which is melodramatic in its language, repetitive, imprecise, weak on the relationship between cause and effect, and heavily skewed towards the English-language literature. The topic, however, is one of great promise and it is to be hoped that the present pioneering work will soon be followed by more effective analytical appraisals.

J.D. Alsop
Canborough, Ontario


Although published more than a decade ago, Winslow's book deserves recognition for being one of those excellent regional histories that focus a spotlight on a particular segment of society at a critical time. When done well, these histories serve their communities by expanding the knowledge and understanding of their past. Winslow's study of privateering through the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 not only illuminates a lesser-known aspect of Portsmouth's economic and social history but also offers a useful adjunct to other regional works, such as Jerome Garitee's study of Baltimore privateers in the same period, The Republic's Private Navy, or volumes by earlier writers like William M. Robinson, Jr. on Confederate privateers and Howard Chapin's work on the privateers of Rhode Island during King George's War.

Winslow's stated intent was to present the story of Portsmouth privateering from the perspective of the privateer captains and crews rather than from a political or legal viewpoint. To do
this, he makes extensive use of newspapers, public documents like state and naval records, private papers (many never previously published) from a variety of sources throughout New Hampshire and New England, and legal and insurance records. While hampered by the lack of primary records and several great Portsmouth fires over the years, Winslow nevertheless assembles a thorough bibliography, including books and articles that other researchers may find as useful as the book itself.

*Wealth and Honour* is divided into three parts: the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the interwar years (1783-1812), and finally the War of 1812. Once he has dealt very briefly with the origins and legitimacy of privateering, the author sets the stage for revolution in New Hampshire and the British provocations that led Titus Salter, the first New Hampshire privateer, to strike first and let the courts decide later. Like many authors writing about privateering, Winslow commends his subjects for their good behaviour, especially in light of the harsh society in which they lived and the many risks such seafaring involved. Typical of their brethren around the world, Portsmouth privateers tended to serve themselves first, but Winslow maintains that they always aided the country's war effort.

The period between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 covers the nearly thirty years when the fledgling United States struggled to gain the respect of the European nations. For the first decade, storms and over-fishing were the main threats to the maritime economy of Portsmouth. Although these issues are not relevant to privateering, Winslow contributes some very interesting local history. Then in late 1793, during the "French War," as the French Revolution was called, the New Hampshire brig *Polly* fell victim to a British privateer for carrying French property. For the next twenty years, lack of an American navy meant that US ships were under threat from a variety of seaborne predators, including French, British and Spanish naval and privateering vessels, Algerian pirates and the British press gang. A small number of Portsmouth privateers seem to have acquitted themselves well during the Quasi-War with France (1798-1801), defending their cargoes and crews from insult and attack. As events moved inexorably toward the War of 1812, Winslow traces the role of Portsmouth vessels as they manoeuvred around and within the shifting embargoes and trading obstacles placed in their path. The cases he uses to illustrate the frustration and anger such actions caused indicate the clear personal sense of economic loss and political outrage that gripped a maritime community like Portsmouth by 1812 and resulted in the American declaration of war.

Of the three sections of the book, the one on the War of 1812 is the largest and offers the most comprehensive study of the activities of Portsmouth's privateers at the time. It is here that the thoroughness of the author's research, combined with more readily available material, makes the greatest impression. In addition to outlining the most important activities of Portsmouth's sixteen acknowledged privateer vessels, Winslow evaluates their activities and weighs the millions of dollars worth of ships and cargoes captured in 419 prizes against the cost of lost exports and trade disruption. His conclusion is that Portsmouth privateering was on balance a losing proposition, but it was either that or nothing.

*Wealth and Honour* is a handsome volume published by the Portsmouth Marine Society as part of its ongoing efforts to encourage and disseminate the maritime history of the former Port of Piscataqua. Winslow's work makes a valuable contribution to this series and is a must-have for a student of privateering history.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario


The name of Alejandro Malaspina does not easily come to mind when considering the great navigators and explorers of the eighteenth century, yet between 1789 and 1794 he led a highly successful expedition to the Pacific. The coastline from Montevideo, past Cape Horn and up to Acapulco was accurately charted. Botanists among his crew gathered and illustrated the flora and fauna while artists recorded the way of life of the natives and depicted landscapes and architecture; between them they produced a unique record of the Spanish-American empire. This achievement would have been better known but for the fact that Malaspina went beyond the bounds of duty appro-
appropriate to a serving naval office and became involved in politics.

Malaspina was born in northwestern Italy, long before that country was unified or developed a navy of its own. To further his social credentials he therefore first joined the religious Order of Malta, which had a small navy and afforded an opportunity to gain sea time. In 1774, under the patronage of Antonio Valdés, Spanish Minister of Marine and Head of the Order of Malta in Spain, Malaspina enrolled at the Midshipman's College at San Fernando, near Cadiz.

In 1788 he was a signatory to a plan for a major scientific voyage. Modelled on the expeditions undertaken by the British and French in the previous two decades, the plan was to chart the remote coasts of South America, prepare sailing directions for commercial navigation, and study the way in which the Spanish colonies were governed. Under this cover every opportunity was to be taken to glean economic intelligence about the trading outposts of rival nations around the Pacific rim. Malaspina was well suited to lead the enterprise. In addition to being an accomplished navigator he was academically successful, although he had over the years developed a blend of arrogance and naivete, traits that were to lead him into difficulties later in life.

Unlike the voyages of the early navigators who concentrated on the preparation of navigational charts and the sketching of landfalls, Malaspina's expedition visited established colonies. As a result, his botanists and artists were able to spend longer at each location, enabling them to produce more detailed results than their predecessors. But during the long months at sea Malaspina had ample opportunity to turn his attention to the formulation of his own theories about the nature of government and in particular about how Spain could be better ruled. On his return Spain was at war with France and the former's government in a state of confusion. Unabashed, Malaspina drew up a scheme for a peace treaty, distributing copies to those he thought would be sympathetic. In his enthusiasm he overlooked the King's chief minister, Manuel Godoy. Ignoring friendly warnings, Malaspina was unwise enough to suggest to the King that were he to be granted the necessary authority, the entire Cabinet could be dismissed to be replaced by a panel of suitable candidates of Malaspina's choosing, thus solving the nation's problems. Just as he was about to depart for leave in Italy in November 1795, Malaspina was arrested, no longer titled a Brigadier of the Royal Navy but branded "the criminal Malaspina." Found guilty of treason in April 1796 at the age of forty-two, he was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years and a day in the Fortress of San Anton in the port of La Coruna. He served seven years before being released following intercession by Napoleon.

The author has produced a very readable account of this neglected naval officer. It is timely because among the titles in preparation for the Hakluyt Society is a new translation of Malaspina's journal covering the 1789-1794 expedition. Mr. Kendrick is an assistant editor on the team undertaking the work.

Norman Hurst
Coulson, Surrey


This volume of an intended trilogy explores the relationship between Hampshire, in particular Portsmouth and its environs, and the East India Company. The Company used Spithead for its south coast anchorage and Portsmouth was usually the last British port of call for company ships sailing for India and China, and the first for vessels returning home from the East. Company ships consequently had much to do at Spithead. Outward-bound vessels had to take on board cargo, specie, passengers and troops; secure equipment and stores; effect last-minute repairs; and take receipt of mail and instructions. Inward-bound craft were expected to protect sufficient of their crews from the press to get them into the Thames, and all their cargo from allegations of smuggling. Relations between the Company, the Royal Navy and customs officials were not always amicable.

The work generated by these operations was sufficient from the early seventeenth century to demand the appointment of a company agent. In the seventeenth century it attracted prominent entrepreneurs, including the London merchant
William Towerson, Portsmouth businessman Sir Josiah Child, and local corporation official Sir John Biggs. Late eighteenth-century agents included Andrew Lindegren, a member of the Swedish business family that dominated the British import of Scandinavian naval stores. The variety and scale of these agents' other interests, like those of the Company directors, demonstrate the extent to which East India Company business, itself a vital element in the British national economy, was part of a far greater commercial world; vibrant, diverse and far-reaching in scope.

This is the value of this book. Essentially a local history, it places the regional minutiae of a great company in its international context, giving a much needed depth to the study of the topic and interweaving a wide array of themes into a comprehensive whole. At one end of the spectrum, there are chapters on local Company stockholders, Company officers who came from Hampshire, and Company ships that were built locally, not to mention the Indian operations of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, which shipped its mission cargoes through Portsmouth. At the other extreme, the connections of the Swedish, Danish and Dutch East India Companies with Portsmouth demonstrate the international tensions that existed and the cosmopolitan nature of eighteenth-century shipping and seafaring.

Based on fifteen years of work, the book relies for much of its detail on primary sources from over thirty different repositories, including papers in private hands. It is a remarkable synthesis of information that is largely peripheral to mainstream studies of the Company or to Portsmouth. It contains sixty tables and six maps, as well as a full bibliography and index. Meticulously documented, it is undoubtedly destined to serve as work of reference for anyone interested in either of the subjects. Unfortunately, because of its price, it is more likely to find a place on the shelves of institutional purchasers than private students interested in the history of the Company or of Portsmouth. There can be few scholars who can afford the price of even the first volume; the cost of the trilogy will surely be prohibitive. That aside, Thomas has performed a service which will long be of value to the commercial and the local historian.

Roger Morriss
Cheltenham, UK


*Shipwrecks of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Eras* is essentially a compendium of marine-related accidents from a particularly disaster-rich period in maritime history, providing a broad glimpse at the sheer volume and variety of nautical perils afflicting seafarers during this crucial era. Consisting almost entirely of edited contemporary newspaper accounts ("Every important shipwreck which appeared in a British newspaper or other publication of the period will be found in this volume," the author asserts in his preface), the book conveys an immediate sense both of the quotidian nature of these incidents and of their horror.

It would be easy to recommend this book for its macabre interest alone, for its incessant accounts of the manifold varieties of suffering and death on the waters: storm, fire, lightning, disease, mere drowning, the extremes of exposure and endurance, human cruelty, cannibalism, and horrid death. The incidents recounted do not always conform to the limits set by the book's title: there are accounts of dozens of naval and merchant shipwrecks, of civilian boating accidents on lakes and rivers, of naval courts martial unrelated to wrecks, and of explosions in port. Many apparently incongruous entries are best described as "human interest stories." As a result, the book presents a diffuse but fascinating impression of naval and marine experience during this hard and occasionally heroic period.

The utility, as distinct from the interest, of a book of this type lies chiefly in the quality of its preliminaries and back matter. Grocott's bibliography suggests that he has delved deeply into contemporary literature; running to only forty-five entries, it nevertheless refers to vast quantities of print. Decades-long runs of newspapers, volumes of journals and chronicles are supplemented by standard references of the period: chronologies, comprehensive naval histories, pilot books, gazetteers and biographies, all evidently used chiefly in the composition of the book's introduction and notes. Given the sheer bulk of information presented in the chronology of

Roger Morriss
Cheltenham, UK
wrecks, the notes are necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The text names over 1500 individual vessels. These are uniformly informative, providing clarification of points of seamanship, cartography and salvage, as well as elucidating obscure points of history. Given the abundance of oddities and obscurities in the text, however, and the references at Grocott's disposal, the notes presumably could have been multiplied indefinitely. Notes explicitly keyed to the text are supplemented by eight appendices which, while providing much supplementary material on individual perils and incidents (on the contemporary state of lightning conductors, for example, or on the court martial of Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker), likewise seem arbitrary when compared to the bulk of unannotated material that precedes them. The book also includes a four-page double-column glossary of nautical and archaic terms of use to the general reader, but superfluous to those who possess standard marine lexicons or have access to good etymological dictionaries.

The most useful item, and the feature that gives the book more than entertainment value, is a ten-page, small print, triple-column index containing (by rough calculation) entries for over two thousand vessels, places, and persons. The completeness of the index turns a simple chronicle into a useful (albeit idiosyncratic) reference that will allow scholars and enthusiasts alike to identify particulars for a great many contemporary wrecks. Grocott's book gives a vivid sense of the immense scale and terrifying fragility of shipping in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, in a form both accessible to general readers and helpful for students of the period.

Roger S. Marsters
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Cracking good stories are rare in this age of anti-narrative scholarship, and *Endeavour's* cover blurb is right to say that this is a tale worth telling. Peter Aughton delivers a dramatic story aimed at (and priced for) general readers. The voyage of *Endeavour* from 1768 to 1771 was one of the world's greatest journeys of discovery. Its story, though well known, never seems to grow stale. Aughton steers his readers through the politicking of the voyage's planning stages, launches them into the unknown beyond Cape Horn, and shares his own sense of wonder and excitement at the shores and shoals of the South Pacific. The narrative never flags and is illuminated by generous and appropriate extracts from the journals of Cook and others.

Aughton, a mathematician, keeps an eye on the voyage's scientific aspects; especially its mission to observe the transit of Venus. A useful appendix explains exactly how this was meant to contribute to the calculation of the earth's circumference. Aughton also explains the complex process of lunar-distance calculation for longitude, reminding us that it would be Cook's second voyage - not his first - that tested the new Harrison chronometer. His book also explores Cook the man - husband, father, commander, scientist, patriot - in a way that does justice to a complex personality and to Cook's relationship with equally complex characters like Joseph Banks. Aughton refrains from passing judgment - he has no interest in denouncing Cook as a racist colonialist - and keeps his eye on the story. This sustains the drama and keeps the book to a manageable length.

Aughton did not intend to write an academic analysis of the voyage, but readers familiar with recent Cook biographies and conferences, or with the outpouring of scholarly publication on Pacific exploration generally, will find this book disturbingly out of date. Cultural contacts are described in a way that ignores a generation of historical and anthropological scholarship. Aughton should have refrained from making his own pronouncements on Pacific cultures and societies; particularly unforgivable is his declaration that Australia was too big and its indigenous people "too backward to maintain a stable civilisation at any level higher than the one that existed" (168). Constant reference to "the natives" also shows Aughton's detachment from basic conventions of courtesy and accuracy with regard to Pacific islanders.

This book provides an excellent introduction to Cook's pioneering voyage and its generous quotation from contemporary sources also makes it an inexpensive source book for students of exploration. Nevertheless, I am reminded of
Glyndwr Williams’s summing-up after the 1997 Royal Society conference commemorating the voyage of the *Endeavour* replica. One of Williams’ most urgent pleas was for a readable, popular, and up-to-date treatment of Cook’s interaction with Pacific peoples. Aughton has fulfilled the first two conditions, but unfortunately not the last.

Jane Samson
Edmonton, Alberta


This is a *festschrift* for Glyndwr Williams, a professor emeritus in the University of London and well-known scholar in the field of British maritime enterprise and Canadian northern history. For years Williams was editor of the Hudson's Bay Record Society and its guiding hand. He also contributed a volume to the Navy Record Society on Anson’s circumnavigation. His first book was on the British search for the northwest passage in the eighteenth century, based on his PhD thesis completed under that taskmaster Gerald Graham at King’s College, London. In recent years he has gone from strength to strength, writing with P.J. Marshall a fine book on Imperial geography and mapping and completing a survey of British oceanic activities in the early years of Pacific exploration. Recently he has turned to biography, and more is anticipated from this energetic, careful scholar. In his career he has made London University the centre from which to aid overseas museums and universities, and their scholars, in developing conferences on set themes. A conference impresario, Williams has found himself at the centre of scholarly initiatives. In this volume, various recipients of his sound thinking and wisdom repay favours and honour their guide and teacher.

Alan Frost investigates British schemes to revolutionise Spanish America, a well known theme. Andrew Cook looks at Alexander Dalrymple and the Hydrographie Office. Jane Sampson explores the voyage of HMS *Herald*, and Roger Knight writes on John Lort Stokes and the New Zealand survey of the mid-nineteenth century. William Barr investigates the role of a warrant officer in the Arctic, George Ford. Greg Dening follows on with insights into the Tahitian queen Purea. Robin Fisher reviews George Vancouver in regard to native peoples on the Northwest Coast and Hawai‘i. Christon Archer examines smallpox epidemics on the Northwest Coast and Andrew Porter looks at British missions in the Pacific. Sylvia Van Kirk, in the most innovative contribution, discusses the native wives and daughters of five founding families of Victoria, Vancouver Island. P.J. Marshall provides reflections on the British encounter with India, and David Mackay closes the volume with a retrospective on what is new to say on James Cook and Pacific history.

The late twentieth century was marked by an abundant amount of scholarship on Pacific history, seeking as it did to inject historical and anthropological rigour into a field that had only been investigated marginally. J.C. Beaglehole gave authenticity to the subject and laid down a considerable degree of wisdom for the study of the islands, continents and peoples of the Pacific. It is interesting to see Beaglehole under attack from historians nowadays, and it is always easy to crawl over the bodies of dead historians. But in one specific way Beaglehole was at a disadvantage. The sources at his disposal were, in his time, limited; and since his era all new manner of documentation has surfaced. That new documentation is used to effect by the scholars in this fine book, and the whole is a fine testament to a mentor and guide of superb value to contemporary scholarship.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario


*Seapower and Naval Warfare* is the most satisfactory re-evaluation of the role of sea power in the early-modern period written in the past few decades. In less than three hundred pages of well
written text, Richard Harding manages to provide a persuasive narrative of the evolution of at least part of the European naval arsenal - the sailing battle fleets. Moreover, he places these changes in context, showing how social, political, economic, intellectual and technological factors widened (or sometimes constrained) choice. The notion of alternatives is especially important, for the author takes Alfred Thayer Mahan's dicta a step further by showing that nothing in the process was preordained; decision-makers almost always had a plethora of choices. This remarkable book, which manages to synthesize much of the best recent work on the period, deserves to be read by a wide variety of maritime scholars and interested laymen.

The author's main focus is on the eighteenth century, an era in which he contends that naval actions became ever more important in determining the outcome of hostilities. If there are any skeptics, Harding's vigorous and convincing analysis should win them over. His choice of evidence is masterful and amply supports the larger argument. Similarly, he shows how the concept of sea power changed along with improving naval capabilities. Ideas are too often ignored in naval history, but Harding demonstrates that without intellectual justifications, the pace of change - and perhaps the outcome as well - might well have been very different.

But if the volume is generally impressive, I still have several caveats. First of all, I am disappointed that the book is heavily Eurocentric. While Professor Harding avoids the pitfall of making his story exclusively British, he has relatively little to say about the non-European world, with the exception of the United States. There is, of course, a certain logic to this in the era before the introduction of steam. Nevertheless, it does limit the comparative dimension somewhat. At the very least, I would have liked him to expand his scope to consider the way that European navies were used outside the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic. Second, this is very much a "big power" book. Readers interested in a fuller treatment of the smaller European powers would be better served by consulting Jan Glete's magisterial Navies and Nations. Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860 (2 vols., Stockholm, 1993). Third, the book is not completely successful in breaking out of the old "strategy and tactics" paradigm that has dominated the writing of naval history until recently. While some chapters, most notably "Seapower on the World Stage 1713-56" and "Seapower and Global Hegemony, 1789-1830," do successfully place naval issues in the broadest perspective, many of the others do not do so as clearly as they might have. Fourth, Harding is much better on political/intellectual analysis than on socio-economic. The last fifteen years of his period, for example, were marked by a growing rejection of mercantilism in favour of the still novel doctrine of free trade. Yet the ways in which this might have influenced changing ideas about the role of seapower are generally ignored. Finally, I am not entirely happy with the appendix, which depicts comparative naval strengths in different periods. The data comes from Jan Glete's book, and taken out of the careful context that Glete provided, presents serious interpretive problems, especially for the more casual reader.

Nonetheless, my minor quibbles should really be taken as complements, for they suggest something of the magnitude of the accomplishment. If Richard Harding has not written a perfect book, he has come closer than almost any I could name. Seapower and Naval Warfare is a very good volume that ought to change fundamentally the way we think about the evolution of seapower during a crucial period of European development. The subject will not need fundamental re-examination in the foreseeable future.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


Students of the American Civil War may be astonished to find that the USS Monitor was not the only notable ironclad launched by the US Navy. More astute students of naval and maritime history will realize that a second type of ironclad also joined the fleet at that time. Styled the New Ironsides, this seagoing ironclad offered an alternative gun platform in configuration, armament and purpose. While monitors set a somewhat dubious precedent for a class of warships
that formed the mainstay of the American combat fleet for nearly a generation thereafter, the USS Ironsides in many ways presaged the later new steel navy, ready to provide maritime security on the high seas rather than in harbour and coastal waters. Discussion of just why one and not the other (or both) types of ironclads claimed a permanence with naval officials, as well as a superb descriptive narrative of the planning, construction and fighting of New Ironsides forms the basis of Dr. William Roberts' compelling book.

