BOOK REVIEWS

Glenn Grasso (comp. & ed.); transcribed by Marc Bernier. *Songs of the Sailor: Working Chanteys at Mystic Seaport.* Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1998. 67 pp., illustrations, musical transcriptions, suggested readings, glossary. US $9.95, spiral-bound; ISBN 0-913372-84-6.

Sea shanties were the shipboard work songs of the Age of Sail. At the Mystic Seaport Museum, shanty singers demonstrate how songs were used not only in their modern role, as entertainment, but also in their original role as an important element of shipboard work. This book is an overview of shantying at the museum as well as an accompaniment to *Songs of the Sailor,* a compact disk by the museum's shanty team.

The book briefly explains how shanties are used at the museum. The introduction, aimed at a young audience, explains sailing, shipboard life, and the shantying tradition. The annotated bibliography is brief but well-considered, while the short glossary doesn't quite catch all the technical terms used in the book. Twenty-seven shanties comprise the heart of the book; they are arranged in five categories according to the particular shipboard activity they were intended to accompany (capstan, halyard, short drag, windlass and pumping shanties, and ceremonial and fo'c'sle songs.) Each section is introduced by a one-page explanation of the activity that the songs would accompany, the typical subject matter, as well as musical considerations. The selection of songs offers a good overview of the variety in the genre, although there is no mention of the non-English shanties. For each song there is a note about the source, an explanation of any special terms or situations, and often a further exposition on shanties. A few songs are presented with variants.

The song texts are often not loyal to the source versions cited. Some technical terms are simplified. "Unacceptable" language is replaced or removed. Verses that might offend modern readers have also been omitted – a museum must work with a family audience in mind. Yet this means that much of the vocabulary and subject matter used on seagoing vessels in the 1800s is thus rendered inappropriate. Curiously, references to drinking and drunken behaviour remain.

Other editing appears more arbitrary. Some songs, like "A Long Time Ago" and "Lowlands Low," have been rewritten and greatly shortened from the source on which they claim to be based. Such editing is severe enough to lose the sense and mood of the song. With "Shallow Brown," verses of other songs replace most of those of previously published variants. While adding such verses to suit the duration of a task was a period practice, removing the original verses and the story they tell is unprecedented. Deletion of verses is also encouraged by the one-song-per-page format, so that some songs have been much shortened. While the notes mention the censorship and editing, they don't adequately convey its extent, so that readers will be left without a full impression of what shanties were really like.

This book shows well how shantying can work in the context of a modern museum. This is an increasingly important context for shanties today. Overall the book is well-organised and laid out. The musical transcriptions are well presented and match the sources. They are set in keys appropriate for singing and playing on common instruments. The spiral binding makes it easier to read the music while playing. I cannot comment on how well the book complements the CD it is intended to accompany, as I have not heard it. Nevertheless, as a general introduction to shanties, it is marred by the wholesale editing of lyrics and the extreme brevity of exposition. Rarely is any element of the book longer than one page. A reader wanting a true sense of shantying must still seek out-of-print works by Colcord, Doerflinger, Whall, and Hugill. Sadly, only Stan Hugill's *Shanties from the Seven Seas* (also published by Mystic) is still in print.

Andrew Draskoy
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Martin Terry. *Maritime Paintings of Early Australia 1788-1900.* Carlton South, Victoria: Miegunyah Press, 1998. xiv + 1 1 I pp., illustrations, bibliography. AUS $59.95, US $59.95, cloth; ISBN 0-522-84688-2. Distributed in the USA by Paul & Company, c/o COSI, Leonia, NJ.

The "Antipodes" have produced a rich and unique body of maritime art, yet historical analysis of

such images has traditionally been discussed from the centre of power (the "Empire") outward. *Maritime Paintings ofEarly Australia* provides an Australian perspective on this artistic production, challenging, to some extent, the established view that this marine art was merely a reflection of European artistic conventions and an expression of colonial control over the region. The idea is admirable: unfortunately the writing does not live up to this "post-colonial" potential, a potential that the pictorial richness of the book reveals.

For a publication released by Melbourne University Press, *Maritime Paintings* is, surprisingly, academically weak. It lacks supporting documentation (only six notes for the whole book, though there is a decent bibliography) and there is only limited analysis of the art works reproduced. Moreover there are a number of errors in the book, including mis-numbered illustrations, improper dates, along with a confusing use of both plates (colour images) and illustrations (black and white images – though at least one listed illustration is in colour). Passages of hyperbole and melodramatic conjecture (as on pages 39, 85, 98), along with sections of convoluted phrasing, also detract from the text.

Terry's analysis is further confined by a more traditional formalistic reading of the art works. While not advocating that Terry delve into the more arcane aspects of the contemporary critical theory, the book's subject matter does provide an ideal mechanism for a post-colonial perspective. Post-colonial theory/practice gives a voice to those normally viewed as powerless under colonial authority, providing a multi-vocal "speaking/writing back to the Empire" in effect. Its practice shows how minorities (notably Aboriginal people), emigrants, and the dispossessed (transported convicts), often subverted colonial power to their own ends. Indeed Terry unintentionally hints, a number of times, at just such a post-colonial position – as when he discusses the maritime artworks of convict artists like John Lancashire or Thomas Watling. Watling's watercolour of a departing ship watched by, what appears to be, shore bound local colonial administrators (themselves imprisoned by the departure) provides both a melancholic and sardonic painting "back to the Empire." Terry also stresses, in both his opening and conclusion, the importance of the Aboriginal perspective towards colonization and the creation of their own unique maritime imagery – but he fails to include a single Aboriginal image in the text, belittling these good intentions.

Also problematic are Terry's art historical biases. He casually dismisses scrimshaw as an "artless" form (though the example shown clearly demonstrates "artful" aesthetic considerations), yet decries those who call maritime painting "artless."[ix] Similarly ships portraiture is written off by the author as a repetitive and "self-defeating genre, [83] yet he fails to consider how nuances like handling, composition, lighting and detail can speak volumes regarding the importance of such images in the marketplace of the day. As Marcia Pointon has shown with her examination of "wigs" in eighteenth century portraiture (in *Hanging the Head),* even the most insignificant detail in a formulaic genre reveals insights into changing social and cultural standards.

Nevertheless, this is an odd book for while the text could do with more development it is a pictorially enlightening "read," particularly in the forms of art considered as "maritime" imagery. Objet d' art, photographs, still-Iifes, cartographic illustrations, explorer's and surveyor's drawings, and scenes from "below decks," are included in Terry's discussion. These expand pictorially upon the limited visual repertoire often found in books on maritime art (though the inclusion of dentures rescued from the wreck of the *Dunbar* is needless pictorial filler). Included in the book are excellent works by Tom Roberts, and John Skinner Prout, along with Arthur Streeton's magnificent "The Three Liners" of 1893. Streeton's work captures, through impressionistic brush-work, the energy and dynamics of modern steamship life juxtaposed with the sailing and rowing taking place in Sydney Cove. However Terry's statement that Streeton's work is sketchier than anything Monet would have done is inaccurate, particularly given Monet's earlier, and seminal, maritime scene, "Impression: Sunrise" of 1872. In praising the amateur artist J. Pearson and his naïve painting "The Fish of Sydney Harbour" (c. 1901) Terry visually ends his book on a strong note. If only more texts included the work of such divergent artists, we would find marine art to be a far more dynamic field than the editions published by the "Collector's Club" on the subject lead us to believe.

Gerard Curtis
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Wendy Robinson. *First Aid for Underwater Finds.* London and Portsmouth: Archetype Publications Ltd. and Nautical Archaeology Society, 1998. 128 pp., photographs (b+w, colour), bibliography, index. Spiral-bound; ISBN 1-873132-662.

When underwater archaeology began to take on a more serious hue in the late 1970s, one of its many challenges was the conservation of waterlogged and often salt-impregnated materials. In fact, the excavation and raising of submerged artefacts represents such a traumatic change in an object's environment that "first aid" is immediately required in order to stabilize it and prevent its rapid degradation. This book is thus not about the great advances in the conservation of waterlogged materials during the last two decades, but rather about the action that must be taken expeditiously in order for the conservation to be worthwhile. It reads like a manual and clearly that is its intended role, judging first of all from its spiral binding which resembles that of a recipe book – perfect for counter-top consultation with wet hands (although the pages themselves are not water-resistant!).

The first step in applying "first aid" is the recognition of materials, which Robinson divides into the traditional material culture categories of organics (wood, bone, leather, etc), metals, and minerals (stone, ceramics, glass). Every material requires its own mode of intervention and, at the risk of being a little repetitive, the necessary steps are reiterated for each category so that there is no frantic paging back and forth to find all the needed information. Just to make sure, Robinson has provided a thorough index. However, she does not believe in simple formulae which can be applied across the board. We learn, for example, that smoking must be banned in the vicinity of any organic material that may eventually be used for carbon dating; glass objects must be initially stored in salt water and not desalinated abruptly; iron objects can begin to corrode "at alarming rates" as soon as their *in situ* environment is disturbed. In all, sixteen large categories of materials are covered and for each, there is a discussion of the properties, degradation characteristics and preferred mode of permanent conservation. For each category as well, there is a recipe-like summary of "first aid" measures to be carried out and a list of things to avoid.

A publication such as this is not really geared for professional conservators (except those who need to educate archaeologists), nor for hefty organisations like Parks Canada which already ensure that any raised artefacts are immediately passed over to a well-equipped conservation team. Instead, it addresses the growing trend among avocational diving groups, contract archaeologists and smaller museums to take on the excavation of a submerged site. This trend is obviously more advanced in Europe than in North America, and more in the United States than in Canada, but it is clearly here to stay as more archaeologists become aware of the extraordinary richness of submerged sites. Such low-budget underwater archaeology cannot afford the kind of division of labour among divers, cataloguers, conservators and supervisors that characterized the field in its developmental years and this book fits into that new reality. Yet its accessibility and its non-specialist audience do not make it any less rigorous in its approach. "First aid" may be a way to avoid the heavy cost of maintaining a specialised conservation team on site but it does not replace the need for specialised conservation later on. Its goal is to allow informed decisions to be made about an object once its survival is guaranteed and thus fits into any archaeological project.

As underwater archaeology slowly permeates Canadian universities and other cultural organisations, the need for manuals such as this will become more apparent. Wendy Robinson has offered a particularly good one, for it melds the archaeologist's interests and approach with those of the conservator. She has also discretely put her finger on a notoriously weak link in the process of underwater archaeology – the care of objects immediately after they have been raised.

Brad Loewen
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Godfrey Baldacchino and Robert Greenwood (eds.). *Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for Small Islands.* Charlottetown: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, 1998. 384 pp., figures, tables, essay references, index. $24.95, paper; ISBN 0-919013-23-6.

In the context of increased globalisation what should small island societies do? First, argue the authors of this collection, they must do something, for steady as she goes is no longer an

option. Second, that something cannot be self-reliance, for they think only the terms of global integration, not integration itself, are open for debate. As presented here, this debate is simple enough: a society can develop an internal sustainability "from the inside-out" or it can rely on managing externalities and develop "from the outside-in." Bracketed by four more general essays, this book consists of a series of case studies which illustrate these two competing strategies in the relatively wealthy island communities of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

For the uninitiated these "ins" and "outs" can be confusing. Relying on transnational oil companies, low-wage sub-contracts for General Electric, or a combination of tourism and export oriented mono-culture are all presented as examples of internal sustainability, while exercises in local and regional public planning, or adjustments to local regulations governing financial intermediaries, are considered examples of external integration and dependent development. This initial confusion dissipates once one realises these distinctions do not really matter. It is the neo-liberal agenda which is "in" and interventionist public authorities, gender equity, ecological concerns and community-based development which are `out ." After all, as one of the editors confidently asserts, government planning is "hopelessly naïve and false...an exercise in tea-leaf reading." [215]

Thirteen of the sixteen papers were first presented at a Charlottetown conference on patterns of autonomy and dependence held in 1992 and they have been substantially revised and updated for publication. Yet only the editors, Baldacchino and Greenwood, seem to have had the opportunity to integrate into their work the contributions of the other authors. This is unfortunate, because a more sustained dialogue between the contributors would have improved the work substantially. Take, for example, the thought-provoking essay by Jean-Didier Hache who argues that small islands are political not geographical constructs. What we are in fact dealing with, he suggests, is the product of a process of political marginalisation. Personally, I found this a much more interesting idea than the presumption that a conservative insularity is innate to small island cultures; a presumption which informs many of the case studies and is raised to the level of a general principle in the concluding essays.

Generally, the authors in this collection consider both geography and history to be unimportant. Greenwood argues, for example, that the model for Newfoundland should be northeastern Italy. As this suggests, the maritime reality of island life is consistently ignored. Only two papers discuss marine resources and they focus on oil developments in the Shetlands and Newfoundland. Though an earlier collection in this series dealt with the North Atlantic fisheries, (Amason and Felt, 1995) nevertheless, it is remarkable that, in a collection on economic development strategies for small islands, fishing is only discussed twice. The two references are revealing. In the Shetlands relying on oil for "internal sustainability" meant "some of the best fishing grounds...were destroyed by the pipelines," [105] while compensation amounted to a derisory £70,000. In the article on the Azores, an archipelago which controls an exclusive economic zone nearly twice the size of France in the mid-Atlantic, there is a passing reference to "the potential for development of this sector [which] is enormous since both coastal and deep sea fishing still follow old traditional methods." [317] The potential for whom? Development of what?

Development can be measured in many ways. The authors of this collection, who are all men and who are all senior level bureaucrats, consultants and academics or some combination of these three, are in the development business. They consider an increase in GNP to be the fundamental measure of development. The strategies they propose may vary. Baldacchino recommends maximising rents by "the flexible marketing of the desirability of location." [216] Mark Shrimpton stresses the spin-offs for business from large scale projects like Hibernia, (understandable since according to his figures only twenty-three percent of the person-years of employment actually went to Newfoundlanders despite a two billion dollar government subsidy) the most important being the "connections and contacts developed through various projects have provided local companies with international exposure and have broken them out of the local operations mind-set." [205-6] J. Doug House is also preoccupied by this mind-set, but he advocates the wholesale revamping of local government, because the causes of "thwarted development ... are largely political and bureaucratic ... not economic." [172] Stephen Carse and Mark Hampton would beg to differ, as their respective analyses of the isles of Man and Jersey stress the role of local government in creating tax havens.

These apparently divergent and competing strategies in fact share a common set of values: flexibility, individual initiative, innovation, integration and co-operation are the way forward for small island communities. Dressed in the drag of the nineties, these concepts are used to justify new forms of dependency within the global economy. How ironic this travesty, for the historical practice of these virtues by the people living in small island communities explains a good deal of the vitality, diversity and richness of our cultures and societies. Preservation and further development of our unique places in the world will not be easily achieved, but the competing strategies offered here will make that task more, not less, difficult. Transnational corporate mind-sets, money laundering and high rents are not what we need. Nothing less will suffice than respecting the historical, spatial and ecological diversity of our islands as we struggle to overcome the deeply-rooted social and gender inequities we face.

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Eric Ruff and Laura Bradley. *Historic Yarmouth, Town & County*. Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1997. ix + 118 pp., photographs. $18.95, paper; ISBN 1-55019-220-4.

With 20,000 photographic images and negatives in their collection, the Yarmouth County Museum and Archives has one of the most comprehensive collections of photographs for any town of comparable size in Atlantic Canada. Selecting two hundred of these photographs taken by professional photographers, curator Eric Ruff and archivist Laura Bradley have produced a beautiful book that demonstrates a high degree of photographic literacy on the part of the authors. *Images of Our Past* concentrates on the period from the mid 1800s to the early 1940s. Many of the photographs concentrate on the late nineteenth century when Yarmouth experienced unparalleled prosperity, becoming the second largest port of registry in Canada for registered ship tonnage in 1879.

The book is divided into nine short chapters ranging from streetscapes, domestic architecture, business and public architecture to special events, uniforms, shipping, transportation and professional photographers and their subjects. The Yarmouth County Museum has the reputation of being among the best regional museums in Nova Scotia and it is obvious that Ruff and Bradley have an intimate knowledge of the collection and its historical context. Two photographs highlight the mseum buildings. The first museum, located in a Gothic-Revival style building, was originally built as the Milton library in 1888 and became the museum in 1958. [43] The structure was subsequently demolished. The present-day museum, housed in the former Tabernacle Congregational Church (1892), was converted to the Yarmouth County Museum in 1967. [44]

The photographs have been acquired with a careful eye to documenting the image, including the people, the buildings and the objects. Precise, appropriate captions reveal a careful concentration to detail. One, depicting a Sunday afternoon on Willow Street, shows nineteen people, mostly children with their bicycles, tricycles and wagons. As was typical of well-dressed children and adults in the early 1900s, all nineteen are wearing hats. [8] The authors counted those hats just as they did the thirty-four wagon wheels and seven wagons in a photograph in the transportation chapter. [97] Other photographs reveal the close collaboration between the photographic images and the museum collections. In a delightful interior view of the home of ship owner Loran Baker there is a rare Japanese Kutaniware vase shown in the living room that is part of the museum collection. [15] Another interior scene shows Mr. and Mrs. Robert Caie in their living room at "Fir Banks" in 1888. Robert Caie is examining a photographic album while Mrs. Caie is knitting. Between them is a knitted toy cat, now an artifact in the Yarmouth County Museum.

Ruff is at his best describing the shipping of Yarmouth. The photograph of the barque *Bowman B. Law* captures the town's first iron square-rigger in all her glory, including painted gunports typical of the 1880s. The museum also has the "specification book," providing details regarding the ship's construction. Another image shows the steamer *Castilian* after foundering off Yarmouth in 1899. [90] Numerous artifacts saved from the vessel are now preserved in the museum. Twenty years after *Castilian* went aground, the steamer *North Star* also met an untimely end on shoals near Yarmouth Harbour. [93] The Yarmouth Museum currently has the ship's wheel and bell on display. Other photos show the children of Captain Ladd, Kathryn and Forrest, aboard the ship *Belmont.* In later life, Kathryn volunteered at the museum; she doubtless ensured that her

mother's letters to her parents, now in the archives, were preserved, thereby providing an intimate portrait of life at sea for a young mother and her children. It is rare for photographic books to have such rich historical context.

There are some disappointments with the book. Because they relied primarily on professional photographers, the authors leave the impression that everyone in Yarmouth was well-to-do. There are few pictures of fishermen, sailors and the working-poor of Yarmouth. A more comprehensive, introductory essay highlighting the social and cultural history of Yarmouth during this era would also be most welcome. Ruff and Bradley obviously have the sources – manuscript, material culture and photographic – to provide an improved historical framework for the *Images of Our Past.* Perhaps the format of the publisher prevented them from pursuing this further.

Ken Donovan
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David Adams Richards. *Lines on the Water: A Fisherman's Life on the Miramichi.* Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1998. 240 pp., map. $29.95, cloth; ISBN 0-385-25696-5; $18.95, paper; ISBN 0-385-25850-X.

The Miramichi is the central character in all of David Adams Richards' novels. ln *Lines on the Water,* he uses his own experiences, folklore, local history and the experiences of older fishermen and guides, to write a very personal and beautiful account which describes the importance of the river and the role of fishing in his life. This book, however, is about much more than fishing. Because of Richards' understanding of place and the people living in that place it is also about the people of the region and their relationship to the land and its resources.

Richards' personal experiences cover all aspects of fishing from the young boy's experience of catching his first fish, to landing his first salmon, to the importance of the river commercially and as a haven to escape the routine of daily life with all its ups and downs.

Lines in the Water contains a series of carefully crafted anecdotal vignettes which reveal much about the author and also about those who fish and who have fished the Miramichi in the past: the guides, the sports, and the local fishermen. All are treated with compassion and understanding, even the poachers and the rich sports "from away." Richards understands them, knows where they are coming from and why they behave as they do. He rarely makes harsh judgments about their actions. Sometimes he is too kind.

Richards also describes with some sadness the changes that have taken place because of technology, the dwindling fish stocks, and the increased areas of closed or leased waters, which are gradually destroying what was once part of growing up on the Miramichi. Both my father and I have fished many of the same streams and rivers the author writes about. Today many of the streams are empty or the pools are privately owned or leased. The increased cost of fishing salmon in the famous pools may soon remove that experience from reality into the realm of stories or reminiscences told to children by their grandparents. The results of the changes that have taken place on the rivers are best illustrated in Richards' stories of his friend "Old Mr. Simms." It is one of the most poignant stories in his book.

Many readers will relate to *Lines on the River* since the author is able to articulate thoughts and feelings few of us can fully express. Like other reviewers of this book I find that there is much in it to reflect my own personal experience. His descriptions of standing alone in some remote spot on a river or of wading into deep pools in anticipation of hooking the big one or of falling into the stream, or of cooking the day's catch on the shore are elements which resonate at different levels of the reader's awareness.

For Richards, however, fishing becomes more than just throwing a line on the water. Fishing, especially fly fishing, is something that one has to work very hard at to be successful. For Richards it seems to be a metaphor for life and all the challenges life presents. It also becomes a vehicle for expressing his views on the struggles of people marginalized by society trying to maintain their dignity while trying to cope with the changing environment around them.

The book also conveys a sense of reverence for the past, for what appears to have been in some ways a better way of life, a more compassionate way of life, something which is certainly worth defending. Anyone who has ever fished, and even those who haven't should enjoy *Lines on the Water.*

W.A. Spray
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Berni Stapleton (text), Jamie Lewis (photographs), Chris Brookes (audio). *They Let Down Baskets.* St. John's: Killick Press, 1998. viii + 64 pp., photographs, compact disk (*"what happened was... ").* $24.95, paper+ CD; ISBN 1-895387-91-4.

It is astonishing that three individual artists, working independently and without prior collusion, could have produced this very tidy package of words, voices and photographic images, that fits together so seamlessly as to constitute a delightful whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

The foundation upon which the work is erected is a diary kept by the self-proclaimed mermaid, Berni Stapleton, while, with Amy House, she toured the province in 1994 presenting to enthusiastic audiences their play, "A Tidy Package," based on the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fishery. That same event inspired photographer Jamie Lewis as it did radio documentarist Chris Brookes to record, in the voices of fisher people and in images of their world, some sense of the catastrophe that had suddenly, like some legendary rogue wave, swept them from their moorings, overwhelmed the world they had known, and left them rudderless and adrift upon a vast ocean of uncertainty.

In her beautifully lyric prose and in her poetry, Berni Stapleton demonstrates the mystical connection that exists between the people of coastal Newfoundland and Labrador and the sea. For four hundred years and more they had clung to the edge of the continent, making the ocean their field of endeavour, their source of livelihood, their sometimes cruel, sometimes capricious, sometimes beneficent mistress, to be wooed or wrestled with as occasion demanded, but always to be respected as the source of life and of their way of life. Their songs, their stories, their mythologies, all that gave their lives meaning, derived from their association with the sea. There seemed no reason for belief that this association would not continue to an indeterminate future.

But now, at one fell stroke, the connection was severed. Unthinkable, unimaginable, as it was, the once vast populations of fishes in the northwest Atlantic, whose inexhaustibility had been, for centuries, an article of faith, had been reduced far beyond the level of decimation, and, in some cases brought to the edge of extinction. More than 30,000 men and women directly involved in the catching and processing of fish and fish products were made instantaneously redundant. As many more were indirectly affected in an economic sense, and indeed the entire population of the province reeled from the deadly blow to an enterprise that had been their reason for being that had entailed centuries of struggle and endurance; and that had informed a unique cultural identity and a proud heritage.

Bewilderment, anger, frustration, fear of the unknown, the embarrassment of sudden dependence, nostalgia, sorrow, and despair are some of the emotions captured by Berni Stapleton in her text. And although, here and there, there are glimmerings of hope, it is difficult to escape the feeling that we are grieving for a world that is irretrievably lost. She says "The fish-magic shields us from the real truth, or else no one would remain. Resettlement lifts its head, hungry. It's time to feed that old idol again. Glimpses of the future through the mists bring grief. Our time is receding, becoming less solid with each passing day. A new time steps over us and pushes us further and further away. Further and further away from ourselves."

And when you have wept, and sometimes laughed, with Ms. Stapleton, turn to your CD player and listen to the authentic voices of fishers and their families as they struggle to come to terms with a world turned upside down. Chris Brookes' documentary won the CBC Canadian Radio Award for the best radio special and, as well, the 1994 International Gabriel Award for Radio Excellence. Both awards were well-deserved. Listen and judge for yourself.

Jamie Lewis' superb photographs are a worthy complement to the outstanding text and the brilliant CD. Read, look, listen and enjoy.

Leslie Harris
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Poul Holm. *Hjerting et maritimt lokalsamfund midt i verden ca. 1550-1930.* Esbjerg: Hjerting Fiskeriforening, 1992 [available through Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet, Tarphagevej 2, 6710 Esbjerg V, Denmark]. 99 pp., photographs, illustrations, maps, tables, sources. DKr 98, hardbound; ISBN 87-984383-0-1.

In 1992 the "Fishermen's Union of Hjerting" celebrated its hundredth anniversary by publish-

ing this book, containing the history of the village Hjerting on the west coast of Jutland, which today is a suburb of the town Esbjerg.

Hjerting had an early origin as a maritime society, becoming important in the middle of the sixteenth century as a port of call for vessels carrying cattle and fish to Holland and Hamburg. The people of Hjerting supported themselves through work both on land and on sea. When there was no fishing, the men turned to seasonal agricultural work; a familiar factor in coastal societies was the always important trade in goods between farmers and fishermen. Yet those who engaged in the fishery did not limit themselves to the adjacent coastal waters of the North Sea. In the eighteenth century, ships sailed from Hjerting to Greenland and Svalbard hunting whales.

As a fishery society, Hjerting reached its peak in the late nineteenth century, becoming a leading port in the Danish North Sea fishery thanks to the introduction of new types of fishing vessels and techniques from abroad. Still, this did not last long. By the last decade of the nineteenth century the fishermen of Hjerting had begun to move to the adjacent town of Esbjerg. The main reason for this was the lack of a good harbour. In contrast, a harbour had been built in Esbjerg during the second half of the nineteenth century, making it a preferable place to land fish. The last boat landed in Hjerting in 1930.

Poul Holm has organized this book into two parts. The first tells the history of Hjerting to 1890 while the second emphasizes the history of the Fishermen's Union, which was founded in 1884 as an insurance fund but soon evolved into an organised union in 1892. While these developments took place, Esbjerg's role as a fishing port grew stronger. This part of the book also tells the history of the first decades of the twentieth century, a period that saw many attempts to save Hjerting as a fishing village.

The research is in general well done. We are provided with an interesting picture of the development of Hjerting, especially as a fishing village, and the author places the small village within the larger context of developments in the fisheries of the countries around the North Sea and elsewhere in the Atlantic. There are nevertheless two things that I miss in the book. One is a deeper discussion about the structure of the local society. This is more an economic study of the fishery than a social history. Of course, this might be explained by a lack of documents or simply the limited size of the book. Also lacking is a map of Hjerting, especially for the time when the fishery there was at its peak.

Still, on balance the book offers a good description of Hjerting as a maritime society, especially in terms of its fishery and economic development.

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Reykjavik, Iceland

L.J. Lloyd. *Southport and North Meols Fishermen and Boat Builders.* Liverpool: National Museums & Galleries on Merseyside, 1998.70 pp., illustrations, photographs, maps, bibliography, index. £6.95, paper; ISBN 0-95304083-6.

This well-illustrated book provides detailed information on a specific area of the North West of England and as such will be welcomed by local historians as well as those seeking an insight into the boatbuilding and fishing fraternity of Southport and North Meols. The volume is divided into three sections, the first being a chronology of the area from 1086 to the decline of fishing in the 1920s, with the final two parts devoted to the boatbuilders and fishing practices.

Half of the book is taken up with the chronology which the author has based on a number of local sources, including the 1953 lecture notes of M.N. Hosker. The style and approach of this section can appear slightly disjointed at first glance, with a variety of indentations, typefaces and diagrams disrupting the narrative flow. However this does not interfere with the delivery of a considerable amount of useful information in a clear and accessible manner, and one can see why the author has chosen this approach. For example it is stated that the Southport pier opened in 1860, which in itself seems an insignificant event for the fishing community. The author then explains that the pier altered the pattern of the fishermen's lives by creating better access to land their catch, thereby placing the event in context.

A longer article on the area's oldest industry, shrimping, follows the chronology leading to the book's second part on the boat builders. Again, this section is very well illustrated with maps of the boatyard locations, the boats themselves and their builders. The text is enlivened with portraits of long-standing builders, notably Richard Wright, known locally as Peter's Dick. Excellent photographs of the boats on the slips and remark-

ably clear pictures of the boatsheds are reproduced.

The final section is devoted to fishing practices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which includes diagrams and sketches of trawl gear drawn by the author. These are very well executed and makes for a well-balanced and perhaps the most satisfying section of the book. The drawings and descriptions of gear will be of particular interest to those wishing to compare gear with other ports. It fills a gap in the literature by exposing the fishing methods of the area and clearly defining the way fishing gear was made and used. This book is a welcome contribution to the local history of the principal fishing community of Lancastershire. It will have a wider readership through its descriptions of fishing from small sailing craft.

The book is profusely illustrated with photographs, documents, maps and diagrams, adding further interest to the subject matter.

For those with no previous knowledge of Southport or its fishing traditions, Len Lloyd's book provides an accessible introduction to the subject. It will be of particular appeal to those with special interest in coastal fishing craft and boatbuilding. This large format, soft cover volume is moderately priced making it available to all of its intended audience.

John Edwards
Aberdeen, Scotland

Eric McKee (Intro. Basil Greenhill). *Working Boats of Britain: Their Shape and Purpose*. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983; rev. intro. 1997. 256 pp., illustrations, figures, maps, appendices, glossary, references, index. £30, cloth; ISBN 0-85177-27-3.

Anyone with an interest in boats and boat building will be certain to welcome the reprinting of Eric McKee's classic treatise, *Working Boats of Britain: Their Shape and Purpose*. Readers should not expect a cursory typology with a smattering of lines drawings and tables for good measure. What they will find is a thoughtful and demanding study that nonetheless remains readable and engaging.

The preface states that in order to record existing wooden boat types in Britain (excluding Ireland) and preserve the knowledge of builders, time was of the essence to conduct a comprehensive survey. It is a scenario daunting enough to overwhelm the most ambitious among us, yet the finished work portrays an impressive breadth of research and depth of analysis. It does not however, provide a close look at all types of British small craft, but examines their different shapes in order to formulate a classification scheme.

The publication is the product of a ten-year immersion into the world of boats, their builders, and their environment, and was supported by the Caird Research Fellowship from the National Maritime Museum. It is divided into two parts, each with six chapters. The first, "The Factors Affecting Boatshape," provides the framework for the whole and includes the chapters, "Influence of Surroundings," "Work for Boats," and "Personality of Boatmen." The findings of McKee's fieldwork make up the second part, with chapters on "Realisation of Boatshape," "Propulsion and Steering," and "Distribution Patterns." In these comprehensive sections, the research is presented logically as is the methodology by which it was conducted. The vast amount of detail mostly clarifies the writer's focus, but sometimes obscures it.

The text is an interesting mix of past and present. The historical accounts and anecdotes of boat yards and builders contribute to the book's flavour and animate the boats. However, setting this information in a more fixed chronological context along with endnotes, would be useful. The language is only occasionally too technical – a feat for a former Royal Navy engineer – and could be compensated for by a larger glossary, although the many illustrations help to simplify the more complicated concepts. These depictions, from "The Geometry of an Oarsman" and "Whole Moulding" to an array of punts, prams, trows, and barges, are exquisitely executed and further reveal the author's understanding of his subject.

Seven appendices complete the main body of the work. The fourth is connected to the chapter on boat names, shapes, and classes. It is the unique and practical classification scheme providing a common system of reference for plank-built boat shapes, from skiffs and smacks to scows and bateaux. Appendices on British coastal structure, types of shores, distribution patterns, and fetch at various ports, also complement earlier chapters. Those on the accounts of Mr. B.B. Johns (a nineteenth-century boat owner) and "The Park Wall Agreement" (late-eighteenth century instructions and rules between the owner of a fishing boat and

its operators) add to the historical background but are less crucial to the thesis.

McKee's expansive knowledge and direct writing style make a lasting impression of both his scholarship and penmanship. His ability to infect the reader with the passion with which he pursues his study is the key to the success of the book. It is a fitting testament to the late author, whose expertise in the field stemmed from a lifelong Royal Navy career and his own boat building experience.

Monica MacDonald
Ottawa, Ontario

John F. Leavitt. *The Charles W. Morgan.* 2nd ed.; Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1998. xi + 123 pp. + scale plans, photographs, illustrations, appendices, glossary, suggested reading, index. US $19.95, paper; ISBN 0-913372-10-2.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1973; it was probably written for those who had just visited the *Charles W. Morgan* in her berth at Mystic Seaport Museum and wanted to know a little more about the vessel. This updated second edition still serves that need, but is also a very detailed and worthy history of the vessel, the last surviving American whaling ship from the age of sail.

The *Morgan* was built by the Hillman brothers, on the Acushnet River near New Bedford, Massachusetts, in 1841. They must have made her strong and stout, for she made thirty-seven whaling voyages in a career lasting more than eighty years. She was considered a lucky ship, nearly always making a profit for her owners, and this probably helped keep her at sea for so long.

During her many years at sea, the *Morgan* experienced just about everything that can happen on a whaling voyage. There were capricious masters and troublesome crewmen, stowaways and deserters, deaths and injuries at sea, damage from storms and groundings and, on one occasion, a deliberately lit fire. Her crews had to avoid icebergs in the Arctic and repel hostile island natives trying to board her in the Pacific. They also managed to evade capture by the Confederate commerce raider *Shenandoah*, during the American Civil War, and German raiders during World War I. Among her more unusual experiences was the rescue of some men from a sinking sampan, who turned out to be escaped convicts from a Russian prison camp.

Like most American whalers of the period she carried polyglot crews, drawn from various parts of the world. One notable crewman was boatsteerer Nelson Cole Haley whose reminiscences of his time on the ship were later published in *Whale Hunt*, one of the best accounts of a whaling voyage. Another who served on her for many years was George Parkin Christian, the grandson of *Bounty* mutineer, Fletcher Christian.

After she ceased whaling in 1921, the *Morgan's* future looked uncertain. Tied up at dock in New Bedford, slowly deteriorating, she was almost destroyed when a burning ship drifted against her side. Fortunately, the New Bedford marine artist Harry Neyland thought she should be preserved for posterity, and led the effort to save her for future generations. Financial help came from Colonel Edward Green, the wealthy grandson of one of her former owners. A permanent berth was prepared for her at Green's summer home at Round Hill, South Dartmouth. But when he died in 1935 without making any financial provision for her upkeep, her future again came under threat. She once more began to deteriorate, and was badly damaged in a hurricane in 1938.

Finally, a new home was found for her at Mystic Seaport, where she was towed in 1941. In the years since, she has undergone numerous refits and repairs, and in 1967 her significance was officially recognised when she was declared a National Historic Landmark by the US Secretary of the Interior. She was refloated in 1973, and moored at Chubb's Wharf, where she remains today, the oldest American square-rigged merchant vessel in existence.

This history of the vessel is well written, and contains some superb illustrations. There is a good chapter on how a typical whaling ship operated, and another detailing her restoration. The location of all her surviving log books are given in the appendix, as well as a summary of each voyage, and the names of her crewmen. A glossary of whaling terms, a brief bibliography and a series of detailed fold-out scale drawings of the vessel complete the work. This book will appeal to anyone interested in the history of whaling during nineteenth century.

