BOOK REVIEWS


One can compare America and the Sea to an oceanic trawl brimming over with treasures from the deep. Concentrating on the maritime experience of the United States, this sophisticated volume reflects the best and most recent scholarship. The book’s quality is not surprising since the authors of America and the Sea are distinguished historians serving on the faculty of Mystic Seaport’s Frank C. Munson Institute. That institute offers graduate-level courses in maritime history during the summer season. Now Mystic extends its educational impact by commissioning and publishing America and the Sea.

The breadth of this volume’s interpretive framework is suggested in the opening paragraphs. Here the authors assert that the sea can be perceived in two paradoxical ways: first, as a highway allowing nations to share in the worldwide mingling of people, resources, and cultures; and, second, as a barrier behind which a country such as the United States could be isolated and protected during much of its history.

The subject matter presented in America and The Sea is far more extensive than the salty account one might expect of the ocean-going merchant marine. That subject is covered very well. But the volume also presents insightful accounts of US fisheries, especially in the North Atlantic and Pacific Northwest, and describes water-borne commerce on the Great Lakes and other inland waterways. The volume contains illuminating coverage of the economic history associated with the development of US ports and changes in trade patterns. Another major component consists of the social history of the men and women associated with maritime industries. There are long sections dealing with the US Navy and the light house, revenue marine, and lifesaving services that eventually formed the US Coast Guard. Finally, attention is given to the influence of geography, natural resources, and the achievements of marine scientists in the historic interaction between people and the sea.

Much of the richness in America At Sea stems from the authors’ decision to supplement the basic narrative in several ways. The volume’s oversize format allows heavy use of illustrations, including numerous works of art and historic photographs. These add to the aesthetic as well as to the didactic value of the volume. Sidebars are presented with equal skill, and include many contemporary documents such as slave-voyage narratives, a battle report of USS Constitution, and Alexis De Tocqueville’s amazing commentary from the 1830s predicting that the United States would become the world’s leading naval power. As well, the principal authors, together with other scholars, offer in-depth comments on selected subjects or individuals. Many of these sections mirror the interest of modern historians in the roles of women, African-Americans, and the underclasses, all of which once received scant scholarly attention. The sidebars cover many other topics, such as modern aquaculture, the round-the-world cruise of Joshua Slocum, and recreational uses of the sea.

The conclusions in this volume are often fresh and challenging. For example, the authors identify a number of maritime factors that help explain the decision of colonial Americans to declare their independence from Great Britain. They observe that the maritime policy developed by the Federalists in the 1790s reflected a mercantilistic attempt to aid maritime industries. But Mystic Seaport’s scholars also point out that marine prosperity in the new nation depended upon the private initiative of ship owners and captains. While acknowledging the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the authors note that his seapower theories can be questioned.

Any work as ambitious as America at Sea may be criticized. In this reviewer's opinion the World War I naval section gives disproportionate attention to the London perspective of Admiral William S. Sims, dismissing all too easily Washington's point of view. For such a well-designed volume, it is surprising that the maps are not more handsome and numerous. Nor does the index appear to be entirely complete. A cross-check
revealed that the indexers failed to pick up the names of several scholars referred to in the text. Nothing, however, should obscure the fact that *America At Sea* is an important volume. It represents the most comprehensive and scholarly account of US maritime history written to date. The authors and publisher deserve a hearty well done for their notable contribution to our field.

Dean C. Allard
Arlington, Virginia


Michael Salewski is Germany's leading naval historian. He is a very prolific writer with interests that extend far beyond naval history. His *Political History of Germany*, for example, appeared in two volumes a few years ago. Teaching history at the University of Kiel since 1980, he is also the editor of a review journal and the *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft* as well as its side journal *Historische Mitteilungen. Beihefte*, of which *Die Deutschen und die See* is volume 25. For his sixtieth birthday, two of his pupils published twenty-two articles or parts from books he had written over the last three decades. Anyone familiar with Salewski's writings will welcome this collection because the files can be cleared of many photocopies, while those unfamiliar with his work now have an opportunity to get an excellent overview of the academic work of this eminent historian.

The way the essays are arranged almost turn the book into a monograph. The articles are presented more or less chronologically, from the middle of the nineteenth century forward to the end of World War II. The opening paper, "Germany as a Sea Power," is a splendid general introduction. The surprising conclusion Salewski reaches is that Germany became a sea power only when she did not have any aspirations in that direction, i.e. the moment she joined NATO and was given a specific task within the frame of international maritime politics. For the first time in history the German navy carried neither ideologies nor claims for colonies or shares in the international maritime economy, which so often had caused deadly competition with other powers.

In cooperation with the United States, Great Britain and the other NATO partners the German navy (i.e. the West German navy) helped to secure peace in the Baltic and North Seas and in the Atlantic, in contrast to the performance of its predecessors, which seemed always to head for disaster when they acted on their own and in antagonism to the rest of the world.

Every topic Salewski touches is masterly scrutinized by an author who knows the sources and archives. His analysis is often surprising and always brilliant, especially when dealing with aspects of the *Kriegsmarine* (1935 to 1945). Based on an intimate knowledge acquired in the 1960s when he wrote his dissertation and later his *habilschrift* about the German Supreme Naval Command, he offers valuable insights into the quite intricate relations between Hitler and Raeder, Raeder and Dönitz and Dönitz and Hitler. It is astonishing how many Anglo-American writers fail to consult Salewski's path-breaking work on the German Supreme Naval Command.

Although I was familiar with most of the articles in this collection, reading them again was highly stimulating. The book can be recommended to all readers interested in German naval history. It is a *must* for all scholars working in that field. Perhaps one day an English version will be available.

Lars Ulrich Scholl
Bremerhaven, Germany


This yearbook contains the papers of a conference held at Esbjerg in August 1997. The publication within a year's time deserves a compliment. It is once again in the attractive blue jacket, one of the trademarks of the Esbjerg museum. By and large, the six papers show good quality but do not have much relation to each other. Hence I restrict myself to a brief characterization of the essays.

As part of a greater study into the history of the fisheries along the South Devon coast from the eleventh into the mid-sixteenth century, Harold Fox discusses the transition from seasonal
to permanent settlement of fishing villages in England. He draws attention to the influence of landscape and the location of those villages in that transition, and examines the role played by aspects of the development of local sets of by-laws and the birth of nonconformity. S.I. Langhelle discusses some aspects of the timber export trade from the Tysvaer area of Norway (north of Stavanger) during the seventeenth century, when Scottish traders seem to have dominated, rather than the Dutch as was the case in several other areas. Another essay by the Flemish historian J. Parmentier shifts our attention to the Southern Netherlands after they had become part of the Austrian empire in 1713. Several new maritime activities were developed during this period, not only in trade with China and India, but also in whaling and the fisheries. Parmentier describes in detail a short-lived effort in Nieuwport to catch herring and cod near the Far Oer and Iceland from 1727 to 1740. Olaf Janzen's article deals with piracy in Newfoundland waters during one of the more difficult periods in the history of that island, the decade after the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713). There was very little British authority visible or present, the fisheries were unprofitable, and hence Newfoundland began to develop into a shelter and recruiting ground for Atlantic pirates. This lasted until c. 1725. Janzen includes discussion of the interesting history of Atlantic piracy well before 1713. In his well-known lively and anecdotal style, A. Jarvis describes the role of the workers (and their hardships) in the construction of the nineteenth-century docks of Liverpool. Finally, there is an essay by J.F.E. Biasing which analyses the role played by the trade in timber in Rotterdam's breakthrough after 1870 as the major port in Holland and Western Europe.

Jaap R. Bruijn
Leiden, The Netherlands


An esteemed senior colleague and friend, whom I was visiting some years ago at his east-coast home, once put it to me that oceans have their own distinctive smell. This observation, by no means intended as a humourous nod to the usual concerns of environmentalists, stemmed from his many years experience on the world's oceans. To this day, that remark has remained with me in part because, having been raised on the Pacific coast, I was immediately able to sense the truth of it, and also because it so aptly expressed something of the intangible character of coastal life.

Pierre Berton's Seacoasts, illustrated with André Gallant's photography, is in many respects a celebration of the intangible – an impressionistic portrait of the different qualities and cultures of Canada's three ocean coasts. Like most coffee-table books, it appeals to the senses, though in this case delight is clearly tempered by concern. Organized from west to east, with sections dedicated to each coast, Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic, and complemented by two poetic photo essays, one entitled simply "Land Scapes," the other "Sea Shapes," this book aims both to reinforce our attachment to Canada's vast coastal legacy and to elevate our environmental awareness.

Berton is well-known in Canada as a popular writer with a passion for history. He has an ear for the resonant anecdote and the compelling story, which is also much in evidence in this book, as is an abiding, wide-ranging historical interest. As a book aimed at a popular audience, footnotes are non-existent, even though in covering so much geography, Berton inevitably also covers vast stretches of difficult historical terrain. Yet for all its historical context, this book is by no means a formal history of Canadian coastal life. Rather, it is a kind of journalistic tableau, richly illustrated with both contemporary colour images and an evocative selection of historic, black and white photos.

The Pacific is represented by chapters dealing with the Potlatch tradition (a way of addressing the natural wealth of the region), the salmon fishery (introducing a recurring environmental theme) and Pacific light keepers, offering a sketch of a now-vanishing way of life in which Berton stresses the darker side of this work, its hardship and isolation, while also lamenting the indifferent attitude of earlier governments. The Arctic shore is similarly described through chapters devoted to the search for the Northwest Passage, the Whale hunt (returning to the environment) and a brief exploration, part history, part social commentary, of cultural contact and transition among the Inuit. Finally the Atlantic coast, perhaps the richest in historical references, is covered by chapters dedicated to shipbuilding, the cod fishery (another
warning-lament for a ravaged ocean resource) and Sable Island’s fabled reputation as “The Graveyard of the Atlantic.”

If Berton is well-known for the way he applies a readable journalistic style to historical concerns, it must be said that in this book the former wins out over the latter as the operative force. In part this is because the attention paid to the environmental health of our oceans, while presented here in a broadly sketched historical context, is very much a contemporary affair, the problem with our salmon and cod fisheries being particularly pressing. Moreover, Berton’s critical voice achieves its strongest tones in these sections. Yet journalistic style is also evident in the handling of the purely historical topics. Take, for instance, the chapter on Atlantic shipbuilding in the nineteenth century. The idea of a “golden age” is here clearly played for dramatic effect and nineteenth-century hyperbole is repeated without reservation. Yet the historical trajectory of nineteenth-century shipbuilding, as presented by Berton, only vaguely represents the complex factors, relative measures of value, and the cycles of demand that actually influenced this enterprise. Admittedly, one should not expect nuanced historical analysis from a book of this sort. Still, Berton is clearly aware of the important work undertaken by Eric Sager, Gerald Panting and Lewis Fischer, [168] research intended precisely to shed light on a subject too often obscured by regional mythology.

Yet, judged in the context of its intended goals and audience, such objections are minor. While specialists may well take issue with matters of detail and emphasis, ultimately this book does succeed in offering us, in pictures and words, some of what otherwise only travel, local insight and thoughtful use of the senses – including an appreciative nose for the sea – can fully reveal.

Garth Wilson
Ottawa, Ontario


For this reviewer, the first glimpse inside this little volume is decidedly off-putting. Under the title “Auld lang Syne” is a prefatory excerpt from the Daily News of 16 December, 1896, which commences with the asinine assertion that “the change of name from Tickle Harbour to Bellevue is an improvement both from a euphonic and a postal standpoint.” The piece goes on to commend a wholesale revision of Newfoundland nomenclature, not only to eliminate many duplications that might confuse the postal service (a more or less worthy objective), but to prettify that which was “not pretty” and to render acceptable to pious ears that which was “blasphemous.” Thus Damnable would be changed to Columbus, Muddy Hole to Meadow Hall, and names like Devil’s Cove, Dirty Cove, Cuckold’s Cove, Maggotty Cove, Naked Man, Famish Gut, and others, equally redolent of our unique historical and cultural experience, banished completely from our lexicon, as though our past were an embarrassment and a shame. I do not know if the quotation is offered with Mr. Harding’s approbation, or whether he presents it satirically as with Swift’s "Modest Proposal." I sincerely hope that the latter supposition may be the correct one.

The main text of the book is an annotated gazetteer of settlements on the Avalon Peninsula exclusive of the Isthmus. Strangely, the list is not complete. Communities like Portugal Cove South, Mobile, Kitchuses, and Green’s Harbour, for example, do not appear. A few now-abandoned villages are identified yet many more are not. The criteria for exclusion are not established, though one might suppose that a deficiency of quirkiness was the preponderant consideration.

For, as the author notes in his introduction, he is a person who likes his “history quirky, odd and dramatic.” But, of course, this is not a work of History as such. There are, indeed, historical facts scattered throughout the text, typically such as would interest the antiquarian, or constitute the “bread and butter” of an average tour guide. But with the fact, there is a large admixture of pseudo-history, legend, mythology, folklore, tradition, and, in respect of place names, particularly, a healthy dollop of fanciful speculation, as in the case of Foxtrap, for example.

Yet as we follow Harding around the Avalon, we hardly get the sense that we are involved in an exploration. Indeed, geography, whether cultural or physical, hardly comes into it. The spectacular rock bound coasts, the ever-present ocean, the stark beauty of the geologically tormented barrens, the multitudinous rivers and turbulent brawling brooks, the lakes and ponds, the dramatic
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capes, awesome views such as that which bursts upon the traveller's eye as he or she tips the hill that leads down to Bay de Verde, and, of course, the manner in which our built heritage was adapted to a hard landscape and a way of life predicated on the necessity to catch fish, are all absent. And yet these, I believe, are the elements of exploration to which the visitor's eye should be drawn.

Thus, for those with an interest in quirky history, this book will be of considerable interest; for those interested in exploring the Avalon, it will fall short.

To end on a personal note, I must decline the honour of having been born in St. Mary's Bay, though there are indeed far worse places. But my St. Joseph's is located on the western side of "that far greater Bay."

Leslie Harris

St. John's, Newfoundland


In Westcoasters, author Tom Henry discusses fourteen vessels that he credits with significance in the early history and subsequent development of Canada's Pacific coast. Most of them have already received separate and individual attention by historians in numerous books and articles, often in technical or analytical language. Bringing a fresh perspective to these ships and vessels was therefore not an easy task. For this reason Henry wisely steers a different course, looking for anecdotal and humorous material while providing a quick survey of the vessels' uses and potentials. By treating all of the vessels together in a single volume, he underscores the fact that no single vessel played a decisive role in shaping the province of British Columbia.

The book commences appropriately enough with Captain Vancouver's sloop-of-war Discovery, which visited British Columbia's coast from 1792 to 1794 and was instrumental in creating the first charts of that coast and in naming so many places there. Henry then proceeds to the legendary Beaver of the Hudson's Bay Company, the Fraser River steamers of Captains Irving and Moore, that grande dame of sailing ships, the Thermopylae out of Victoria, the Princess Maquinna of the CPR, and the early cruise ship Lady Alexandra of the Union Steamship Company. All are familiar to us, yet under Henry's hand they spring to new life. With comedic insight and a staccato style, Henry will relate a humorous story or event that brings a vessel and its time into focus. For instance, he recounts an incident in which two deckhands were busy shifting a load on a river-steamer in early New Westminster. One of the men, hired only twenty-four hours before, looks up and says to the others: "Heh, when does a man get some sleep here?" "Oh", says the other, "I don't know, I was only hired three days ago." It is a revealing comment on working conditions a hundred years ago.

For typical working vessels Henry chose the supertug Lorne, the five-masted schooner Malahat, the ocean-going tug Sudbury, a converted RCN corvette and the fishing trawler BCP 45, made famous through its appearance on the Canadian five-dollar banknote. With great skill Henry weaves a summary of the west coast's navigational problems for tugboats and fishing vessels alike, its extensive network of narrow passages along oft-uncharted islets and inlets, accentuating the fabulous skills of early skippers. His synoptic views suggest great knowledge of these boats.

One ship deserves special mention: the Columbia I (and later its successor, Columbia II) of the Columbian Coast Anglican Mission, which operated between fifty-six ports on the BC coast from 1910 to 1957, serving (mostly) native communities with spiritual and medical needs. John Antle, its legendary minister, is given ample space, as is Dr. W.A.B. Hutton's ability as physician/mechanic on the ship.

Then there is a chapter on the submersible Pisces. This craft was designed and developed between 1953 and 1966 by three clever men – Al Trice, Don Sorte and Mack Thomson in North Vancouver. It was successfully tested in December 1966 in Jervis Inlet. Production seemed guaranteed. However, the government of the day refused to issue export permits on purely political grounds and the project had to be scrapped. For that reason alone, this chapter should perhaps not have been included in this book. The vessel appears not to have had an historic impact on the province, for its participation in the BC economy came to nought.

The closing chapter deals with the 48-foot
The Northern Mariner

dugout Haida war canoe Lotaas, built in Skidegate, Queen Charlotte Islands under the watchful eyes of master-sculptor Bill Reid, himself part Haida. This boat deserves to be in the book, were it only for reasons of tradition. There was a time when hundreds of these dugouts lined BC's northern beaches, providing the only means of transportation on the coast.

Tom Henry is to be congratulated for creating this well-prepared and informative book. It is generously illustrated with old photographs and most importantly (as the dust-jacket says), it is "fun to read."

Hendrik (Hank) J. Barendregt
Langley, British Columbia


With the publication of Stuart Frank's Dictionary of Scrimshaw Artists eight years ago, many students of whaling and scrimshaw may have assumed that the final word had been written on this very specialized arena of artistic endeavour, at least for a decade or more. Happily this has not been the case, as Frank's latest labour, More Scrimshaw Artists, clearly demonstrates.

Utilizing the format developed in Dictionary the author, from his vantage point as director of the Kendall Whaling Museum in Sharon, Massachusetts, adds not simply more than a hundred new names but new identities to the role of shipboard artists in bone, baleen and ivory. The biographical sketches provided with virtually every entry bring the individual practitioners of what Frank terms this "occupational art" to life. In addition, forty-three artists first introduced in Dictionary receive supplementary entries that build upon or refine their original profiles.

An amazing range of personalities emerges from the pages of this book, from Irish-born Hampton P. Wilson, who served in both the Confederate army and the Union navy during the US Civil War, to Nantucketer Allan Folger, who in 1841 shipped as a boatsteerer aboard the whaleship Ganges at the incredibly young age of fourteen. Various nationalities are represented in this work, underscoring at once the multinational nature of pelagic whaling and the shared shipboard experiences that both transcend and diminish the importance of national identity.

In the search for the identities of additional scrimshaw artists the author casts a broader net, including records of whalemen and mariners seized by the gold rush craze of 1849. Few of these adventurers found the mining camp any more profitable than the deck of a whaleship.

More Scrimshaw Artists continues the work of Dictionary in identifying Alaskan native artists and exploring the development of souvenir production as a result of arctic whaling activity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The fascinating role of key firms and individuals in the inception and growth of a commercial ivory carving market is examined in the wake of more recent scholarship. Included here are entries for artists on both sides of the Bering Sea, men like Native Siberians Zhirintan and Khukhutan whose work featured bright polychrome decoration so different from the monochromatic treatment characteristic of Alaskan pieces.

Seven appendices provide a feast of detail on topics ranging from the development of sperm whale scrimshaw in the Pacific to a young whaleman's short glossary of specialized whaling terms. Frank goes on to consider New Bedford's "Spun Yard Club," a long-running, informal gathering of aging whalemen attended by a smattering of young enthusiasts hanging on (and fortunately for us, recording) their every word. Like the similar "Jibboom Club" of New London, the group flourished until the end of the American pelagic whaling in the 1920s. A cautionary tale in Appendix VI, "Commissioned Fakes," reminds us all that clever scrimshaw forgeries have circulated long enough for even spurious examples to attain an undeserved patina of authenticity.

A marvellous piece in many ways worthy of a monograph itself is a journal kept by Charles H. Durgin aboard the bark Monticello of New London during a voyage to Hudson Bay in the mid-1860s. Quoted verbatim from the original manuscript at the Kendall, this appendix brings us face to face with the incredible challenges involved in arctic whaling. A tireless scrimshander, Durgin helps pass away the bitter cold Canadian winter producing scores of napkin rings, bodkins and other items when he is not participating in musi-
cal and theatrical productions with many of his fellow whalingmen. While a map of Hudson Bay would have been helpful to the reader, the illustrations of some of Durgin's handiwork complements the text nicely.

More Scrimshaw Artists is clearly the result of a process as dynamic as the artists' own endeavours. The author has benefited greatly from an amazing network of dedicated scrimshaw scholars, collectors and scientists, which he describes as a "gaggle of Sherlocks" to his Dr. Watson. It has been a fruitful partnership, and one deserving the support of all interested students of this singular art form.

Richard C. Malley
Simsbury, Connecticut


Spinner Publications "is a non-profit, community-based small press which seeks to record the history and culture of the cities and towns of southeastern Massachusetts" through the use of oral history, photography, firsthand accounts, and narrative prose. [176] Nicholas Whitman's A Window Back fits the bill exactly. The purpose of this volume is to provide a firsthand look at New Bedford through the eyes of photographers active between 1841 and 1925.

There were, of course, hundreds of photographers active in New Bedford during this period, some for decades, some just passing through. Processes changed from early and rare daguerreotypes, ambrotypes, and stereotypes, difficult and unwieldy technologies primarily the province of professionals, to later and ubiquitous box-camera snaps. From what must be a mountain of possible images, Whitman has selected approximately 150 representative samples arranged under ten subject headings: the voyage, far away places, the waterfront, waterfront trades, the city, the bridge, inhabitants, industry, surrounding townships, and leisure. Portraiture forms a roving eleventh subject cutting across the others. Most images are reproduced on full page, with photographer and date (where known) as well as the photographic process employed. Supporting text is limited to a brief introduction, an opening one-page summary for each chapter, and a caption for each photo. This is, in short, a picture book, with the strengths and weaknesses that implies.

Foremost among the strengths of the book are the quality of the reproductions and the clarity of overall design. Readers of this journal are likely to be drawn to the early chapters on whaling and waterfront life. Some of the usual suspects are here, photographer Albe rt Cook Church for example. But most of the images are by individuals who are, at least to me, new, and Whitman notes that this is the first time of publication for most. Particularly interesting if not always artistically noteworthy are the images taken at sea by the likes of Captain Henry Mandly, Herbert Aldrich, and Marion Smith – who was presented with a camera just before sailing with her husband, Horace, master of the California. We also have the work of such wharf rat photographers as Stephen F. Adams and Clifford Baylies. But given the chronological and thematic scope of this project, Whitman can do little more than whet one's appetite for more. Presumably this is his goal.

The weakness of the book is the assumption that photographs speak clearly to us. Photographs are facts and interpretations of facts: facts require a context and interpretation requires analysis. Whitman himself writes that "no one in the 1840s could have foreseen the ways in which time would heap layers of meaning onto photographs." [9] Absolutely. And we need assistance excavating those layers. Almost nothing is said, for example, about the motivation of the photographers, the conventions to which they adhered, or the purpose for which the resulting images were intended. Yet there are hints of wonderful stories here – of the master's wife Marion Smith, and E. Paul Tilghman, "one of two prominent African-American photographers in New Bedford." [91] Lewis W. Hine, crusading reform journalist of New York, passed through to take images of paper boys and pool halls. The literature on Hine alone is substantial. Similarly, we need to know more than what the one-sentence captions can tell about the subjects. What are we to make of Fred Palmer's photograph of "Mrs. Mann and Children," [119] an African-American single mother and her two children sitting in front of the building from which they have just been evicted? Even
Whitman adds to the layers of meaning by selecting his ten subject categories and not others.