Roberts, himself a former surface warfare commander, chronicles New Ironside's story from its inception as an insurance policy against Confederate (and foreign) naval threats, to service on blockade duty and naval assaults on Charleston, South Carolina and Fort Fisher outside Wilmington, North Carolina. His description of the bureaucratic wrangles of construction and competition with John Ericcson's monitor establishment is especially enlightening. He mixes politics with the technical details of pioneering ironclad construction on the Delaware River at Philadelphia while explaining the evolution of warship design during a period of rapid technological change. While his portrayal of combat service is somewhat terse in comparison with more general naval histories of the war, he intersperses proportionate social and human dimensions of shipboard life and the quirky personalities of ship and squadron commanders. While one could wish for even more about New Ironside's sailors, Roberts' comparison of Admirals Samuel F. Du Pont, John Dahlgren and David Dixon Porter in how they related to their state-of-the-art naval craft is illuminating.

Most intriguing, however, is Roberts' treatment of the military-industrial relationships which doomed New Ironsides to eventual scrapping. No matter that Confederate respect for this warship was reflected by an offer of $100,000 for its destruction, or that Porter regarded the ship as the best in his fleet for offensive operations. It also did not matter that Roberts considered New Ironsides to be equal or superior in performance and ability to its two main potential foreign rivals, HMS Warrior and the French Gloire. Washington bureaucrats and the Ericcson "monitor ring" blocked efforts at replication. While the builder, the Cramp shipyard, commanded US Navy contracts well into this century, Ericcson and his cronies in essence dictated naval policy and technology not only for the rest of the Civil War but well into the late nineteenth century. Thus, Roberts' book - with its fine period photographs, ably-done line drawings, and careful research into original naval records - provides two useful contributions. First, it dissect Union naval construction and operational development in a new fashion. Second, it sets the stage for a better understanding of subsequent naval development in the nineteenth century through linkages between the ironclad program of the Civil War and later construction of a new steel and steam navy.

Benjamin Franklin Cooling
Chevy Chase, Maryland


Craig Symonds' excellent new biography of Franklin Buchanan is noteworthy not only as the definitive biography of a key figure in US naval history but also as the first volume in the new Naval Institute Press Library of Naval Biography. This series, edited by James Bradford, provides new interpretive biographies of influential figures in naval history. All will be relatively short in length and contain minimal endnotes, a time-line, bibliography, and suggestions for further reading.

Symonds is well-known in naval and military history circles. A professor at the US Naval Academy, he has written eight books, including two biographies of Civil War generals. His latest volume is a carefully researched and elegantly written account that will appeal to both the specialist and general reader alike.

Franklin Buchanan, the only admiral in the Confederate Navy during the Civil War, will forever be known for his brief command of the ironclad Virginia and his attack on 8 March 1862 on the US Navy warships Congress and Cumberland. "Old Buck" also commanded the Confederate side in another great Civil War battle at Mobile Bay. But as Symonds makes clear, Buchanan's naval career spanned fifty years and was much more than the sum of his Civil War service.
Buchanan joined the US Navy as a midshipman in 1815. Ambitious, he demonstrated early that he was a consummate professional who took his work seriously and could not abide those, especially officers, who did otherwise. He also had no patience with those who succumbed to drink. An authoritarian, he employed the lash liberally to secure discipline. Born in Maryland to a father who opposed slavery, he married into a powerful slave-holding Eastern Shore family and soon adopted its pro-slavery views. As Symonds notes, Buchanan was a curious mix of "Southern aristocrat and Yankee Puritan."

Buchanan's pre-Civil War service was at times noteworthy. He was the first superintendent of the US Naval Academy. During the Mexican War he participated in the Tuxpan and Tabasco River expeditions and led the land assaults. He played a key role in Commodore Matthew C. Perry's two expeditions to Japan and was the first American official to set foot on Japanese soil. He also served on the Naval Efficiency Board, helping to weed deadwood from the service, and he supported new technology.

When the Civil War began, Captain Buchanan resigned his commission in the belief that Maryland would secede. When his home state did not leave the Union, he tried without success to retract his resignation. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles refused to have him back and so after several months Buchanan made his way to Richmond and joined the Confederate cause. A few months later he commanded the James River Squadron, including the new ironclad Virginia. Determined to drive off the Union blockading fleet, Buchanan won a great victory, but he was wounded during the battle and thus did not participate in the revolutionary contest the day with the Union Monitor.

On his recovery, Buchanan was promoted to admiral and given command of the naval squadron in Mobile Bay and its surrounding district. He did his best to instill professionalism and to secure ships for the Southern navy. It was not for want of his energy, but rather due to the paucity of Confederate manufacturing resources, that only one ironclad, Tennessee, was produced.

Symonds absolves Buchanan of blame in failing to sortie in Tennessee and to engage Admiral David Farragut's blockade. Forced on the defensive, Buchanan could only watch as Farragut built up his strength for the inevitable attack. On 5 August 1864, at the Battle of Mobile Bay, Buchanan did the best he could with the assets available. Aboard Tennessee, he was again wounded, this time seriously, and was forced to yield command. Taken prisoner, he was later exchanged but could only watch the inevitable Confederate defeat.

Buchanan remained unrepentant. He seems to have convinced himself that it was the US Navy that had deserted him, rather than the other way around.

Spencer C. Tucker
Lexington, Virginia


In its scarcely four-year existence, from the firing on Ft. Sumter in April 1861 to the surrender of the raider Shenandoah in Liverpool in November 1865, the Confederate States Navy contributed, it can be argued, more to naval history than perhaps any other navy of the century.

Too many remember the CSN for the first battle of ironclads at Hampton Roads, but that was hardly its most original or enduring legacy, as bigger and better ironclads were already to be had in Europe and the unseaworthy behemoths produced by the North and South were destined for the scrapheap soon after their creation, if they were not sunk first. Far more notable were three contributions made by the CSN that affected naval strategy and tactics permanently thereafter: the deployment of the naval (as opposed to private) commerce raider; the use of the underwater mine as a strategic defence technology; and the invention of the first submarine that actually sank a capital ship. All three were, regretfully, most enthusiastically taken up by the German navy after the War Between the States, and it was said that Bismarck himself required all naval officers of captain's rank and above to read Raphael Semmes's Service Afloat.

All three have lately become a part of recovered history: first the bathtub in Richmond, VA where Matthew Fontaine Maury invented the electric mine; second the discovery and recovery of artifacts from the raider CSS Alabama off
Cherbourg; and finally the discovery of the submarine CSS H.L. Hunley in the harbour of Charleston, SC. Writings abound on the first two, but R. Thomas Campbell's narrative on the amazing pedal-powered sub that sank USS Housatonic in February 1864 is the first book to provide a stem-to-stern history of this subject. The story follows the vessel's inception, creation, and demise, and its subsequent discovery in May of 1995. It is informative and entertaining, as well as well-researched and documented.

*Hunley*, the *ad hoc* creation of its namesake inventor, was made of transformed boilers and powered by a crew of twelve, who would peddle like underwater madmen in the light of a single candle, hoping to attack by striking a spar torpedo against the target, an act that was sure to destroy both ships. It followed in the footsteps of the Revolutionary War submarine *Turtle*, which failed in its mission against the British nearly a century earlier. Indeed, the idea of a submarine as a tool of naval warfare goes back to DaVinci and perhaps Archimedes, but *Hunley* was the first actually to close with an enemy and establish that concept as viable. Hunley, who died with his ship in its final hour of glory, could hardly have imagined that his invention would so quickly evolve from such humble beginnings into a weapon system capable of destroying the world.

This book includes everything from the complexities of creating a whole-cloth concept model in a charged and fluid Southern wartime economy to the politics of what to do with the artifact once it was discovered by - who else? - Clive Cussler. At what is now the end of its journey, *CSS H.L. Hunley* can be seen at the Charleston Museum. Campbell's book, replete with pictures, documents, and engaging writing style, is a must-read before you go to see it.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, NY


The editorial committee of the Karlskrona Naval Museum's 1999 Yearbook have produced a very interesting and fine work to celebrate the inclusion of the city, its dockyard, and F.H. af Chapman's country house in the World Heritage Site List as object No. 560. It is unusual to include a naval dockyard still in use for the construction, maintenance and repair of naval vessels.

The book contains eleven chapters about city and dockyard, one chapter about af Chapman's country house at Skarva, and the director's report on the museum's 1998 activities. L. Stenholm, chief archivist of Blekinge county, in the first chapter, "Karlskrona the Naval Town," provides a short history of the city from its inception in 1679, including its fortifications and ship construction. The author includes summary of Unesco's decision to classify Karlskrona as a heritage object. J. Coad, in a chapter on "Historic Architecture and Engineering Works in Naval Bases," points out that Karlskrona has four rare structures: the ropery (ninety years older than Chatham's), the covered Wasa slip, the mast crane and the five finger docks. The continental equivalent is Rochefort, France.

I. Wenster, the architectural specialist of the Blekinge Museum, in a well-illustrated article outlines the new approach to the design of fortifications and dockyards. An interesting description of the Drottningeskar fortress, built to cover the western approaches to Karlskrona, is contributed by K. V. Kartaschew. Erik Dahlberg, the great seventeenth-century engineer, was responsible for the fort's design and construction. Colonel O. Melin, late of the coastal artillery (part of the Swedish Navy), covers in some forty pages the construction of the large fort built on Kungsholm Island to control the harbour's eastern entrance. This fort, because of its size and buildings, is in reality a small town. Begun in 1690, owing to the state's financial problems its completion was delayed until 1741. It was strengthened with heavy guns in the 1870s and 1890s. The fort was fully manned during both world wars. Until late in the twentieth century, it was dependent for fresh water on daily deliveries by boat from Karlskrona, which ceased only on the completion of fresh water and sanitary sewers after World War II. The Second Coastal Artillery Regiment still uses Kungsholm as a training centre.

K. Kartaschew's second contribution is a description of the defence works built on Västra Hastholm (West Horse Island) in 1867. Its original armament was two twenty-four cm. guns, increased to four and three five-inch guns, which in turn were replaced by twelve-cm. guns
The Northern Mariner mounted in twin turrets. A total of 248 men comprised wartime crew. This fortress was abandoned about forty years ago, although some guns and the power plant are still in place. Government has yet to decide if it is an historic monument worth preserving. Before his death, O. Cederløff wrote the story of the two forts known as "Good Night" and "Good Morning," which were built in the 1860s. Seven years later, both were declared obsolete. "Good Night" became a lighthouse for the fairway into the harbour.

B.O. Swahn, a professional architect, describes the first plan for the town and its defences (drawn up in 1694 by Dalbergh and Stuart), its subsequent modification owing to lack of funds, and later developments. In a second chapter, Swahn describes the present-day uses of eighteenth-century storehouses, the naval lockup (now a computer centre) and old naval barracks. In a third, he takes the reader on a dockyard tour, pointing out of Chapman's great "Number 1 Storehouse," his Plans and Ship Model building, the old Sculpture Workshop, and several other notable buildings. It is gratifying to learn that the great Admiral af Chapman's country house, a few kilometres from the city, is included in the World Heritage List. J. Reis provides an interesting study of this house. Incidentally, a book in English about it was published in November 1998.

The New Naval Museum's director, Mr. P.I. Lindquist, has contributed a fascinating article about the history of the museum, founded in 1752 by royal decree. He tells of the beginnings of the collection and how Chapman stressed the need for models. He stresses that the museum is designed to elicit public participation. He also writes of the construction of a replica of the postal vessel Hiorten on the museum grounds and the teaching of boat-building skills and the preservation of vessels. Lindquist's annual report tells readers that visitors in 1998 numbered over 128,000. The museum was host to five travelling exhibitions, launched Hiorten, participated in the 1999 Rendoc Conference and much more.

The yearbook is an excellent production. Five English summaries will stimulate the readers' interest and encourage them to visit Karlskrona's fine new naval museum, as well as this fascinating city.

Daniel G. Harris
Nepean, Ontario


Launched from Courtenay Bay in Saint John, New Brunswick, from the famous shipyard of John Fraser in April 1877, the 1473-ton wooden sailing ship Struan became waterlogged and broke up after going aground on Christmas day, 1890 off Cape Lookout, Oregon. This book narrates the vessel's history from its launch, through a transfer in 1889 to Norwegian ownership, to its demise, and finally to a recovery in 1990. The author spares no detail in his description of the shipyard, the original Saint John owners, and the voyages.

The author came across the remains of the vessel while attending Scouting camp in the 1930s. Camp Meriwether was a former homestead on the coast where Struan grounded. The young boys salvaged various pieces, including the anchors and chains and later the ship's windlass. They eventually established a memorial and the ship's name board, salvaged many years before, has been lovingly repainted by the young scouts. Struan entered the shipping world near the end of more than a half century of uninterrupted New Brunswick shipbuilding. Like many others at the time, the vessel was used to carry such traditional cargoes as New Brunswick timber, as well as coal, guano, cotton and rice. Its ownership was quickly transferred to Liverpool, like many other New Brunswick vessels, within one month of first registration.

Like many other Atlantic Canadian sailing ships in the late 1880s and early 1890s, Struan was sold to Norwegian interests after twelve years of satisfactory service. But, the Norwegian owners were not to enjoy any profit. After loading lumber at Port Townsend, Washington, the vessel encountered a gale. On 2 December 1890, the sails blew out in a sudden gust, causing the vessel to cant and to take on water. The list caused the deck cargo to break loose and it was thrown overboard. The pump broke down and the crew was forced to cut away the masts to prevent capsizing. They spent twelve days on board before being rescued by a passing vessel.

This book has been the labour of love for the author. He spent much of his spare time tracking down details of the ship, owners, and voyages.
The book offers a lesson on the tenaciousness necessary to write nautical history. This exceedingly well-illustrated volume includes colour photographs and original art in addition to sketches. Copies of original documents and excerpts from newspapers add to the flavour.

Nonetheless, the author avoids the academic literature on the rise and fall of the Atlantic Canada fleet. Although he does compare the Struan with other vessels arriving in ports at the same time, he does not discuss the context of her sale to Norwegian interests other than to say "that the ship was over 12 years old and that the Norwegian syndicate seemed prepared to offer a fair price (estimated at about 65% to 70% of the original cost when built in 1877)" (146) and that the vessel was worth about £7921 (CAN $31,864). This would have been a perfect place for a reference to the scholarly literature. In the author's defence, though, this is a history of one particular vessel. There is already a good book (Maritime Capital) that discusses the rise and fall of the Atlantic Canadian fleet.

The author does not assume that the reader knows anything about the intricacies of sailing ships or nineteenth-century regulations. The book is interspersed with chapters on such esoteric subjects as tonnage calculations, navigation, and marine safety laws, although these sometimes seem like intrusive tangents. There is also a very good nineteen-page chapter on the history of John Fraser, the shipbuilder. Unfortunately, the reader will need a good atlas while reading because of a lack of maps - a pity considering the considerable time and expense by the publishers to include the rich variety of illustrative matter. The author has written a book that provides enough detail to satisfy any nautical specialist yet that also attracts the uninitiated. This is a pleasant summer read.

Bradley Shoebottom
Fredricton, New Brunswick


This is yet another extensive volume about traditional British and Irish boats. But this one is limited to the history and development of indigenous fishing craft. The author is a naval architect who has owned a Loch Fyne skiff and written broadly on his chosen field. In this, his first book, he also touches on fish, fishing methods and the mechanisation of the fleets, as well as the many varieties of regional fishing craft.

Smylie is genuinely empathetic with his topic, writing with a warmth and enthusiasm which he easily transmits to his reader. Not since Edgar Marsh or David Butcher has a watercraft ethnographer combined his knowledge and skills with the fine art of composing warm technical prose. It is a difficult task after we have read the almost mawkish rhetoric of recent American writers on traditional boats. And conversely, British and European writers (in translation) have written many useful works on traditional small craft, in scholarly but cryptic, often clinical prose.

The author begins with a short chapter on the herring, its importance as a protein source, and how it was caught, processed and marketed. The next chapter is a brief review of fishing vessel developments throughout the British Isles. In the succeeding fifteen chapters Britain is circled and divided in a counter-clockwise direction, and the history of specific regional craft are described. Construction, shape and development of most of the oared and sailing boats are covered. Some types are described up to and beyond their mechanisation. Two chapters cover the boats of the Northern Scottish isles and the Isle of Man. The closing chapter looks broadly at vessel mechanisation by steam or motor power. A puzzling anomaly: the Manxmen get a complete chapter, yet much larger and more diverse Ireland merits only a shorter chapter.

The overview of fishing boat history draws on the text and drawings of the 1849 Washington Report. This seminal work was commissioned after a disastrous gale destroyed many boats of the Scottish fishing fleets. The report was especially descriptive and illustrated the extant Scottish craft. It has been widely used in many British small craft histories. Late nineteenth-century US Fisheries reports have similarly been sourced for recent material on American fishing boats.

One of the admirable features about this volume is the number and variety of boats which have not been widely covered or even noted elsewhere. This book begs comparison with the recently published Chatham Directory of Inshore craft. There is an evenness in the text because it

Daniel Finamore has selected ninety-seven photographic images from the more than one million available in the collections of the Peabody Essex Museum. All relate in one way or another to the sea - from vessels to distant destinations and sail lofts - and are arranged chronologically from 1850 to 1955. Each image receives a page to itself, is clearly reproduced, and is accompanied by the name of the photographer, photographic process employed, date of acquisition and, in most cases, a short paragraph on the subject. There are short biographies of selected photographers. At first blush, it looks like any number of other collections of miscellaneous marine photographs. But that is not the author's intention.

Photographic images of all sorts began entering the collections of the Peabody Essex Museum shortly after the medium was invented in 1839. Why? It is a simple enough question, but not always easy to answer given the eclectic nature of donations and purchases over the course of more than a century and a half. As Finamore tells us in his perceptive introduction, the organizational principles for cataloguing the collections give the game away. Almost invariably they follow simple taxonomic patterns that permit scholars to document and illustrate various elements of the visible heritage of Essex County. Built structures, streetscapes, trades, crafts, and the like are arranged by type, style, location, and so on. Similarly, vessels are arranged by name, shipping line, rig, means of propulsion, or flag of ownership. "The use of photography for its illustrative functions has resulted," according to Finamore, "in a collection that has been perceived as purely documentary in value." (14)

Need an image of a gambrel roof for a classroom lecture? Want a photo of a particular schooner captained by your great uncle for the wall? No problem. Generations of scholars and ordinary folks have found a ready resource in the photographic archive of the museum, and many images have become famous through repeated use.

The difficulty is not just that this arrangement makes it awkward to use the collections for other purposes - say searching for the work of a particular photographer or style of composition - but that it leaves the impression that they are compilations of disinterested facts. We understand that this is not so when we look at written documents. If a diary or treaty is heavily laden with the conscious and unconscious intentions of the author or authors, to say nothing of the perceptions of the reader, Finamore argues that we should not forget that photographs are likewise constructed by individuals, constrained by technology, and biased by presentation: "As with the written word, all photographs distort reality toward the perspective of their creator." (11)

Finamore is disturbed therefore at the uncritical way in which the Peabody Essex photographic collections have so often been used, and would like to alert us to both the dangers and the potential of the subjectivity of images. And there is potential. Once we see photographers as authors, perhaps even artists, their work takes on a wider range of meaning. And once we put the photographs back in their context - in someone's wallet, among other images in an album, tacked to a bulkhead - their importance deepens. The major
The purpose of this collection of photographs is to highlight these more subjective readings, to put before us images that do more than document a particular object. Not for Finamore the usual collection of ship portraiture, racing yachts, or vessels under construction. Instead, he emphasizes unusual, fresh, or novel images with provocative perspectives. He makes us conscious that these are in some way special views of the past, and in so doing hopes to cause us to ask questions about what is going on between the photographer and the time and place. So far so good.

The problem is that you cannot simply throw out images and invite the reader "to make any number of connections among the photographs." To interpret a diary we need to know all we can about the author, the time and place, the genre, and more. The same holds true for a photograph. We need to know all we can about the individual who created the image, especially the motivation. We need to know about the setting, especially what was left out. And we need to know where the photograph lived, the use to which it was put. Here the volume leaves us at sea. Finamore does not want this to be just another collection of photographic images. Yet the failure to provide more assistance in interpretation means in many ways that this is what it remains.