Mark Howard
Melbourne, Australia

Ed Parr. *The Last American Whale-Oil Company. A History of Nye Lubricants, Inc., 1844-1994.* Fairhaven, MA: Nye Lubricants, 1996. iv + 103 pp., photographs, illustrations, select bibliography [orders to: The Whaling Museum, 18 Johnny Cake Hill, New Bedford, MA 02740, USA]. US $28.95, cloth; ISBN 0-9653026-0-1; US $15.95, paper; ISBN 0-9653026-0-X

The history of the nineteenth-century American whale fishery has been examined by scholars for the better part of a century. By contrast little has been written about the hard-earned product of that fishery – whale oil – once the voyage was completed and the casks were unloaded at ports such as New Bedford-Fairhaven, where much of this story unfolds. In order to provide the end users, both commercial and residential, with products vital to the manufacture and use of such precision machines as firearms, timepieces, lamps, sewing machines and bicycles, various procedures were required to refine the raw oil. This was the arena into which William F. Nye would one day venture and triumph.

The author, commissioned by Nye Lubricants to prepare this sesquicentennial history, notes that, though it was established in 1865, the Company has long considered 1844, when William F. Nye first experimented with refining whale oil, as its true founding date. Whatever validity there may be to this claim, the fact remains that, following its organization in 1865, the firm enjoyed a meteoric rise that may have astounded even Nye himself.

The focus of the book is clearly the line of specialized watch and clock lubricants produced by the firm in direct competition to its well-entrenched cross-town rival, Ezra Kelley. For these products oil from the head "melon" and jaws of blackfish (pilot whales) and bottlenose dolphins was used almost exclusively. Shore fisheries along Cape Cod and, later, the Outer Banks of North Carolina, helped maintain a stable supply of this oil even as the pelagic whale fishery vanished by the early twentieth century.

One of the disappointments of this study is the lack of information concerning the actual processes used in producing Nye's various whale oil products. Even if the techniques were considered proprietary at the time, there would be little reason not to examine them here, given the final prohibition on the use of such raw materials in the 1970s. And while it appears that Nye processed oil from bowhead whales for use in lamps, and sperm whale oil for special machine lubricants, only passing reference is made to these other products which, in terms of sheer quantity, must have surpassed the specialized watch and clock lubricants that hold center stage in this work. To what degree the dearth of Company records (most of which were unceremoniously hauled off to the local dump following a change of ownership and focus in the 1950s) has shaped the study's final outline is unclear. In any event the reader would have benefitted from a more balanced look at the product base of this remarkable firm.

If the technical aspects of the Nye story are lacking, the author has nonetheless done a fine job in drawing out the characters of the key individuals involved in the firm's story. First and foremost is William F. Nye (1824-1910) himself, a restless, ambitious young man whose early work experiences (merchant seaman, house carpenter, cabinetmaker, building contractor, city magistrate, fruit wholesaler, and sutler) drew him from his Cape Cod homestead to places as far-flung as teeming Calcutta, Gold Rush California and war-torn Virginia. Nye's determination to succeed in what he correctly saw as a growth industry, the field of specialized illuminants and lubricants in a booming post-Civil War economy, carried him and the firm into the twentieth century as undisputed leader in the field of watch, clock and specialized machine lubricants. Nye is a fascinating character, part entrepreneur and cutthroat competitor (his defacto takeover of the rival Ezra Kelley firm is amazing), part abolitionist and social reformer, part philosopher and adherent of Spiritualism. As events were to prove, an important part of the firm's core went to the grave with Nye.

As so often happens in family businesses, the second generation lacked the vision of the first and was further distracted by increasingly rapid social and technological challenges spared their predecessors. So it was with Joseph K. Nye, under whose largely absentee leadership the firm essentially marked time. After his death in 1923, day-to-day management of the firm fell to a series of trusted employees, but by the 1950s the firm had hit rock bottom. Then, following several false starts, the business was resurrected as a producer and distributor of a wide range of specialty lubricants needed by a space-age economy. New leadership, combining both marketing imagination and technical aptitude worthy of the founder,

reinvented Nye as a leader in the field of custom lubricants, where it is now positioned to leap into the new millennium with optimism aplenty.

Despite its shortcomings *The Last American Whale-Oil Company* clearly suggests the rich historical potential to be found in the study of shore-side industries of all kinds. Only through such studies can the pervasive influence of the maritime world be more fully understood and appreciated.

Richard C. Malley
Simsbury, Connecticut

Marshall Everett. *Story of the Wreck of the Titanic: The Ocean's Greatest Disaster.* London, 1912; "Conway Classic" reprint, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1998. 320 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices. £9.99, cloth; ISBN 0-85177-768-6.

Few events exemplify the adage, "Never let the facts get in the way of a good story," like the sinking of the *Titanic*. Close on the heels of the major newspapers, subscription book publishers based in Illinois and Pennsylvania shamelessly exploited the disaster, producing a half-dozen "instant books" that were sold door-to-door in the tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands across North America. Primarily aimed at young readers, one of the most common was *Story of the Wreck of the Titanic*, attributed to "Marshall Everett," the pseudonym for Chicago journalist Henry Neil. Now reissued by Conway Classics in a facsimile edition, this book will appeal to so-called "rivet counters" who must read all they can about the doomed liner.

Story of the Wreck of the Titanic and its ilk form the basis for much of the lore about what happened that memorable night. Readers concerned about authenticity should go elsewhere for answers to the difficult or contentious questions – of which there are too many to address here. But to acquire a sense of contemporary media responses to the disaster, albeit mostly from an American perspective, the Everett book is an instructive if flawed primary source. Its value increases if examined as cultural artifact rather than strict historical narrative.

Indeed, the most unsettling aspect of the *Titanic* reprints – nearly all the 1912 instant titles have been reissued in recent years – is the utter lack of historical context. Why is there no introduction analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the text, which is obviously (sometimes painfully so) cobbled together from various newspaper reports of questionable veracity? Is it because the publishers feel that the story is so well known that no explanatory note is required, or is it because no authoritative voice could be found to express a critical opinion? Is it simply a matter of cashing in on public interest aroused by James Cameron's 1997 film?

One probable explanation is that serious *Titanic* historians have never really paid much attention to Marshall Everett *et al.*, even though these books did more to promote the mythological aspects of the disaster than any other source. In his cultural history of the *Titanic, Down with the Old Canoe,* Steven Biel barely mentions them; neither does Richard Howells in his new book, *The Myth of the Titanic.* No one, it seems, is interested in the fact that the instant books (Everett being the most prominent, alongside another by Logan Marshall) were responsible for propagating several myths, such as the one about "Nearer my God to Thee" being played, [94-95] or the "women and children first" myth [47] – a particularly ironic one, given that more men than women survived. These journalistic embellishments became so powerfully associated with the *Titanic* story that even today, many who consider themselves experts on the subject believe them to be true.

In a recent lecture in Halifax, Professor Howells offered an explanation for why "Nearer my God to Thee" became a part of the *Titanic* myth. He claims it was a Canadian survivor, quoted in the New York press, who heard it as the ship sank. Howells surmises that Vera Dick, finding herself in a lifeboat in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, recalled another shipwreck on the Pacific Coast of British Columbia, widely reported a few years earlier, in which passengers were said to have sung the famous hymn. Howells argues that the woman from Alberta was influenced by "social memory" rather than real-time experiential feelings at that traumatic moment in her life. In similar fashion, we believe that "Nearer my God to Thee" was playing because it confirms what we think *ought* to have occurred at the time. In that context, the truth of the matter seems irrelevant.

The remarkable persistence of *Titanic* as myth and metaphor suggests that it has indeed entered our "social memory" in ways that we are

only now beginning to understand. For anyone wishing to study the origins of that process, *Story of the Wreck of the Titanic* is a useful starting point. It is a shame that modern readers will be no more attuned to the nuances of myth and history so tightly bound up in these books than their 1912 counterparts.

Jay White
Pointe-du-Chêne, New Brunswick

Betty O'Keefe and Ian Macdonald. *The Final Voyage of the* Princess Sophia: *Did They All Have to Die?* Surrey, BC: Heritage House, 1998. 192 pp., maps, photographs, sources, index. $16.95, paper; ISBN 1-895811-64-3.

It is a strange feeling to be sent a book to review that deals with exactly the same topic as one of your own works. In 1990, Bill Morrison and I published *The Sinking of the Prince Sophia: Taking the North Down With Her.* Eight years later, Betty O'Keefe and Ian Macdonald produced *The Final Voyage of the Princes Sophia: Did they all have to die?* It is, as Yogi Berra used to say, "Deja vu all over again." O'Keefe and Macdonald did not attempt to re-write *The Sinking of the Prince Sophia* – although they did include it in their bibliography, managing in the process to turn Bill Morrison into David R. Morrison. Instead, their book is an adventure story/tragedy, designed to appeal to a popular audience and to raise again the vexing questions surrounding the worst maritime tragedy along the Pacific Northwest coast.

The tragedy is not all that well-known, a puzzle in itself. In October 1918, the *Princess Sophia* ran aground while steaming south from Skagway, Alaska. The ship was stuck on Vanderbilt Reef and, despite valiant efforts by local mariners to retrieve the passengers, all rescue attempts came to naught. The ship went down, claiming over 350 lives and leaving only a single dog as a survivor of the tragedy. It was, as with all maritime disasters, a story filled with sorrow and pathos, as dozens of divergent lives came together in tragic circumstances. For the families of the victims and many west coast observers, the "real" story involved the responsibility for the disaster. Was it incompetence on the part of Captain Locke? Did the Canadian Pacific Railway company prevent the removal of passengers from the ship, thus contributing to the mass death? Could the disaster have been avoided?

The Final Voyage is an interesting read. The authors do a good job of conveying the urgency, sorrow and anger surrounding the disaster. They claim, in their cover copy and some of their general introductory comments, that they are going to do far more than they actually accomplish, but that is hardly unusual. What you have is a reasonable, if thin, popular history, about an event that is not well known. Having gone to considerable lengths to find some useful material, the authors tend to follow the documents far too closely. They use the transcripts from the lengthy inquiry that followed the disaster to document the public debate surrounding the episode rather than to reconstruct the events and actions involved with the sinking of the *Princess Sophia.* They did not, inexplicably, capitalize on the excellent documentary record generated by the American court cases that followed the disaster. (We used these materials in our book, and if the authors here used the volume, they could have easily followed the citations to the material). The documents – both the ones the authors used and the ones to which they did not gain access – provide much more insight into the events and personalities involved with the disaster than this book reveals. That is unfortunate, for the complete story is more interesting than the one recounted here.

Popular and amateur historians labour under considerable difficulties. They lack the salaries and access to funding that allow academic historians to pursue their research to the full and logical conclusion. Very few are so fortunate as to produce books that repay the time and investment made to the research and writing. O'Keefe and Macdonald have done a reasonable job in the circumstances. They collected a great deal of useful material and have written the story of the *Princess Sophia* disaster in a lively and engaging fashion. The book does not cover any substantial amount of new ground and leaves a fair number of interesting elements out. The emphasis on the long-debated questions about liability and responsibility is overdone – the more substantial stories about the sinking of the ship relate to its impact on the lives of the victims, their families and the North itself. It is, more broadly, encouraging to see popular historians tackling the story of the *Princess Sophia,* thereby assisting in the effort to keep the memory of this pivotal event alive. *The Last Voyage* will, in the final analysis, be of little interest to serious historians of west coast mari-

time history, save for as an example of the "popularization" of regional history.

Ken Coates
Saint John, New Brunswick

Ian Cassells. *A Light Walk*. Latheronwheel, Caithness, UK: Whittles Publishing, 1997. vii + 152 pp., photographs, illustrations. £ 11.95, paper; ISBN 1-870325-51-6.

A.J. Lane. *It Was Fun While It Lasted: Lighthouse Keeping in the 1950s*. Latheronwheel, Caithness, UK: Whittles Publishing, 1997. v + 185 pp., photographs. £13.95, paper; ISBN 1-870325-67-2.

Martha Robertson. *A Quiet Life*. Latheronwheel, Caithness, UK: Whittles Publishing, 1997. vii + 199 pp., photographs. £14.95, paper; ISBN 1-870325-71-0.

Three recent releases from *Whittles Publishing* explore varied aspects of lightkeeping in Britain. Ian Cassells' *A Light Walk* is a keeper's account of a marathon hike around Scotland. In *It Was Fun While It Lasted,* ex-keeper A.J. Lane recounts the vagaries of life on several English lights. Martha Roberston looks back on her early years as the daughter of a Scottish lightkeeper in *A Quiet Life.*

While posted at Scotland's remote Muckle Flugga lighthouse, lightkeeper Ian Cassells kept his passion for walking alive by marching (12 laps to a mile) around the tiny rock. While imagining that he was striding from Thurso to Land's End, Cassells decided he would walk to all of the staffed mainland Scottish lighthouses to commemorate the 1986 bicentenary of the Northern Lighthouse Board, and to support the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. Fifty-eight days, more than a dozen lighthouses and 1,300 miles later, Cassells completed his journey.

A Light Walk should be a lively account of the author's experiences on the road, but the story falls a little short of holding the reader's interest. Cassells describes encounters with wildlife and local characters, sore feet, motorway traffic, rain and windstorms. Pleasant descriptions of the Scottish coastline and countryside are interspersed with snippets of local history. When not camping out in cow pastures in his tiny, chronically leaky tent, Cassells spent most evenings enjoying a few pints in local pubs, while watching World Cup football on TV. He provides only brief sketches of each lighthouse visited; more anecdotal information about the lights and less about the tedium of walking along busy motorways would have enlivened his story. Cassells raised more than £ 1700 for the RNLI, and received much support for his walk. Given the magnitude of Cassells' journey, it is disappointing that the narrative often strays from the purpose of his lighthouse walk.

It Was Fun While It Lasted is decidedly lively. Author A. J. Lane entered England's venerable Trinity House lighthouse service as "a fugitive from the Birmingham branch of a large insurance company" in 1953. Unbeknownst to Lane, it was the end of an era for the ancient lighthouse authority – soon technology, in the form of generators, radio equipment and helicopters, would spell the end of the tradition of lightkeeping in England.

The book is divided into seventeen engaging chapters, covering the author's exile from the business world, to his employment as a lightkeeper on eleven English lighthouses. On the famous Eddystone light, Lane soon experienced the social dynamic resulting from three men living in the cramped quarters of an isolated rock tower. He describes the vagaries of weather and sea conditions, capricious principal keepers, and the joys of fishing with explosive fog signal charges. Much of the text is composed of Lane's original journal entries, which transport the reader to tower shaking storms at the Eddystone, and to hilarious episodes on various lights, including a side-splitting account of some creative electrical re-wiring performed at the Portland Breakwater light. [157-160]

Lane's account of his lightkeeping experiences is dryly witty and irreverent but he also writes with great sensitivity to a way of life that was coming to an end. "There were too many engines, too much noise, too much technology providing points of contact with the outside world." [185] Lane's seven years as a lightkeeper gave him the opportunity to experience a solitary lifestyle in the middle of a sometimes volatile natural and social environment. His journals and remembrances of lightkeeping are at once comic and poignant, and he has captured the uniqueness of a service and way of life now gone forever.

Martha Robertson's *A Quiet Life* is a gentle account of her family's life on remote Scottish lighthouses and provides another perspective on

the lightkeeping tradition in Britain. The book's title though, belies the hardship and isolation faced by many keepers before the advent of modern conveniences. Robertson was born while her parents served at Inchkeith lighthouse in the Firth of Forth. She spent her formative years on several isolated lightstations before attending school in Glasgow and then joining the World War II effort with the WRNS. Her urban and wartime experiences stand in contrast to her family's coastal rural existence on the lights.

While looking back on her lighthouse years with fondness, Robertson acknowledges the difficulties experienced by lighthouse families, especially the keeper's wives, who faced a life of endless domestic chores and limited social contact. Remote, wind blasted islands like Barra Head and tiny west coast isles like Lismore were beautiful, but not always pleasant places to live.

In 1998 the last of Scotland's lighthouses was de-staffed, making *A Quiet Life* an increasingly important record of an important facet of Scottish maritime history.

Chris Mills
Ketch Harbour, Nova Scotia

Guy Gilpatrie; illustrations by Anton Otto Fisher and George Hughes. *Glencannon & Co.* Palo Alto, CA: Glencannon Press, 1997. xiv + 208 pp., illustrations. US $35, hardbound; ISBN 1-889901-03-2.

In the 1950s, if not earlier, the *Saturday Evening Post* (New York) was popular "watch below" reading on British merchant ships. Copies often found their way aboard in bundles of magazines sent by the local seamen's missions while ships were in port. So there was added interest in settling to read this collection of eleven short stories which had originally appeared in that weekly magazine between 1930 and 1946.

Although each story could stand alone, by adopting a common *dramatis personae,* Guy Gilpatrie provides a linking thread to these sea-life episodes which would have appealed to any editor interested in devices for maintaining circulation. Gilpatrie is at home in the community he describes, and it seems likely that his experience spanned the two often separate merchant shipping worlds of the crew manning the ships and of the shipowner's office managing them.

We are invited into this maritime world principally through the senior officers of the SS *Inchcliffe Castle.* She is one of twenty-three British tramps owned in London and manipulated by the wily general manager, Virgil Hazlitt, from his office in St Mary Axe. In his hands lie the employment prospects of the principal characters, ship's master, Captain Ball, the Chief Engineer, Mr. Glencannon, and the First Mate, Mr. Montgomery. Glencannon, a whisky drinking, Glasgow Scot of course, can turn his hand to anything, from an appendicitis operation to making a corset so Captain Ball will look more spritely when reporting to Hazlitt. A "Mr. Fix It" he rises triumphant above all difficulties. He is an avid reader of the *Presbyterian Churchman* though prone to heavy drinking bouts when having a run ashore. Ball is the easy-going, yet capable long-serving master. He spends much of his time, afloat and ashore, "chewing the cud" with Glencannon, on whom he leans to sort out important problems such as finding a proper Christmas dinner. Montgomery, the teetotal first mate of long standing, desperate for Ball's job as master, is always conspiring to demonstrate Ball's inadequacy to Hazlitt. But his pet hate is the Chief Engineer, for his drinking and because Glencannon can always "wrong foot" him.

It is in the opening story, "The Missing Link," that Montgomery goes down with appendicitis and has to suffer the indignity of being anaesthetized with whisky and operated on by Glencannon working to a diagram in the *Ship Captain's Medical Guide.* But Glencannon has lost his best cuff link and suspects it might have been left behind during the operation. He keeps the ungrateful Montgomery on a string by threatening a second operation. In this case, however, Glencannon has his "come-uppance," as the cuff link is removed from his interior in an operation at the Seamen's Hospital when the ship has returned to London. It had been in the tumbler from which he had fortified himself during the operation.

That tale reflects a true episode at sea, and a grain of truth underlies most of the stories. In "The Ladies of Catmeat Court," an East End of London slum of rented one- or two-room dwellings, Gilpatrie brings in the wives of the ships' ratings and their anxieties at the rumours that Hazlitt might purchase a motor ship, and so put their men on the labour intensive steamships out of work. The rumour was a mis-understood remark overheard by the charlady at the com-

pony's office. Hazlitt is shown to have a weakness: he forgets to wind his watch against which he has for twenty years been checking Big Ben in the hope of catching the clock in error. But he knowingly allowed the rumour to spread, thereby cunningly extracting an additional measure of work from the crews of all his ships, each hoping thereby to avoid their ship being laid up.

These two examples must serve to convey the "feel" of structure of the stories, including the interplay between different sections of the crew, between officers from different ships, and between the leading characters and those associated with shipping ashore in both London and ports around the world. Much of the content of the stories is conveyed in conversations, which are mostly presented in direct speech vernacular, whether of Glencannon's Scots dialect or of the crew's wives' east end "cockney." These verbal pictures are well drawn and hold the attention; they are quietly humorous though at times capable of generating an outburst of laughter.

The illustrations, some of which may originally have been in colour though all here are in monochrome, pick up episodes from the stories. The scenes appear accurate in detail but for the depiction of the main characters wearing Merchant Navy uniform ashore. Except during World War II when it was found advantageous to do so, most merchant seamen "would not be seen dead" ashore in uniform; in any case many tramp ship officers never owned a uniform at all. Perhaps an element of editorial license was operating.

The stories were last published in collected form between 1944 and 1946, so this new collection is welcome in bringing these pleasant tales with their insights into sea life to a new audience. The preface, by Walter W. Jaffee, contains a brief paraphrase of each story. What a pity the opportunity was not taken to tell us something about a writer capable of such tales. We are not told whether these are all the Glencannon stories or a selection. And might the editor have stretched himself with a note about tramps shipping in the 1930s for the benefit of the non-specialist reader? Finally, it would have been nice to have been told something about the co-incidence between the name of the principal character, Glencannon, and that of the publishing house, Glencannon Press.

Alston Kennerley
Plymouth, England

David Palmer. *Organizing the Shipyards: Union Strategy in Three Northeast Ports, 1933-1945.* Ithaca, NY: ILR Press of Cornell University Press, 1998. xvii + 264 pp., tables, photographs, illustrations, select bibliography, index. US $39.95, cloth; ISBN 0-8014-2734-7.

For North American workers the 1930s and '40s proved momentous. These were the heady decades of the Congress of Industrial Organisations, the militant centre of industrial unionism that successfully organized "unskilled" depression-weary workers in the key sectors of the industrial economy. Spurred on by President Roosevelt's New Deal and the economic recovery associated with World War II, the CIO's rise was meteoric: less than ten years after it split from the conservative American Federation of Labour it had nearly four million members. But as historian David Palmer argues in his new book, "[f]avorable economic and political conditions alone did not ... guarantee union growth." Indeed, as the pioneering efforts of the CIO-affiliated Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA) illustrates, "most decisive ... was the level of local union membership and involvement and the existence of local leadership that could mobilize these members into an active movement." Described by the author as a "collective biography," *Organizing the Shipyards* examines the pioneering efforts of these local leaders and activists in three northeastern ports; in so doing, it opens a window on the complex political process that created and sustained the CIO revolution on a day-to-day basis.

Drawing on an impressive array of sources, including some precious oral history, Palmer reconstructs the organizing drives conducted by the IUMSWA at the massive New York Ship (Philadelphia), Federal Ship (New York) and Fore River (Boston) complexes between 1933 and 1945 – a period when `organizing fever" was in the air. Over this twelve-year period the union's membership increased at a rate greater than the CIO as a whole, peaking at 178, 300 by the war's end. Palmer is particularly interested in probing the dynamic relationship between rank-and-file workers, local activists, and national leaders as it unfolded within each particular setting and changed over time. Like other CIO unions, the IUMSWA changed dramatically over this period; born ofrank-and-file militancy and a commitment to a radical reconstruction of society, by the close

of the war the union was increasingly bureaucratic, centralized, and tied to the limited political vision of the Democratic Party. Understanding this transformation and, more importantly, its impact on union strategy, is at the core of this book – and for Palmer, it is a story that today's labour union movement would do well to understand. Put simply, when local leaders embraced trade union democracy, rank-and-file organising, and a broad left-wing social agenda, the IUMSWA was a potent force. Conversely, when it abandoned this organising vision in the post-war period, a time when the shipbuilding industry was in precipitous decline, anti-communism was tearing unions apart, and industrial legality was limiting the scope of collective action, this industrial union was beaten back.

Given the importance of shipbuilding to the US economy during this period and the pioneering role the IUMSWA played in forging industrial unionism, Palmer should be commended for recovering the shipyard workers' story in such fine detail. Indeed, he has drawn out the key strategic questions faced by the union activists very well and critically assessed their decisions in a fair and measured way. (The conclusions of the book will give those interested in union issues today something to chew on.) For those interested in maritime history more generally, Palmer's discussion of the history of shipbuilding in each port and the work process in each shipyard will be of particular interest.

I do, however, have one reservation, and it is not about what is here, but instead about what is not. David Palmer has written a work of traditional labour history. *Organizing the Shipyards* is about leaders, strikes, and the workplace, not the broader social and cultural experience of"making a New Deal," that forms the basis of this book. As a consequence, the broad shift in the expectations of rank-and-file workers and their families – about the salience of unions, the role of government, and themselves – that took place between the wars is left unexplored. Grappling with this sort of cultural transformation is crucial, for without it, no amount of union agitation, let alone the right "strategy," would have been enough to bring about such a remarkable explosion in union growth.

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David Williams (ed.). *The World of Shipping.* "Studies in Transportation History"; Aldershot and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997. xxvi + 180 pp., tables, figures. US $59.95, cloth; ISBN 1-85928-347-0.

This is the third volume in the series "Studies in Transportation History" to focus on a marine subject. The series was published to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of *The Journal of Transport History*. Each volume contains articles reprinted from the *JTH* complete with their original pagination. Included here are eleven essays and an illuminating introduction by the editor, David Williams. He has selected papers that discuss aspects of the revolution in merchant shipping that began in the late nineteenth century. Seven essays deal with the history of British shipping, while Australia and New Zealand, the United States, Japan, and Nigeria receive one each. This bias towards more recent history reflects that of the journal in which they all first appeared.

William's introduction sets the stage by describing briefly the revolutionary changes that merchant shipping has undergone in the last two centuries and by tying the reprinted articles to the various themes of technological change, regulatory evolution, managerial development and economic expansion. The essays are presented in rough chronological order beginning with Simon Ville's piece on the transformation of the Henley's of Wapping from coal merchants who owned ships to shipowners. The next two essays deal with regulation, J.H. Widle's "The creation of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade" and Freda Harcourt's "British oceanic mail contracts in the age of steam, 1838-1914." Both of these papers emphasize the importance of government intervention in the "free market" of nineteenth-century British shipping.

The three articles that follow deal with geographic regions, Australasia and the Far East, that were more effectively integrated in the European economic system by the development of steam technology. Frank Broeze's "Distance tamed: steam navigation to Australia and New Zealand from its beginnings to the outbreak of the Great War," goes beyond a discussion of technology to analyse the effect of the P&O's monopoly on the efforts to develop subsidized service to the continent and the subsequent importance of local shipbrokers in the development of the conference system. Malcolm Cooper's essay on the rise and

fall of the Glen Line, a small British firm specializing in the China tea trade, is a study in the life cycle of management. Initially, the Glen Line was a vigorous concern filling a profitable niche trade but as the century progressed it fell victim to changing market conditions and management atrophy. On the other hand Stephanie Jones' "George Benjamin Dodwell: a shipping agent in the Far East, 1872-1908" is a success story. Dodwell began as a shipping clerk in the Shanghai office of an established British shipbroking firm. He worked his way up and set himself up on his own when his employer was facing bankruptcy. Realizing the potential of North American-Far East trade he obtained a contract to manage the Canadian Pacific Railway's new trans-Pacific service. When Dodwell decided that he wanted to set up his own line, William Van Horne cancelled his CPR contract and forced him out of the Canadian market. Undeterred Dodwell moved his North American terminus to Seattle and proceeded to make a fortune. One wonders how many other bright young men Van Horne's bullying cost Canada. The common thread in these three papers is the important place of shipbrokers in the industry and the necessity of flexible management.

In a class by itself is Derek H. Aldcroft's "The depression in British shipping, 1901-1911," first published in 1965. This classic is a macroeconomic study of the decade-long slump in world shipping and particularly British shipping following the end of the South African War. The article has stood the test of time without any challenges from the practitioners of econometric history. Max E. Fletcher's piece "From coal to oil in British shipping" describes how this significant shift in technology effected and helped speed the decline of the British merchant marine. The reluctance of British shipowners to invest in diesel-powered vessels is put down to the importance of the coal industry to the island's economy and the shipping business in particular. This view can no longer be accepted after Harley's revisionist argument on the lack of significance of coal exports to the British shipping industry. Beyond this Fletcher's acceptance of Sturmey's position on the conservatism of British shipowners should perhaps be modified when the pre-World War I depression is taken into account. Tramp and liner owners' conservatism had been well earned in the 1901-1911 slump.

Two essays focus on port development. R.W. Barsness' is a geo-economic survey of port evolution in the United States from 1900 to the early 1970s. Ayodeji Olukoju's "The development of the port of Lagos, c. 1892-1946" is a micro study of the political and economic factors that determined the growth of West Africa's most important harbour. Although this drama was played out in a colonial setting the problems were (and still are) the same the world over. Finally Tomohei Chida's work on Japan's post-war shipping policy illustrates the importance of networking in the shipping industry. That government-industry links were crucial in the renaissance of Japanese shipping should come as no surprise; after all, were they not merely a newer version of postal subsidies or liner subventions?

Taken together this collection is the best of the three marine volumes in the "Studies in Transport History Series." However, to some, the cost of $59.95 US may seem steep. Perhaps a more cost-effective way to commemorate a scholarly journal's anniversary would be to reproduce a sample of its best out of print articles on a website.

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Bram Oosterwijk. *Zes Maal Rotterdam: De geschiedenis van een reeks fameuze HAL-schepen.* Amsterdam: Van Soeren & Company, 1998. 464 pp., illustrations (colour, b+w), photographs (colour, b+w), figures, bibliography. *f* 95, Bfr 1900, cloth; ISBN 90-6881-080-4.

Bram Oosterwijk's *Zes Maal Rotterdam: De geschiedenis van een reeksfameuzeHAL-schepen* is a handsomely produced and profusely illustrated history of the six great Holland America Line (HAL) ships which have borne the proud name *Rotterdam*. Oosterwijk is an accomplished Dutch researcher and writer with a number of works to his credit including the sesquicentennial history of Smit tugs (1992). This volume particularly honours the 125th anniversary of the founding of the Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij (Holland American Line) in 1873. The details included in the study of the six *Rotterdams* involve a virtual history of the NASM and fill to overflowing the 464-page text which ends with a one-page bibliography, but, unfortunately, no index. No historical work of this magnitude should ever be published without an index

and that is regretted.

The book's many illustrations are drawn from a wide variety of sources and include reproductions of many of the famous Stephen Card paintings that grace the main staircases of many recent Holland America liners. ln the case of the sixth *Rotterdam (1997),* Card paintings of all her predecessors have been magnificently executed as part of the flagship's decor and have been assembled here on the dust jacket.

The early history of the founding of the NASM, or as it is more familiarly known, Holland America Line, is retold in the opening chapter. Subsequently, the development of the history of the line is presented with particular emphasis on the careers of the first five *Rotterdams (1872,* 1886, 1897, 1908, 1959). Each receives a chapter illustrated with a generous collection of rare and unusual, paintings, photographs, and prints. Among the interesting illustrations are ones showing the two traditional designs for the fifth *Rotterdam* (1959) [280-281] as a two- or three-funnel enlarged *Nieuw Amsterdam (1938).* Ultimately the courageous decision was made to go with the revolutionary modern lines of that great ship featuring the two dramatic smoke uptakes centered aft. The coverage of the fifth *Rotterdam* is particularly fine and warrants the label "definitive" from her construction through her long career as the HAL flagship.

The reviewer well remembers the events surrounding a magnificent picture [310] of the second *Nieuw Amsterdam* and fifth *Rotterdam,* shown together in New York Harbor. On October 16, 1959, the new *Rotterdam* arrived early from Europe and HAL, having only one suitable Hoboken berth, had to spend a day switching their two big liners. In the morning the empty *Nieuw Amsterdam* had to back out so that *Rotterdam's* passengers from Europe could disembark. Then the two largest Dutch liners had to switch berths so that *Nieuw Amsterdam's* Caribbean cruise passengers could board in the afternoon; finally, *Rotterdam* returned to the Hoboken berth in order to prepare for her trans-Atlantic sailing the next day. This logistical nightmare for HAL provided an opportunity for some of the finest photographs of the two together. The saving grace was the free publicity when large pictures of the two Dutch queens graced every New York newspaper the next day.

The building of the newest – the sixth – *Rotterdam* (1997) by the Fincantieri Yard in Monfalcone, Italy provides the final chapter. Again the photographic coverage both in colour and black and white is excellent and the brilliant public rooms of the new ship show why she has had such an excellent reception.

As a commercial history, *"Les Maal Rotterdam* is a magnificent job, and Bram Oosterwijk is to be congratulated. The book is well worth acquiring for the illustrations alone, although that is what many will have to be content with since the text is in Dutch. Let us hope that the Holland America Line, or its parent Carnival Cruises, might have the Dutch text translated into English so that this effort can reach the much broader market which exists for so fine a maritime work.

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Peter Kuckuk (ed.). *Unterweserwerften in der Nachkriegszeit. Von der »Stunde Null« zum »Wirtschaftswunder«.* Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1998. 208 pp., photographs, figures, illustrations, tables, bibliography, name index. DM 24.90, paper; ISBN 3-86108-612-3.

The title of the book suggests that it might be a review of shipyards on the lower Weser river in Germany and their history after World War II. Instead, the book contains seven essays on a diversity of topics on various aspects of shipbuilding in the area after the war. Time and again the essays show the difficult and slow development and establishment of new administrative structures in the Bremen area, first by the occupation forces and later by a military administration. One describes the search for funds for ship construction; others illustrate the conditions of shipyards in general and in Bremerhaven, still others deal with the varying fortunes of a renowned yacht builder and of a major shipyard.

The region of the lower Weser river was occupied by British forces during the last weeks of the war in May 1945. Within this area the US supply base and port of embarkation at Bremen and Bremerhaven were to be established. The eerie atmosphere in Bremen, after heavy fighting and the breakdown of all infrastructure and civil administration, comes to life with a vivid documentation of times and places. The first steps of victors and vanquished, without electricity, without public or individual transportation, are por-

trayed with all their frustrations.

The personal outlooks of the individual essays repeatedly highlight the myriad problems that were to be overcome in the re-education of people and in the reconstruction of the area. A completely destroyed major German port had to be made operable again in a hurry. The river leading to it had to be cleared of mines, and the local population had to be fed. The book makes clear the differences between British and US attitudes *vis-à-vis* a conquered Germany. The Potsdam treaty prohibited Germany from constructing seagoing vessels of any kind, yet shipbuilding was the industrial mainstay of the entire region. At the end of 1946 restrictions were lifted for a few ships below 1500 tons gross and for some trawlers, but still none could be built due to lack of material. In 1949 some steam-powered ships below 7200 GRT were permitted, but not until 1951 were most restrictions lifted. The book details the excruciatingly slow resurrection of shipbuilding and later its phenomenal growth. The book also illustrates how the Bremen government made funds available for this major industry against all official sanctions.

The rather personal outlook of the individual essays results in a picture of the times as it appeared to the actors in the drama, though nowhere in the Foreword does the editor give any indication that this had been his intention. The book relies exclusively on archival materials for its statements and is very well documented. It derives its internal tension from the possibility of the present day reader to judge the outcome of the efforts of the time.

Another aspect of the book is its success in showing individuals grappling with the problems of the times. There is the boat yard, where British and US pickets guard each other and the sailing yachts in storage. There is the German manager, whose large shipyard has survived the war nearly completely intact and who has to reconcile the demands of his new superiors and of his hungry workers. And there are the many individuals from both sides who, sometimes contrary to official policy, try to get a job done against innumerable odds. The book refrains from political statements. It supplies information for the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Fifty years after the war nearly all the names of shipyards mentioned in the book have become memories. Practically all of them have closed their gates, in common with their British counterparts – victims to worldwide economic processes, and not of ideological dogma or economic antagonism. The book is full of facts and gives many sources, nearly all of them German, for further studies of this little known facet of German industrial history.