What we have here is a fascinating and well reproduced selection of images. What we need is assistance in understanding them.

M. Brook Taylor
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Although archival investigations are a common adjunct to shipwreck research, this recent book offers a refreshingly explicit and detailed methodological approach to archival research as it relates to the identification of hitherto unidentified shipwreck sites. The author employs a very systematic methodology that is more efficient and maximizes the returns. The book also highlights the complementary nature of both sets of data, the archival and archaeological, whose interplay often leads to the resolution of shipwreck identification problems. To illustrate the methodology, the author presents case studies of a number of shipwreck sites. Regionally, the study focuses on the Baltic Sea area and chronologically, on the post-medieval period although the particular vessels considered by the author range from the late seventeenth century into the nineteenth century. The archaeological research greatly benefits from the excellent preservation of sunken vessels and their contents in the low salinity environment of the Baltic Sea.

The first three chapters of the book covers the scope, limitations and the theoretical underpinnings, both archival and archaeological, of the study. Disappointingly, the discussions of archival and archaeological theory are general and superficial in nature and do not approach an in-depth treatment of the subjects. These chapters also include an overview of both the Swedish and Finnish archives, the main sources of information used in the study and the ones with which the author is most familiar. Incorporated as well is a useful discussion of the important customs registers of the Sound, documenting all vessels entering and leaving the Baltic between 1497 and 1857, now housed in the Danish National Archives at Copenhagen.

In chapter 4, Ahlström launches into the central thesis of his book, that is, in order to get to the relevant information pertaining to a shipwreck, a researcher must first of all thoroughly understand the bureaucratic structure that produced the documents. As the author correctly states, it is essential to know which government organizations had the responsibility for producing specific records. In this way, an understanding of the flow of information within the bureaucratic system can be gained leading the researcher to the most likely repositories of the desired records. The author then details the bureaucratic structure of Sweden from the central state authorities, through the provincial authorities, down to the local town level outlining their jurisdictions and responsibilities. This leads to a discussion of the myriad of archives containing records produced by the various organizational levels of the government. These include Board of Commerce papers, naval records, diplomatic correspondence, various court records, customs records, salvage and auction documents, ships’ certificates, journals and passports, captain’s protests as well as seaman guild records. However, and as Ahlström points out, this is not an exhaustive consideration of individual archival sources. Rather, it reflects those used for the study.

In chapters 5 through 10 the author puts the methodology to test in a number of case studies of a variety of predominantly commercial vessels resting in the Baltic. In each case, the archival research process is detailed step by step leading to a positive identification. The evidence is systematically presented, illustrated in most cases with extracts from the records, so that the final conclusion is, as a rule, inescapable. These case studies reveal the interplay between archival and archaeological research. Vessel characteristics noted on the shipwrecks such as dimensions, type, rigging and cargo can eliminate competing archival wrecks from further consideration and thus produce more productive and efficient searching. Also, such things as artifact and dendrochronological studies can refine the dating of a particular vessel and provide leads to other sources of archival information. That the author’s methodology is successful can be adduced from the fruitful
This is a well-made book, amply illustrated and with only a few typographical errors. While the writing is at times awkward, presumably because English is not the author's first language, the essential meaning is clear for the most part. Readers may also be somewhat annoyed by the fair degree of repetition found throughout the book. The book concludes with a useful bibliography, adequate index, a list of the archival sources consulted and an appendix listing Swedish royal decrees and regulations relating to trade and seafaring between 1667 and 1824.

This book will not interest everyone. It will have its greatest appeal to historians and others interested in documentary research. For anyone conducting archival research into post-medieval Baltic shipping this will be an invaluable guidebook to the relevant archives of Finland and Sweden. Underwater archaeologists and those fascinated by shipwrecks will be tantalized and left wishing for more information on the wonderful wrecks presented in the case studies. In fairness though, the book’s stated orientation is historical and not archaeological. Even so, it will encourage archaeologists to consider other sources of information concerning their shipwrecks. Although more attuned to European sources, the techniques and methodology presented in this work should be universally applicable. A similar study and approach to North American archives would be a worthwhile endeavour.

R. James Ringer
Ottawa, Ontario


This book deals with Jewish seafaring from the earliest documentation in the biblical period until the late Talmudic era (500 CE). With this work, Patai updates his first Hebrew version, published in 1938 and titled *Hebrew Shipping*. Patai claims that since his Hebrew book, no additional one on Jewish shipping had been written since his Hebrew book. This is incorrect, for it ignores *Nautica Talmudica* by Sperber (1986). Still, Patai's work is the only one to deal with Jewish shipping since early biblical times, and gives a more complete picture of sources of Palestinian and Babylonian Rabbinic shipping.

The book opens with the first Hebrew seafaring venture reported in the Bible – the legendary account of Noah and the ark. Patai introduces parallels that existed in ancient Middle East traditions. He then shows the interpretations given by the Talmudic sages to the problems of dimensions and construction of the ark.

Following this episode, the biblical literature refers to seafaring only in the monarchic period (from tenth to the early sixth century BCE). Seafaring and shipbuilding were then handled by the Phoenicians, neighbours of the Hebrews who ventured on long-distance voyages for Jewish interests to the Indian Ocean as well as to the Straits of Gibraltar. To these ventures the author relates the interesting tradition of the arrival of the Mormons to America, by way of the Indian Ocean eastwards, early in the sixth century BCE. The theme is well written and annotated in the appendix by a specialist. Despite this absence of any evidence of first-hand experience with shipbuilding, the biblical records confirm that knowledge was extensive; this conclusion is sustained by rare archaeological finds.

The next two chapters deal with shipbuilding, the manner of construction of sea-going vessels and the types of crafts mentioned in the biblical literature and in ancient Palestine and Babylonia. To the Talmudic literature the author adds evidence drawn from the Gospels and medieval Jewish literature, supported by illustrations on various archaeological reliefs. Patai, however, ignores ancient shipwrecks excavated since the compilation of his book, such as the one discovered at Caesarea along the Israeli shoreline.

The five chapters that follow deal with seafaring by the Jews. According to historic evidence, Jewish naval warfare anticipated their involvement with maritime trade. Jewish naval affairs lasted about a hundred years, from the Hasmonean Kingdom in the second century BCE until the loss of Judean independence (132-135 BCE). Thereafter, ships continued to have a role in warfare only in Jewish folklore, for Jewish seafaring then became confined to maritime trade. Patai discusses the crew that manned the ships, their tasks, rank on board and the origin of the terms of their titles. The sources show the good relationships that existed between the sailors and
the Talmudic sages, in large measure because of their mutual concerns in maritime trade. The Talmudic sages dealt with maritime trade in the Bible, according to the conditions of their own times. The Rabbinic information on Jewish maritime trade is supplemented by references from contemporary Hellenistic writings. Patai then discusses some aspects of maritime trade: life in port (loading, unloading and embarkation); sailing on high seas; the seasonal differences in sailing practices at sea and on the rivers and waterways of Babylonia; the measures taken by the crew to save the ship in a stormy sea (including some esoteric methods). Evidence from Talmudic sources is supplemented by that from the Gospels. The section ends with the corpus of laws, made by the Talmudic sages for Palestinian seafaring and shipping on Babylonian rivers and canals. These laws concerned property relations, chartering, buying and selling ships. They include, in the Jewish case, a body of religious laws that had to be observed abroad, at sea and in port while loading and unloading ships.

Two chapters deal with the very different theme of sea lore, and provide insight into the place that the sea, with its awesome power and its miraculous denizens, held in Jewish imagination in the Bible and in the Talmudic literature. The biblical Hebrews saw the sea and its creatures as the most formidable part of nature. In the Talmudic literature there are two distinct types of legendary material. One reflects the moralistic-religious world-view of the Talmudic sages. The other is the sailors' yarns which found their way into Rabbinic sources, either stated explicitly by the sailors, or attributed to sages who, in turn, heard them from sailors.

In the closing two chapters, Patai introduces the vast historic evidence concerning ports and port towns along the Israeli coastline, on the Red Sea, and around the Sea of the Galilee, together with archaeological data from the biblical period to the late medieval period. A close inspection of the sources shows that Patai failed to distinguish between natural bays and artificial ports, for both of which he uses the term harbour. He might have drawn the correct conclusions had he used recent archaeological data, available through numerous excavations carried out by the time his book was completed.

In conclusion, this work deserves appraisal for the vast varied documents it introduces. It would serve as an essential basis for scholars wishing to enrich the picture by using archaeological findings. Careful attention to the principles of interdisciplinary research shows that both disciplines complement each other. In this case, however, historical evidence should not always be taken literally.

Ruth Gertwagen
Qiriat Motzkin, Israel


This little book is a printed version of a list the authors have been maintaining on the Internet since January 1995. It comprises a list of most of the "naval and maritime museums collections of maritime interest and accessible historic vessels" in what the authors describe as the "brittano- hibernal archipelago," a geographical expression your reviewer must confess not to have met before. The publication is intended to make the list accessible to Internet non-users – or perhaps to those who prefer to have their information with them in their pockets when travelling.

The field of maritime museums and preserved ships is constantly changing and both in small details as well as in a few bigger details this book has already been overtaken; the authors wisely make no claims for its completeness. Nevertheless it is a very useful compilation and a check of a number of institutions well known to your reviewer has revealed a careful presentation of material of the kind useful to the visitor with specific interests. I shall certainly find it useful myself, and can therefore recommend the guide for both the tourist and the serious researcher.

Basil Greenhill
Saltash, Cornwall


In October, 1877, Alexander Hall and Company launched the 430-ton barque Elissa from their yard at Aberdeen, Scotland. This book narrates
the history of the vessel from time of building, through changes of owners, its discovery as a much altered smugglers transport, and its eventual recovery and restoration.

Detailed information is provided on the Hall shipyard, the early owners, and general information on its voyages. The book tells of its sale to a Norwegian company, which renamed it Fjeld, then to Swedes who renamed her Gustav, then to Finnish owners, and finally to Greek interests where she became Christophorus, then Achaeos, and finally Pioneer.

Peter Throckmorton, marine archeologist and maritime historian, spotted her in Greece in 1960, and in concert with Karl Kortum, the director of the San Francisco Museum, began the long process which eventually led to her purchase and voyage to the United States. Uninsured in 1969 and vulnerable to confiscation because of use in illegal activities, the small barque lay tied up next to a vessel which was to be scrapped and at the time the purchase went through she had already been stripped of many fittings.

Money now had to be found for necessary repairs so that she could make the long journey to America. Kortum managed small amounts of cash to Throckmorton in Greece but that ended when his board of trustees stopped any further funding for the ship. At that point Canada almost got the vessel. The mayor of Victoria was receptive to Kortum’s suggestion that the small barque be moored in the harbor in front of the Empress Hotel. David Groos, a local MP, pushed the idea, went to Greece and purchased the vessel. Sadly no berth space could be acquired, funding fell through and once again the vessel was up for sale. Galveston in Texas became interested and using the fact that Elissa had called at the port during her career the city purchased the vessel.

Sailing Ship Elissa should almost be required reading for any person or institution interested in purchasing and restoring an old vessel. It provides a valuable insight into the pitfalls and costs which can be incurred. Elissa’s initial restoration cost between four and six million dollars. To be added to that are the bills for finishing restoration touches and maintenance. One aspect of importance for those considering a similar venture is the use to which the vessel is to be put. If it is to be used as an active sailing ship, modern safety regulations will force modifications, thus compromising authenticity.

While advertised as a coffee table book, Sailing Ship Elissa is I think rather more than that. It is excellent for the general reader who is interested in the history and preservation of a nineteenth-century sailing ship. The specialist reader who is seeking real details, such as full cargo lists instead of excerpts, will find it frustrating. It is obvious that a great deal of research, yielding much information, has been carried out, leading one to wonder why this book has been curtailed in length and thus content. There are tantalizing glimpses into what might have been included. The bibliography is extremely limited and while mentioning some sources does not state where they were found. For example crew lists are just said to have been found in depositories in England and Canada. No specifics are provided of the vast holdings at the Maritime History Archive at Memorial University in Newfoundland. The book is however priced right and would be a very worthwhile addition to one’s maritime library.

Eric Lawson
Bowen Island, British Columbia


In Tidewater Triumph, Geoffrey Footner charts the origins and developments of the once famous Chesapeake Bay pilot schooner. Through an extensive use of archival material, including a treasury of lines drawings and marine illustrations, Footner demonstrates the impact of various economic and political events on the use and design of the pilot schooner. He also demonstrates its considerable influence on the development of schooners in other parts of the world.

A small but fast vessel originally used to ferry pilots out to inbound English tobacco ships, the pilot schooner developed into a local transport, largely of grain, sometime in the 1730s. During the American Revolution, the pilot schooner, now capable of limited offshore work, became a blockade-runner that supplied Baltimore (the principal unoccupied rebel port) with goods from the French West Indies. With the renewal of
The Northern Mariner

hostilities between England and France in the early 1790s, France purchased several large pilot schooners for use as privateers. This enlargement of the type proved remarkably successful, and, when war broke out in 1812, approximately 130 "Baltimore schooners" were operating as merchant vessels between Chesapeake Bay and such places as the West Indies and France. Almost all of these vessels were used as privateers in the conflict and it is a clear measure of the type's suitability to the task that this twelve percent of the American privateer fleet accounted for forty percent of British merchant ship losses. In the years following the end of the war, the industrial revolution brought unprecedented peace and prosperity to the Western World. Consequently, the speedy but incapacious pilot schooner grew unprofitable in conventional trade. The "Baltimore clipper" maintained much of its notoriety by becoming a principal vessel of the opium and the slave trades. Few of these vessels were actually built in America, however, for success had led to imitation in many places, including the West Indies, France, Sweden, and England. On the Chesapeake itself, the pilot schooner continued in its traditional role as a local transport. The "pungy," as the type finally came to be called, enjoyed a renewed popularity when the oyster fishery on the Chesapeake was stimulated into a frenzy in the 1850s. After 1880, the depleted oyster beds could no longer support sophisticated vessels such as the pungy, and the type went into rapid decline.

In the telling of this fascinating and important story, Footner brings to bear a subtle grasp of naval architecture and a passion for history, especially Chesapeake history. The result is a remarkably detailed account of the forces that motivated the various changes in the architecture of the pilot schooner. Although a few discussions of such matters as lines and rigs may leave the non-specialist feeling a bit excluded, Footner generally manages to keep his reader engrossed with clearly written accounts of trade, military conflicts, Chesapeake communities, leading merchants, shipbuilders, spies, individual vessels and other particulars of a more general interest.

While his principal purpose is clearly to tell the pilot schooner story, Footner openly takes aim at theories which claim foreign influences on the development of the pilot schooner or which minimize its influence on the development of schooners in some other places. Because he was the most prolific writer in this field, Howard Chapelle is Footner's most frequent target. At times, Footner even admits frustration over the dogmatic acceptance of various unfounded theories. However, such is the nature of history. Much of what we accept as the truth is actually myth. When new information is brought to light, parts of the myth fall away. Yet the process is never instantaneous because inertia is a characteristic property of myth. Footner ends his study with the statement that "claims to the origin of the model, common around the world, will subside as information about these influential schooners' origins in Virginia and Maryland spreads." Geoffrey Footner has certainly made the information available, but how long it will take to spread is anyone's guess.
five-masted schooner, *City of Orange,* the four-masted barkentine, *City of Houston,* and the four-masted schooner, *City of Pensacola.* While, at the time, over five hundred four-masted schooners worked the eastern seaboard of the United States and the Gulf Coast, what made these vessels unique was the intention to employ them in an international trade from the beginning. All were fitted with auxiliary engines capable of providing five to seven knots and the vessels might more correctly be described as "auxiliary schooners and barkentines." Of the two ships and twelve barkentines constructed between 1916-1919, the last eleven were built by ISC at Orange, Texas.

The historical narrative about these vessels covers the gambit of just about everything that could happen to a sailing ship in war and peace. The text is illustrated with numerous contemporary photographs and a number of paintings done by the author-artist. Bricker's work is Number 77 in a very ambitious enterprise, "The Centennial Series" of the Association of Former Students of Texas A & M University. It is a work heavily based on folklore about the fourteen Texas sailing ships, and possesses a unique charm.

*Wooden Ships from Texas* provides valuable insight into a little-known episode of American maritime history and therefore fulfills the stated goal of the author. Since a legitimate aim of maritime research and writing is to capture lore before it disappears and is lost forever, Bricker's work serves a worthwhile purpose. It undoubtedly will serve future historians well, while it does not fail to provide interesting reading now.

William Henry Flayhart III
Dover, Delaware


"He took her over, made her over, brought her over." These words from Alan Villiers' forward to the original (1960) edition of Gordon McGowan's story, encapsulate what this book is about: the absorption, refitting and sailing from Bremerhaven to the United States in 1946 of the barque *Horst Wessel* (built for the German navy in 1936/37), under Gordon McGowan's command. Renamed *Eagle,* she was to become famil iar to seafarers and ship watchers the world over as the US Coastguard's training ship, though with double gaffs on her mizzen mast her German origins can never be concealed.

In reissuing the book with a new introduction and afterword, the National Maritime Historical Society makes a remarkable story, which is compulsive reading, accessible to a younger audience as well as those of us who missed it originally. It is remarkable for what was achieved, for the way it done and for the people involved, in the context of chaos and shortages in 1946 occupied Germany. The ship was extremely run down, and, although the hull was sound, all its equipment including the rigging and the engine, needed a major overhaul to bring it into service. Salvation with the rigging came with the discovery of a forgotten warehouse bursting with marine stores including enough new rope to re-rig the whole ship. But getting a new engine block made was a saga of a different order which led to searches all over Germany and a battle with officialdom.

But this is not just a story of initiative and scrounging and learning as the work progressed; it is also one of human relationships in which the American officers and their raw trainees developed a respect and comradeship with the German ship-keeping crew to the extent that the latter ended up also making the passage to America. The contrast between the rigid formality of German naval relationships and the relaxed but nevertheless authoritative American style is well drawn out. In fact the practical expertise of the Germans was essential throughout. One classic mistake was the failure to pre-stretch the new running rigging, which seized up completely (and potentially dangerously) when they first tried to set sail after being towed out of Bremerhaven.

Among other episodes was McGowan's hazardous drawn-out flight from America to Germany, relationships with American naval officers in Bremerhaven, and his interaction with Herr Rickmers whose shipyard handled the *Eagle's* drydocking and who spoke English with a perfect Oxford accent and slept behind his office desk.

It is difficult to see a commercial shipowner giving the idea a thought, and certainly not placing a man in command, who although well experienced in command of power driven ships, had the haziest of knowledge of square rig sailing ships. Yet that is what the USCG did in this case, and their confidence was rewarded. Of course there were mistakes and crises, and the passage might
have met with disaster, but with careful passage planning (following in the wake of Columbus), experience was built up before the real test of a major storm came along.

As well as being a "good read," this autobiographical account provides valuable insights into the situation in Germany just after World War II, and it is particularly useful for its description of the business of re-fitting and re-commissioning a sailing vessel, something which is not too common in the narrative literature of maritime history, and as such is a contribution to source material. It is well produced, with some good photographs of the ship and the crew.

Alston Kennerley
Plymouth, Devon


This book is based on the journal and photographs of a young man who was determined to serve under sail for the sheer adventure of it. Gordon Belton, a South African, was twenty-one years old and "a born sailor, with a passion for all things connected to the sea" when, in June 1945 he signed aboard S. V. Lawhill, a steel, four-masted barque. Belton served on Lawhill until well after the end of World War II and then moved to S.V. Passat, a vessel similar in rig to Lawhill but a little larger. His well-written, interesting and informative journal covers the time he spent aboard Lawhill only, but he was very busy with his camera while aboard both ships.

By 1945 large, square-rigged sailers still employed in trade were very rare and Belton was lucky indeed to find two such ships. The 2816 ton Lawhill was built at Dundee in 1892 and Passat, of 3180 tons, was launched at Hamburg in 1911; when built, such vessels commonly had a life expectancy of about twenty years. It is interesting to note that at one time both ships had been owned by the tenacious Gustav Erikson. Passat and Lawhill are both well documented in other sources, notably the latter by Alan Villiers as he had served aboard her early in his career. He describes Lawhill as "a wind blown jute warehouse." Well, perhaps she was but she was designed as a work horse, not as a clipper and the ubiquitous windjammers did yeoman's work for a very long time. Further, as a study vessel, Lawhill was idiosyncratic and therefore is of particular interest. Her topgallant masts were stepped aft of her top masts and while this was extremely rare, it worked well. Also, according to Villiers she was "a masterpiece of labor-saving devices on deck and aloft" which "an alert and highly competent mind had really set systematically about the business of simplifying the immense task of handling her canvas and gear." The alert mind alluded to was the renowned Bracelin Jarvis so naturally Lawhill carried his famous winches. Lawhill was broken up in 1959 but Passat has survived and is now a museum ship in the Baltic.

The photographs in the book are arranged to fit with appropriate journal entries and they really are first rate. Belton, with the youthful enthusiasm of a "first-tripper" and a wonderfully artistic eye, seems to have been determined to record on film every aspect of life at sea under sail. He was not averse to climbing to the main mast truck or the outer end of the bowsprit in even the worst weather for the right picture. Some of the results of his efforts are very dramatic, all are informative, and one's respect for his photographic talent is magnified when one considers that the only piece of equipment with which he had to work was a Kodak Brownie box camera. Belton died by accident at age twenty-six and this is particularly lamentable because his potential was evidently so great.

This is a handsome volume and overall it is well produced. A fine set of drawings (Sail Plan, Deck Plan and Body Lines) of Lawhill is included and the editor notes that large scale copies are available in poster format. However, the book is not flawless; potential buyers should know that there are a number of corrections in the text. I did not find these bothersome as they indicate the editor's desire for accuracy and give the book a rather personalized feel. It will be of special value to those interested in windjammers, and especially to those who have enjoyed the work of Alan Villiers.

John McKay
Langley, British Columbia

This is a light-hearted description of the author’s voyage from England across the Atlantic in a seventy-five-year old pilot cutter, the *Hirta*, with a crew consisting of the author, his wife and four-year-old daughter, and a couple of friends. The goal of Cunliffe’s Atlantic venture was to reach the United States by retracing, more or less the route used by the Vikings, but the story ends at L’Anse aux Meadows in Newfoundland. The route also took advantage of the long daylight hours in the summer in those latitudes which eased navigation and the need for battery-operated lights at night, even as it allowed for interesting stopovers under way. The author’s romantic fascination with the Vikings made it seem all the more appealing.

The journey begins in Brighton, moving from there to several Norwegian ports from which the Vikings generally set out on their Atlantic voyages. *Hirta* then set sail for Iceland after a brief stop at the Faeroes Islands. From Iceland the author intended to sail to the site of Eric the Red’s home in Greenland near present-day Narsassuaq, but bad weather and pack ice off the coast of Greenland near Cape Farewell forced him to abandon this plan. Instead he set out directly for the Strait of Belle Isle and L’Anse aux Meadows. This course was not the Viking route. Vikings, who could not determine longitude, hugged the coasts, crossing over to North America at Davis Strait and then simply following the coast.

The book is written in a colloquial first-person style. In almost every port, the boat became the target of the town drinkers who arrive bottles in hand. This sometimes led to funny situations as when a couple of cronies turned up with a bag full of smoked mutton legs in Norway or when the *Hirta* crew was generously plied with beer and fresh water in battery-acid gallon cans in the Faeroes Islands. On the national holiday in Norway a woman, magnificently dressed in the local folk costume, embodying the very spirit of Norse women, addressed them in a broad South Carolina accent. Some episodes border on the dangerous, as when their jib was ripped apart or when a malfunctioning lighthouse made landing in heavy weather a nerve-wracking experience.