M. Brook Taylor
Halifax, Nova Scotia


This handsome illustrated book is an introduction to the remarkable collection of images and artefacts which Mr. Henderson has built up over a lifetime, and which is housed in his foundation, the Independence Seaport Museum at Philadelphia. Its focus is the daily life of the sailor in the English-speaking world. At one level the book is directed to fellow collectors of "Marine Art and Antiques," for whom it admirably evokes what is obviously a remarkably rich and varied collection. It also aspires to use the collection as the basis for a serious essay in social history, but in this it is less successful. The idea of fully integrating the evidence of pictures and artefacts into the social history of the sea was admirable, but the antiques by themselves could not be sufficient foundation for a serious study, and the authors do not look very far beyond their own collection. Comparing their bibliography with their text suggests that they have not come across all the recent books on the subject, nor read all of those they have found.

Moreover the great range of the collection in time, subject and material spreads the scholarly commentary too thinly, and the authors are not sufficiently familiar with the social history of seafaring to locate their objects accurately in their historical context. It is notable from the text, and even more the captions, that from lack of curiosity or historical knowledge the authors have in many cases missed or misunderstood some of the significance and interest of their own collection. A few examples must suffice. They think Gillray's famous 1801 engraving of Emma Hamilton as "Dido in Despair" was issued before the battle of the Nile, and it is not clear that they have even identified the artist. They are not aware that the significance of O.W. Brierly's lithograph of the steam line-of-battleship Agamemnon getting under way from Spithead in 1853 is that it is sailing for the Black Sea at the outbreak of the Crimean War. Instead of asking on what occasion an anonymous three-decker embroidered in wool might have been dressed overall, manning yards and flying the royal standard, they simply identify it as the Royal Yacht! They refer to Thomas H. Sumner's *New Method of Finding a Ship's Position at Sea* as a guide to fixing longitude with a chronometer, which leaves us to assume that they have not heard of the position-line and its celebrated inventor. A silver snuff-box presented by Lord Elgin to "Mr. Cornelius Rogers, Master Pilot, *HMS Shannon,* 8th August, 1857" is illustrated with Rogers' name misread as Ryan, and with no comment on why the presentation might have been made. Readers with some knowledge of history will recall that Elgin was on a diplomatic mission to China in *Shannon* when he was urgently diverted by the news of the Indian Mutiny. On his own authority Elgin constituted a naval brigade out of the crew and sent it inland; 8 August 1857 was the day it reached Calcutta, and Mr. Rogers must have been the Hoogly pilot who brought it up river. It is a dramatic little story, knowledge of which would greatly increase our appreciation of the artefact.
So a book which sets out to bridge the gap between historians and collectors seems instead to emphasize how wide it remains. It is clear, however, that the Henderson Collection really is very fine, and would reward a visit to Philadelphia. For those who cannot get there, this book is a good introduction, and more than a mere coffee-table book, although rather less than it aspires to be.

N. A. M. Rodger
London, England


New England Views presents a selection of images by the late nineteenth-century photographer Baldwin Coolidge. Individual photos have been published over the years, but this is the first time a substantial collection of his work has appeared in one volume. The book is a collaboration between three researchers, archivists and writers with a long-standing interest in Coolidge’s photography. New England Views begins with an introduction to his life and work that also discusses the photographic equipment and techniques of the day. Baldwin’s photographs are grouped into geographical chapters which range up and down the New England coast, from Biddeford Pool in Maine south to a number of locations in Massachusetts, including Boston, Nantucket, Woods Hole and Martha’s Vineyard.

Each chapter begins with a brief introduction. Individual photographs are identified as to place and date and given a short description that concludes with the collection and catalogue number. Great attention has clearly been paid to design; the finished volume is well-proportioned and pleasing in every regard, from the paper stock to the images, which are reproduced in very handsome duotones of exceptional clarity. The book concludes with a bibliography, a table relating Coolidge’s numbering system to dates the photos were taken, and a thorough index.

Baldwin Coolidge was a New Englander through and through. Born in Woburn, MA, he worked first as an engineer. An abrupt career change in 1878 led him to open a photography studio in Boston, and he made his living this way until he retired to California in 1917. He was prolific and is known to have produced more than 20,000 glass plate negatives. These might well have been lost, or suffered other indignities often visited on old glass plates, such as being cleaned and used for windowpanes and greenhouses, were it not for the foresight of William Sumner Appleton, founder of the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities. In 1918 he persuaded Coolidge to donate more than 2000 of his negatives to the Society, and these make up the majority of Coolidge images known today.

As is so often the case with photographs of earlier times, even the most quotidian images in this book are visually compelling. Whether depicting vanished activities, such as a memorable shot of Boston’s “T Wharf with at least twenty-five fishing schooners rafted up, or simply a quiet afternoon on a millpond in Windham, New Hampshire, they convey an abiding sense of place. Coolidge worked with large-format glass plate negatives and his images were printed by contact directly from the plate. The resulting photographs have great clarity and depth of field, and repay long and careful scrutiny.

There is much here to interest the maritime historian, from early steamers, wharves and harbours to views of some of the small working watercraft that once populated North America’s coasts. Even a quick survey reveals bank dories, swampscott dories, Woods Hole spritsail boats, a wide variety of catboats, oyster sloops, surfboats, whaleboats and whitehalls. Those researching waterfront architecture and the rise of coastal vacation culture will also find much of interest.

It is impossible to understated the value of publishing collections of such photographs. In their own institutions, they might be seen by staff and a few researchers, but such work is time-consuming and can be detrimental to the artifacts. Catalogued, annotated, digitized and published, especially in such fine style, important images of nineteenth-century life and culture can reach a wider audience. It is to be hoped that the high standard set by the editors, writers and designers of New England Views will inspire more institutions to publish images from their holdings.

John Summers
Middletown, Rhode Island

The anchor is the single most recognizable maritime symbol, used to denote the sea-going world in everything from heraldry to popular cartoons. Being robust, it is also a frequent survivor at shipwreck sites, offering enigmatic clues to date and origin. The development of this vital element of nautical technology has been described in countless overviews of the history of ships but only at a superficial level. There is also no shortage of technical works, particularly in the archaeological literature, describing older types. But there is no really adequate and accessible summary of that body of information. Unfortunately, while it is an advance on anything else available, Curryer’s new book does not meet the need.

The author surveys the whole story from the stone anchors of the Mediterranean Bronze Age and the timeless killicks, through the stocked anchors of the Roman, Medieval and early modern periods, and so onward to the present. About half the book is devoted to developments since 1800 - patent anchors of the nineteenth century, leading to the familiar stockless form by about 1920, the advent of chain cables, “high holding power” anchors such as the Danforth and CQR, plus more exotic kinds. The latter include mooring anchors, Doris mud anchors for offshore oil platforms, “sea staples” fired into the seabed, and the AC 17 anchor developed for the demanding requirements of the RN’s nuclear submarines. Along the way, Curryer provides interesting details of anchor manufacturing in the pre-industrial age - a period when these were among the largest metal objects constructed by man.

The whole is copiously illustrated with photographs of anchors in assorted museum collections, contemporary drawings of various designs, illustrations of anchor works and testing facilities, tables of anchor and cable dimensions from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources, and a few views of anchors in use. The latter reach back to include extracts from the Bayeux Tapestry and the tomb of Pharaoh Sahure.

The problem with all this is the author’s tendency to summarize or reproduce whatever material came to hand, instead of preparing a balanced history illustrated with available material. This is most obvious in the case of stone anchors, where she relies on an old typology prepared by Honor Frost, a 1975 research report on one particular expedition to the Black Sea, a personal communication from the Ashmolean Museum, and specimens in the collections of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Maritime Museum of Piraeus. More, and more relevant, material could have been found in the archaeological literature published in any one recent year. From the past century or so, one might note that the classic stocked anchor of the Maritime Provinces and New England, in which the stock passes through the shank rather than the reverse, is not even noted. The space (nearly two pages) devoted to the AC 17 and its precursors invites interest in the US Navy’s solutions to the same problems. Those, however, are nowhere mentioned - the imbalance likely resulting from an AC 16A being on display in the “anchor park” of the National Maritime Museum, where the author worked.

The result is more of a disordered scrapbook of oddments relating to anchors than a history of the technology. Considering the dearth of alternatives, this book deserves some attention from historians and nautical archaeologists but it should not be relied on as a definitive source.

Trevor J. Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia


Horace Beck’s and Malcolm Archibald’s books are popular compendia that provide introductions to a broad range of maritime folklore traditions. To the discipline of American folklore, Beck was one of the twentieth-century pioneers who brought it from an amateur pursuit into the university context. Nothing is said about Archibald
in his volume, and the reader can assume that he is a popular writer specializing in British maritime topics. Beck's book was originally published in 1973, and he has added a new introduction to this edition.

In broad sweeps, both authors survey such topics as folk literature (names on the sea, language, songs), extensive legend narratives (pirates, battles, famous seafarers), and a wide range of folk belief (supernatural figures, sea creatures, spectre ships). These two books are remarkably similar, yet different in important ways. Both are intended for popular audiences. They are written in an accessible style, often with humorous asides, meant to entertain as well as inform. Both are unencumbered with the mechanics of scholarly distractions. Archibald's volume contains a simple bibliography, and the reader must try and guess from where various details derive. Beck's book uses footnotes to attribute sources. In spite of this, however, he often generalizes from memory, and much of the information he chronicles has no cited sources. Having heard countless accounts of all kinds of traditions, Beck has assimilated much of this traditional knowledge as his own. Individual accounts and their sources, then, have understandably long faded in memory.

How do these authors define their subject matter? The term "folklore" is central to both. Both stay close to the popular definition of the word: oral materials passed on informally, materials often suspect in their content. One cannot criticize either author for their narrow use of the idea of folklore. The general public believes - to use one Newfoundland writer's phrase - that folklore is "old foolishness," and those who call themselves professional folklorists (still) labour under this popular conception.

But the tone of both writers often differs in how folklore is explained. Archibald points to one explanation for a certain name, custom, or belief. This clearly reflects his reliance on printed sources. Beck, on the other hand, frequently offers different explanations for one cultural form, indicative of the ambiguities that arise from field research involving many informants. Beck and Archibald both follow the lineage of how folklore is understood in Great Britain: the search for "popular antiquities" or "curious survivals." Neither book has extensive discussions of material culture (one of the prominent topics in North American folklore studies today). More important, neither shows an awareness of the scholarship of European regional ethnology (which used to be called folklife) - a blend of history and anthropology - where some of the most important work on maritime folklore has been done. While Folklore and the Sea was first published in 1973, the book shows little knowledge of the Scandinavian ethnological studies being published at the time (such as Knut Weibust's Deep Sea Sailors [1969]).

What can an academic interested in maritime culture glean from these volumes? In Archibald's case, the book offers a listing of unattributed occurrences, beliefs and practices that at best are starting points to track down more scholarly reports. Beck's volume, on the other hand, offers more specific directions. Yet Folklore of the Sea is clearly not meant to be an introduction to what folklorists are doing today on maritime folklore. One needs only to turn, for example, to the Newfoundland research of David Taylor on boatbuilding or Mark Ferguson on saltfish making to see how contemporary folklorists practice their craft. This is not to dismiss Beck's book, only to say how much a period piece it is, a milestone in its day, but now superseded by studies based on more precise field techniques and methods.

Both books are examples of how popular writers present folklore. Beck's book is important as the first major work by an academic folklorist on maritime traditions, attempting to arrive at a methodological rigour not seen in amateur collections. Archibald's book is an amateur collection, meant to be a popular, pure and simple. For academics it is only useful as a stepping off point to more rigorous questions. But for scholars there are more recent works that provide better examples of what folklorists are doing today.

Gerald L. Pocius
St. John's, Newfoundland


Grief-stricken by the sudden death of his seacaptain father in 1913, the blossoming Maine
writer Lincoln Colcord, Jr. found consolation in sorting out the family's store of seafaring letters, until then left neglected in the attic of their Searsport home. Inspired by the memories they evoked of a childhood spent partly at sea, he embarked on a programme of transcription, and then, with his sister, Joanna, binding the collation into a coherent narrative with a running commentary. It was a task apparently fated to be unfinished, for it was put down at the start of the First World War and never resumed. Fortunately, the unfolding yarn was taken up by Professor Parker Bishop Albee, Jr., Curator of the Lincoln Colcord papers, resulting in this very handsome volume.

Both Lincoln and Joanna were born on shipboard during their parents' honeymoon voyage on the Charlotte A. Littlefield in 1881-1883. This was not uncommon: Joanna wrote afterward that the briny wave had been the birthplace of more than seventy citizens of the small town of Searsport. Nor was it extraordinary that the Colcord children should go on the occasional voyage with their parents, either separately or together, at intermittent intervals between 1889 and 1901. What was unusual was Lincoln's intense response to the experience.

In the spring of 1899, when Lincoln was not quite seventeen, Captain Colcord was given command of the great square-rigger State of Maine for the first of four China voyages, and while he took his wife and daughter along, the decision was made to leave Lincoln at home. It was a good choice, made by wise and caring parents who were very aware that all the time an adolescent boy was at sea, he was not learning the skills that would serve him well in adult life. If Lincoln stayed too long on board ship, the only occupation open to him would be seafaring - and this at a time when it was obvious that the demise of the square-rigger was imminent. For Lincoln, however, it was a heartbreak he never got over.

The disappointment, he wrote, "marked my character for all time. I never recovered from it." (77) This book, being a direct result of this obsession, offers a most privileged view into a seafaring family's private joys and pains.

The photographs are a particular delight, many of the best being the work of young Joanna, who carried a camera on State of Maine. Generous captions mean that Letters from Sea could be read as a coffee-table picture book, without referring to the text - which would be a pity, for then the reader would miss Captain Colcord's marvellously vigorous letter-writing style, so eloquent in their humour, the love of the sea that he passed on to his son, his deep regard for his family, and his basic decency.

If Lincoln Colcord had recommenced the task of collating this volume after reaching maturity as a noted writer and literary critic, he could well have edited out some repetitious material, and put ships' names in italics instead of upper case. Unfortunately, this last is reflected in the index, which also lists ships with people's names as if they were the people themselves, surname first. Thus, bark Charlotte A. Littlefield is indexed as LITTLEFIELD, CHARLOTTE A. But these are minor flaws. This is a book that will live with the reader a very long time, a highly recommended addition to the collection of any maritime enthusiast or social historian.

Joan Druett
Wellington, New Zealand.


The US Revenue Cutter Service, which merged in 1915 with the American Life Saving Service to become the US Coast Guard, began to operate in waters off Alaska as soon as Washington purchased that territory from Russia in 1867. The authors of this book are well qualified to address their subject. Truman Strobridge, a retired US government historian and archivist, served for six years as the historian for the Coast Guard and held a similar position with the US Alaskan Command. Before becoming a professional historian, Dennis Noble was a career Coast Guardsman who made six cruises to the Bering Sea and other Arctic regions.

Although the traditional mission of the Revenue Cutter Service was to enforce the nation's customs laws, Strobridge and Noble demonstrate that the organization's tasks in Alaska went far beyond the prevention of smuggling. American revenue cutters undertook numerous search-and-rescue operations for seamen...
in distress. The cuttermen enforced national and international fishing regulations, including measures that helped save the Bering Sea fur seals from extinction. The organization provided subsistence to populations in frontier Alaska that sometimes faced starvation, offered modern medical assistance that otherwise was in short supply, and occasionally handled law enforcement duties. Credit also must go to the Revenue Cutter Service for its extensive role in pursuing or supporting the scientific exploration of Alaska.

A memorable aspect of this volume is its account of the famed Bear. Built in Scotland in 1874 for the Newfoundland seal fishery, this legendary vessel was acquired by the US Navy ten years later and participated in the Arctic rescue of the Greely Expedition. In 1885 Bear entered the Revenue Cutter Service, making thirty-four cruises to Alaskan and Arctic waters until sold by the government in 1929. During the next decade Richard E. Byrd included the vessel in one of his Antarctic expeditions. Then, in 1939 the ship was repurchased by the Navy for operations in polar waters. When finally decommissioned in 1944, Bear had achieved seventy years of maritime service.

From 1886 to 1895 Michael A. Healey was Bear's skipper. Popularly known as "Hell Roaring Mike," he is the subject of extended and sympathetic coverage by Strobridge and Noble. Healey was a superb seaman. In his efforts to assist Alaska's Inuits to domesticate Siberian reindeer - a program that unfortunately was a failure - Healey personified the humanitarian agenda that was a trademark of the Revenue Cutter Service. At the same time, however, Healey became an abusive alcoholic. His fight with alcohol and the downfall of his professional career came in 1895, when his junior officers in Bear filed misconduct charges that led to a court martial conviction and Healey's suspension for a period of four years. Amazingly, in 1900 he returned to active duty as the skipper of another cutter, only to go on an alcoholic binge during which he attempted suicide repeatedly. Relieved of command by his own officers, he briefly entered a hospital for the insane. Yet three more years of duty remained for Healey - whose endurance was beginning to rival Bear's - until his 1903 retirement from the Revenue Cutter Service, thirty-eight years after his initial appointment.

This volume is based on considerable research in original sources and makes good use of the leading secondary literature. Due to its topical organization, it sometimes is repetitive. Nevertheless, the volume presents a fascinating account of seagoing adventures in frontier Alaska. *Alaska and the US Revenue Cutter Service* will be of interest both to general readers and to a wide array of serious maritime scholars.

Dean C. Allard
Arlington, Virginia


This volume is one outcome of a research project into the "Maritime Dimension of the British Economy since 1870," undertaken by the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies of the University of Exeter. It comprises 359 pages of statistical tables prefaced by an introduction of some thirty pages and is intended to serve as a building block for analysis of the maritime aspect of the British economy. To this end it provides statistical data abstracted from the *Annual Statement of Navigation and Shipping of the United Kingdom.* One of the many valuable features of the *Annual Statement* is that it provides information not only for the kingdom as a whole but also for individual ports. This volume brings together the data for each port in every year and assembles it in tables covering the period 1871-1913, thus enormously facilitating analysis. There are three sets of tables. The first covers movements of vessels into and out of each port from and for overseas places. Especially useful is the fact that these are grouped according to regions of trade. The second set of tables covers entrances and clearances in coastal and foreign trades, distinguishing between vessels "with cargo only" and those "with cargo and in ballast." The third series, again concerned with entrances and clearances, distinguishes between sailing vessels and steamships. The experience of each port in the UK can thus be examined closely. There are also summary tables relating to the constituent countries and islands in the UK.

This volume will without doubt be of great utility to researchers in maritime history both for
the data it makes accessible and the introduction, which provides valuable background on the compilation of the Annual Statement and discusses problems of definition and usage. The latter are considerable. They include issues such as what constituted cargo and ballast; the precise meaning and interpretation of clearing and entering; and the difficulties arising from vessels entering from abroad which later called at other British ports. While the introduction offers valuable guidance, this might have been enhanced by the provision of practical examples. A brief comment on what the data tells us about the shipping of, say, Cardiff or Southampton would have been helpful and interesting.

Besides the need to study the introduction, researchers drawing on the data should also appreciate that the Annual Statement provided other material that is not included in the tables. In particular, it distinguished between British and Foreign vessels; this is crucial to understanding the shipping and trade of certain ports. Hence, reference to the original sources may be required of those engaged in detailed analysis. Such reference, however, will have been immeasurably lessened through the easy access to the basic data, which are so carefully and conveniently assembled in this study. The volume is handsomely and strongly bound and, crucial in a reference work of statistics, the tables are admirably clear and easily read. All in all, this is an important reference volume and working tool for all those engaged in the study of British shipping during the era when it was most dominant. Starkey, together with Gorski, Milward and Pawlyn, whose names all appear on the title page, are to be congratulated.

David M. Williams
Leicester, United Kingdom


This exceptionally handsome book is in essence an extended photo-essay concerning the construction of RMS Titanic. More broadly, it is also a "culturescape" of industrial Belfast, where old and new, rural and urban, meshed ambiguously at the turn of the twentieth century. Richly textured, it comes from the hand of Michael McCaughan, artist, photographer, and Curator of the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum. Drawing on the vast photographic archive of that institution, the author is ideally placed to select from and interpret the unique sources at his disposal. Most of the images come from the extensive Harland and Wolff collection that dates from the mid-1890s and documents in often stunning detail the evolution of its Queen's Island yard. McCaughan, however, judiciously sprinkles the volume with plates that illustrate life outside the workshops in an Ulster that still combined handloom weaving with industrial modernity. Indeed, one of the strongest themes of the book is the paradoxical nature of the society that spawned Titanic. Clearly, this is no more "picture book," but a critical, thought-provoking piece of scholarship.

