The VE Day Riots in Halifax,
7-8 May 1945

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Ten days after the Halifax VE Day Riots, the Commanding Officer (CO) of HMCS Cornwallis - the central east coast naval base at Deep Brook, Nova Scotia - wrote "that the [Cornwallis VE Day] story might have been [different] had it not been for the fact that the Wet Canteens and other facilities were thrown wide open. The result of the programme was a splendid example of mutual confidence and due respect for law and order." What happened at Cornwallis was typical of the many successful VE Day celebrations held throughout the Naval Service of Canada, which in 1945 had a strength of over 90,000 people. At Halifax, the story was much different. There were about 18,000 men and women, twenty-three percent of the navy's complement, in that city on VE Day. For about twenty-four hours, over a two-day period, thousands of those personnel ran amok on the streets of the Nova Scotia capital and, briefly, Dartmouth. Why was this? Why had more than three-quarters of naval personnel behaved well, and the twenty-three percent in Halifax so badly?

Before the summer of 1945 the official explanation for indiscipline ashore had to do with the high number of small ships in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). The findings of the naval Board of Inquiry on the Halifax VE Day Riots reiterated this view in May 1945.

The service of the majority of the seagoing personnel has been in small ships, where discipline is necessarily less rigidly enforced, due to war conditions, than in a peacetime naval organization. While unit discipline in the ships may be considered satisfactory, inadequate stress has probably been placed on the behaviour of libertymen ashore; this would be applicable to barracks personnel, a large number of whom have served at sea.

Thus, the argument went, small ships provided few opportunities for training or professional development compared to big ships, and partially-trained sailors drafted to small ships were never instilled with the high sense of discipline that ought to have been part of their cultural baggage when they went ashore. Officials, however, only resorted to this explanation when there were problems and they could not explain why tens of thousands of small-ship Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) sailors did demonstrate high discipline ashore, overseas and in Canada, throughout the war. Moreover, apparently satisfied with this monocausal explanation, the official inquiries failed to consider other potentially critical

issues. This was especially true of those arising from the profound stresses that wartime expansion had placed on the prewar navy and on the city of Halifax.

I

The Halifax VE Day Riots were proof of a breakdown in military good order and discipline, as well as in civil-military planning. The events of 7-8 May confirmed that civilian and military activities on VE Day were conducted independently and that civilian plans were out of step with military realities. To make matters worse, with a few exceptions, the military's plans did not meet its own requirements.

Victory in Europe had long been anticipated, but the actual event came without warning. VE Day was announced by civilian radio in Halifax about 1030 on Monday, 7 May 1945. Civilians were given the rest of the day and the following day off. All stores, cinemas, cafes and restaurants closed before noon and remained shut until two days later. Thousands of sailors on "lodgings and compensation," who normally ate in Halifax eating establishments, found themselves without any meal arrangements. Liquor stores, which had closed as usual on Friday, would normally have opened at 1230 on Monday. But no Halifax liquor store opened on either 7 or 8 May, in accordance with the Nova Scotia Liquor Commission's announced VE Day policy, about which the commission in April had informed Rear-Admiral L.W. Murray, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Canadian North-West Atlantic Command (CNA).

The three armed services continued to work through the afternoon of 7 May, but the canteens and messes were closed. The Navy made no special arrangements for the thousands of officers, sailors and Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS) personnel accommodated at Stadacona, the main naval base in the city of Halifax adjoining the dockyard, several other Halifax units, and those living out on "lodgings and compensation." Their "celebrations," which included a parade, were scheduled for the next day. During the evening of 7 May the canteens opened briefly, church services were held in the city, and civic officials organized outdoor events, including street dances and fireworks from George's Island. The naval and army garrison in Halifax provided equipment and technical support for these events. Otherwise, the city essentially remained closed.

Thousands of RCNVR personnel, for whom nothing had been arranged and no direction provided, began spontaneous, exuberant and drunken celebrations in their canteens on the evening of 7 May. The sailors affirmed their self-image as proud, tough men of the sea who were not to be ignored or trifled with by the authorities, who, it will be seen, had let them down by not planning on a principle of "mutual confidence." When the canteens closed, drunken sailors searching for more liquor became violent and destructive. Some created diversions to distract the military and civilian police forces away from the real targets - the liquor stores - which crowds then broke into and looted.

The sailors - and later the crowds of soldiers, airmen, merchant mariners, and civilians who joined them - were allowed to behave this way because of the deliberate and well-publicized Police and Shore Patrol policy which permitted crowds to form and did not allow authorities to arrest drunks. Rear-Admiral Murray told the Kellock Commission that he had developed this policy to protect the Shore Patrol from civilians who might take offense at any rough treatment of drunken sailors. Murray argued that "the citizens of Halifax...would say...here is a man who helped win the war and you are going to arrest him
for being a little tight on VE Day." Judge Kellock no doubt gave voice to the unspoken thoughts of many when he referred to the policy as "a rather strange document."

The following afternoon, as the official civil-military VE Day Service of Thanksgiving took place on the Garrison Parade at the foot of Citadel Hill, less than a kilometre away in the lower inner city the celebratory behaviour started again. The violence escalated, from harmless flag-stealing to window-breaking (for flags), then to looting the window displays, and finally to pillaging the store interiors. Photographs taken at the time showed naval personnel participating in a variety of activities. Some of these young Canadians - Chief Petty Officers (CPOs), Petty Officers (POs), ratings, WRCNS and members of the other armed services - were photographed smiling, sitting on public lawns drinking from stolen bottles, and generally enjoying themselves as if at a social or country fair. Other pictures showed the looting. The young ratings, as well as CPOs and POs in these images, were clean, fit, proud, well-turned out and often had an exaggerated swagger about them. Discipline, though not obvious, was not entirely absent. Time after time during the afternoon officers and sailors spontaneously and bravely reinforced authorities and threw themselves "into the breach," holding back mobs at entrances to liquor commissions and department stores. Despite these efforts at restraint, violence escalated late in the afternoon as the crowds broke into more liquor stores, continued to loot, and became increasingly unruly. Growing worried, senior civic officials and military officers in Halifax requested army reinforcements. At 1800 the mayor declared VE day over and Rear-Admiral Murray, the senior military officer serving in Halifax, accompanied by the mayor, announced this from a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) sound truck. As the Halifax streets cleared, rioting began across the harbour in Dartmouth. By 2300 all the streets were cleared, and a military curfew was in force.