A third of the book is about the Vikings, especially Eric the Red and Leif Ericson. This discussion, interspersed within the modern story, is delivered in the same tongue-in-cheek tone as the rest of the book. This would be all right if the author really knew something about the Scandinavian Viking Age. As it is, the information conveyed is best disregarded. More successful are the author’s descriptions of Norse navigation which he obviously has made more of an effort to understand. He uses the trick of native Scandinavians to tell us what Viking sailing was all about, which makes for a seamless integration into the overall story. Even so, the book is best left alone by anyone interested in Vikings. It is really about the cutter and the voyage and will probably be enjoyed most by people familiar with boats and interested in sailing. It is light and pleasant reading but rather superficial. The cutter is described in detail, with diagrams and drawings, and weather and sailing conditions. Almost all of the voyage was made under sail. The only relatively sophisticated equipment was a radio-direction-finding set. The wooden cutter had a constant, albeit slow leak, and required regular pumping with a hand pump. The crew encountered a great deal of bad weather, and one is constantly reminded that the sea is a formidable force. I do dispute Cunliffe’s description of Quirpon as a place filled with rubbish and dilapidated buildings. He also mis-spells Griquet, reading ‘q’ as a ‘g’. The story stops as the crew visits L’Anse aux Meadows, concluding that, although exciting, the crossing had been sufficiently arduous that they never would like to repeat it.

Birgitta Wallace
Halifax, Nova Scotia


This is the gripping account of a voyage in a 42-foot ketch, *Le Dauphin Amical (The Friendly Dolphin)* from Los Angeles south in search of that
nautical Holy Grail, Cape Horn. Réanne Hemingway-Douglass, a graduate in French and teacher, is the unconvinced companion to her husband's compulsive-obsessive drive to round the cape: she, the gentle, thoughtful, humanist mother; he the hard-nosed, bullying, pragmatic father. They make an unlikely pair for so perilous a voyage, and once their son Jeff and companions decide that the voyage is not for them and leave, the narrative concentrates not only on the day-by-day record of life at sea but on the unfolding drama of the interplay between these two very different personalities and on the unfolding metamorphosis in their relationship. Both keep journals: Réanne's, written in the most appalling conditions, is revealing as she probes into herself and her struggle to become a nautical equal of her sometimes tyrannical husband in their often very unequal struggle with Mother sea. They do not achieve the Horn, for at 50° south they are "pitch-poled" (tossed head-over-tail by a monster wave) and the remainder of the voyage focuses on their efforts to remain afloat and alive aboard their seriously crippled yacht.

Their decision to enter the Strait of Magellan brings its own set of problems, compounded by the fact that a chronometer which was to be freighted to Easter Island never arrived. This is not too serious as long as they have engine power and are able to obtain time checks by radio to set their wrist watches, but until Don is able to get the diesel running, this is not possible and their approach to Patagonia, a lee shore, is fraught with off-lying dangers. Once in the Strait, and on two separate occasions, approaching freighters ignore their frantic signals for assistance, despite the fact that they are flying the distress flag. Eventually they are befriended by the British ship Bendoran, and Réanne is able to climb precariously a Jacob's ladder with news to be transmitted to their families; while fuel and water are lowered to the wounded Le Dauphin Amical, she enjoys scones and tea with the captain's wife. When the weather worsens she hastily returns to the yacht, which now is torn by williwaw — catabatic winds of immense ferocity that funnel through the inlets and fjords of the Strait — that lay Le Dauphin Amical over on beam ends at anchor. Eventually they reach the safety of Punta Arena and an immense outpouring of kindness and assistance.

Perhaps, then, the title should have been Punta Arenas, One Man's Dream One Woman's Nightmare. The cover illustration of Réanne looking absolutely miserable imposed on a monster wave about to engulf all before its path would seem to make this all too clear. Yet this is not only a woman's narrative of triumph over adversity, and survival. Réanne awakens to the realization that this experience has changed her forever: "What had I learned about myself? I had learned from our sailing nightmare that the will to survive is the strongest instinct I have — that when my life depended on it I could push myself far beyond what I'd ever believed possible." And in the dedication to her book she is able to write, among others: "To Don — co-pilot for life — who taught me to soar."

The book includes a map of the voyage track as part of each of the covers. It includes details of the yacht, a glossary of terms, and charts of important landfalls, the damage report of Lloyd's of London and a Beaufort Scale; an extract from the newspaper from Ontario, The Daily Report; and references to such notables who went before them as Drake, Moitessier, Tilman, the Smeetons. The account opens with a verse from Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal, L'Homme et La Mer) — what one would expect from this remarkable woman. There is one error in the "Notes." The apparent method of calculation of True course to Magnetic is reversed, that is to say a True course of 090(T), with a deviation of 25 degrees West, would be a Magnetic course of 090 +25= 115 degrees, not 065 degrees (Error West Compass Best).

Finally, as Réanne's friend Roberto Uriburu, who urged her to write this book said: "raising a child and writing a book are two of the most beautiful tasks in the world." Réanne has done both and I'm glad she did. The trio of Le Dauphin Amical, Réanne and Don deserve our congratulations for doing it their way.

Geoffrey H. Farmer
St. John's, Newfoundland


This book is the outcome of a conference on medical aspects of polar tourism by ship, held in 1995 at the Scott Polar Research Institute in
Cambridge, England. Apart from those attending in the polar medical fraternity, there are over thirty contributions by ship's doctors and tourists.

Arctic and Antarctic tourism is an ever-expanding business and a lucrative one for adventure cruise operators with ships specially designed for ice covered seas. The Russians converted two full icebreakers for tourist accommodation and Germany and France have a number of ice-strengthened ships. Apart from first class cabins, the hotel facilities are usually of a high order. Passengers are, for the most part, elderly and affluent – the average fare for a twenty-day North West Passage voyage is $25,000 (Canadian) per person. The passengers expect to be well treated in all aspects, including physically and medically.

Medical facilities on board the German ships on which I have had four years experience as Ice Master during North West Passage have been excellent. There has always been a doctor and nurse, both of whom speak English. The hospitals are modern and well equipped for consultations, treatment and emergencies. According to Safe Passage Questioned, however, there has been some difficulty on board Russian ships with doctors not sufficiently fluent in English and as regards medical supplies, as well.

It is however essential that prospective passengers realize that Arctic and Antarctic cruises have certain risks not found in conventional cruises. The polar ships operate in relatively isolated waters, so that any medical evacuation called for by the Doctor and the Captain could take some time to achieve by helicopter or ship's boat if near some shore facility. We are reasonably fortunate in the Canadian and American Arctic where communication can be established with shore authorities such as the RCMP and Canadian Coast Guard in Canada and an evacuation put in hand. It can be much more difficult in the Antarctic. The book describes some difficult evacuations, all at the patient's expense.

Before embarking on a polar cruise a passenger should have a medical check-up, particularly if elderly. For instance, over the years, I have seen passengers with canes joining for Arctic cruises and on one occasion a lady in a wheel chair! Part of the attraction in these cruises is landing and visiting isolated communities by Zodiac boats. It can be quite easy to break the other leg when scrambling ashore with a cane. The ship's officers and crew are very attentive to these shore excursions but passengers must realize there is some risk. The book is well documented in regard to shore visits and inherent possibilities of accidents.

The doctors and nurses I have met are dedicated to the well-being of the passengers. The cruise operator expects to see healthy and happy passengers leave the ship in hope that they will reappear for another Polar voyage.

The doctor/patient relationship is interesting. Most doctors act as independent contractors to the patient. They do not work for the cruise operator. Their fees are therefore settled directly with the patient. Not only does the book provide a great deal of information for the tourist, but it is suggested as a compendium of polar medical background for any aspiring ship's doctor. It is certainly a long way removed from the "Ship Master's Medical Guide" and its rudimentary advice which was the standard work many years ago.

Tom Irvine
Nepean, Ontario


Ticonderoga: Tales of an Enchanted Yacht tells the remarkable story of one of the best-known and best-loved yachts ever built in America. Her launch in 1936 must rank as one of the least auspicious beginnings to a great career ever recorded in yachting history. Before an illustrious crowd of invited guests, reporters from two Boston newspapers and members of the yard crew that built her, Tioga, as she was originally known, stood ready for launching. After owner Harry Noyes' daughter Hope smashed the champagne (on her second try), fifty-four tons of yacht began to slide down the ways. Just seconds afterwards, the starboard side of the cradle gave way, and the 72-foot yacht heeled sharply to starboard, grating along the side of the shed door as she passed through it. When she hit the water, she lurched back to port, knocking those aboard off their feet and hurling one of the yard crew over the side.

The guests quickly recovered their aplomb after this dramatic beginning and so did the yacht, for Ticonderoga went on to a stellar career and a secure place in yachting history. Designed by L. Francis Herreshoff for Bostonian Harry Noyes,
she was an enlargement of Tioga, an earlier Herreshoff yacht which Noyes had briefly owned. Herreshoff, a great (and singular) design talent, created both Tiogas to his own rules. For him, art, beauty and coherence of design were paramount virtues. He disdained yachts designed to rating rules and those created just to win ocean races. It is a testament to his design skill that Ticonderoga later went on to win ocean races against just such yachts. Her most spectacular defeat of a racing machine was in the 1965 Transpac race, sailed through Tropical Storm Bernice, where she bested plywood magnate Cornelius Bruynzeel's lightweight racer Stormvogel in a near photo-finish. This was but one victory in a career littered with triumphs and racing honors, an interesting life story for a boat that was originally designed as a beautiful, fast but comfortable day-sailer.

Since its inception in the 1860s, ocean racing in yachts has been a larger-than-life sport, and, it would seem, legendary yachts require larger-than-life characters to own and sail them. This book is as much about Ticonderoga's owners as about the yacht herself. Some notable characters have walked the decks of this famous yacht, and the book offers revealing glimpses into the rewards and challenges of owning a yacht on this scale.

Racing campaigns, refits, yard bills, repairs and rebuilds all placed demands on the yacht's owners. Some proved equal to the challenge; others had to acknowledge, reluctantly, that they could no longer keep the boat in the manner she required. All, however, clearly fell under the spell of her history, accomplishments and character. More recently, the burden of ownership has been increased by the knowledge that one has custodianship of an acknowledged national treasure.

Ticonderoga: Tales of an Enchanted Yacht is a handsome and well-illustrated book, as befits a yacht of her grace, from yachting artist T.F.R. Thompson's painting on the dust jacket to the many stunning black-and-white and color photographs. The story moves along briskly, recounting Ticonderoga's eventful life under her various owners including Scott and Icy Franz, the current ones, who commissioned the book. Jack Somer has written a book that belongs on the shelves of any one with even a passing interest in yachting, and especially ocean racing, history.

John Summers
Newport, Rhode Island


Lake Champlain, on the route between the St. Lawrence and the Hudson Rivers, contains many wrecks. Most historians have given their attention to eighteenth-century English warships and Benedict Arnold's Revolutionary War flotilla, shipwrecks all lost in this century, due to "indiscriminate recovery." The archaeological successes include the gunboat Philadelphia and the Ticonderoga at Washington and Whitehall, New York. These vessels served their finite function as warships often do. Another matter entirely is the prosaic, undistinguished horse ferry found in Burlington Bay adjacent to the town of the same name. The authors, Kevin Crisman and Arthur Cohn place the technical development and use of this vessel type well within the tradition of an American response to a cash-strapped economy, technological development and the pressing need to cross the lakes and rivers that were seen as barriers to progress.

Boats were single hulled and catamarans. A single horse or teams of horses walked on treadmills or in a circle (a whim boat) around a central axis. The horses did not benefit since "sickness and morality rates were higher" and some, when put to pasture "continue to walk in circles." Horse ferries remained in use across North America into the twentieth century but their heyday was during the 1820s. New York, "the cradle of the teamboat ferry" had eight including a design by the steamboat promoter, Robert Fulton. Why then, in the face of rapid development of the steamboat did the horse ferry hang on so long? In a compelling narrative that covers patent wars, monopoly rights, the use of venture capital and the driving force of expansionism the authors illustrate well the "Yankee" energy so characteristic of the age. This is no ordinary "boat" history.

Part two is a detailed archaeological survey of the Burlington Bay Wreck. The artifacts, the hull and machinery are closely examined and there are first-class illustrations. A problem for many readers examining technical drawings is the matter of scale, but not here. The drawing by Kevin Crisman, Figure 63, as an example, "Horse
Ferry interior profile and deck construction," includes the horse in position and a crewmember, a good way to illustrate the relationship between two- and four-legged beasts and how the machinery works. Other technical drawings use the same approach. The lines of the hull are cleanly delineated elsewhere.

The authors, on the use of sawn timber vs. curved timber raise the issue of technology transfer. They speculate on there being a direct connection between an article by the Royal Navy shipwright William Hookey in the *Repertory of Arts, Manufactures, and Agriculture*, a British journal of 1816, and a reading by "any progressive American shipwright." Their shipwright candidate is William Annesley, an inventor "ahead of his time with a good idea." I would have preferred more on the subject of technology transfer and perhaps some use of literature outside the titles in the bibliography. *When Horses Walked on Water* is a fine piece of work, but characteristic of a good read, it makes one hunger for more. It might have benefitted from some current studies in material culture method and theory – *Learning from Things* from the same press has some items of interest.

The appendices include a patent concession, a catalogue of the artifacts, and principal dimension of the Horse Ferry. The twenty pages of endnotes provide an ideal source of information for historians planning further work during this period. The sources include books, newspapers and periodicals, unpublished primary sources and scholarly papers and theses. In the bibliography I missed an old but dated favourite of mine, *Emulation and Invention* by Brook Hindle who, as an historian of technology, provides insights into the "manipulation of images and ideas" that might have been useful. The illustrations and photographs are all well chosen including a Canadian example from Croil's Steam Navigation.

The end when it did come was not due to an influx of steamboats. "Railroads and bridge technology spelled the end of the horse powered boat." This is the model for a book that every serious curator would like to write – underwater archaeology at its best and material culture history in the narrative style – and can therefore be highly recommended for the professional reader and worth looking up by the non-specialist.

Maurice D. Smith
Barriefield, Ontario


This publication comprises fifteen papers presented at a conference at La Trobe University, Melbourne in 1997. The goal was to draw together and review the current status of research as part of a collaborative project (AWSANZ – the Archaeology of Whaling in Southern Australia and New Zealand) initiated and directed by the editors (Lawrence and Staniforth). The project's principal aim is "to bring together historical archaeology and maritime archaeology in order to develop an integrated analytical framework regarding Australasia's earliest maritime industry, its associated material culture and cultural landscapes." [7] An implicit academic focus nevertheless recognizes the role of cultural heritage managers and the need to bridge the divide between academic-based and public-sector archaeology.

The papers are organised into three parts: "Regional Overviews of Whaling Research" (Gojak on New South Wales and Norfolk Island, Nash on Tasmania, McKenzie and Anderson on land sites and shipwrecks respectively in Victoria, Gibbs on Western Australia and Prickett on New Zealand); "Case Studies" (Staniforth on South Australia, Lennon on Victoria, Jacomb on New Zealand); and "Thematic Studies" with papers by Miles, Chatwin, Pearson, Stuart, Kostoglou and Lawrence. All are well written and include informative illustrative material such as site plans, artefact drawings and photographs, and archival maps and images. A useful glossary of whaling terms is given in the preliminaries, but the absence of a combined bibliography leads to frequent repetition of commonly consulted sources. The "Regional Overviews" provide good summaries of investigations undertaken to date, many derived from existing published work, heritage reports, doctoral theses, and so on. Common themes emerge, with historically derived information presenting a wealth of supporting evidence for whaling activity, and an array of colourful
characters.

New South Wales and Norfolk Island in the South Pacific were on the northern limits of shore-based whaling in Australia, but as Gojak notes, [11] the whaling industry that developed "shares major characteristics of technology and economic integration with other Australian states." Entrepreneurial and mercantile aspects of the whaling industry are alluded to in several papers, but only Gojak questions [ 19] how archaeologists might "identify the material signatures of entrepreneurial capital?"

Whaling was an economic activity, not only providing a valuable export but also stimulating the rise of a free economy in which men could invest, trade or work. It promoted local shipbuilding and coastal trade; the development of port facilities and infrastructure; opened up uncharted bays and new areas for settlement; and, resulted in interactions between Europeans, Aborigines and Maori which were initially marked by equality and reciprocity. Whaling was one of the few industries where the crew were shareholders in the voyage, multicultural crews being treated on an equal footing. Furthermore, it was an industry which did not deny the presence of women, either on board ship or on shore, as many whaling logs and settlers' diaries bear evidence.

Many of these issues are identified in this volume as areas in need of further research. Additionally, however, the "economic integration" of the industry also requires attention. With the exception of Chatwin, whose "Thematic" paper, "If the Government Think Proper to Support It: Issues of Relevance to Australian Whaling in the Demise of the British Southern Whale Fishery," [87 ff.] gives a succinct historical analysis of factors influencing British and Australian whaling in the early half of the nineteenth century, there is little discussion of the strategic, political and economic circumstances affecting the whaling industry at this time. Some authors are clearly confused by the seemingly "complicated" patterns of shipping ownership; the types and tonnages of vessels employed in the industry; and the rapidity with which ships entered and left the trade. [Pearson, 93] Yet there is a substantial volume of published work by British and Australian maritime historians (notably A.E.G. Jones) which provide explanations for many of these phenomena and reveal the dynamic and innovative mercantile operations of nineteenth-century businessmen, shipowners and shipping agents whose multi-faceted interests crossed many boundaries, and for whom, whaling was generally only one of several business roles (see for instance Frank Broeze, Mr. Brooks and the Australian Trade [Melbourne, 1993]). Failing to "fully integrate maritime information," as Dan Byrnes emphasised in 1988 ("Outlooks for England's South Whale Fishery, 1784-1800, and 'the Great Botany Bay Debate'," The Great Circle 10, No. 2 [ 1988], 79-102), prevents the web of "formerly apparently unrelated data on maritime activity" from being untangled – and historians should not be overlooked in this process.

Of all the papers, Parry Kostoglou's "Thematic" contribution "When whaling was a War: An Examination of Conflict in Tasmanian Bay Whaling," stands out as a pioneering example of the type of analysis that may be achieved as an outcome of the AWSANZ project. Based on extensive field and archival research of whaling sites in South Australia and Tasmania, many of which are all but obliterated above ground and so do not immediately tell a compelling story, Parry eloquently and successfully bridges the divide between the "academic" requirement for an "intellectual" analysis, and the "public" need for a captivating, informative interpretation which sees the people employed in the whaling industry as much the victims of this economic enterprise as the whales upon which they preyed.

Myra Stanbury
Fremantle, Western Australia


This book brings a useful and somewhat unique perspective to the growing literature on whaling. It is both highly statistical and highly readable. In Pursuit of Leviathan is the eighth publication in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) series on "Long-term Factors in Economic Development." Two of the three principal authors, Lance Davis (California Institute of Technology) and Robert Gallman (University of North Carolina) are research associates of the
NBER, while Karin Gleiter is a member of the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina. To fully appreciate this book, it is important to understand that the object of the NBER is to ascertain and to present to the public important economic facts and their interpretation in a scientific and impartial manner." This, then, is a publication of data and statistical analysis. It is also a manuscript which benefits from the fact that much of the material has "appeared, in preliminary form, in other publications." Feedback from this experience obviously helped compensate for the fact that Davis and Gallman only became interested in whaling as a focus for a joint research project after they had begun a search for data which would enable them to comment "on technical change and productivity improvement in the nineteenth-century United States." Neither of them, they confess, "had any idea of doing a study of whaling."

On an early visit to the Baker Library at the Harvard Graduate School of Business the team "laid hands on" Joseph Dias' manuscript on whaling, a collection of information on 4,127 New Bedford whaling voyages that took place in the years 1783-1906. This data set subsequently became the core of their research effort and, fortunately for scholars interested in virtually any aspect of commercial whaling, "the plan of a paper exclusively devoted to technology and productivity expanded into a short monograph, and then into a very long book on the economic history of American whaling."

The authors claim that there are lessons to be learned from the American whale fishery that are germane to modern interests. This well-structured book is concerned with these lessons. The first three chapters identify objectives and methodology, offer a clear and concise appraisal of data sets and sources, and provide the historical and biological footings for all that follows: natural resources; labour; capital; technology; productivity; markets; agents, captains and owners; and profits. There are also chapters titled "The Americans Replace the British," "Modern Whaling," and "In Retrospect."

Although this volume is a fine piece of work, it will have little appeal for the general public, and will be most useful to scholars with a quantitative bent. It has a rich empirical core, able statistical analysis, and reasonable and perceptive interpretation. The authors not only add significantly to our understanding of an already well-studied industry, but their approach serves as a model which will stimulate whaling research by both new and established academics in an increasingly diverse range of disciplines.

The book is not entirely without flaws. From an organizational point of view, for instance, incorporation of chapter twelve, "The Americans Replace the British," with chapter two, "Whales and Whaling," would provide a more comprehensive historical setting for the statistical focus of the book. More importantly, it would also rectify my only real quibble with the book. The many differences between the American whale fishery and British Northern whaling in the nineteenth century are too great to permit valid comparison, a fact which, curiously, the authors seem to understand and acknowledge. As well, separate chapter appendices (ninety-two pages) seriously disrupt the narrative of a sometimes difficult text.

On the whole, however, this is a book of a quality beyond its rather prohibitive list price. It bears all the hallmarks of prodigious research. The authors objectively set out the facts and intelligently discuss the multi-varied aspects of a large-scale, spatially complex, technologically diverse and long-lived industry. It will richly repay reading, even for those who know something of the American whale fishery specifically, and commercial whaling generally.

Chesley W. Sanger
St. John's, Newfoundland


Listening to the Sea is a timely plea for ecological sensitivity, disciplinary integration, a holistic approach to the environment and the political change necessary to make it all happen. Divided into seven chapters, the first is concerned with the history of the "proprietorship" of the sea from the Roman Empire, focusing primarily on the establishment in the eighteenth century of the three-mile limit. Wilder makes it clear that considerations leading to control of the seas were economic, political and military. With very few exceptions, no thought was given to ecological
Wilder offers ample evidence with vivid descriptions that there is a major problem. The historical material is well presented, although there is room for questioning the interpretations offered (in 1938 was Roosevelt only interested in expanding federal power or did the fact of impending war affect his actions – this possibility is never raised in Wilder’s rush to describe the deprivation of states’ rights). Other than a focus on political power there is little explanation for what is being described. Economic pressure arising from concentrated economic power (of the oil companies, perhaps) rarely, if ever, appears as a factor. Wilder describes the search for alternative power sources after the 1973 OPEC crisis, and the ultimate failure of this search but without any analysis of who derailed the effort and why. At times Wilder acknowledges scientific ignorance, but then neglects it in “explaining” what is wrong with our oceans’ policy. He calls for cessation of overcapitalization of fisheries and of subsidies to fisheries. Such calls have been common in Canada, for instance, for forty years with little having been done about it. Why? Until we understand that “why” we are likely to make little progress. Wilder does not help in this regard. Finally, the overweening thrust of the book is that substantial progress would be made if only there were more local control over oceans policy. After reading Wilder’s book, this reviewer remains unconvinced.