Awake to both the potential and the limits of his sources, the author takes little at face value. Thus, he notes that precision of record is often claimed for documentary photography, whereas in truth it produces no more than visual quotation requiring careful interpretation like any other historical evidence. The result, he concedes, is normally ambiguous. Still, and perhaps aiming a blow at post-modernists, McCaughan asserts that photographs do preserve the appearance of things at specific moments in time and are "authentic records of existence." (5) Titanic and the people who built it, in short, are "facts" that cannot be relegated to the realm of symbolic legerdemain, even if their final significance remains elusive. Nothing, in fact, could better testify to the measurable solidity of the great White Star liner than this book itself.

Selecting his images with skill, McCaughan artfully introduces the reader to the many technological and social elements that went into Titanic's birth. Accordingly, the scale and complexity of the works at Queen's Island are documented in photographs that depict everything from sprawling electrical facilities to the tedious labour of hand-rivetting. At several points, the old sharply clashes with the new as teams of horses draw carts loaded with modern machinery. Similarly, the gargantuan stands beside the small as workmen inspect propellers or scramble to hoist the famed fourth smokestack in place. Dominating the pages, of course, are ever more striking...
shots of *Titanic*, which slowly grows from skeleton to comely liner sliding down the slips into Belfast Lough. The result is a well-rounded portrait that will delight hardened buff and new reader alike.

What a shame, therefore, that well enough was not left alone. Why, it might be asked, does the otherwise judicious McCaughan insist on following the story through to the sinking? In doing so he violates the spirit of his own title and adds nothing to that which is readily available elsewhere. Perhaps the lure is irresistible. So too, it seems, are references to a gilded prewar age, this despite the enormous body of scholarship from Tuchman to the present that makes the Edwardian "garden party" image unsustainable, a trick of perspective. One might also wish that so talented a writer might occasionally have found a synonym for the word "leviathan." Even so, these few reservations aside, this book should have an honoured place on the shelves of all those who continue to find *Titanic* irresistible.

James G. Greenlee
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


In this important new book Richard Brooks, whose recent life of Fred T. Jane was favourably noticed in 1998, has examined the role of Naval Brigades from 1815 to 1918. He provides the first account of how these formations were organised, trained and used, together with an analysis of their importance, based on a well developed perspective and a wealth of research. In contrast to the Victorian image of the Naval Brigade as an heroic but essentially amateur formation, Brooks stresses that they were neither accidental nor amateur. He begins with the Crimean campaign, where a brigade was formed to move and fight a large proportion of the naval guns being used as siege artillery at Sevastopol. The introduction of continuous service for ratings in 1853 enabled the navy to train the sailors in a wider range of tasks, including shore service. The drill and doctrine inculcated at HMS *Excellent* were identical to those of the army, while the organisation of a naval brigade became a matter of well prepared routine. By the 1870s the naval rating was perfectly capable of operating as an infantryman or providing artillery and other specialist support for overstretched army formations. Bluejackets, Royal Marine Infantry and Royal Marine Artillery could be deployed with or without the army.

In the absence of a significant naval threat almost every British land campaign from 1815 to 1914 involved naval support ashore. The shift from significant imperial garrisons to a largely home-based army left many areas of British interest without a local military force. Consequently the navy provided both seaborne protection and fighting power on shore. Being shipborne and multi-roled, naval personnel were the most economical form of local imperial defence/reinforcement, and the consistency of their deployment suggests this was an accepted element of Imperial strategy. How far it was wise to deploy skilled ratings ashore, when soldiers could have been obtained, remained a moot point. While naval losses ashore were light, it was good for morale to give the sailors a share of the action. Once the opposition became dangerous, or the chance of action at sea increased, proper Naval Brigades were a misuse of resources. In 1914 Churchill sent Naval Brigades to defend Antwerp, but these formations were not the trained sailors of the previous century. Instead, they combined raw recruits straight from the depot with a motley collection of army and volunteer officers. Pitted against German forty-two-cm. howitzers, they did well to escape. Over time the brigades lost contact with the sea, becoming another khaki formation on the Western Front, distinguished by their beards, rank structure and naval *esprit de corps*.

Before 1914 Naval Brigades kept officers and men in contact with the reality of war. Almost all officers received their baptism of fire ashore or in riverine service. The greatest beneficiary of shore service was David Beatty, who transformed a pretty ordinary career in three years, serving in gunboats during the Omdurman campaign and then as an infantry commander in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. He was promoted twice. His predecessors included Fisher, Beauchamp Seymour, Beresford, Percy Scott, Jellicoe and Andrew Cunningham, who had his baptism of fire hundreds of miles inland, dressed in khaki.

Brooks stresses the amphibious offensive dynamic in British naval power, traced back to 1660, that saw sailors regularly landed to exploit
the command of the sea. This book should be read by anyone wishing to understand the full range of naval power before 1914, as well as the origins of modern amphibious forces. Naval Brigades were firepower-heavy, mobile, amphibious and flexible instruments for the prosecution of war at all levels. Like their modern equivalent they were at their best in an emergency, but only because they were already well prepared.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


At the beginning of the twentieth century the Royal Navy confronted several serious problems, including concern for officer training and recruitment. It was not just a question of numbers but of specialization once in the navy. Naval authorities perceived a dangerous shortfall in the quality and quantity of those bound to serve in the engine-rooms of the fleet. Worse still, "deck" officers, those of the "Executive branch" who specialized in Gunnery, Torpedo and Navigation, and who appeared destined to command ships and eventually fleets, generally looked down on engineers.

To overcome such "social snobbery," most naval officers' attitudes had to be radically altered and more engineering officers trained. Thus came the birth of the Royal Naval College at Osborne on the Isle of Wight, a quasi "junior" college where cadets received their first two years of training before completing their time at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth.

Between the time Osborne opened in September 1903 and its closure in May 1921, some 4000 cadets passed through its doors. Boys went there at about age thirteen, moving on to Dartmouth at fourteen or fifteen. Most saw service as naval officers, but some became army officers, High Court judges, or served their country in other ways. Among the sons of several European Royal families who attended were the future King George VI and Earl Mountbatten. Also, an incident occurred at the college on which British born playwright, Sir Terence Rattigan based his 1946 play "The Winslow Boy," a real life drama in which a young cadet was accused of theft and his father fought to clear his name.

Michael Partridge, a senior lecturer in history at St. Mary's College, Strawberry Hill, UK, examined Osborne's history and assessed the extent to which it achieved its founders' aims. He paid particular attention to the cadets' daily life at the College, their routine inside and outside the classroom - and to the institution's ethos and atmosphere. He utilized a wide variety of eyewitness accounts as well as written records to reconstruct Osborne's establishment from its earliest days to its closing.

Criticisms of the College, raised at the time and repeated in recollections of survivors over sixty-five years later, varied widely. The most significant faultfinding concerned the age at which the College recruited cadets. By bringing them in at thirteen or younger, the College faced two tasks. The most important objective involved training boys in the ways and duties of Royal Naval officers. But that to a large degree proved incompatible with the second task, namely the wider education of the boys. Furthermore, the desire to train all potential officers in all subjects, including elements of engineering, only compounded the difficulty. Attempting to cope with all these demands in two years proved impossible, and something ended up being sacrificed, specifically the cadets' general education. It would have been preferable to wait until the boys had completed their schooling before teaching naval discipline and the intricacies of engineering.

Besides, naval authorities never satisfactorily tackled the question of recruiting sufficient numbers of engineer officers despite the effort devoted to it in both the Osborne and Dartmouth curricula. They designed the Osborne curriculum to include considerable amounts of practical engineering work with a view to enticing cadets from the College into that branch of service. The fact remained that regardless of what authorities did to encourage boys at Osborne, too few volunteered for the Engineering Branch. The Admiralty found itself forced to recognize this reality. As a hoped-for source of all the engineer officers needed for the RN, the Osborne experiment failed. That helped lead to its eventual closure.

The primary aim of Osborne authorities appears to have been the introduction of boys to naval discipline. Recollections tended to suggest that the administrators succeeded, perhaps too
well. The extent to which discipline stymied initiative in young cadets was - and is - a matter of debate, but the general opinion suggested that it did prohibit learning to an undesirable degree. Clearly, the navy sought to create a uniformly recognizable caste of officers and in that they succeeded. Osborne did not achieve that unaided, but it served as a beginning, and the navy rounded off that instruction by two more years at Dartmouth and then time on training cruisers.

The Osborne naval cadets performed well in the two world wars and in the many other duties required of them. Not all rose to become Admirals of the Fleet or First Naval Lords, but more than one achieved such distinctions. Training at Osborne had its weaknesses, as did the education provided. Yet the Admiralty deemed it a success and most former cadets agreed. Partridge concluded that Osborne was a qualified success that deserves to be remembered, as do the numerous boys who attended it. That is a fair assessment.

David Pierce Beatty
Sackville, New Brunswick


Nicholas Lambert has produced an important and interesting book offering fresh interpretations of some well-known themes in the history of early twentieth-century naval power. In this densely-written and prodigiously-researched work, Lambert claims that the Royal Navy's building programmes in the decade prior to 1914 were not necessarily intended to compete with the burgeoning German High Seas Fleet. He offers a detailed re-examination of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher's own role in shaping these programmes, reiterating Fisher's predisposition towards battle-cruisers and "flotilla defence" schemes, the latter involving the acquisition of large numbers of submarines and destroyers to defend the British Isles from attack or invasion.

The book robustly defends Fisher's strategic vision. Still, in order to obtain support for his often controversial plans Fisher, according to Lambert, was guilty of "duplicit," "exaggeration," "concealment" and of providing "misleading" reports to Cabinet. Lambert weaves a complex narrative involving the interplay of fiscal restraint, inimical personalities, vicious interservice rivalry, naval manning problems, bureaucratic politics, the far-reaching effects of technological change, shifting diplomatic policy and the doubtful strength of Britain's naval industrial base. It is a very full menu.

The Fisher revolution, argues Lambert, was rooted in strategic concepts predating the rise of German naval power. The main conclusion of the book is that funding crises better explain the RN's building programmes than the naval planning of potential continental adversaries. For Fisher, integrating advances in weapons, communications and propulsion technology into the design of British warships imbued the navy with far greater potency and flexibility in planning for imperial defence than could be achieved by global dispersal of smaller units. Wireless, improved naval intelligence, and the effective deployment of powerful, long-range, fast warships would provide Britain more "bang for the buck."

Although the Edwardian budget crises are well known, Lambert claims that their effects on naval strategy and shipbuilding programs have been hitherto ignored by scholars. While these might indeed be under-explored in the literature, Lambert fails to elaborate on the intricacies of contemporary budgetary allocation and the expensive social reform programs of successive British ministries. By not doing so, he has denied readers the opportunity of fully judging the merits of his views: that the needs of the non-naval budget heavily influenced, perhaps even dictated, naval planning in this period.

Nor does the author adequately discuss the naval planning of other powers. Detailed references to the various parallel German naval laws would have helped place his arguments in a more balanced context. The naval arms race in capital ships did exist; Mahanian principles of battle fleet actions, blockade, and control of the seas remained at the root of most professional and public naval debate. In fact, the RN began planning for war against Germany in the summer of 1905, as the author well knows. Lambert also virtually ignores the impact upon British shipbuilding policy of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, diplomatic confusion over German ambitions, the destruction of the Russian fleet in 1904-1905, and the growth in American naval power. This leaves a vacuum-like feel to the text, which ultimately remains
primarily about Fisher's role as First Sea Lord and his willingness to challenge orthodoxy - and Lambert has a limiting tendency to uncritically accept everything Fisher said or wrote.

Lambert dismisses previous historians' views that the revived German navy of the prewar period forced Britain to abandon the two-power standard and concentrate its strength in home waters. "The existing narratives of pre-1914 Royal Navy policy," he writes, "are fundamentally flawed because their authors approached their subject with a series of mistaken assumptions." (6) His favourite target is Arthur Marder. In this matter, Lambert is obviously of the Jon Sumida revisionist school. (Lambert even refers to Sumida as his "co-conspirator.") Yet the author's relish in belittling Marder is disconcerting given that Marder's work on the pre-1914 period was published half a century ago and, whatever its shortcomings, was unquestionably ground-breaking in its time. In this and other respects, the tone of Lambert's narrative seems too smug, even arrogant; only he has the answers. The book is not always well edited: there are a number of minor typographical glitches, especially words missing from sentences.

Despite these criticisms, Lambert has written an impressive book, one which will deservingly foster debate and discussion.

Serge Durflinger Gatineau, Québec


Cyril Falls in *The First World War* wrote that "no episode of the war is more poignant than the effort to force the Dardanelles." Robert Rhodes James, who wrote the classic account on Gallipoli concurred, but added that "[n]one, certainly, has aroused more controversy." It is evident from this latest work on the subject by Geoffrey Penn that the controversy continues with as much vitriol as ever accompanied the operation itself.

The problem of forcing the Dardanelles as a way of bringing pressure on Constantinople was nothing new. The British tried it successfully in 1807 under Admiral Duckworth, but even then it was fraught with difficulty, as the narrow confines of the Straits exposed an attacking naval force to the risks of enemy fire from the high ground on either side. Improvements in gunnery over the course of the nineteenth century made it even more dangerous. Lord Fisher realized as much when he was in command of the Mediterranean Fleet and later when he was First Sea Lord. A joint military and naval committee in 1907 reached a similar conclusion, as did First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill four years later. Why, then in 1915 did Britain's War Council approve so dangerous a venture?

In part, this is the question Geoffrey Penn sets out to explore. It is a well-travelled path and others with far greater scholarly competence have covered it much better. Of greater interest is the way Penn focuses on the difficult and sometimes stormy relationship between Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Fisher, his First Sea Lord. They had much in common: both were strong willed, ambitious and energetic. But they were also remarkably different, as Penn notes: "Churchill's eloquence and personal charm enabled him to overcome resistance based on knowledge and experience, reducing naval officers, untrained in the art of debate, to stuttering, incoherent and frustrated incompetence." Churchill, he says, thought of sea warfare as a "cavalry officer." (20) Fisher had strong opinions on naval matters and sixty years of experience but was intimidated by "smooth-tongued" politicians like Asquith and Churchill and inclined to brood. At times his behaviour could be quite erratic. When two such strong personalities clashed on so important an issue, it is not surprising that the outcome proved disastrous for both.

Penn has written this work to prove Fisher right and Churchill wrong over the Dardanelles. It ends up being a hagiography of Fisher and a polemic against Churchill. Fisher is given credit for resisting a fiasco and for insisting on joint operations. Churchill is seen as bull-headed and single minded, convinced even when the evidence is to the contrary that a naval assault could achieve a decisive result. In the end, of course, disaster overtook the naval assault. Indeed, the entire Gallipoli operation became a fiasco. Penn blames Churchill for ignoring good advice, being stubborn and domineering. The failure cost Churchill his political career, while Fisher resigned. Both scrambled after the event to get back into power but neither succeeded.
The Dardanelles operation was, of course, intended to resolve the dilemma of the Western Front, to remove Turkey from the war and to assist the Russians. There had been other proposals by Fisher, initially even backed by Churchill and some of the generals, to force a passage through the Baltic and land a force on the Pomerian coast. But as the war developed this option became fraught with difficulties similar to those at the Dardanelles: the presence of a hostile fleet, including submarines, mines and shore batteries, and the strong possibility of a resisted landing. It also required the decisive naval Armageddon involving the German Fleet that Fisher so desperately wanted but was to be denied. Nevertheless, that Baltic option continued to intrigue Fisher even after it was abandoned by Churchill. Penn is convinced that it might have worked, thereby shortening the war. Like the prewar navalists, he has bought into the argument that the Army was a "projectile to be fired by the Navy."

It is only at the end of his book, in a rather remarkable twist, that Penn acknowledges the contribution Churchill made to the war effort. He credits him with being the only politician with "an active determination to fight the war on Allied terms, rather than merely by sheer weight on the Western Front, but tried to do something about it." (238) As for the Dardanelles operation, "by the time Churchill succeeded in forcing Kitchener to agree to a military operation it was too late." He concluded poignantly, however, by giving Fisher much of the credit: "Fisher was his tutor."

As a study of the Dardanelles operation this book offers few new insights. As an examination of the relationship between two of the key players it fleshes out important detail, but the author's judgement is not always balanced or even fair.

David Facey-Crowther
St. John's, Newfoundland


The Bismarck saga and the sinking of HMS Hood remain popular subjects of World War II naval history, and potentially lucrative for the publisher. A book that promises a comprehensive explanation of the Battle of the Denmark Straits, and "for the first time a clear and accurate account" should be particularly successful, as it deserves to be //it contains new information and most important, is accurate. It was with much anticipation that the reviewer turned to the first page.

And with much annoyance that he finished the last paragraph. This is not a book which lives up to the usually impeccable standards of the publishers (Chatham Publishing in the UK, Naval Institute Press in North America), nor is this very slim volume worth the asking price. Most of the book is a fairly standard re-hash of the Bismarck story, concentrating on the action with HMS Hood and Prince of Wales. Winklareth does provide two wrinkles that are worth reading: first, he highlights the four-point alteration of course made by the German ships a few minutes before the action commenced. Second, he shows that several oft-used photographs of Bismarck during the action are usually printed in reverse. As well, his explanation of why Hood was firing at Prim Eugen instead of Bismarck is very well done. Winklareth's points are worth knowing about - if true. And this highlights the first two problems with this book: not only are there no footnotes but the only entries in the bibliography are fairly standard secondary sources. Notably absent is the article "The Loss of HMS Hood - A Re-Examination" by W. J. Jurens (Warship International, Number 2, 1987), which remains the most complete and thorough analysis of the battle. No primary sources, such as the data-rich and easily obtained gunnery report from HMS Rodney (in the Public Record Office) seem to have been used. In his discussion of the actions, the author makes frequent use of fairly precise predictions of time-of-flight. But without any footnotes it is impossible to determine just from where he gets his figures. Did he calculate the time-of-flight himself, or did he use range tables?

Also worrisome are the numerous errors in the main text. Some are trivial: Repulse was armed with twin turrets, not triples (60), for example. More seriously, the fatal explosions in the battlecruisers lost at Jutland did not occur because of shells penetrating to the magazines (19); the reasons why a sixteen-inch main armament for the new King George V class was rejected had nothing to do with "blast damage" (30); and he shows a poor understanding of Royal
Navy ethos if the supposed concern of Captain Leach at not firing at the ordered target (85) is any indication.

And then we get to Winklareth's analysis of the gunnery. Fortunately, most has been left to the appendix, where it can be easily ignored - it is at best misleading. Besides not knowing that both navies usually fired *salvoes* and not broadsides, the most glaring error is his belief that RN gunnery was based on waiting for each salvo to land before making the necessary corrections and firing the next. (87) This had not been done since the promulgation of the *1916 Spotting Rules*: he should have paid more attention to chapter 5 in Raven and Robert's *British Battleships of World War Two* (one of his sources). To his credit, he does provide a useful description of the workings of optical rangefinders, but in his explanation of the complete system he avoids any mention of the computing machinery used: the differences between *Hood*'s Dreyer Fire Control Table and the Admiralty Fire Control Table in the newer ships are significant. Neither is there any comparison of the different gunnery techniques and equipment of the German and Royal Navies.

This book *could* have been so much more. A great deal has been left out: no discussion of the non-participation in the Denmark Straits by *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* and the description of *Bismarck*’s final action is skimpy. Surely he was not worried about this slender volume being over large. "New light" this book certainly is not - you would be much better off renting the 1960 movie.

William Schleiaufh
Pierrefonds, Québec


The title of this work is misleading because, in writing a book about the Italian navy and fascist naval policy, the author has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the overall naval balance in the Mediterranean in the 1930s. Mallett does this by combining a traditional approach to naval history with a modern concern for showing its interrelationship with foreign and economic policy.