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K. Dharmasena. *The Port of Colombo 1940-1995, Volume II.* Tokyo: Japan Overseas Ports Cooperation Association, 1998 [orders to: Japan Overseas Ports Cooperation Association (JOPCA), Kazan Building 4F, 3-2-4, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan]. xi + 424 pp., map, tables, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. Available free on request [expenses for mailing charge and bank commission for cashing a cheque must be borne by applicants for the book], cloth; ISBN 955-599-106-5.

I vividly recall, in the early 1980s, reading Professor Dharmasena's *The Port of Columbo 1860-1939* (1980). I was impressed by the skill with which he combined narrative and statistical material, how he set his study in a multi-disciplinary framework and avoided the narrow parochialism of many (especially official) port histories. Professor Dharmasena's book provided both a model and a source of inspiration for those of us working in the field of port history. Re-opening his book almost two decades later, I find no hint that it was to be the first in a two volume series but am delighted to see that in 1998 he published this second volume dealing with the history of the Port of Colombo between 1940-1995.

In chapter I, where Professor Dharmasena summarises the development of the port before 1939, he inevitably draws heavily on his earlier work. Unfortunately, rather than taking the opportunity to present a synthesis incorporating the results of new research, the author largely repeats material, including thirteen tables, from the previous book. It is disappointing that significant literature on Asian port history and historiography such as Broeze, Reeves and McPherson's path-breaking paper on Asian port cities *(Journal of Transport History* 1986), is not utilised in this chapter or indeed anywhere else in the book.

Chapter II examines port development between 1940-56, although coverage effectively begins in 1945 as, regrettably, the war years

receive no attention. The years following World War II and independence from Britain in 1948 were turbulent both for Sri Lanka and the Port of Colombo. Colombo, like many ports, was suffering from damage during the war years, inefficient storage and cargo handling, and industrial unrest. Serious congestion and delays caused it to lose its reputation for being one of the most efficient Asian ports; shipping companies levied surcharges on freight rates to compensate for the port's inefficiency. Efforts to boost efficiency and reduce industrial unrest met with some success but the surcharges were not removed until 1965.

In order to explain changes in port trade and shipping, Chapters III and IV examine key features of Sri Lanka's economy and post-war economic history. In 1957 the government adopted the policy of import-substitution industrialisation which was then in vogue amongst development economists. This was pursued with limited success until 1977 when, the government, influenced by the success of the East Asian economies, switched to a strategy of export-orientated industrialisation (EOI). Although Sri Lanka continued to lag behind the Asian Tigers, it succeeded in increasing exports and more than doubled the growth rate of GDP to six percent per annum between 1978-1983. One effect of the EOI strategy was to reduce Sri Lanka's reliance on traditional primary exports such as tea and rubber: in 1976 agricultural exports accounted for 76 percent of total exports, but by 1996 their share had shrunk to 21 percent. The structural shifts in trade were accompanied by alterations in the geographical pattern of trade. One casualty was trade with the United Kingdom, which by 1991 accounted for a mere six percent of exports and five percent of imports. All these changes were reflected in the trade and shipping of the Port of Colombo, which remained Sri Lanka's major port throughout the post-war period.

Strong growth of trade and shipping led to pressures for improved port facilities. As is well known, the most spectacular post-war innovation for handling non-bulk cargo was containerisation, but its capital intensive nature made it a costly and risky investment for ports in relatively poor countries such as Sri Lanka. In chapter V, which discusses the development of containerisation, we learn that containers first came to Colombo in December 1973 when the American President Line unloaded them using "on board gantries." Construction of a container berth began in the mid-1960s but lack of funds delayed completion. The funding problem was overcome in the early 1980s with "soft" loans from the Japanese, apparently tied to the use of Japanese construction companies. By 1983 Colombo's container movements had reached 142,811 twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs), about nine per cent more than Bombay, and it claimed to be the leading port in South Asia. [255]

Chapter VI traces the evolution of port management and control in Sri Lanka. In line with traditional British practice a state-owned body, the Colombo Port Commission, had been created in 1913 to administer the port. But its autonomy was limited and it could not cope with post-war difficulties. Government responded by nationalising the ports industry, creating the Port Cargo Corporation (1958) and the Port Tally and Protective Services Corporation (1967) to control the labour force, stevedoring and other port operations. Another venture in state socialism was a national shipping line, the Ceylon Shipping Corporation, created in 1969. Control of the port by three government departments led to problems with overlapping responsibilities and coordinating port activities and in 1979 the three agencies were merged into one body, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), with comprehensive powers over all Sri Lankan ports.

The SLPA succeeded in reducing industrial unrest by providing generous welfare benefits to the workforce and allowing restrictive practices such as over-manning. [293-303] The practice of making "extra" payments to speed up cargo handling became so entrenched that they were described as "productivity incentives" rather than "bribes"! In 1995 Colombo with a staff of about 17,000 handled just over one million TEUs while Singapore with a staff of about 4,000 handled twelve million TEUs. Apparently, like many other public enterprises in Sri Lanka, the port was used as a `job bank." [346-8] Not surprisingly, this affected the profitability of the SLPA: net profits after taxation increased from Rs172 million in 1980 to only Rs453 in 1993. In addition, it was cross-subsidising the loss-making ports of Galle and Trincomalee.

Chapter VII reviews these problems and future prospects for the Port of Colombo. Political interference in port administration remains a concern. Thus, in February 1997 the Minister directed the SLPA, without warning, to raise tariffs. Professor Dharmasena also argues that the

port "should not be treated as any other public enterprise in Sri Lanka where in most cases political considerations supersede competence in appointments to positions of responsibility carrying very high remuneration." [333] Despite these and other problems, he argues against wholesale privatisation of the port and is critical of a proposal in 1997 by a consortium led by P & O to build a privately operated terminal.

Unfortunately facts and statistics – 109 tables in 389 pages of text – overwhelm the reader. Some use could have been made of graphs and many of the tables removed or consigned to the appendices. The book would have benefited from tighter editing to remove excessively detailed and repetitive material and correct some grammatical mistakes. There is no index. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, and the lack of references to the general port literature, Professor Dharmasena displays an impressive knowledge of port operation and development and the book contains a wealth of material of interest to maritime historians interested in post-war ports and shipping.

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Niels Lynnerup. *The Greenland Norse: A Biological-anthropological Study*. Copenhagen: Danish Polar Center, 1998 [Strandgade 100 H, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark]. 149 pp., figures, tables, photographs, maps, references, appendix. DKK 225, paper; ISBN 87-90369-24-6.

Niels Lynnerup's *The Greenland Norse, A Biological-Anthropological Study* is a pleasure to read. Lynnerup is a physical anthropologist, and the book is based on his PhD dissertation at the University of Copenhagen in 1994. Impressive for its thoroughness, both in detail and methodological approach, the book provides a convincing explanation for the eventual disappearance of the Greenland Norse.

Lynnerup examines the total body of Norse skeletal material from Greenland, representing about 22,000 individuals from a time period spanning almost five hundred years. The skeletons come chiefly from burials in cemeteries, practically all of which are known from written documents and archaeological investigations A few are from burials inside churches and outside the cemeteries. Lynnerup brings them into context through a discussion of Norse burial practices as well as the archaeological methodology by which they were retrieved (in early excavations, frequently only the skulls were brought into museum storage). The current curatorial status of the finds is also explained. The skeletons are examined for age and gender distribution, stature, racial affinity, and pathology. Lynnerup concludes that, contrary to popular opinion, the Norse, both in Greenland and elsewhere, were relatively short, especially the women. Physically they were clearly a subgroup of the Icelandic population with (like the Icelanders) a strong Celtic component. There were occasions of Saami traits in the same proportions as found in the mainland Scandinavian populations, but no evidence of Inuit attributes. For those who lived past the age of seventy, joint disease and osteoarthritis were common phenomena. There was evidence of physical strife in the form of cuts from swords, axes, and knives. Lynnerup also has an interesting discussion of the radiocarbon dates obtained on the bones themselves. He wisely takes into account the so-called reservoir effect of marine-based radiocarbon on a population whose diet contained a great deal of seal and other marine food. In part of the Norse areas, this effect makes the raw dates as much as five hundred years too old.

All large cemeteries are known, and many have been excavated. Lynnerup takes into consideration the number and size of cemeteries, the burial density and number of years in use for each cemetery as well as the total number of retrieved specimens. The total number of burials calculated for all the cemeteries lies between 26,000 to 30,000. Lynnerup applies several demographic models to these figures and reaches the conclusion that this number of individuals would represent an initial settlement size of four to five hundred (there was practically no subsequent migration to Greenland). The population reached its peak in the early thirteenth century, with a total number of about 2,000 or an absolute maximum of 2,500.

Lynnerup uses the physical anthropological data to provide a logical explanation for the "disappearance" of the Norse from Greenland. For more than a century, that "disappearance" has been a subject of speculation by both scholars and laymen. The Norse settlement had been founded about AD 985 by Eric the Red on the inner fjord systems of Greenland's southwest coast. A second concentration of settlement took place further to

the north. Known as the West Settlement, it was abandoned about 1350 according to medieval records and subsequently confirmed by archaeology. The southern part, known as the East Settlement, continued to exist until the second half of the fifteenth century. Around 1540, when a German expedition landed briefly in the Norse area, members observed abandoned dwellings and fields but not a single person except for the corpse of a man on the beach close to boathouses. Beside him was an iron knife so worn that little remained of the blade.

So what happened to these Norsemen? Niels Lynnerup concludes that it was the low Norse population figures that sealed their fate. The minimum number of individuals for a viable settlement is five hundred. For the West Settlement, the total population of which never was much above the minimum figure, the worsening climatic, agricultural and trade conditions of the early fourteenth century would soon have made it impossible to function as a community. By about 1350, an emigration to the East Settlement would have been unavoidable. However, even this consolidation was not sufficient to save the population as some of the initial sustenance pursuits could no longer be maintained. Lynnerup suggests that a trickle of emigration back to Iceland of as few as eight people per year, or a hundred over ten years, would have a compounded effect on a population as small as 2,000 individuals (which is in sharp contrast to the situation in Iceland and Norway, where the pre-Plague populations numbered 80,000 and 300,000 respectively). Any emigration would involve primarily young adults, which in turn would lower the fertility rates. Once the population begins to decrease, it becomes even more vulnerable to fluctuations in fertility and mortality. [117] Thus the impact would have been substantial. At the same time, after the ravages brought by the Black Death in Norway after 1350 and the 1402 plague in Iceland, there was plenty of abandoned land for emigrant Greenlanders, some of whom seem still to have had family ties with Iceland. In terms of percentage of the total Icelandic population, such a small and probably slow influx would hardly have been noticeable, especially in times of plague and upheaval.

In summary, Lynnerup's study of the physical anthropology of the Greenland Norse is thorough, innovative, and a thought-provoking synthesis of all the physical data available. This is an important contribution to a growing body of scientific research on the Greenland Norse.

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John M. MacAulay. *Seal-Folk and Ocean Paddlers: Sliochd nan Rèn.* Knapwell, Cambridge, UK: White Horse Press, 1998. xviii + 110 pp., illustrations, photographs, maps, bibliography. £7.95, US $14.95, paper; ISBN 1-874267-39-1. Distributed in the United States by Paul & Company, c/o COSI, Leonia, NJ.

This is a very confused and confusing book. In preparing this review it has been extremely difficult to compose a few succinct sentences that explain the author's intent, possibly because there is none. What follows is an attempt to make sense of this volume.

The author is a native Hebridean Islander well steeped in the knowledge of his homeland. Growing up on the islands he heard of mer-folk and Finn-folk (strange paddlers who suddenly appeared off the coast in skin boats and disappeared as suddenly). He also knew people whose families claimed descent from the Seal-Folk – seals that were able to shed their skins and become human beings. Throughout the Celtic regions there is a recurring theme of maritime folk who have encountered and at times married these creatures. Later, he learned of Inuit kayaks that had been recovered off the coasts of Scotland and the Netherlands in the nineteenth century. This volume is his attempt to bring these disparate threads together and to create a plausible explanatory theory. Unfortunately, the effort does not work. The threads are too knotted and the author never succeeds in untangling them to weave a coherent story.

The book is divided into a series of chapters, each presenting information about one of the particular threads of the story: Merfolk, Seal-Folk, Kayaks, History, and Mythology. The reader will often wonder where the book is heading. At various times the author suggests that the Finn-folk may have been coastal Sami who may have had skin boats and may have fished off the coasts of the Hebrides. At other times he suggests that they might be the remnant of the old Norse population of these islands. Finally, in the last chapter "The Lapp of Honour," he presents his theory that these Finn-folk/Seal-folk/Merfolk

were the old Norse settlers of Greenland. Driven out of Greenland by climate and other factors, and with no wooden boats, they returned home in Inuit style kayaks and settled on the outer islands such as the Hebrides and Faroes. Unfortunately, no archaeology or history presented in this book or elsewhere supports this fascinating and fantastic claim.

MacAulay's methodology for this study is most unusual. He argues that we should not dismiss evidence from folklore and oral history. Nor, he writes, should we ignore evidence from earlier historians merely because it is old and out of fashion. Neither of these statements is controversial. The more evidence a researcher brings to bear on a problem the more likely he or she is to derive a reasonable hypothesis. However, he then goes on and ignores all contemporary data. For example, his information on northern Scandinavian archaeology is derived solely from nineteenth-century publications. Likewise, none of his kayak data is drawn from the works of contemporary experts. A glance at his bibliography indicates the ease with which he disregards other avenues of research. As a result he falls into several traps of his own making. For example, MacAulay argues that kayaks found on the coasts of northern Europe might have been crafted in Scandinavia by Sami. Unfortunately, all the kayaks in question are western Greenlandic in origin, with two exceptions that fit the known dimensions of Labrador kayaks. He also argues that the wood used in the manufacture of at least one of the kayaks is Scandinavian in origin. Had he researched driftwood he would have learned that the species in question is commonly found as driftwood in Greenland. Finally, he ignores the hunting equipment found with the kayaks that is exclusively Inuit in origin.

This book is a difficult read because the author provides no clear pathway for the reader. This may be partly intentional. It is clear the author wishes to maintain some of the mystique of the folklore. For those travelling through the northern islands, the book may help understand the islanders and their relationship to the sea. In terms of its explanations for seal-folk, it cannot be recommended.

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Roderick and Marjorie Webster. *Historic Scientific Instruments of the Adler Planetarium & Astronomy Museum, Vol. I: Western Astrolabes.* Chicago: Adler Planetarium & Astronomy Museum, 1998 [1300 South Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60605, USA]. xiii + 179 pp., illustrations, photographs, figures, tables, appendices, makers' biographies, bibliography, index. US $45, cloth; ISBN 1-891220-01-2.

The astrolabe can be used to solve more than forty mathematical and astronomical problems. Like most modern computers, the astrolabe was used because it was quick, flexible and multipurpose. Earlier instruments were used mainly for astronomical and astrological purposes but time-telling, surveying and navigating were also frequent applications.

Chicago's Adler Planetarium houses a large and rich collection of scientific instruments: astrolabes, navigation instruments, globes, telescopes and sundials. Since it opened in 1930, the Planetarium has acquired many collections of such instruments, cared for by the Planetarium's Curators Emeriti, Roderick and Marjorie Webster. With the publication of *Western Astrolabes,* the Adler Planetarium inaugurates a multiple-volume catalogue of its complete collection. This first volume is not limited simply to a description of the different astrolabes in great detail; it also contains a complete technical introduction by the Websters and a well-written and fully illustrated history of this instrument by Sara Schechner Genuth.

The technical introduction takes us through some basic mathematical concepts, stereographic projections and the geometric construction of the rete and tympan. Each part of the astrolabe is illustrated and its role explained. However, since knowledge of mathematics is necessary to use the astrolabe, the technical introduction is not designed to bypass this requirement.

Nor does Sara Schechner Genuth's introduction on the history of astrolabes limit itself to the chronological evolution of the instrument. The cross-cultural diffusion of this instrument is discussed in some detail and the subsequent variations in usage are addressed in a critical and objective manner. Within the Western European context, the diffusion of the astrolabe across social classes is mentioned, as it became a favoured instrument for the élite and the poor alike. Her essay also contains many footnotes for further

reference and pertinent illustrations from varied sources.

The catalogue itself makes up the bulk of the book. It contains forty-seven detailed descriptions of specific collection pieces dating from the thirteenth century to 1989 collector items. Each entry clearly follows a precise template that includes the origin, the maker, measurements, photographs of the face, reverse sides, additional pieces and the provenance of the piece. In many cases a star list accompanies the entry. Entries include Classic types, Multiple types, Surveyor's astrolabe, de Rojas type, Stellar Compass, Astrolabe-Quadrant, and Mariners' Astrolabes. A Star Catalogue in the appendix helps the reader find all the astrolabes that contain a specific star on its rete. A bibliography and full index follows a short list of astrolabe maker biographies.

Western Astrolabes fulfils its goal in giving the reader access to a large and detailed technical catalogue of these mathematical jewels. The quality of the photographs should also be noted, for they are clear and precise and all inscriptions on these instruments are readable. Let us hope that subsequent volumes of this catalogue project will be as rich and well documented.

Marc Cormier
Toronto, Ontario

Pablo E. Pérez-Mellaina (trans. Carla Rahn Phillips). *Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. ix + 289 pp., illustrations, tables, colour photo-plates, notes, index. US $29.95, cloth; ISBN 0-8018-5746-5.

In the sixteenth century, after Spain's first fledgling settlements in the Caribbean had been established, Spanish fleets sailed year after year back and forth between Seville – one of the busiest and richest ports in the world – and the Indies (as Spaniards called their possessions in America). Becoming increasingly challenged by European rivals as the century wore on, it was on these fleets that Spain's trade with and control over its vast New World empire depended, as did the Spanish monarchy for the imports of American bullion that were so crucial to keeping it solvent. The flotas *de las Indias (as* they were known) were clearly not average fleets of the time. Rather, as the colonies, trade and imports of gold and silver grew, they became great convoys of as many as two hundred merchant vessels and their heavily armed escorts, requiring some seven to nine thousand mostly volunteer mariners. It is the daily life of the crews who manned these fleets in the sixteenth century and who kept this vital link working – and not the ships themselves – which is the subject of Pérez-Mellaina's book.

Based on the extensive range of records available in the Archive of the Indies in Seville and supported by ample illustrations, notes, and an index (but not a bibliography), the volume also has a useful introduction by the translator, herself a well-known hispanist. This outlines basic facts about sixteenth-century Spanish and European history which the author would have assumed were familiar to the Spanish-speaking audience for which the book was originally written.

Pérez-Mellaina opens his study with a scene-setting chapter that describes the characteristics of the *Carrera de las Indias* (the Indies' Route or Run), the organization of the fleets sailing on that "great transoceanic highway" [2] as well as the bases at either end where the fleets arrived and departed: Seville – the official port for trade with the Indies and therefore the gateway to the New World – and the ports in America (San Juan de Ulna, Veracruz, Cartagena, Nombre de Dios, Portobelo and Havana). But the emphasis throughout is on the sailors, their life (and that of their wives) in Seville before and after voyages and their trials and tribulations on the round trip to and from America (where many jumped ship).

Chapter Two is an examination of the number, size and geographic origins of the men and boys who went to sea, many from Spain's culturally and linguistically diverse regions but many also from as far afield as Flanders and the Greek islands. The author also inquires into what made this great mix of mariners sign on for what was definitely not a pleasure cruise (the reason often being the lure of New World riches), considering as well both the "Prestige and Dishonor for Maritime Occupations." [35]

The two middle chapters concentrate respectively on the ship as "a place of work" and as "a place of life and death." The wide range of themes addressed include how crews handled the most complex machine of its time, division of labour, remuneration and the varying economic stature of all those in the maritime labour hierarchy. Also analyzed are the conditions of shipboard life, free time, sexuality, sickness and the

rate of death, which sometimes reached catastrophic levels due largely to tropical diseases but also through shipwreck and attack by corsairs.

Chapter Five considers issues of discipline and conflict: relations among shipowners, crews and commanders, interaction within the crews as well as between officers and men, authority on board ship, delinquency, mutinies and desertions. The text is liberally provided with detailed examples and stories from the lives of individual seafarers as, indeed, is the whole account.

The study concludes with a detailed analysis of "The Mental Horizons" of the sailors, discussing the process of training mariners (from seamen and gunners to masters and pilots), the sailors' culture and world view, their religious system of beliefs and their perception of, and ties with, family and friends in the light of their often year long absences from their homes.

The depth and quality of Pérez-Mellaina's work do justice to the importance of these fleets. He has asked a series of questions regarding the social history of maritime communities that are not straightforward to answer. But through careful research, reconstruction, analysis and interpretation the author has painted a vivid portrait of the life of the officers and men of Spain's Indies fleets in the 1500s. The volume, therefore, is an excellent contribution to Spanish and European maritime history in the early modern period.

Michael M. Barkham
Bilbao, Spain

R.J. Barendse. *The Arabian Seas 1640-1700*. Leiden: Research School CNWS, Leiden University, 1998 [Nonnensteeg 1-3, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA, Leiden, The Netherlands]. vi +465 pp., maps, tables, appendices, index. f60- (excl. Postage; + *f10*- when using a foreign cheque), paper; ISBN 90-5789-009-7.

The Arabian Seas 1640-1700 must rank as one of the most thoughtful, creative and provocative monographs to be added in recent years to the still fast growing "era of the East India Companies" historiography. Although Barendse, ultimately, has not been able to avoid some uncertainties (for example, with regard to the definition of his period), duplications and contradictions, he offers a fresh and remarkably comprehensive analysis of the economic and political worlds of the Arabian Seas during a period of intense but always changing interactions between indigenous and European traders and rulers. The book is based on his 1992 PhD thesis and many years of exhaustive research in the archives of many countries (notably Portugal, the Netherlands, and England). The result is a wealth of documentation, insight and synthesis. Barendse does not aim to emulate the sheer limitless thematic range of Braudel's work on the Mediterranean in his particular oceanic space, but many building stones for the construction of an "histoire totale" have been painstakingly assembled.

A similar wealth of historical actors crowd Barendse's account of the complex story of trade, empire and violence that characterised the political economy of the Arabian Seas. Although the main thrust of the book, in view of their archival preponderance almost inevitably, is a comparative study of the role and fluctuating fortunes of the Portuguese Estado da India, and the Dutch and English East India Companies, Barendse is as much interested in the role, dynamics and performance of indigenous traders and rulers in this maritime region that formed the connection between India and the countries of the Middle East and beyond. Surate's merchant prince Abdul Ghafur features prominently as do the Ja'aribas of Oman (although they are strangely overlooked in the index). The Portuguese, Dutch and English each are assigned a chapter, but in addition there is a chapter "European nations in the Arabian Seas." Some further overlap exists with the chapter "Diplomacy and the State." The concluding "Afterthoughts" are, similarly, tilted more towards the European than the Asian side as Barendse enthusiastically enters the Perlin-Wallerstein debate about the "Eurasian proto-capitalism" *vs.* regional "world economy" concepts. His far-reaching and detailed analysis gives his views additional authority: although clearly preferring Perlin's thesis, he insists that two "cardinal reservations" must qualify the image of the homogenised super-continent: the total imbalance in oceanic shipping between Europe and Asia ("there was no Mughal factory in England"), and the importance of the additional inter-continental connections of Europe with Africa and, especially, the Americas. Especially American silver is given particular significance, even if Barendse (a case of Homer nodding?) entirely neglects the importance of American silver entering Asia across the Pacific through Manila.

With regards to the development and func-

tioning of markets in the Arabian Seas region Barendse is refreshingly pragmatic, observing a dense network of trade built on a variety of hierarchical and highly diverse markets, ranging from regional staple markets to a large number of often unstable local markets. Answering the question why the Europeans were able to crowd in on the trade in the commodities they craved for the European market or for their inter-Asian operations, Barendse is uncertain; although he seems to reject the monopsonist theory in favour of an economics of scale through the centralization of operations explanation (e.g., pp. 172 and 219), in several other passages it is clear that the VOC needed far greater profit levels than traditional traders because of its extensive overhead expenses (e.g., pp. 233 and 439).

Barendse not only brings together a remarkable volume of information on trade, commodities and markets, but he presents his findings deftly and with a nice eye for telling case studies and detail – see his account of the trade between Portuguese Diu and Mombasa and Malindi. His analysis of the collapse of the Kerala pepper trade is the best I have seen to date and his insights in the structure of the indigo trade and a host of other commercial and political affairs are refreshing and important. Barendse never hesitates to challenge established orthodoxies. For instance, he argues convincingly that the East India Companies must be regarded as states, despite their own protestations to the contrary. Their actual or potential use of large-scale violence, their bureaucracies and their territorial control (however small the size of that territory) all qualified them as such. In consequence, he sees a much greater convergence between the Companies and the pre-1660 Estado da India than most historians are prepared to do. He could have added that the latter, after its heavy losses in mid-century – which dramatically altered both its character and its relationship with its increasingly Asianized citizenry – became remarkably like the modern right-wing state with its extensive out-sourcing and contracting of services with private interests.

Some readers may doubt that Barendse's "Arabian Seas" can be regarded as a legitimate region of study. In their view the trade and other relations of its various littoral areas have insufficient power to create a homogenous and coherent thalasso-political entity. Barendse himself, in addition, is deeply concerned with the diverse and fragmented hinterlands of his region's ports and looks far beyond the limits of the Arabian Seas in much of his assessment of the changing relationships within the region. Similar doubts have been raised with regards to the credibility of studies based, for example, on the North Atlantic. In my view, such challenges to regional maritime history are ill-conceived. There is no space in the world, on land or at sea or mixed, that makes perfect historical sense in isolation from its surrounding environment – least of all national history! – but that does not mean that regional studies are inherently flawed. On the contrary, as *The Arabian Seas* convincingly demonstrates, a well-executed case study of a densely traversed maritime space with a full acknowledgment of the significance of its hinter-, over- and foreland connections can be particularly valuable, exactly because its focus is on the region's centripetal rather than its centrifugal forces.

There is a number of minor matters in which I would disagree with Barendse. His use of the term "guerre de course" is incorrect and it is much better to describe the cartazas as "navicerts" than as "letters of marque." [290] The Catholic church could hardly be a traite d'union *(sic)* between Goa and East Africa when a number of casados actually converted to Islam. [305] Tea was certainly not yet a major factor in his period. [60] No mention is made of the bulk trade in dates from southern Iraq, nor of the fisheries of the region and the related trade in fish oil, an indispensable raw material for the Arabian ship- and boat-building industries. There are a few typographical errors too many (e.g., `choir' instead of `coir,' p. 174), and the maps are not particularly readable and useful. The index has no subdivisions for major entries and, worse, there is no bibliography. But, overall, *The Arabian Seas* is an important, thought provoking, wide-ranging and fascinating book that will stand tall for many years. It makes a major contribution both as a regional maritime study and as a sustained comparative study of the commercial and political interaction of indigenous Arabian Seas societies and the European intruders into their oceanic space. It also raises issues that have become prominent in recent maritime economic scholarship of more modern periods, such as ethnic entrepreneurial diasporas, networking and the gathering and processing of information.

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Western Australia

Anton Gill. *The Devil's Mariner: William Dampier, Pirate and Explorer.* London: Michael Joseph, 1997. xx + 396 pp., maps, illustrations, b+w photo-plates, bibliography, index. $35, cloth; ISBN 0-7181-4114-8. Distributed in Canada by Canbook Distribution Corp., Newmarket, ON.

William Dampier; Mark Beken (ed.), Giles Morton (Foreword). *A New Voyage Around the World: The Journal of an English Buccaneer.* London: Hummingbird Press, 1998 [address: 28 Tooting High Street, London SW17 ORG, UK; tel: +44 181 769-4169]. xii + 294 pp., maps, illustrations, colour plates, appendices, glossary, gazetteer. £19.95 [+ £3.50 postage], cloth; ISBN 0-9532918-0-4.

The British National Register of Archives has an electronic search facility over the World Wide Web. A word search on "pirate" produces just one result: "William Dampier, 1652-1715 Explorer and Pirate." Of course, Dampier was not the only British pirate to leave detailed records of his activities–men like Basil Ringrose, Lionel Wafer and others did so too – but he did achieve a greater degree of social respectability. His is the only "incontestably genuine portrait of a British pirate that there is," Gill tells us in his opening chapter, and Dampier's portrait hangs in the National Portrait Gallery in London. It was not just respectability, of course, that resulted in his portrait being taken: Edmund Teach, dead on the Ockerecock Inlet, Bartholomew Roberts, tossed overboard in all his finery at the end of his last battle on the Guinea coast, or Calico Jack Rackam, hanged at Jamaica, were simply not available to sit for an artist. And while drawings were made that claimed to represent men like Blackbeard and Black Bart, they were quite different in conception, and were directed at a different market. There is a world of difference between the staid formal oil portrait of Dampier and the rough line drawings and engravings of popular literature. Teach and Roberts were popular pirate heroes; Dampier was the hero of grave and responsible men.

One of the chief merits of Gill's book is that it shows how that respectability was achieved. A lot of it is derived from Dampier's own accounts of his travels, in which he skates very carefully around any admission that he was indeed a pirate: he calls himself a privateer, although it is clear that many of his exploits were piracy. In the process of describing his journeys, Dampier sheds an extraordinarily detailed light on the workings of pirate crews: their fissiparous nature, their rough equality, the way in which captains were changed, and decisions were reached. But Gill does not simply base his account of Dampier on the man's own writings: he has made considerable use of other accounts written by pirates, some of them published, others still in manuscript (mainly in the British Library). Gill has done a lot of research, writes well and quotes vividly, so it is a pity that one of the major failings of this book is that it has no references beyond the bibliography at the back. The decision to leave out footnotes or endnotes was presumably done in the interest of satisfying a more general rather than an academic market – though is it true that a general reader does not want to be able to follow points up?

Dampier's own chariness at showing himself to be a pirate was only a part of his success at achieving respectability. Another factor was the fluidity with which Dampier and others like him moved between regular and freebooting enterprise: it was the enterprise rather than the social cachet that was significant. Dampier was determined to make his fortune and he moved between working as an estate manager, a logwood cutter, a seaman, a privateer and a pirate. On the way he bemoans his companions' lack of staying power that prevented them from seizing any but the most transitory opportunity. The ease with which he could move between roles was one aspect to his success, and Gill captures this very well.

There was nothing unusual about this: a century or so before other West Countrymen, like Drake and Raleigh had crossed and re-crossed the boundaries between state service and piracy. Like them, too, he was famous not so much for his raiding activities, but for his daring as an explorer: Dampier, too, circumnavigated the world and left an account of it that was widely read. It is this account that Hummingbird Press has reissued. This was the third underpinning of his respectability, for it was a book for an educated audience: simultaneously a book of geography and ethnography and natural history, in astonishing detail. It was also beautifully written, although apparently Dampier had the assistance of a ghost writer. But it was also an account of a piratical life (despite the claim to be a privateer). The social dynamics of a raiding ship are placed alongside his descriptions of the resources of the countries that he visited: the two were interdependent. This edition

breaks the link to some extent, by shifting some of the descriptions of plants and animals to an appendix. The editor, Mark Becken, says that this is closer to what Dampier himself intended, but he also omits some passages altogether when he judges that they have little to add to the account. Even so, there is an enormous amount of material in this edition, and it is very welcome. Apparently this is the first book produced by Hummingbird Press and they have made an excellent job of it: the book is very well printed on high quality paper that allows full scope for the excellent illustrations.

C. Richard Pennell
Parkville, Victoria

Deryck Scarr. *Slaving and Slavery in the Indian Ocean.* London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. xii + 238 pp., maps, notes, bibliography, index. US $65, cloth; ISBN 0-312-21211-9.

All right, I admit it. I get very suspect when the very first paragraph of a book contains a glaring factual error about the main object of the study. ln this case Professor Scarr mis-states the date in which Mauritius gained independence (1969 instead of 1968). If this were all, I suppose I and most everyone else could just go on. But in fact, rather than being a momentary annoyance, the first paragraph foreshadows what is really a very weak book.

In this book, Scarr endeavours to look at patterns of slavery in the south-western Indian Ocean, focusing his attention on Mauritius in particular but with a wider gaze at times toward Bourbon/Reunion and Seychelles. He grounds his study in a brief review of eighteenth-century slavery in this region (chapters 1-2), but the heart of the book (chapters 3-9) focuses on the final period of Mascarene slavery from 1810 to the 1830s. He looks at the illegal trade that developed following British abolition, the internal and external efforts to sustain or halt the illegal trade, and the winding down of the trade and preparations for the transition to indentured labour. In all this he covers terrain already mined by Moses Nwulia, Marina Carter, Hubert Gerbeau, Anthony Barker, Vijaya Teelock, and Richard Allen though, surprisingly, aside from a reference to only one of Allen's many major articles, none of the others are acknowledged.

Scarr has worked in archives in France, England, and the Mascarenes, and the strength of the book lies in the stories he tells. Researchers that follow Scarr's trail will be able to make more of his research than he has, inasmuch as the author never feels the need to offer a thesis or hypothesis, never feels the need to introduce or conclude a topic or subject, never feels the need to attach his interesting stories to any larger analytical purpose. Much of the time it is simply impossible to follow what he is after.

Finally, I feel I must say a word about the production of this book. I have closely edited dozens of volumes in my career, and I know I can safely say that this book has never seen an editor's pen, or mouse, or whatever. Much of the writing borders on the incoherent. There are sentences within that are well over a hundred words long (see pp. 4-5, and 198 for two examples); paragraphs that do not hold together; ideas that are offered and then not followed up, paragraphs that are indented or not as whim may have it, words capitalized out of the blue for no apparent reason, and much, much, more. So that while one can praise a commercial publisher for taking up a subject that more commonly would find a home with a university press, the quality of the work is such that I can only conclude that this manuscript probably could not find a university press and for reasons obscure to me, the publisher decided to put a cover on what is really, at best, a first draft of what could have been a very valuable book.

Larry W. Bowman
Storrs, Connecticut

Carmel Vassallo. *The Malta Chamber of Commerce 1848-1979: An Outline History of the Maltese Trade.* Valletta: The Malta Chamber of Commerce, 1998 [orders to: The Malta Chamber of Commerce, Exchange Buildings, Republic Street, Valletta, Malta]. xviii + 254 pp., illustrations, photographs, photo-plates (b+w, colour), appendices, bibliography, index. 10 Maltese Liri, paper; no ISBN.

There is little doubt that the writing of a commissioned history of a Chamber of Commerce could end up as a tedious task both for the writer and the reader. Dr. Carmel Vassallo has, however, managed to overcome many of the difficulties usually associated with such a work and has been able to

present a comprehensive outline of the history of the Chamber through a general history of Maltese trade over a period of four centuries. The corsairing economy of the island under the Order of St. John is briefly analysed and provides useful insights on the trade and shipping of the time. The eighteenth century, which saw a large decline of the old anachronistic corsair activity, is analysed through the development of commercial networks with the western Mediterranean and the Levant. The end of the Order in 1792 meant the beginning of British rule, after a brief French interval, and the integration of Malta during the nineteenth century into the British Empire and the world economy. The island was transformed into a major port of call and victualling station for the growing grain trade from the Black Sea and the Levant to western Europe as well as for the trade heading for Suez. The role of Malta changed completely, however, in the twentieth century as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal, the massive introduction of steamships, the telegraph and the wireless, together with the closure of the Black Sea grain trade during World War I. For most of the century Malta became what Dr. Vassallo describes as "a war economy" by becoming Britain's most important naval base abroad until Britain's final departure from the island in 1979. In this way, and notwithstanding the interruption of one century, Malta continued to link its fate in the twentieth century with men-of-war and a different type of violence at sea deeply felt during the two world wars.