In the immediate aftermath of the riots, authorities assessed the damage and tallied up the casualties. A naval officer and a rating had died, and the physical destruction of the city core was significant. Less obvious, but equally important was the damage done to the navy's good reputation, which had been won in the five gruelling winters of war. And the man in charge of the navy in Halifax, as well as the east coast and the northwest Atlantic, lost his career. As C-in-C CNA, Murray was the only Canadian officer in the three armed services to command an allied operational area. He had the respect and support of the Royal and US navies and the allied air forces. The British had honoured him as a Companion of the Bath (CB) and a Commander of the British Empire (CBE). He was known by thousands of men and women throughout the east coast anti-submarine warfare (ASW) fleet, who respected his efforts at managing their operations.

By 1945, however, Murray seemed increasingly out of touch with the fleet and its needs. In speaking to the crews of the recently returned ships Chaudière and Algonquin, he ignored their hard-won successes and instead lectured them about conduct, warning that "he wouldn't have any rowdiness ashore." Following the riots he seemed to drift even further from reality, claiming that while the disturbances were "regrettable...[yet they have]...served a very useful purpose. It has put the Navy personnel on their mettle and right up on their toes. It has been forcibly drawn...to the officers that the ratings are showing much more pride in themselves and their appearance...and much more respect...than before."

Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) did not agree. Murray was relieved of command and blocked from reinstatement or further service in the Canadian armed services or the allied command structure. Until his death, Murray remained obsessed with this
treatment, leaving Canada to study law in England to pursue his case. Similarly, many officers and men who had served with him never forgot how he had been singled out for punishment." For the sailors - regular and reservist, from Upper and Lower decks alike - the riots ended the Battle of the Atlantic on a powerful and disturbing note.

II

Two assumptions are central to any understanding of the immediate causes of the VE Day Riots. The first is that they represented a failure by the naval command to cope with the personnel and base requirements of wartime expansion. The second is that the riots were a legacy of three years of naval indiscipline in Halifax. Both require closer examination.

For all their success in commanding the tiny interwar flotillas on either Canadian coast, Admirals Nelles, Jones, and Murray, and their prewar RCN staff officers did not respond effectively to the wartime expansion of the navy. This was partly the result of government's neglect of their service after 1918. Perhaps more important, though, was the nature of their training, which was conducted by the Royal Navy (RN). Their "big ship" time concentrated on duties and responsibilities at sea and was not enhanced with equivalent administrative experience ashore. The RN Staff College at Greenwich trained RN and RCN officers for RN staff appointments at sea. RCN officers did not hold Admiralty or RN Dockyard appointments and hence did not have the professional foundation needed to design and develop a complex naval command and shore establishment that could provide leadership for about 15,000 demanding volunteers in Halifax." The narrow and insular experience of the prewar RCN provided a limited organizational and personnel model which proved inadequate to the task."

While RN "big ship" training did not give adequate preparation to manage service expansion, it did provide an outstanding basis for understanding ships and men at sea. Rear-Admiral K. L. Adams remembered the importance of RN fleet training in the interwar years. In 1929, as an RCN Lieutenant, he was posted to HMS Calypso, a cruiser in the Mediterranean fleet.

We had a lot of talented officers. This is what makes a Happy Ship as much as anything else. Fair minded, strict and capable officers...We exercised in every department until we were perfect in everything we did...confident that we would be able to hold our end up in any situation...we met the fleet...It all made sense. The organization of the Fleet as a whole and that of each individual ship was excellent. Every one including the most junior seaman knew what he was doing and why he was doing it. Discipline was strict but always just and fair. Morale was high because of the respect held by juniors for their seniors. I hope I never forget the lessons I learned [with the RN]."

Training with the RN also developed character and a high degree of self-possession. As a result of its emphasis on training for operations at sea, the RN instilled a unique set of values in its officers. According to one interwar description, the RN officer was:

a man of action and never at a loss. He must make up his mind on every occasion instantaneously and without hesitation, and he must be prepared
to take on *any* job at a moment's notice...in these characteristics lie his strength and his weakness. They make him the finest ships officer in the world, but they render him unsuitable for work that requires administrative, organizing...or reflective capacity, and what is more they *prevent him from realizing that there is any kind of work that he cannot do.*

These same values informed prewar RCN officers, who emerged from their training with great confidence in their ability to command; a strong sense of their own importance and worth; and little or no self-doubt. They were not inclined towards conciliation or consensus-building in the service or with civilians. Some also carried grudges against fellow officers.

This temperament and outlook did not mix well with the requirements of the wartime RCNVNR which was in effect a people's navy. The thousands of men and women who comprised this force had come of age in the years following the First World War when economic and social upheaval had undermined or altered established hierarchies, institutions and values. The VRs' view of the world reflected these profound changes. It was characterized by:

[a] a touch of independence, a measure of iconoclasm, a clear contestation of any inherent right to be at the top...[combined to make]...a new social heresy. That heresy held that the poor, the lower classes, and even the "lesser breeds" had rights to life, employment, adequate income, good health, a reasonable standard of living, and, where competence existed, to a place and status in the many varied hierarchies of the land."

Yet many RCN officers refused to accept, or even sometimes to acknowledge, that the world had changed. According to Louis Audette, an RCNVNR Lieutenant-Commander:

the [wartime] Navy was in the hands of a scantily educated and largely unimaginative group of Senior Officers who, nevertheless, clearly deemed themselves a very elite group. They found it very hard to admit to their councils those who wore lesser school ties. Many of them sought valiantly to perpetuate a state of affairs which had long ceased to exist. Their greatest failing was their persistent attempt to preserve - or rather to revive - much of what had disappeared with the nineteenth century and which they erroneously thought still to exist in Britain."

Fortunately, not all RCN officers saw "these new social views" as "heresy." Many were young enough not to have had any direct knowledge of the pre-1914 world for which some of their superiors longed. Like the VRs, they had lived with and come to accept social change as normal. For these officers, the unforeseen demands arising from the massive expansion of the RCNVNR presented enormous potential. Though separate from their own service, the RCNVNR provided about ninety percent of wartime naval personnel and therefore great opportunities to demonstrate their leadership abilities.