He correctly places naval policy as but one part of Mussolini's programme of imperial expansion and analyses how the navy was affected by the *Duce*’s plans for a greater Italian empire and, in turn, how effectively it was able to support that policy. He has little time for those revisionists who have argued that the *Duce* was little more than an opportunist with no deep-seated imperialist agenda. Mallett argues the reverse: that Mussolini’s imperial agenda is fundamental to understanding both Italian foreign policy and naval policy in the 1930s. After this opening, he charts the course of Italian naval policy, as Mussolini slowly brought Italy closer to the German orbit and as Britain replaced France as the principal enemy which the Italian navy prepared to face. He ends his narrative with Italy’s entry into the Second World War.

But this book is not just for those interested in Italian history. It is also valuable for those studying the history of British defence and naval policy in the 1930s. Of particular interest is the chapter on the Italian navy and the Abyssinian Crisis, which leads one to question British assumptions and policy-making during that period. Mallett shows that the Italian navy was clearly no match for the RN and would have lost any contest between the two in 1935-1936 decisively. Italian ships lacked the range to conductoperations across the Mediterranean, they were outgunned, inferior in numbers and the navy possessed few properly defended bases. It was further weakened by its dependence on land-based air support.

Embarrassed by this inability to challenge the RN, in the aftermath of the crisis the Italian naval staff proposed the idea of a *flotta d'evasione* capable of wresting control of the entrances to the Mediterranean from the British and thus truly making it a *mare nostrum*. In its conception, this scheme was fantastic, for it demanded the construction of nine or ten capital ships, four aircraft carriers, thirty-six cruisers and close to seventy-five submarines. This was clearly beyond the industrial and financial means of Italy. Instead, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the under-secretary for the navy, sensing Mussolini’s shift towards Germany, proposed a new policy predicated on less construction that was little more than a replacement scheme. While this course would still leave the Italian navy outnumbered, Cavagnari envisaged that an alliance with Germany could overcome this disadvantage. At that
point, Italian naval and foreign policy began to converge. The German navy, he hoped, could occupy enough British and French vessels in the North Sea and the Atlantic that Italy's relative position in the Mediterranean would improve.

Nevertheless, Italian industry remained unable to keep up to even Cavagnari's minimum programme and Mallett traces well how the combination of a lack of industrial infrastructure, finance and a constant shortage of raw materials kept delaying the completion of many ships, but especially the *Vittorio Veneto* battleships. All this begs the question of whether Italy could ever have hoped to pose a successful challenge to British and French control of the Mediterranean. The author believes that it could have done a better job had it focussed on taking advantage of its key location in the central Mediterranean and geared itself to cutting British lines of communication at their narrowest point. Given that trying to defeat the RN in a fleet encounter was so far beyond the resources of Italy, Mallett criticizes the Italian high command for not taking advantage of guerilla tactics. An emphasis on the use of submarines, torpedo boats and aircraft carriers, he argues, would have had the potential to disrupt British control of the Mediterranean. But the Italian naval high command, including Cavagnari, was committed to the capital ship. In Mallet's view, this left the Italian navy with little option at the start of the war but to adopt a "fleet in being" strategy. Awed by the RN, Cavagnari shelved plans for an offensive against Malta and confined the navy to a defensive role protecting communications with North Africa. Ultimately, this strategy doomed the Italian navy to defeat.

Orest Babij
Kingston, Ontario


Military operations in the Arctic are usually treated as appendages to other campaigns: Germany's conquest of Norway is granted a few paragraphs as an introduction to its invasion of the Low Countries and France; the convoy battles and operations of German battleships in northern waters are depicted as adjuncts of the Battle of the Atlantic; and the jockeying for the establishment of weather forecasting stations accorded a line or two in the examination of other topics.

Mark Evans brings these operations together in a single volume, describes them in detail, and argues by implication that they had a unity which makes the Arctic worthy of being considered a distinct theatre of operations. He writes from an Allied point of view, but analyses the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The *Kriegsmarine* was constantly short of fuel, lacked a significant air arm, received little support from the *Luftwaffe*, and lacked aggressive spirit. The British were as poorly prepared for operations in the Arctic. Prior to the outbreak of war poor liaison between scientists and the Royal Navy, and hidebound leadership, meant that the British entered the war with deficient anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare equipment and tactics.

Britain committed significant resources to Norway in 1940, but "Allied efforts were doomed due to unpreparedness, lack of air support, communication problems, indecisiveness, and the dispersal of effort between multiple targets."(46) The entire operation was undertaken for political reasons and was poorly conceived. Political expediency in the form of the necessity of keeping Russia in the war also meant that convoys would be sent around the North Cape carrying supplies to Murmansk and Archangel even if losses were staggeringly high: 7.5 percent of ships in Arctic convoys were lost, ten times the loss rate in Atlantic convoys. The author maintains that Russia could have been better supplied through the Persian Gulf, but regardless of the route, he believes that "Russia would probably have survived without western aid, and [thus that] all these sacrifices were for naught." (138) Indeed, what saved the Allies in the Arctic was nothing that they did themselves, but Hitler's failure to understand naval warfare and Göring's disregard of the German navy's need for air support.

Evans draws most of his information from English-language secondary sources, and there is little new in his book, but he brings together in one place coverage of virtually all British and German military and naval operations in the Arctic during World War II. He could have made his work more complete by also including additional information concerning Norwegian opposition to Germany's invasion and the operations of the Norwegian resistance. This limitation aside,
Evans provides a highly readable analysis of a too often overlooked portion of World War II.

James C. Bradford
Bryan, Texas


Kemp's short book provides a good overview of the design and technical aspects of the midget submarines used during the Second World War in all their various configurations. The author also provides a good summary of the various strategic concepts that accompanied their development. The discussion of actual operations is brief, however, with one or two highlights discussed and then generally a quick summary of overall activity. While it is not unusual for specialist books to focus on certain aspects of their subjects, the title of this volume might be considered slightly misleading since it fails to note a focus on technical and conceptual issues and an intention to cover operations only briefly.

In the introduction the author identifies the key themes he traces through the book. First he provides three sub-classifications of midget submarines: human torpedoes, small submersibles and true midget submarines. The human torpedoes, according to Kemp, are the Italian Maiale ("pig") and the British Chariot. The submersibles he counts as the German Neger and, somewhat confusingly, the Japanese Kaiten, which he also refers to as a human torpedo in his text. (54) Most historical accounts also refer to Kaiten as human torpedoes. It is not entirely clear why Kemp uses the labels he does for his taxonomy, as the difference between human torpedoes and submersibles is clearly very fine. He defines submersibles as "craft which use their ability to submerge to undertake their operations and protect them from detection and counter-attack." (39) Surely this applied to both human torpedoes and submersibles. The reader is left to infer that the difference is possibly that Kemp's human torpedoes were open to the elements, while his submersibles were enclosed (often with fatal, asphyxiating, results for the operators of Negers). The actual midget submarines are the Japanese Ko-Hyoteki, the Italian CA/CB types, the British X-Craft and the German Seehund. He further classifies these designs into the "practical," the "enthusiastically designed but impractical," and the "suicidal either by accident or design." (11)

The book begins with an account of the midget submarine's origin in the Italian Navy in the First World War, leading to a discussion of that Navy's remarkable successes in the use of these weapons during the Second World War. The Italian effort at developing midget submarines clearly predated the Second World War. The only other navy to proactively develop a midget capability was the Japanese, which undertook a sophisticated effort to create midget submarines capable of engaging American warships in the "decisive battle" anticipated in any future conflict with that nation. The Japanese Ko-Hyoteki was a remarkable effort to develop a capability in response to a strategic concept. Unfortunately, many of the assumptions upon which it was based proved flawed, and the Japanese midget submarine force never operated as anticipated.

The other midget developments were reactive efforts. The British were so impressed by Italian successes that they began their own midget program in response. The British X-Craft subsequently took midget submarine operations to a level of sophistication and success that can still be seen as the standard even today. The Germans, on the other hand, developed a series of midget submarines as desperate expedients in an effort to find some way of stopping the Allied naval juggernaut. Though the German effort diverted Allied escorts and aircraft from other activities, their successes were few. Their losses, mainly from self-destruction through marine accident or poor design, were appalling.

A short summary of postwar midget developments is also included. This summarizes briefly the efforts of the UK, US and USSR. There is also a one-page discussion of the other nations that have midget submarines, a surprisingly lengthy list: Yugoslavia, Croatia, Colombia, Libya, Sweden, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.

The pictures and line drawings throughout the book are superb, and are worth a look for anyone interested in the subject. The sources, as the author notes, are somewhat limited for this
area of research, but Kemp has made good use of what is available. There are a limited number of footnotes that provide some direction for further research and a short, reasonable bibliography.

This is not likely a book for everyone. Those interested in the design, technical and strategical background of midget submarines will be well pleased. Readers seeking a history of midget submarine operations should look elsewhere.

Doug McLean
Ottawa, Ontario


This groundbreaking new study examines the backgrounds and training of U-boat crews. A specialist in German war records at the US National Archives, Dr. Tim Mulligan has for years been mining these holdings and other records for information on those who manned the U-boats. He has interviewed former German submariners, absorbed their lore at reunions, and gathered basic biographical data from over 1100 U-boat officers and men by means of a questionnaire. Finally, the author has made extensive use of the vast literature available in English and German.

Readers familiar with Mulligan's earlier writings will recognise some findings, but this new book has delved deeper into census figures and sociological studies. His questionnaire provided reinforcing data on the civilian backgrounds of ratings, the fact that they were drawn from all over Germany in proportions roughly matching the overall population, and his earlier discovery that about sixty percent had worked in the metal working trades. The data show that the profile for officers was different: about half (compared with twenty-eight percent of enlisted personnel) were from North Germany. Mulligan demonstrates that there was considerable continuity in the upper middle-class backgrounds of officers of the Imperial Navy and that of the thirty, but that over time education levels at entry had increased. Interestingly, one quarter were sons of army or naval officers. Not surprisingly, the expansion of the navy in the late 1930s and during the war was achieved by increasing the proportion of cadets from middle- and working-class backgrounds.

*Neither Sharks Nor Wolves* includes a chapter surveying the wartime employment of U-boats which like the rest of the book is based firmly on extensive sources. Mulligan explains how several generations of U-boat sailors were required because of heavy attrition and describes how the training system expanded and underwent modifications. He shows that forty percent of the trained personnel available in September 1939 were lost during the first twelve months of war and argues that even had new boats been produced in larger numbers by 1941 the U-boat arm would have been unable to man them. Indeed, during the first months of war, trials and work-up training for new boats were cut to two months to increase operational strength. Heavy losses of new boats then forced a return to longer training periods; even as late as 1944, an average of six months or more was allocated to the trials and training of the last batches of type VII boats. The ages of U-boat crews became an issue in Germany after the late 1970s when Lothar-Günther Buchheim alleged in his novel *Das Boot* that "little more than children" were sacrificed. Dr. Mulligan shows that on assuming command officers were on average in their late twenties (26.7 to 29.5 years old) and that two-thirds or more of ratings were between twenty and twenty-four.

Other authors have too easily identified Admiral Dönitz as virtually making all key decisions about every aspect of U-boat operations. By throwing light on Admiral von Friedeburg, responsible throughout the war for organisation and training, and others, Mulligan’s study creates a far more nuanced picture of the submarine arm.

The author concludes that the U-boat arm was "a warrior elite skilled in technology, egalitarian in spirit, dedicated in combat, and faithful unto death." (236) In addition to discussing the background, training, operational experiences and even the postwar fortunes of German submariners, Mulligan ventures into contentious issues such as the influence of National Socialism on the navy, awareness of the government's genocide policies, and the treatment of allied survivors. Here primary sources are scarce. The writer explains that letters, diaries and other personal papers will not emerge for study for some time and that the U-boat veterans' attitudes to wartime
events "remain intensely private." (244) When discussing moral issues Mulligan comes across as an advocate if not an apologist for the "warrior elite" he has studied in such detail. Now that more than half a century has passed since the war, we are aware that both sides made decisions which are indefensible morally (e.g., area bombing by the Allies), but the author seems reluctant to call a spade a spade. For example, a directive by Dönitz in October 1943 that sinking convoy rescue ships would be of "great value" in "the desired destruction of ships' crews" (212) is written off as "academic" because by that time the U-boats were no longer able to pose a sustained threat to convoys.

The Naval Institute Press has produced this book in its trademark sturdy binding. Unfortunately, the reproduction of the photographs is poor, a pity because they have been selected with care. The text is dense with facts and therefore requires careful reading.

Based as it is on impeccable and extensive research and painstaking analyses, Neither Sharks Nor Wolves fully merits the term "authoritative." This valuable profile of the U-boat service will likely become a standard reference in English.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


In the vast literature covering the Battle of the Atlantic, Wiggins uses an approach not often seen: a collection of interviews with German submariners, with emphasis on the experiences of what may be called ordinary people rather than the heroes found in most other books, although recollections of some U-Boat commanders are also included. The intent was laudable, but the results are as mixed as the contributors to this book. Nevertheless, it is very readable and entertaining. It succeeds in capturing the spirit and attitude of German submariners in general. The stories show a desire for adventure, pride in having fulfilled obligations and happiness at having survived against improbable odds.

Most of the twenty-one chapters are structured around literal quotations by the veterans interviewed, interspersed with the author's condensed interpretations of other remarks. The latter, however, often seem to suffer from either a misunderstanding between interviewer and interviewees, perhaps due to language, or an uncritical acceptance of every word the author heard. For the most part these weaknesses will not affect the enjoyment for the casual reader. But when it results in statements that some of the WWII training submarines were constructed and used in World War I - which is absurd - or that there were only three survivors of the battleship *Bismarck* (when there were actually more than a hundred), the reader is given dangerously incorrect information. More research by the author, using easily available sources, could have avoided such errors.

The book also suffers from the problem of real and perceived recollections fifty years after the events. Trying to remember my experiences as a German submariner, I have been surprised by how often what I thought to be true was in fact false. It must also be asked whether crewmen whose activities during missions were mostly limited to an almost automatic and repetitive succession of simple tasks are qualified to generalize about the operations of submarines.

It is interesting to note that many of the veterans seem to consider their life stories to be of far greater interest than their experiences on a submarine in action. Considering the fact that life on a submarine on patrol was to a great extent sheer boredom, only occasionally interrupted by short periods of intensive action, this attitude is quite understandable. The excitement of escape from a prisoner-of-war camp, of visits to nightclubs between missions, and of dealing with the aftermath of a lost war all seem more memorable than the actual war. One of the adventurers never even set foot on a submarine, but does he have stories to tell? I gained the impression that a few of the interviewees could be straight descendants of the notorious eighteenth-century raconteur, Baron von Munchhausen.

The book left me with mixed feelings. To a great extent it is a fascinating collection of real and little-known events, the journey of the Indian nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose on a U-boat to a rendezvous with a Japanese submarine in the Indian Ocean for one. As well, the reader will occasionally be well entertained by some
imaginative flights of fancy, obviously needed to augment failing memories. The reader must unfortunately decide for himself what is history and what is fiction.

Werner Hirschmann
Toronto, Ontario


That submariners are a special breed of seaman comes through loud and clear in this memoir. Part history, part autobiography, it tells of his experiences with the US Navy Submarine Service during the Second World War and its evolution into the massive nuclear-powered arm it is today.

Edward "Ned" Beech is the author of fifteen books, notably the best-seller Run Silent, Run Deep. Though it is a strongly personal account, Beech manages to avoid hogging the limelight. This is no small feat of modesty, considering that he fought in the Battle of Midway, carried out numerous war patrols, and earned ten decorations for gallantry in combat.

Beech had a "good war." Graduating from the Naval Academy in 1939, just as the Second World War began, he spent his first two years of service in the North Atlantic as communications officer aboard one of the old four-piper destroyers that were hastily reactivated. His ship was part of the Neutrality Patrol, cruising back and forth to establish a presence. We learn that neutrality was a slender reed for Americans at that time. Beech tells how he decoded a message to all US naval vessels in the area ordering that if they encountered Bismarck they should follow and send hourly reports. Bismarck at the time was the focus of a search by the Royal Navy, which eventually found and sank it.

A few days after the US entered the war in 1941, Beech was graduated from training for submarine service. We learn in passing that this hazardous duty was simply an assignment, not some kind of romantic volunteerism. The author gives an excellent overview of the early naval battles between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the American, British, Dutch, and Australian fleets. Though not present himself, Beech clarifies the operations. He mourns the necessity of sacrificing so many fine ships and men in defending the Dutch East Indies in a struggle that was doomed from the start. He has scathing opinions about the ineptitude of the Dutch admiral in command.

When the tide of war at sea turned, US submarines played an important role. Beech survived no fewer than twelve patrols in the Pacific. Inclusion of excerpts from action reports gives a sense of what was involved in those underwater attacks. Yet there is surprisingly little insight into the conditions of life aboard the boats.

Beech's achievements in peacetime were also impressive, as naval aide to President Dwight Eisenhower and later helping Admiral Hyman Rickover to develop the nuclear submarine programme. One does not have to be a naval buff to be appalled at some of the fatuous squabbling that went on at the highest levels of command. Pettiness and jealousy between commanders and politicians sometimes threatened to ruin the US Navy's preparedness. The author reveals details of how the most serious of these delayed and complicated the introduction of nuclear submarines during the tensest period of the Cold War.

Beech's closing chapters foresee a grim possibility in future wars as a result of the nuclear submarine, which he describes as "absolutely the most terrifying ocean-going vehicle of all time, armed with some of the most fearsome, most easily concealable, most readily usable weapons ever conceived by an uneasy mankind." He predicts that at the outset of any general war between the superpowers the oceans will immediately be emptied of all commercial-type ships.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


At the instigation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US Navy in 1941 purchased and converted two small merchant ships to serve as decoy
or Q-ships. This book is the story of these two ships, USS Asterion and Atik, in the Battle of the Atlantic. They were commissioned into the US Navy and secretly fitted with concealed armaments; their mission was to attract, and then destroy by gunfire, a surfaced U-boat. On 23 March 1942, the two Q-ships sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire to begin operations against German U-boats attacking allied shipping off the east coast. USS Atik was almost immediately sunk by U-123 on 27 March after sustaining two torpedo hits and engaging in a gun battle; there were no survivors. The circumstances of this sinking are less than clear and there is a possibility that U-105 may also have played a role. Meanwhile, on its first voyage Asterion sailed through areas off the American east coast where U-boats were operating but made no contact with the enemy; this pattern was repeated on subsequent cruises. In October 1943, without ever having come into contact with a U-boat, Asterion's career as a Q-ship ended.

This book is certainly clearly written and its prose flows easily, and sections are based on extensive research in American archives. Q-Ships versus U-Boats therefore throws light on a little-known aspect of American naval history. Nevertheless, it also raises a basic question about the writing of history since, in the absence of any documentary or other historical sources, the author uses his imagination to reconstruct the loss of Atik. Kenneth M. Beyer was supply officer in Asterion, and states in his preface that the chapter on the loss of Atik "is the story of what probably happened. It is not however, fiction. It is based on actual events. Reasonable conjecture, plus my first hand knowledge of the USS Atik/SS Carolyn and the men who served in her, formed the foundations for my conclusions." (xiii) We live in the age of the television docudrama in which history and fiction are becoming increasingly intertwined. Perhaps the most notorious recent example of this is Edmund Morris' biography of Ronald Reagan.

In recent years there have been a number of books which claim to be histories of events in the Battle of the Atlantic, based on primary sources but also containing fictionalized elements. The authors of these books all claim, in various ways, that the employment of the techniques in fiction is the only way their particular subject can be adequately portrayed. Nevertheless, the embedding of a fictional element within a book that claims to be a work of history raises a fundamental question about the writing of history. Can authors, like Edmund Morris or Kenneth M. Beyer, of books which are partly history yet at the same time partly fiction or "reasonable conjecture," claim to be writing history? If the answer is yes, the next question obviously is what amount of such a book can be fictionalized before it becomes something else than history? This reviewer thinks it best that historians avoid the necessity of having to answer the second question by the simple expedient of leaving the writing of fiction to novelists. With this important proviso, the work of Kenneth M. Beyer is an interesting contribution to the history of the Battle of the Atlantic, at least as far as the documented part of the book is concerned.

David Syrett
Flushing, New York


With the end of the century upon us, one has to admit that aircraft have been the dominant military weapon of the last half-century. They made their first appearance just after the dawn of this century, and only the most radical of their earliest proponents could foresee that their descendants would challenge all of mankind's other weapons for control of the battlefield. This volume focuses on one aspect of this development, the substantial and substantive increase in the importance of aircraft in naval warfare. Its author participated in some of the most crucial naval battles fought in the Pacific, and this is his first major publication.