The Chamber of Commerce established in 1848 formed the umbrella association that sheltered all the island's commercial activities and attempted to do the same with the new post-World War II activities such as industry and tourism. However, the new demands meant that major transformations should take place, and these were indeed carried out by some important personalities who presided over the Chamber during this period.

Based on original research in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce and a series of contemporary periodical publications, the book is useful to anybody studying not only Maltese but also Mediterranean trade and shipping.

Gelina Harlaftis
Piraeus, Greece

Thomas Manby. *Journal of the Voyages of the H.M.S. Discovery and Chatham*. Fairfield WA: Ye Galleon Press, 1992. 295 pp., frontispiece, illustrations, index. US $32.50, cloth, ISBN 0-87770-459-7; US $19.95, paper; ISBN 0-87770-630-1.

Thomas Manby served under George Vancouver on his voyage of 1791-1795, first as Master's Mate and Third Lieutenant on the *Discovery* and later as master of the *Chatham*. In addition to his formal logs, now in the Public Record Office, London, Manby kept a personal journal in the form of narrative letters intended for a friend. They cover the period from the expedition's departure in February 1791 to June 1793, when the expedition's boats were exploring the waters leading into Queen Charlotte Sound. These entertaining letters, which reflect his youthful enthusiasm, are now published complete for the first time from the manuscript in the Coe Collection of Western Americana in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Yale University.

Manby writes in a relaxed, informal style, designed to entertain. As he states in his preface, his letters are "but the scribble of a plain, blunt seaman to his dearest friends" and not intended to record "philosophical transaction[s] and observations" or to depict "the works of nature unfolded like a naturalist." As such, they complement the more substantial accounts of other participants in the expedition such as Archibald Menzies, Edward Bell, and Peter Puget.

For the most part, the letters are a narrative of the main events of the voyage. They also reveal Manby's love for the outdoor life. He enthusiastically recounts his accomplishments as a marksman, whether shooting wild duck, hunting deer or snaring sharks. He also teases us with his amorous adventures – "who will not envy the delights experienced by a young sailor in his one and twentieth year?" [120] One also finds the occasional touch of humour as when he describes his encounter with a skunk: "I was saluted by a discharge the most nauseous and fetid my sense of smelling ever experienced." [155] One suspects he was a lively and sociable companion. Occasionally Manby reveals a serious side to his character, such as his detailed account accompanying Broughton on his hundred-mile exploration of the Columbia River. [196-201]

Manby has nothing material to say of his fellow officers, not even either of his captains,

Broughton or Puget, or the infamous Thomas Pitt, but there are two references to Vancouver that reflect their difficult relationship. When Vancouver blasted him for a mistake when exploring off Birch Bay, he wrote: "his language I shall never forgive unless he withdraws his words by a satisfactory apology." [174] When Vancouver appointed him master of the *Chatham,* Manby said "it cleared me from a man I had such just reason to be displeased with." [194] On the other hand, Manby praised Vancouver for his success in negotiating a truce between warring kings in the Sandwich Islands. [258]

Following his return to England, Manby continued to serve in the Royal Navy until 1809 when poor health compelled him to retire. He enjoyed an active career, seeing action in command of a number of ships during the Napoleonic wars off the English coast and in the West Indies. In 1825, he was promoted to Rear Admiral.

Not part of the journal are thirty-six pages that provide a useful time-line of significant events affecting the northwest coast of America, and a post-script written by Manby's agent, summarizing his family history and career after his return with Vancouver. There is also an appendix giving the muster tables of the *Discovery* and the *Chatham*.

Ye Galleon Press has established a reputation as a small printing house devoted to publishing less well known documents of Pacific Northwest history. It produces beautifully crafted printed and bound books and markets them at a modest price. This volume is no exception.

Freeman M. Tovell
Victoria, British Columbia

J. Richard Nokes. *Almost a Hero: The Voyages of John Meares, R.N., to China, Hawaii and the Northwest Coast.* Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1998. xii + 226 pp., illustrations, maps, appendices, documents, select bibliography, index. US $35, Cdn $52.95, cloth; ISBN 0-87422-155-2; US $19.95, Cdn $29.95, paper; ISBN 0-87422-158-7. Canadian distributor, UBC Press, Vancouver.

The name of John Meares does not carry the same weight, even for students of the regional history of the Pacific Northwest, as do the more familiar appellations of Cook, Mackenzie, Vancouver, Gray, and Lewis and Clark. Long an enigmatic and somewhat controversial figure, Meares has not had a specific work dedicated to his exploratory efforts (other than his own extensive narrative of 1790) until the publication of this splendid little book. As befits an author who was, for most of his career, a newspaper editor, the writing in *Almost a Hero* is spare but certain, the facts unembellished and as accurate as solid research can make them, the story well told. Nokes does much to present an interpretation of Meares and his explorations which, if not as glorious as that of Cook and the rest, are nowhere near as miscast as they appear in the more conventional works of W. Kaye Lamb and F.W. Howay.

These earlier historians tended to portray Meares as a somewhat inconsequential blunderer whose two chief claims to fame were losing twenty-four men to cold, hunger, and scurvy while held in the ice at Prince William Sound in the winter of 1786-87, and being in the wrong place at the wrong time and having his ships impounded by the Spanish at Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island in 1789, thereby precipitating the Nootka Sound Controversy and, almost, war between England and Spain. In Nokes' careful prose, supported by even more careful research, Meares appears as something rather different than that conventional portrayal. He appears, in Nokes' title phrase, "Almost a Hero."

Like virtually all other explorers in northern Pacific waters in the latter years of the eighteenth century, Meares was motivated by two goals: furthering the trade in sea otter pelts and locating a passageway between the northeastern Pacific and the northwestern Atlantic. He attained neither – the first because of American ships and fur-trading interests; the second simply because it did not exist. In effect, then, Meares was unsuccessful in achieving the same goals that others more famous had failed to accomplish as well. Nor did he discover the Columbia River, the legendary Great River of the West (though he had spied its mouth before Captain Robert Gray of Boston entered the river in 1792) and he failed to explore one of the Pacific Northwest's most important geographical features – the Straits of Juan de Fuca – though the opportunity presented itself.

What Meares did do was to undertake careful explorations of the Pacific Northwest coast, make accurate maps that often surpassed those of more famous predecessors like Cook or contemporaries like Vancouver, and record his exploits for history in one of the most dramatic and well-written

historical narratives ever: *Voyages Made in the Year 1788 and 1789, from China to the North West Coast of America,* published in London in 1790. While later historians have either ignored or disparaged his work, his own country's government thought highly enough of it (and him) to elevate him to the peerage and grant him the title of baronet in recognition of his exploratory efforts and his "Memorial" to Parliament upon which rested the British case in the Nootka Sound dispute, eventually negotiated in Britain's favour and giving her equal rights in the Pacific trade. Although not a hero in the conventional sense, Meares was certainly a more important historical figure than past scholarship has judged. The publication of *Almost a Hero* should go a long way to correcting that judgement.

John L. Allen
Storrs, Connecticut

Mary Malloy. *"Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast: The American Maritime Fur Trade 1788-1844.* Kingston, ON and Fairbanks, AL: Limestone Press, 1998. 232 pp., notes, index, map insert. US $28, cloth; ISBN 1-895901-18-9. Distributed in the USA by the University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks, AL.

This is an essential book for students of the "coast trade." Mary Malloy, who immersed herself in the subject – especially its documentary side – for more than a decade, sets out in the book to describe the commercial contact between the Northwest Coast natives and the New England maritime fur traders on the basis of the extant shipboard journals of the "Bostonians." [3, 22] In actual fact she does this only briefly and partially, so that the two narrative chapters – concerning the vicissitudes of the American trade and life aboard the American "coasters" in the early 1800s and including long quotations from the primary sources – take up less than a sixth of the text. The strength of the book is therefore not to be found in its detailed analysis or narrative flow (although it is well written). Rather, the work is extremely valuable because of its critical historiographical review, its useful gazetteer of coastal ports of call, and – above all – its comprehensive list of American trading vessels. Indeed, the ship list, which describes the movements of, and the primary and secondary sources for, every "Boston ship" that took part in the Northwest Coast fur trade, occupies half of the book. Thus, it is primarily a reference work, and a much needed one, since – as Malloy so starkly demonstrates – historians and anthropologists have too long neglected the trade's primary sources. These comprise mostly American journals and logbooks because Yankees dominated the trade from the mid-1790s to the mid-1830s. She explains why [21] but has been too kind, perhaps, to add that too many writers have simply been lazy and sloppy in their research and too often are more concerned with theory than with the record.

The historiographical section is likewise valuable, though I think Malloy does (as others always do) overrate Wike's dissertation, as well as shortshrift my own book. Yet she does not pull her punches, as when she justifiably criticizes a native writer and rightly takes such an iconic interpreter as Robin Fisher to task for overestimating the extent of native control of the trade and underestimating the level of trade violence – again because they underuse the primary sources.

"Kodiac" and "Northwest Company" notwithstanding, typos are almost non-existent, as are factual errors (such as the dating of Fort Taku's founding to 1811 [42]). There are a couple of debatable, if not erroneous, generalizations, as when she states that "it was this trade that led directly to the American annexation of the Pacific coast territories," [4] that Russian-American Company furs did not affect the sale of American furs in China, [26] and that shipboard company was male only [60] Finally, the hard-to-read map is an insert, not an endpaper as listed. But these are quibbles. This is a "must" buy for every serious student of the coast trade, and a bargain at the price (even in American dollars!).

James Gibson
Toronto, Ontario

Travers Twiss. *The Oregon Territory, its History and Discovery.* New York, 1846; facsimile reprint, Fairfield, WA: Ye Galleon Press, 1998. xxi + 264 + iv pp., index. US $29.95, cloth; ISBN 0-87770-670-0; US $19.95, paper; ISBN 0-87770-671-9.

Diplomatic wrangling over the Oregon territory was a focal point of Anglo-American diplomacy for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, and even when the boundary west of the continental divide was determined upon by the

Treaty of Washington, 1846, festering quarrels persisted over the San Juan archipelago until finally resolved in 1872. This book reminds us of a public discussion between American and British writers about the future of Oregon.

The book under review was published, in part, to counter historical "firsts" and legal claims as put forth by the Librarian of Congress, Robert Greenhow, a distinguished American authority, who compiled a memoir on the history and geography of the Oregon area, printed for Congress in 1840, and a thorough history of the Oregon question, published in 1846. The latter book was published almost at the same time as Twiss' book. It is not possible to judge the one without looking at the other, but the discussion can be short, for Greenhow was decidedly partisan, a hired gun for the American administration. Twiss, by contrast, came at the subject as a student of international law; and his discussion of respective claims was founded on past and current international legal authorities.

Twiss was a brilliant student of mathematics and classics at Oxford. He had a full comprehension of the German language. He was called to the bar, became professor of international law at Kings College London, and later Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford. He became Queen's Advocate-General in 1867 and was knighted. His public career was caught short in 1872 when he and his wife, Marie Pharialde Rosalind Van Lynseele, orphan daughter of a Polish army officer, prosecuted for malicious libel a solicitor who had circulated statements imputing immorality to Lady Twiss before her marriage. Cross-examination taxed Lady Twiss, the prosecution collapsed, and Sir Travers withdrew from public life, devoting himself to compiling and editing *The Black Book of the Admiralty*, on mediaeval maritime law, and many other works on international maritime matters, including the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied to contraband of war and blockade.

Twiss mastered the historical details of the Oregon quarrel. He studied Mackenzie, Fraser, Thompson and other Canadian traders; he reviewed Vancouver and Broughton, British naval surveyors; he went back over details of Lewis and Clark and particularly John Jacob Astor's commercial empire at the mouth of the Columbia (Twiss was careful to point out that Astor's empire lacked official US government sanction); he examined Spanish claims (which Greenhow argued the United States automatically inherited). Twiss discusses the extent of the Louisiana Territory as purchased by the United States. The last third of the book is historical rather than legal, and traces the diplomacy of the question. This is a fair review of the issues at stake and the respective position of the two powers.

In this new edition, we see a book hidden largely from view for a century and a half. First published in London and in New York, this is a reprint of the New York edition. Among all the reprints that I have seen over the years this is clearly the poorest in quality, and I am sorry to say so, for I have long admired Ye Galleon Press. The quality of the reproduction of the original text is uneven and in some cases unclear. Some pages had to be typed in, where photo reproduction would not suffice. Even more alarming is the biography of Sir Travers Twiss, originally published in the *Dictionary of National Biography* (this is not specified in the reprint; it is included as "Introduction"!). I would have no objection to this *DNB* entry being reproduced (with suitable attribution, of course) but what is alarming and unscholarly is that it is riddled with transcription errors. The whole is quite unreliable.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario

John Gascoigne. *Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. vii + 247 pp., figures, illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. £40, US $64.95, cloth; ISBN 0-521-55069-6.

The aim of this book is to position Sir Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society from 1778 to his death in 1820, in his rightful place as a promoter and chief adviser of "imperial science" to the British government. The author, John Gascoigne, succeeds admirably, rightly dubbing Banks "the unofficial minister of science."[23]

Gascoigne explores the partnership between science and government during a period of both revolution and British state consolidation. Lacking its own experts, Banks was one of those indispensable men whom government would call in for advice on a wide range of issues. The way in which Britain could use scientific exploration to advance its commercial and strategic interests is

a major theme of Gascoigne's book. Imperial possessions were to be used to strengthen national economic and strategic self-sufficiency. The rapid growth of population, however, doomed Banks' belief in domestic self-sufficiency to failure, as Gascoigne rightly points out.

Banks never held political office, relying instead on patronage networks and personal contacts to advise and influence the decisions of such offices of government as the Admiralty, Home Office and War Office. The list of Banks' friends in the political field is impressive – George III himself, William Pitt, Henry Dundas, Lords Sandwich, Mulgrave, Sheffield and especially the first Lord Hawkesbury, the leading authority in commercial and imperial matters, all figure largely in this book, often but necessarily relegating Banks to a secondary position.

Gascoigne tackles the wide range of issues influenced by Banks – his important role in exploration, be it to the Arctic or the Pacific, the Wool Bill (which Banks, self-appointed leader of the landed interest, opposed), the East India Company, the African Association and the London Missionary Society to name but a few. Many of these subjects have been covered before, notably by Harold B. Carter and David Mackay, but Gascoigne brings a fresh approach to the subject. He particularly makes a point of the importance of The Royal Society as an instrument of state policy.

For those interested in maritime studies the case of Newfoundland, that "nursery of seamen," is of particular interest. Here, Gascoigne explores the important relations between navigation, trade and imperialism. Britain's worry was that fishermen would settle there, thus depriving the mother country of their maritime skills and perhaps risking another colonial secession. By 1807, however, Banks, recognized the impossibility of compelling these would-be settlers to return annually to England. Newfoundland by then was no longer just a fishery but had become a colony.

After Liverpool's death in 1808, Gascoigne maintains that Banks' contacts with political life largely dwindled. But as he himself points out, [174] Banks simply made new contacts, turning to men like Earl Bathurst and Castlereagh. It was Banks who drafted the important Order-in-Council of February 1810 which, in the name of George III, granted the North Atlantic Islands (dependencies of enemy Denmark) neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1813 he again urged the annexation of Iceland, now because of its importance as a fishing station (comparing it favourably with Newfoundland).

Manuscript sources are only listed in the List of Abbreviations (where astonishingly the *Dictionary of National Biography* finds its place). This is a shame; a full listing of printed primary sources is always much more useful. There is an impressive list of printed sources, but it is disturbing that Gascoigne uses Hermannsson's article from 1928 as his major secondary source for Banks' Iceland connection, with its attendant mistakes, long rectified. More to be regretted is the fact that Gascoigne does not use *Sir Joseph Banks: A Global Perspective (1994),* published in the wake of the Royal Society's 1993 international conference to commemorate the 250th anniversary of Banks' birth. The articles reflect the most recent scholarship on Banks on a variety of subjects touched upon by Gascoigne.

The book is well written, skillfully placing Banks in his historical context. The frequent repetitions can be tiresome but they drive home the points the author wishes to make. Gascoigne chooses his quotations well, illuminating the subject. This book is extremely valuable on how imperial concerns prompted interest in the possible uses of science and Banks should now be recognised for his important role in that development. With this second book on Sir Joseph Banks (the first, being *Joseph Banks and the English Enlightenment),* Gascoigne is fast becoming one of the world authorities on this remarkable man.

Anna Agnarsdóttir
Seltjarnarnesi, Iceland

Ian Christopher Campbell. *"Gone Native" in Polynesia: Captivity Narratives and Experiences from the South Pacific.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. xii + 167 pp., maps, photo-plates, select bibliography, index. US $55, cloth; ISBN 0-313-30787-3.

The word "beachcomber" conjures up images of tropical islands, friendly islanders, and a life of ease and freedom; Ian Campbell demonstrates that nothing could be further from the truth. By analysing the experiences of eleven beachcombers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – James Morrison (Tahiti), Peter Hagerstein (Tahiti), Edward Robarts (Marquesas), William Torrey (Marquesas), John Young (Hawai'i), George

Vason (Tonga), William Mariner (Tonga), James Read (Tonga), David Whippy (Fiji), John Twyning (Fiji, Wallis and Futuna), and William Diaper (various) – Campbell shows how diverse, and often dangerous, life on the beach could be. He provides biographies for each beachcomber, but includes only brief and limited extracts from their writings. This is an important point because the study of captivity narratives is very fashionable in North America and Australia at the moment, and readers might be misled into thinking that Campbell is contributing either to the source material or to the theories about captivity literature.

What Campbell does provide is an empirical, historical study which builds on his earlier work on beachcombers; especially his 1989 article in the *Journal of the Polynesian Society* on the historiography of beachcomber Charles Savage. He argued then (and now) that although beachcombers were part of the Euro-American impact on the Pacific, "the facts of cultural change were entirely due to the perceptions of the Polynesians." [154] Although Campbell does not discuss the post-colonial theories that have made so much impact on Pacific historiography in recent years; it is clear that he believes in the primary importance of indigenous agency. His beachcombers are not representatives of a relentless Euro-American colonialism. Campbell also believes that beachcomber experiences help us understand the complexities of acculturation and assimilation. He links the physical and psychological pressures experienced by beachcombers with those encountered by immigrants everywhere: a provocative conclusion that will no doubt generate considerable debate in circles where beachcombers (and other Euro-Americans) are defined as intruders whose racist discourse colonised the islanders they wrote about.

An emphasis on the importance of each individual's background and character drives home the argument that beachcomber-islander encounters were not predetermined by impersonal forces. William Mariner entered the household of a Tongan nobleman because of his appealing youthfulness (he was fourteen) and his position as captain's clerk; half of Mariner's shipmates were simply killed outright during the Tongan attack on their vessel. John Young was forty-six when he became separated from his shipmates at Hawai'i, but his skill with muskets won him the patronage of a powerful chief. Island women sometimes intervened to protect castaway men or deserters who attracted them. Each case was different, and each beachcomber reacted differently to the circumstances of his new life. Only one generalisation can be made with confidence: not one of the men Campbell describes ever set out to become a beachcomber. All were inadvertent arrivals, although a few (like John Young) subsequently refused to leave their new homes. Most were glad to be rescued, yet even these sometimes found it difficult to readjust to life in their homelands. Certainly none remained unchanged by having "gone native."

This book is beautifully produced with proper footnotes for easy reference, and marvelous illustrations reproduced (in black and white) in large, single-page format. It is so clearly written that it will be of interest to general readers as well as academics. But there is also meat for the specialist scholar: Campbell's mastery of the printed and unpublished source material comes through clearly. In short, this book will enhance its author's reputation as one of the acknowledged leaders of Pacific history.

Jane Samson
Edmonton, Alberta

Ludger Müller-Wille (ed. & intro.; trans. William Barr). *Franz Boas among the Inuit of Baffin Island 1883-1884: Journals and Letters.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. xvi + 298 pp., b+w photo-plates, appendices, glossary, sources, index. $50, £37.50, cloth; ISBN 0-8020-4150-7.

This book is the personal record of his pioneering fieldwork in Baffin Island kept by Franz Boas (1858-1942). First published in the original German in 1994, it is part of a campaign by the editor, Ludger Müller-Wille, to rehabilitate Boas' reputation in his native land, where his Jewish background caused the Nazis to discredit his work. For those of us who vaguely associate Boas with the Pacific Northwest, or have a hard time keeping him straight from Alfred Kroeber, the book makes an excellent introduction to a man who had an immense influence on North American anthropology.

Müller-Wille has done a masterly job as editor, weaving together his various sources – the several journals kept by Boas, his letters to his family back home and to his fiancée, Marie Krackowizer, in the United States as well as the

journal kept by Wilhelm Weike, the family servant who accompanied Boas – into a unified and readable whole. Both in his introduction and his notes he is admirably scrupulous about indicating the source of each part of the book.

The German edition has been translated by William Barr, who has long been interested in German polar exploration in the Canadian Arctic. He has written about the German role in the First International Polar Year (1882-1883) and has translated Heinrich Klutschak's account of his Arctic travels in *Overland to Starvation Cove: With the Inuit in Search of Franklin, 1878-1880* (1987). In fact, Boas' journey to Baffin Island was in part the result of German enthusiasm for the polar world. As a boy of 12 he had expressed the desire to go to either the North or South Pole. He had studied the Arctic and its people intensively and been impressed by Klutschak, and by the American, Charles Francis Hall, and their belief that the best way to live and travel in the Arctic was to do as the Inuit did.

Arriving at Baffin Island in late August 1883 aboard the *Germania,* which had come to retrieve the German scientists from their Polar Year station at Clearwater Fiord, Boas lived and travelled in the Arctic for a year. While he was assisted by the whalers, especially the Scot Jimmy Mutch and the American Captain John Roach and, of course, by Weike, he could not have done what he did without the Inuit. This was indeed more true of him than of any of his predecessors. While Boas had his own reasons for being in the Arctic, namely the desire to launch his academic career and to get a job in the United States, he had come to study the Inuit and not to use them in pursuit of another goal, such as finding Franklin. The Inuit themselves were his goal.

The result of Boas' year in the Arctic was publications such as *The Central Eskimo* (1888) still a classic of anthropology and a treasure to the present-day people of Baffin Island. Yet the book under review, with its wonderful immediacy, has its own value. Tired as Boas often was after an arduous day of travel, followed by an evening of collecting Inuit tales and topographical knowledge, he usually made the time to write up a personal account of what he had done, seen and learned. Confident in the love of those to whom he wrote, he felt free to set down his feelings – delight, frustration, ambition, homesickness, his longing to be with his fiancée. (To my mingled admiration and dismay, Muller-Wille states in the introduction that he has left out "personal remarks and amorous comments," [24] out of respect for Boas' privacy; fortunately, this proves not to be entirely the case.) At one point Boas even gives a humorously phonetic version of his English, a language almost as new to him as Inuktitut.

Yet fascinating as it is to make the acquaintance of the young Franz Boas, the main interest of the book is the Inuit, as it was for Boas himself. He became intensely involved with the Inuit not just as an anthropologist but also as a man. Called upon to attend the sick, he shared in the misery of those who lost their loved ones, as at the death of a little boy in November 1883: "The mother looked at me fearfully, hoping to read some comfort in my eyes, but I could only feel the small body becoming colder and colder and soon he was quite dead." [141] As we follow Boas day by day, we come to realize that what for him, and for other Arctic travellers, was an episode in their lives, was life itself for the Inuit. This is the way it was, and this is the way it had been, for centuries. What for Boas, and for most of the world, is a remote, far away region, is for the Inuit their homeland, where the Herr Doktor had to ask them the names of places. It is good to be reminded that the Arctic was much more than just a stage for European heroism or folly.

Anne Morton
Winnipeg, Manitoba

Clark G. Reynolds. *Navies in History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. xi + 280 pp., figures, illustrations, photographs, maps, appendices, further reading, index. US $35, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-716-3; US $24.95, paper; ISBN 1-55750-715-5. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

One of the most vexing problems in teaching naval history to undergraduate students has always been the lack of a suitable textbook. Like many others, in the absence of a sound overview I have had to make do with a combination of monographs and articles. This has not been completely satisfactory because students who are just beginning to study a subject often like the security of a text to fill in the gaps between lecture topics and assigned readings. Fortunately, the appearance of *Navies in History* means that this approach will no longer be necessary. Clark Reynolds, whose prolific scholarly output will be

known to every naval historian, has given us a superb synthesis of current research in clear and engaging prose. I have already revised my undergraduate course to use it.

While *Navies in History* is a useful book, it is best to be clear about just what it is. Spatially, it is very much focused on the North Atlantic; little room is given over to the rest of the world. Indeed, it would be possible to argue that the real emphasis is even narrower: on Britain, which ruled the waves until sometime in the twentieth century, and on the United States, which has been the world's pre-eminent naval power since then. The American bias is especially evident in the author's decision to devote entire chapters to the American Revolution and to the US Civil War, two formative events in American history that were much less central to broader issues of naval development. A goodly portion of the latter chapter is devoted, of course, to the competition between *Monitor* and *Merrimack*, but refreshingly Reynolds accepts that the use of ironclads in that war was the culmination of a much longer trend.

Similarly, the temporal focus is a lot narrower than the title might suggest. Reynolds' emphasis is clearly on the early modern and modern periods. Chapters 2 and 3, which take the story from antiquity up to 1500, are little more than potted histories and really do not provide adequate context. Similarly, chapter 17, "The American Pax," which examines the post-1945 era, is truncated and under-developed. This last decision is one that I think sensible, however, because any historian who came of age during the Cold War, as Reynolds did, is understandably going to have some difficulty in gaining historical perspective on so recent and contentious a period.

As a teaching tool, the book has obvious strengths. Although there are no footnotes, there is a reasonable section of books and articles "for further reading." Generally the literature he cites is up-to-date and balanced, although a bibliography that totally ignores the work of both N.A.M. Rodger or Andrew Lambert, two of the most important of the younger naval historians, is disappointing. Perhaps the book's greatest strength, though, is to be found in the appendices which contain a very useful collection of maps and some other features, like warship profiles, that I suspect students will consult frequently. But why are the warship profiles only of US Navy craft?

Such quibbles notwithstanding, I must underscore the usefulness of this volume. There is nothing else like it, and I cannot imagine an undergraduate course that can afford not to use *Navies in History*. For writing such a volume, Clark Reynolds has again earned our gratitude.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland

James L. George. *History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998 and London: Constable, 1999. xvi + 353 pp., illustrations, photographs, tables, appendices, bibliography, index. US $32.95, Cdn $50.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-312-5 NIP); £25, cloth; ISBN 0-09-479700-5 (Constable). Canadian distributor for NIP, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

More than the other armed services, "navies are about [their weapons, i.e., about] warships, many different kinds of warships," argues James L. George at the start of this ambitious work. [xi] His goal is to describe the evolution of warships over the millennia and explain how each type was used. To a large extent he succeeds, though not in a balanced fashion because he devotes only eighty pages to pre-twentieth century warships.

The heart of the book describes and analyzes the development and employment of every type of modern warship. Individual chapters focus on battleships and battle cruisers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and craft, service ships, mine warfare vessels, and other small combatants. Chapters are organized chronologically, usually beginning with a section on "early precedents" followed by one to five page sections on the pre-World War I era, World War I, the Interwar Period, World War II, the "Post-World War II Period," and a conclusion that summarizes the chapter and speculates on the future, e.g., "it will be costs, not capabilities, that drive the carrier from the seas" [196] and "it appears that the days of ignoring mine warfare might finally be over." [238] Tables showing the balance of vessels among nations during World War II and comparing the displacement, dimensions, armament, and speed of each type over the past century, plus a few illustrations complete each chapter. Taken together these chapters provide a highly readable and solid introduction to modern warships.

The closing chapters, musings on "lessons" to be learned from the past and on "The Future of

Seapower and Warships," reflect George's experience as a congressional staffer and his service at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They will strike some readers as superfluous and the twenty pages devoted to them might have been better allotted to earlier chapters on "The Age of Sail" to provide coverage of gunboats which appeared to be effective in the Baltic and Black Seas, if not in American waters, or to riverine and coastal defense vessels in the chapter on "The Age of Steam, Ironclads, and Steel." The endnotes and bibliography are more than adequate for most readers.

George's appendices listing numbers of warships that served in each major navy during World Wars I and II would be more useful and better reflect the true balance of naval forces if they were expanded to indicate the number of warships at the start, conclusion, and perhaps mid-point of each war such as after the Battle of Jutland and just prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The inclusion of the *United States* (CVA-58) in a list of "Major Operational Accidents" as "sunk by unfriendly fire by Secretary of Defense Johnson" in the appendix on "Warship Casualties since World War II" is flippant.

The above cavils aside, George has produced a concise, well-written survey of the history of warships that deserves a wide audience among military as well as maritime and naval historians.

James C. Bradford
Bryan, Texas

Jeremy Black. *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents 1450-2000.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. x + 334 pp., illustrations (b+w, colour), photographs, maps, notes, index. US $35, cloth; ISBN 0-300-07202-3.

Jeremy Black, head of the history department at the University of Exeter, is one of the most prolific historians working in the English language. If all goes well, his thirtieth book should come rolling off the presses this autumn. Starting out as a scholar of seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain, he has become increasingly far-flung in his interests. In the last two years, with works such as *Why Wars Happen* (New York University Press, 1998) and the book under review here, Black has gone global.

War and the World is an extraordinarily ambitious work. It aims to provide students and the general reader with a genuinely global military history, one that shows how peoples around the world have met the challenge of war over the past half-millenium, not another recitation of the rise to dominance of the West. Readers will also welcome Black's attempt to bring together in one place the various strands of revisionist thinking that have emerged in the last two decades on the subject of Western military hegemony over the rest of the globe. And, the audience of this journal will be particularly interested to note the pride of place given by Black to naval power in the story of European expansion.

War and the World takes on a range of the more potent shibboleths of mainstream military history. One of its main targets is the so-called "Rorke's Drift" version of military history, in which, through superior technology, discipline and motivation, small numbers of European troops have been able to defeat large numbers of non-Europeans. Black goes to great lengths to demonstrate, largely successfully, that other, non-Western ways of war have prospered over the centuries, that the West has not always won and that when it has, technology has had to share the limelight with a number of other equally important factors. Although *War and the World* is dedicated to Black's friend Geoffrey Parker, this argument directly refutes Parker's well-known thesis that the "Military Revolution" of the sixteenth century ushered in Western hegemony over the rest of the world. Black here continues an argument he first made in his *A Military Revolution? Military change and European society 1500-1800* (Macmillan, 1991).

Central to his point of view are the notions that, first, European military technology only became a major factor in expansion in the eighteenth and, especially, nineteenth centuries, and that, second, the key area of technological development was the maritime sphere, not land armies. It was European fleets, with their ability to not only project power, but to move people and large quantities of goods relatively quickly and cheaply over great distances, Black argues, that gave European powers their first enclaves in Africa and Asia and made possible their gradual expansion around the globe. But, he wonders, and this is an intriguing point, wasn't Western mastery of the sea in Asia achieved largely by default, because both China and Japan had resolutely turned their backs on the sea?

War and the World seeks to appeal to a wide audience. Scholarly apparatus has been kept to a discreet minimum and the text abounds with well-chosen illustrations. There is no bibliography, but the endnotes offer ample suggestions for further reading. The book's vast subject has been squeezed into eight main chapters. The level of detail is formidable and, though the author believes this is necessary, given general ignorance in the West of the military history of the Rest, some readers may find the narrative heavy going at times. There are occasional slips, inevitable, perhaps, in a work of this scope. Thus, George McClellan, sometime Union army commander in the Eastern theater of the US Civil War, is transformed into George McClennan; Francis Dhanis, commandant of King Leopold's *Force Publique* in the Congo in the 1890s, becomes Francis Dhamis; and historian Charles Balesi, France's gift to Chicago, ends up (twice) as Charles Badesi. One could also quibble with some of Black's judgments. The Seminole Indian wars in Florida in the 1840s, for example, did not end in victory for the US armed forces, as Black suggests, but in an embarrassing stalemate. These are minor miscues, however, and do not detract from the value and importance of the book.

War and the World should find favour with two quite different audiences. Those who want a handy reference work on global military history since the Age of Exploration will find this book useful. But it will probably be most helpful to those investigating the historical background to the current debate on the "Revolution in Military Affairs," between the technological determinists and those who, like Jeremy Black, believe that asymmetrical warfare, in which the enemy does not fight the Euro-American way, could prove to be the kind of conflict for which Western militaries should be preparing.

Bruce Vandervort
Lexington, Virginia

David F. Marley. *Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998. xi + 722 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, photographs, further reading, index. US $99, cloth; ISBN 0-87436-837-5.

Here is a massive and enjoyable reference book, one that is as big as the subject and geography it explores. David Marley is a Canadian naval historian who is an internationally known expert on armed conflicts in the Americas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now, in *Wars of the Americas,* he ranges far wider, covering five hundred years of conflict in and around the Western Hemisphere.

He organizes his giant subject in an orderly way, to make it easily accessible. Each incident is presented chronologically and dated, grouped and prefaced by a brief historical perspective. Though they are mainly land battles, there is much naval lore included, making the book particularly informative to readers with maritime interests. One is struck by how often amphibious actions have played a crucial role in the struggle for power in North and South America. There are no details of ship construction or sailing technique, but this volume mentions virtually every type and class of vessel – caravels, shallops, galleys, men-of-war, slavers, treasure galleons, steamers, merchantmen, pinnaces, aircraft carriers, submarines, and battle cruisers.

From what must have been painstaking research, Marley names the ships and the countless intrepid men who sailed them – commerce skippers and naval officers, admirals, settlers, navigators, corsairs, and pirates. Marley manages to include so many individuals, they are indexed in twenty-seven pages of names. He writes in the present tense, giving a sort of you-are-there feel. His descriptions are mostly brief, a couple of paragraphs, each containing specific details. Short passages also work when pacing the reader through longer pieces on entire campaigns. Coverage is given to the two centuries of warfare that went on before the United States and Canada were settled by Europeans. Ships brought Spanish and Portuguese who all too often clashed with the aboriginals they discovered. Soon, equally predatory French and English corsairs arrived, setting off endless sea warfare. There is interesting trivia told about the colonists who followed, such as that Spain briefly "leased" Venezuela to a German consortium in the 1500s. Covering so many countries, the English-language reader learns about unfamiliar wars and sea-battles in turbulent Central and South America. There must be scarcely a coast, lake, or river of the Americas that escaped the clash of arms. What is today the United States receives the most coverage in this blow-by-blow account of constant maritime strife in North America. Fleet actions and minor skir-

mishes alike show how naval operations played a major role in American growth. Yet the book gives Canada fair due as well, no doubt thanks to the author's nationality. He brings forth some previously unheralded men of the sea who helped establish Canada, while detailing brisk combats in our waters over time.