William E. Schrank
St. John’s, Newfoundland


Despite the relatively small numbers now dependent on fishing in developed countries and its very minor contribution to their GNPs, fishing commands a remarkably high political profile and is perpetually involved in conflict and controversy; hence the relevance and interest of a book addressed specifically to the politics of fishing. This volume comprises fifteen chapters by a broad spectrum of authors and is the outcome of a conference organised in 1996 by the political scientist and editor Tim S. Gray, who contributes the introductory and sum-up chapters. The authors include seven academics from several disciplines...
along with a variety of fisheries administrators and representatives. It provides, mainly by a case studies, a fine analysis of the web and hierarchy of interacting factors that condition political decision-making in relation to fishing.

The book is also important in being dominantly but not exclusively on the area of the Northeast Atlantic, the part of the globe with the longest history of modern intensive exploitation, and an area which is of special interest in that fishing for the big majority of the countries involved is governed by the multi-national Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union – a circumstance which inevitably complicates the process of decision-making. Arguably the CFP shows the modern problems of formulating and operating fisheries policy in a democratic context at their most acute. There are also chapters on Norway and Iceland, and these serve to show that while unitary national control obviates certain big problems of the CFP, it is no panacea for ills. In fisheries policy and management it is clear that as well as effective biological conservation, there needs to be provision for interested groups to have an effective voice in the formulation of policy and that compliance with the rules needs to be enhanced. Any involvement of interest groups to date has mainly been of fishermen and has tended to sideline other groups such as processors. With qualified exceptions in some countries, management has been on a top-down basis; while there has been some consultation of interest groups, these have had little direct involvement in the formulation of policy. There have been considerable background problems with the pressures for greater economic efficiency which has been articulated mainly in a desire to privatise what has been a common-property resource by means of individual transferable quotas (ITQs); but this has been at odds with the social objectives of maintaining stakeholder interest and the maintenance of employment levels and of communities. Problems have also been due to greater uncertainties in the stock assessments by fisheries scientists than was realised until recently.

Central to the content of the volume are the vexatious problems of the CFP: despite the prolonged ten-year wrangle by which it was hammered out, it comes under stricture from a series of angles. Its basic official objective has been to give a stable framework for the fisheries backed by legal sanctions; and to this end it enshrined the key principles of long-term resource conservation, open access for community fleets, and fixed proportions of total catches (quotas) for member countries. However by general consensus it has failed: the civil servant Charles Cann speaks of "the inherent tendency to anarchy" in fisheries and of failure being the "almost inevitable result of conflicting forces." To Tim Oliver, a fishermen turned journalist, the quota system of the CFP has had "tragic results" and produced a "political and bureaucratic quagmire."

Several of the contributors see regional devolution and decentralisation of management within European waters as integral to the way ahead; and while this could be more sensitive than the present monolithic structure in coping with the problems of different maritime regions, it would give added problems in maintaining a fully co-ordinated system with equity.

This book certainly presents a thoughtful and up-to-date airing of the problems of effective fishery management and of their political context. It recognises that the basic framework for management must be set by political decision, and explores how the decision-making process could be improved and management made more effective and more acceptable to the interest groups. Yet fishing now operates against a resource ceiling in circumstances where it is accepted orthodoxy that economies should expand and living standards rise; and this makes conflicts and controversies inevitable. Certainly some of the ideas advanced here stand to improve decision-making and management; but it is scarcely likely that they will remove fishing from the pit of political controversy.

James R. Coull
Aberdeen, Scotland


This slim, unpretentious volume is the ninth in a series of scholarly works on the fisheries of the North Atlantic published by the North Atlantic
Fisheries History Association. It comprises a collection of papers presented to a symposium sponsored by the NAFHA at Thórshavn, Faroe Islands, in September 1996. According to the book’s preface, the purpose of the gathering was to encourage postgraduate research in fisheries history and to draw new scholars into this neglected field of study.

With that goal in mind, the editors have presented ten brief but heavily documented historical essays on a variety of fisheries-related subjects, two by established scholars and eight by graduate students or recent doctorate recipients. The studies range chronologically from the early Middle Ages to the mid-twentieth century and cover topics relating to the medieval fisheries of Holland, Germany, Denmark, and Iceland, as well as the more historically modern industries of Great Britain, Norway, Greenland, and Spain. The emphasis is on socioeconomic developments in the cod and herring fisheries of the respective countries, but political and technological themes have not been neglected, and other species, such as hake, haddock, and salmon, are also discussed.

Two serious omissions mar the presentation. The first is a total lack of any North American component in the included papers, an oversight that prevents the collection from fully living up to its title; the "northeastern Atlantic" fisheries more accurately describes the book’s subject content, which focuses largely on northern European activities. The second omission, a time gap, results in little attention being given to the critically important nineteenth century; instead, four of the papers cover the dawn of recorded fisheries history from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, while five of the remaining six concentrate exclusively on the twentieth century.

From the reviewer’s perspective, the first half of the broken chronology is the most compelling, although others might easily disagree, depending upon individual interests or areas of specialisation. Carsten Jahnke’s essay on regulating the medieval Baltic fisheries, for instance, anticipates concerns that linger to the present day in terms of resource conservation and rational marketing. Similarly, Annette de Wit’s study of a seventeenth-century Dutch fishing community shows in fascinating detail how industry problems related to working conditions, labour contracts, marine insurance, and vessel ownership changed little from the Holland of that time to the United States and Canada of two hundred or more years later.

This is not to dismiss the essays on the later period. Two stand out in particular. Bjorn-Petter Finstad’s analysis of post-World War II fisheries policy in northern Norway graphically illustrates how the onset of public planning and investment after the war changed the Norwegian cod fishery forever. On a quite different subject, Guinevere Glasfurd provides an enlightening glimpse into the serpentine Machiavellian behavior of the Unilever Corporation of Great Britain, which entered the offshore ground fisheries in the 1930s not to fish but indirectly to extract its overseas profits from unrelated business activities in Nazi Germany. As Glasfurd’s historical sidebar makes clear, the Unilever of the prewar period was truly a multinational in the spirit of our own freewheeling business era.

All of the articles in this compilation are intensively and exhaustively researched, using primary materials with an emphasis on government documents and mercantile records. The serious scholar will have to overcome the obstacle that many of the sources and bibliographical listings are not in English. The lay reader will also find that the writing is occasionally less than scintillating. This is primarily a work for fisheries history specialists, and the uninitiated will find it heavy slogging at times. The ponderous style of some of the essays is inevitable in an academic collection, and the problem is magnified by the needs of translation and the emphasis on pre-doctoral graduate research.

Nevertheless, for those with the interest and inclination, a careful perusal of these papers will prove rewarding. At the very least, readers will come away with a lesson applicable to today’s conventional economic wisdom. In contrast to the prevailing and often unquestioned belief in the timeless efficacy of unfettered free markets, one of the contrary constants of the fishing industry throughout history, these essays show, has been a pervasive government involvement in the form of public regulation, planning, and subsidy, without which most national fisheries of the last millennium could not have thrived or even survived. That useful corrective alone, whether intended or not, makes North Atlantic Fisheries a worthwhile publication.

Wayne M. O’Leary
Orono, Maine

This is the memoir of a fishing captain who spent most of his life at deep-sea fishing, primarily on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. It was written in 1975-76 under the guidance of Raoul Andersen, an anthropologist at Memorial University of Newfoundland, who also interviewed Thornhill and who provides introductory comments, explanatory endnotes, maps, an appendix and glossary. Thornhill had carried his autobiography through from his birth in 1901 to the end of his 1951 fishing season, when his sudden death in 1976 brought his project to an end. Andersen eventually assembled the book we have before us.

Thornhill’s memoir is presented to us in chapters beginning with his family’s early struggles to earn a living from the lobster and cod fisheries of Fortune Bay, Newfoundland. Here we see a way of life that has only been hinted at by other observers. In the tiny outport of Anderson’s Cove, the Thornhills and other families struggled to make a living from the nearby seas and from the land which could provide little in subsistence agriculture but contained generous stocks of birds, rabbits and caribou. Thornhill, like many young teenagers of his generation, was determined to join the ships which fished the nearby banks and the distant Grand Banks. Unlike most of his peer group, however, Thornhill was ambitious and wanted not only to become a bank fisherman, but to rise to the rank of captain.

Chapter two introduces us to Thornhill’s teenage years on board the primitive bank ships, and from that point on the deep sea fishery remains the focus of this memoir. His first command at age twenty-six, his marriage, setting up his household in the town of Grand Bank, and the birth of his children are all described carefully, but it is his command of his ships and his experiences at sea that receive most of his attention. We learn of the hardships of this fishery and the misery of the Great Depression; we sympathize with Thornhill’s circumstances in finding himself with only ten dollars one Christmas, half of which was spent on a rocking chair for his little daughter. (Although for many Newfoundland families during this period, this amount of cash would have been considered a small fortune.)

Thornhill’s fortunes took a turn for the better in 1943 when he was hired to take over a major boat for an excellent firm. His earnings increased and he was able to buy a new house that same year. Later, in 1948, he was appointed by Job’s Fisheries Ltd. to captain one of the firm’s first steam trawlers to prosecute the bank fishery out of St. John’s. In that year he was able to buy a house in St. John’s, leaving the relatively new one in Grand Bank vacant. He was an enormously successful fishing captain; in that first year, 1948, his crew members shared thirty-seven percent of the gross value of the total catch, receiving $3600 each after the customary practice of paying for their food. (Compare these wages with the $750 earned by the highest-paid teacher – a male principal [headmaster] – in the parish of Harbour Grace in 1947-48.)

Captain Thornhill describes himself as a fair and reasonable skipper. However, he had been trained in a cold, wet, relentless business in which he was lucky to get an hour’s sleep each night; in which men rowed out in dories and caught the fish on lines in all kinds of weather and at great risk to their lives; in which the fish had to be cleaned and processed and salted at the end of each day’s fishing – and in an era when fishermen often made nothing from the voyage. Consequently, after 1948, when the fishing technology had moved to trawling, dory fishing was eliminated and the lengthy salting process had been replaced by icing the fish down in pounds, Thornhill seems to have thought that his men should work indefinitely as long as the pay was relatively good. Thus, he could find humour in an anecdote about keeping his crew fishing and splitting day and night through a January storm, having convinced another skipper to stop fishing because the weather was "not fit for a dog." [265]

To work for sixty to seventy hours without rest was not unusual for Thornhill's crew. And with high wages and a scarcity of work, he had no difficulty in keeping his men: "They could be replaced easily," he explains, "as there were always other men waiting for a berth." [268]

Yet none of this detracts from the fact that Thornhill was a hard-working, intelligent man who, practically by his own efforts, became the most successful, respected, and highly paid fishing captain in Newfoundland. His account and the editing, extensive notes, and explanatory comments provided by Andersen make this book
required reading for anyone interested in Newfoundland's fishery and way of life in the first half of the twentieth century.

Shannon Ryan
St. John's, Newfoundland


This is a popular collection of sixty-three "tales" about the misadventures and tragedies of Newfoundland vessels at the height of the coastal schooner era during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author, Robert Parsons, presents his material in a vein similar to his previous writings. Having compiled his stories from bits and pieces of newspaper accounts, some oral history and folklore, Robert Parsons provides much information on obscure marine tragedies. He moves his chapters geographically from the island’s west coast from Corner Brook and the Bay of Islands northwards in clockwise fashion, ultimately returning to the southwest coast and the famed natural "wind tunnel" at Wreck House. For the most part, its content consists of an uncritical narrative that sometimes borders on hagiography, in the manner of "our toilers of the sea" as heroes. It is indeed meant to inspire and to make readers more aware of Newfoundland’s rich maritime heritage. For these reasons and at this level, the book is "a good read."

These stories are delivered in a straightforward, matter-of-fact summary manner. Though they all deal with the same general theme, there is a remarkable diversity among them. For example, in his account of the well-known sinking of HMS Raleigh in 1922, he concentrates instead on the Sandbeach, a salvage tug, which apparently blew up carrying away explosives from the main ship. In the course of describing the sequence of events, Parsons also provides much interesting information on the salvage process, including names of companies and individuals, as well as brief discussions of related legal proceedings which, to my knowledge, have not been recorded elsewhere. In a story about the Wimoda, a sealing vessel trapped in 1949 in ice off the Northern Peninsula, we learn about survival procedures under inclement conditions. Elsewhere, one gains a glimpse into the incidence of shipwreck, as in the case of the Saucy Arethusa one of whose crew members, Cecil Anstey, found himself in such a predicament six times during his days at sea. One wonders at the plain bad luck of the crew of the Kinsman who not only found themselves shipwrecked in 1921 but, in returning home, also trainwrecked close to Curling. The final story concerns the now abandoned former home of Lauchie McDougall, "Gale Sniffer Extraordinary to the Newfoundland Railway." It existed on a stretch of coastline, infamous even today for the high winds that sometimes reach 140 kilometres per hour and more off the Table Mountains, occasionally lifting rail cars off their tracks. This was also where in 1915 the surviving crew of the wrecked schooner Izetta found refuge.

The careful reader can find interesting information here on individual communities and harbours, storms, community reaction to disasters, ship insurance, customs agents, population statistics, seasonal labour, the fishery, the seal hunt, the merchant, the sailor, sermons and funeral practices. The book is enhanced throughout with images of various sorts: photos, posters, prints, and newspaper articles. There is also the occasional poem, song lyric, letter, telegram, and recollection. There are scattered references to government and judicial reports. In addition the inevitable number of ship, crew, and passenger lists provide a sense of who helped to make this history. On the whole, it is a grim but fascinating record, and, as the author claims, a powerful testimony to this ocean heritage and both to those who succumbed and to those who survived it.

Rainer Baehre
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


Tanod and Jaksa's coffee table book *Guiding Lights* poses and answers the questions about lighthouse keepers: "Who are they?" "What do they do?" "Why do they do it?" [6] An introduction sets the scene by describing the origins of lighthouses in British Columbia and comments
about the keepers and their duties. The authors devote a separate chapter to each lighthouse and group the chapters by geographic area. Every chapter of *Guiding Lights* gives the date and circumstances (usually shipwrecks) under which each lighthouse was established, along with the local peculiarities of weather and sea. The concluding chapter presents highlights of the authors' visits to lighthouses. It also discusses the implications of the government policy of de-staffing the lighthouses. Ironically, a few months before publication, in 1998, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada announced that "the keepers at the rest of B.C.'s lighthouses would stay."

The inside cover has an eye catching and easy-to-read outline map of the British Columbia coast depicting the location of all lighthouses and indicating which are staffed and which are un-staffed. However, the authors' names in white lettering on the outside cover tend to blend into and get lost in the photograph. *Guiding Lights* describes many but not all of the lighthouses in British Columbia (seventeen out of twenty-seven staffed, and five out of eighteen unstaffed), although a prospective reader might presume by the title that it describes them all. A statement to explain that some staffed lighthouses were not visited by the authors and, ideally, why they were not visited would have prevented this confusion. As the book contains no index, readers interested in a particular lighthouse must leaf through the entire book in search of their quarry. Each chapter presents the lighthouse location on two vividly coloured outline maps. The first shows the entire coast of British Columbia, the second is a more detailed local map providing ample reference to the site at a glance.

The scenes are imaginatively composed showing night, dawn, sunshine, rainbows and fog. Most depict relatively calm seas. However, almost every keeper describes a dramatic rescue in a storm. Several photographs of turbulent seas would convey a more balanced representation of the text.

The lively prose, liberally sprinkled with quotations from the keepers, captures the feeling of visiting the lighthouse and having a personal conversation with the keeper. *Guiding Lights* keeps its focus on material provided by present day keepers. For tales of early keepers the authors refer the reader to Donald Graham's books *Keepers of the Light* and *Lights of the Inside Passage.*

The armchair adventurer will feast on the vivid, visual pictures of remote areas in *Guiding Lights.* Photo hobbyists will be guided and inspired by Mr. Jaksa's imaginative composition and innovative camera angles. Students of human nature will be intrigued by the personal interviews with those who choose this life of isolation. *Guiding Lights* thoroughly answers the questions, "Who are the people who choose this career?", "What do they do?", "Why do they do it?"

Suzanne Spohn
West Vancouver, British Columbia


Although lightships are fairly well represented among preserved historic vessels, their bibliography is slim, so this small volume makes a welcome addition. It is not intended as a scholarly work, being rather a tribute to "the forgotten heroes of the bobbing red beacons." [vii]

The author has a pleasing style of writing, and rapidly convinces the reader that working on a lightship was indeed hard and dangerous work. The crew of the *Proudfoot Shoal* were not relieved in the eleven years 1883-94 – and that on a vessel at Latitude 10°32' South! The dangerous part is illustrated with cases from all around the
world of light vessels sinking, foundering, breaking up, getting run down by their "customers" and being sunk in wars.

For those whose previous knowledge is slight, there are some remarkable revelations: one characteristic type of accident was dragging or losing the anchor(s) in heavy weather and being driven onto whatever hazard the vessel was supposed to be marking, as in the tragedy of LV90 (South Goodwin) in 1954. The extraordinary fact is that no British lightship was ever fitted with mechanical propulsion, apparently on grounds of economy: vessels provided in the interests of safety at sea were rendered dangerous to their crews by a parsimony which must have made Samuel Plimsoll uneasy in his grave. It would have been good to see a few numbers, to show how the risks compared with those in other maritime occupations, though these would probably be difficult to isolate. In particular they would not show up disasters like that when LV North Carr lost her moorings: the vessel and her crew were saved, but the eight-man crew of the Broughty Ferry lifeboat died.

The episodes described are horrifying, but eventually one wearies of storms and dragged anchors. There are some splendid disaster-free stories, such as that of Robert Stevenson's use of the LV Pharos as a floating base for the early stages of construction of the Bell Rock lighthouse, or the bizarre "rescue" by the Falls lightship of a party of Belgians who crossed the Channel in 1997 in twenty-four inflatables to go shopping in Ramsgate and got caught in a storm on their way back. There is also a fair amount of good information about the technology and operation of the lights and other equipment as well as the vessels themselves.

Unfortunately, a lot of this information is spread around the book in an apparently haphazard way, so that, for example, the invention of the Fresnel lens appears in one chapter, a shoal digression into different kinds of lamp oil in another and the technique of wick-trimming in a third. This prompted scrutiny of the contents page to try to work out exactly what the rationale of the chapters is. Nearly all are titled with the name of a vessel or a station, but there is no chronological, geographical or technical order to them: it is not explained in the Introduction and I still do not understand it. A good index would do much to mitigate the difficulty, but there is no index at all.

In short, this is a "good read," interesting and informative stuff, but if one wished to use it as a reference book, (which, to be fair, is not the author's intention) finding things in it would be infuriatingly slow.

Adrian Jarvis
Liverpool, England


Many books have been written about America's lighthouses, but another important marine safety service in United States waters has only recently attracted public and academic interest. Formally established in 1878, the United States Life-Saving Service (USLSS) was the predecessor of the modern-day Coast Guard rescue service. Originally begun as a volunteer lifesaving effort in the late eighteenth century, the USLSS evolved into an extensive system of rescue stations on the east and west coasts of the continental United States, as well as on the Great Lakes.

The U.S. Life-Saving Service: Heroes, Rescues and Architecture of the Early Coast Guard presents a comprehensive view of the history of the USLSS. The service had its roots in the Massachusetts Humane Society, formed in 1785. Small, unattended "Humane Houses" were constructed along remote areas of the Massachusetts coast to shelter shipwrecked mariners. By the mid-nineteenth century, lifeboat stations had been established on the New Jersey and New York coast, but not until 1871 were there any regulations governing the operation of the stations. Beginning in 1878, under the dynamic leadership of General Superintendent Sumner Increase Kimball, the life-saving service experienced rapid growth and increased efficiency; by 1915 when the USLSS was merged with the Revenue Cutter Service, it had saved 150,000 lives.

The information presented in the book has been divided into seventeen chapters, alternating between the life-saving stations in specific states, and chapters about keepers and surfmen, rescue boats, life-saving equipment, women and minority
people in life-saving, and the architecture of lifeboat stations. Authors Shanks and Yorks have researched all aspects of life-saving, and through their writing emerges a picture of highly dedicated (and underpaid) men and women who often gave their lives for the safety of others. By its very nature, life-saving was an extremely hazardous occupation; men were even killed during practice sessions (capsise drills were the most dangerous). Keepers and surfmen worked in horrific weather conditions to save lives, in some cases rowing twenty miles just to get to the scene of a wreck. Work-related diseases such as rheumatism and tuberculosis, to say nothing of sprains and broken bones, took their toll. Overall, the danger faced by keepers and surfman was summed up by the surfman's motto "You have to go out, but you don't have to come back." [32]

At its peak in 1914, the USLSS had 279 active stations on the east and west coasts and on the Great Lakes. Station types varied from state to state, and included Florida's family-operated Houses of Refuge, Kentucky's floating lifeboat station and the standard life-saving stations established on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. The U.S. Lifesaving Service features photographs of almost every life-saving station in the country, along with rare views of dramatic rescues in dangerous sea conditions. The photos also highlight the functional and aesthetic elements of life-saving buildings developed in different areas of the country; more than thirty architectural styles evolved between 1848 and the early 1930s.

The U.S. Life-Saving Service is a veritable encyclopaedia of information about the formative years of organized life-saving in the United States. Vivid accounts of rescues are combined with a plethora of information about the people, the architecture and the legacy of the USLSS. The book is an excellent, comprehensive reference source, which also captures the essence of a service dedicated to the saving of lives under extremely adverse conditions. The book is also important as a record of the evolution of life-saving architecture, and of the men who designed the stations. The authors are to be commended for their detailed research and their efforts to preserve records of a service crucial to the safety of mariners in American waters.

Chris Mills
Ketch Harbour, Nova Scotia


The most publicized and written-about marine disaster of all time must be RMS Titanic. There are now dozens of books about the ship, analysing its particulars, construction, passengers and crew, the last dinner aboard, the wireless messages, the sinking, world reaction to the sinking, the press accounts, the religious implications, the discovery of the wreck, the salvage of its artifacts, etc. etc. There are books on Titanic for serious ship buffs, for historians, for the general public, and for children. There are numerous fictional offerings, including three science fiction works – Clive Cussler's Raise the Titanic, Arthur C. Clark's Ghost from the Grand Banks, and Robert Serling's Something's Alive on the Titanic!

Do we therefore need yet another book on Titanic? In this case, we do. Daniel Allen Butler has carefully sifted through the seemingly innumerable facts and minutiae to assemble a detailed account of Titanic, from construction and launch until the most recent dives to recover a shattered piece of the liner's hull. Filled with details, this book will be an essential addition to the Titanic historian's library, or for any scholar or member of the public – including libraries – interested in a comprehensive review, with all the available evidence, of what transpired with this ship from when it was launched, through that long, terrible night, and in the years and decades that followed.

It is a logical successor to Walter Lord's A Night to Remember, Wyn Craig Wade's End of the Dream, and Michael Davie's Titanic. Butler brings us up to date with "Unsinkable."

Butler's chapters review the origins of the ship, her construction, maiden voyage, the collision with the iceberg, the sinking, the aftermath, with its body recoveries and burials, inquests and lawsuits, rediscovery, the numerous dives and recoveries from the wreck, and a summary chapter in which Butler assesses the meaning and significance of Titanic. He also includes summaries of the controversy surrounding the Leyland liner Californian and the conduct of her master, Captain Stanley Lord, what became of many of the players aboard Titanic, and concludes a fascinating epilogue on the behaviour of Captain Edward J. Smith of Titanic on that fateful night.
The shortcomings of "Unsinkable " are in its assessment of what has happened to the ship since its rediscovery in 1985. More than 150 dives have been made, considerable controversy (only briefly mentioned) has erupted, and travelling exhibitions of recovered artifacts are touring North America. More discussion of this issue is needed. Considerable legal battles, over who has the right to salvage the wreck, control of the intellectual property, and control of RMS *Titanic*, Ltd., the company salvaging the wreck, have been waged. This should be reviewed in more detail. Much material has been raised, and a detailed analysis of the iceberg damage and sinking has been conducted. And of course, James Cameron has made his film. In fairness to Mr. Butler, the naval architectural analysis and the film came just as he was doubtless putting his book to press.