Prewar RCN officers, serving in the RN or the RCN, had no experience coping with the "new social heresy." Indeed, the small permanent RCN force, with its minuscule budget, could not have upgraded prewar personnel facilities or improved arrangements ashore even
if there had been a demand to do so. But there was no demand, because prewar RCN ratings expected and received little. Commander P.G. Chance, a prewar officer, remembered the RCN world in Halifax in the 1930s.

The only brick buildings were the Admirals’ Command offices and the men's wet canteen, known as "the little red schoolhouse"...there was no Stadacona Barracks...sailors were accommodated...in the yard...officers [provided]...for themselves ashore...[As OOD]...in the wet canteen...I dared not look right or left as we passed...the large, silent, group of hardened sailors."

Among these men, claimed prewar rating W.M. Mansfield, "were those that couldn't read or write, could never pass their ET-1 [Educational Test on joining]." Yet morale and discipline seemed unaffected by the generally harsh conditions and very Spartan recreational and educational arrangements.

After the summer of 1940 this world was turned upside down when large numbers of RCNVR officers and men were hastily enrolled and appeared for sea duty on the Canadian coasts. These VR officers and sailors enlisted for various personal, social, cultural, ideological or economic reasons. Once in, different factors impelled them to continue to serve at sea. Attitudes to service at sea and the RCN changed at least twice throughout the war. As these changes occurred the VRs created an original identity that was different from anything in the prewar period. Based on an infectious pride - in themselves as individuals and in their service - it was fuelled, rather than depleted, by the harsh wartime conditions of their ships. They expressed their self-identity through their tailored uniforms, ships' crests and songs, and gun-shield graffiti; by 1943, they had formed these spontaneous demonstrations of pride into a clear and powerful idea of what it meant to be a VR. How had this happened?

In 1941 the VRs had little more than boundless enthusiasm and a strong loyalty to each other and to their rapidly expanding service. In the winter of 1941-1942 they responded well to sound leadership from young RCN officers aboard their new small ships. This harsh period enhanced not only their basic skills but also their survival. It also reinforced their great pride and their enthusiastic amateur ethics. As LCdr Eric J. Downton, RCNVR, recalled:

we were all very young. We were fighting a very crucial battle, but we didn't take it too seriously...There were the usual tensions and animosities and the living conditions in the [corvette] Mess decks were terrible. You couldn't get hot food, after two days at sea and the living conditions were appalling...It was incredible and yet we didn't think of it as hardship. It was a challenge. Mainly I recall the very good morale and the sheer physical hardship, in terms of exposure, bad food, cold, wet, and imminent danger...[c]ompared to the professionals in the RN and later the Americans...we were very ill-trained but the spirit was good and we did the job for which we were needed...[we were]...high spirited amateurs, who professionally weren't very good in the RCNVR. I realize now that we weren't very good."
Needless to say, these "high-spirited amateurs" made mistakes, but most could be attributed to their inexperience, inadequate training and poorly-equipped ships, rather than to low morale or poor discipline and leadership. And naval officials were slowly making improvements to conditions afloat and ashore throughout the hard winter of 1941-1942. In modern psychological terms, the combat motivation level of the RCNVR was high, morale remained strong, and RCN leadership responded with an equally high level of enthusiasm.

The year 1942 was marked by rapid operational deployment to counter the ubiquitous U-boat threat. The overworked escorts fought from the coast to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to mid-ocean, and back again. These shifts in operations occurred without warning. As *Paukenschlag* peaked in early 1942, the tasks for the Canadian escort fleet set by the RN seemed boundless. RCN senior officers had little or no opportunity to institute permanent, well-reasoned changes. But junior RCN officers continued to provide outstanding leadership, and RCNVR officers gained experience. Some complaints were made during the summer of 1942, however, and they were harbingers of what was to come.

By the spring of 1943 VR enthusiasm began to wane. The veteran VRs, whose training and discipline had improved during the early winters on the North Atlantic, became disillusioned with the austere personnel support policies of the RCN, which did not meet VR expectations and were below the standard of the army or RCAF. Improvements afloat and ashore were underway, but not in proportion to the needs at sea; hence, the VRs felt neglected. Disciplinary incidents increased. Hard living in wretched small ships had altered the proud, enthusiastic amateur image VRs had of themselves. Now they also began to work at looking tough; excessive drinking became *de rigueur*; and their great pride was transformed into an aggressive, short-fused and cocky demeanour.

During the period 1941 to 1943, the hundreds of newly commissioned Canadian small ships were unable to provide adequate training to complete the development of the rapidly deployed VR officers and sailors. Yet the volunteer officers and men on those small ships developed a highly refined and effective sense of self-discipline and "team work." A young Canadian diplomat, Charles Ritchie, observed this unique ethos when he travelled by Canadian landing craft to visit troops in Normandy following the Overlord landings in 1944. Ritchie soon "discovered the RCNVR views," which differed from those of the RCN:

> the R.C.N.V.R. hate the Royal Navy as being stuck-up, stuffy and superior. They also hate the [RCN] whom they consider quite rightly to be an imitation of the [RN]. The [RCN] for their part pride themselves on the accuracy of their naval tradition, admire, albeit slightly resent, the [RN], and look down upon the [RCNVR]. These and other naval mysteries have been revealed to me in the course of this visit."

Ritchie was also impressed with the VR leadership style and efficiency:

> Life at such close quarters could be hell, but, in fact, it was carefree and cheerful. It was an efficiently run ship, but not run on any orthodox [RN] lines but in a peculiarly Canadian way - the lack of fuss and feathers, the humour and horse-sense...This...was due in part to the officers...they knew how to run the ship and keep happy a crew of boys of nineteen...[who]...were a tough, good natured lot who would have been impossible to
manage by spit and polish. They enjoyed every incident and welcomed everything but monotony. It was an atmosphere of youth."

This sense of teamwork was much sought after by the VR officers. As James Lamb described it, "the new discipline of the escort groups was based on a team concept, rather than on rank structure; as in a bomber aircraft, officers and men worked in close association in positions that were often interchangeable." The new wartime discipline was different than

The old discipline of the Big Navy, inherited from the Royal Navy, [which] was based on an officer class whose education, character, and social background were worlds removed from those of the seamen. On the lower deck, thought was not encouraged; a man did as little as he could get away with, and the whole disciplinary system was geared to produce an acceptable standard of performance from an indifferent crew. It was a system measured in outward show, with lots of stamping and shouting and saluting."