The struggle to beat the German U-boat offensive in World War II is ably summarized in two stages. From Newfoundland to the Great Lakes and on to Vancouver Island, Canadian sailors proved to be "Aye, ready," and are acknowledged here. The numerous maps, drawings, and photographs included add a visual commentary on the violent centuries described. *Wars of the Americas* is an absolutely must-have volume for every reference library or military buff's collection, and can be highly recommended.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia

Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches. *The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652-1674.* Stroud, Gloucestershire:: Sutton Publishing, 1998. xi + 212 pp., photo-plates, illustrations, maps, figures, notes, bibliography, index. £20, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1787-3. North American distributor, International Publishers Marketing, Herndon, VA.

In their preface, Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches point out that the Anglo-Dutch wars have been largely ignored by modern historians because they were both "unnecessary" and "unnatural." The series of maritime battles in the 1600s accomplished little in terms of settling the intense commercial and political rivalry between the two powers, and so historians tend to overlook them as a subject of scrutiny. The tide of academic inattention has turned, however. Hainsworth and Churches' book follows on the heels of a spate of recent works that examine this important period in maritime history. The most all-encompassing analysis is J.R. Jones' *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (1996). While Jones' account seems likely to remain *the* work on this subject for some time, that is not to say that Hainsworth and Churches' book is not welcomed or needed. Their contribution to the historiography is to examine the naval battles as well as the policies and actions of the Dutch and English commanders.

One of their stated aims is to bring the battles to life for the reader. They have done an admirable job in this regard. The authors have included a number of contemporary portraits and paintings (in black and white). Their appreciation for the art of the period, particularly paintings depicting battle scenes, is clear: "The great naval battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars ... have chiefly impinged on the modern consciousness not through the historical writing but through contemporary painting." [preface]

Particularly helpful are the diagrams and maps of various battles. Liberal use of contemporary quotations (although spelling has been modernized) and their own evocative language also serve to bring the participants and their actions to life. Indeed, Hainsworth and Churches are quite masterful at painting a verbal landscape with their own colourful phrases; for instance, they describe the "blame game" which followed the English humiliation at Medway as a "frenzied round of wound-tearing" [167] or the secret Treaty of Dover as the "unexploded mine... under the throne" of Charles II. [190] A more conservative editor might have reined in the authors' stylistic excesses. As it stands, the authors have turned a blow-by-blow account of these battles into a "real page-turner."

The book is very accessible to a general audience. The authors include numerous helpful explanations so readers are never left puzzling about a term or event, regardless of their level of expertise in maritime history. Absent are the obscure allusions and specialists' jargon which are so common in academic works.

The authors are fairly successful in presenting a balanced picture of the wars and the English and Dutch participants, although they are heavily dependent on English sources. The bibliography contains only a smattering of Dutch works; one wonders if they have plumbed the Dutch sources to best advantage.

Overall, this book offers a detailed account of the Anglo-Dutch maritime battles. We may conclude that the authors have fulfilled that stated objective. For those interested in naval conflicts, this work will prove both entertaining and edifying. However, for readers searching for a more in-depth, wide-ranging, and three-dimensional analysis, Jones' book is the unquestioned masterwork of the field.

Cheryl Fury
Saint John, New Brunswick

Tom Pocock. *Battle for Empire: The Very First World War 1756-63.* 272 pp., plates [illustrations, chart reproductions], notes, select bibliography, index. £7.99, paper; lSBN 1-85479-390-X.

Popular history has an important function. It helps sustain and satisfy widespread interest in the subject. Yet there is a fundamental requirement that this book fails to meet: it must be accurate. Consider, for instance, the first twelve lines of the introduction, in which can be found two errors: the period 1756-63 is described as "the very first world war" and we are told that "the combatants were Britain, allied with Prussia and Portugal against France, Austria and, latterly, Spain." This last statement is highly misleading, as Britain and Portugal were not at war with Austria nor Prussia with Spain. Nor was this the first world war in the sense of a war fought in a global arena. ln 1580-1640 Spain and Portugal were under the same monarch. The rebellious Dutch fought them in the West lndies, Brazil, West Africa, Angola, East Africa, Sri Lanka, India, Taiwan, Malaysia, Chinese waters, the East Indies, the Low Countries, Atlantic waters and the Mediterranean. This was far more extensive geographically and chronologically than the Seven Years' War. In the latter there was nothing in South America to compare with the lengthy Dutch campaign in Brazil. Furthermore, with the exception of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-21), conflict was continual. Had Pocock been aware of the first "world war," he might have made interesting comparisons with the Seven Years' War, but the opportunity was not taken.

Consider, as well, page 25, where again we find two errors: "the constant factor was the enmity between Britain and France ... Britain and France had fought each other in 1740 for eight years." As to the first, the two powers were allies in 1655-9 against Spain, in 1672-4 against the Dutch, and in 1716-31. For the second, Britain and France did not begin hostilities with each other until 1743, and declare war until 1744. Indeed, in 1740 the French threatened war with Britain in support of Spain, but, despite British fears, the fleet sent by France to the Caribbean did not fight. On the next page, "negotiations for a peaceful compromise began in 1755." Well no, commissioners had met since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Such errors spoil what is otherwise a vigorous piece of writing. Pocock is a good battle historian, unoriginal but able to tell a good story. Yes, his grasp of the international context is limited, his understanding of domestic politics is poor, and he does not relate his campaign accounts to wider debates about British military capability effectively. The examples of error I give could be repeated.

This may simply sound like the grousing of a scholar. Such limitations do not affect the profitability of a book that has already been paperbacked. I suppose it boils down to self-respect. If Pocock is aiming for accuracy let us hope he tries to raise his standards for his next book. Let us also hope that the reviewers cited on the back page and the publishers try to do more about standards of accuracy. These standards should not apply only to academics.

Jeremy Black
Exeter, England

John E. Barnard. *Building Britain 's Wooden Walls: The Barnard Dynasty c. 1697-1851.* Oswestry, Shropshire: Anthony Nelson, 1997. 110 pp., illustrations, photographs, figures, tables, appendices, notes & references, bibliography, index. £20, cloth; ISBN 0-904614-63-8.

The Barnard family was building ships in East Anglia by 1580 but first came to prominence in 1739 when John Barnard of Ipswich won an order for the frigate *Biddeford.* In 1742, he leased the King's Yard at Harwich from the Navy Board and became one of the principal private builders of warships until his bankruptcy in 1781. Twenty years before that failure, he had been present to greet Princess Charlotte when she arrived at the dockyard, en route to her wedding to the King – subsequently declining a proffered knighthood in favour of an order for the *Robust,* 74 guns, his fourth 3rd Rate ship of the line!

In 1763, John's son William established himself at Deptford, where he specialized in East Indiamen, as well as building warships and other craft. Following his death, his wife and sons continued the business there. However, the end of the comfortable East India Company monopoly, reduced naval construction after 1815 and a lack of interest by the last surviving son, Edward, saw new construction by the Barnards end in 1825 and their last recorded repair activity in 1834.

In eighty-five years, the family had built seventy-seven vessels for the Navy Board, includ-

ing no less than seventeen 74s, plus sixty-two East Indiamen and an unknown number of lesser vessels. This remarkable production included the *Northumberland,* 74 guns, which took Napoleon to imprisonment on St. Helena, the *Pandora* frigate, which carried the *Bounty* mutineers on the first stage of their voyage home and is now being excavated by Australian archaeologists, and two of the ships that stood in Nelson's line at Trafalgar: *Orion* and *Africa.* There was even a Canadian connection, since the Barnards built the *Litchfield,* which touched a shoal in the approaches to Halifax in 1756, leaving it her name.

This book grew from the author's interest in his namesake's genealogy and it does not escape its roots. (Not for nothing are the dates in the subtitle those of the birth and death of members of the "dynasty," rather than those of the ordering of their first and delivery of their last ships.) The orientation is firmly focused on the documentary record of the Barnards and does little to provide a wider context: the author has not used the voluminous information on both contemporary shipbuilding and Admiralty construction policies to flesh out the skeletal story revealed by the Navy Board in-letters and similar sources. Thus, this book is more likely to appeal to specialists who have already absorbed such background and for whom the view from within a shipbuilding family will provide a valuable, fresh perspective.

Yet even specialists will feel the lack of analysis. The Navy Board preferred to order major warships from its own yards or from private ones on the Thames. Harwich was one of the few locations outside "The River" that saw commercial construction of ships of the line, a distinction that this book shows was due largely to John Barnard's success in securing orders, beginning with the *Hampshire,* 50 guns in 1740 and, more remarkably, the 3rd Rate *Conqueror,* 70 in 1755. The question remains, how did he do it? As overseer for his first warship, the *Biddeford,* Barnard was sent Thomas Slade, who went on to become the Surveyor of the Navy from 1755 to 1771. John did not receive any orders for ships of the line after Slade's death, save for the *Inflexible* and *Irresistible* at the beginning of the American war. Was his period in favour thus simply a result of a fortunate personal relationship? This book, useful though it is, does not explore such issues.

Trevor Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia

Richard Buel Jr. *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. xi + 397 pp., tables, abbreviations, notes, index. US $35, cloth; ISBN 0-300-07388-7.

The author combines the well known with the obscure. What is well known and much discussed is British naval supremacy, porous though it was. What has only been guessed at, and little considered, is the economy of wartime America. The strength of the book lies less in what Buel says about the British navy, a subject already well understood, than what he concludes about the economy, a matter scarcely studied. He identifies the early collapse of agriculture and its modest revival. This is important as agriculture is the least understood and least investigated of all aspects of the colonial economy. For anyone to add usefully even a jot or tittle to the subject is a considerable achievement.

Until now the only aspects of the rebel America's wartime economy adequately investigated were those of public finance and commodity price movements. To this is now added an interesting estimate of the functioning of the grain market. Buel's principal thesis is that the British navy's blockade of the American coast, however porous, was sufficiently effective to curtail sea movements of flour, a major export commodity. He estimated that wartime surpluses could have fed an army of 243,000 men, yet for much of the hostilities the continental army remained both poorly provisioned and chronically short of recruits. Drawing on the accounts of several millers, Buel argues that acute grain scarcity occurred in the middle and northern states in 1778-80. To explain this he focuses on external markets. From a study of fragmentary trade evidence maintained by wartime American states, he concludes that the Royal Navy took a far greater toll of American trade and shipping than could be compensated by the opening of American trade to non-British empire ports. As American overseas commerce declined by between sixty and eighty percent the price of imported goods rose. In response Congress attempted to erect an economy based on import substitution. An integral part was the issuing of paper money. That it eventually lost most of its value has been explained by excessive emissions. Buel disagrees, arguing that it "ignores how British naval supremacy was shaping American economic behavior." [45] He argues that

payment in depreciating currencies turned agriculturalists against production of surpluses. Such neglect of agriculture created shortages, which raised food prices. Of this underproduction, at least 2.4 million barrels of wheaten flour is accounted for owing to military service-induced labour shortages.

The entry of France into the war failed to reverse this trend. Weak demand in America for French-traded West Indies and European goods continued unless generous credit, of the sort American importers were accustomed to experience from pre-war British suppliers, was extended to American buyers. The one consistent bright spot was the New England market, where privateering profits enabled Boston to emerge as the major entrepot for the exchange of American for French goods. As the British focused on the war in the south from 1778 onwards, their attempts at close blockade off New England failed. This arose as much because of the huge extent of Massachusetts Bay as to its frequent fogs, "the blockade runner's friend." [73] It took the Royal Navy until 1782 to effect a close blockade of much of the eastern seaboard. This was occasioned by Parliament's post-Yorktown refusal to authorize major land operations in North America. Free to blockade, the navy experienced many successes against American trade in the last two years of war and not only in the Delaware region. Yet Buel counts it a failure, as the Philadelphia region was never completely cut off from foreign trade. Where Philadelphia's trade fell off badly in 1782, that of Baltimore rose.

American navies fared poorly against the Royal Navy and never managed to cooperate effectively with those French squadrons which reached safe American anchorages. Privateering was "at best only a partial substitute for commerce." [104] Unlike commerce, privateers had no control over the nature of the cargoes they happened to capture. Warehouses could so readily become overstocked in unwanted luxuries or excessive amounts of prize flour.

The loss of major ports to the British for extended periods – Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, Newport – seriously curtailed the American economy. Though the ports collectively housed but a small part of the population, of the twenty most densely populated places, nineteen were seaports. With the loss, however temporary, of these major entrepots the economy was restricted even as smaller neighbouring ports took up some of the slack.

Buel also argues that American economic recovery was ensured by the Rochambeau expedition's immobility at Newport in 1779-80. Usually viewed as a military disappointment, its prolonged presence brought so much hard coin into the region to pay its troops and to purchase supplies that the regional economy prospered, "the next best thing to military victory." [157] Simultaneously the arrival in Cuba of a large Spanish fleet created a local demand for American provisions, especially through Philadelphia. To this was added major hurricane damage which both severely damaged the British squadron in the Caribbean but also created severe food shortages, which America suppliers were hard-pressed to fill. All this allowed a limited economic recovery in the Delaware-Chesapeake region.

"War has broke one half of the merchants here, the peace is like to break the other half," stated a Philadelphia merchant in August 1782. Were American merchants strapped for capital by war's end? This question and many others, Buel wisely begs. He suggests that recovery came only in the 1790s with the outbreak of war between France and Britain. His method is bank-counting: two by the end of the war, twenty-eight by 1800! He ends his account with an epilogue – a quick trot from 1783 to 1812 – rather than a conclusion.

His effort is thoroughly refreshing, and signals the fact that non-economists can contribute so much more to our understanding of the historical working of an economy than economists who have no skill at decoding historical documents while relying instead on frequently inappropriate application of modern theories to economic history.

Julian Gwyn
Ottawa, Ontario

Colin White. *1797: Nelson's Year of Destiny*. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1998. xii + 164 pp., illustrations, figures, endmaps, appendices, bibliography, index. £18.99, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1999-X. North American distributor, International Publishers Marketing, Inc., Herndon, VA.

We are now almost half way into the "Nelson Decade" and, predictably, the bicentenary of the famous admiral's last ten years has spawned a great deal of activity concerning this important

era. While some of the events of the current ten-year period would seem almost frivolous, this partial biography of Nelson is the result of the research and information sharing resulting from some of the more academic efforts being made. Colin White, as Deputy Director and Head of Museum Services at the Royal Navy Museum, Portsmouth was in an ideal position to take advantage of this new information, most notably that of Spanish origin, and he has successfully chronicled the events of one year of Nelson's life into this volume.

White's decision to focus on the year 1797 was logical for while Nelson was well established in the Royal Navy by this time (he was made Post Captain in 1779 at age twenty), it was this pivotal year that brought him into the public eye at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent where he captured two Spanish ships and, to a lesser degree, at the doomed assault on Santa Cruz de Tenerife in which he lost his arm. Of more importance, these events brought him to the notice of the Admiralty so this "year of destiny" can therefore be thought of as a prelude to Nelson's "years of fame."

Arguably, this is a hackneyed subject and while biographies of Nelson do not nearly approach those of Napoleon in number, one would think that the definitive works on Nelson have already been written. So the question is raised: "Why another biography?" and in asking this we find the strengths of this work. White does not argue with established biographies but he does bring forth new material to dispel a number of myths surrounding Nelson, exaggerations and convenient omissions that were almost deliberately perpetrated by early chroniclers and repeated by subsequent writers to further aggrandize this man. This was blatant propaganda at the time and distorted our picture of the admiral.

As the author has focussed on one year of Nelson's career only, the book is eminently digestible; it is wealthy in detail without being ponderous and it is a pleasure to read as the narrative flows well. This flow has been deliberately enhanced by an innovative publishing technique with which the author is experimenting. In order not to interrupt the reader's concentration on the main body of text, secondary subjects have been placed in separate sidebars. A good and interesting example of this is the discussion presented on the amputation, treatment and problems with Nelson's wounded arm. While this technique is not wholly new, it seems to be successful. The book itself is very well-produced, the maps of sea battles are clear and understandable and the illustrations are well placed and appropriate – some being new to publication.

The Duke of Wellington met Nelson but once, in September of 1805, and with his gift for concise understatement he later stated that the Admiral was "really a very superior person." The same can be said of this book, it really is superior.

John McKay
Langley, British Columbia

Brian Lavery. *Nelson and the Nile: The Naval War against Bonaparte 1798.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 318 pp., maps, figures, illustrations (b+w, colour), principal sources, notes, index. US $42.95, Cdn $62.50, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-640-X. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

Readers of this journal will be familiar with Brian Lavery. He has produced invaluable books, such as *Nelson's Navy,* and *The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War 1600-1815,* which provide huge amounts of detail on the sailing navy. With this book Lavery moves on into the area of naval campaigns, with attention to grand strategy, tactics, and the characters of commanding officers. This is not necessarily an easy transition, but he has accomplished it with skill. It is never easy to find fresh approaches to familiar events, such as Nelson's experiences in the Mediterranean, yet readers will find here a treatment which is both broad in scope and focussed on essential details. In fact the title is misleading and even sells the book short, for there is much information here on the French situation, naval developments, Neapolitan politics, Maltese and Egyptian societies, strategic issues, and much more. Nelson does figure as the central character, but he does not dominate every page.

To place the Battle of the Nile in context Lavery reminds us that the greater reputation of Trafalgar owes much to the drama of Nelson's death. It came, however, at a time when numerous defeats had demoralized the enemy fleets and when Napoleon's invasion plans were already given up. The battle of the Nile, on the other hand, occurred when the opposing forces were far more evenly matched and the stakes were probably higher. At the end, it produced "the most decisive naval victory of its age." [5] The cam-

paign grew out of a list of French options to attack British interests in 1798. A cross-Channel invasion was considered too risky, but a thrust into the eastern Mediterranean held much promise. A French army in Egypt could threaten British interests in India, and a somewhat nervous government could get the useful but ambitious Bonaparte out of France for a while. British lntelligence reports indicated some French activity was afoot in Toulon, which prompts an analysis of the importance of the Mediterranean (otherwise a minor economic factor for Britain) in current strategic thinking, and a very efficient description of the options facing the Admiralty in the disposition of its too few ships. Simply put, French naval strength based at Toulon was potentially dangerous, even beyond the Mediterranean, and Britain could not let control of that Sea just slip away. The Mediterranean had been abandoned in 1796 when combined French-Spanish numbers were too great, but the Battle of St. Vincent in 1797 had weakened the Spanish fleet. In 1797 when Admiral the Earl St. Vincent, the erstwhile Sir John Jervis, decided to send a force back into observe Toulon, he gave Nelson the command. The 39-year-old Rear Admiral was the newest naval hero.

Lavery makes clear that a gale almost ruined Nelson's mission before it started by hammering his ship and scattering his squadron. Meanwhile Bonaparte's expedition sailed and slipped by the British, stopping to conquer Malta, an episode which Lavery covers in typical fashion: the divisions in Malta's society and governing structures are described, and he analyzes French motives for the acquisition. Apparently they recognized its strategic value for dominating the central Mediterranean, they did not want Austria to get it first, and of course the rich plunder to be had there was always welcome to Paris. The Knights of Malta surrendered, not knowing that Nelson's fleet was then only a hundred miles away. Had they delayed a few days, Nelson might have appeared with who knows what dramatic results for Malta and for Bonaparte.

Of course neither London nor Nelson knew the ultimate French objective. Nelson spent much time stopping over forty merchant ships for intelligence, and contacting all British consuls in ports he passed. Other than that he depended on lookouts, and the scouting of his too-few frigates. There was a brief stop at Naples and soon after he learned of Malta's fall. It was then Nelson reasoned Egypt was the French goal. They had not sailed for Sicily obviously, and west winds ruled out passing Gibraltar. In chasing the French to Egypt there occurred one of the great "might have beens" of history. Nelson's outlying frigates spotted four French frigates, but were ordered to give up the chase in view of the greater goal. Had Nelson known it, those frigates were escorting the slow and ponderous troop convoy. Had Nelson investigated the sighting his fleet would have caught Bonaparte's entire expedition on the open sea. The possible results can only be imagined. Nelson of course pressed on and arrived in Egypt before the French. Disappointed and impatient, Nelson left immediately to look elsewhere, and the French arrived the next day, thus depriving him yet again of a victory, and providing Bonaparte with another step on his career.

Lavery is particularly good on analyzing Nelson's command habits. The "Band of Brothers" reputation seems a bit premature, as Nelson was rather aloof at this time. He was also isolated from his superiors, with no firm base this side of Gibraltar, no firm intelligence, and the nagging fear that if he made a mistake the consequences for Britain, and his own career, could be catastrophic. No modern commander faces quite such stress.

The French landed safely in Egypt, and Lavery has an excellent section on their plans, and the disposition and state of their fleet. He points out that our assumptions of French naval inferiority owe much to hindsight. In the last war their fleet had acquitted themselves well, and their last crushing defeat was Quiberon Bay in 1759. Hence when Admiral Brueys anchored his fleet in a defensive line in Aboukir Bay, there was reason to feel confident the British would be baffled. Lavery's assessment of the French line, however, clearly shows its shortcomings, including shoal lines, likely wind directions, space between ships, the lack of springs on the anchor cables, and of course Nelson's unconventionality.

There is an exhaustive treatment of the battle itself, with numerous vignettes from both sides. Again, Lavery includes a great deal of information here on types of cannon, the relative merits of French and British ship construction, tactical choices in approaching an enemy line, and even strategic outlooks of the officers on both sides. One example must do: Brueys expected Nelson to attack his centre and rear, hence his strongest ships were there. Nelson in fact attacked the van

and centre, where the oldest and weakest ships were (more because of wind conditions than anything else) but the whole French plan was in confusion immediately. Ultimately only two of the French ships escaped (one captained by Villeneuve, who would command against Nelson at Trafalgar).

There is much more in this book than can be conveyed in a brief review. Clearly it contains far more than the title suggests, the maps and illustrations are relevant, and the writing is exceptionally clear. Lavery is to be commended on giving us as complete a picture of the entire campaign, and naval practice, as we are likely to see anytime soon.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario

Eric Tushingham, John Morewood, Derek Hayes. *HMS* Vanguard *at the Nile — The Men, The Ship, The Battle.* 144 pp., illustrations (colour, b+w), maps, tables, £9.35, Europe (air, £10.80); £10, North America (air, £14.50), paper; ISBN 0-9510702-7-4.

With its compact, oblong shape and glossy appearance, the Nelson Society's *HMS Vanguard at the Nile- The Men, The Ship, The Battle* resembles nothing so much as a picture postcard. A curious amalgam of naval and political history, biographical record and genealogical resource, it relies almost entirely on previously published materials. The sole exception is *Vanguard's* muster lists, the publication of which constitutes a narrowly addressed communication from Nelson's time to our own.

In the two hundred years since the Battle of the Nile, the figure of Horatio Nelson has been subject to intense scholarly analysis and popular veneration. While less minutely scrutinised than the heroic apotheosis of Trafalgar, Nelson at the Nile has been the subject of at least two full-length treatments: Oliver Warner's *The Battle of the Nile (1960),* and Christopher Lloyd's *The Nile Campaign: Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt (1973).* The Nelson Society's publication disavows any claims to comprehensiveness but manages nevertheless to place the battle in a variety of political and strategic contexts. The historical background and the account of the battle itself are tautly and concisely rendered, the narrative augmented with charts, tables, and diagrams that outline the opposing forces and the order of battle. The authors largely resist the laudatory tendency evident in Nelson studies from Robert Southey's *Life* (1813) to the present, but succumb to other, equally serious shortcomings. The facts presented are uniformly unattributed, and the book includes neither footnotes nor bibliography; works consulted (including the helpful, but rudimentary *Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea)* are included in the initial Acknowledgments section, alongside the names of individuals and research institutions. Significantly, Warner and Lloyd do not appear. A close reading of the book, particularly of the contemporary excerpts presented (letters to and from Nelson and his captains, selections from logs, etc.) suggest that the authors relied heavily on Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas' *Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson (1844)* and the Navy Records Society's *Logs of the Great Sea Fights (1900).* There is little evidence of concern for more recent historiography.

This book is one of a series begun with the 1988 publication of *The Men Who Fought With Nelson in HMS Victory at Trafalgar,* through which the Nelson Society seeks to demonstrate that it is "devoted to people living today whose ancestors witnessed the making of history." The historical background which occupies perhaps two-thirds of the text is intended to support the genealogical core of the book: the muster lists for HMS *Vanguard* for the period including the Battle of the Nile. The lists register all present on board a vessel, and include individuals' names, places of birth, qualifications, rank, date of entry, impressment status. Thus they can, in the aggregate, be an extremely valuable resource for the naval historian. The records for a single vessel over a two month period, however, are necessarily of limited utility. Foregrounding the lists is entirely in keeping with the authors' stated intention to concentrate "not on the Battle but on the personnel and biographical information," but it inevitably limits the book's appeal. *HMS Vanguard at the Nile* offers little that is new for scholars of the period; for Nelson enthusiasts intent on establishing a genetic connection to the great men or the great events of history, however, it will prove a most welcome dispatch.

Roger S. Marsters
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Robert Malcomson. *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812-1814.* Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1998 and Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xx + 411 pp., maps, illustrations, figures, appendices, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. Cdn $34.95, US $36.95, cloth; ISBN 1-896941-08-7 (Robin Brass Studio).

For a war totally unknown to the British, forgotten by the Americans, and erroneously remembered by most Canadians, the War of 1812 has recently undergone a scholarly revival. To this growing list of reexamination comes this fine operational study of the Lake Ontario campaign by Robert Malcomson. This is a far better book than the one he previously did with his brother Thomas on Lake Erie. Robin Brass Studio has done an excellent job with the illustrations and the maps are superb.

The ups and downs of the Lake Ontario campaign varied with the speed by which shipbuilders could launch vessels. As one side launched a new warship, the other would up the ante with larger ones of its own. By the end of the war, both sides were building ships larger than those used by Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar. Never before had there sailed on saltless seas vessels the size of HMS *St. Lawrence,* 112-guns, launched in September 1814, or the 110-gun USS *New Orleans,* a-building when the war ended. This was a far change from the 16-gun US Brig *Oneida* that dominated the lake in the fall of 1812. Years ago, C. Winton-Clare, a *nom de plume* for R.C. Adams, called the contest "A Shipbuilders' War." How true he was.

The author provides us with a deeply researched, well-written description of the tactical aspects of this contest. Nowhere else will readers find a more precise account of the struggle to gain mastery over these waters. The detail provided expands greatly upon the standard studies done nearly a century or more ago by Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred T. Mahan. As commanders of their respective squadrons, Commodore Isaac Chauncey of the US Navy and Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, Royal Navy, quickly learned to be wary of their opponents' abilities and sought combat only when they thought they had the tactical advantage. In the end, this meant there would be no decisive naval battle for control of Lake Ontario. The one chance for such an effort came 28 September 1813 when Chauncey discovered Yeo southwest of York (Toronto) and the two fought a four-hour engagement in which the British flagship lost her mizzen topmast and was at the mercy of the Americans. Had not Commander William Mulcaster on the *Royal George* gallantly covered his senior officer's escape, Upper Canada might have been at the mercy of the American army. Although they did not know it at the time, the war would last more than a year and yet never again would the two squadrons encounter each other. One side would anchor at Kingston or Sackets Harbor (only thirty-five miles apart) while the other dominated the lake. When the shipbuilders changed the combat ratio, the tactical situation changed.

Without a Trafalgar (or even a Lake Erie or Lake Champlain victory), the contest centered on logistical support of the competing armies. Here, as Malcomson effectively relates it, the British were the more successful, but only slightly so. This opens up one of the two major weaknesses in the book. The central problem of both sides was one of command. One aspect of this subject was the problem of inter-operability between naval and ground forces. Initially the British had the advantage because Yeo was clearly placed under the operational control of Governor-General Sir George Prevost. But the acrimony between Prevost and Yeo flowing from the British repulse at Sackets Harbor, 29 May 1813, led to the Admiralty changing the command arrangement between the two. In January 1814, Yeo became "Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed on the lakes." What the author fails to point out is how this modified the command arrangement that previously existed, in which Prevost was a joint (not "combined" as Malcomson says) commander. In effect, the British made their command arrangement more like that of the Americans who never achieved a successful coordination of the two services despite presidential and departmental orders for inter-service cooperation.

The second major problem is Malcomson's unwillingness to discuss strategy beyond Lake Ontario. The British were fighting a war they never wanted and they were hard-pressed to find a way to end the conflict. What were their strategic objectives beyond preserving British North American territory? This problem is at the centre of any discussion of what Whitehall hoped to accomplish in this conflict. Obviously there was no desire to reincorporate the United States into the British Empire. The defeat of Napoleon in

1814 opened up several options besides blockading the North American coast and defending the Canadas. Whitehall ordered a series of operations in the Penobscot and Champlain valleys and upper Great Lakes to alter the international border, raids into the Chesapeake and along the Georgia coast, and the conquest of West Florida and New Orleans.

All this seriously affected Yeo's command. Because of its commitments elsewhere, the Royal Navy's Atlantic command refused to provide him with enough senior officers and enlisted men to effectively man his several Great Lakes squadrons. Yeo hoarded what few men and shipwrights he had to the detriment of the effectiveness of his subordinates who lost critical battles on Lakes Erie and Champlain. This raises another question. Was Yeo the right man for the job? A very junior captain with no experience commanding a first rate ship much less a squadron, he was placed in command of what eventually became a major naval force requiring at least a rear admiral. Did the rank disparity between Yeo and Prevost affect their relationship? Would any admiral take such a position on freshwater? Such questions are not asked, much less answered.

Similar questions of command and strategy emerge on the American side. Within the limits Malcomson sets for himself, he has accomplished a fine job focusing on the tactical and logistical problems of Lake Ontario. We now need someone to ask the bigger questions and build upon this and other research to analyze this war in its larger context.

David Curtis Skaggs
Bowling Green, Ohio

Richard Hill. *The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815*. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1998. xx + 268 pp., photo-plates, maps, tables, glossary, bibliography, index. £35, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1816-0. Distributed in North America by International Publishers Marketing, Herndon, Virginia.

This study of naval prize makes a rich and sorely needed contribution to the study of naval prize-making. The author, Rear Admiral (Ret) Richard Hill, brings to this work not only his extensive naval background but also more than ten years experience as Chief Executive of the Middle Temple, one of the British Inns of Court. His familiarity with the legal system enables Hill to explain the complicated legal process surrounding the development of the naval prize system in a clear and easily understandable manner.

The present work follows upon the author's editorship of the *Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy* and seeks to determine whether naval captains at sea during the Napoleonic Wars were actually aware enough of the evolving laws and regulations governing prize to make the system workable. Three years of work and over 250 pages later, Hill's conclusion is yes, captains were better informed than one would think. Moreover, a number of suspected abuses within the system, such as dishonest prize agents, exorbitant court fees, collusive officials and excessive delays, could either be dismissed or explained within the context of the period. Hill's strongest criticism of the system focuses on the inordinate length of time cases took to work their way through the system and the penalties this imposed on the naval crews in particular who were denied their prize money for months if not years.

The book is divided into three parts: "Law and Operations," "The Middlemen" and "The Spoils," with individual chapters addressing single topics within each section. While this makes for numerous chapters (twenty-three), some of which are only a few pages long, it does make it easier to differentiate between the various legal, administrative and financial issues surrounding the taking and keeping of prizes. Non-specialists looking for clarification on one or more areas will find the logical arrangement very useful. Chapter endnotes also expedite tracking the sources which are extensive and wide-ranging including rich primary sources from Admiralty documents and private papers as well as useful references from Jane Austen and Patrick O'Brian.

More analytical than scholarly in scope and conclusions, a work of this kind requires a great deal of research into primary documents because of the lack of secondary sources available. For example, in order to determine whether the cost of taking a prize through the courts was too high, the tasks of each court officer had to be defined . In an era without job descriptions, this required a certain amount of detective work, but the conclusion was that 8.7 percent fees on average were not out of line and the system itself was "pragmatic, imperfect, but workable ..." [160]

The Prizes of War offers a valuable modern

analysis of the complex legal system of naval prizemaking that is a useful companion to recent works by David Starkey, Carl Swanson and Patrick Crowhurst on British, American and French privateering in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In focusing on the development of British naval prizemaking practice during the Napoleonic era, Hill's study fills an important gap in the record. The one weakness is the lack of reference to the Royal Navy's activities *vis-à-vis* Vice-Admiralty Courts, except where there were abuses, such as Malta, or especially adept judges, such as Halifax. While this might have provided an added dimension to the work, it does not detract from the value of the work.

Despite dealing with a relatively specialised topic, the book is written in a clear, accessible style and greatly aided by an eight-page chronology of the political, military and legal events of the period and a six-page glossary of terms ranging from Advocate to Yardarm to yardarm fighting. Readers will also appreciate the index and a good selection of maps and tables. Several of the illustrations are from the collection of the Royal Naval Museum which published the work.

The Prizes of War will be welcomed by all who are interested in the legal aspects of the British naval prizes system in its heyday.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario

Jean-Marc van Hille. *Les loges maçonniques à bord des pontons anglais sous le premier Empire.* Quimper: Editions Le Phare de Misaine, 1999.98 pp., illustrations, bibliography. Ffr 66, 10,06 Euros, paper; ISBN 2-9506837-6-2.

The influence of freemasonry in the eighteenth century has been studied, but there is still very little in print dealing with freemasonry among sea officers and seamen, though it unquestionably existed and was possibly of some influence. A serious study of some aspect of nautical freemasonry would be well worth having. Unfortunately this is not it. J-M. Van Hille bases part of this small book on the fragmentary surviving papers of a Lodge of French prisoners of war aboard a hulk at Chatham in 1811. Although he admits to inventing dialogue, these pages have some appearance of being based on evidence. The rest of the book rambles around the subjects of prisoners-of-war, hulks, and freemasonry in a fashion which leaves much doubt whether it is to be read as fact or fiction. Though the book is presented as history, we are introduced to imaginary ships and people, stories are repeated on the authority of "memoirs" which the author admits are probably inventions, and fantastic figures are offered for numbers of prisoners at different dates. None of the serious scholars who have written about freemasonry or prisoners of war, in French or English, are mentioned in the bibliography. If this is a novel, on the other hand, it has no plot and almost no structure. Perhaps the charitable reviewer had best consider this little book neither as scholarship nor as imaginative literature, but as an essay in opinion. In a very French way, it rehearses a list of traditional grievances. Van Hille hates the English, naturally, but equally the French, who have never honoured their navy as it deserves, and the freemasons who have taken the wrong side in masonic politics. Those who share his views and are not unduly scrupulous to distinguish fact from fiction may find this work to their taste.

N.A.M. Rodger
London, England

Dennis J. Ringle. *Life in Mr. Lincoln's Navy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. xvi + 202 pp., photo-plates, notes, bibliography, index. US $32.95; Cdn $50.95; ISBN 1-55750-736-8. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

This is the first major study of the social life of the Union Navy in the Civil War. Author Dennis J. Ringle served in the US Navy for twenty-one years, in engineering and damage control, an experience that informs and enhances his ability to comprehend and convey the issues that affect sailors. After assessing the pre-war American Navy, Ringle examines ten key areas of activity: recruitment, initial training and the introduction to shipboard life, routines, drill, food, entertainment, pay, medical care and battle. The book is based on extensive research in primary and secondary sources, including personal papers, logs, muster books, and official records on all aspects of service life. His treatment combines official statistics and eye-witness accounts in a persuasive, often compelling narrative.