So, to repeat the question, do we need another *Titanic* book? Absolutely. Butler's book fills in some needed gaps and paves the way for the next *Titanic* book I'd like most to see – a detailed archaeological account of the wreck on the bottom, and what we have or have not learned from over a decade of recovery from this scattered, broken hulk.

James P. Delgado
Vancouver, British Columbia


In the world of ship broking and financing, the insurance business is one area where relatively few substantial works have been published. This becomes very apparent when we compare with what has been published on shipowning and ship management. Atle Thowsen's book on Scandinavian Marine Claims Office, Inc (SMCO) is therefore a valuable contribution to the literature on maritime history, for he focuses on one of the (often unknown) pillars of the shipping industry, the insurance industry and its partners.

Few industries are able to take advantage of the international market quite the way shipping can. It is a truly international business, and invariably involves a complex network in which ownership, financing, constructing, building, repairs, manning, and so on is not limited to national borders. This is especially so when it comes to insurance, as Thowsen explains and analyses in this book. He puts the story of SMCO into the larger context in order to demonstrate the complexity of modern society in general and the shipping industry in particular. A network of good and reliable partners is essential for profitable shipping. In *The Underwriters Follow the Fleet*, Thowsen is also able to profit from his research on war insurance and shipping during World War II, thereby giving his book an added dimension.

SMCO can trace its roots back to the era of sail in Norway, and Thowsen demonstrates that it was shipowners in Bergen who pushed for the appointment of a common surveyor and average agent in New York. In September 1897 the position of surveyor in New York for iron and steam ships was advertised, and in 1927 the office was given the name Norwegian Underwriters' Agency. The name was then changed in 1959 to Scandinavian Marine Claims Office Inc.. Thowsen analyses and describes how the company evolved through the years, and how it remained both flexible and dynamic as it adapted to the changing shipping world.

Because SMCO operates as a middleman between the underwriters and a ship’s representatives, personal attitudes may have been more important than is the case in other sectors of the shipping industry. It is therefore logical that the present book lays a strong focus on the directors of the company. This in turn suggests that this part of the industry is heavily dependent on strong entrepreneurs.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that the present book has a very attractive lay-out. This is very much due to the work of Tore L. Nilsen, the illustrations editor. He has done a remarkable job of putting together pictures which clearly demonstrate why there is a need for a Scandinavian marine claim office: shipping is very obviously a risky business. The choice of illustrations therefore complements the text in an excellent way.

Due to the international aspect of the shipping industry, and the large historical interest all over the world, the publishers should be congratu-
lated for bearing the costs of translating this work into English. This English edition makes it possible for non-Scandinavians to learn more about this dramatic part of shipping history.

Anders Martin Fon
Tønsberg, Norway


Just as Henry Ford's Model T put the horse out of business, today's global radio navigation aids are putting the sextant out of business. Libraries and bookstores are overstocked with books dealing with the automobile over the past century, yet few books are truly authoritative on specific manufacturers and for specific eras. Similarly, few of the many books available on navigation through the ages offer an authoritative discussion of the transitions brought on by technological change. Peter Ifland, a retired US Navy deck officer, and collector of hand-held navigation equipment for the past thirty years, is one of those exceptions. In his book, he describes the progress made from earliest times to the end of the celestial navigation era. The book is richly illustrated with many colour photographs, some black and whites, lines drawings (some original and some redrawn for the book), and old wood cut illustrations. An unofficial count shows that he visited at least sixteen marine museums in six countries, photographed eleven instruments that predate the advent of the double reflecting sextant that we all know, seventy-seven conventional marine sextants, seven accessories such as artificial horizons, seven box (or pocket) sextants, fourteen distance measuring sextants (or stadimeters), and thirty-three aviation sextants. Very few of these instruments are credited to any museum and the reviewer therefore supposes that most of these instruments are from his personal collection, which can now be seen at The Mariners' Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

To find your way by the stars, it's all in the angles – the angle between the horizontal (or vertical) and a star, or even the angle between one celestial body and another. The more accurate the measurement of these angles, the more precisely the navigator can fix the ship's position north or south (latitude) and east or west (longitude) from some reference point. In the first chapter, Ifland describes the evolution of the celestial navigation instruments from the Arabian Kamal, which measured the altitude as the length of string needed to hold a piece of wood of fixed length away from the eye, the astrolabe, which hung vertically with a rotating arm with two peep-sights, the quadrant, which had a sighting line and a plumb-bob, to the cross-staff which worked on the same principle as the Kamal but with a cross-stick on a squared-dowel. Things became more elegant with the Davis quadrant which meant that one did not have to look directly at the sun nor in two places at once. The evolution finally progressed to the double reflecting principle used in the modern sextant. Altitude of the mid-day sun or of Polaris provided latitude.

In Chapter 2 Ifland discusses measuring the angle between the moon and either the sun or a star to determine time. Elevation of celestial bodies at a known time then provided a solution for longitude. There is accordingly a short description of the time-specific events: eclipses of the sun (four times a year) and moon (three times a year); and eclipses of the moons of Jupiter (once every two days). These, however, were only available to the shore-based surveyor, not to the mariner. The mariner had to measure the often large lunar-distance angles and hence the development of sextants capable of angles up to 160 degrees or more. Accompanied with the need for measuring large angles was the need for accurate Ephemerides. This work was done at various observatories, such as Greenwich with the first Nautical Almanac published in 1766 for the following year.

The third chapter deals with the materials and construction of sextants, structural rigidity, size and weight to improve performance. The technical advancements of machine dividing of the arc, vernier scales, drum micrometers, and quick release mechanisms are mentioned in Chapter 4, while the optics, mirrors, prisms, filters, sighting tubes and telescopes comprise Chapter 5. This is followed by a chapter which explains the mariner's solution for obtaining an horizon when it was not visible by using spirit levels, reflection off a horizontal surface (mercury), gyroscope, pendulum, etc. Chapter 7 illustrates special instruments for use in land
surveying, hydrography, and cartography. Naval officers would be interested in the examples of distance determining devices by measuring the angle subtended by a known distance (e.g., height of mast). The last chapter outlines the development of sextants for dirigible, aircraft, and space craft uses. The Epilogue describes the death-knell of sextants, the Global Positioning System (GPS). There is an appendix of patents listed alphabetically by inventor, a glossary of terms used in the book, and a comprehensive list of 108 suggested readings, from the 1767 Almanac to Dava Sobel's 1995 book on longitude.

The quality of the photographs is fantastic, the lines diagrams are excellent, and the text is informative, though I occasionally found the descriptions unwieldy without the instrument in my possession. Overall, however, this is an excellent book particularly worth its purchase price.

David Gray
Ottawa, Ontario


John MacDonald has lived and worked in the Arctic for many years. For the past twelve years he has lived in Igloolik, NT working as the Director of the Igloolik Research Centre (part of the Nunavut Research Institute). In this, his first book, he explores many aspects of the Arctic sky from an Inuit perspective. MacDonald adopts a holistic approach, not only examining astronomical phenomena but also explaining their meaning and place in Inuit cosmology. The reader learns how Inuit envisioned the universe and the active role they played in its maintenance. As such, the book is much more than its title suggests.

MacDonald uses a broad brush to paint his portrait of the Arctic sky drawing from Inuit oral history, written accounts of anthropologists and astronomers, and personal observation. Numerous excellently translated quotations from Inuit elders provide rich detail and colour. MacDonald is to be commended for allowing the elders' own words to speak for them. Inuit traditional knowledge is being lost at an alarming rate. Of the elders quoted in this volume, over a third have passed away in the last five years. Fortunately, some of their knowledge lives on through this volume and the tapes recorded for it.

Compared with other cultures, the Inuit have relatively few named constellations. MacDonald examines possible reasons for this, including loss of traditional knowledge, long periods of twenty-four hour daylight and frequent winter hazes that obscure even a cloudless night sky. A standard star chart identifies Inuit constellations. Each constellation is then illustrated and described. There are similar sections on the planets, sun and moon. The sun section is particularly informative, as the author describes the ceremonies attending the reappearance of the sun in January after an absence of several months.

The book continues with chapters on "The Atmosphere," "Navigation" and "Time." In these the author explores the role astronomical phenomena played in weather prediction, navigation and as seasonal indicators. In keeping with his holistic approach, the author does not limit his discussion to the role of astronomy, choosing to provide the reader with a more complete understanding of these topics and thereby adding to the book's value. One example of this is the chapter on navigation. To European explorers and whalers, navigation in the Arctic was hazardous. The frozen ocean presented an almost insurmountable barrier. Moving ice crushed ships while frozen straits prevented navigation through the Northwest Passage. In contrast, the Inuit lived and travelled on the land-fast ice and hunted in the moving pack ice. MacDonald helps us to understand how the Inuit were able to navigate on the land, sea and ice. He does not focus solely on star navigation. Instead, he demonstrates how Inuit made use of all available information to ascertain their position describing the use of snow drifts, winds, tides, currents, inuksuit (stone cairns), animal behavior and even dreams.

The Inuit have wonderful legends about the origins of the sun, moon and stars. MacDonald rightly concludes the book with two chapters of legends. The first was entirely collected by the author in Igloolik while the second was gleaned from previously published sources. The author's comments on these legends are insightful and assist the reader to understand the deeper spiritual meanings of these fascinating traditions.

This volume benefits immeasurably not only
from the author’s domicile in the north but also from his careful research and checking and rechecking of information with elders. It is well written, clearly laid out and readily accessible to a general audience. There is some repetition, but this does not affect one’s overall enjoyment of the book. This is a book one can easily dip into over and over again. It should certainly be read carefully by anyone with any interest in the Inuit, the north, astronomy, cosmology or shamanism.

Susan Rowley
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


The title of this interesting and well-illustrated monograph is a nice précis of the author’s thesis: medieval cartography had a diachronic dimension and was meant to represent human geography in time as well as in space. Since many, even most, existing medieval maps survive in books rather than as separate documents, it is possible to break with scholarly tradition and attend to the surrounding text and diagrams, rather than simply abstracting medieval maps as examples of primitive cartography. Evelyn Edson is not the first to take this approach, but she does an excellent job of summarizing the implications of reading medieval maps in context. The conclusion to which she is driven, that these are maps of time as well as of space, is not the only way of accounting for the notorious “inaccuracy” of medieval maps, but it does suggest an important factor in the oddness of these representations to the modern eye. Significantly, there was no single word for “map” in the Middle Ages and it was, as Edson argues, no accident that some medieval maps were simply called “histories” by their makers.

The book summarizes what we know of the classical cartographic tradition and examines the influence of early Christian authorities, like Isidore of Seville and Bede. There follows a lucid explanation of the computus, i.e. the vexed problem of calculating the date of Easter, with a discussion of this calendrical problem as a context for medieval science and for several important medieval maps and diagrams. Edson also discusses maps surviving in medieval histories, as well as histories without maps and maps without histories – notably the magnificent thirteenth-century Hereford Cathedral mappemundi. Many are illustrated, with significant details enlarged and explained. A few important maps are discussed but not illustrated. (Here one suspects the dead hand of restrictive reproduction policies beyond the influence of the publishers.)

Mapping Time and Space is well laid-out, not simply on the page but heuristically as well. Edson summarizes current topics in early cartography with considerable wit. The work is not oriented towards maritime history, in fact that would be contrary to spirit of historicism in which it is framed. The author discusses the emergence of portolan charts briefly but she makes it pretty clear that, with a few exceptions, the seas on which most maritime historians prefer to embark were peripheral to the medieval vision of the world. This is just one of the thought-provoking implications of this excellent work.

We might also consider the ways in which the medieval cartographic framework was accurate: from the existence of Africa to the south, to the conception of Eurasia as a huge mass of land surrounded by water, to speculation about the existence of a continental antipodes, and a vague notion of Thule in the northern seas beyond Britannia and Hibernia. The idea that the earth was flat was distinctly a minority view, promoted by Cosmas Indicopleustes or “Mr World Sails-to-India” as Edson calls him, characterizing the Alexandrian merchant-turned-monk as a sixth-century Ross Perot, convinced that his business acumen could bring common sense to the confusions of geography. It is useful to see this populist world view within the perspective, so to speak, of the more complex and ultimately more scientific spiritual and historical traditions of the millennium.

This is the first in a new series of British Library Studies in Map History, which the publishers promise will comprise well-written and well-illustrated books by leading scholars, presenting recent research to a wider audience. The present publication is a good start. Reasonably priced, given its extensive illustrations, it deserves a place in scholarly libraries.

Peter Pope
St. John’s, Newfoundland


The subject of exploration and historical cartography has seen the publication of many works in the last decade. The anniversary of Cabotian and Columbian explorations has done much to energize this field of history. However, most books have concentrated either on the documentary evidence, i.e. the narratives, or on the cartographical evidence.

As always debates arise over the interpretation of documentary evidence and the cartographical record is often used as proof or complementary evidence for theory X or Y. In *New Found Lands*, his latest of many books on the history of cartography (including *The Image of the World: 20 Centuries of World Maps* and *The Mapping of the Heavens* and *The Charting of the Oceans: Ten Centuries of Maritime Maps*), Peter Whitfield takes a different slant. This book has one clear purpose: to document the intellectual context of exploration. Not only are we presented with a wonderful collection of illustrations and a solid exposition of the history of world exploration, but we are also provided a detailed commentary of the shifting intellectual context. Once again, the span of this work is breathtaking. Peter Whitfield tries to cover as much of history as possible by starting with the ancient world and taking us to the exploration of our neighbouring planets.

Whitfield dedicates entire chapters to major episodes of the history of exploration, discussing for instance the role of maps in reporting the eastern voyages of Marco Polo. These views, along with Polo's narrative, were a principal motivation for the age of discovery. The lure of the east was the major catalyst for the subsequent exploration campaigns of the Portuguese, Spanish, English, French and Dutch. The search for a transatlantic passage to the Indies and China gave birth to the so-called discovery of the New World and the Northwest Passage. Once Western Europe acquired a taste for exploration and colonisation, the subsequent charting of the oceans, the continents and the poles was only a matter of time. Each phase of these European enterprises is discussed and illustrated with contextual maps. Through this careful and precise narrative of exploration, the shifting cartographic representation of the world becomes easier to understand.

Whitfield also comments upon the shifting motives for exploration. Until the nineteenth century, colonialism and empire building were the main forces driving this enterprise. However, polar exploration marked the point at which exploration was motivated solely by the search for knowledge, thus opening the door to the spirit which animated interplanetary exploration and space based cartography.

Peter Whitfield's style is always clear and concise. This is directly imputable to the fact that he has near complete mastery of the subject and very acute knowledge of every map and explorer discussed. The relevance, scope and clarity of the illustrations are to be noted.

Kees Zandvliet's *Mapping for Money*, much narrower in scope and purpose than most books on cartography, is more akin to a scholarly dissertation relating the importance of mapping in Dutch exploration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Anyone who has ever been interested in the history of mapping of any continent has undoubtedly come across the names of Blaeu, Van Keulen, Visscher and Plancius. Kees Zandvliet's book is therefore an excellent way to discover, in much detail, the contribution of Dutch cartography and exploration in the shaping of European mapping.

The book begins by investigating the influence of Portugal and Spain and moves on to early years of Dutch cartography. The evolution of the mapmaker's education and status are closely studied. This is particularly important because Zandvliet argues that Dutch expansionism and economic importance during this era were directly related to the improvements in the quality of education and training. In the ensuing chapters which make up the bulk of the work, Zandvliet deals with map and chart making as a fundamental tool for economic prosperity within the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Dutch West India Company (WIC). The crucial role of the Blaeu family, de Graaff, Doncker, Vingboons,
Van Keulen and Vooght in the history of these companies is well developed.

Zandvliet also discusses topics other than the importance of cartography in Dutch expansionism. He ties in many links between map making and art and the representation of the mapmaker in Dutch painting. With the expansion of the Dutch economic empire, the map soon became more than a fundamental tool; it also became a work of art, a status symbol and symbol of economic wealth. Although the main focus of this book is related to the history of cartography in the Netherlands, the study of the underlying blueprint can be of benefit to any cartography scholar.

**Mapping for Money** has well-documented appendixes, thoroughly researched and complete notes, a large index and a rich bibliography. Both works are highly recommended.

Marc Cormier
Toronto, Ontario

Joseph C. Schnaubelt and Frederick Van Fleteren (eds.). *Columbus and the New World*. American University Studies Series IX, History, Vol. 185; Bern and New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1998. x + 207 pp., figures, illustrations, index. sFr 60.00, DM 75.00, US $42.95, £26, FF 240.00, OS 500.00, hardback; ISBN 0-8204-3736-0.

The flood of publications loosed by the quincentenary of Columbus’ epic voyage shows little sign of subsiding. This latest reappraisal of the man and his achievement comprises nine papers originally presented to gatherings held between 1991 and 1993 under the auspices of the International Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Conference at Villanova University. The intention was to consider the European intellectual background to the voyage, the voyage itself and its aftermath. These sensible and laudable objectives are hardly met by the resultant volume. The essays it contains constitute, in their nature and scope, an idiosyncratic, not to say eccentric, approach to such notable themes. Editorial control would appear to have been minimal, so that while some papers are a mere four or five pages in length, one and by no means the most important hogs much of the available space, taking up twenty-five pages and with a further twenty-one pages of notes and a bibliography as well.

The overall coverage of the proposed topic is unbalanced and inadequate. Six essays are devoted to the background to 1492, but only one to the voyage itself and two to its aftermath. Particularly unsatisfactory are the essays providing the so-called Prologue and Prolegomena to 1492. The discussion of Columbus’ well-known and astonishing religious fervour is scrappy and marred by the assumption that his *Book of Prophecies* remains unpublished. But there are still stranger things to come. Bourke pointlessly argues that Columbus might never have attempted his voyage had he heeded the opinions of St. Augustine. Allan Back goes a step further with a totally irrelevant account of the thought of the eleventh-century Muslim philosopher known in the West as Avicenna and its impact (or rather lack of) in Europe from the Middle Ages to the days of Immanuel Kant. Hardly more germane to the theme of the voyage is Saliba’s essay urging that Arabic astronomical learning was not in decline during the Age of Discovery and tracing the possible impact of Arabic scholarship in Christian Europe. The remarks, however, on the early history of the astrolabe in the West are somewhat unfortunate. Rather more useful, though hardly adding much to what is already known, are the overlapping contributions by Buisseret and West on the actual and potential sources of Columbus' geographical knowledge and opinions, and on the early mapping of his discoveries.

Only when it turns to the voyage and its consequences does the book come alive. A lengthy contribution by Kelly confirms the widely accepted view that Columbus was a dead reckoning navigator. It usefully surveys the techniques of seamanship and navigation in the early modern centuries, though some of the information is rather loosely tied to the Columbus voyage. There are also some curious errors of fact or interpretation. That remarkable, if unlovable, seaman Captain William Bligh RN, is said to have commanded what is described as a "company" ship, while Columbus allegedly performed the remarkable feat of "running close-hauled into the wind." However, the collection is rounded off with two good and challenging pieces. In a cogent and sharply-foocussed essay Muldoon stresses the degree to which medieval ideas, practices and institutions underlay the beginnings of Europe’s overseas expansion, and offers a deft analysis of the reasons why the Spanish crown rested its title to authority in the New World on a papal grant. But the final essay by McNeill on the biological and ecological consequences of 1492 is the most
remarkable. Basing himself on the findings of Alfred Crosby he outlines how diseases, crops, domestic animals, weeds and pests from the Eurasian landmass affected the Americas after the Columbus voyage. He speculates as to why Africa was for so long much more successful in resisting European incursions and colonization of the Americas. And he concludes with a wide-ranging survey of the impact of New World maize and potatoes in the Old World. Here indeed imagination soars as he urges — surely with tongue in cheek? — that the potato thwarted Cromwellian schemes for Ireland and underpinned German militarism, whilst maize was responsible for social dislocation in Rumania, the aggressiveness of Serbs and sparked off World War I into the bargain. Such visions are worthy of Columbus himself and do something to rescue an otherwise disappointing evaluation of the Admiral’s achievements and influence.

G.V. Scammell
Cambridge, England


Francis Drake grew up in a world in which England was largely interested in fostering trade with the Baltic countries and Northern Europe. Portugal and Spain on the other hand were developing links with overseas territories, the former pushing into the Indian Ocean and beyond while Spain amassed wealth from its conquests in South America and from trade across the Pacific while at the same time endeavouring to suppress Protestant unrest in the Lów Countries.

Some English merchants traded successfully with the Spanish mainland, but others who sought to trade in the Caribbean and Central America met with deceit or a hostile reception. In frustration they turned from time to time to strong-arm tactics, taking Spanish vessels by force and appropriating their cargoes. It was while sailing with his relatives, the Hawkins, that Francis Drake began to develop his reputation as the scourge of Spain. Engaged ostensibly in legitimate trading, albeit embarking slaves from West Africa, squadrons of small ships would set out from England and return with richer pickings, much to the delight of backers. Although as the author points out that the term “privateer” was yet to be coined, this in effect is a convenient way to describe Drake’s activities, since he was operating with the full knowledge of the Crown and its advisors.

Kelsey retells the story of Elizabeth’s principal sea-dog with skill. A third of the book is taken up with appendices, notes and an extensive bibliography but into the remainder he has condensed the whole Drake story, not only introducing the reader to the accepted version of events but also offering an opportunity to explore alternative theories. By the end of the narrative it would be a brave person indeed who would choose Drake as a shipmate, friend or business partner. His knack of turning on those close to him is unnerving; indeed, his tendency to adopt a God-like attitude as voyages progressed foreshadowed the wave of Puritanism that was to sweep Britain a century later.

There are so many books about Drake that an author must be hard pressed to make his own contribution stand out from the others. The subtitle *The Queen’s Pirate* has an attractive romantic ring about it. Kelsey clearly believes Drake was a pirate because he loses no opportunity to describe the activities of the man and his crew in such a light — indeed too much so. From his description of their activities there is no way they can be likened to the stereotype pirate of legend who murdered and pillaged for personal gain. To use a current expression Drake was a “state-sponsored terrorist.” Yes, Spanish citizens were killed from time to time, but not in any systematic fashion. More often than not, having inconvenienced his captives, he would reward them and let them go. The most serious charge that can be laid against Drake and his men was religious bigotry. Time and again we are told that his crewmen crushed rosaries under foot, damaged crucifixes, defiled and destroyed church plate and desecrated the interiors of Catholic churches. This was pointless vandalism whose sole aim was to cause distress. To this day aspects of the British constitution continue to reflect this bias.

That criticism aside this book will be a useful addition to the library of anyone interested in the period providing as it does a quick means of accessing the totality of the subject.

Norman Hurst
Coulsdon, Surrey
Narváez was one of that small group of Spanish pilotos (non-commissioned officers) whose individual contributions to the exploration of the Pacific northwest coast have been largely overlooked. This book fills one such gap.