By 1943, then, RCN and RCNVR officers, and their RCN superiors, had to understand that their sailors' effectiveness, afloat and ashore, was suspended in a delicate balance between "small-ship" ethics and an informally developed sense of discipline, tempered with excessive alcohol use and the cocky pretense of toughness. All these conditions existed throughout the navy. Failure to grasp this reality could lead to trouble, which was seen more in Halifax than any other wartime port.

Halifax was the cradle of the massive naval expansion, as well as the future home of the postwar fleet. Because of this, it was crucial that the Naval Service of Canada establish credible relations in Halifax during the war. This task was more difficult than was first realized. The problem was simple: the RCN was the new kid on the block. In the interwar period, pride of place in the city was shared between the RN and the Canadian Army. The RN had been the naval presence in the port for close to three centuries, and there had been soldiers garrisoned in town since the eighteenth century. By comparison, the RCN had never been of significant size to matter.

These traditions prevailed within the extremely difficult wartime conditions in Halifax:

The permanent residents are too few in numbers, and not quite rich enough, to entertain the 60-70,000 increase in population in their homes. Our facilities for pleasure and entertainment were never lavish, because Haligonians have always been accustomed to entertain at home rather than in night clubs, dance halls, taverns and hotels...[the city has endured]...tens of thousands of transients]...and their families. Capital of a small province and a county seat, Halifax is also a railway terminus, a convoy assembly base, a naval [and]...air base, a military headquarters and a fortress city, a shipbuilding port and a university centre...Halifax [was like] a town of 3000 with three or four thousand visitors - and a large percentage of them anxious to celebrate."
During the war Halifax was hopelessly overcrowded with service personnel and temporary civilian workers. Thousands of servicemen, mostly young VR sailors, lived off base on "lodgings and compensation," often three or four to an attic room in an older home in the inner city. This situation, combined with the complex nature of the city, was an enigma to the armed services at the time, and remains so for the historian today. On one hand there was an acknowledged, well-known and long-established tradition of liquor smuggling and bootlegging. Conversely, Halifax was home to probably the most active and militant temperance movement of any middle-sized Canadian urban area. In 1942, for instance, this lobby succeeded in closing down the Ajax Club, a privately-run institute for ratings. Yet, as if to confound the first two characteristics, hundreds of Haligonians provided help to servicemen, as best they could, in volunteer service organizations in the inner city.

From 1942 onwards, incidents of disregard for authority by Canadian naval officers and men steadily increased in Halifax. The pressures of the war and the difficulties of living in Halifax contributed to alcohol-related offences ranging from "high jinks" to more serious vandalism, destruction of property, and assault. Heavy drinking was a well-known Canadian characteristic. In June 1942 the Naval Minister, Angus L. MacDonald, asked Rear-Admiral G.C. Jones, Commanding Officer Atlantic Command (COAC) in Halifax, to investigate disciplinary problems, including "excessive drinking by some Naval Officers in Halifax." Curiously, the Naval Service, the Naval Board and the Naval Staff - the normal chain of command - were excluded from this investigation. Jones replied to the Minister that:

No one suggests that our organization here is by any means perfect, but the faults are almost entirely due to the rapid expansion and the lack of trained officers...no one can deny that excessive drinking has been indulged in by some Naval Officers. Steps are continually being taken to eliminate these people by dismissal or transfer."

Jones added a hand-written note to the effect that "'Joe' Connolly is back with some interesting ideas." Commander J.P. Connolly was the NSHQ Director of Special Services (DSS). A VR, he was also a Halifax lawyer, a veteran of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and a personal friend of Jones and the Minister. Moreover, he had been Naval Provost Marshall in Halifax with Admiral Jones in 1940-1942.

In October 1942, the CO of Stadacona, Capt. K.L. Adams, reported to Admiral Murray (who had just replaced Jones as COAC) that the main problems in Halifax were "Discipline...Morale...Accomodation...[and the] RCN Depot." These problems caused further incidents throughout 1943, and early in 1944 Murray wrote to his command that "there have been too many cases where officers, who would not think of letting down their ship, have let down the Navy by making a disturbance on shore when in uniform." Several months later R.J. Rankin, Managing Editor of the Halifax Herald, was so concerned about the deteriorating state of naval indiscipline in Halifax that he by-passed Murray and wrote directly to Jones, who by then was in the Naval Service.

Jones responded by once again sending Capt. J.P. Connolly to Halifax to investigate. Connolly reported on 3 July 1944 that there was "a general deterioration in discipline more or less condoned by Senior Officers" and that "Junior Officers appeared to be the worst offenders...their conduct gives a scandalous example to ratings." Connolly claimed this was caused by "small ships...[which] bring...a distinct relaxation...when such ratings go
ashore...their failure to observe discipline spreads to shore ratings and those...[on] training." There is no record of Connolly's meetings with Murray while he studied the disciplinary problems on his base. Clearly, Jones trusted Connolly's views on the matter."

Capt. Connolly's main contribution was to recommend an overhaul of the Shore Patrol. Sadly, between July 1944 and VE Day, neither Murray nor CO Stadacona made any effort to integrate Connolly's 1944 revised Shore Patrol arrangements into the Halifax command and staff relationship. As a result, control of the Shore Patrol fell into a hopeless muddle during the VE Day Riots: no one seemed to know to whom the Staff Officer Shore Patrol was responsible."

Following VE Day, Connolly, by then the successful CO of HMCS Avalon, the large base in St. John's where the celebrations were successful, again visited Halifax and reorganized the Halifax Shore Patrol to prepare for VJ Day.

In short, there had been naval disciplinary problems in Halifax, a city with immense problems of its own, since June 1942. At least twice, in 1942 and again in 1944, officials had advised the Naval Minister of the situation. In each case surreptitious methods were used to seek solutions, instead of following the normal chain of command. These methods, unfortunately, produced only half-hearted efforts to solve problems and failed to provide the necessary continuity or follow-up between incidents. This was particularly the case with the organization of the Shore Patrol, the regulatory arm of the naval command.

Between 1942 and 1945 the naval command in Halifax and Ottawa failed to correct the high incidence of naval indiscipline in Halifax. Three factors contributed to this failure. The first was the choice of COs for Stadacona. Following Adams, an effective CO in 1942 (and who was appointed CO again after the riots), NSHQ selected three senior officers, all of whom were "by and large, as unsuitable...for this appointment...as could be found." The CO at the time of the riots, the third since Adams, was Capt. H.W. Balfour, RCNVR. His plan for VE Day was defensive in nature and dwelt on protecting base property and facilities from his VR ratings."