The 399 pages of this volume cover the period from the birth of heavier-than-air military aviation, which came quickly upon the heels of the Wright brothers' success, to the end of World War II. The author has added a concluding chapter that summarizes post-1945 developments through the Falkland Islands dispute and Desert Storm. The volume is indexed and features relatively voluminous notes and a comprehensive bibliography. It also includes a significant number
of maps and photographs. The latter are scattered throughout the volume, and they generally compliment the text effectively. While few of them are original, they at least bear the mark of careful selection. One very nice touch is that the publisher has included the official archive negative number for many - but not all - of these images.

In general, the work is arranged in chronological order, and it places a greater emphasis on battle rather than design history. For the most part, the author manages to convey his passion for naval carrier aviation while presenting a balanced account of its rise to prominence. His summary of the design characteristics and battle tactics of the powers that built - or planned to build - these planes shows signs of detailed research. The text also adequately covers the development and use of radar, and the vital evolution of aircraft control officers. In addition, he also discusses the relative merits of the AAA weapons and aircraft of the major powers during World War II.

There are, however, several minor weaknesses of both detail and scope. The narrative is presented in a lively, almost argumentative fashion, which gives the volume a distinctive, colourful flow. But this is also its major weakness. Another drawback is the book's heavy focus on carrier aviation, as opposed to the role of land-based aircraft. While he does cover the isolated key feats of land-based aircraft, such as the sinking of _Roma_ and _Tirpitz_, this aspect is largely under-represented. In particular, the section on the loss of _Roma_ seems to have been inserted almost as an afterthought. Another example is his critical observation that the USN and RN failed to emulate the Japanese tactic of relying on the catapult seaplanes of cruisers and battleships for reconnaissance, thereby effectively reducing their attack capacity. He is clearly not a fan of the Royal Navy's armoured carriers, and maintains that their extra protection only served to restrict the number of aircraft that they could deploy. One is also tempted to ask why key behind-the-scenes players like Admiral John H. Towers of the USN are not even mentioned in the narrative. In terms of details, one has to wonder about which sources he actually consulted for warship AAA armament. For example, _Prinz Eugen_ carried twelve, not ten, 105-mm. guns and _Bismarck_ certainly never carried the total of thirty-six twenty-mm. guns he asserts.

Overall, this work offers an entertaining, though slightly biased view of the history and role played by aircraft - particularly carrier aircraft - at sea during World War II. Given the author's penchant to concentrate on carrier aviation, it cannot be seen as the definitive description of the role of aircraft on the high seas. Nonetheless, it is a good beginning.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Dollard des Ormeaux, Québec


Destroyer escorts were built in greater numbers than any other Allied warship type and of these the _Buckley-class_ was the most numerous. In fact, as a class, the _Buckleys_ were the third most numerous of all warships after the _Fletcher-class_ destroyer and the _Gato-class_ submarine. Despite its relatively late entry into the war, the _Buckley-class_ played an important role and amassed an impressive combat record. Indeed, this class of warship has an impressive number of "firsts, mosts, and fastests" to its credit that are not well known. Now, thanks to the very fine work of Bruce Franklin, an excellent record of this little-known but significant class of warship has been produced. With only rare exceptions, this appears to be a uniformly first-rate work that will join the ranks of the best books of its type.

Franklin strikes a good balance between the descriptions of the _Buckley-class_' technical development and its operational history. Neither aspect is over-emphasised. The result is an efficient and economical treatment of the subject that leaves the reader satisfied. But, beyond the scope of the ship itself, Franklin's treatment of the historical background to the war in the Atlantic is a concise and masterful account that considers all political, military, and economic elements, from the strategic to the tactical. This information is of great significance in understanding the British-American cooperative planning that brought the destroyer escort concept to maturity. Many will consider this the greatest value of the book.
The physical arrangement of the volume contains many noteworthy devices. The technique of placing small vignettes from veterans and quotations from various sources into highlighted, box-like areas, is both visually appealing and an effective way of maintaining the reader's interest that does not detract from the main text. Likewise, the captions below the numerous photographs and diagrams are filled with interesting information that adds greatly to the main body of the text. This is particularly true in the book's second section, where an extraordinary photographic record of every one of the 154 Buckleys is presented. The deft selection of photographs provides a varied and highly instructive treatment of every stage of the ships' development, employment, and eventual demise. Here again, the photo captions add significantly to the impressiveness of the collection. The book is completed by a series of very detailed annexes that provide a wealth of data that is of value and interest. In all, this is a very fine book. Yet the few shortcomings of this work need mentioning as they are significant and prevent it from being rated truly outstanding.

Despite the presence of many fine tables, the basic characteristics and dimensions of the Buckley-class are not set out in this fashion. Rather, they are "buried" in the text, and the reader is forced to hunt for them when the predictable desire to make comparisons with similar warship classes arises. Franklin does very little of this comparative analysis for us. When he does, the data presented are occasionally misleading. An example is Franklin's attempt to show how the tight turning radius of the Buckley-class was a tactical advantage versus submarines. (17) Rather than compare it to a representative enemy submarine class, which had already been identified, the turning circles of River-class frigates and Fletcher-class destroyers are used, all of which are given for widely differing speeds. The result is data that cannot be used for accurate comparison. The saddest weakness of this book is the very small scale of the ships' drawings and the minuscule font of the text used on them. (22-27) Six pages are wasted because the intricate detail and print is so small as to be illegible. This is a great shame and one wonders why, with so much effort and space put into the photographic record, more space could not have been made available for these important drawings?

Despite these errors and shortcomings, The Buckley-Class Destroyer Escorts is a welcome and worthy addition to this type of naval literature. Franklin has claimed a place for himself among the elite writers in this category and his next effort is awaited with great anticipation. The book deserves a place in any good reference library and is a welcome addition to my personal collection.

Ken Hansen
Toronto, Ontario


From its handsome dust jacket to its extensive bibliography, this book is a delight. In Battleship and Cruiser Aircraft of the United States Navy 1910-1949, William Larkins has produced a seminal work on the comparatively poorly-documented use of observation aircraft in conjunction with major classes of warship in the U.S.N. It fully justifies the well-established reputation of its author as one of the leading experts on the subject of naval aviation in the United States Navy.

Larkins breaks his treatment of the subject into six chapters complemented by seventeen appendices. The chapters provide a survey of the use of shipboard aircraft in the U.S.N.; illustrate several of the practical operational issues to be solved; detail the intricate and colourful marking schemes used; describe experimental types; provide detail on the operational deployment of aircraft and squadrons; and cover the use of aircraft aboard smaller vessels.

Each chapter is illustrated with a comprehensive selection of photographs culled from over 700,000 reviewed by the author's team. They are significant not only for the information they provide on the aircraft and the environments in which they were used but also for the coverage
they provide on the ships themselves. The black and white photographs, many of which are magnificent in detail and reproduction, are a major strength, but by no means the book's only one.

The first chapter provides a brief overview of the introduction, growth, operational use in peace and war and ultimate demise of shipboard observation aircraft in the USN. This covers much familiar ground, but the specialist nature of the subject permits the inclusion of more detailed information than is normally found in standard works on naval aviation. The chapter concludes by noting that the role of the observation aircraft was superseded by the introduction of new technologies in the form of radar and the helicopter, and that the breed faded away except for several survivors in museums and on the decks of preserved battleships.

For those interested in such exotica, the third chapter provides a gold mine of information on the markings and colours applied to observation aircraft during four main periods: pre-1925, 1925-1940, 1940-1946 and postwar. This includes an exhaustive set of tables on the correct tail and side-markings of aircraft aboard USS Portland during the 1930s, the colourful "Golden Age."

A short treatment of experimental types is followed by the main section of the book, which in 106 pages provides extensive detail on the status of aircraft, squadrons and ships annually for each year between 1924 and 1949. This is a prodigious compilation from a variety of sources, providing a dramatic picture of the expansion of the USN during the war years. The accompanying photographs are particularly excellent, showing many of the ships, aircraft and operational bases, as well as a host of accidents and little-known episodes.

The final chapter rounds out the story with excellent detail on unusual deployments and experiments on ships not normally associated with observation aircraft. The appendices cover a variety of topics, such as squadron assignments, aircraft assignments, accident reviews and aircraft performance characteristics. These reflect the exhaustive mining of aircraft cards and other records accomplished by Larkins and his team over many years.

There is little to criticise with this volume. There are occasional typographic errors, lapses in the consistent treatment of ships' names and, on at least one page of the review copy, the print quality was poor. Overall, however, this is a book with high production values. A colour component would have been welcome, but this subject has been dealt with elsewhere by John Elliott. This book belongs on the shelf of anyone with the slightest interest in naval aviation. At its reasonable price, there is no excuse not to own a copy.

Christopher J. Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


This collection of essays, edited by E.T. Wooldridge a former aviator in the US Navy and a respected historian, is a first-hand account of the birth of American naval aviation during the interwar period, the so-called "Golden Age" of naval aviation. Rear-Admiral Jackson R. Tate, Vice Admirals Alfred M. Pride and Herbert D. Riley, and Admirals John S. Thach and Thomas H. Moorer, among others, relive in their own words the creation of the naval air branch, training, the development of tactics and doctrine, and the striking improvements in technology prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. The experience gained by these officers during and following the First World War laid the groundwork not only for their own success but also that of the navy and marine corps during World War II. That said, there were failures as the naval aviation community struggled to find its role (the USN's brief flirtation with rigid airships and gliders comes to mind). This is a fascinating story and fills an important gap in the history of US naval aviation.

The book consists of sixteen chapters, divided chronologically into three parts: World War I; the 1920s; and the 1930s. Wooldridge furnishes a brief contextual piece which sets the tone for the chapters that follow. The first two chapters trace the early development of US aviation during and immediately following the First World War. Chapters three through seven cover the "roaring twenties" and focus upon carrier and seaplane operations, the Three Sea Hawks aerobatic team and barnstorming, and the less well-known story
of the navy's gliders. Chapters eight through sixteen, which comprise the bulk of the book, cover the decade before the Second World War, paying particular attention to navigation and exploration, the marriage of the lighter-than-air to the heavier-than-air community, technological improvements in aircraft types, squadron operations, and evolving tactics.

The experiences of these men were typical of the period, though not always exciting. They flew seaplanes and land planes, and served in ships ranging from seaplane tenders to cruisers, battleships and carriers. Most performed routine tasks, at remote air stations far from the prying eyes of Washington, DC, but nevertheless important work. Distance gave these officers a measure of independence and allowed them to hone their skills as pilots. Flying in mechanically unreliable machines, with limited navigation equipment and often frightful weather conditions, these men pushed their aircraft and themselves to the edge. That more men were not lost is attributable to their competence and, in some cases, sheer nerve.

This reviewer found the chapters on the USS Langley, the navy's first carrier, to be particularly insightful. Admirals Pride and Tate's descriptions of the trial-and-error process - for there is no other way to describe it - of designing and installing a suitable arresting gear-and-barrier system was crucial to the navy's success. What the USN learned aboard Langley was later incorporated into other carriers. Similarly, the development of a deck-lighting system in the 1920s would eventually permit round-the-clock operations. Equally fascinating was the story of how the landing signal officer's position came into being. These two developments would significantly improve carrier operations and cut-down on casualties - both material and personnel. Innovations such as these ensured the survival of the aircraft carrier.

Meanwhile, equally important lessons were being learned about the importance of training naval aviators in the fine art of navigation. In today's world of on-board computers and global positioning satellites, it is hard to image a time when pilots literally flew by the seat of their pants and had to find their way by celestial navigation and dead-reckoning. Flying over vast distances, particularly over water, creates a whole new set of problems for pilots. One is struck by the lack of knowledge and experience the navy actually had in long-distance flights and why, given the location of bases, this situation developed.

Vice-Admiral Herbert D. Riley noted that "[t]here is some justification, but very little, for this lack of appreciation for cross-country flights and training for the, due to the nature of the planes then existing. Their short-legged characteristics in themselves, impaired the development of the concept of their use for transcontinental flight. But I think in retrospect, at least, that it was extremely short-sighted for the people laying out curricula to overlook the tremendous possibilities for distance flying that were inherent in aviation. I don't think that they give it any significant thought, particularly the navy, where they would be flying from ships at sea and doing navigation by methods heretofore used in ships, and not by 'contact flying' by identification of landmarks."

In the early 1930s the USN was forced to devote more of its resources to the west coast because of the military threat posed by Japan. This, in turn, led to a series of cross-country flights between San Diego, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, in order to have its planes overhauled. Apparently the maintenance facilities at Norfolk "were being starved to death" because of the unbalanced division of assets. The first flights, according to Admiral Riley, were harrowing to say the least. At the time, comprehensive aviation charts of the United States did not exist, and the pilots had to rely on road maps supplied by oil companies for their cross-country flights. Nevertheless, the knowledge acquired by the naval aviators who took part in these flights would serve the navy well in the coming conflict. Indeed, those officers would later serve as future USN instructors.

This book makes for interesting reading and offers new insight into the formative years of naval aviation. That said, the writing in places is somewhat uneven and could have benefited from additional editing. There are an impressive collection of photographs that accompany the text. Wooldridge has also furnished a select chronology of US naval aviation from 1910 until 1941, which is particularly useful as a reference tool. So, too, is the glossary. My only criticism of the book, and a minor one at that, is that the reader would have benefited from a conclusion that placed both the accomplishments and the failures of US naval aviation in their proper context.

Shawn Cafferky
Victoria, British Columbia

Robert Cressman has produced a revised version of the 1955 classic work of the same name. The original was a rarity in the libraries and resource shelves of institutions, so this new edition will provide an opportunity for readers to own their own copy. At only US $45.00 it is a smart purchase and a very worthwhile and useful addition to the bookshelf of any serious scholar who researches or teaches about the Second World War. At the same time, this book will be of great utility to general readers interested in knowing what the USN did during that conflict. Now, with little effort, the reader can add context to other works that are more detailed in their analysis of specific naval events or identify important, collateral actions that make the naval history of the United States in that war easy to follow.

This updated version differs from the original in some very important ways, reflecting the knowledge of the fields of maritime and naval history that the author brought to the project. Where the original work was largely a list of ship losses with a minimum of analysis or description, let alone narrative, this new edition has a far more detailed acknowledgment of the role of small naval units, such as cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, landing craft and transports, along with the to be expected tales of submarines, carriers, and battleships. Enemy vessels, both damaged and lost (such as the losses inflicted on the French Navy in November 1942) are also now to be found in these pages, another useful and thoughtful correction to the original.

US torpedo boat and small ship actions against blockade runners in the Mediterranean, along with the more famous Pacific actions discussed in the original, are now present. Merchant shipping and its role in the conflict, so central to the winning of the war and the topic of much recent historical research, has found its rightful place within the work. Such a change reflects the increased importance given to the period 1939-1941 in this new version, recognizing the role of contraband, blockade and embargo in the formulation of British and American relations during that time. The American submarine fleet, completely absent from the original, has finally surfaced in Cressman’s work, taking its proper place as a vital arm of the USN in the war. Also, the use of aircraft against ships, as well as mining operations and their results, are included.

The terminology of the book is exacting and accurate, leaving little ambiguity or confusion on the part of the reader as to what is meant by either the term or the description. Sub-textual commentary about important conferences, staff relations, alliance problems, enemy intentions, and a myriad of useful details help make this an actual "read" as opposed to merely a listing. Germane illustrations and a handy glossary and bibliography complete the book and make it easy to use as a reference. The amount of work required to amass this sort of detail, while providing that useful contextual information and material, is certainly worth acknowledging, and Robert Cressman is to be commended for doing a most thorough and scholarly job. Many areas of future naval or maritime historical research can be discovered by a careful gleaning of these pages, thus also making it a useful tool for graduate students searching for topics.

Overall, the production quality and materials of this book are first-rate. With a work such as this, individuals want a product that will stand the test of time, both academically and physically. Readers will not be disappointed with this carefully thought-out and nicely constructed piece.

Greg Kennedy
Kingston, Ontario


On 29 March 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy battleship *Yamato*, the largest battleship ever built, set out from its base at Kure, Japan for its first mission of World War II. It proved to be *Yamato’s* only combat mission, as on 7 April it came under determined, fierce and incessant air attack from the United States Navy. After several hours of desperate combat, *Yamato* sank at 1423, taking most of its crew down as well.

But not all the crew perished. Aboard was a young naval officer, Yoshida Mitsuru, who was rescued by a Japanese destroyer and returned to a
Japanese naval hospital on Sasebo Island. After the war, Mitsuru wrote an evocative memoir of Yamato's first and fatal mission. Originally suppressed by censors, Mitsuru waited until the Allied occupation of Japan ended and subsequently published the first version of this book in 1952. In later years, Mitsuru periodically published later revisions to it. One year before his death in 1979, Mitsuru issued this, the final and definitive edition of the "death ride" of Yamato. This edition was first published in the US in 1985 and in Great Britain in 1999.

"Evocative" is the only word to describe Mitsuru's memoir. He titled it correctly: a "Requiem." The writing of this book is accurately described in the introduction - a "prose-poem," composed of many short entries that give the narrative a poetic effect. This is a rare, first-person look at the crew of a fighting ship, written in all the emotion that the death of his colleagues could inspire. Even those who fought on the other side could not help but be moved by Mitsuru's descriptions of the incessant attacks on his ship. Mitsuru knew from the first that Yamato's mission was likely a one-way trip to death and destruction. Undoubtedly many other members of the crew felt the same way.

The result, then, is an almost poetic narrative of men going knowingly to their death. Mitsuru included many human moments of Yamato's mission: the California-born nisei (Japanese-American) who was trapped in Japan at the war's outbreak receiving a rare letter from his mother in the US wishing him well; the image of Yamato's captain, going down with his ship and simultaneously eating a biscuit; the physical discipline used on crew members by officers and by senior officers upon more junior ones.

Surrounding it all is the terror of deadly accurate air attacks: explosions, damage to the ship, pieces of flesh of dead crewmen scattered about Yamato, and the ending, when those still in the water saw Yamato's hull turn skyward and then fall forever to the depths. On that dead ship were some 3000 Japanese sailors who never saw their homeland again.

Over the years, response to Mitsuru's various editions has varied: some have said that the book represents one of the great writings engendered by the Pacific War. Still others, most notably Japanese critic Eto Jun, feel that the original 1952 version was more accurate in representing Mitsuru's feelings and as such was better literature. The debate can be explained in this manner: the 1952 edition was one of the first writings of the Pacific War to originate from the Japanese perspective. In the intervening nearly fifty years, we have had many more writings expressing the Japanese view, including Saburo Sakai's Samurai, Inoguchi's and Nakajima's The Divine Wind and John Toland's magisterial The Rising Sun, which though written by an American, showed the Pacific War from the Japanese viewpoint. Thus, Mitsuru's Requiem for Battleship Yamato has lost some of its novelty.

Still, despite the passage of time, this book cannot fail to involve its readers. The horror of war is well expressed and the terrible casualties of naval war are perfectly illustrated. It remains a powerful testament to a great ship and a great crew. But more, it is a powerful lesson to those too-quickly disposed to seek military solutions to mankind's problems.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Most readers will be acquainted to some degree with the sweeping carrier operations of the United States Navy in the Second World War; dripping with drama, they were sometimes captured on film usable in documentaries and even Hollywood movies. Other types of carrier operation, involving far fewer aircraft and shrouded in cloud or darkness, may be less familiar, at least to the lay reader; it is the history of these missions that Charles H. Brown relates in Dark Sky, Black Sea: Aircraft Carrier Night and All-Weather Operations.

Divided into nine main chapters, this narrative takes the long view, from the 1920s to the early 1990s, and though not analytical to any great degree, Brown's story is highly detailed, especially as regards technical issues. In the immediate postwar period, for example, "new aviators found that the standard combat airplanes
The Northern Mariner

- Bearcats, Corsairs, Skyraiders, and the early jets - were ill-equipped for instrument flying. Because of the cockpit design, pilots could not easily scan their basic flying instruments. Partially because of poor equipment, when night fell or clouds appeared most fighter and attack pilots attended to their collateral duties or broke out the acey-deucy gameboards." (48) In describing such developments as angled flight decks, catapults, missiles, and the A-6 attack aircraft, Brown thus manages to translate technical complexities into readable prose, so that one need not be an expert in aviation issues to understand the developments he describes.