At its peak the Union Navy had 55,000 men in service, surprisingly close to the 56,000 men

raised by the Royal Navy for the Crimean War (1854-1856). Ringle demonstrates that very few sailors were non-national, in contrast to the army, which formed whole regiments of German and Irish immigrants. The Navy was quick to employ black sailors: twenty percent of enlisted men were black, a proportion that would not be equalled for a very long time. War, it appears, is a great antidote to prejudice.

Over seventy percent of recruits came from the Atlantic states, yet most were not experienced seafarers and few remained at sea after the war. The real need was for engineers, for this was mainly a war fought on the coasts and rivers of the Confederacy. These inexperienced recruits required more extensive familiarisation in initial training, and more careful handling.

Pre-war reformers had recognised the link between drink, health and discipline. Once the Southern states seceded the spirit ration, which they had provided, was abolished. Men continued to smuggle drink on board, while Admiral Dahlgren illegally issued spirits before a battle. However, Dahlgren was censured and the Chief Medical Officer argued that coffee was a more effective and longer-lasting stimulant than alcohol. Subsequently coffee was issued before the attack on Mobile Bay. Food provided an alternative release from tedium, and as most of the warships served close to shore fresh supplies were available. In this war more soldiers died of scurvy than sailors. Fresh food and distilled water help to explain the good health record of the fleet. Curiously the low-lying armoured monitors proved to be healthier than traditional wooden ships. Overall naval losses were low – 1,800 died in action, 2,550 of disease (one in fifty; the army lost one in twelve to disease). Much of this success reflected attention to hygiene, well-trained doctors, good hospitals, and effective treatment.

Many of Ringle's conclusions emphasise the timeless nature of sea service, and of war. The greatest danger was loss of morale, and this was more likely to be caused by boredom and poor food than any other factor. Here the relatively active service of most ships, and the attention of the officers avoided the sort of catastrophic collapse of discipline that destroyed the High Seas Fleet in 1918, a collapse brought on by these two factors. It would require another study to address Ringle's concluding assertion that the Civil War Navy laid the foundations of the modern United States Navy; his evidence actually suggests the effort of 1861-65 was neither sustained, nor institutionalised.

Although the treatment is a little too upbeat, tending to generalise success, while individualising failure and indiscipline, this is a clear, well-written and important contribution to the naval history of the Civil War, and of transitional navies in general.

Andrew D. Lambert
London, United Kingdom

David M. Sullivan. *The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War – The Third Year.* Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Press, 1999. xiv + 361 pp., photographs, maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US $40, cloth; ISBN 1-57249-081-0.

This volume continues the author's year-by-year chronicle of the Marine Corps during the Civil War. Previous volumes portrayed the varying missions of the Navy's land arm ashore, on the high seas as well as in the riverine warfare of the Mississippi valley in 1861 and 1863. This third volume covers more waterborne operations such as the curious attempts to recapture Fort Sumter in September 1863 as well as the May 1864 Red River expedition in northwest Louisiana. It also discusses penetration raids designed to interdict Confederate transportation and other logistic arteries in the Carolinas. Yet Marines also helped battle New York City mobs protesting conscription immediately after Gettysburg and the Marine Band performed at the dedication ceremonies where Abraham Lincoln delivered his Gettysburg Address. These events are also analyzed and Sullivan further discusses internal Corps administration and system of justice as part of the institutional analysis he began in the previous volumes.

One of the more fascinating topics that Sullivan recounts concerned foreign station duty of the Marines in the Pacific and East Indian squadrons in this period. Fairly unknown was the American naval confrontation with Japanese naval forces in the Shimonoseki straits on July 16, 1863 – part of America's attempts to keep open access to trade routes and markets in the Orient. He further documents unrecognized service of the Marines in the sinking of the CSS *Alabama* off Cherbourg, France and the capture of another Confederate raider, *Florida.* Marines were also active with a gunboat flotilla seeking to cut off

Hood's retreat during his disastrous Tennessee campaign in late 1864.

While much of the volume concerns what even Sullivan calls "backwater of the conflict," and "war on the periphery," that was indeed where the Marines were often called upon to help save the Union. Moreover, while the author seems to strain to note every event involving Marines, that too is a feature of the series. None of this should lessen the interest, for scholarship continues to show this great war was more than Napoleonic set-piece battles and their great captains. We don't have a feel as yet on the overall importance of the war for the Marine Corps or *vice versa.* Let us hope that analysis of this sort will be found in the concluding volume where the author binds together themes and answers.

Certainly one of the strengths of this series lies with the publisher's receptivity to florid use of illustrations and maps. Faces and scenes can ably enhance a text in this fashion and the dust-jacket bears a fetching colorized rendition of a period photograph showing a smartly attired squad of Marines at the Washington Navy Yard in April 1864. Indeed, the 118 photographs surely must be dictating the price of each volume in this series. For devotees of the history of the Corps, these identified faces may seem indispensable. For maritime and naval readers, they will merely clog the otherwise clearly focused text. This, however, is the series' approach. It also dictates the multi-volume to date. Still, we can hope that as the author approaches the end of his arduous journey, he will step back and provide a "warts and all" conclusion as to what it means for understanding this facet of mid-nineteenth century maritime as well as military history.

Benjamin Franklin Cooling
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Anne Marie Drew (ed.). *Letters from Annapolis: Midshipmen Write Home 1848-1969.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. xiv + 216 pp., photographs, illustrations, glossary, index. US $29.95, Cdn $43.50, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-170-X. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

This is a collection of letters from thirteen midshipmen while students at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Traditional Academy historiography has largely ignored the lives of the students and concentrated on administrative history. This collection is a unique way for Drew, a Professor of English at the Academy, to begin correcting this omission. As a whole, the letters show student life and how it was influenced by internal and outside events.

As one might expect, most of the letters are from students who went on to become career naval officers, yet there are letters as well from those who went on to other careers. Drew provides a brief biography on each contributor followed by their letters. These, in turn, are arranged into several periods: Pre-Civil War; Reconstruction Era to World War I; Pre-World War II; and the beginning of the Vietnam era. The letters reveal students' first impressions, their relations with others, and their lessons and extracurricular activities, such as dances and sports. The latter often filled a disproportionate percentage of the letters with tales of Army-Navy games and trips to other locales – all distractions from the humdrum of Academy life.

Over the course of the collection, changes and conflicts are revealed. Letters from the pre-Civil War era show the rough life at the early Academy and growing national tension. The letters then jump to 1877 with those of Harry Phelps. [65-81] His letters reveal that the Academy had settled into a professional routine, while the next set of letters, by Alfred K. Schanze, reveal some of the problems at the Academy at the turn of the century. Schanze reflected on Revolutionary War hero John Paul Jones' reburial at the Academy, the Russo-Japanese War, and Academy hazing. [82-97] The letters of Orin Shepley Haskell and Daniel Vincent Gallery from 1918 are striking for their description of the raging flu epidemic. [114-129]

The letters show that the midshipmen were part of the society which spawned the Academy. They were affected by national strife and the coming of modern technology. By 1965, for example, Midshipmen like Gerald P. Motl were going out to "get something to eat" and then ending up "guess where?? at McDonald's." [183] Ironically, descriptions of Academy life began to fade in the more recent period, thanks in part to increased use of the telephone. Motl often ended his letters with "I'll probably call Sunday – Before you get this." [187] Yet students were also affected by other national events. Barry Mason Shambach wrote in 1967 of observing a Marine exercise simulating an assault on a Vietcong

bunker, although he failed to comment on the Vietnam conflict itself. [200] Later, on 6 April 1968, he reported how the Academy was guarded by Marines in light of the "senseless" shooting of Dr. Martin Luther King. [211]

This collection is valuable for anyone studying institutionalized youth. The only weak point, as Drew admits, is that the letters are only those that made their way back to the Academy. It is hard to criticize an author for what is not in a collection, but I would have liked more letters from the Civil War and Spanish American War eras, as well as more from the Vietnam era, to fill in the time gaps. Despite its drawbacks, *Letters from Annapolis* is the best social history of the Academy yet published, only rarely glorifying the institution.

Mark C. Hunter
St. John's, Newfoundland

David McLean. *Education and Empire: Naval Tradition and England's Elite Schooling.* London and New York: British Academic Press, 1998. viii + 184 pp., notes, bibliography, index. US $59.50, cloth; ISBN 0-86064-295-0. Distributed in Canada and the United States by St. Martin's Press, New York, NY.

In this slim volume, David McLean breathes new life into the time-worn aphorism: "You can't tell a book by its cover". Thus, an otherwise well researched and handsome tome is gravely marred by an almost wholly misleading title. Granted, the work does concern itself with "education". But "empire" is conspicuous by its all but total absence. Indeed, the only hint of an even vague connection between the two is registered in a passing reference that appears to have been " tacked on"and , in any case, comes from a time after the main events described by McLean. [141] Sadly, the same observations apply to the subtitle. Accordingly, anyone expecting a close examination of how the early-Victorian Royal Navy educated youthful candidates in seaman-like skills and values will be disappointed here. Instead, what one finds is a perhaps useful, yet ultimately rather narrow discussion of the way in which "naval tradition" and Arnoldian-style educational reform made uncomfortable bedfellows at the Greenwich Schools in the early 1840s.

On his chosen ground, titles aside, McLean does a fine job of reconstructing the ideological and personal tensions that bedeviled efforts to bring reform to the Greenwich schools which, in one form or another, had provided education to the children of indigent officers and other ranks since the early 1700s. He ably charts the general history of that institution and offers a good overview of educational reform movements throughout Britain in the early nineteenth century. In short, he is particularly adept at establishing the context within which reformers sought to do away with rote learning, corporal punishment and an antique curriculum in England's schools. Greenwich became a target for experimentation, following a damning report authored by its Governor, Admiral Charles Fleming, in 1840. Seeking advice, the Admiralty called on the newly-formed Committee of the Privy Council on Education for assistance. Only too happy to oblige, its Secretary, Dr. James Kay-Shuttleworth, leapt at the opportunity. The Greenwich schools, after all, with over 800 students enrolled, far outstripped contemporary public schools in sheer size; they also claimed some measure of prestige though they remained charity institutions. In short, the high priest of contemporary reform could scarcely resist such a tempting laboratory. Turning to the challenge with a will, Kay-Shuttleworth and his hand-picked headmasters, according to McLean, sought to use Greenwich as a model upon which the whole of English education, high and low, might quickly be refashioned. They hit, of course, the proverbial brick wall.

McLean is at his best in explaining the complex nature of resistance to change. While sympathetic to reformers, he is far from blind to their intemperate disdain for dissent. On the other hand, he understands that not all dissent sprang from narrow self-interest or unreasoning blindness. Thus, he plausibly emphasizes the special force of two Greenwich imperatives: naval discipline and limited resources. Both , it seems put a cap on everyone's ambitions. But so did the unpredictable influence of personality. In a tangled atmosphere of ideological , political and personal conflict, few "reformers" or "traditionalists" behaved well. Sensing this, the boys took advantage of the ever-widening split and eventually ran riot in the literal sense. One such exercise in mayhem finally attracted sufficient press attention to warrant an official investigation, which, in turn, generated much of the documentation upon which this book is based. In time, true reform slowly followed until the Royal Hospital

School emerged as a premier training facility for young mariners, only closing its doors in 1933.

The great strengths of this book include assiduous research, judicious impartiality, and good story telling. As well, it is quite valuable in illustrating the formative experience of some, such as Henry Moseley, who would go on to be major figures in the campaign for general educational reform. Well produced and sporting a superb bibliography, *Education and Empire* has much to recommend it. Still, readers will find the yawning gap between title and contents disconcerting. Moreover, the author tends to dodge the issue of typicality when assessing the final significance of the Greenwich experience. Neither fish nor fowl, Greenwich was never truly comparable in class terms with Eton, Harrow and other "elite" schools. Meanwhile, although it was a charitable institution, the special concern with naval discipline rendered it different in kind from both "popular" and "public" establishments. In the end, therefore, one wonders to what degree this particular experience can be generalized.

James G. Greenlee
Corner Brook, Newfoundland

Andrew Lambert. *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession.* London: Chatham Publishing, 1998. 256 pp., photographs, appendix, sources, index. £30, cloth; ISBN 1-86176-086-8.

This book has been a long time coming. That is not to suggest that Andrew Lambert has taken an overly generous amount of time in producing the book. Rather, it has taken almost forty-five years for another maritime historian to take up the torch of providing the field with an intellectual history that helps explain why the Royal Navy thought the way it did prior to the twentieth century. This is the first significant work since Donald Schurman's *Education of a Navy* to address the issue of where the Royal Navy received its education and under what conditions. Through this professional biography of John Knox Laughton, one of Britain's seminal maritime thinkers of the nineteenth century, Andrew Lambert has once more proven that he is the heir apparent to the mantle of Britain's premier maritime historian.

Lambert's knowledge of the personalities and the institutions involved is unsurpassed. The naval personnel, politicians, academics, and departments in which each resided all come together clearly and lucidly in the telling of this tale. That clarity is important, in order that the path by which Laughton gained access to the critical decision-makers and influenced policy be easily understood and recognised. More importantly, the reader understands the various issues and forces at work in trying to accomplish a task as mammoth as trying to influence a tradition bound institution into taking a new tack. Thus, the importance and critical nature of Laughton's work is undeniably proven by Lambert and not left to the reader to imagine or suppose that some sort of influence was exerted.

The main reason Lambert is able to accomplish this masterful story-telling is his excellent knowledge of primary and secondary material. Private papers, obscure and well-known; departmental documents; contemporary articles and reviews; all are here to add their weight to the tale of what Laughton wrote, who read it and how it was received by the various readers. At the tactical, strategic and operational levels, Lambert has traced Laughton's career and the changes in the fortunes of that career. This is intellectual history in all its glory, discussing concepts, motivations and results of a man's desire to educate the Royal Navy to the uses and abuses of history as a learning and policy-making tool.

From Lambert's book it very quickly becomes quite clear that Laughton's contribution to the changing nature of the Royal Navy was on a level rarely discussed in the literature dealing with the period. Instead of technological change and concerns being at the centre of attention, a real revolution in naval affairs intellectually was being dealt with at the same time within the late nineteenth-century Royal Navy. What was a navy for and what was it to do in order to defend the extended Empire, were some of the key issues of debate into which Laughton launched himself through the use of historical example. By demanding a more rigorous and scientific approach to the study of maritime history, Laughton created a new standard, or rather an instrument, by which naval thought and policy could be measured. It was that scientific methodology which won him the respect of the Royal Navy, and, just as importantly, the academic community. That linkage between a holistic view of the "how to do history," and a solid grounding in the limits and usefulness of how to apply history as a tool of analysis, are the central themes that Lambert

brings out of Laughton's body of work and what it meant.

Andrew Lambert has done the maritime history profession, as well as the memory of one of its greatest practitioners a great service by producing this book. It is not an exaggeration nor a throw away line to state flatly that this book is a must read for anyone who desires to understand the mind of the Royal Navy in the years leading up to the Great War. One can only hope that it appears soon in paperback so that circulation can become as extensive as possible.

Greg Kennedy
Kingston, Ontario

Michael J. Crawford, Mark L. Hayes, Michael D. Sessions. *The Spanish-American War: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography*. Naval History Bibliographies, No. 5; Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998. xii + 126 pp., illustrations, author index. US $9, paper; ISBN 0-945274-40-8. Order by GPO Stock Number: 008-046-00188-0.

Since the 1890s the US Navy's historical office has produced a number of reference works, including editions of source documents, chronologies, and dictionaries of ship and unit histories. Bibliographies also are featured. In fact, the volume under review is the fifth contribution in a new bibliographic series begun by the Naval Historical Center in 1993.

Two of the compilers of *The Spanish American War*, Michael Crawford and Mark Hayes, are staff members of the Naval Historical Center's Early History Branch. Michael Sessions is a reserve officer assigned on a part-time basis to the office. The skilled hand of the Centre's senior editor, Sandra Doyle, also is evident in this handsome volume. She made effective use of drawings created especially for the bibliography by the naval artist, John Charles Roach.

This publication celebrates the centennial of the Spanish-American War, the traditional origin of America's emergence as a world power capable of defeating a European nation and willing to administer new colonies in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. A twenty-page historical overview presents a succinct account of the causes, conduct, and aftermath of this conflict. This is an objective summary that does not hesitate to note the defects as well as the triumphs of the United States Navy. Unfortunately, due to the brevity of this section, the authors are unable to develop fully their observations on certain aspects of the war that continue to arouse controversy. Among these are the reasons for the destruction of battleship *Maine* in Havana Harbour, a seminal event on the road to war, as well as the basic morality and wisdom of America's decision to initiate a conflict with Spain.

In addition to a historical summary, the book includes a discussion of the needs and opportunities for research and writing. In this reviewer's opinion, the authors are entirely correct in contending that much greater attention needs to be given to the institutional aspects of the Navy of the Spanish-American War, including the service's enlisted personnel, logistics, and certain areas of technology.

The basic bibliography follows the historical sections. It consists of 611 citations to published works on all dimensions of the conflict. The authors exclude juvenile literature and are selective in listing sources dealing with diplomatic history and titles in foreign languages. Otherwise the authors offer a comprehensive bibliography. Brief annotations accompany citations that are not self-explanatory. The works are organized in a sensible subject-matter system and there is a detailed index to the names of authors.

The Spanish-American War is a well-crafted and scholarly work. It should achieve its basic goals of arousing interest and facilitating historical research in a significant chapter of world history.

Dean C. Allard
Arlington, Virginia

John Winton (comp. & ed.). *The Submariners: Life in British Submarines 1901-1999.* London: Constable, 1999. xiv + 316 pp., photo-plates, index. £20, cloth; ISBN 0-09-478810-3.

The twentieth century is notable for introducing many new weapons of war into general service. Among these were submarines – stealthy and deadly weapons that profoundly changed the nature of naval warfare. Their unique capabilities required bold and resourceful individuals to operate them. This book tells the story of many of those individuals in the British submarine service, mainly in their own words. John Winton, a prolific British author of naval history and fiction,

weaves the many accounts together with short descriptions to provide context, but otherwise lets the stories speak for themselves.

The anecdotes cover the full gamut of life in submarines, ranging from the dramatic to the mundane. One recounts the tragedy of a peacetime accident, another examines the challenge of providing food for a submarine on patrol. The chronological arrangement begins with accounts of the first pioneers in British submarines and ends at the end of the century with descriptions of life aboard the extremely sophisticated nuclear vessels in the Royal Navy today. The contrast between the primitive and the modern is of course striking, and serves to remind us of how much has changed in naval warfare in the past one hundred years.

The book is divided into five sections: "Early Days"; "The First World War"; "Between the Wars"; "The Second World War"; and "Postwar". As might be expected, the dramatic events of World War II provide a significant proportion of the accounts related, about twice as many as each of the other sections contain. Nonetheless each section contains at least ten accounts, and the postwar section has seventeen as compared to the twenty-nine in the section on World War II. There is enough in each part to give readers a good sense of the state and nature of submarine operations of the period.

Winton's selections are gathered primarily from previously published accounts, but there are private manuscripts as well. The use of previously published material will mean that regular readers of British naval history may well recognize some of the usually recounted tales, such as the attack on the *Tirpitz*. However, most of the stories will be little known except to specialists, and the book forms a good cross-section that effectively holds a reader's interest from first to last.

The eight pages of pictures provide a human face to this book, and are well chosen. The table of contents indicates where all the accounts were drawn from, and the index allows those wishing to find specific information easy access to it. Winton's book on British submariners is a worthwhile read for those with a specific interest in the subject, or for those who enjoy first hand accounts of men at sea in challenging situations.

D.M. McLean
Orleans, Ontario

Roy Humphreys. *The Dover Patrol 1914-18.* Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1998. viii + 216 pp., photographs, maps, glossary, appendices, bibliography, index. £18.99, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1967-1. Distributed in North America by International Publishers Marketing, Inc., Herndon, VA.

Two pictures dominate our view of World War I at sea: majestic lines of dreadnought battleships in the North Sea; and the carnage wrought by German U-boats against Allied merchant shipping. Sadly, the significant naval effort (by both sides) in many other theatres of war is now almost forgotten. A small redress is Humphrey's description of the Royal Navy's Dover Patrol, involving masses of men, material, and ships of all types, in a mostly successful attempt to exert control over the eastern part of the English Channel.

As the author notes in his preface, little has been written about the Dover Patrol after the initial flurry of post-war biography. This is unfortunate, because there was quite a bit of technical and tactical innovation, and a surprising number of encounters with the enemy. Certainly it is an area which could benefit from dispassionate modern writers and research in newly-released archival material. Although a decent read and useful summary of events, *The Dover Patrol* doesn't quite answer the call.

What Humphreys provides is a nice little overview of events intended for the general public and written from the British point of view; there is very little from the German viewpoint, and while the work of the French Navy receives some mention, their contributions deserve a more complete treatment. The absence of footnotes makes it impossible to tell how much material comes from local archival sources as opposed to the secondary sources listed in the bibliography. One surprise is that the excellent volume *Big Gun Monitors* by Ian Buxton does not seem to have been consulted — and thus a rich source of information on the activities of the RN's monitors has been left out. Nevertheless, for those who want an easy introduction to the Dover Patrol, this book is a reasonable start. All major events are outlined, although not in great detail: generally the book is a collection of tales and anecdotes a couple of paragraphs in length, just stuck together. That is a pity — in a general way, the book would be improved by a more structured approach, and specifically would be much more useful if the

coverage of the more important events such as the loss of the cruisers *Aboukir, Hogue* and *Cressy* and especially the surprisingly few German destroyer raids were expanded and illustrated with maps. To the author's credit, the April 1918 raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend are dealt with in some detail, in a fast-paced and accurate narrative.

There is a nice selection of photographs (albeit undated and unsourced), but the captions could be improved: some interesting items have been missed and there are a couple of errors (that does not appear to be the Kaiser in the photograph on page 186!). The discerning reader will also notice errors in the description of *Marshal Ney's* re-armament (p. 54; she carried a 9.2-inch gun as well as the 6-inch) and HMS *Swift* was most certainly *not* capable of "more than 40 knots." [87] Still, there is useful material in the book, notably the appendices, which list the German gun batteries (including calibres) which defended Zeebrugge and Ostend and an inventory of all the ships which at some point in time were part of the Dover Patrol.

Overall, this is a decent little book, perhaps of limited value to the specialist, but a good entry point for laymen to what is an important but little-known part of World War I.

William Schleihauf
Pierrefonds, Quebec

Franz Rintelen von Kleist (intro. Reinhard R. Doerries). *The Dark Invader: Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer.* London, 1933; London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997. xxxvii + 288 pp., photographs. US $37.50, cloth; ISBN 0-7146-4792-6; US $18.50, paper; ISBN 0-7146-4347-5. Distributed in USA by International Specialized Book Services, Portland, OR.

The mysterious Captain von Rintelen (Franz Rintelen von Kleist) named on the title sheet of the 1933 first edition of *The Dark Invader,* in fact, was Franz Dagobert Johannes Rintelen, born in Frankfurt on the Oder on August 19, 1878. He, a young naval intelligence officer with every likelihood of reaching high rank, travelled to the still neutral United States in 1915 and only saw his own country again after a lapse of six difficult and, in part, cheerless years spent in British and American prisons. The history of those years is told in this book. He depended upon his memory for the conversations that he recorded.

Though almost everyone in Berlin after the war claimed to have nothing to do with or to have known nothing of this brash naval officer's undertakings, Rintelen's departure for his mission to the United States was anything but a secret operation. The Admiralty agreed to his transfer to the Ministry of War in February 1915, and records show that he received his basic instructions from that office. He landed in New York in April, where he stayed with some interruptions until he sailed for Berlin in August. British agents apprehended him off Ramsgate on 13 August 1915.

Rintelen's main assignment, during his short four months' stay in the United States, seems to have been halting shipments of war material from the United States to Germany's enemies. Whether his efforts were to be limited to giant purchases of material or whether his instructions from the beginning also included the possibility of sabotage, is open to question. The answer depends largely on one's interpretation of the less than explicit records, most of which were produced after the event in the early post-war investigations in Germany or the United States. Besides, most participants in these investigations were unlikely to be primarily interested in the truth. Rintelen would have wanted to demonstrate that while in the USA he acted on instructions from Berlin; military and political leaders in Berlin after 1918 would have wanted their orders to appear quite normal, namely concerning the purchase of war material in America to prevent its shipment to Germany's enemies.

Records on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that Rintelen revived a faltering sabotage campaign which included plans for destruction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in several places and relied on an extremely diverse network of operatives consisting of naval personnel from German ships tied up in New York harbour, a motley group of adventurers, and German agents. They ran a dangerous operation which involved placing incendiary devices on ships leaving the harbour with cargo for the Entente. At the same time Rintelen and some of his men apparently were involved in a plan for organizing labour and fomenting strikes in US ammunitions plants. In addition Rintelen engaged in a scheme to return the ousted General Victoriano Huerta to power in Mexico with a view to provoking a war between the Untied States and Mexico — thus tying up American resources of manpower and material.

The Dark Invader is part of a "Classics in Espionage" reprint series designed to recover lost and long-forgotten texts that have been influential in history and popular culture of modern espionage. Reinhard R. Doerries, Professor of Modern History at the University of Erlangen-Nuernberg, who wrote the foreword to *The Dark Invader*, observed that it may be a classic, a revealing report about operations generally denied by governments, but not the whole truth. Rintelen, in his memoirs, attempted to tell what Berlin in the post-World War I years stubbornly denied had happened, particularly regarding acts of sabotage. However, official German records, captured by British and American forces at the end of World War Il, tend to show the colourful memoirs of the German Naval officer to be accurate. They make a fascinating read. One wonders why the story has not made it to the screen!

David Pierce Beatty
Sackville, New Brunswick

Leonard Sellers. *For God's Sake Shoot Straight: The Story of the Court Martial and Execution of Temporary Sub-Lieutenant Leopold Arthur Dyett, Nelson Battalion, 63rd (RN) Division during the First World War.* London: Leo Cooper, 1995. xi + 179 pp., photo-plates, tables, references, bibliography, index. £15.95, cloth.; ISBN 0-85052-470-9.

Between 1914 and 1919 some 3080 British soldiers were charged with capital offences by courts martial. Of these only 346 were executed, of which three were officers, including Leopold Arthur Dyett, a temporary sub-lieutenant with the 63rd (Royal Navy) Division. Charged with desertion in the face of the enemy, Dyett was the last officer in the war to die as the result of being accused of lacking backbone and moral fibre. Almost immediately his execution raised a public hue and cry. Dyett was young and inexperienced, a civilian forced into service by national conscription. The grounds for his trial were questionable and the process flawed. No less a public figure than Winston Churchill wrote in the introduction of A.P. Herbert's 1919 novel *The Secret Battle,* based loosely on the Dyett case, that "It is a soldier's tale cut in stone to melt all hearts."

Was this indeed the case? Was justice too harsh given Dyett's youth and inexperience? Was he the victim of circumstance and timing, a pawn in the wider game of war? Sellers thinks so. And what about the charge of cowardice in the face of the enemy? Given what we now know about shell-shock and other stress-induced psychological disorders was it possible that Dyett and many like him were wrongly charged? Sellers thinks so. The problem is that the personal records shed little light on the matter, as several commissions and committees since the war have discovered. It turns out that medical science at the time knew little if anything about such disorders. And so arises the broader question, whether all those accused and executed for cowardice in World War I should therefore receive public exoneration. This would certainly set the record straight for the innocent but what about the guilty? Hence the moral dilemma the Dyett case and Sellers' book raises.

No war has cast so long a shadow on this century as World War I. Historians still debate the causes and the consequences, the strategy and the tactics, the leadership or lack thereof. The list goes on. In most cases it is a matter of reinterpretation or the discovery of new evidence. Sometimes, it simply represents a new focus on the study of war itself Sellers' book raises major issues that frequently confront and often confound the historian. Should we see the past through the eyes of the present? Should we seek to rewrite history to reflect current values or viewpoints? This is not exactly what Sellers is asking. He wants the reader "to make a judgement" about the Dyett case based on the extensive evidence he provides in the text. But in so doing he also wants the reader to apply his/her "background and personality" to that judgement. The risk is that the reader will find himself/herself swept up in the same moral dilemma that continues to complicate the issue of public exoneration of those executed for cowardice in World War I.

This is a provocative little book if not an enjoyable read for those interested in World War I and the place of the court martial in military history. It may overwhelm at times with its excessive quoting from various sources. And it is not history in the purest sense but it does touch on important issues that concern historians. That is its real appeal. On a final note, this is a matter not likely to go away soon, as evidenced by recent reports in the British media.

David Facey-Crowther
St. John's, Newfoundland

John Winton. *Cunningham: The Greatest Admiral since Nelson.* London: John Murray, 1998. xxiv + 432 pp., maps, photographs, chronology, bibliography, index. £25, cloth; ISBN 0-7195-5765-8.

Michael Simpson (ed.). *The Cunningham Papers; Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, OM,KT,GCB,DSO. Volume 1: The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939-1942.* Aldershot, Hants. and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing for The Navy Records Society, 1999. xxviii + 626 pp, maps, glossary and abbreviations, chronology, bibliography, list of documents and sources. £30 (members), cloth; ISBN 1-84014-622- 2.

Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope – or "ABC" as he was almost universally known–published his extensive autobiography, *A Sailor's Life* (Hutchinson) in 1951. It was detailed as to his whole life, reasonably well done, concentrating on his defence of the Mediterranean naval sphere from 1939 to mid-1943 – one of the better immediate post-war military leaders' biographies. However, its first draft, Winton tells us in this biography, had to be watered down insofar as ABC's criticisms of then-Prime Minister Churchill, Generals Montgomery and Alexander, and the problems of air defence of his fleet during the evacuations from Greece and Crete in 1941. This large volume is therefore a candid and most interesting re-examination of ABC from a perspective of nearly half a century, though there will undoubtedly be those who would take issue with the rather unnecessary subtitle "The greatest admiral since Nelson," a risky definitive for a general biography.

There is much that is new in assessing ABC's performance and characteristics. Thus, we are told that "ABC inherited his family's brains but not their energy...and was always lazy," [3] and that "he had not had his mind stretched sufficiently to cope easily with administration and personnel suggestions for improvements." [339] He was a "salt horse," meaning that he was not a specialist officer. Cunningham himself admitted that he was at the very least sceptical of most specialists, even contemptuous of his fleet's so-called gunnery and radar (RDF) experts on many occasions. Yet he could be persuaded by experience, and became cautiously dependant on the best of these. Dudley Pound, his senior as First Sea Lord, was much more prescient with ideas for use of carriers, convoy and political opportunism.

Not surprisingly, the book covers ABC's time as C-in-C Mediterranean to October 1943 in far more detail than his life before and after that service – sixty-six percent of the volume. Twenty percent is dedicated to his early years, his joining the Navy at age 14 in 1897 and his experiences, mostly in destroyers and cruisers, to age 56. He served in the Naval Brigade ashore in South Africa, at the Dardanelles, and in the normal range of sea positions and staff appointments before going to the Med. as Commander-in-Chief. He tended to run his fleet there, even in the desperate days of the hard-fought Malta convoys, the Greek evacuations, and the attempts to fend off the Italian fleet's forays against his much weakened forces, as though it were simply an extension of a couple of his destroyer flotillas. He was obviously happiest when at sea in *Warspite* or *Valiant,* searching for the Italians to give battle. His later career as First Sea Lord (until June 1946) could hardly be assessed as more than "satisfactory." In fact ABC himself suggests that the change to the post-war situation really needed a newer and younger man. In the Mediterranean, like Nelson, he had made his most valuable contribution to winning the war.

Through many contacts with those who worked with or for ABC, or left letters and memoranda of their contacts, Winton is able to note more of the idiosyncrasies than Cunningham revealed in his own autobiography. He had a boyish sense of humour, was considerate of those around him who served him well. This extended even to his senior staff who did not necessarily always agree with him; he would follow their subsequent careers with interest. Yet he could be vindictive, abrasive and very rude to those who he felt were not pulling their weight, did not participate well in his Mediterranean command triumvirate, or, in his judgement, let him down in some way. Typically Navy, he married late at age 46, and Winton is rather unkind in his description of Lady Nona Cunningham; but then ABC tended to be disparaging as well, although he was obviously devoted to her.

Winton did not have the benefit of *The Cunningham Papers, a* new release by the Navy Records Society; edited by Michael Simpson, which makes a valuable adjunct to Winton's biography. With a brief lead-in summary and explanation and a few pages of scene-setting by

Simpson, this volume provides most of the text of some 327 letters, memoranda and War Diary excerpts that passed to and from ABC to the Admiralty, friends, his First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound) and a host of others during the first three years of the Mediterranean war. This covers the "phoney war" phase, the attacks on Taranto, the support and then the retreat from Greece and Crete, the unhappy takeover of the French fleet in Alexandria, the worst of the Malta convoys, the reinforcement of Tobruk – all the harshness of his position until relieved in mid-1942 to go briefly to Washington. A second volume will presumably cover that phase and his triumphant re-entry into the later Med. battles.

Together with his own autobiography (1951), Winton's assessment of many of these same documents in the book reviewed above, and this dispassionate listing of the actual exchanges between ABC and others, we gain a clear impression of a most unusual and competent commander. These are the years of maximum adversity: lost ships and crews, lack of air support, and, at least in ABC's carefully worded opinions, sometimes lack of even verbal support, nay, active and improper intervention by the Admiralty in distant London. He does not call for more than his due in strained circumstances of supply, ships, weapons, aircraft. Yet one soon gains the impression that he felt that those engaged in the Atlantic battle and those directing the RAF had little understanding of the problems in the Mediterranean and the dangers were it to be lost, and with it Suez and the whole Middle East with its oil and access to the Far East. Similarly, he felt that the value of the nips and bites his valiant and fast disappearing fleet were making at the Italian and later German southern flank were not appreciated. Reading these reports, letters and diary entries by themselves, one becomes immersed in the decisions to be made, the juggling acts to be performed to meet his commitments, the day-by-day efforts to solve the unsolvable, without the smoothing effect of Winton's assessments and connecting narrative, or even ABC's more private fulminations in his own volume. It is, as they say, a real page-turner.

All three volumes are well worth a joint perusal.

Fraser M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario

Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani. *The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943.* London: Chatham, 1998 and Rockville Center, NY: Sarpedon, 1999.352 pp., maps, photo-plates, notes, bibliography, index. £25, US $32.95, cloth; ISBN 1-86176-057-4 (Chatham), 1-885119-61-5 (Sarpedon).

This unimaginatively titled work is a collaboration by two authors who are established experts in this topic. It is an attempt to update our knowledge of the naval dimension of the Mediterranean theatre during World War II. Control of this region played a significant role in determining the outcome of this global conflict – and it could have had an even greater significance, had the Western Allies rejected Stalin's argument that the "Second Front" had to be in France.

In twenty-four chapters the text covers the period from just before the beginning of the war to the Italian surrender in 1943. It is buttressed by a number of illustrations, including archival photographs, battle diagrams and a few maps. The photos complement the text and run the gamut from display shots to action scenes. The battle diagrams were recreated with the aid of the logs of the actual combatants and represent a determined effort to place everything in the right place at the right time. There are also extensive notes, a comprehensive bibliography and an index. A study of the bibliography clearly shows the extent to which the authors went to obtain official contemporary documents from all the major participants as well as postwar accounts.