This was an expression of an outdated leadership approach based on fear of the lower deck, and was the antithesis of a style based on trust and mutual confidence, which the VR wartime officers and men had come to expect.

The second factor was the lack of effective organization. From 1942 onwards Murray and other senior officers in Halifax knew what they needed, but their efforts were frustrated by a lack of available organizational talent. Murray for one had repeatedly written about the need for discipline ashore and had personally advocated the "Divisional System" of man management. Yet he and his staff failed to create an organization that could effectively and professionally administer thousands of sailors undergoing training, working in the dockyard or awaiting a drafting signal to a ship." They were not helped by a Shore Patrol organization that was only temporary and not fully trained until 1944.

Finally, the Halifax-Ottawa command relationship was not healthy. Jones and Murray maintained a prewar grudge and did not communicate with one another, a situation of which the senior officers were well aware." While operational matters were not impaired significantly by this rift - their staffs did much of this work for them - it had a detrimental effect on the navy's ability to identify and solve sensitive abstract problems, like civil-naval relations. Thus, in June 1944, when the disciplinary situation in Halifax reached crisis proportions, Jones sent Connolly to make recommendations. Jones did not use the normal chain of command or seek Murray's advice beforehand.
...I went ashore [VE Day in Halifax] and I saw...there was a hell of a lot of drunkeness...which was very inappropriate...things were getting out of hand. So I nipped smartly down...[to] see Jimmy Hibbard [Capt (D)]...He said to me, "I just can't do it, I daren't make a move because Admiral Murray's in town and he will blame me for anything I do wrong"...there was a lack of direction...It was nothing to do with training but lack of direction."

It is tempting, as many people did at the time, to blame the Halifax VE Day Riots on Murray's general approach to command and his actions in the months leading up to May 1945. It would be foolish to deny that his lack of organizational and administrative ability contributed substantially to the crisis. But blaming the riots on the actions or inaction of one powerful commander greatly oversimplifies the complexity of the situation.

The rapid expansion of the prewar RCN meant that thousands of untrained RCNVR reservists were given to the navy for the duration of the war. The VRs were the largest of the three components of the naval service, but they were separate from the RCN and RCNR, which had more training and experience. The VRs had no experience with the traditions of the navy. Nor did they have time to be instructed in the relationship between service traditions, morale and discipline. Perhaps as a result, the VRs created their own culture and identity. There were positive and negative characteristics of this culture. VRs had a high sense of pride and team spirit; demonstrated a strong affinity for teamwork and a desire for activities based on "mutual confidence;" and wanted to feel part of the naval team because they comprised ninety percent of it. The troubling traits included hard drinking, acting tough, drinking-related crime, a three-year habit of crime in Halifax, and an "us vs. them" relationship to those not at sea.

What made these troubling traits potentially dangerous was the fact that some senior RCN officers of an older generation were not equipped to deal with social change as represented by the VRs. This senior group was governed by a strong sea-going ethic that did not stress base organization and administration. It is probably not surprising then that most lacked the ability - and probably the inclination - to administer effectively. Many sensed problems, and complained about them, but could not suggest solutions other than a return to prewar values. Younger RCN officers, mostly at sea, adapted to the "new social heresy" and at the same time maintained an acceptable standard of discipline on their ships.

These circumstances were common to the entire navy. Most of the navy kept on top of the problems, and in general RCN leadership got the best from the VRs, which helped them to improve their reputation at sea. In Halifax, however, these circumstances collided with existing problems unique to that city. On the civilian side, the city had its own problems: overcrowding, parochialism, and no tradition of coping with a Canadian navy of any significant size. At the same time, the navy had failed repeatedly to find effective COs for Halifax, at least in part because there were not enough good RCN officers to go around. Murray and these mediocre COs demonstrated an inability to organize the base (and the Shore Patrol) effectively. Finally, the tense Ottawa-Halifax command relationship made handling delicate problems difficult.
This coincidence of circumstances created an explosive situation in Halifax of which officials were well aware. After the disciplinary crisis in June 1944, Capt. J.P. Connolly predicted "dire consequences" unless changes were made, yet little or no action was taken. The VE Day arrangements indicated that officers such as Murray, and his Chief of Staff, Capt. G.R. Miles, R CN (enrolled in 1911 and 1916, respectively), were out of touch with the men and women of the navy. The VE Day plans were poorly thought-out and loosely coordinated. No one had the imagination or foresight to make special arrangements based on "mutual confidence," such as dances, open canteens, unlimited beer and so on. Instead, most COs simply ordered "open gangway" and let their men fend for themselves. This situation was hardly due to the confusing distinction between the level of discipline on small ships and ashore, which deserves comment.

Capt. Connolly was the navy's expert on discipline in Halifax. A Haligonian lawyer, he had examined the problems in 1942 and again in 1944. He concluded on both occasions that the high level of indiscipline in Halifax was due to the small-ship nature of the navy. But he revised his conclusions after VE Day. Notwithstanding the findings of the Board of Inquiry, in a volte-face Connolly claimed that small-ship discipline was higher than discipline ashore:

large numbers [of sailors]...are returning from sea service [who are] raising the standard of dress and discipline. The latest survey [3 July 1945] shows that Naval personnel who have had sea experience are more highly disciplined and have greater respect for their appearance than the shoregoing type."

Had Connolly found the real villains - the thousands of sailors on "log and comp" - who were an undisciplined aberration of the original, sea-going VRs, with all their troubling traits but without the proud team spirit?

What became clear to everyone was that thousands of Canadian sailors from ashore and from ships projected their highly developed self-images onto Stadacona and Halifax on VE Day. The sailors gave life to their own ideas about behaviour, and they moulded their behaviour to fit expectations. Once it became apparent to the VRs on 7 May that there was no attempt by their superiors to foster mutual confidence, and already knowing that their antics inside and outside Stadacona would not be suppressed, they escalated their drunken high jinks to include vandalism and theft. The VR ratings (including WRCNS on 8 May) simply reacted in accordance with their self-image, and at the same time delivered a final, tragic signal to authorities in Halifax. The message was clear: their needs were those of a wartime "people's navy," which were more complex, and required more adaptation and thought - forthright leadership, in other words - than R CN ratings in the 1930s.