Narváez was only twenty when he was appointed Segundo Piloto of the San Carlos, captained by Gonzalo López de Haro, the second ship of an expedition in 1788 to the Gulf of Alaska commanded by Estéban Martínez. One of the most important Spain sent north, it confirmed to the Spanish authorities reports of Russian activity in waters Spain claimed as hers and, more importantly, intelligence of a possible Russian expedition to occupy Nootka Sound.

Narváez' journal of this expedition, narrated, translated and edited by the author, forms almost half the book. In many respects it is a typical journal of a Spanish piloto: factual, observant, but almost impersonal. Thus, he has nothing to say about the bitter disputes which poisoned the relations between the two commanders, perhaps because Martínez threatened him with arrest if he did so. To have this journal available in print for the first time is to be welcomed.

Narváez returned north again in 1789 under Martínez to occupy Nootka and was sent in the seized Northwest America that Meares had built at Nootka, restored and renamed the Santa Gertudis la Magna, to explore the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. He was thus the first Spanish explorer to investigate Clayoquot Sound, Barkley Sound and the Strait as far as Port San Juan. Following the decision to reoccupy Nootka after its temporary abandonment in October, 1789, Narváez returned under Francisco de Eliza. In 1791, Eliza in the San Carlos and Narváez in the schooner Santa Saturnina explored Haro Strait and Georgia Strait. Two important results were the first chart of Haro Strait and Georgia Strait and Narváez' discovery of the entrance to Vancouver harbour, a year before George Vancouver. McDowell devotes a chapter to his unsuccessful efforts to locate Narváez' lost journal of this important expedition. This is to be regretted as Narváez did the major part of the exploring.

Narváez' progress up the ranks was painfully slow but he remained in the Spanish navy until he became involved in the early stages of the Mexican independence movement and accepted a commission of lieutenant in the nascent Mexican navy. A full chapter is devoted to this phase of his career. He died in Guadalajara in 1840.

There are useful appendices devoted to the dimensions of the Santa Saturnina, its manifest, and a glossary of place names. Yet some errors were also noted. The fur trader Barkley was English, not American; and his ship was the Imperial Eagle, not the American Eagle. [10] The San Carlos was not built in La Havana but in Manila, hence the name, El Filípino, by which she was often called. [20, 98] The Santa Saturnina was not the last metamorphosis of the Northwest America but put together from sections taken off Colnett's Argonaut in San Blas, re-loaded onto Eliza's Concepción, taken to Nootka and there assembled with the addition of some locally cut timber. [51, 168] Students of Spain's contribution to our maritime heritage will also question some of the author's statements, such as Narváez was the first European to chart the interior of the Strait of Juan de Fuca [38] (that was Manuel Quimper in 1790), or that "Bodega decided to make Martínez the scapegoat for evacuating Nootka" [42]; the outgoing viceroy, Manuel Flores, never informed his successor, Revillagigedo, that he had recalled Martínez.

Freeman M. Tovell
Victoria, British Columbia


Although there is an extensive literature on early English and French exploration and settlement in North America, much less attention has been paid to Spanish explorations and claims of the same period. Yet for a while Spain, too, was a major player in North America, with pretensions to lands yet unexplored and concern about the threat of incursions by other powers. In this little book, published after his return to Spain many years later, Reinaldo Rodriguez analyzes the results and implications of the Muscovite expedition, and the potential Russian threat to the Spanish empire on the Pacific northwest coast.
years in the Philippines and New Spain as a missionary, Father Torrubia warns that Spanish realms on the Sea of California were threatened, not by the English, who spent two futile centuries searching for a sea route linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but by the Russians.

Making his case, Torrubia discusses the claims of discovery attributed to the mythical Admiral Bartolomeo de Fonte and corroborated by the dubious Juan de Fuca, Lorenzo Ferrer de Maldonado, and Fray Antonio. The latter had described a Strait of Anian, with shores allegedly peopled by Muscovites (Russians). Prevarication and rumour flourished during the early years of the Age of Discovery, when credence was often given to "information" later thrust aside by more reliable explorations.

In the long run, both Spain and Russia failed in their efforts on the North American Pacific Coast and were supplanted by the British, whose mastery of the sea was soon affirmed by Cook and Vancouver. And even the British would be displaced by the as yet unknown power of the Americans, who would dominate the maritime fur trade and occupy the Oregon Country and California. Torrubia's book is therefore little more than an historical curiosity. Still, in its own day, it was a reasoned attempt, using the information then available, to judge the course of future events in the New World. The translation is ably done—having the translation and the original Italian version in the same volume permits the reader to compare the two.

Like other titles from Ye Galleon Press, the book is durably and attractively bound, and an example of fine printing. Unfortunately, there are a number of typographical errors.

Richard A. Pierce
Kingston, Ontario


This short travel account is a clear, simple reminiscence that the author had privately printed in 1861, when he was 82 years old and the events recalled were half a century old. Intended for his friends and relatives only, it recounts "from memory" without any subtleties or profundities the adventures of Captain De Wolf (the original spelling, but more commonly D'Wolf) during his journey not only to the North Pacific but also across Siberia (as the title of the first printing, but not this one, makes clear). It is a simply and clearly written story, similar, no doubt, to the tales that the "White Grandpa" told his grandchildren in retirement in Dorchester (now a Boston ghetto).

Notwithstanding these caveats, as well as the fact that "Norwest John" knew, by his own admission, "very little Russ," it is at times an informative, as well as an enjoyable story, being one of the few published firsthand accounts of a Northwest voyage, particularly one involving trade with Russian America (a necessary adjunct for many American "coasters") and an overland return via Siberia (D'Wolf was the first American to do so). The most valuable descriptions for the historian include those of a perilous collision at sea with a ship in company, a risky stopover on the Spanish Main at Valparaiso, Chile, a rendezvous with other "Boston" ships at Newhitty at the northern tip of Vancouver Island, a characterization of Sitka's swashbuckling Governor Baranov, Sitka's winter of starvation of 1805-06 (and a missed opportunity – D'Wolf was invited but declined to visit California with Imperial Chamberlain Rezanov to obtain alimentary relief), an eyewitness treatment of the Sitkan Tlingits, the art of dogsledding in the Kamchatka Peninsula, and travel on horseback over the notorious track from Okhotsk (then Russia's chief Pacific port) to Yakutsk, on a riverboat up the Lena River from Yakutsk to the head of navigation, and in a carriage through Siberia under the aegis of the posting system.

Upon his return home, D'Wolf in 1808 married Mary Melville, becoming the uncle-by-marriage of her nephew Herman; he later became his literary uncle, too, appearing as such in Redburn and Moby Dick. He christened his only son John Langsdorff D'Wolf in honour of the German naturalist and explorer with whom he had become close friends on his North Pacific voyage.

Glen Adams' Ye Galleon Press has a well-deserved reputation for making scarce titles available in attractive format at a reasonable price; this title is no exception. The 1861 printing was limited to one hundred copies. It was reprinted in 1917 in the omnibus Tales of an Old Sea Port. Ye Galleon Press published its first
printing in hard cover in 1968 as an enlarged facsimile of the 1861 edition, adding a map of the route of D’Wolfs voyage (in a vessel of twenty-five tons!) from Sitka to Okhotsk. This second printing has been completely reset in a different type face and format (and the alternate spelling of the author’s surname). The only other edition – and the most informative (it boasts a long introduction and annotations, handsome sketches, views, photographs, and endpaper maps of some of D’Wolf’s round-the-world journey) – was published in a limited edition in 1983 by Rulon-Miller Books of Bristol, Rhode Island, the author’s birthplace.

James Gibson
Toronto, Ontario


French naval captain Abel du Petit-Thouars sailed from Brest in the frigate *Venus* at the end of 1836, returning in 1839 after an impressive voyage of exploration in the Pacific. A vast publication project followed, producing by 1855 eleven volumes of text and four folio atlases. This small selection reproduces only those chapters which cover *Venus’* visit to Monterey and, more briefly, her voyage down the coast of Baja California, visiting Magdalena Bay and Cabo San Lucas. The same book was first published in a limited, fine edition by Glen Dawson in Los Angeles in 1956, but has long been out of print; now Glen Adams has photographically reproduced the Dawson version and issued it in an inexpensive edition of 500 copies. Once again the scholarly public can be grateful to Adams and the mission of such reprinting he has chosen for his Ye Galleon Press.

Du Petit-Thouars spent less than a month in Monterey late in 1837. He arrived from Kamchatka with his crew riddled with scurvy and his ship in need of repairs and supplies, all of which needed tending to as well as his normal meteorological and cartographical responsibilities. None of this was easy, particularly since provisions were scarce in a year of drought (the French had to send out their own hunters, and even found themselves digging their own wells). Neverthe-
sponsored by the New York City businessman Henry Grinnell and sent in search of Sir John Franklin. It was commanded by Lieutenant Edwin DeHaven, whose health was so badly broken by the Arctic conditions that he was forced to leave the navy soon after the expedition's return. The expedition is best known for its doctor, Elisha Kent Kane; he would be so taken by the north and the Franklin search that he would lead the second expedition funded by Grinnell. Carter's private journal has been edited for publication by two dedicated amateurs. Their focus was on an unusual activity by a prominent Virginian rather than to edit the Arctic journal of someone who happened to be from the American South. CNRS members will therefore find the several definitions of a DR position unnecessary, and those with specialist arctic knowledge will find errors in the introduction. A purpose-drawn track map of the expedition route rather than pictures of expedition charts would have been useful. But none of that diminishes the interest of the journal. Carter had both his 25th and 26th birthdays in the north, but even allowing for the strong opinions of youth, the journal exhibits a priggish quality. He complained repeatedly of the lack of Sunday services. He has few kind things to say about his companions, and was quite happy to use the excuse of duty not to attend expedition entertainments and social occasions during the arctic winter. The structure and organization of the expedition prompts questions about the US Navy as an institution. The expedition commander, Lt. DeHaven, held the honorary appointment of Commodore. On his ship, the Advance, he was the only commissioned officer; his second-in-command, the commanding officer of Rescue, and Carter himself were all "Passed Midshipmen" with appointments as acting Masters. According to Carter, the expedition was poorly prepared and equipped, no doubt because it was mounted very quickly, though the proposal had been in the President's hands for some time. The lack of senior substantive rank and the final rush to send it to sea suggests parallels with the first United States Exploring Expedition, of 1839-42.

Carter's journal reveals a curious lack of common purpose. The expedition sailed on 23 May but it was only on 4 July that Carter learned the details of the plan. 1850 was a busy year for Franklin searches and the Americans were not alone. On 27 August the captains of the several expeditions met and agreed on a plan that divided up areas of search. Yet Carter only learned these details from an Englishman in chance conversation on 11 September. Two days later, Carter's commanding officer provided DeHaven with a requested statement recommending that the Americans terminate their search and head south. Carter's only reference was "Home stock was up high." [75] All this would suggest either that DeHaven did not share his plans widely or that Carter did not enjoy the captain's confidence. Yet Carter's commanding officer had been a friend at Annapolis, and the Rescue officers crowded living space made secrecy improbable. Was Carter too self-centred to be observant? His drawings included in the illustrations would suggest not, as would his selection for subsequent United States exploring expeditions. If the journal is typical of the period, it provides interesting glimpses for social historians of the US Navy. For arctic specialist this may also be a useful volume.

William Glover
Manotick, Ontario


There is a certain sameness to much academic writing, perhaps attributable to the fact that the writers are compelled to prove that they are the sort of person who deserves either a doctorate or a tenure-track job. Rob e r Feeney, the author of Polar Journeys, is in his eighties. He earned his PhD (in biochemistry) a long time ago, and is thus free to write what pleases him. As a result, this book is an engaging blend of his professional knowledge of nutrition and his personal interest in the history of polar exploration.

Feeney's interest in the polar regions began when he requested the National Science Foundation for some penguin eggs, necessary to his research. The NSF replied that if he needed penguin eggs he could fetch them himself. The egg research, and another project on the natural "antifreeze" of certain fishes, took Feeney on more than a dozen expeditions to both the Arctic and the Antarctic. He met numerous men who had
figured in polar history, such as Sir Charles Wright, one of the party who discovered the bodies of Scott and his companions. He also acquired and read what he modestly terms "a poor man's library." [xvii] Perhaps, but he has read to good effect in an interesting variety of books, such as Melville's *In the Lena Delta* (1885) on the disastrous *Jeanette* expedition.

Feeney surveys polar exploration more or less chronologically and takes the story right up to the age of space travel, which he sees as the modern equivalent. He looks at polar expeditions from the aspect of nutrition, which, for a variety of reasons, often played a crucial role in their success or failure. Many tragedies occurred because of the lack of food or the lack of the right kind of food. Scurvy, caused by Vitamin C deficiency, is infamous, but an equally appalling death can result from an excess of Vitamin A, which could afflict those who ate, when compelled by hunger, the livers of polar bears, dogs or seals. Feeney has an excellent chapter on Mawson's near-death from hypervitaminosis A on his 1911-1912 Antarctic expedition. There is also an appendix on the topic.

There is inevitably much grim reading in this book but there are incidental pleasures along the way. I enjoyed learning that rats, the last resort of desperate sailors, are an excellent source of Vitamin C. These fortunate rodents are able to synthesize the vitamin and so, in that respect at least, are better suited for lengthy voyages than our own kind. And the contrasting diets of Russian and American cosmonauts suggests that the Russian space program has its merits; the Russian menus include borscht, sturgeon and five kinds of bread, only one of them white.

Feeney's overall approach to his subject is particularly appealing. To begin with, as an expert on nutrition he is inclined to be charitable to the misconceptions of the past. It is the laity who tend to be contemptuous of those who did not know what we know now. Feeney is aware of how hard-won knowledge can be, and of how long it can take for the correct theory to win out. So Scott is not condemned as a fool because he thought that he could avoid scurvy by avoiding contaminated food. If we believe now that Lind was right about lemon juice as an anti-scorbutic, it is because our understanding of vitamins was not available to Scott. Moreover, there is still room for disagreement about nutrition. When Feeney was a doctoral student at the University of Wisconsin, he became "highly prejudiced" against the ideas of Stefansson, which were soundly derided. Yet in this book he presents a highly sympathetic account of Stefansson's advocacy of an all-meat diet – a diet which continues to contradict conventional wisdom.

Perhaps the best thing about *Polar Journeys* is the way Feeney is both full of enthusiasm for the courage, tenacity and good humour of so many polar explorers and yet also realistically aware that these brave spirits had to live within the same limits of the possible as the rest of humanity. Even heroes must cope with their bellies and bowels. The vicious cycle of diarrhea leading to nutritional deficiency leading to infection leading to diarrhea [12] can strike anyone who is unfortunate or ill-prepared. *Polar Journeys* is not only a contribution to its own field but to the wider field of human geography. It is one of those books that can enhance the reading of other books.

Anne Morton
Winnipeg, Manitoba


Glen Adams and Ye Galleon Press have produced some beautifully bound reprints of rare items of maritime and American history in recent years, and this is another title in the series. The author of this work, Horace Holden, was born at Hillsborough, New Hampshire in 1810. He was just twenty-one years old when he sailed from New Bedford aboard the *Mentor* on a whaling voyage to the Indian Ocean in July 1831.

The first part of the voyage was uneventful, with brief calls at Fayal in the Azores, and at Coupang on Timor. Soon after leaving Timor, the *Mentor* encountered a fierce storm that lasted for three days and eventually drove the ship onto a coral reef near the Pelew Islands on the night of 21 May 1832. In the initial panic, ten of her crew immediately abandoned ship, but their boat overturned in the wild seas, and all ten men were
drowned. The remaining crewmen wisely chose to wait till morning before deciding what to do. At first light, they sighted some islands in the distance, and set off for them in a whaleboat.

The island proved to be inhabited and soon after arrival an assembly of natives was called to debate the whalemen's fate. Things looked grim till some of the island women, including the local "prophetess" interceded on their behalf. The whalemen's presence proved a burden to the islanders who divided them between a number of villages to spread the load of feeding them. After several months had passed, the whalers asked the natives if they would allow them to leave the island. The villagers agreed, and helped them build a large canoe which, together with their whaleboat, carried them from the island.

They set off on 27 October 1832 and two weeks later reached Lord North's Island, whose inhabitants proved less friendly and more impoverished than their former hosts. The American seamen were again divided up between different families, but this time were treated as household slaves, and were expected to work hard in return for shelter and a little food.

As their captivity continued, the remaining seamen began to succumb to the poor food and hard work though one was murdered by the natives. Eventually only Holden and another American remained alive. When the two men were so weak that they could no longer work for their masters, they were allowed to go free. Yet they were denied regular food and had to beg for scraps to sustain themselves. They were on the verge of starvation when a British vessel called at the island in November 1834 and rescued the castaways. In May 1835, three years after they were shipwrecked, both men returned to the United States. Holden's ordeal did not seem to have permanently impaired his health, for he later settled in Oregon and lived to the age of 94 years.

This reprint of Horace Holden's adventures has been attractively bound and illustrated with a selection of monochrome maritime images. There is an introduction by Keith Huntress, an appendix containing a vocabulary of Polynesian words and dialogues compiled by Holden, plus another appendix containing articles about Holden's later years. The only obvious blemish is an absence of text from page forty-nine of the review copy.

Mark Howard
Melbourne, Australia
before capitalism. Here his prior work on Gujarat is particularly helpful. In tracing the complex economic ties across the Afrasian Sea, and especially the exchange of cloth for ivory, Pearson finally locates the Swahili ports as semiperipheries to the world system, and connective and compradorial (but, critically, not exploitative) to the interior. His discussion of the concept of use value in determining whether or not exploitation occurs is especially illuminating here.

When he finally gets to Portugal in Chapter 5, Pearson's work is in the spirit of contemporary world system writing in denying any exceptionalism to these encounters in the early modern period. While later developments between European peoples and the Indian Ocean/Afrasian Sea would obviously transform the entire region, and integrate it into Wallerstein's world-system, this had not yet happened, and Pearson repeatedly cautions us not to view early modern history from a later vantage point. In so arguing he embraces the notion of uniformitarianism – the broad commonality of the world prior to the Industrial Revolution.

In making his argument about the Swahili Coast, Pearson always is aware of the potential for use (or misuse) of history. He is very critical of Hindu-nationalist misuse of history in India, and some of his argument is strongly directed against those (primarily in Kenya) who seek to demonize the role of the Swahili in Kenyan history in order to ostracize them politically. Pearson acknowledges the Swahili people emphasized their cultural distinctiveness from interior peoples during the Omani and colonial periods – something he sees as historically misleading and politically damaging.

For a small book, there is much richness here, and scholars of this region and this era will find much of interest. Yet of greater value than any specific piece of data or interpretation is the almost Rashamon-like model Pearson uses to interpret the Swahili Coast from different geographic or methodological vantage points. He thereby opens windows of opportunity for students both within and outside the region to go on to deepen our awareness and understanding of this distant Afrasian world in the early modern period.

Larry W. Bowman
Storrs, Connecticut


Over the past three decades numerous studies have examined the status of women in American society during the colonial and antebellum periods. Although most historians agree that women's sphere was severely circumscribed by the Victorian era, they are less sure about women's social, economic, political, and religious roles during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While the 1600s were hardly a "golden age" for American women, some scholars believe women's status declined during the subsequent century. Joan Hoff Wilson succinctly summarised this outlook in the title of her influential 1976 study, "The Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution." Other historians, notably Linda Kerber and Mary Beth Norton, disagree and have emphasised that women's status improved during the Revolutionary Era as "Republican Motherhood" enhanced women's importance. In *Ebb Tide in New England* Elaine Forman Crane supports Wilson's view and argues persuasively that women in New England seaports became more dependent and less autonomous than they had been in the early 1600s. Patriarchy triumphed, and women were increasingly marginalised.

Crane first became interested in studying these ports because women constituted the majority of the population by the Revolution. She began with a "misguided optimism" [5] that female empowerment was related to numerical superiority. Her optimism proved to be mistaken, however. Although women outnumbered men, Crane demonstrates that men dominated them in virtually every aspect of public life. Chapters examining the religious, economic, political, and legal arenas of these seaports reveal that women lost status and independence as the eighteenth century progressed. Women accounted for the large majority of church members, but the male clergy dominated religious life. As the economy grew and became increasingly integrated into Britain's commercial empire, there was a notable separation of the home from production. This process undervalued women's work and contributed to the feminisation of poverty. Women were totally excluded from New England's political world,
and changes in the laws governing divorce, estates, dower rights, and other property issues left women increasingly dependent on men. Far from improving women's autonomy, the American Revolution strengthened the rights of patriarchy with the rise of "Republican Motherhood," which entrenched the "patriarchal, hierarchical, and dependent relationship between husband and wife." [209]

While Crane's account is largely convincing, there are some problems that weaken the book. After a brief prologue and introduction, the first chapter begins with a sweeping overview of the secondary literature concerning European women during the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modern era. Although establishing historical context is important, Crane concedes that the "link between urban medieval women and American colonial women may seem tenuous. [26] It does, and it is difficult to discern the influence of such developments as the closing of double monasteries in the eleventh century on the lives of seventeenth-century New England women. Crane has marshalled an impressive array of manuscript and published primary sources for her evidentiary base, but this does not preclude her from offering numerous judgements supported more by supposition and insinuation than evidence. Constructions such as "it may have been," "it must have been," "it might have been," along with "it is likely" and "it was probably" appear throughout the book.

Perhaps the biggest disappointment for readers of this journal is how little Crane has to say about the wives of sailors, longshoremen, and other dockside workers. She realises the absence of so many husbands away at sea exacerbated women's financial dependence and that seafaring's hazardous nature contributed directly to the feminisation of poverty by creating numerous widows. Unfortunately, Crane pays scant attention to the family life of New England sailors. Was a seafaring culture, including important class values, handed down from one generation of sailors to another, as Marcus Rediker has asserted (but not demonstrated)? Clearly, Mrs. Jack Tar would have played a pivotal role in such a process. Regrettably, she is conspicuously absent in Crane's study.

Carl E. Swanson
Greenville, North Carolina


The "Studies in the History of Civil Engineering" series, of which this volume is a part, is a very worthwhile venture. By reproducing articles from a variety of sources, the Variorum Press of Ashgate Publishing aims to provide a "reference collection" on different aspects of engineering in the past with the twin aim of providing engineers with insight into the history of their profession and other readers "with new ways of looking at engineering structures." [xii] On the evidence of the volume under review, both of these objectives are likely to be met.

Adrian Jarvis is Co-Director of the Centre for Port and Maritime History at the Merseyside Maritime Museum. For this volume he has selected seventeen papers. Each is reproduced in its original format, including maps, figures and illustrations and while the volume has its own continuous pagination, the original pagination is reproduced, thereby enhancing the volume's "reference" value. The collection begins with surveys by Sir Cyril Kirkpatrick and Sir Leopold Savile given as addresses to the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1925-26 and 1940-41 respectively. Both surveys look at the harbours of the classical Mediterranean – Egyptian, Greek and Roman – but Kirkpatrick's lecture continues, in outline, down to the 1930s. Jarvis makes the point that the eighteenth to the early twentieth century was the heyday of the all-round "dock engineer": the 1930s marks the arrival of the "specialists." In that sense, these two opening papers may be taken to mark the end of the period of the articulate engineer literate in the profession's history.