The authors wisely chose to concentrate on the whole rather than any individual campaign or battle. They focus on the Italian perspective as much as possible but have also addressed other issues such as the role of Vichy France in this theatre. As well, they discuss some of the few occasions when the Axis came close to uncovering the "Ultra" secret. Generally they manage to put the proper emphasis on the key aspects and highlights of the struggle in this region during this period. They also analyze the failure of the European Axis powers to develop a truly collaborative war effort – as evidenced by their inability to overcome their mutual distrust.

Discussion includes key engagements (Matapan and Punta Stilo) and events (the Taranto raid, the Italian charioteer attacks on Allied harbours), and the whole array of other anticipated subjects including the inevitable discussion

and review of the Axis plans to invade Malta. Yet the authors did not limit themselves to discussing the "what" and "why" of these topics. They look at a number of technical and other issues which are often overlooked but still contributed to the final outcome of this struggle. Chief among these is a discussion about the potential impact of Italy's two incomplete carriers *Aquila* and *Sparviero.* They also examine the very short barrel life and rapidly declining accuracy of Italian naval ordnance. These shortcomings ensued from the Italian Navy's obsession with long-range combat. This failing might have been offset by the development of radar-controlled fire systems, but Italy's neglect of this technology compounded this deficiency. Another topic of note is the failure of the Italian air force to intervene effectively in the naval war.

Overall, this is a reasonably well-written and balanced work. As a general history it offers some new insight into particular events, but its strength lies in the authors' ability to put events into a clear perspective. One minor disappointment is the lack of tables of equivalent ranks and warship strengths. It is also unfortunate that the text is marred by several instances of proofing errors. While these do not detract from the value of the text, they do spoil the flow of its narrative. Still, this is a welcome addition to the growing library of reference works on World War H.

Peter K.H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Québec

James G. Dorrian. *Storming St. Nazaire. The Gripping Story of the Dock-Busting Raid March, 1942.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. xvi + 304 pp., maps, photographs, illustrations, bibliography, index. US $29.95, Cdn $43.50, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-849-6. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

In March 1942 a Royal Navy and British Army force set out on "Operation Chariot," a cross-Channel raid to destroy the dry dock facilities at the German-defended Biscay port of St. Nazaire. It was to be done in the usual 1940s "Rube Goldberg met Biggles" British way. HMS *Campbeltown,* a lightened Lend-Lease destroyer, was filled with ten tons of delayed explosives, raced on the high spring tide under coast artillery fire into the shallow harbour, rammed into the outer lock gate and scuttled while commandos destroyed other dockyard sites, again under intense German fire. The Navy then withdrew what was left of the force, "barely more than one third" of the original 611, all ranks. The charges in the destroyer blew up the lock gates the next day. The force did not attack the U-boat facilities. The cost was high: casualties numbered 169 killed, 200 taken prisoner – the British government would award eighty-five medals, including five Victoria Crosses. Was the operation worth it?

In *Storming St. Nazaire,* James Dorrian does not hesitate to answer in the affirmative. Setting out "to make a record of their sacrifice, truthfully and with conviction," he writes from the perspective of those who were there: the subalterns, riflemen, sappers, Oerlikon gunners – all those who fought their hearts out and whose stories were never told. Dorrian believes that their heroic actions speak for themselves, and that those actions have their own rewards, regardless of the cost. And it is unquestionably a powerful story of immense individual bravery based on survivors' accounts. In the end, Dorrian attributes the success of the raid to high small unit cohesion. In almost all cases the ship's companies and commando sub-units had served with each other for over two years, morale was exceptional and so were training standards. As well, most of the attackers had taken Benzedrine before the attack "to enhance their alertness."

But was the raid really necessary? St. Nazaire was unique among the many Biscay ports. Besides the submarine pens, it had the largest dry dock facility in western Europe, purpose-built before the war to maintain the French liner *Normandie.* It was towards St. Nazaire that the crippled *Bismarck* was making when she was sunk in the spring of 1941. From this port *Bismarck's* sister ship, *Tirpitz,* could attack shipping in the Atlantic. It is not at all clear, however, whether the Germans still intended to threaten the Atlantic with capital ships by early 1942. German surface forays into the Atlantic were probably over by then because of the danger from the Royal Navy, now reinforced by the US Navy Atlantic Fleet, as well as from allied air forces. For this reason the Germans had withdrawn *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* from Biscay in February 1942. Thereafter Hitler's policy for *Tirpitz* was to threaten the Allied navies from Norway and the North Sea. Only U-boats would continue commerce raiding in the Atlantic. Had someone blundered by insisting that the raid

go forward?

The operation was planned by the Combined Operations staff of Lord Louis Mountbatten. He and his staff are well known to Canadian historians for their role in planning the Dieppe raid four and a half months later. In my opinion (and I think Dorrian would agree) the Combined Operations planners reached a point, sometime in early 1942, where they refused to accept any change to the original aim. The planning process seemed to generate a momentum and logic of its own. Dorrian did not use primary evidence to examine the planning for the raid, nor did he examine inter-service politics. Perhaps a wider understanding of the planning will some day explain the hidden logic for the St. Nazaire raid, as well as for the tragic errors at Dieppe a few months later.

In the meantime we are fortunate to have Dorrian's definitive tribute to the officers and men who selflessly carried out "Chariot."

Bob Caldwell
Ottawa, Ontario

Alan Harris Bath. *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. xii + 308 pp., notes, select bibliography, index. US $34.95, cloth; ISBN 0-7006-0917-2.

The sharing of information and the maintenance of a long-term intimate cooperation between the intelligence organizations of two nation states before World War II was almost beyond comprehension. Intelligence is perhaps the most sensitive and secretive of all activities of a nation state. A nation's intelligence organizations, generating secret information obtained by secret means, are by their very nature the most closeted of all government bodies. Indeed, in the world of intelligence, secrecy is the dominating obsession. Before World War II, with the exception of certain intelligence organizations of one nation state never shared information with those of another nation state. All of this changed during the war with the creation of an Anglo-American intelligence alliance (which also included Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as junior partners), in which was shared not only intelligence but also such other secretive information as intelligence sources and code-breaking techniques. Never before in history had intelligence organizations of different sovereign states worked so closely and as intimately as those of the principal allied nations during World War II.

Alan Harris Bath, a former US naval intelligence officer, has written a history of this cooperation and information sharing between American and British naval intelligence during the war. Such cooperation began before the American entry into the war, when the intelligence organizations of each navy approached each other as would two strange dogs upon first meeting. Once they overcame initial misconceptions, suspicions, and institutional resistance, US and British naval intelligence in the war against Germany developed extremely close cooperative relations sharing not only intelligence, but also code-breaking information. Anglo-American naval intelligence in the Mediterranean and northwest Europe, under the auspices of Eisenhower's headquarters, especially in the preparations for D-Day, worked very closely together. Yet it was the war against the U-boats in the Atlantic which brought about the greatest degree of cooperation and integration, with the Canadians serving this case as a junior partner. American, British and Canadian submarine tracking rooms were in daily contact with each other, sharing tactical information on U-boat deployments while American and British code breakers not only shared information, but worked jointly on decrypting U-boat codes. Perhaps never before in history had intelligence organizations of three different nation states worked as closely as did those of the United States, Britain, and Canada in the war against the U-boats.

The war against Japan was a horse of another color. There, close cooperation between American and British naval intelligence did not develop, due mostly to the predominance of American power and the antipathy of Admiral Ernest J. King to all things British. Australian and New Zealand naval intelligence was to a large extent taken over by the US Navy; the Americans provided the Royal Navy with little intelligence on the Japanese until a British fleet operated in the Pacific late in the war. The contrasts in the relationship between American and British naval intelligence in the Atlantic and the Pacific wars shows that, in the final analysis, war-time Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation was shaped and controlled by such forces as national interests, perceived threats, personalities, and differing naval service traditions. *Tracking the Axis Enemy* is clearly argued, well written, and extensively

researched not only in American and British archives, but also in those of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It is a "must" for all students of Anglo-American relations as well as for historians of intelligence in World War II.

David Syrett
Flushing, New York

Philip Kaplan and Jack Currie. *Convoy: Merchant Sailors at War 1939-1945.* London: Aurum Press, 1998. 224 pp., photographs and illustrations (b+w, colour), bibliography, index. £19.95, Cdn $39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-85410-551-5. Canadian distributor, General Distribution Services, Toronto, ON

The stated purpose of this book is to serve as a "powerful reminder" of the debt owed to unsung ordinary seamen of the Merchant Navy during World War II. To achieve this the collaborators assembled a remarkable assortment of photographs and reproductions of paintings and wartime posters from many sources. These are supplemented by accounts of the better-known incidents.

The subtitle more accurately describes the contents as they venture beyond the confines of convoy sailing. The authors, one a military historian and the other an art-director, organized their material in fifteen independent chapters disregarding chronology. The opening chapter describes the transitions of merchant shipping from the early days of sail to the present century. The recruitment and conditions of service of seamen is covered in later chapters, while individual chapters deal with tankers, Libertys, as well as naval corvettes and ships of the opposing forces. Malta and the Russian convoys are given chapters of their own as is the invasion of Normandy. Jack Currie, an air force pilot during the war who trained in the USA, is generously afforded a chapter to describe an uneventful passage he made on a troopship across the Atlantic.

Woven through these chapters are some of the better known, and well recorded, epics – the catastrophic sinking of the troopship *Lancastria* off St. Nazaire June 17, 1940, the heroic effort of the armed cruiser *Jervis Bay*, the saga of the salvaging of the tanker *San Demetrio*, the gallant struggle of the tanker *Ohio* to reach beleaguered Malta against overwhelming enemy attacks, are just some of the epics given cursory treatment. Added to these are accounts of survival. Together they provide a general overview of the topic.

Though attractive and easily read, the book will not satisfy serious students of maritime history for it does not delve into the strategic struggles both ashore and afloat in the depth necessary to understand all the forces at work. Yet it succeeds in its stated purpose as a powerful reminder of what merchant navy seamen endured during the war. This is due mainly to the excellent photographs, notwithstanding the fact many have been published before. Still, one cannot help but wonder why it was necessary to include stills from popular war movies. The bibliography, though dated, provides useful sources for further study. Too bad Marc Milner's carefully researched *North Atlantic Run* is not included.

Some errors and omissions should be noted. In the list of bases exchanged with the USA for fifty aged destroyers it is surprising that neither Newfoundland nor Bermuda are mentioned considering their importance. [61] The *Oltenia II* sunk on January 8, 1943 is incorrectly named. [103] It is also stated [123] that a ship loaded grain in "St. John" in Newfoundland before proceeding to Halifax to join a convoy; surely this should be Saint John, New Brunswick. The statement that implies that ship's lifeboats were seldom swung out at sea [163] is also incorrect, as many of the photographs in the book show. Yet another error that will be quickly spotted by many is the impossible compass direction "south-west by east." [210] On the other hand, and not to appear too pedantic, the idiosyncratic behaviour ascribed to the legendary Capt. J.C. Brown [48] can be confirmed, this reviewer having experienced it first-hand.

This handsome volume would make an ideal gift for anyone approaching the subject for the first time but it is more suited to a coffee table than a library shelf.

Gregory P. Pritchard
Blue Rocks, Nova Scotia

Marc Milner. *HMCS Sackville 1941-1985.* Halifax: The Canadian Naval Memorial Trust, 1998. vii + 96 pp., photographs, maps, appendix. $12.95, paper; ISBN 0-9683661-0-4. Distributed by Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

The only criticism of this beautifully-written book is perhaps that it has too much information for

those who are most likely to buy it. These are the many visitors who briefly visit HMCS *Sackville* – the very last of the wartime Royal Canadian Navy's 123 corvettes – and its interpretation unit both at the same jetty in downtown Halifax and managed by the Canadian Memorial Naval Trust which commissioned this book.

Those who lack the time to read all of Milner's detailed text can revel in the wealth of photos of the warship's long history of four decades at sea in three careers – first as a busy World War II corvette (1941-1945), postwar Canadian government oceanographic and acoustics research vessel and, since 1985, a permanent floating naval museum. This record in pictures of a single RCN warship is unique among the 300-plus RCN warships of World War II. In fact the dearth of photos of wartime ships and crews was largely the result of the totally unimaginative Royal Canadian Navy brass who forbade – even threatened sailors with punishment – if they took private photos of their ships and crews in port or at sea in wartime.

Such limitations notwithstanding, Milner, with the support of Halifax's Maritime Museum of the Atlantic close by the *Sackville,* begins his photographic history with the ship under construction, then fitting out in the slip at Saint John Shipbuilding and Drydock during the summer of 1941, followed by a diversity of wartime photos of *Sackville at* sea and during refits. To this are added postwar photos of the ship in its career as the Canadian government's civilian CDNAV *Sackville* plus fascinating photos at the end of the book on her slow but steady restoration to her corvette status in 1943 – as everyone sees her today. There are also photos of both naval and civilian personnel in *Sackville's* life – as well as a few onboard photos of the kind forbidden during the war. There is the torpedoed and abandoned cargo ship SS *Belgian Soldier* as she drops well astern of her convoy as "seen from *Sackville's* foc'sle in the early hours of 3 August, 1942" [30] plus pictures of her skipper, officers and crew in July 1943. [44]

The only regret – which has nothing whatsoever to do with this fine book – is how *Sackville* would have been immeasurably enhanced as a floating museum if a captured German U-boat was on the other side of the same jetty. The two former enemy ships could have been visited in tandem and in perpetuity as the time inevitably draws closer when very few living Battle of the Atlantic veterans from either side will remain to tell the story – just their ships. Incredibly, Canada did have such an opportunity. But the same RCN brass who forbade wartime picture-taking gave orders in 1947 that the U-190, which had surrendered to the RCN in 1945, be sunk by gunfire close to where she had torpedoed the minesweeper HMCS *Esquimalt* in April 1945, a mere three weeks before the war's end. In contrast, in the spring of 1944 during the war at sea, units of the US Navy towed the surfaced and captured U-505 across the South Atlantic to a US naval port to be saved for postwar display. Today, U-505, accurately restored like *Sackville,* is a popular tourist attraction in its permanent site outside Chicago's famous science museum.

Finally, one must add that the retired naval vets of both the Naval Officers Association of Canada (NOAC) and the Halifax-based Atlantic Association of Chiefs and Petty Officers played major roles in the initial fund-raising for *Sackville's* restoration. Most of the founding trustees of the original Sackville Trust that raised $800,000 were NOAC members followed by successive fund-raising campaigns with members across Canada of both associations. These are important facts that the author fails to mention.

John D. Harbron
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John F. White. *U-Boat Tankers 1941-45: Submarine Suppliers to Atlantic WolfPacks.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 251 pp., illustrations, figures, maps, tables, photographs, appendices, bibliography, index. US $36.95, Cdn $53.50, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-861-5. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

Mobility, achieved through refuelling at sea, was a key ingredient in German submarine successes in critical periods during World War II. U-boat fleet commander Admiral Dönitz's strategy was to hit Allied shipping in areas where it was least well defended, quickly shifting to new hunting grounds when effective defences appeared. After Britain built up its escort and maritime air forces in home waters in early 1941, the U-boats moved west towards North America, and into the south Atlantic. When, in the spring and summer of 1942, Canada and the United States improved the defences in their waters, the U-boats moved back out into the central Atlantic, beyond the range of

shore-based air cover, and concentrated into very large wolf-packs that were able to overwhelm convoys' unsupported and under-strength surface escorts.

The Germans overcame the Royal Navy's destruction of the fleet of surface replenishment vessels in 1941 through technical innovation: the construction of submarine tankers. All of this is well known in the literature. So too is the important new dimension of the story added by releases of "Ultra" intelligence sources by British and US archives during the last twenty years. It was Britain's initial penetration of German naval Enigma in 1941 that enabled the Royal Navy to smash the surface tanker resupply system, and the great success of U-boat tanker operations in 1942 and early 1943 owed much to the "blackout" of British intelligence by the German navy's adoption of an improved four-rotor version of the Enigma machine. Allied re-penetration of Enigma in early 1943 allowed the British and US forces to hunt down the U-boat tankers, made vulnerable as they were by the need to establish by radio a precise rendezvous with their "customers."

U-Boat Tankers by John F. White makes a significant contribution by retelling this story with the focus sharply on the re-fuelling problem and the U-boat tankers. The author has used the surviving war logs fully and effectively, not least by seeking out additional sources to supply context, most interestingly on the design, work ups, operational cycles and technical strengths and shortcomings of the tanker boats. He has also closely married up this information with the latest work on Allied penetration of Enigma, and on the detailed course of the Battle of the Atlantic from both the Allied and German perspective. His effort to trace each mission of the ten purpose-built type XIV tankers, and the eight type XB submarine minelayers that also regularly refuelled combat boats makes for dense reading in spots. The good maps and presentation of information in tabular form in the appendices help overcome the difficulty. At the same time, the detail will make the book a useful tool for research.

Certainly the author demonstrates the importance of his subject. The U-boat tankers and minelayers carried out a total of some five hundred replenishments, which in many cases doubled the length of time attack boats were able to spend on operations. Most of these replenishments took place between the spring of 1942 and spring of 1943, and therefore played a critical role in some of the leading successes of the U-boat offensive. Without the tanker submarines, the attack boats would not have been able to make the extended patrols in North American waters and sustain the pack operations at mid ocean that took such a heavy toll on Allied shipping. It was these losses that, by threatening the British economy and Allied offensive deployments, compelled Britain, Canada and the United States to pour masses of additional resources into the anti-submarine war. Moreover, the precedent of the disasters in 1942-43, and tenuous edge of anti-submarine techniques over evolving submarine technology, allowed the Allies little margin to reduce the large escort and U-boat hunting forces during the rest of the war. In this light, White's calculation that each U-boat tanker was worth four attack boats may well understate their larger strategic contribution.

Roger Sarty
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Duncan Ballantine. *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War.* Princeton, 1947; "Logistics Leadership" series reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998. xxv + 308 pp., figures, index. No cost, cloth; no lSBN [A limited number of copies are available for individuals from the Naval War College Foundation, Naval War College, 868 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207 [tel: +1 401 848-8306; e-mail: kosterj@nwc.navy.mil]).

Worrall Reed Carter. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II.* Washington, 1954; "Logistics Leadership" series reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998. xxxvi + 482 pp., maps, photographs, list of COs, glossary, index. No cost, cloth; no ISBN.

This reviewer was well chosen to examine books on logistics, since, like so many military and naval historians, he has much to learn about the subject. One does not have to search far for an explanation; logistics is hard, not only for its practitioners but for those who seek to analyze its complexities years later. That is why books such as Duncan S. Ballantine's *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* and Worrall R. Carter's *Beans, Bullets and Black Oil* are so important – they take us where few historians dare to tread.

Ballantine's book is the more general of the two. It is, to put things in a nutshell, a learning experience. Chapter 1 provides both an excellent definition of what constitutes logistics and a hundred years of historical context. Then, in his opening remarks on World War Il, he makes the important point that "It was the great good fortune of the United States and the cardinal error of the Japanese that the attack at Pearl Harbor was directed almost exclusively against ships, and not to a greater extent against the supporting installations." [39-40] What follows is a clearly written, jargon-free account of the role of logistics, mainly in the Pacific Theatre, from 1941 to 1945, incorporating much detail on organization and reorganization in the course of the conflict.

We learn, for example, that "The task of logistics breaks down logically into three broad divisions – planning or the determination of requirements, procurement, and distribution." [47] We also learn about the difference between retail and wholesale approaches, and the use of "automatic supply" systems, where "each element in the supply chain must push supplies forward without requisitions, request or reports from forward units to be served," [174] hence subordinating accountability to a greater goal. Important players in the story, of which there were many, include Service Squadron 6, which sought to put afloat, as much as possible, all refueling, rearming, and reprovisioning operations, and the Logistics Organization Planning Unit (or LOPU), whose main role was to review procedures and recommend improvements. Taken together, the various organizations and the techniques they adopted lead Ballantine to suggest that "Perhaps the most outstanding achievement of 1944 had been the improvement of procedures of logistic control and operation within the theatres," [245] hence setting the stage for victory in 1945.

Worral R. Carter's study provides more in the way of operational detail as he takes the reader through the poor logistics of the Battle of Coral Sea and the primitive support arrangements at Guadalcanal to the huge scope of logistical operations off Okinawa. Throughout he provides a wealth of information on what was supplied, in what quantities, and in how much time. A few highlights: Service Squadron Ten effectively taking over Pearl Harbor's role of supplying the Fast Carrier Force during the Marshall Islands campaign, and later becoming "the principal – and fast becoming the only – source of supply to the ships in the Central Pacific"; [134-35] during the Marianas Campaign logistical organizations took on the task of replenishing carrier aircraft at sea, an idea that was "entirely new and peculiar to operations in the Pacific." [146]

Of challenges there were, of course, many, such as a chronic lack of boats to ferry supplies around floating bases, ammunition resupply when there were myriad types to store and provide, oiling at sea, the use of "reefer" ships, and much more. In discussing support for the invasion of Saipan, Carter describes how "The amusing rumpus over a shortage of black pepper that arose at this time would have made a good comic opera theme. There was such a howl in Task Force 58 that almost half a ton – 894 pounds exactly – had to be proportionately rationed among the ships before the growling stopped." [328] On a more serious note, the author points out how the presence of Service Squadron Ten relatively close to the fighting allowed several battle-damaged ships, including cruisers, to be rescued, towed, and repaired without having to send them back to Pearl Harbor or the US West Coast. By the early spring of 1945 Service Squadron Ten "could do almost anything a continental naval base could, and in many cases faster, with hardly any repair job it could not tackle and accomplish." [293] In essence, Carter's book is an analysis of how this was achieved.

The two works complement each other well, and though they contain little of the cut and thrust that first interested many of us in military and naval history, they are important books that historians must study if they are to understand how victory in the Pacific was achieved.

William Rawling
Ottawa, Ontario

F.W. Bates; Walbrook D. Swank (ed.). *Pacific Odyssey: History of the USS* Steele *During World War II.* Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1998. xvi + 92 pp., photographs, illustrations, maps, appendices. US $9.95, paper; ISBN 1-57249-145-0.

During World War II destroyer escorts were built in United States shipyards to satisfy the great need for ships with the primary duty of anti-submarine warfare. There were 563 completed from 1943 through 1945. Fifty-six were high speed transports (APD); the others were assigned

to escort duty with merchant convoys and naval task groups. Other duties included aircrew rescue and training American submarines. USS *Steele* DE-8 was one of the earliest such destroyer escorts commissioned and *Pacific Odyssey* is an account of her wartime service. Built at the Boston Navy Yard she carried out her initial work-up at Bermuda, then returned to Boston for ten days before proceeding to the Pacific for the remainder of the war.

Until now the history of this class of vessels was scattered through many books about the war; very little had been written about them specifically. It is a shame, then, that *Pacific Odyssey* does little to fill this historical gap. Originally written under wartime conditions of censorship and security, it offers not much more than a chronological record of where she went and a little about what she did. This record ends abruptly on 18 September 1945 as she departs Guam for the United States. There are roughly drawn charts of her numerous voyages, a recording of the reporting and detachments of the officers and a complete crew list in the appendix with dates of reporting and detachment. What is missing, probably due to wartime security restrictions, is any description of the ship. It would be nice to know some details of the dimensions, power plant and armament of the vessel without having to refer to other publications. Such data could have been added in the preface or in an appendix.

Author Frank W. Bates served in USS *Steele* for the last eleven of the nearly thirty months from the ship's commissioning to the end of the record. He apparently compiled the material which was then edited by Wallbrook D. Swank, a prolific author of Civil War events. This is Swank's first effort at maritime history. In effect, what author and editor have put together is the framework for a story that still remains to be told.

Eugene Harrower
Portland, Oregon

Janusz Skulski. *The Battleship Fuso.* "Anatomy of the Ship" series; Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 256 pp., tables, photographs, lines drawings, illustrations, bibliography. US $55, Cdn $84.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-046-0. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

This is Janusz Skulski's third contribution to the "Anatomy of the Ship" series, having previously completed highly successful works on the Japanese battleship *Yamato* and heavy cruiser *Takao.* This series of books aims to provide the finest documentation on individual ships and ship types ever published. Skulski is a model builder with a deserved reputation for extraordinary attention to detail, which is very evident in the larger portion of the book. The photographs and, in particular, the lines drawings of HIJMS *Fuso* are as superbly executed and visually exciting as the jacket liner claims them to be. With the aid of a large group of friends in Japan, Skulski unearthed new and previously unknown resource material which he then used to good effect to make the anatomy portion of the book as complete as the available records would allow. While the author admits that gaps in the record remain, the result is an eye-pleasing and comprehensive study of the many and extensive transformations of this World War Il-era battleship.

The book is divided into three sections of significantly unequal length: an introduction of a scant twenty-three pages; a section of photographs of forty pages; and the lines drawings, which amount to an overwhelming one hundred and eighty-two pages. The short introductory section is meant to provide the details of the ship's design and service history plus its technical specifications, which the liner notes claim is the usual approach of such monographs. Given the size of the book, the result is a poorly organized, decidedly cursory, and somewhat clinical description of the ship. Skulski limits himself to explanations of what happened during *Fuso's* service life but provides virtually no analysis as to why things happened. Considering that the author has been in possession of previously unknown documents of possibly great historical value, this is a most regrettable limitation on the potential value of the book.

Unfortunately, there are some very evident weaknesses in the structure of this book. The introduction is not written in a scholarly style and there are absolutely no footnotes or endnotes to indicate the source of the details being provided. Such a serious deficiency means that Skulski's beautiful work falls well short of its potential to be an authoritative reference. This weakness is most glaringly evident in a one-and-a-half-page section wherein Skulski attempts to clarify the circumstances of the sinking of both *Fuso* and her sister ship *Yamashiro* at the Battle of the Suriago

Strait in 1944. There has been a long-standing debate over the details of the action in this battle and Skulski claims that his extensive research confirms the Japanese version of events. He does not, however, go into any detail whatever in his explanation nor does he substantiate his conclusions. This very weak treatment of an important historical issue is already drawing strong and detailed criticism by dissenters and the reader should be aware that the issue is far from being resolved based on Skulski's work.

Some of the lines drawings contain errors that indicate oversights in the editing and production process. Thus, two magnificent drawings of *Fuso*, [80] one an overhead view and the other a side view, are marred by the unexplained omission of the primary antiaircraft gun mountings from the side view. Elsewhere, [90-91] a spectacular drawing of the ship showing the characteristic and massive pagoda-like superstructure to very good effect is identified as a view of the ship in 1915, while on the opposite page, a view of the ship in its original condition after launching is described as its final configuration in 1944! Clearly the description of two front views of *Fuso* have been reversed. Since a central theme of the book is to describe the impressive transformation of this often-modernized ship, such an error from a highly respected publisher is truly startling.

The result of these errors, omissions, and unbalanced structure is to diminish significantly the book's value as a work of history. Had the author wished to produce a definitive work of enduring worth, more attention should have been paid to scholarly writing practices and historical analysis, perhaps at the expense of some of the many pages of minutely detailed drawings. While *The Battleship Fuso* may be of inestimable worth to model builders, it can only rank as a tertiary reference to naval historians.

Kenneth P. Hansen
Toronto, Ontario

David Wragg. *Carrier Combat.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998. viii + 291 pp., illustrations, photographs (b+w, colour), maps, bibliography, index. US $39.95, Cdn $57.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-115-7. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON.

The twentieth century saw several advances in naval warfare, including the submarine and the development of naval air power. By the end of World War I, the Royal Navy had developed the aircraft carrier, a concept soon emulated by the US, Imperial Japanese, and French Navies. Though developed in the interwar period (1919-1939), the aircraft career's combat baptism did not occur until World War II, with later appearances in Korea, Suez, Vietnam, the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict, and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Conflict. David Wragg's *Carrier Combat* is just what its title implies: a comprehensive account of aircraft carrier combat actions.

Wragg organizes his work into six discrete sections: the development of the aircraft carrier, carrier activities off the northern Europe coast and in the Mediterranean in 1939-1942; the Pacific War in 1941-1942; the final stages of carrier combat in Europe and the Mediterranean in 1942-1944; the victory in the Pacific from 1942-1945, and the post-1945 combat usage of the aircraft carrier. Canadian Naval veterans and RCN enthusiasts may be disappointed to find no mention of the RCN carriers HMCS *Warrior, Magnificent,* and *Bonaventure.* However, these saw no combat and were accordingly omitted. Earlier carriers operated by the RCN, *Nabob* and *Puncher,* each had brief service careers in World War II.

Each section is further divided into subtopics dealing with carrier actions. For example, the section dealing with the Pacific War *ante* the Battle of Midway has subsections on carrier operations around Guadalcanal, the Solomon Islands, the Gilbert Islands, "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" (a 1944 battle in which US Navy carrier fighters took a heavy toll of Japanese aircraft at minimal losses to themselves), the British Pacific Fleet's operations in and around the island of Sabang, the Battle of Formosa, the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Battle for Okinawa. Each sub-topic contains a brief statement of the background of the carrier action, an analysis of the ship and aircraft involved, including statistics, a description of the action, and a final interpretive comment. The section on the postwar usage of the aircraft carrier may spark discussion; Wragg gives full credit to the USN/RN carrier effort in Korea. He gives credit to carrier sorties in Suez, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, and the Persian Gulf conflict, but he does not avoid the flawed strategy that led to Suez and Vietnam. He is more complimentary of the successes in the Falklands and Persian Gulf.

The book is heavily illustrated. Every section

contains some photographs, and a colour section contains some unusual photographs of aircraft , carriers, personnel and equipment. Included therein is a rare shot of a USN Grumman F9F-5P reconnaissance aircraft in natural metal finish – very unusual for a shipboard aircraft. The photographs will be of help to a modeller or aircraft/ marine historian. The maps and charts included within the text orient the reader to the location of each carrier action.

This book is a most impressive work. It offers an "easy-reading" narrative while also satisfying scholarly and interpretive expectations. Wragg's "Comment" at the end of each sub-topic provides the basis for historical debate and discussion. Moreover, Wragg analyses the various types of aircraft used by the combatants in each carrier engagement. From the text it is clear the Allied cause in World War II was fortunate to have carrier aircraft of the high quality employed by the US Navy and exported to the Royal Navy.

In short, the purpose of this work succeeds admirably. Wragg has presented a comprehensive account of carrier operations while simultaneously making this readable for the novice to the field. The expert in this field of study will likewise find much in *Carrier Combat* to agree and also to debate. It is recommended to a wide variety of readers. The cover carries a striking colour photograph of a US Navy A-7 Corsair prior to its steam catapult launch.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Richard Johnstone-Bryden. *HMS* Ark Royal IV: *Britain's Greatest Warship.* Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1999. ix + 262 pp., photographs, bibliography, index. £20, US $39.95, cloth; ISBN 0-7509-1798-9. Distributed in North America by International Publishers Marketing, Inc., Herndon, VA.

Richard Johnstone-Bryden and Sutton Publishing have produced a handsome, informative but not entirely satisfying history of the last of the Royal Navy's conventional fixed-wing aircraft carriers. Indeed, it may be more accurate to describe this book, in the words of the Foreword written by Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Michael Pollock, as a "Report of Proceedings" rather than a history. Considered in that vein it adds some measure of insight into the twilight of Royal Navy fixed-wing aviation prior to the deployment of the V/STOL Harrier. It also provides insight into the culture of the Service at a time when significant social change was occurring in Great Britain itself.

The author has divided his material into chapters corresponding to HMS *Ark Royal's* six commissions as well as a brief treatment of her construction and finally of her ultimate demise. The primary vehicles used to flesh out the story are a substantial number of interviews with those involved with the construction, commissioning, operation and finally the deletion and scrapping of this ship. These oral histories are woven into the official record of HMS *Ark Royal* from the time she was laid down in 1943 until she was scrapped in 1980.

The result is a fascinating tapestry of recollections from the dockyard, mess decks and Wardroom covering a thirty-five-year period with the latter ten years predominating. We learn, for example, that there were near collisions on the trials conducted before the ship was turned over to the Royal Navy and that an enterprising Petty Officer generated vast sums for the ship's fund by selling flower pots of earth from Plymouth to American visitors during a deployment to the United States. We also have the ship's version of the collision in the Mediterranean between HMS *Ark Royal* and a Soviet Kotlin Class destroyer in November 1970, as well as a great deal of anecdotal discussion about the difficulties of operating aircraft not truly suited to their roles or which technology had passed by, such as the Westland "Wyvern," DH "Sea Vixen," and Supermarine "Scimitar."

Rewarding as this chronology may be, it nevertheless does not tell the full tale though there are many hints at the larger context into which the HMS *Ark Royal* story fits. There is little explanation of why it took twelve years to build the ship. We are not provided with much information on the technical and engineering shortcomings of Ark *Royal* when compared to her sister HMS *Eagle* or of the factors which contributed to the latter's not being considered a happy ship. We are provided little information on the conditions of life aboard apart from a telling photograph showing a crowded mess deck not far removed from scenes recorded fifty years earlier. And finally, there is very little analysis of what transpired at the end of her life and what really lay behind the decision to do away with the traditional fixed-wing carrier in the Royal Navy.

Despite these shortcomings, this is a handsome book, loaded with detail and profusely illustrated with black and white photographs, many of which have not previously been published. The book is well designed and printed on a high quality stock which does justice to the illustrations. Useful descriptions of her three earlier namesakes and her successor are included as an appendix. Summary data are also presented on her leading particulars, structural changes during major refits, types of aircraft embarked, costs of construction and Commanding Officers.

In conclusion, this book will be welcomed by those who wish to obtain a feel of the period and a narrative and visual rendition of the life of a major class of warship in the Royal Navy. But it is not an exhaustive treatment. Those wishing a more in depth analysis will have to look elsewhere.

Christopher J. Terry
Ottawa, Ontario

Miles Rivett-Carnac. *Fran Ship to Shore.* Bishop Auckland, Durham: Pentland Press, 1998. vii + 165 pp., photo-plates. £19.50, cloth; ISBN 1-85821-535-8.

As I took my first leaf-through this book it seemed that its author and your reviewer might have much in common. We both laboured as chief cadet captains during our early education as "makee-learnee" naval officers. He had a King's telescope to balance my Nixon sword. He went off to join his training cruiser only seven years before I first went off to sea in HMCS *Ontario.* There is a photograph in his book of HMS *Dainty* transiting the Kiel Canal which might have been taken within days of when my HMCS *St. Croix* had her portrait taken there in 1963. I was, in a word, intrigued.

Alas, it was not to continue; as the similarities came to a shuddering halt. He left the RN as a commander in 1970 for a career in high finance; I exited the RCN as a lieutenant two years earlier, for a career as a historian. But lo; there still was a chance, for he went to Baring brothers, the English merchant bankers. I had just finished reading Ron Chernow's monumental history of *The House of Morgan,* and was eager to learn more of the financial manipulations of the past twenty years from a British point-of-view. Perhaps I would be enlightened as he followed his career ever upwards at the bank.

I have a treasured cartoon in my historical scrapbook depicting a clump of Victorian gentlemen, by all appearances, sitting around a table sipping their afternoon tea. A minion is delicately whispering in the ear of one of them that there was

> "`a Spot of trouble, Sir...they've found a slight discrepancy on one of those strange electronic devices the young traders use...'"

Above the table hangs the sign "Barings Bank." The cartoon, of course (from the *Ottawa Citizen,* 1 March 1995), concerned the antic of the rogue trader, Nick Leeson, whose nefarious activities brought the end to a bank that in the last century had stood Canadian governments in good stead. One of those tea-slurping bankers could very well have been the author of the book under review, for at one stage of his career in the upper echelons of Barings he was in charge of the department that "ran" Leeson.