How should we view the Halifax VE Day Riots? If they were a direct result of the naval command's failure to administer their men and adapt to their needs, then can we claim that these lapses in command were in turn a predictable consequence of the immense challenges arising from the navy's explosive growth? From any point of view, the navy's tasks were almost impossible. Circumstances were against them; they were required to manage the administrative growth of a large and complex institution while at the same time fighting at sea against a wily opponent. Operationally, they were compared with the RN and the USN, two naval institutions with centuries of disciplined experience at war and ashore.
In Canada, many Haligonians and journalists compared the navy to the Canadian Army, despite the fact that service was the only fighting service that in 1939 had an experienced general staff, specialists, and service support capabilities. Clearly these comparisons were unfair. The naval command of the day should be measured against a different standard: "given their prewar training and wartime circumstances, how successfully did they manage their part of the expansion?"

It is certain that senior RCN officers were not well-prepared to administer the massive expansion of their service, to respond to the unique needs of a people's navy, or to foster sound civil-naval relations. This lapse in preparedness was determined by the training and development of RCN officers prior to the war. In that sense, mistakes made ashore were set in train long before 1942. Given this, it is only to the extent that some senior officers failed to see, and adapt, to the new requirements that they can be blamed for their failures during the war.

Nevertheless, most RCN officers did their best, and the overall result was successful. When encouraged by the RN, the highly confident and powerful personalities of the RCN officers - although not attuned to administration - provided the perseverance and drive to complete the wartime expansion. They provided hundreds of ships and thousands of RCNVR sailors for naval warfare, first in the Atlantic and later in all the allied theatres. No one can question the operational effectiveness of more than 100 RCN fighting ships at sea by 1945. Perhaps VA’dm Sir Peter Gretton put it best:

There used to be a rather pompous old naval saying, "The impossible can be achieved at once; the miracle takes longer." [Examining]...the RCN's contribution to the Second World War, one cannot but conclude that the impossible was achieved but the miracles remained elusive...The average standard of the staff officers at Ottawa was not high enough - there were simply not enough first-rate brains available, and the ships had to be manned...It is certain that the RCN tried to do too much and thus the miracles were not achieved, but that must be blamed on the politicians as well as the sailors."

Although the wartime expansion hit the operational mark, the effective administration and organization of naval life ashore in Halifax stood as one of the "elusive miracles" that was unattainable throughout the war. So too was the reluctance by some older officers to adapt prewar perceptions to the needs of a people's navy.

NOTES

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1. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group (RG) 24, vol. 11117, file 70-1 -6, Capt. J.C.I. Edwards, RCN, Commanding Officer (CO) Cornwallis, to Commander in Chief (C-in-C), Canadian North-West Atlantic Command (CNA), 18 May 1945. Following the Riots, C-in-C CNA requested
that all his COs report on their VE Day celebrations. The strength of Cornwallis was close to 8000 at the time. Their plan was based on a notion of mutual trust and there were no problems.

2. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11208, Naval Board of Inquiry on the VE Day Riots, Findings.

3. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), 113.3S2.003 (D1), "Report on the Halifax Disorders May 7th-8th, 1945, by Hon. Mr. Justice R.L. Kellock, Royal Commissioner" ("Kellock Report"), 28 July 1945. The army and the navy conducted separate Inquiries. The Naval Board of Inquiry used the term "factors" and not "causes." The Commission of Inquiry ordered by the Privy Council Office was headed by Hon. Justice R.L. Kellock, whose public report was widely distributed. The Kellock Inquiry testimony was not opened to the public until 1997; see NAC, RG 24, vols. 5330 and 5331 ("Kellock Testimony"). For later histories, see James M. Cameron, Murray: The Martyred Admiral (Hantsport, NS, 1980); and Stanley R. Redman, Open Gangway: An Account of the Halifax Riots (Hantsport, NS, 1981).

4. The terms "morale" and "discipline" were used frequently, often in combination but seldom with full understanding. For the purpose of this study, morale is defined as one of the functions that governs how people respond and react to danger. This definition is derived from John Baynes, Morale. A Study of Men and Courage (London, 1967); Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1945); and A. Roger Thompson, "Combat Motivation and Behaviour among Naval Forces: A Discussion Paper" (Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis Staff Note 9, 1991). Also a prewar Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) definition of morale and discipline, explained by Rear-Admiral (ret.) K.L. Adams earlier in this paper.

5. "Kellock Report," 6. The Chief Commissioner of the Liquor Commission also had suggested that service canteens be closed on VE Day. Murray, on behalf of the three services, had replied that canteens should remain open "to the extent of the limited supplies that would be available." Maintaining large stocks of beer and liquor appeared to be a major problem with service canteens. With all the liquor warehouses closed, the canteens would not be able to remain open for long.

6. The original civil-military VE Day Plan included events for only one day, from 0900 until the evening. There were no contingency plans for what to do if VE Day were announced, for example, in mid-morning. Instead, the plan was based on one theoretical day, using the principle that events would be conducted to divert crowds from the downtown core. Dancing was planned for South and South Park streets, and entertainments, as well as the Service of Thanksgiving, were scheduled for the Commons side of Citadel Hill. A harbour fireworks-searchlight-fire boat display was planned in the evening, which required the crowds to face the harbour and the downtown. See Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), RG 32/102/5-7, file C-124, series 36C, "Brief Outline of Preparations by HCEC [Halifax Civil Emergency Corps] Executive." The HCEC was also known as the Civil Defence Committee.

7. Ibid. On the evening of 7 May, on short notice, the officials decided to hold the outdoor harbour fireworks and light show. They later claimed this was due to a forecast of bad weather for 8 May. The armed services reacted quickly with their searchlights and fire-boats and the show went on, with hundreds of people watching from the downtown side of the Citadel. Thus, crowds were not diverted from the downtown by this event. Nor were they diverted by the street dances. The other diversionary entertainments originally planned for VE Day were not held on 7 May, and few if any went ahead on 8 May.

8. The term "mutual confidence" appears in a variety of contemporary naval writings, suggesting that it was often used in the RCN.


10. The Halifax VE Day Riots were widely photographed by service and civilian photographers. There is a set of selected black and white photographs in DHH, NDHQ, 113.3S2.003 (D1), and also at the NAC. Cinefilm captured events over time, and the escalation of the violence on 8 May is apparent in this footage, the best of which is held by CBC Halifax.