A word of warning, however, as on occasion the author slips into naval-speak, with such comments as "while the night fighters were moving into the jet era in the mid-1950s, VC-33 and VC-35 still flew ADs in VAD detachments on all CVA and CVB deployments, filling night attack, ASW, and ECM missions." (99) But to be fair, the author provides a glossary, though there is no list of abbreviations, sometimes forcing the less expert reader (like this reviewer) to hunt through the index for definitions.

Still, these are minor issues, and there is an interesting, intelligently-presented story in Dark Sky, Black Sea. Only experimental in the interwar period, and little understood during the Pacific Campaign, night fighters had to await the postwar era to become a true arm of carrier operations. As a one-time night-fighter pilot, Brown is sympathetic towards those of his predecessors who felt they were not being used to their full potential, but he is honest about their impact as well. Discussing the interdiction campaign against North Korea, he admits that it "did not appear to affect their troops' battle strength." (58) There were other missions, however, perhaps the most dramatic being the use of atomic weapons from the early 1950s, units rehearsing their grim task by day and night in the decades that followed. Thankfully, they were never called upon to bring their nuclear-bombing techniques into play, though in the late 1980s and early 1990s their skills were put to the test dropping conventional weapons on Libya and Iraq.

Throughout, the story is the nerve-wracking challenge of operating from a carrier at night. As Brown notes, tests by flight psychologists from the USN's Aeromedical School showed that "all phases of carrier night operations, including the need to be on time at marshal, the catapult shot, and the landing, produced more indications of stress than the heaviest combat." (186) It is this attention to the human side of its subject, as well as its focus on technical detail and mission evolution, that makes Dark Sky, Black Sea particularly relevant.

Bill Rawling
Ottawa, Ontario


The Changing Face of Maritime Power is a thought-provoking and important collection of new essays. It is important not only because it provides a good insight into contemporary British thinking on sea power but also because it breaks new ground in defining the political dimension of sea power. And because of its rather eclectic nature there are a couple of interesting excursions into parallel but slightly tangential areas. In all, it is an interesting collection and, despite the outrageous price, well worth adding to one's library because it has a certain landmark quality in the debate on sea power in the twenty-first century.

It is impossible to do justice to the entire collection in a short review, particularly as several themes run through the book. One of the more interesting is a vindication of Sir Julian Corbett's principles of maritime strategy, which several authors saw as being a more appropriate model for the twenty-first century than the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. This is done with considerable dignity. Despite an obvious British desire to say "We told you so!" to the Americans, the words do not appear in print. In fact, Mahan gets a very fair hearing in the form of a good essay by George Baer on the applicability of his work to the present uncertain international system. Baer contends that the proclivity of today's liberal-democratic politicians for intervention is not inconsistent with Mahan's underlying theory of sea power, where the promotion and protection of national interests are foremost considerations.

Geoffrey Till presents the initial case for holding onto Corbett's principles in a novel and entirely credible manner by presenting "Ten
"Maritime Commandments" he thinks Corbett would have endorsed. To produce the list, he combed the literature to find and substantiate ten enduring principles of maritime strategy that some might claim to be motherhood concepts. But is this not what Corbett is all about anyway? Nevertheless, the truisms Till offers are indeed valid for the somewhat confusing period of international politics facing us. For instance, he correctly points out that limits exist in the use of forcible naval diplomacy in that the target state must be vulnerable from the sea. (23-24) In concert with other authors, he believes the prevailing trends in jointness and power projection "from the sea" are completely consistent with Corbett's views. Interestingly, Jackie Fisher's philosophy that "the army is a projectile to be fired ashore by the Royal Navy" is offered up as sound doctrine for the twenty-first century on several occasions.

One of the highlights is a masterful analysis by Michael Clarke of constraints on the use of force in British foreign policy. Among the many important points he makes is that governments no longer have the same ability to control events, especially economic ones, that they had in the past. Moreover, as he makes abundantly clear, the domestic dimension of foreign policy is greater than at any time in history. Citing the ability of special interest groups to use the internet and e-mail to marshal a powerful constituency, Clarke shows that governments are indeed constrained in how they respond to situations and in the use of force. Added to the need to consider broader political community concerns, in Britain's case the European Union, a government is no longer truly sovereign in shaping its responses to international crises. Despite the compelling nature of national interests, a government must now embark on a highly complex arbitration of domestic and community interests before making a response. This, of course, is a British interpretation which will not find much support in the United States, where "going it alone," if necessary, is still the policy. Clarke's excellent geo-political context sets the stage for many of the other papers, and it is a pity that it is not the opening essay.

Having focussed the initial discussion on power projection and naval diplomacy, which are invariably conducted jointly and collectively as the foremost naval missions (as natural extensions of both Mahan's and Corbett's theories and principles), the collection does not fail in delivering some sound arguments. Some superb contributions from both British and American naval scholars, including Tim Benbow, Andrew Dorman, Eric Grove, Christina Goulter, Andrew Lambert, Colin McLinnis, Malcolm Murfett, Norman Polmar, and Michael Pugh, complete the book. Of these, Norman Polmar's compelling argument that in addition to political problems, naval planners of the twenty-first century will have to pay far closer attention to technology and be very careful in how they measure fleet effectiveness stands out. In the future, he states rightly, numbers of ships alone will not be enough. Rather, it will be proven capabilities that determine the value of the return on the investment a government makes in sea power.

Putting those factors into practice and developing a naval force seen to be useful, as well as one that is a good investment politically, will not be easy. Andrew Dorman makes this abundantly clear in examining the problems facing the Royal Navy in the years ahead. The shift away from the Cold War emphasis on antisubmarine warfare in favour of a balanced "three core" force structure is expensive and demands considerable re-education and training, as well as widespread re-equipping to provide the flexible response mechanisms the government requires to reinforce diplomacy and solve problems overseas. That these operations will almost certainly be conducted in alliance with navies of other states imposes coordination (interoperability) requirements that will also have to be met if success is to be assured. That process will not be cheap.

In closing, the editors ask whether the roles of navies are changing. Their answer is that in many ways the Cold War can be seen as an aberration and that navies have returned to their original function of being instruments of state policy and diplomacy at sea in the broadest sense. Yet as they rightly point out, the extent to which states can use naval power to support diplomacy is now constrained not only by their domestic constituencies but also by the international community. In this, multilateralism is the means in the future by which the greater majority of states will employ naval forces outside their own waters.

Despite the continuation of the long-standing Anglo-American debate over Mahan and Corbett, *The Changing Face of Maritime Power* could be seen as a coming together of British and American maritime strategic thought under the banner

*Canada's Navy: The First Century* by Marc Milner is an authoritative historical survey of the Canadian Navy from its modest beginnings as a small patrol force in the last century to its present state as a modern balanced force with a global reach. Relying on his own expert knowledge of the Battle of the Atlantic and an impressive range of interviews and secondary sources, Milner relates the often turbulent history of the navy through peace and war, success and failure. Particularly noteworthy is his effort to examine the post-World War II period that comprises more than half the narrative. This was possible through his use of the expanding but still inadequate body of research on the postwar period, and personal interviews to fill in the gaps. Milner has emphasized how the Canadian Navy made the logical but sometimes difficult transition after the war from its British imperial and Royal Navy orientation to more the natural North America alignment and a closer association with the United States Navy. Concurrently, the navy fought to establish itself as a national institution in the face of Canada's inconsistent interest in and funding for defence by governments and the public's fixation on continental as opposed to maritime affairs. On the personal level, it is a story of dedication and determination of a succession of naval officers to keep their service going.

Milner begins by retracing the history of the Royal Canadian Navy from its tumultuous political birth in 1910 to 1939. He examines its near demise, its undistinguished record in the First World War as a poor relation of the Canadian Corps, and its lean years during the twenty-year cease fire in Europe. In spite of Laurier's argument for the economic benefits of a home-grown navy, this idea never captured the national imagination. Instead, the RCN immediately became a political football and for many nationalists a lightening rod for imperial entanglements. Only through the exceptional diligence of Commodore Walter Hose, Director of the Naval Service, did the Canadian Navy manage to survive on a starvation budget. Hose defeated the first attempt to integrate the forces, although Milner questions his wisdom. Hose's far-sighted effort to develop grassroots support for the RCN resulted in the establishment of a series of volunteer reserve divisions in major cities across the country that became the foundation for rapid wartime expansion. But, essentially abandoned, the RCN turned to the Royal Navy for succour, equipment and training. As a result, it became a mirror-image of the RN and its culture. Canada's modest effort to arm in the face of the Nazi threat in Europe in the late 1930s enabled the RCN to establish a small nucleus of six fairly modern destroyers and about 1600 trained permanent personnel by the time war was declared in 1939.

The Second World War reversed the fortunes of the RCN as it expanded to over 300 warships and 92,000 personnel at its zenith in 1944. Milner's familiarity with the history of the Battle of the Atlantic and the RCN's successes and failures, as well as its political intrigues and efforts to acquire a balanced fleet that would survive in peacetime, is apparent as he relates the story with an ease and precision that both informs and entertains the reader. That being said, the term "sheep dog navy" does not sit well with veterans. If anything, the story of Canada's large contribution to the allied war at sea is understated. But this is a consequence of being rigorously selective in his survey; Milner has the balance about right.

Milner is forthright in stating the challenges he encountered in writing about the postwar period owing to the paucity of sources and scholarly research. To fill the gaps, he conducted many interviews with key players to develop his understanding of the period from the mid-1960s to the present where most material is closed. The result is an interpretation that is rich in both content and colour and tells a compelling story while pointing the way for future research. The comments in professional naval circles are mixed. They are positive with regard to Milner's description of the navy's equipment acquisition programme for the Canadian Patrol Frigate and the long political battles associated with it. On the other hand, there is a body of opinion that does not fully conform to the Landymore "authorized version" of the impact
of integration and unification on the navy. The R C N was experiencing both severe personnel and financial problems, largely of its own making through over-commitment, in the early 1960s and something had to be done. Also, the emphasis on material acquisition problems leaves the reader to speculate on the questions of fleet efficiency, personnel, and leadership and administration. For example, the order of the succession of Maritime Commanders after 1970 is unclear as is the leadership's vision for the future other than survival.

There are frequent errors of fact in the post-war narrative, some reproduced from secondary sources. For example, Vice-Admiral G. C. Jones did not die at his desk but in his bath, and Vice-Admiral Rayner was not "sacked" by Paul Hellyer but resigned in silent protest. Also, John Charles, never "Johnny," retired as a Rear-Admiral. In another place, the monicker "Commodore John Charles 'Scruffy' O'Brien" points to some editorial problems in the book. Admiral John Anderson was misquoted - it was Ed Healey, and not he, who announced the cancellation the nuclear submarine project at the dinner party described. The statement that Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy was replaced early as CNS is not public knowledge and required a source. Interpretations in vogue such as Audette's vilification of Vice-Admiral Harold Grant and German's popular rendering of the "halcyon years" of the 1950s reflect more personal opinion than objective scholarly research. Many would challenge the Westropp notion of the "more-British-than-the-British" R C N in the early 1960s. The assertion that Canadian sailors were happy to abandon their traditional uniform does not square with the fact that the United States Navy aborted a similar experiment upon the wishes of the men themselves. There are many myths and opinions extant about the postwar R C N. These observations merely reinforce Milner's point about the need for more scholarly research.

Marc Milner took on an enormous challenge in writing this book and the product has reinforced his reputation as one of Canada's foremost naval historians. His rendering is as bold and fascinating as it is instructive and entertaining (Would Robert Borden think that he had "gone ballistic?"). And Milner spares nothing in describing the "fiascos" in the navy's history along with its many successes. His passionate description of the crushing of the R C N through unification is most engaging. The book is up to date, discussing the challenges the navy faces meeting world-wide commitments in the 1990s with diminishing personnel and financial resources, a recurrent theme. It is also a book that has been needed for a long time. The Canadian Navy in particular will be happy that a single reference work now exists for the instruction of personnel as well as for the edification of politicians and the public alike.

Wilf Lund
Victoria, British Columbia


This is a straight-forward biography of a youngster entering the Royal Navy as a Boy Seaman in February 1949 at age sixteen-and-a-half. Its value as history lies in the fact that it is set in the immediate postwar period, when the RN adjusted to peacetime routines, cut-backs and efforts to adjust to its altered and reduced status. Hugh Willis describes with considerable skill many practices that combined a re-establishment of some almost Victorian routines of prewar naval life with those practicalities of over five years' hard-won war experience. Willis' father had been in the RNVR and was an enthusiastic small boat sailor. So Willis' pre-naval schooling was in part at a small "sea training" school, although its bizarre teachers and methods had little to do with the sea, or with such well-run establishments as Conway or Worcester. This forms the introductory chapter.

He narrates his changing experiences with a pleasant humour and skill, giving a wondrous and somewhat startled glimpse of this strange new existence as he encountered it. He started straight off in the carrier Indefatigable and then went to the famous, or infamous, boys' training establishment, HMS Ganges. On graduation he joined a Lochar-class frigate in the Mediterranean. There life seemed almost entirely prewar once again: not much money for steaming about, lots of polishing for inspections, a three-badge AB as a "Sea daddy" to guide him along, and visits to Greek Islands, Turkey and other spots to show the flag. There are the vital fleet regattas, not quite won by their teams, visits for an impressionable youngster to Malta, ancient temples, and life with odd vicissitudes under an unusual but perceptive
Polish First Lieutenant. Later he joined the famous Naval Gun Team for a one-year performance at Earl's Court, and took his turn with barrack duties.

While the dust-jacket claims these are "Willis's hilarious experiences," this succeeds only in making one dubious of the book's value as a bona fide description of life in the RN, which is unfair. The stories are told with humour, often at his own expense as he learns and earns his way from Boy Seaman to Leading Hand. It is well written (Willis gained a commission and remained in the Navy, retiring as a Commander, possibly a Captain, in 1985), and covers only the period of his seamen's time until his commissioning in 1956. He gives perceptive views of what they learned, and his descriptions of ASDIC (later termed sonar), squid, and mooring at Malta between two buoys, bows to seaward, with other ships already occupying space, has a C S. Forester touch. His contacts as a very junior seaman with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten and the odd but capable submariner Captain "Crap" Myers, VC, give a useful perspective. And his depiction of deep concerns about his CW board and later officer selection boards and his stumbling into the world of officers' deportment, "dog robbers" (civilian clothing) and horse's necks will ring memories for those that passed that way.

Overall, this is a well crafted minor autobiography. Like John Winton's novels, it leaves one with the pleasant vague hope that more in the same line might follow.

Fraser M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


For anyone with curiosity about how the US Navy came to be racially integrated, this book will answer many questions. It is the personal narrative of Adolph Newton, who joined the navy during World War II by forging his parents' signatures because he was underage by six months. After relating much of his experience from that time until he left the service after his second tour of duty, the account concludes with a chapter called "Reflections," which examines the progress of the integration up to the present day. Early in his navy career, Newton was told that a black seaman had to be "better than good," an observation that gave the book its title.

This short volume reads as easily as a novel. Although it is not directly stipulated, one assumes that Eldridge, a much younger man with an autobiographical work already in print, did the actual writing, while Newton provided the data. US Naval Institute Press lives up to its prestigious reputation with an easily-readable type font, chapter headings at the foot of every page, sturdy cloth binding and a well-designed paperjacket.

Photographs are scantier than might be preferred. There is a portrait of the author, a view of the ship on which he spent most of his second "hitch" - Donner - and a document certifying him trained as a Class A Motor Machinist. The remaining six are group photos of classes and activities at the Great Lakes Naval Station, where Newton attended boot camp, and at Hampton Institute, where he undertook further training. It is unfortunate that the group photos which include Newton do not specifically identify him. Most are not focussed clearly enough for such identification to be easy with only the portrait photo as a guide. After close scrutiny I could locate him neither in the Company 151 "class picture" from the Great Lakes nor in the photo of the Hampton work detail.

Much of the narrative is concerned with shore-side exploits and romantic encounters with women. This in itself is of interest, as Newton was the only non-white in his department and the slightest innuendo of inter-racial socio-sexual involvements at that time (during and immediately after World War II) had serious implications. On one occasion in the Pacific, in fact, he only escaped severe consequences by wrapping the hair of his native mistress around his head so he would be taken for another native rather than an American serviceman. Sometimes he shared the services of prostitutes with white shipmates. Nor were all his encounters with women engaged in "the oldest profession." It was remarkable that as early as the 1940s, European women, including Englishwomen, would attend public functions with American servicemen of colour and would regard permanent connections as desirable.

Some episodes describe physically violent situations in which Newton reacted strongly to the
racial slurs or unpleasant tricks of bigots. Once or twice he used violence as a calculated ploy to avoid further harassment. It was a great surprise to learn that his Baltimore upbringing had left him unprepared for either the racial enclaves then to be found in such allegedly non-discriminatory places as California or for the extreme segregation practised in ports as close to his home as Norfolk, Virginia.

This is a tale about racial relations, both aboard ship and ashore, although many ex-Navy men of varying backgrounds will be able to identify with the experiences of a young sailor during World War II and in the years immediately following. It is an absorbing book for anyone interested in maritime social history.

Morgiana P. Halley
Baltimore, Maryland


The Yearbook of Aland Maritime History has now reached its tenth anniversary, and can look back on its decade of publication with justifiable satisfaction. The Yearbook publishes up to a dozen or so well-illustrated articles per issue, and the excellent English summaries make them accessible for a wider audience. In his preface for the decadal issue, Börje Karlsson notes the wide variety of topics covered over the years, and a glance at the cumulative index proves this very true. Still, some topics tend to predominate - seamen's memoirs of one sort or another seem to have been a common genre, and the heydays of Aland shipping, from peasant trading to the famous windjammers of the interwar years, have also featured prominently.

In this respect, the latest issue of Årsskrift is no exception. Seafaring is represented by fact-packed accounts of the fortunes of two well-known Aland shipowning firms, of the small-scale schooner trade from Vårdö in the interwar years and of salvage operations in the eighteenth century. Otherwise, there is a strong emphasis on individuals and personal experiences, from the memoirs of a nineteenth-century ship master to the diary of a Second Mate, interred with the crews of two Finnish merchant vessels by Germany in 1944-1945. Recording the everyday life in an auxiliary camp at Stutthof, the diary is chilling reading. An additional angle to the story of interned seafarers during the Second World War is then provided by Göte Sundberg in an article on thirty Finnish seafarers, among them three Allanders, held in northern India.

Although the circumstances in the Dehra Dun camp, as Sundberg says, were relatively humane - the inmates were, for instance, allowed to go for walks outside the camp - the plight of the Finns was considerable, if only on account of its great length. Interned from neutral ships in India or adjacent countries in early 1942 or so, nine of the Finns had the luck to be released a year later for service in allied vessels. For the rest, however, bitter disappointments kept accumulating. Finland's war against the Soviet Union came to an end in September 1944, the war in Europe ended in May 1945, but it took until August 1946 before the Finnish POWs were finally released. Practical problems and bureaucratic tardiness aside, Sundberg wonders mildly whether the British "Forgotten Army" in Burma were in fact the only ones who were forgotten in the closing stages of the war.

The article is the result of a painstaking piece of research involving interviews, archival work in several countries and information gleaned from the Historical Department of the Indian Army. Of particular interest, however, is the way Sundberg first got wind of the fate of the Dehra Dun internees - via a phone call from the daughter of one of them expressing a wish to know more about this stage in her father's life. Likewise, a second article by Sundberg was sparked by someone having found an old notebook in the attic, while another author's piece on the hazards of winter traffic around the turn of the century is based on a notebook passed on to him by his mother.

This homey manner of finding research topics has probably been typical during the Yearbook's history, a reflection of the way the maritime past remains a tangible reality on the Aland Islands. The emphasis on the personal in many of the articles perhaps reflects the same fact and contributes to the charm of the Årsskrift. It continues to be a prime forum for information on Aland's rich maritime past and present.

Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen
Turku, Finland

This is an interesting and very entertaining account of Long Robbie's marine career. It is well researched by the author who had access, after Robbie's death, to his estate papers, naval reports and documented anecdotes.