The bulk of the papers – twelve out of the seventeen – deal with the engineering of British ports between the eighteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Some of these deal with particular aspects of the engineering involved: "the construction of Ramsgate Harbour;" "Hull's earliest docks;" "the improvement of the River Tyne;" "the attack on the Mersey Bar." Others deal with "the engineers" of a particular harbour – Sunderland, Bristol, Millwall – or with an individual engineer working at a particular harbour –
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Thomas Steers and G.F. Lyster at Liverpool, Joseph Whidbey at Plymouth, G.P. Bidder at London. One of the remaining three papers deals with port works in nineteenth-century Natal, another is a comprehensive study of the development of Fremantle. The remaining paper deals with "imperial ports" in the Indian Ocean region (but, since I was a part-author of that paper – along with my colleagues, Frank Broeze and Kenneth McPherson – I make no comment apart from saying that it was the experience of working on it and using the rich materials of sources such as the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers which introduced me to both the work and the writing skills of the late nineteenth-century engineers like Sir Francis Spring, the re-modeller of Madras Harbour).

Jarvis' introduction explains why the volume is so very heavily oriented towards British, and British colonial, ports. Ports in Britain, he argues, needed much more engineering than elsewhere in Europe and so much greater expertise was developed there. Consequently, when ports in other areas needed development, British engineers were often called upon. One certainly sees that illustrated by the worldwide activities of the British consulting engineering firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even if, as in the case of Fremantle, they were not as capable of finding answers as the local engineers like C.Y. (not S.Y. as given on p. xxvi) O'Connor! The other point which Jarvis makes is that historical study of harbour engineering only really develops in the 1960s: this was the time when the nature of shipping and ports began to change and historians and industrial archaeologists began to take much more direct interest in the structure of the ports. As a result, much more has been written on British ports.

Jarvis' introduction provides an excellent context for the papers included in the volume. He also provides a useful select bibliography [xxviii–xxxiv] which, while it continues the emphases of the selected papers does add some US, African and South Pacific references. The volume has name and place indices and a subject index, all of which are helpful. Overall, therefore, this is a valuable collection which should stimulate further interest in what is already a growing field of historical study.

Peter D. Reeves
Perth, Western Australia


Longshoremen have long been associated with labour militancy. And for good reason. The battles waged on the British docks in the nineteenth century and the "great maritime strikes" of the 1930s on the Pacific coast stand out as exceptional moments of class conflict. It is not surprising, then, that for historians and other scholars the key interpretive question has remained the same: what is it about life "on the hook" that prompts waterfront workers to strike, strike, strike? To be sure, this is an important question, yet as the contributors to this new collection of essays argue, there is another dimension to this unique working-class experience that deserves scholarly attention: race. In his Introduction to this collection, the editor, Calvin Winslow, stresses that labourers of all kinds made seasonal migrations to the docks and, as a result, there was always competition for work. Thus, "[f]ew issues have been more important on the waterfront" than the complex relationship between white and non-white workers. [9] More than simply an introduction to new work on longshoremen, this collection is intended to make a contribution to the wider theoretical debate on race and class taking place in labour history.

From the New York waterfront in the early decades of the twentieth century to the docks of San Pedro in the post-World War II period, this collection of five essays ranges widely over both space and time. With varying degrees of emphasis and acumen, the authors examine the world of waterfront work, the politics of waterfront unionism, and the political economy of specific ports. While each article draws out the unique qualities of specific locations and time-periods, taken together, they illustrate the potent power of the "system" – the toxic combination of casual labour and the "shape-up" method of hiring – to mould waterfront workers' collective world view. Howard Kimeldorf's analysis of the rise and fall of the radical Industrial Workers of the World on the Philadelphia docks provides a good treatment of this time-honoured theme. But it is the intersection of the "system" on the one hand, and race relations on the other, that is the conceptual centre.
of gravity here, and two essays stand out: Eric Arnesen's exploration of race relations at several southern gulf ports during the age of segregation and, in particular, Bruce Nelson's examination of west coast longshoremen. Returning to the territory he first charted in *Workers on the Waterfront*, Nelson argues that the ILWU's reputation as a "haven of racial equality" – a reputation garnered under the leadership of radical Harry Bridges between 1937 and 1961 – is in need of revision. Nelson's point is not simply that there was a gap between the official rhetoric of racial equality and the lived reality of racism on a local level, but, on a wider canvas, in the "longshoremen's experience of life and work, 'whiteness' merged with class; and in spite of all the changes that had occurred in the thirties, the specific group identity of 'Lords of the Docks' remained a racialized identity." [175]

This collection illustrates the many and varied ways that racial divisions sorted waterfront workers into particular jobs, fractured the unity of working-class organizations, and contributed to the making of specific racial identities. It also details the strategies that different dockers' organizations employed to foster unity across racial lines. As such, it provides a useful introduction to the latest scholarship taking place "on the waterfront." But its contribution to the wider debate on race and class is far more limited. Indeed, the essays here are marred by a narrow focus on the workplace, union hall, and strikes to the virtual exclusion of working-class life beyond the point of production. Occasionally, working-class communities and families do creep in at the margins, but they are considered important only in so far as they help to explain the real story of unionization and epic confrontation. Merging the world of work with other realms of working-class experience is no easy task; but, as recent work on the history of women and the family illustrates, it is impossible to understand the former without integrating the latter. While the "tight-knit" and "exclusive" character of waterfront neighbourhoods poses a significant empirical challenge to labour historians, as this collection of essays illustrates, however, the bigger obstacle to writing "histories from the bottom up" is the closed character of particular conceptual frameworks.

Andrew Parnaby
Victoria, British Columbia


The appearance of the first two volumes of a new multi-authored, multi-volumed history of the British Empire inevitably invites comparison with that great standard, the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*. Too close a comparison would be invidious, because the historiography of Britain, its overseas possessions and dependencies, and its world influence has moved on so much in the sixty or so years since the Cambridge volumes first began to appear that inevitably the latter can only seem dated and stuffy – not to say archaic – against the fresh ideas, arguments and evidence thrown up by the teams brought together by OUP and its editor-in-chief(W. Roger Louis). To complement and inform the great traditions of political, constitutional and military/naval history which predominated in the Cambridge volumes the Oxford authors are now able to bring to bear the enormous body of research and reinterpretation coming out of more recent economic, social, demographic, cultural and intellectual history. Still, it is instructive to contrast the overall organisation and structure of these two great projects. In place of the eight great tomes thought necessary by Cambridge, the Oxford enterprise will relate and evaluate the story of the sprawling British Empire in only five, of which one will be devoted entirely to historiography. Out go the individual volumes devoted to India, Canada, Australia and Canada in the Cambridge series, and in will come – at least on the evidence of these first two volumes – both a more tightly controlled focus on the interaction between metropolis and colony (or centre and periphery) and a broader concept of what these terms embrace than was present in the Cambridge venture. The prospect of the completed series is most appealing.

While Cambridge's first two volumes had a break-off point in 1783, dividing the "First" and
"Second" Empires respectively, Oxford has gone in for a different approach, with a volume on "early origins" to roughly the end of the seventeenth century and another on the eighteenth century – which is taken to end in 1815. This replacement of 1783 by 1815 constitutes a rejection of the notion of a "First" and a "Second" Empire, the arguments against which are powerfully presented by P.J. Marshall in a concluding chapter to his own volume. There is much to agree with in this approach. It was not until 1815 that Britain finally completed the strategy of breaking into or seizing the overseas empires of other European powers that it had commenced from at least as early as the Cromwellian /Restoration years, and that was essentially the hallmark of a mercantilist approach to international relations. Nevertheless the attempt to establish a new end-point for the "eighteenth century" Empire – marking it off in terms of editorial responsibility from what is to come in the "nineteenth" – merely highlights the ambiguity which surrounds the question of when that "eighteenth century" and its defining themes began. Several of the contributors to Marshall's volume are clearly uncomfortable with confining themselves to the 1700s, preferring to reach back into the later decades of the seventeenth to find their starting-point. Consequently, there is some degree of overlap between the two volumes. This may have been unavoidable – and possibly even beneficial to the reader confining himself or herself to a single volume – but it seems to signal a certain lack of editorial dialogue between Canny and Marshall. This is also to be found in missed opportunities to connect together contributions which appear in one or either of the two volumes – for example, a fascinating essay on "Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580s to 1640s" by Jane Ohlmyer in the first volume with the account of "Emigration from Britain, 1680-1815" by James Horn in the second volume. The two processes of "internal" and "external" colonization were so obviously inter-related that it is disappointing that neither author was given the opportunity to make the connections.

But if divided editorial responsibilities rather get in the way of establishing neat interfaces between individual contributions or of unifying themes across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there is much to applaud in both volumes. The standard of individual contributions – more than twenty in each volume – is universally high. Almost all of the major themes and topics are identified and explored in a readable way, and the fruits of much recent research, a great deal of it by the authors themselves, are incorporated into the essays. Readers will inevitably form their own preferences, according to taste, but cannot fail to be enlightened by contributions on topics with which they are less familiar. Both volumes indeed – but more especially the first – are perhaps best approached as a series of essays to be browsed through in an order dictated by one's own interests rather than by editorial arrangement. Inevitably there will be some disappointment with balance and treatment. Maritime historians, for example, will probably conclude that naval history is well represented – if at times in a fragmented way – but that the history of merchant shipping receives less than its due within general essays on "the imperial economy." Intriguingly, the "eighteenth century" volume contains two such essays on the economic history of the Empire – by Patrick O'Brien and Jacob Price respectively. It may be that the editor had in mind to set up a debate between two scholars known to have rather different views of the significance of Empire for the economic development of Britain. Nevertheless, the two contributions tend to complement rather than conflict. This is partly because each approach their task with rather different emphases – O'Brien focusing on changes in the British economy which resulted in British governments being able to secure levels of taxation sufficient to pay for imperial expansion, and Price on the consequences of the rise in trade in the great colonial staples – but also because it would appear from a brief discussion at the end of his essay that O'Brien has now retreated from his earlier position that extra-European trade and settlement made little contribution to the transformation of the British economy in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Among the distinctive features of "the Oxford approach" is an attention to the interaction between the British and the indigenous societies they encountered in the Americas, Africa and Asia, and an attempt at an objective and sensitive analysis of the significance of the encounter for these societies. In particular, Raja Kanta Ray's contribution on "Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1815" conveys both the passion and the intellectual energies behind Indian reactions to the advance of British military power and the "shaking of the Pagoda tree" which followed. Similarly, the richness and
The diversity of the imperial experience is reflected in an effort to take due account of the role of the Scots, the Irish and the Welsh in the making (and unmaking) of the Empire – something which distinguishes the Oxford History not only from Cambridge's older, thoroughly Anglo-centric approach but also from more recent attempts to maintain that only what went on among "gentlemanly capitalists" in the City of London had any significance for the Empire. It is therefore a matter of some regret to this reviewer that one of the things that slipped down the crack between the two volumes is the Union of Scotland and England in 1707, which transformed an English into a British Empire. Not only are the events leading up to the Union ignored – the failure of the Scottish attempt to become an imperial power in their own right, in the great Darien disaster that so impoverished the mercantile classes and brought them to the view that the only future lay in access to the English colonies – but its constitutional implications are little considered. Had a federal Britain been created in 1707, as many, perhaps most, Scots wanted, constitutional relations with the Irish and the North America colonies might well have unfolded on a different basis. The settlement of 1707, once again under challenge in Scotland, is worthy of more than passing or parochial interest.

J. Forbes Munro
Glasgow, Scotland


It is a wonder that conference proceedings are such a growth industry, considering the complaints of academics who have to edit them, publishers who are asked to sell them, and reviewers who are expected to read them. It is notoriously difficult to get contributors to write about the subject they were asked to tackle, or indeed to write at all, and still more difficult to impose a coherent approach to it. The best conference proceedings would doubtless be achieved by the editor rejecting half the papers and rewriting the rest, but for obvious reasons it seldom happens. The Annapolis symposium adopts an unusual and surprisingly effective tactic for dealing with the problem. No attempt is made to impose a theme within naval history; instead the conference advances on the broadest possible front. In 1995, when the US Naval Academy was 150 years old, there was some emphasis laid on naval education, but even so this was as usual the most diverse of academic fairgrounds, with no less than eighty-seven papers delivered in thirty sessions. Of these the editor has chosen only twenty-five, deliberately spread across the widest possible range of period and subject. Any suggestion of a common theme has been firmly suppressed. The reader (or reviewer) who could fully appreciate this collection would have to know about every period from classical Greece to the 1980s; about the United States, Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, France; about technology, ideology, law, administration, education, historiography and politics. The articles are grouped under eight rather loose headings (Navies in the Ancient and Medieval World, The Royal Navy in the Seventeenth Century, The Height of the Age of Sail, Education of Naval Officers in the Nineteenth Century, Sources for Naval History in the United Kingdom and the United States, Navies of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Atlantic and Pacific Theatres of World War II, and Public Perceptions of the Post-World War II US Navy), but these cover almost everything, and the contents of each section are a random assortment. In short it is best to consider this volume, not as a collection of conference proceedings in the usual mould, but as an issue of a very large and very occasional learned journal. It is the high quality of the individual papers which justifies their place. No review can mention them all, and selection is invidious, but this reviewer was particularly struck by Paul Walsh's learned survey of a completely neglected subject – Irish naval warfare in the Dark Ages. No doubt it will not appeal to the same readership as, say, Lori Bogle's exposure of extreme right-wing subversion in the US Navy of the 1950s, but they are both among the real attractions of a volume which all naval historians ought to consult, even if few will choose to read it from beginning to end.

N.A.M. Rodger
London, England

Prominent as the author of *Gunboat Diplomacy*, Sir James Cable is a former diplomat with a strong interest in maritime strategy. His new book is a "survey of the political purposes for which governments have in the past made use of naval force, and of its political consequences." [viii] Alas, this is defined in such a way as to exclude most of naval force. To Cable it is the mounting of cannon that signals the emergence of the fighting ship and the dawn of relevance in naval history. As well, his view of naval force requires sailors acting at the direction of a central command responsible to the political leadership of a state; Cable does not see this as occurring, other than seldom, for long after the fifteenth century.

These are unfortunate limitations. There is much scholarship on earlier naval warfare showing that political purposes were pursued and served. Cable is not interested: "In 1066 naval force was as irrelevant as it had been when a Moorish army crossed the Straits of Gibraltar in 711 to invade Spain." [6] This approach is misleading. Naval strategy was important in the Mediterranean, as with the Carthaginian Wars and the Crusades, as well as in northern waters. To label this period the "Pre-Naval Era" is simply wrong. Cable is also at fault for his limited geographical range. With few exceptions, this is an account of European naval force. Cable is more concerned to retell well-known episodes, such as the Falklands, than to probe the nature of naval power in, for example, the East Indies in the early modern period: Powers such as the Sultanate of Aden are ignored. So also is Oman, the most important naval power in the western Indian Ocean for a century from 1650, and the Maratha Angrias. Part of the neglect stems from a definition of naval power that focuses on the high seas and ignores the other spheres of marine strength: inshore, deltaic, estuarine, riverine and lacustrine. Nor does Cable grasp the multiple contexts of naval power. To him, it must be distinguished from the force exercised by "freebooting fighting ships operated for the personal profit of the crew." [1] Ships that transport soldiers are also inadmissible. Yet the first exclusion reflects a definition of statehood that omits much political activity in world history, while the second stems from a desire to focus on an operational specialization that is again contingent.

What we therefore get is, in essence, a potted account of Western naval power over the last three centuries, with an emphasis on Britain. Cable acknowledges his debt to Paul Kennedy, and offers an essentially familiar story. He is best on "the primacy of political factors in the practice of gunboat diplomacy," [155] and usefully summarizes his work in the field, as well as bringing it up to date. Or almost up to date. In arguing that there is an underlying consistency in the contributions that naval force can offer to the resolution of disputes between states, Cable mentions submarine-launched intercontinental missiles as the only limit on the invulnerability of deeply land-locked states. Cruise missiles, and, earlier, aircraft carriers suggest the need for some further discussion.

More generally, Cable stresses the flexibility of naval power and therefore its value in dealing with the unpredictability inherent in international politics, argues that it is necessary for states to dispose of force, and criticizes the British government for relying on foreign shipping in wartime. There is much of interest in this book but, in the end, it does not live up to the title.

Jeremy Black
Exeter, England


This valuable selection of documents fulfils an objective first articulated by Sir John Knox Laughton early this century when he proposed the publication of an edited volume illustrating the social life and internal discipline of the eighteenth-century British navy. Brian Lavery has accomplished this task very well. Drawing largely upon unpublished manuscripts in the National Maritime Museum, the Public Record Office, and the Royal Naval Museum, he provides a judicious sampling of the major types of documentation which illuminate the themes of life, discipline, and work structures at sea in the Georgian navy.

The title of the volume is somewhat mislead-
ing; since most of the material dates from the period 1786-1815. The exceptions are the important Admiralty regulations of 1731 (printed in full from the published fifth edition of 1745), the 1756 amendment to these regulations, the first extant captain's order book of 1759, and the charming menu lists for the admiral's table of HMS *Prince George* on the voyage from Britain to New York in 1781, written by a semi-literate steward and featuring as a frequent guest midshipman "PWH" (Prince William Henry, later King William IV). The concentration upon the tumultuous decades after 1789 is an asset, for it facilitates an assessment, in the round, of shipboard life during a period of extended war when existing problems were aggravated and evolving notions of sanitation, medicine, and discipline were coming to the fore.

Lavery endeavours to depict the nature of life and work at sea by casting his net widely. The result is an impressive collection of diverse material, ranging from Admiralty instructions, captains' orders, and contemporary printed commentaries on the navy, to watch, quarter and station bills, crew description books, court martial proceedings, petitions by crews and their dependents, surgeons' journals, and the accounts rendered by pursers and standing officers. Apart from the Admiralty regulations, the evidence is illustrative rather than definitive: nothing can be stated conclusively from the one boatswain's account and the single carpenter's account reproduced, or from the one black list for punishments on board HMS *Blake* in 1811-12. Lavery does not identify the criteria governing the selections presented to the reader: in some instances he has provided the first extant document of its type; in other cases the mundane nature of the evidence suggests typicality; other times we are presented with the atypical and spectacular, as with the mutineers' petitions of 1798, the court martial of two sailors for buggery, and the surgeon's account of a deadly epidemic aboard HMS *Alfred* in 1798. Some evidence is provided in full, but most is presented as selected, well chosen, extracts. Apart from extracts from two diaries, all the documentation is official or semi-official. As Lavery states, these sources are often more prescriptive than descriptive, or, at the very least, reveal life through the lens of accounts, forms and customary procedures rather than as it was lived. Certainly other types of evidence—shipboard last wills and testaments and High Court of the Admiralty depositions can be mentioned as two of the most obvious omissions—for a more rounded picture (albeit perhaps not one truer to life).

The editor is careful—probably too careful—not to generalize from the evidence he has read, collected and reproduced. Little effort is made to explain the significance of the material presented, or to suggest how these documents can, or should, be used by scholars. The selections are left, very largely, to speak for themselves. They have much to offer, but invariably the "raw evidence" produces more questions than answers. Finally, a good, comprehensive index is essential in a volume where information on specific topics lies widely dispersed. Sadly, this index is untrustworthy. The present reviewer selected six index entries for study—chaplain, cook, divine service, scurvy, surgeon, and swearing—and found the index to be incomplete for each one. The best advise is simply to dip into the rich contents, to catch the flavour of the navy at sea during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

J.D. Alsop
Canborough, Ontario


This collection of essays by leading American naval historians provides a stimulating précis of more than two centuries of US naval history and biography. Jack Sweetman's collaborators are highly qualified to examine nineteen pivotal engagements, crafting their narratives in broad strategic and political context. Prefaced by a well-formulated introduction, the volume offers a rich hoard of multi-faceted essays that invite minute consideration by laymen and specialists alike.

Ranging from Benedict Arnold's strategic masterpiece on Lake Champlain in 1776 to the US Pacific Fleet's controversial yet devastating victory at Leyte Gulf in 1945, the contributions are deliberately focused on "lessons of leadership and ... the application of the principles of war." [xv] Taken in tandem with Stephen Howarth's recent *Men of War*, Sweetman's volume provides readings of particular utility for students of naval leadership. Based on English language sources,
the studies draw on memoirs, biographies, documentary compilations, major secondary works and relevant tactical and technological treatises, notably in William Still's masterful account of the action at Hampton Roads and Jeffrey Barlow's well-documented study of Admiral Spruance's harrowing assignment at Okinawa. If their comprehensive strategic introductions limit the authors' depictions of combatant experience under fire, prime exceptions are found in Mark Hayes' narrative of the battle of New Orleans, which effectively mines the Official Records series to reveal Farragut's bluejackets in action during that classic of riverine warfare, and in Barrett Tillman's gripping account of the miracle of Midway.

Sweetman emphasizes that great naval battles have "major historical consequences – political, military or moral, or a combination of both." [xvi] The definition is illustrated in James K. Martin's account of Valcour Island, which immortalized a doomed flotilla that was destined nonetheless to win the critical Northern Campaign of 1776. Martin's reading of Arnold's fateful second encounter with Sir Guy Carleton effectively identifies the humanely calculated strategy of the Governor's Champlain campaign, albeit missing one fascinating aspect, the tactical consequences of that soldier-statesman's deliberate constraints on his native American auxiliaries.

If fleet actions on the high seas dominate this work, coastal and riverine operations, notably during the US Civil War, receive illuminating coverage. Brief notice might have been given to American coastal operations during the war with Mexico, which saw an early use of steam warships that foreshadowed Union operations on western rivers. American experience with guerre de course, which influenced naval construction and policy into the early steel navy era, is highlighted in James Bradford's rendition of John Paul Jones' desperate battle off Flamborough Head and Linda Maloney's study of USS Constitution's cruises. Anglo-American cooperation in defeating German commerce warfare with U-boats during the two world wars receives limited treatment, most adequately as regards employment of Communications Intelligence. William Y'Blood's narrative of hunter-killer operations by the USS Card group against milch cow rendezvous in the central Atlantic during 1943-44 highlights a notably successful phase of the American antisubmarine effort. Regrettably, the long-overlooked Allied success in protecting massive trans-Atlantic troofps remains inappropriate to this work.

Of the eight World War II battles described in Sweetman's book, seven deal with the US Navy in the Pacific, beginning with the command and Intelligence fiasco that resulted in Pearl Harbor. Carrier group operations, vital to the success of American landings in the Central and Western Pacific, are described in the context of the shifting fortunes of Japanese and American naval aviation. Readers will need to refer back frequently to several theatre maps to follow unfolding campaigns. Regrettably, combined Allied operations in the Mediterranean and English Channel, from the landings in North Africa to Italy and eventually Normandy, receive scant notice. While oft citing the magisterial works of Samuel Eliot Morison, the co-authors have ignored the contributions of Stephen Roskill and the sage judgment of Friedrich Ruge regarding the decisive influence of amphibious operations on the outcome of World War II both in Europe and the Pacific. Thus, while lacking a dominant American naval figure, Operation Overlord merits consideration for future editions of this excellent compendium of great American naval battles.

Philip Karl Lundeberg
Alexandria, VA


It is reasonable to ask if anything fresh can be written on the Trafalgar campaign, which has been analyzed hundreds of times. In this instance, Robert Gardiner has edited what might be described as a quirky volume which nonetheless provides some fresh material and an authoritative treatment of the naval strategy of 1803-05.

The book was produced in cooperation with the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. This gave access to a huge collection of contemporary prints and drawings, many by young officers who recorded details of their voyages in their journals. Some are workmanlike, all are in black
and white, and many display a charming amateurishness, attributes which discouraged publication before now and which explain the book's freshness. The pictures were chosen for their relevance to the events, not for their artistic merits, though some are in fact by established artists who churned out prints for sale. In short, this is not meant to be an impressive coffee table book with huge colour reproductions of favourite battle scenes. Rather it recreates events as the participants saw them and as they were presented to the public. This "you are there" sense is a chief attraction of the book.