In the author's accounts of his two careers the book, like the bank, founders. M.R-C (as the author refers to himself throughout) is all too keen to drop the names of the important people he met in both careers, without taking his story any further. M.R-C's account of his naval career would indicate that he was in the last brigade of RN Mohicans, those whose career prospects and path were governed by prowess at cricket, rugby and squash. Time and again his navel peers are gauged by their skills at those gentlemanly sports (see pp. 9, 15 and 17, for example). One is reminded inexorably of the extremely amusing account of naval officers' "flimsies," the tidy little slip of paper by which commanding officers reported their real thoughts of the officers whose conduct they were reviewing. Had I been M.R-C's captain his flimsy would have read that "he used my ship to transport himself from cricket pitch to rugby ground." Suffice it to say that although his naval career spanned such events as the Suez Crises, and British disentanglement from Cyprus and Indonesia, we learn nothing of what it was like to be in the operational RN in those times. Similarly, while M.R-C's time at Barings covered all the enormously significant changes going on in world-wide financial markets since 1970 in the era Chernow attacked as the "casino age" of modern finance his account is bereft of

any such insights.

It may very well have been M.R-C's fate to be one of the last of the old-style "gentleman bankers," in much the way he represented a dying breed of RN officers (one cannot resist thinking that the book might well have been sub-titled "From One Old Boy's Network to Another"). Certainly one cannot read *From Ship to Shore* and not come away with an understanding of how the venerable institution came to an end on a sticky wicket. By phenomenal coincidence, as I write this review, Nick Leeson has just been released from jail. There is a new tipple available in Singapore to commemorate his exploits – Leeson Lager. My suggestion to potential buyers of this book is to try some of the beer instead.

Kenneth S. Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, British Columbia

William M. Leary. *Under Ice: Waldo Lyon and the Development of the Arctic Submarine.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. xxviii + 303 pp., illustrations, maps, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US $32.95, cloth; ISBN 0-89096-845-4.

In recent years scholarly works on Canadian and American arctic exploration and expeditions, both by surface ships and submarines, have appeared. To arctic enthusiasts in general, and submariners in particular, the combination of Marion D. Williams' 1998 *Submarines Under Ice: The United States Navy's Polar Operations* and the newly published *Under Ice: Waldo Lyon and the Development of the Arctic Submarine* by William M. Leary is especially satisfying. Williams' book sets the stage for Leary's biography of Lyon, whom Williams describes as a pioneer in the field of under-ice arctic exploration. Leary's fine book adds depth and character to this arctic visionary. It is written in the same scholarly manner and engaging style as his 1996 book *Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station* (co-authored with Leonard LeSchack).

Waldo Lyon founded the NEL Submarine Research Facility in 1948, an important contribution to arctic research. That same year, after three successful submarine expeditions in arctic waters, Lyon predicted that "The reality of a polar submarine that can navigate the *entire* Arctic Ocean is not only admissible, but may be an immediate practicality." And yet, "official" US Navy opinion was that "Development of the trans-Arctic submarine ... remains in the realm of fantasy." [28] Lyon's commitment to arctic research and an under-ice submarine, his ability to find allies in the naval community, and his tenacity in the face of complacency, if not outright skepticism within the navy, is an inspiring tale. Of special interest to Canadians is Lyon's consistent cooperative effort with the Canadians throughout his lengthy career. The Arctic's strategic importance facilitated such cooperation and Leary's account reveals the commitment of both nations' scientists to convince their military of the potential of arctic under-ice transit and the rewards of greater arctic knowledge. In the early postwar years, in order to convince his superiors of the Arctic's importance, Lyon "place[d] arctic research within existing naval policy" [36] and "within the Fleet rather than within the Material Command or Research Development structure." [40] While there was debate within both navies over arctic warfare, there was consensus on the necessity for more complete oceanographic surveys, hydrographic data, navigational charts, and bathymetric readings. Leary's account takes the reader on Lyon's emotional rollercoaster as he pursued both increased arctic research and an under-ice submarine program.

Lyon was aboard the historic 1957 arctic transit of the nuclear-powered submarine *Nautilus,* a voyage that proved "'unlimited movement' under the ice was now a reality." [107] Then, spurred on by "the overwhelming pressure ... to produce a trump card in the world political game" after *Sputnik,* [108] the Eisenhower administration supported the 1958 transit of *Nautilus* to the North Pole. On both voyages Lyon was present as the boat's senior scientist. These expeditions, in addition to the voyage of another American submarine, *Skate,* demonstrated the growing capability of the under-ice submarine, and Lyon's focus turned to developing a submarine that could operate and surface year-round in the Arctic. With new momentum and official support, Lyon participated in the extraordinary 1960 voyage of *Sargo* which transited 6,000 miles of arctic waters under ice in the winter, surfaced twenty times, and utilized NEL-designed sonar equipment during shallow water transit. For his many contributions, Lyon received the American Society of Naval Engineers' Gold Medal Award. Leary's account of the various arctic voyages is far from dry. The difficulties and near-misses experienced during

the expeditions relay a sense of urgency and, as in *Project Coldfeet,* the reader comes to appreciate the power of the ice and man's frailties against the elements.

Returning to US-Canadian cooperation, Lyon's next voyage was the under-ice transit of the famous Northwest Passage. Arctic veteran and *Labrador* captain, now Commodore OCS Robertson, accompanied Lyon on *Seadragon's* historic journey. The successful expedition spelled the "end of a chapter of all experimental cruises" [205] and opened the door to Lyon's next goal, the "arctic-capable attack submarine" [226]. Delayed, in part, by the tragic 1963 loss of the nuclear attack submarine *Thresher,* and the fact "that neither the [CIA] nor military intelligence sources had ever uncovered a naval threat to the United States via the Arctic Ocean," [232] it was not until 1969 that "the culmination of twenty years of experimentation" was realized. [247] In that year the arctic capabilities of the SSN-637 class submarines were successfully tested. But for Lyon, this achievement, while marking the zenith of his career, marked the beginning of its end as well. His next goal, a superior class of arctic submarines, was not realized. In 1993, despite receiving the prestigious David Bushnell Award for Technical Achievement in Undersea Warfare, he was also instructed to close the Arctic Submarine Laboratory. In addition, the navy's new class of submarines, the *SSN-21/Seawolf* was not capable of operating in the marginal sea ice zone, which Lyon believed was critical in under-ice submarine warfare. As Leary notes, "Lyon's lengthy career as a naval scientist ended on a deeply disappointing note," [257] but his invaluable contributions to developing the under-ice submarine and furthering arctic research, recorded in books such as Leary's, will help maintain Lyon's place in history.

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Martin Malek. *Militärdoktrin und Marinepolitik der UdSSR I956-1985.* Bern and New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1992.388 pp., maps, figures, tables, bibliography, index. sFr 88,00, DM 98,00, US $60.80, £35, FF 338,00, OS 733,00, paper; ISBN 3-631-44671-3.

The dramatic growth of Soviet naval power was the subject of intense study in the West during the Cold War. Some information about building programmes during these critical years is now coming out of Russia. A fresh analysis from a Central European perspective ought therefore to be welcome. Unfortunately this new study (whose title can be translated as "Soviet Military Doctrine and Naval Policy 1956-1985"), an expanded 1991 dissertation, falls short of expectations. Martin Malek is apparently a student of economics who was fascinated by what he describes as the "intersections" between Soviet policies and political science and Soviet maritime development. He set out to analyze Soviet military doctrine and then to examine the role assigned to the navy. Malek concentrated his study on 1956-1985, the eventful period when Admiral Gorshkov was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

This is an ambitious investigation. In the absence of analytical writings from the USSR it is based almost entirely on Western sources. The text is copiously footnoted. Yet the footnotes all appear in an abbreviated format (perhaps a German convention to save space?) which means that discovering information about these sources involves going straight to the bibliography. This is, admittedly, extensive (thirty-nine pages) and divided into several sections ("military doctrine, naval policy in theory and practice", etc.), but this also means that the reader must be quite determined in hunting down the sources cited in the footnotes. The lack of an index makes reference to the text a test of memory or intuition, though this is offset somewhat by a very detailed twelve page table of contents.

The main disappointment about this study is that it is really a raw compendium of information gleaned from the writings of others. No synthesis of the mass of information is offered. Nor is there a disciplined analysis of whether the order of battle was a reflection of the doctrines catalogued in the first part of the study. The three-page conclusion asserts that because of its military doctrines the Soviet Union would have created a major (but different) Navy even if its main rival, the USA had not been an important seapower. However, the case for this finding is not presented. The author gathered statements about everything from Sokolovsky's writings on doctrine to major naval exercises over the years and an examination of the naval order of battle. The wide focus of this compendium is illustrated by an assertion [154] that three Lithuanian officers in

the Baltic Fleet were executed in 1969 for spreading secessionist propaganda.

Many of the conclusions drawn by others are accepted at face value, which is a problem because several are one-dimensional and lack credibility. For instance, Malek asserts [11 l] that in a global war the Soviet Union's overseas allies – Cuba, Vietnam, Angola (listed twice), Libya and Syria – would become involved and that this would present the Soviet leadership with the problem of fighting a conflict in several theatres. Surely it was at least arguable that distant Soviet client states might have avoided becoming embroiled, or more likely that the Soviets would have avoided peripheral areas by concentrating on vital interests. Elsewhere [312], in a discussion about possible operations against NATO shipping, Malek cites a source stating that convoys would take three to four weeks to cross the Atlantic. The basis for such a surprisingly long transit time is not explained. And in the section on the merchant and fishing fleets [200-204] Malek simply re-states alarmist pronouncements. There is no acknowledgment of the role played by the rigidities of central planning and five year plans in shaping Soviet civil fleets.

Malek's book thus falls short of its promise of examining naval policy and force structure in the light of Soviet military doctrine. Its main value is in providing an unfiltered guide to many writings, largely Western, about the Gorshkov era.

Jan Drent
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Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr.. *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War.* Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1999. xxi + 517 pp., photographs, maps, tables, illustrations, abbreviations, notes, bibliography, index. US $59, cloth; ISBN 0-16-049476-1; US $46; paper; ISBN 0-16-049878-3. Order by GPO Stock Number: 008-046-00183-9 (cloth); 008-046-00189-8, (paperback).

Writing official history is a task which invites suspicion almost by definition. The unfettered access to official records elicits covetous glances from colleagues not so privileged. The final product equally is open to accusations of pandering to official sensitivities by skirting problematic issues and ignoring the foibles of ranking characters. CNRS member Alec Douglas was the Official Historian of the Canadian Forces for over two decades. Recalling the old adage that the naked truths of battle begin to get dressed five minutes after it is over, he once described the special responsibilities of setting the official record straight: "If there is no objective analysis based on all the available sources, people forget, or depend on subjective memories, or frequently end up believing in a myth."

Few myths remain by the end of this study of the Persian Gulf War by Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller of the US Naval Historical Center. Theirs is an impressively comprehensive record of Saddam Hussein's grasp for his southern neighbours, the build-up of Coalition forces to halt and expel him, and the continuing watch over his activities. The emphasis obviously is on the naval role. Here are the stories of the embargo and the sealift which constituted major elements of Operation Desert Shield, and then the wartime manoeuvres of Operation Desert Sword (the amphibious feint which was a vital part of the plan for Desert Storm). The prosecution of the war on the waters of the northern Gulf has received little attention, and readers will be satisfied with the wealth of new information presented. However, since naval operations generally unfolded "in support of" the air and land campaigns, neither Shield nor Sword makes sense without an understanding of those strategic and tactical environments. To set the context, the authors weave throughout their text an excellent overview to the conflict. The result is perhaps the best single-volume treatment to date of operations in the theatre.

This opens the way for new interpretations in many respects. For example, the disagreement between Air Component Commander General Horner and the initial Naval Component Commander, Admiral Mauz, over the employment of naval aviation sheds new light on the animosity between Horner and the Canadian Joint Commander, and offers perhaps the first use of the f-word in an official history [114 – if few myths survive, neither do many reputations]. Indeed, the whole question of the command and control of Central Command receives much critical attention. The inadequacy of the US Navy's arms-length relation with CENTCOM seems clear enough in hindsight, but Marolda and Schneller's dissection begs (and produces) a re-evaluation of

US Navy fleet posture through the Cold War. The authors generally pursue the logic of their research, with perhaps one exception. After the opening of hostilities, it took three weeks to declare victory over the emaciated Iraqi patrol boat fleet. Was this really due to cumbersome command and control arrangements? Or should six carrier battle groups, trained to take on the Soviet Navy, have been expected to show a little more aggressive capacity?

To their great credit, the authors' efforts to recognize the participation of the non-American Coalition partners is far more inclusive than the histories produced by either the US Air Force or Army. Although there remain certain small errors (the Canadian navy conducted interception operations, not in the Gulf of Oman as stated on p. 88, but in the upper central Gulf, and long before any of the other allies), the Coalition references are numerous and balanced. If the coverage given Canadian naval and air forces is any measure, the treatment is appropriate to the level of participation.

This is more than just an account of US Navy operations against Saddam Hussein. It is the story of a fleet making the transition from a Cold War posture to that of some newer world order in full concert with its allies. At less than 400 pages of text, Marolda and Schneller cannot hope to be the final word on Persian Gulf operations, but they have hit that right combination of inclusiveness and authority. *Shield and Sword* admirably performs the function of good official history: it establishes an objective basis upon which others can anchor their analysis.

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Rodney P. Carlisle. *Where the Fleet Begins: A History of the David Taylor Research Center, 1898-1998.* Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998 [order from: Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 (fax: 202-512-2250; `phone: 202-512-1800). Cheques payable to Superintendent of Documents]. xvii + 661 pp., illustrations, photographs, tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, index. US $48, cloth; ISBN 0-16-049442-7.

Not many historical works appear these days that were funded by the public purse. *Where the Fleet Begins* is one of the few and, given the length of time that the book took to reach critical mass (more than ten years at least), it was certainly started before the current decade of cutbacks and over-justification common today. It seems unlikely that such a work would, in the current environment, ever get approval to start and certainly not the continued support needed to eventually reach publication. For this reason and others, this book deserves attention.

Despite the subtitle, this is more than just a history of the David Taylor Research Center. Spanning one hundred years of naval research by the United States into both naval architecture and marine engineering, the story parallels the growth of the US Navy over the course of the last century. The US Navy rose from a coastal force unchanged since the Civil War to the world's largest, most modern and the most effective Navy mankind has ever seen.

As the last decade of the nineteenth century unfolded the United States began to look outside its natural borders in search both of challenge and opportunity in the marketplace as well as in the political arenas where power was and is today really exercised. The need for a world-class navy to do so effectively therefore became a cornerstone of Government policy.

Much of the technological development that took place in the United States at that time was the result of European ideas and education applied by new immigrants. The few qualified marine engineers and naval architects that the US Navy possessed at the time had mostly been educated in England or Europe, where naval development was years ahead of that undertaken by the US Navy. However, given the energy and decisiveness with which America attacks a problem once the focus is there, things happened. The creation of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers in 1893 was one such step. The membership of this new society together with the needs of the new navy led immediately to lobbying for the construction of the first towing tank on the North American continent. The Experimental Model Basin at the Washington Naval Shipyard opened in 1898, and this was followed within a decade by the Engineering Experiment Station located at the site of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The health and importance of these facilities waxed and waned over the balance of the century as money and attention was focussed, first on one fleet problem or challenge, then another.

Carlisle's chapters track the passage of time

and the development of major new technical issues. Complete chapters are dedicated to submarines and submersibles, silencing of ships and the "systems approach " to problem-solving. In the chapters covering more recent issues, where those involved are still alive, too much time is spent dealing with people and policies compared to earlier chapters which focus on results and true watershed events of the era.

The period between the wars is well documented and the foresight of designers and planners in developing the ships that would fight the next war is one of the best sections of the entire book. Tantalizing bits of technical trivia emerge throughout, early views of aborted designs of post-World War II aircraft carriers that lead to the Forrestal design and iterations thereof are scattered throughout the book. The chapter "Paths not taken " is a candid look at good ideas before their time as well as others that were just plain old bad ideas. SWATH technology gets considerable attention (SWATH, or Small Waterplane Area, Twin Hull vessels, resemble a catamaran, but the two hulls are very thin at the waterline and buoyancy is created by much larger, cylindrical hulls well under the water). These are very stable vessels, excellent for positional, sea-keeping type work and were developed by the US Navy for oceanographic and hydrographic type work. Carlisle highlights the involvement of the Canadian inventor Frederick Creed in the early days of development.

The written work is thorough, well researched, extensively footnoted and supported by a twenty-plus page bibliography. The author has many similar works to his credit and does not shy away from thorough descriptions of technical issues that challenged the two research centres over the years. The appendices however carry a number of mistakes and are nowhere near the quality of the book itself.

Overall, this book is well worth the price for those who enjoy studying the development of technology. Yes, it can be dry in parts with too much focus for my taste on policy versus actual physics, especially in the closing decades of this century. Nevertheless it is worth the read.

Rollie Webb
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Roger G. Steed. *Canadian Warships Since 1956.* St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 1999. vii + 93 pp., photographs, bibliography, index. $24.95, paper; ISBN 1-55125-025-X.

This is essentially an extensively annotated collection of photographs, most of which were taken by the author but which have been supplemented from other sources. The book portrays a reasonably representative selection of Canadian naval vessels of the last half century (the earliest ships shown having served in the RCN in the late 1940s, although their photographs are somewhat more recent). The work does not attempt to provide encyclopaedic coverage which, as the author makes clear, can be found elsewhere. One characteristic, however, of Canadian warships is that many were updated in the course of their long service lives, and the pictures of several of these ships in their varying versions are of considerable interest. A number of detailed photographs give insight into equipment installations and operations not found in more general surveys.

The accompanying text is useful and generally accurate. This reviewer was only able to detect two errors in fact, although the use of the term "VDS drogue" for the towed body of a variable depth sonar is a minor annoyance. The comments by the author and other contributors provide us with interesting insights into what it was like to serve in and to command some of the ships pictured. For the general reader, the book's interest as a personal and selective view is likely to outweigh its lack of complete but less detailed coverage, which can easily be obtained from, for example, the books of Macpherson and Burgess *(Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1985* and its subsequent update to 1991). For this former naval officer, both the earlier photographs of ships in which he served during the 1950s and the most recent photographs of the patrol frigates of the 1990s were of great interest.

The quality of the photographs themselves is uniformly very good, though it is a pity that the method chosen to reproduce the photographs has resulted in the loss of some detail. Nevertheless, the book will be a valuable addition to any collection dealing with Canadian naval ships and shipbuilding.

Hal Smith
Victoria, British Columbia

Richard Sharpe (ed.). *Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000.* Coulsdon, Surrey and Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Ltd., 1999. [88] + 912 pp., tables, photographs, glossary, indexes. US $420, cloth; ISBN 0-7106-1795-7. Also available on CD-ROM.

The foreword to every new issue of Jane's provides a comprehensive review of the naval situation, world wide. The editor has something to say about every significant navy and his comments on Canada have for several years been quite critical, not of the navy itself but of the government's neglect of the navy and of the armed forces in general. This year, the Canadian media (which always takes some note of the foreword) misquoted him as saying that our fleet was inferior to that of Mexico. This provoked a response from Naval Headquarters, protesting that ours was much more modern! In fact, the foreword did not compare us with Mexico at all but said we were afflicted with the same malaise that, in the editor's view, affects all western navies: neglect by government, shortage of personnel and the civilianisation of the armed forces in order to make them compatible with the social priorities of the nation. The opposing view is that military life must be different: tough, disciplined and by necessity hierarchical, in order for the forces to be effective. This is an on-going debate that has been evident in professional military journals. It should be said, however, that western forces have acquitted themselves well in the various crisis situations they have been called to resolve, such as Kosovo and East Timor.

The world-wide naval scene is as tranquil as it has ever been, with very few major warships under construction and no navy engaged in serious expansion – perhaps because those that would like to lack the means. The United States has only three nuclear attack submarines under construction, while Nimitz class aircraft carriers continue to be added at about one every three years, each replacing an older ship. Completion of the French nuclear-powered carrier *Charles de Gaulle* is delayed again and she will probably not be in service until 2001, twelve years after the keel was laid. The Russian navy is a spent force. Opinion in India is divided as to how to acquire a second aircraft carrier: buy the *Admiral Gorshkov* from Russia, which has been deteriorating in lay-up, or have the Russians build them a new one, which would probably be cheaper. The Chinese navy is learning to operate away from coastal waters and is probably at the stage that the Soviet fleet was at in the early 1950s. Iran's three Kilo class submarines patrol the Gulf of Oman and surface units are very active in coastal waters and around offshore islands, some of which are in dispute.

As this is probably the last year in which most of them will appear in the book, it is time to pay tribute to the designers, builders and maintainers of some famous World War II classes of warship which are still operational after fifty-five or more years of service. The navy of Taiwan, along with modern frigates, includes no less than eighteen US Navy Gearing, Allen M. Sumner and even Fletcher class destroyers, completed between 1943 and 1945, many of them veterans of the Pacific battles. They have been much modified and fitted with modern weapons and electronics, but their 600 psi boilers and 60,000 h.p. turbines keep soldiering on. One Gearing class remains in the Turkish navy and will probably be deleted. this year. Another is the command ship of the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. The only British World War II destroyer to survive is the Egyptian *El Fateh,* ex HMS *Zenith.* She is now tied up but was last under way as a training ship in 1994. She is absolutely original in appearance, with four 4.5-inch mounts and eight torpedo tubes and could be used with effect in a World War II movie. The other type of US warship that has remained in demand is the ubiquitous LST. Indonesia has nine, (some seen in news coverage of the East Timor situation) and Taiwan eleven, while others are scattered among other small navies – not bad for a type that was supposed to last just long enough to win the war!

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Charles C. Swicker. *Theater Ballistic Missile Defense From the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander.* "The Newport Papers," Vol. 14; Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998. xiv + 103 pp., notes, bibliography, glossary of abbreviations. Paper, no ISBN. Available at no cost from: President, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207 (e-mail: press@usnwc.edu).

On opening this book one is presented with a potentially daunting barrage of US military jargon and acronyms. This should not discourage use of

the book, for it contains an important message on the future of naval warfare and the use of naval forces in those ambiguous situations that are neither war nor peace. Still, this is not a book for light reading or for those not directly concerned with the mechanics of war-fighting at sea, naval force development, and the conduct of naval operations. Not only does Commander Swicker's book have much of importance to say it is also an excellent primer on future "high-tech" warfare, especially the integration of modern technology into defence organizations.

The heart of the study lies in the philosophy that as a result of the proliferation of ballistic missiles – with nuclear, chemical and biological warheads – theater anti-air warfare at sea has changed from a philosophy of "shoot the archer" to one of "shoot down the arrow." The justification for the shift in doctrine is not hard to accept: we saw Scuds used in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and the advances in missile technology being made by North Korea are now well publicized. As Swicker explains, [14-15] the recent proliferation of these weapons brings many population centres and industrial complexes into range of potential aggressors. Moreover, possession of quite simple ballistic missiles gives a state, or even insurgents, the means of applying coercive force.

Those who believe that the more traditional "state-versus-state" form of warfare is obsolete need not bother reading Commander Swicker's thought-provoking study because they will not understand the fundamental premise that an increasing number of states, rogue and otherwise, are acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The point made throughout the book is that these weapons are a reality and have already been used to good effect.

Why has anti-ballistic missile defence become a naval concern? Many would hold that land based systems are all that is needed and that those systems can be deployed to defensive positions when a threat emerges. Here, Swicker makes an important point, [18] that the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile system, such as Patriot, requires the deployment of a significant number of US military personnel to a foreign country in protecting US or collective interests where no local capability exists. By deploying a warship with an anti-ballistic missile defence capability, political sensitivities over compromises of territorial sovereignty need not be an obstacle.

Experience over the past decade has shown us that rapid response to an international crisis pays dividends and that the price of hesitation is invariably high in both political capital and human life. Experience in such operations, even though they have not always been completely successful, shows that armies are ponderous beasts that take time to assemble and deploy while navies can move out quickly and be on scene in a relatively short space of time. This, of course, is the essence of the US Navy's present "...From the Sea" strategy. The rapid deployment of a seaborne task force of aircraft carriers, missile-firing ships and submarines, and marines is still considered the best response to a deepening international crisis.

It is here that the wisdom underlying Swicker's book comes through: effective response to crisis will be a joint endeavor embracing air, sea and land forces, as well as many non-military agencies in the rebuilding process that must follow the restoration of order. In this, though, naval forces must take the initial lead. In Swicker's words, "the Navy kicks open the door and holds it open for the heavy land forces." [21] However, to be effective in that role the naval force needs the ability to counter the direct and coercive use of ballistic weapons. The situation in which a ballistic missile threat is possible simply cannot afford to wait for the deployment of land-based systems. The other factor is that by deploying quickly with a full range of weapons systems and response capabilities, a naval force provides the politicians with an important diplomatic "card" that may be sufficiently impressive to prevent or halt the spread of violence without resort to force.

Swicker's concept of future naval operations obviously requires some organizational change not only in the US Navy but also in those navies which routinely deploy with or cooperate with the Americans at sea. Theater ballistic missile defence requires that the naval task force have adequate early warning and command and control systems embracing the full span of modern information management technologies. Not all ships in the task force need be equipped to this extent but they must be able to function within the overall command and control system. In other words, the price of multilaterism at sea in the future will be interoperability with the US Navy.

In casting naval forces as the initial response to ballistic missile threats, especially their coer-

cive use, Swicker draws on traditional naval capabilities in explaining that the new role is an extension of the time-honoured function of navies. As he reminds us, "One of the historical strengths of naval forces has been their ability to carry out a variety of missions."[36] Within this traditional role, however, Swicker sees the future theater ballistic missile defence capable ships having strategic importance comparable to that of the ballistic missile-firing submarine or even a carrier battle group.

It will be easy for some to dismiss this book as merely another attempt to justify enormous military expenditures, but to do so would be to dismiss the reality that ballistic missiles are now more widely held than at any time in the past. Moreover, such a dismissal would require a rejection of the fact that ballistic missiles have considerable coercive value in an asymmetrical international system. One only has to consider the recent responses of Japan, South Korea, and the United States to the possible launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile by North Korea to understand this fact. The bottom line is that Commander Swicker's book contains a great deal of food for thought and should be widely read by those directly involved in the planning of naval forces structures and operations at sea, especially by the politicians and bureaucrats who control the purse strings of naval modernization.

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Charles W. Koburger, Jr.. *Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century: Projecting A Naval Revolution.* Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1998. xv + 167 pp., photographs, tables, illustrations, appendices, annotated bibliography, index. US $55, cloth; ISBN 0-275-95300-9.

J. Paul Reason. *Sailing New Seas.* "The Newport Papers," Vol. 13; Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998. xiii + 91 pp., figures, appendices, notes. Paper, no ISBN. Available at no cost from: President, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207 (e-mail: press@usnwc.edu).

These two works take very different approaches to a common subject , the future of the US Navy. Koburger is a former US Coast Guard officer who has written a number of historical studies. He is self conscious about his lack of experience in modern naval analysis and at times it shows, for example in his continued use ofNTDS to describe the current US action information system, in his discussion of the pros and cons of short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (STOVL) *versus* more conventional carrier aircraft, and in his coverage of the capabilities of the F-14. Some of his discussion is curiously dated, for example on the battleship question. More oddly still, there is no reference to the important Cyclone class patrol craft, while he puts some emphasis on the patrol hydrofoils (PHMs) – although these were stricken in 1993! He also gets himself into a rather unhelpful tangle with amphibious shipping designations. Some of Koburger's prescriptions and predictions are a little too specific for his research base and his style of writing also detracts from the strength of his argument. Nevertheless this is still an interesting book and quite a useful commentary on the American naval future as seen from the late 1990s.

Reason's paper has the opposite problem to Koburger's. It is definitely the work of an insider – no less a personage than the Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet. The paper has all the briskness of a senior officer's briefing. The admiral does have some very useful things to say about the challenges of the highly uncertain future naval environment and the need for a capability for the US Navy to respond with flexibility, agility and speed. He rehearses the capabilities of the fleet but quickly moves on to questions of management, using the carrier flight deck as his model of a flexible, "flat" and decentralised organisation. The paper then gets into much detail about proposed reorganisation that is probably too specific and which might date rapidly. It is easy to lose the wood for the trees here. Moreover the final section on how to achieve the reorganisation is accompanied by graphs and theory that goes to the opposite extreme of generality. Nevertheless, the admiral has much that is interesting to say, not least in his first appendix on "fighting principles" for a future fleet.

Between them these books provide a fascinating – if idiosyncratic – snapshot of the American naval debate at the end of the first post-Cold War decade. Both are worthy of attention.

Eric Grove
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Joel J. Sokolsky. *Projecting Stability: NATO and Multilateral Naval Cooperation in the Post Cold War Era.* "Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 4; Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998. xiii + 63 pp.. Cdn $10, US $8, paper; ISBN 1-896440-17-7.

This is a short but interesting piece of work, especially when read in the light of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo. Sokolsky examines, briefly, the development of NATO multilateral cooperation during the Cold War and the prospects for its continuation in the post-Cold War-era. The alliance's maritime goal has changed, from deterrence and warfighting to a search for stability ashore. But the author argues that the maritime component is nevertheless "uniquely suited to support the current objectives of the Alliance." [4]

Sokolsky's review of recent NATO multilateral maritime operations provides insights into the widening focus of the alliance. He sees maritime multilateralism as an example of an expanding mission in support of broader European interests that reach beyond the immediate geographic domain of the alliance. Inherent in Sokolsky's findings is a shift in NATO from defensive alliance to an organization seeking stability in adjoining regions. The author notes the alteration in NATO focus from the once-important Norwegian Sea, where the alliance might have fought a naval Third World War, to the Mediterranean basin, a region of political instability that might threaten European interests. Sokolsky points his finger at the Balkans as an area most likely to cause NATO further troubles. But he also sees NATO looking further afield, suggesting the possibilities of multilateral exercises with the navies of the North African littoral and the Levant, including Israel and Jordan (the navy of which operates not in the Mediterranean but primarily in the Red Sea).

Concerning the alliance's search for new missions, Sokolsky maintains that maritime support for peacekeeping operations will be a critically important element. He surveys NATO support for UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, such as Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, and Deliberate Force, as well as participation in and support for the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. The UN finds NATO maritime power so attractive, Sokolsky argues, because the alliance can provide on-call multilateral forces, the components of which are accustomed to working together and prove to be far more effective than a comparable *ad hoc* force cobbled together by the UN to meet the latest crisis.

Despite the attraction and capabilities of NATO's multilateral maritime forces, Sokolsky admits that one of its principal political attractions is that it is the most achievable form of military cooperation. In short, the over-the-horizon and possibly fleeting presence of a naval force allows member states to avoid the difficult political commitment inherent in the deployment of a comparable multilateral ground force. Unfortunately, maritime force is generally less effective than a ground force when dealing with affairs ashore. In recent Balkan crises, Sokolsky concludes, naval multilateralism has had "minimal impact." [61]

In retrospect, with its 1998 publication *Projecting Stability* offered clear evidence of a post-Cold War alliance – NATO – in search of a mission. Sokolsky highlights what could easily be termed mission-creep, in both geographic and other terms. In that sense, what is currently taking place in the Balkans is symptomatic of the changes outlined by Sokolsky more than a year ago. If one pairs multilateral air action alongside the maritime, as a form of military commitment politically easier to sustain, but less effective than a commitment of ground forces, then the parallel becomes complete, and the problems apparent.

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Robert Catley and Makmur Keliat. *Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea.* Aldershot, Hants. and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997. x + 221 pp., tables. US $69.95, hardbound; ISBN 1-85521-995-6.

The Spratly Islands is the collective name for a series of islets, Gays, reefs, rocks and low-tide elevations centrally positioned in the South China Sea. In contrast to the lack of precision regarding the number of above-water geographic features that exist in the Spratly Islands area are the sovereignty claims of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan-China and Vietnam to all or some of the islets and adjacent ocean areas. The multiple overlapping claims and the action asserting and supporting the claims has led to conflict and made the Spratly

Islands a high tension area in Asia.

All territorial disputes contain the possibility of violence and the Spratly Islands area has witnessed naval posturing and skirmishes. The national, regional and global interest in the Spratly Islands is essentially threefold. First, there is the possibility of hydrocarbon wealth in the seafloor of the Spratly Islands area. Second, the Spratlys are located adjacent to major commercial seaways, thus having a strategic importance for claimants and non-claimants. Third, the states adjacent to the Spratly Islands view both the dispute and individual sovereign claims as part of a larger strategic picture involving historic rights, regional prestige and national prowess. Another reason for interest in the Spratly Islands dispute has been the high-profile efforts of the Indonesian government in the 1990s to provide a forum for informal discussions to reduce the volatility of the dispute.

Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea endeavours to review all the various elements of the conflict. The book admirably provides an overview of the numerous components: the historical claims; recent occupations; the economic aspects; the strategic concerns; the role and interests of the United States, the Russian Federation and Japan; and the global context of the Spratlys issue. Special attention is rightfully given to the interests and actions of the PRC regarding the Spratlys dispute. The PRC is the major regional player. For this reason its actions in simultaneously asserting its interests in the Spratlys while seeking to soothe its neighbours is a central dynamic of the Spratlys dispute.

The longest chapter in the book is entitled "Indonesian Mediation." This topic is of special note for two reasons: one of the co-authors is Indonesian (the other is Australian) and Canada has had a curious involvement in the "mediation." Since 1989, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has been assisting the efforts of the Indonesian government in hosting informal regional workshops regarding the Spratly Islands controversy and related marine issues. Several Canadian academics (including the reviewer) and non-governmental technical experts have played a background role in the Indonesian initiative. In giving Canada credit for its involvement the authors provide a curious explanation for the Canadian involvement. At page 165, they comment that Canada produces "a `peace studies' perception of international politics" which "is understandable in a country that faces no strategic dilemmas, since the US will always protect it." Canada's support for the Indonesian initiative is based on the far-sightedness of the Canadian government, Canada's direct disinterest in Southeast Asia, the ocean expertise of Canadian specialists and the personal relationship and energies of the Canadian participants and the principal Indonesian involved former Ambassador to Canada Hasjim Djalal.

The authors provide some interesting hypotheses regarding the motivations of the Indonesian government in initiating the workshop process. In the first stages, Indonesia promoted itself as an "honest broker" in the Spratlys dispute since Indonesia has no claim to any of the islets in the Spratlys area. The authors surmise that part of the Indonesian motivation was concerns over the Spratlys being a potential regional flash point and that Indonesia, having had an important role in defusing the Cambodian conflict, was simply turning its attention to the next most volatile regional problem. In the mid-1990s it became clear that the PRC claim in the South China Sea extended beyond the Spratly Islands area and included ocean areas claimed by Indonesia in the vicinity of Natuna Island well to the south of the Spratly Islands area. The authors note, without explanation, that this altered the perceived role of Indonesia and changed the dynamic of the Indonesian initiative.

The authors determine that the Indonesian "mediation" efforts "failed." While the workshop process did not result in either a solution to the Spratlys dispute or a manner for managing the dispute, the workshop process is continuing with a mandate of building confidence through technical cooperation on marine issues. It remains to be seen whether this confidence-building approach will ultimately lead to resolution or management of the Spratlys imbroglio.

The authors have provided a readable introductory book regarding the issues and elements that are critical to an understanding of the Spratly Islands dispute but little new ground is broken or explored.

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