11. NAC, Record Group (RG) 24, vol. 11208/152, Naval Board of Inquiry, Testimony of Lt. R.M. MacLean, RCNVR, CO HMCS Grou. Grou was a frigate in Halifax for a lengthy time being "tropicalized" for Pacific operations. MacLean and an unnamed Ordinary Seaman defended Eaton's department store from service and civilian looters.
VE Day Riots in Halifax, 7-8 May 1945

12. After the riots several newspaper editorials compared the navy with the army. The Ottawa Journal, 10 May 1945, asked "why were troops not called out [when]...uniformed hoodlums... were...[rioting]?" The implication was that the army was steady and reliable while the navy were "uniformed hoodlums."

13. The "Kellock Report," 61, listed the damages as "6987 cases of beer...55,392 quarts of spirits...from the [several] establishments of the Liquor Commission...30,516 quarts of Beer from Keith's Brewery...In Dartmouth 5256 quarts of beer, 1692 quarts of wine and 9816 quarts of liquor...[in Halifax]...564 firms suffered damage, 2624 pieces of plate and other glass...were broken and 207 of these firms suffered from looting in some degree."

14. When HMCS Chaudière returned to Halifax in March 1945, the CO, LCdr C.P. Nixon, remembered that "Admiral Murray came aboard. He evidently knew nothing of our exploits. All he talked about was the conduct of the men ashore...It went over like a complete wet blanket...I got [the men] together and thanked them." In the same interview, Hal Lawrence remembered that "Yogi" Jensen had reported a similar incident when Algonquin returned to Halifax: "It was terrible, the Admiral's speech to returning warriors. He just warned them that they had better pull their socks up that they weren't in the UK now...It was quite an unsuitable speech." DHH, BDHQ, Biography File, Interview, Capt. C.P. Nixon, RCN, March 1987.


16. For example, Commodore (retd.) J.C. Littler RCN, recently wrote in his published memoir, "[u]nfortunately, the Halifax riots at the end of the European war caused this finest of Canadian Admirals to take the entire blame for those in command of barracks and dockyard." See J.C. Littler, Sea Fever (Victoria, 1995), 252. Much of Murray's correspondence reflecting his life-long concern with his dismissal is in NAC, MG 30, E207/2. Cameron, Murray, presents a sympathetic case for Murray's innocence, partly and correctly based on exaggerations in the press.

17. "Kellock Testimony," vol 5331/13, 1410. When asked if he had ever "satisfied" himself "at any time that your senior Officers had or had not experience in the handling of large concentration camps," Murray replied that "[i]t has never been necessary for me to do so. They have had experience since."

18. DHH, NDHQ, R.H. Caldwell, "Change and Challenge: The Canadian Naval Staff in 1943" (1997); and "Admiral Murray and the ACHQ" (1995). The problems on the east coast could only have been solved through greater centralization in Ottawa and Halifax. Moreover, greater emphasis in NSHQ and Halifax should have been placed on the advice of specialists and outside assistance.


22. Ibid., 236.

23. Ibid., 243.

24. The majority of the officers and men in the Canadian Naval Service were RCNVR. In January 1945 the all-ranks strength figures were: RCNVR, 78,000; RCNR, 5300; and RCN, 4384. See Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Activities on Shore During the Second World War (2 vols., Ottawa, 1952), II, 274. There is no study that tracks enlistment in the RCNVR or the RCN through the war. Moreover, apparently many VR ratings transferred to the RCN for a six-year period of service between 1940 and 1942. The author is indebted to LCdr R.H. Gimblett for this insight.


27. The average rate of VR personnel enrolled and sent to the fleet was about 700 men per month. This figure is based on LCdr W.R. Glover's re-
search on the training demands of the RCNVR and a discussion with Dr. Roger Sarty, 15 May 1998.


29. For the first scholarly suggestion of a self-image based on a distinct culture, see Michael L. Hadley, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy," in *ibid.*, 35-56.

30. There is a great deal of evidence to support this high degree of pride of service. For example, William H. Pugsley, *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen - Life on the Royal Canadian Navy's Lower Deck* (Toronto, 1945), repeatedly stressed this in his study of the wartime views of VR Ordinary Seaman: "against the outside world they stood as one" (54); "the men are proud of the fact that their discipline is more severe than that of other services" (66); and "[going ashore]...you dressed very carefully...to satisfy your own finer instincts of what a matelot should wear [which was]...a tailor-made job - 'tiddlies'—...Ratings are...fussy...[a sailor said]...I'm proud of my seaman's uniform...you can have it tight enough to look good...The seamen are fighting proud of their uniform" (229).


32. Roger Sarty, *Canada and The Battle of the Atlantic* (Ottawa, 1998), 89-90, cites a report of 16 October 1941 which described this dangerous situation: "for the most part [COs] have not one other officer on whom they can...rely [upon]...many of the ships are grossly under manned...unless very urgent steps are taken...grave danger exists of breakdowns in health, morale and discipline."

33. Admiral Dönitz, head of the German U-boat service, named the first wave of his offensive against North America in January 1942 *Paukenschlag*, which means "drumbeat" or "toll of drums." The name stuck, and it was used to describe all U-boat attacks in North American waters in the first half of 1942. The Germans used the full term *einen kraftigen Paukenschlag* to describe their "tremendous and sudden blow." See Gunter Hessler, *The U-Boat War in the Atlantic* (London, 1989), chapter 4.

34. In a brief social history of the prewar and wartime navy, based on eight interviews, James A. Boutilier noted that "[s]ome of the [prewar RCN] Lower Deck tended to look down upon [VR] officers as inexperienced and amateurish." Other distinguishing characteristics between junior RCN and RCNVR officers included the belief that "[RCN] officers were more aloof...[they] were very, very well trained but...distant...the [VR] officer...knew a lot but he wasn't afraid to ask [for] more knowledge... VR's were trying to be an officer without knowing how to be [one]...[VRs] jumped in there and ran it [well]...How they got sifted out and did the job I'll never know. I think we were a bunch of lost sheep and I think the RN took a bloody dim view of us." See James A. Boutilier, "Matelot Memories: Recollections of the Lower Deck in Peace and War 1937-1945," in NAC, MG 31, E18, Audette Papers, vol. 16, 12-13.