In his younger days Robbie was sometimes described as "the kid who never grew up," for he was an expert in practical jokes. His grandfather Horatio and his father George Robertson were both windjammer captains in the China trade - Horatio became wealthy in China, and bought Moresby Island on the West Coast after coming to Canada. Young Robbie was obviously imbued by his forebears' seagoing past and was determined to follow the sea. Ironically, his father was equally determined to discourage this, enrolling him at McGill University in chemical engineering. He lasted a year there before running away in 1924 to sea, aged seventeen. Robbie soon became an indentured cadet in the subsidised Canadian Government Merchant Marines on board the freighter *Canadian Challenger*, followed by nine years in the *Lady* ships of Canadian National Steamships - miniature cruising liners, each carrying over two hundred passengers to the West Indies and beyond. There are many amusing anecdotes about this happy period.

Robbie also joined the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve in 1931 and became a First Officer in *Lady Somers*. Having obtained his Master's ticket, as a Lieutenant RCNR he was called into the navy in 1938. Having had brief experience in windjammers during his early days, Robbie was appointed sailing master in the sail training schooner *Venture*. This was followed by a brief stint at Naval Headquarters in Ottawa to assist in recruiting merchant service officers, but he did not last long - he had no time for the naval bureaucracy, who accused him of over-recruiting (not a bad idea) - and so he was sent to Halifax to open a naval college. Robbie commandeered Kings College on his own signature to train embryo RNCVR sub-lieutenants successfully. A brief spell at sea as Executive Officer of *Prince Robert*, an auxiliary cruiser, ended because of a health problem, and so it was that in 1943 he was appointed to Halifax as Commander of the Dockyard, having been promoted to Commander RCNR.

There, the "Robbie touch" became evident. The Dockyard and all its outlying establishments were inefficient and incapable of providing rapid repair services to naval and merchant ships. Robbie reorganised the whole area and found the right people to manage. He was always very conscious about fire safety in the ships, in Bedford Magazine and elsewhere. He had taken the US Navy's firefighting course and it stood him in good stead when the US-owned ship *Volunteer*, full of ammunition, caught fire in port in 1943. Robbie, the Fire Chief and his crew and a harbour pilot boarded the ship, which its crew had abandoned. Tugs and a fire boat towed the still-blazing ship to safety, beaching her at Mauger's Beach. Robbie was awarded the George Medal and others involved were also suitably rewarded, Captain Brackett, the pilot, receiving the MBE. Robbie was promoted to Captain RCNR. Before the war ended, he was again firefighting when Bedford Magazine caught fire in 1945. This could have been a major disaster. An evacuation ensued, graphically described in the book, of over 100,000 people.

After 1945, Robbie was transferred to the RCN in the rank of Commander and finally returned to sea as Captain of the destroyer *Cayuga* on the Pacific coast. It was there, in 1948, that he played a central role in organizing naval relief when the Fraser River flooded badly. Shortly thereafter, he was promoted to Captain and was appointed to London as the naval member on the Canadian Joint staff. Neither Robbie nor his wife Madge were much impressed with the party rounds and he badgered Ottawa to return him to sea duty until at last he was appointed to command the naval icebreaker *Labrador*.

Built at Sorel and commissioned in July 1945, *Labrador* was classed as an Arctic Patrol vessel but was in fact an Arctic research and scientific platform carrying up to twenty scientists from a variety of disciplines such as hydrography, oceanography, radio propagation and magnetism. Robbie was clearly the right man to command the ship, and he served in that capacity for two years. Donal Baird describes the exploits of both the man and the ship well, from the first transit of a deep-draft ship through the Northwest Passage from Atlantic to Pacific followed by the first circumnavigation of North America. Robbie then
was sent back to Halifax in November 1954 and was involved in the early building of the Distant Early Warning Line in 1955 when he was task group Commander for some twenty US ships: icebreakers, landing ships and cargo ships in the eastern Arctic in uncharted waters. Thereafter, as a Commodore in Washington he was appointed as an adviser to USS Seadragon, the first nuclear submarine to navigate the Northwest Passage submerged and reach the North Pole. After retirement, Robbie and other Arctic enthusiasts set up shop as Northern Associates, Inc., a consulting group. He finally settled in Oakville, Ontario where he died. His wife had preceded him; his friends waked him at his cottage, polishing off all the remaining liquor, as he had instructed.

The Robbie Touch is a very good read and the price is right.

T. A. Irvine
Nepean, Ontario


Newfoundland's lighthouse keepers are among the last of their kind in Canada. In the early twentieth century there were 800 staffed lighthouses across the country. Today there are fifty-two, including twenty-four lights dotted around Newfoundland's rugged coastline. Along with their colleagues in British Columbia and New Brunswick, Newfoundland's lightkeepers carry on a tradition that has all but disappeared in the rest of the world. In Lighthouse People, Jim Wellman has assembled a collection of stories of some of the men and women who kept, and continue to keep, Newfoundland's lights and foghorns. He explores the life and work of the keepers and their families, who live at places like Cape Race, Belle Isle and Baccalieu, some of the most exposed and inhospitable chunks of rock imaginable.

Lighthouse People is divided into twelve chapters, beginning with a brief history of the lighthouse system in Newfoundland, the work of the keepers, and their family life. Chapters two to eleven tell the stories of the keepers and their families at ten lighthouses around the province. Chapter twelve tells of the challenges of raising young children on isolated lights.

Along with a number of humorous stories, the book contains a stiff dose of tragedy. In chapter two, Wellman recounts the story of Katherine Fionder, who lost her husband in a fierce storm at the St. Jacques Island Light in Fortune Bay in December 1963. Eric Fionder and his assistant never returned to the house after leaving to check supplies at the station's boathouse. Less than a month later, twenty-two-year-old Gladys Flynn was killed along with three others when the snowmobile and sled they were riding on drove off a cliff on rocky Belle Isle. Gladys had been on her way to rejoin her lightkeeper husband at the island's northeast light. Wellman also tells of a more recent tragedy on Fortune Bay's Green Island, where lightkeeper Brian Cull attempted to revive six-year-old Jennifer Bonnieul, who died after her family's boat overturned off the island in 1994. It was a devastating experience for the Bonnieul's family, and for the young lightkeeper who was not able to save the young girl.

As well as tragedy, weather plays an important role in the stories of Wellman's lighthouse people. In the early 1960s the keepers at South Head, Bay of Islands, were imprisoned in their house during a storm that deposited almost four feet of ice. When ice clogged a chimney, Max and Faith Shepard and their daughter climbed through a ceiling hatch and across their attic to the other side of the keepers' duplex where they could stay warm with the assistant keeper and his family. It took the keepers more than a week to chop the ice from the station buildings after the storm ended.

Lighthouse People is a compelling read. The stories of Newfoundland's lightkeepers, past and present, show the dangers that keepers have faced over the years, and the important role they continue to play on a dangerous coast. Although the book would benefit from careful editing - there are some awkward tense changes in the introduction and some stories could be tightened without losing substance or impact - the stories stand on their own. Lighthouse People is a vivid and powerful tribute to a Newfoundland tradition, and an important record of a vital aspect of the province's maritime history.

Chris Mills
Ketch Harbour, Nova Scotia

This is a reissue with additional material and photographs of John Guzzwell’s 1950s classic account of his voyage round the world in *Trekka*, a twenty-foot, six-inch, wooden light-displacement yawl he built behind a fish and chip shop in Victoria, BC. The foreword to this classic is written by the master sailor and writer, Hal Roth, holder of the Blue Water Medal of the Cruising Club of America.

John Guzzwell is of that generation of sailors that included the great single-handers Bernard Moitessier and Francis Chichester, and the sailing couples of Miles and Beryl Smeeton and Eric and Susan Hiscock. And John Guzzwell is still sailing: in 1998 he completed the Singlehanded Transpac Race from San Francisco to Hawaii in *Endangered Species*, a wooden scaled-down version of a BOC (British Oxygen Company) racer which he built himself.

*Trekka’s* wanderings across the oceans of the globe is a tale told with simplicity and charm. Each leg of the voyage is accompanied by a small marginal sketch map, and black and white snapshots. Guzzwell’s prose is clear and uncluttered and eschews any attempt to embellish or dramatize. Wherever he went he made friends, and the whole voyage left in its wake clusters of friendships that have remained for a lifetime. Later, when he was married, he returned to renew many of these earlier friendships, for he did not stop sailing *Trekka*, but returned to Hawaii with his first wife, before eventually selling *Trekka* to an admirer in 1961. In 1965 he completed construction of his yacht, *Treasure*, and with his wife, Maureen, and twin sons set sail for Australia retracing much of the route of *Trekka*, ultimately to settle for a time in the Bay of Islands before eventually returning to the West Coast of BC. In the 1970s, the gallant little yawl sailed round the world again with new owners. Today, *Trekka* is under the care of the BC Maritime Museum, to which it was presented by the Thermopylae Club, an organization dedicated to maritime history.

Maps of the voyage of *Trekka* appear in the fly-leaf front and back of the book, simply drawn, and with small annotations along the route. Outward bound from Victoria, it’s south to San Francisco, onward across the Pacific to the Hawaiian Islands, then southward to the Line Islands (Palmyra, Washington, Fanning, Christmas) and into English Harbor on Fanning Island, and the cable station there.

One of the joys of *Trekka* is that one encounters unheard of islands, such as Boatswain Bird Island, which lies offshore of Ascension, and at the time of Guzzwell’s visit was the site of a cable station manned by a Mr. Harrison, who was the Resident Magistrate as well. Now it is an RAF staging base and yachts are not allowed to land.

*Trekka Round the World* was published in 1963, but eventually went out of print after several editions. Lack of capital thwarted John Guzzwell’s ambition to publish a revised edition until he met Réanne Douglass (her book, *Cape Horn: One Man’s Dream, One Woman’s Nightmare* was reviewed in *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord* in July 1999) and her husband Don, of Edge Productions, who encouraged Guzzwell to provide a renewed edition and to tell something of his life after *Trekka*. This story appears in the afterword. An Epilogue explains the eventual sale of *Trekka*. In appendix I Guzzwell discusses the merits and some of the disadvantages of *Trekka*, while in appendix II he analyzes the pitch-poling of *Tzu Hang* in the Southern Ocean.

Guzzwell’s book is a delightful read, the sort English reviewers would call “a cracking good yarn.” In a tribute to his New World he comments that “I feel a strong sense of gratitude to the New World for allowing me the vision, energy, and freedom to pursue my dream without the need of some form of sponsorship which would have spoiled my sense of achievement and satisfaction in the venture.” An approving chorus of cheers can be heard from Joshua Slocum, Francis Chichester, Alec Rose, Bernard Moitessier, Vito Dumas, Harold Tilman and the others of that great company of pioneers who did it their way.

Geoffrey H. Farmer
St. John’s, Newfoundland


The drama of the 1994 Canadian arrest of the Spanish trawler *Estai* for alleged harvesting
infractions on the waters beyond the east coast 200-nautical-mile zone is a critical component of Orrego Vicuna’s book *The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries*. The Canadian action is identified as being “the first...direct exercise of jurisdiction by the coastal state over high seas fisheries of straddling stocks” (113) and part of a wave of state and international concern in the 1980s and 1990s about the harvesting practices by fishers in waters beyond national jurisdiction. This wave of concern ultimately resulted in the completion in 1995 of the elegantly titled "Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks." While the 1995 Agreement is not yet in force, Canada became a party in August 1999.

The primary focus of the book is the 1995 Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement. The first half of the text contains an analysis and description of the legal, political and scientific conditions that led to the Agreement. The later half is a detailed discussion of the contents of the 1995 Agreement. Not surprisingly, Canadian action and involvement is prominently discussed throughout. Beyond the high profile and vigorous engagement of the Canadian government, the book notes the activities of the Oceans Institute of Canada in Halifax and relies upon the monitoring reports from the negotiations by the International Institute of Sustainable Development in Winnipeg.

Orrego Vicuna takes the view that the international law of high seas fishing has undergone several major shifts in the twentieth century. Where once the high seas encompassed most of the waters of the oceans and there was little regulation, the acceptance of 200-nautical-mile zones of national fisheries jurisdiction dramatically decreased the high seas area but left harvesting activities in that area largely unregulated. And now, following the 1995 Agreement, the high seas area will be subject to conservation-based regulation. Orrego Vicuna attributes these changes to concerns expressed by countries like Chile and others regarding over-exploitation, resource degradation and necessary conservation. A less-noble characterization would be that coastal states, such as Canada, were less interested in conservation of marine living resources than they were in displacing other fishers in exploiting the resources. It is worth recalling that in the 1970s Canada argued that a 200-nautical-mile "national" zone was necessary to ensure appropriate conservation which was not being accomplished by the foreign fleets. Canada immediately commenced fishing fleet expansion to replace the foreign fleets. By the 1990s Canada had managed to deplete most of the stocks within that zone and then it was time to focus more sharply on foreign activities on the high seas.

The author, a distinguished professor of international law from Chile, is sympathetic to the concerns of coastal states in dealing with foreign fleets on the high seas. Chile, like Canada, has been at the forefront of the wave of states seeking better regulation of fishing activities on the high seas. Unilateral state action, such as the Estai incident, is viewed as an acceptable lever to force change. Orrego Vicuna comments: "[I]n many cases the unilateral option has been the major factor inducing the attainment of solutions that had otherwise proven elusive." (117)

Numerous writers, including this reviewer, have attempted detailed legal examinations of the text of the 1995 Agreement. This book assists these continuing efforts by placing the Treaty provisions in their proper context, both regarding the inter-connectness of many of the articles and the negotiating history of the wording. For academic and government lawyers engaged in analysis of the 1995 Agreement, this book will be an indispensable guide. For the general reader the first half of this book, plus the last chapter, is accessible and provides a valuable survey of the pressures that led to the Estai incident and the 1995 Agreement. The analysis in the back half of the book will be devoured by the specialist but will be of less interest to the casual reader.

Ted L. McDorman
Victoria, British Columbia


American shad have been one of the principal resources that define the Susquehanna River - a
reputation this species (*Alosa sapidissima*) engenders and shares with other well-known rivers such as the Hudson, Delaware, and Connecticut. Correspondingly, the Susquehanna River’s shad fishery is at the centre of how historians need to view the cultural, economic, and environmental transformation of this waterway. Richard Gerstell’s *American Shad in the Susquehanna River Basin* is a detailed description of the imprint and effect of this fishery both on the resource itself and, in wider terms, on the larger context of the estuary over a three-hundred-year period. Complimenting this focus is the book’s alternative perspective - the manner in which the species and its fisheries responded to human-induced changes to the basin.

While there are numerous issues that unite historical study of fisheries around the globe, there are just as many that differentiate these investigations along lines such as region, environment, and target species. Gerstell confronts this challenge by carefully documenting the specific varieties of shad fishing on the Susquehanna River, along with the gear, business practices, and management schemes that accompanied it. By providing this inventory, Gerstell is able to show the specific geographic relevance of this regional shad fishery - the logic behind fishing certain areas, fishermen living in particular communities, and, above all, the local knowledge needed to effectively use notable fishing grounds.

Gerstell’s treatment of the Susquehanna River shad fishery, while not interpretive, is focussed on ethnographic details that leave the reader fully informed on how it was conducted within daily and seasonal rounds. Having provided this textured view of the shad fisherman’s working life, Gerstell positions fisheries historians to address the territorial implications of shore-based seine fisheries and anchored shad float operations. As with other inshore and riverine fisheries, shad fishing had a terrestrial orientation (use of particular islands and shoreline locations) that embroiled it in conflicts ranging from roving gill nets to wider debates about river accessibility and the politics of water use.

These topics are enhanced by Gerstell’s thematic approach, leaving the reader with both a cultural and biological understanding of the shad’s placement in the region’s broader historical ecology. Indeed, the book’s systematic description of spawning runs, shad harvests, marketing, and consumption patterns unveils shad’s appearance as among the most ritualistic of all American fisheries. The book’s audience will be struck by a seemingly inadvertent call by American fisheries history to account more fully for this anadromous species’ integrated symbolic, economic, and ecological legacy.

To the author’s credit, it cannot be said that he leaves this prospect uncharted. As former Chief of the Division of Research for the Pennsylvania Game Commission, he demonstrates the use of source materials that are needed in doing historical research on the Susquehanna River shad. Gerstell combines the use of wills, probate inventories, government fish commission reports (state and federal), newspapers, land records and other manuscripts, with the various forms of material culture used to harvest shad. He is arguably at his best when he guides readers through the technology that most profoundly impeded shad’s sustainability on the Susquehanna - electric power dams. This discussion proceeds from documenting the historical effects of the Conowingo, Holtwood, Safe Harbor, and York Haven dams on shad movement up and down the Susquehanna to the utility of fishways and fishlifts that attempt to mitigate these obstructions. This technology’s habitat-altering legacy provides context within which the author describes the modern history of shad restoration.

Readers should not expect more from *American Shad in the Susquehanna River Basin* than a straight-forward narrative history. This may be accountable to Gerstell’s background in natural resources management. But this apparent limitation also contributes to the book’s very strength. Gerstell’s background allows him to explain the content and value of source materials shaped by a specific occupation and fish species. In short, this book provides fisheries history with certain methodological guidelines for addressing this specific topic. More broadly speaking, Gerstell’s work has the transcendent effect of contributing to fisheries history’s evolving methodological and interpretive framework. The returning shad annually provoked expectation and hope along the Susquehanna and perhaps it is not surprising that Gerstell concludes by noting contemporary events that continue to celebrate the much diminished resource and its fishery. Similarly viewed, the spirit of this book calls for continued historical examination of this important fisheries topic.

Michael J. Chiarappa
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For many not well acquainted with Great Lakes shipping, the quintessential laker is probably the *Edmund Fitzgerald,* whose tragic end features in most of the modern media of popular culture. Less well remembered is that not far astern was the *Arthur M. Anderson* of the Pittsburgh Steamship Company, an older ship that not only survived the same severe weather conditions but also went about and started looking for survivors.

For almost a century Pittsburgh Steamships was the largest fleet operating on the Great Lakes. For almost that same length of time it was a mere subsidiary of one of the largest corporations on the planet, United States Steel. Although the name was used initially by the Carnegie interests, the company really dates from the formation of the "Steel Trust" in 1901. Bobbing along in the wake of the merger were six shipping companies with an oddly matched array of sixty-nine steel ships, forty-three barges, assorted tugs, fireboats and miscellaneous things marine. From then until 1988, when USS sold off sixty percent of its stake in its various guises the Pittsburgh Steamship Company in its various guises was a creature of US Steel.

Despite the fact that this volume was published by an academic press, it is not a particularly scholarly work. There is no effort to set the history of the firm in a larger historiographical context, either in terms of Great Lakes shipping or the role of transportation units in the construction (or deconstruction) of large industrial concerns. Nor is there any joy for the accountants. There are few numbers beyond ship tonnages, cargoes and crew sizes. It is, however, a useful addition to Wayne State's "Great Lakes Books" series from the perspective of the average reader.

The press has served the volume well in terms of scholarly apparatus. Eleven pages of notes and as many of index are accompanied by four pages of bibliography. In addition, there is a sixty-one-page fleet list, which largely chronicles the disposal of that initial fleet, as the company specialized in larger more efficient hulls. In 1901, the entire Great Lakes fleet (including Pittsburgh's 112 hulls) moved twenty million tons of ore. (46) In 1995 this fleet's eleven remaining hulls moved 23.5 million tons of cargo. (254) The illustrations are plentiful, although mostly relatively distant images of ships and shore facilities. With only a couple of exceptions, the humans provide little more than a sense of scale. While perfectly adequate for the type, the paper on which the book is printed tends to absorb rather than enhance the black and white photographs.

Although this is a company history, the perspective is distinctly from outside the boardroom. Relatively few archival sources are offered; most of the company material was published. None of it is from US Steel. On the other hand, the author has mined a rich vein of marine press files and has tracked down a number of valuable informants from head office and the rank and file. The oral history is skilfully woven into the narrative to provide a welcome human dimension.

If the archives of US Steel could be made to yield more material on the operations of the company, then another kind of researcher with another set of questions might well produce a very different book. But it would not have been written for Mr. Miller's readers. In brief, *Tin Stackers* serves its intended audience well.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


Iain Ward, a former merchant navy officer, joined the Hong Kong Police in 1966 and retired as a Superintendent in 1994, spending most of that time in the Marine Police. He has told the story of this unique law enforcement unit in two very readable informal history books. In *Sui Geng: The Hong Kong Marine Police 1841-1950,* published by Hong Kong University Press in 1991, he described the formation of the Water Police, as it was first called, and its development over more than one hundred years. In 1941, Hong Kong was conquered by the Japanese, who ejected most of the population; but when British rule was re-established in 1945, they came flooding back. The