35. The main complaints were originated by a disgruntled officer, LCDr A.D. MacLean, RCNVR. See NAC, MG 32, C71, J.J. Connolly Papers, vols. 3-8. The author is indebted to Richard O. Mayne for this insight.


37. In September 1943 LCDr H.E.W. Strange, RCNVR, Deputy Director of Naval Information, commented on Canadian ratings in Derry: "vice habits of the respective navies...U.S. ratings seek prostitutes, R.C.N., ratings seek liquor, and R.N. ratings indulge in both." NAC, MG 32, C71, vol. 3, file 3-12, part 1, Strange to J.J. Connolly, 21 September 1943. RCNVR rating Frank Curry tried to explain this development. "The dance was a great success...the consumption of liquor escalated...the crew [Kamsack] took to the streets and battled amongst themselves in a wild, terrifying night of blood...It was as if all the years of harsh and brutal living conditions had finally turned us into animals...Often through the long [war] years of despair, our pent-up feelings found temporary release in...alcohol...to provide the basis for periodic breakouts...to return from shore leave to find a good part of the crew roary-eyed drunk and in a vile mood, the ship in turmoil. Who could blame
VE Day Riots in Halifax, 7-8 May 1945

them? The breaking point was often very close...[small incidents aboard or ashore simply added]...insult...to injury." Frank Curry, War At Sea: A Canadian Seaman On the North Atlantic (Toronto, 1990), 71-72. On the distortion of VR pride, see A/Capt J. M. Rowland, RN, Capt (D) in St. John's in September 1943, who commented on VR discipline and noted that "There is quite an idea prevalent that one should look 'tough.'" His superior, FONF, agreed, and noted that what was needed was "a pride in uniform rather than in 'looking tough.'" NAC, RG 24, vol. 11947, DNF 1700-11/1, Capt. (D) to Flag Officer Newfoundland, 2 September 1943; and 1057-3-24/1, vol. 3997, FONF to NSHQ, 27 September 1943.


39. Ibid., 171-172.


42. On VE Day there were over 4000 naval personnel of all ranks living in civilian accommodation on "lodgings and compensation;" the "Kellock Report," 17-20, reported that Scotian had 2639 and Stadacona 1178. On the other hand, all of Peregrine's personnel were in barracks. Capt. "D" noted that his shore staff, over 300, were all on "log and comp." See NAC, RG 24, vol. 11582. This author did not calculate "log and comp" figures for other naval units or the other two services.

43. Jay White, "The Ajax Affair: Citizens and Sailors in Wartime Halifax, 1939-1945" (Unpublished MA Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1987), 39-86; and White, "The Ajax Affair," Moncton Times-Transcript, 1 May 1988. The Ajax club was privately organized by non-Haligonians. While it existed, the club was an elegant and highly successful wet and dry canteen for ratings only.

44. DHH, NDHQ 80/218, F 883/1, MacDonald to Commanding Officer Atlantic Command (COAC), 4 June 1942; and F 883/4, vol. 17, COAC to Minister, 8 June 1942.

45. DHH, NDHQ, Naval Historian's Collection (NHC), vol. 14, NSS 1000-5-13, CO RCN Baracks to COAC, 12 October 1942.


48. DHH, NDHQ, F 883/30, vol. 17, Connolly to CNS, 3 July 1944. See also "Kellock Testimony," vol. 5331/11, 1079-1081, for a reference to the "Rankin Incident."

49. In 1991 Dr. Roger Sarty interviewed Katherine Roberts, the best friend of "Tillie," Admiral Jones' wife, who advised that Jones "was not a social person...To get more information look up Capt. Joe Connely [sic] - they were best friends. Joe used to attend functions with Tillie when G.C. wouldn't...I'm under the impression he was the only one G.C. really cared about. Another was Angus L. MacDonald [sic]...All were from NS." Katherine Roberts to Roger Sarty, 19 December 1991, original in Dr. Sarty's private collection, Ottawa.


51. DHH, NDHQ, NHC, 81/520/1440-6, vol. XII, John A. MacDonald to RAdm C.J. Dillon, 2 March 1945. Lt. (Paymaster) MacDonald, RCNVR, was "Captain's Secretary" to the CO. He advised that the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) had confirmed this opinion of these COs.

52. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11117, file 70-1-1, CO HMCS Stadacona to C-in-C CNA, 8 March 1945. The Naval Board of Inquiry examined this plan in detail when they questioned Capt. Balfour; see "Naval Board of Inquiry," vol. 11208, 86-106.

53. A review of the organization files of the largest Halifax units revealed that solving personnel and disciplinary matters was the major problem facing commanders and staffs during the war. For example, in October 1943, on the eve of an attempt to reorganize the naval command following the implementation of the Area Combined Headquarters, HMCS Stadacona's strength was 11,000, a complement that clearly was too large for a single "unit." See NAC, RG 24, vol. 11541, files H-1-2-1, H-1-2-8 and H-1-2-4. The files were for C-in-C CNA, Stadacona, and Peregrine, respectively. There is related material in the C-in-C CNA orga-
nization files in RG 24, vols. 11009 and 11657.

54. In a 1986 interview describing wartime NSHQ relations, RAdm M.G. Stirling, a signals officer, remembered the hate that his Director of Signals, A/Capt G.A. Worth, RCN, directed towards Murray: "Sam [Worth] would just tell him to shut up. Sam was by then a Captain. He was senior to [Murray] as a Cadet, and neither of them had ever forgotten it. He [Worth] was not a respecter of persons." In the bipolar world of RCN senior leadership, Worth clearly was a "Jones man." See DHH, NDHQ, Stirling Biography File. There is some evidence that signals between Murray and Jones were sent from duty officer to duty officer on direct teletype. Consider this dialogue: "Is there an officer there please?" "Yes." "I have a very important message for CNS which Admiral Murray has asked me to pass to an officer...to be given directly to CNS with no filed copies; would you mind taking it please?" "Yes, I am on the DDSY machine...there will be no further filed copy."

55. DHH, NDHQ, J.H. Wade Biography File, 17-18, Interview, Lt. J.H. Wade, RCNVR, and LCdr Glover, 4 February (nd).

56. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11117, file 70-1-8, Executive Assistant to VAdm G.C. Jones to CNS, 3 July 1945. Jones was then C-in-C CNA and CNS.

57. The inspiration for the conclusion in the paragraph was drawn from Craig M. Cameron, *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951* (New York, 1994).