The authoritative aspect is assured by the reputations of the authors. Gardiner is an expert on Royal Navy ships; David Lyon and Roger Morriss have produced notable books in recent years; David Taylor provides several sections also. Brief sections are supplied by specialists, such as "Notes on Artists" by Julian Mannering. The description and analysis of the Trafalgar events is therefore reliable. The contributors' sections are scattered throughout the book, and while their identities are noted in a list preceding the "Contents" they are not identified in the text. To ascertain the author of each section, one must therefore turn back and scan the list to find the relevant section. David Lyon, for example, provides ten sections, ranging from "the East Indies and Africa 1803-04" to "Invasion Defences" to "Strachan's Action" (immediately following Trafalgar). This necessitates much turning of pages, and frankly it gets annoying very quickly. Also the mixing of so many short sections by various authors means a smooth blend is difficult.

This latter point leads to a discussion of the "quirkiness" mentioned above. Aside from the scattering of contributions, there is often difficulty in following the logic in sequencing. After the "Introduction" (by Roger Morriss, we find after a search) there is a three page section by Gardiner on "America's Barbary Wars," though it is not quite clear what this has to do with the Trafalgar Campaign. A short description of ship decoration practices of the British, French and Dutch navies is sandwiched between items on the resumption of the Cadiz blockade, and the opening moves of the battle. A description of HMS Diamond Rock, an island overlooking Martinique, occupied and commissioned as a "stone frigate" by the Royal Navy, is quite well-done, and well-illustrated, but aside from the fact that Villeneuve recaptured it on his voyage to the West Indies in 1805, one wonders why it deserves four pages in a book on Trafalgar. The book abounds in such asides, and it must be admitted, many are of interest. We are treated to brief sketches of privateer vessels, the convoy system, the 12-pounder frigate, Robert Fulton's "infernal" machines, the 50-gun ship, and the types of craft in Napoleon's invasion flotilla. Of course we also benefit from larger insights such as the fact that the invasion plans were made impossible by Sir Robert Calder's action, prior to Trafalgar, though that wretched Admiral paid dearly for not scoring a huge victory. Credit is also given to Lord Barham, the aging First Lord, whose fleet dispositions made Calder's action possible. We are informed too, that Nelson was not bedecked in shiny splendour in the battle, but was wearing a faded old uniform. Thus the shot that felled him was likely unaimed. There are other examples of recent research to add to the quality of the text.

Serious complaints are few. There are rather too many spelling and grammatical errors (ten in fact) of the sort which escape a "spell-check" but not proper proofreading. Louis XVI was executed in 1793, not 1792, and I am not sure it was fear of Jacobinism which motivated Britain in the war by 1805. [9] On p. 122 we are told Nelson arrived in the West Indies by June 1805, and on p. 123 it is changed to July, rather a key point. There is also an occasional lapse into jargon which will confuse many, such as the earnest statement [151] that the Victory's approach to her opponent was so close that her main yard "brushed the ?ang of the French ship's gaff."

In short, this is an amusing read. The topics are dealt with at too short a length for extended academic analysis, though the contributors have high credentials and their accuracy may be relied on. The illustrations are fresh and many have charm, while the text includes much "sidebar" information which is informative if not invariably of obvious relevance. Gardiner does indicate that many of the sidebars will add up to complete pictures of certain topics (like ship types) when all the volumes in the series are seen together. Five volumes are planned for the 1793-1815 wars; together they will provide core information on a myriad of naval issues. This is a laudable plan, but at $72.50 each, one might want to think carefully about a commitment to all five.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario

Richard Woodman recently retired from a maritime career, in which he nonetheless found time to write two dozen novels set in the period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. He has also written several non-fiction works, including a history of Trinity House's marine service and *The History of the Ship*. Richard Gardiner, the guiding hand behind Chatham's twelve-volume "History of the Ship" series, did the editing, picture research, and wrote some of *The Victory of Seapower*’s specialist sections.

This is a worthy addition to Chatham's pictorial histories. The series is designed to cover the major events of maritime history while providing a sense of how these were seen by contemporary painters and print-makers, often using the less familiar and sometimes previously unpublished images. Toward these ends, logs, journals, and other contemporary accounts are used. Most of the paintings, prints, and drawings of ships and individuals come from the 60,000 images in the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich. The series also draws on the many plans in the Adm Irty Collection of ship draughts. The Peabody Essex Museum and Mystic Seaport in the United States also provided images. Unfortunately all illustrations are in black and white.

Historians as well as model makers will want this volume, not only because it covers some relatively obscure actions and topics but because the illustrations were selected at least in part to illuminate seamanship, technology, weapons, and warfare. Thus there are drawings of the carronade, the chief naval ordnance innovation of the period. But *The Victory of Seapower* should not be considered only a picture book; its excellent text provides keen insights into developments.

This is the fourth volume in five titles for the period 1793-1815. It covers the whole of events of the period 1806-1814 and the Hundred Days in 1815, save for the War of 1812, which is to be a separate volume. The book opens with the aftermath of the Battle of Trafalgar, when Nelson's ships of the line smashed the combined French and Spanish fleets and established British supremacy at sea for nearly a century to come.

This does not mean that the Royal Navy rested on its laurels. That there were no other fleet actions was simply a consequence of the fact that no other major naval force emerged to challenge British supremacy at sea. US Navy single-ship victories in 1812 could in no way alter the strategic balance. Still, there was much work for the Royal Navy, especially enforcement of the blockade of France and French-controlled territory. This action by "the storm-battered ships" stands as one of the signal triumphs in naval history. In 1806 the Royal Navy captured Capetown, destroyed the French West India Squadron, and attacked Boulogne. Following the July 1807 Treaty of Tilsit, fearful that Denmark would add its fleets to those of France and Russia, Britain again attacked Copenhagen and took the Danish fleet. The Royal Navy also played a key role in the Peninsular War and in 1809-1810 it took Martinique, Santo Domingo, Guadeloupe, Mauritius, and Réunion. All these are covered in this volume, as are many other actions.

North Americans can look with anticipation to the volume treating the War of 1812.

Spencer C. Tucker  
Lexington, Virginia


This well-written and entertaining book is a popular history of the British campaign in the Chesapeake in the late summer of 1814. The author is to be commended for uncovering much new information, particularly from American sources, on the personalities, locales and events of that campaign. A journalist by profession, Pitch renders his narrative in a breezy style that engages our attention and holds our interest. The result is a very readable anecdotal history of the Chesapeake operation of 1814.

Unfortunately, the analysis of these operations suffers because Pitch does not place them in
proper strategical context. Although he informs us numerous times of the weakness of American forces defending Washington, particularly the shortage of regular troops, he does not explain that the American army was absent in the Chesapeake because much of it was on the northern border that summer, attempting to carry out the conquest of Canada, as it had been for more than two years. Canada, the major theatre for both the American and British governments during the War of 1812, receives remarkably short shrift in this book and Pitch seems unaware of the inter-connection between events in the north and operations in the mid-Atlantic. Washington was not burned because Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane was sure it could be "either destroyed or laid under contribution," as the author states. Nor was it burned in retaliation for American destruction of the provincial parliament building of Upper Canada at York in April 1813 or the destruction of Newark (modern Niagara-on-the-Lake) as is often thought. Rather, an unauthorized raid on the Long Point area of the Canadian shore of Lake Erie in May 1814 caused Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, commander-in-chief of British North America, to request Cochrane to raid the Atlantic coast of America; the admiral complied. The author's omission of the Canadian connection is all the more remarkable because it has been traced and emphasized in two previous books covering similar ground: Robin Riley's *British at the Gates* (1974) and Whitehorne's *Battle of Baltimore* (1997).

The historiography of the War of 1812 has always suffered much from regionalism. This is understandable, given the geographical extent of the conflict. Yet it can be taken to extremes as it often is by historians of the Chesapeake, Louisiana and Northwestern campaigns who fail to place these campaigns in their proper perspective. The major theatre of the war, the area where both the United States and Britain concentrated the bulk of their forces in 1812-1815, was the northern border between Buffalo and Lake Champlain. The figures speak for themselves – by the summer of 1814, 70 percent of the American regular army and 77 per cent of the British regular troops in North America (28,000 of a total of 36,000) were operating there. The northern theatre was of paramount importance and since it affected strategical and operational considerations in all other theatres, it can only be ignored by historians of those other theatres at their peril.

*The Burning of Washington* is a book that will appeal to general readers who like their history lively and diverting but it will be of considerably less interest to the professional historian or student of the War of 1812. Although it is in no way the author's fault, the very high price will probably limit sales in this country.

Donald E. Graves
Ottawa, Ontario


It is difficult to do justice to a book as well-informed, provocative and rewarding as John Wong's *Deadly Dreams*. The 1856-1860 conflict had its origins with British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who was anxious to expand British trade, the dominant theme of his foreign policy. Palmerston was quite prepared to use force, as he had in 1840-1842, to secure trade concessions from China. That first Opium War failed to produce the desired increase in trade and access to the wider Chinese market. Well aware that three major rebellions were raging in Southern China the British exploited the opportunity to open the door for their trade, in order to offset the cost of China tea, prop up India, and benefit the wider Imperial economy. Palmerston wanted concessions from the Chinese authorities and was prepared to go to war to get them. These views were made known to the acting Consul at Canton, Harry Parkes, when he was in London in early 1856. Moreover, the British government prepared for the conflict by seeking alliances with France, the United States, and even its recent enemy, Russia, and by despatching gunboats for coastal operations before the incident that is commonly understood to have prompted the conflict. Having created a first-class coast assault navy to attack Russia from the sea, England was well equipped to make demands on China. Wong might have added that the selection of Rear Admiral Sir Michael Seymour for the local command was no accident. Seymour had first-hand experience of gunboat operations in the Baltic Campaigns of 1854 and 1855. More work on him and his relationship with the Home Government, both before
he was sent to China, and during the early stages of the war, as revealed in the Halifax papers, would have been a useful addition to the study.

In October 1856 the Water Police at Canton seized crewmen who were known pirates from the Arrow, a Hong Kong-registered lorch (a European-style vessel with a Chinese rig, built and owned locally). Acting Consul Parkes persuaded his local superior, the Minister Plenipotentiary in the Far East, Sir John Bowring, and Admiral Seymour, to begin a war without revealing that the lorch was out of registry and had lied about the insult to the British flag which, as Wong shows conclusively, was not flying at the time. Bowring, who had been ordered to renegotiate the 1842 Treaty, was desperate to demonstrate his prestige by gaining access to Canton. Both his wider aims and his personal ambitions had been thwarted by Imperial Commissioner Yeh. Yeh’s obstruction had already irritated Bowring, and he hurried to exploit Parkes’ incident to knock down the gates he could not open peacefully. His dispatches also helped to demonise Yeh. Only later did Bowring realise that Parkes had misled him.

When news of the incident reached London the Ministry was defeated in the House of Commons by an unholy coalition of radicals, disgruntled whigs and opposition tories. Palmerston, who had his finger on the political pulse, called a snap general election in which he soundly defeated his critics, many of whom lost their seats. Defeat taught the Manchester radicals Cobden and Bright that the manufacturing districts they represented wanted a Palmerstonian war for trade, not a pacific foreign policy. Opium was not the only commodity that Britain wished to sell in China.

Beyond the specific case of the Arrow War Wong discusses long term trends in British policy. Palmerston and his colleagues sought an informal empire of Free Trade, with profit as the overriding aim. Territory costing money to administer was avoided outside the Indian subcontinent and much of the policy on China was driven by Indian needs. For much of this period the main weapon of the Empire, the Royal Navy, was paid for by the import duty on China tea coming into Britain! This puts the cost of sea-power in perspective, and shows just how cheaply a global empire can be secured. This study, based on the Canton archives captured by the British in 1857, the Imperial Chinese Archives and British and French official papers, completely overhauls our understanding of this conflict, and its wider antecedents. No student of nineteenth-century history can afford to ignore this book.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


Jane Samson is quite correct when she states that little is known today about Royal Navy activities in the Pacific Ocean following the voyages of Cook, Vancouver, and Bligh. The present study sets out to examine the complex interlude of "informal empire" that separates the era of culture contact and the commencement of colonial rule. Readers who expect to read about lusty encounters between seamen and native women and gunboat diplomacy designed to intimidate violent warriors will be surprised. Naval officers influenced by evangelicalism, strong anti-slavery sentiments, and nineteenth-century debates about the nature of race dedicated themselves to Christianization and civilization of the Pacific islanders. They pursued a humanitarian mission in which they supported the work of Protestant missionaries and opposed beachcombers, French Catholics, sandalwooders, settlers, traders, whalers, escaped convicts, and procurers of natives for plantation labour. Officers worried about demographic decline caused by venereal diseases and epidemics, alcohol, and the diffusion of firearms.

Because nineteenth-century British governments lacked interest in annexing Pacific islands, naval captains found themselves at some disadvantage in their efforts to control whites who took up residence among the natives. British consuls such as George Prichard at Samoa annoyed naval officers by supporting resident Europeans rather than the islanders. Instead of serving as an agent of civilization, Prichard sold liquor, muskets, powder, and shot from the consulate, and he dealt with other traders, contrary to the wishes of humanitarian naval officers who supported missionary work among the islanders and expressed positive views about the Samoans. Nevertheless, when native governments emerged at Tonga or Fiji, the British refused to recognize them fully. Royal Navy captains relied upon mission stations for information that often tended to confuse the
issues. As a result, they intervened in politics and jumped to conclusions based upon their own attitudes of superiority. During the 1840s, missionaries at Tonga opposed the emergence of a confident centralized native government. Fijian politics were even more complex, volatile, and violent. The British advanced the position of Cakobau to the rank of tuiviti (ruler of all Fiji), but there were three unsuccessful cession attempts – 1855, 1858, and 1874 – before the British government took control.

British naval officers and missionaries believed that mistreatment of islanders by traders produced a cycle of retaliatory violence directed against the next white visitors to arrive at their shores. Some merchant captains involved in the sandalwood trade and in transporting native labourers from the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands used intimidation and even kidnapping to fill their quotas. Over 100,000 islanders went to Queensland and 27,000 to Fiji. However, Samson points out that the naval humanitarians exaggerated the level of force involved in both pursuits. After all, the sandalwood traders depended upon cooperation with native labourers who cut, cleaned, and stored sandalwood. Traders expected hard bargaining and threats, but many captains carried instructions from ship owners to avoid violence. Regarding the plantation labour trade, most natives volunteered and did not suffer compulsion. Samson identifies many other factors that explain native violence such as their desire to acquire European goods, internal rivalries, deep concerns about devastating disease epidemics, and many incidents that resulted from complete misunderstandings. The naval humanitarians believed that violence occurred because the traders could not control their behavior and described the plantation labour trade as outright slavery. The difficulty was that Royal Navy officers lacked jurisdiction over the merchant traders and the Pacific islanders who were neither British subjects nor bound by treaties.

Samson notes that between 1829 and 1874, there were only eight incidents where naval captains turned their guns on islanders. Naval bombardments destroyed villages, but were of questionable effectiveness since the natives simply fled. They were not intimidated by British technical superiority and recognized that they could kill traders or missionaries when the warship departed the area. Despite misunderstandings and provocations, the Royal Navy did not practice gunboat diplomacy in the South Pacific. In their moral crusade to help primitive islanders, some officers failed to recognize local realities and refused to understand that Britain was not anxious to take on the headaches of expanded empire. In the case of Fiji, Commodore James Goodenough, a humanitarian of paternalistic views, believed that he knew what was best. The fact that there was a racially mixed government struggling to govern Fiji did not enter Goodenough's thinking, which was dominated by his readings.

Samson's excellent book clarifies many aspects of nineteenth-century South Pacific history and there are broader questions presented for further discussion and thought. First, it is valuable to compare Royal Navy roles in the South Pacific with the Northwest Coast of North America and elsewhere involving coastal and island indigenous populations. Second, the actions of the benevolent and self-righteous naval officers resonate from the nineteenth century to the present. Their humanitarianism and paternalist views based upon religion and racial theories of the day often confused rather than clarified situations. Even with the best of intentions, British naval officers usually accomplished their best work at sea and not in politics on land.

Christon I. Archer
Calgary, Alberta


This nicely rounded tome on the Union Navy finds its author having to fight two major difficulties. One, unusual for Naval Institute Press, is an annoying type face and remarkably poor copy editing, resulting in some confusion and obvious errors, especially where dates are concerned. The other, not so unusual to students of this war, is the subject itself – a navy with lots of bureaucracy and precious little style and panache, especially compared with its more colorful and often outrageous rival, the Confederate Navy.

By 1861, the US Navy, which had once faced down Algerian pirates and European superpowers, had sunk into an underbudgeted morass of
bureaucracy that favored neither skill nor ingenuity. It had no enemies to fight and no money to fight them with. Then, with secession, it lost many of its best and brightest officers to the new Confederacy, and was faced with rebuilding a navy utterly unlike its predecessor either in purpose or in content. Unlike the ocean-going, deep-water navies of other countries of the period, designed to protect against foreign depredation or to commit depredation themselves, what the Union needed was more of a shallow-water police force to suppress its own people, or those segments of the population seeking independence.

It was a daunting task, and what emerged was a navy of massive size and limited efficiency (twenty-five percent of its ships were in for repairs at all times). What it lacked in originality or effectiveness, it made up in sheer numbers – fully ten times the size of the Confederate Navy. For every Confederate ship the Union Navy had a whole class of comparable ships. It is sometimes hard to imagine why it took them four years to beat their undersized and underfunded rivals.

Despite a handful of spectacular battles by sometimes brilliant and noble ships and commanders, the daily reality of the Union Navy was a tedious grind, whether on blockade station in the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico or on patrol in countless rivers and bays where running aground was often more of a hazard than an elusive enemy. Canney gives a good feeling of this throughout the book, especially in excellent segments about life on board ship and the long and complex processes involved in such a large endeavor of shipbuilding, logistics, and supplies.

At the beginning of the war, America had a merchant fleet second only to Great Britain and a naval fleet hardly worthy of the name. At the end of the war, America had lost virtually its entire merchant fleet to foreign flags, thanks to the Confederate raiders, and had built a world-sized naval fleet, most of which, unfortunately, could not safely venture more than a few miles from shore. The legacy of the shallow-water ironclads has been greatly overrated – they paled by comparison to the likes of Britain’s Warrior or France’s Gloire or the generation of seagoing ironclads like the Confederacy’s Stonewall, which arrived too late to do battle.

What is most rewarding about this book is its thoroughness – it covers every aspect of what it took to build, deploy, and maintain this naval behemoth – and its pictures. These truly do speak more than words about what naval existence was like at that time. In a word, it was depressing, though doubtless it was eminently better than being slaughtered on land in what is still America’s costliest war in terms of wholesale suffering and loss of life.

In the end, the best word for the Union Navy may be "serviceable." It did the job, and a very specialized one at that, and when that job was done it was, mostly, scrapped, as it had little application in a world where global seapower was the lynchpin of what a navy was about. It would take America another thirty years to begin to join that elite company of naval powers.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, New York


The efficacy (and efficiency) of the Union blockade of the Confederacy during the US Civil War has renewed interest of late. David Surdam’s provocative article, “The Union Navy’s Blockade Reconsidered”, in the Naval War College Review (Autumn 1998) joins what appears to be a major difference of opinion between purist Civil War historians (Richard Beringer et. al, Raimondo Luraghi, Frank Owsley, Stephen Wise and William Still, Jr.) and more traditional naval historians such as Bern Anderson. The former tend to debunk the value of the naval blockade in defeating the Confederacy. Surdam and Anderson pursue the opposite conclusion. All agree on one salient point – the seminal importance of the southern port of Wilmington, North Carolina to the economics and logistics of the conflict. Guarding that entry point for the Confederacy’s life blood were several forts, the most important of which was the famous Fort Fisher. Curiously, the struggle for this fort has become the focus of two recent operational studies, Chris Fonville’s The Wilmington Campaign (Savas Publishing, 1997) and Robinson’s monograph, reviewed here.

While Robinson does not cite Fonville, the latter’s thirty-two detailed tactical maps as well as his more general focus on Wilmington rather than
the fort may well be the significant difference between the two works. Nonetheless, of interest to students of maritime, Civil War and naval history generally must surely be the integrated study of personalities, combined operations, technology and strategic intent in *Hurricane of Fire*. All have been succinctly captured by Robinson, a history instructor in Texas, previously published author (*Shark of the Confederacy; the Story of the C.S.S. Alabama* [Naval Institute Press, 1994]), and lifelong student of Fort Fisher’s claim to Civil War glory. Certainly the events themselves are not forgotten (that is for anyone familiar with the war outside Virginia!). Rufus Zogbaum’s famous battle painting (carried in part on Robinson’s dust jacket) of Fort Fisher in L.G. Prang’s famous War Scenes lithographic series conveyed the tactical ambiance and symbiosis of massive fort, heavy ordnance, and poorly orchestrated and under-equipped landing force attack of sailors and marines. Moreover, even today, Fort Fisher’s physical remains are a tourist attraction for the area. But, like so many facets of the Civil War story, Fort Fisher’s role has been largely nested in other topical approaches — witness Chester G. Hearn’s biography *Admiral David Dixon Porter; The Civil War Years* (Naval Institute Press, 1996) — where Fort Fisher was but one aspect of that famous naval leader’s career.

The Union did not take Wilmington until January 1865. This was not because the Union did not try to take the place, but rather because the army and the navy could never get their act together as a team to do so. Other ports from Charleston to Mobile attracted more attention. In fact, Robinson pointedly suggests the Union government was misguided in focusing more on the Wilmington’s sister port in South Carolina than eliminating the principal supplier of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. He fails to account for the political symbolism of Charleston as the beacon for Union intentions, perhaps, but certainly provides an interesting sub-theme on this relationship between the two cities as part of that cosmic question of the blockage’s strategic success. More to the point about Fort Fisher, however, Robinson juxtaposes the abortive operation of Porter and Union politician-general B.F. Butler in December 1864 with the successful Porter-Alfred Terry expedition of the following month that finally cracked this last citadel on the southern coast. Again, employing well the art of sub-thematics, Robinson shows how in that one-month period, the successful politics of a reflected Abraham Lincoln rendered expendable a political-general like Butler, thus opening the door to a military solution to the grand strategic question of how to finally close down the Confederacy’s maritime link to Europe.

En route to this conclusion, Robinson ably recounts Confederate defense efforts at building and improving seacoast defenses, successfully defending for so long the estuary to Wilmington and negotiating the minefields of inadequate manpower, prickly command personalities and an absence of a naval presence of their own. Robinson might have better illuminated the technology story (aside from the comedy of the Union’s rattle-patted notion of exploding a gunpowder-laden vessel close in to shore to literally blow-down the sandy walls of this Confederate Jericho!). Also, one wonders at “lessons learned” taken away from this episode by both arms of the United States military regarding the technology of ship, fort and ordnance. Nevertheless, Robinson proves once again that while Fort Fisher might seem a sideshow, sometimes such sideshows are pivotal in the larger scheme of things. In this vein, like Fonvielle, he has given us a useful if specialized addition to the military/maritime story of mid-nineteenth century North America.

Benjamin Franklin Cooling
Washington, DC


At the height of the American Civil War more than two million Union soldiers served the US Army. During and following the conflict, these victorious soldiers generated innumerable diaries, day books, articles, letters, and memoirs. The federal navy on the other hand, recruited far fewer sailors, and thus, the personal manuscripts penned by bluejackets was considerably less when compared to that of soldiers. Fewer still were the number of epistles written by US Marines. At peak strength during the war, the Marine Corps boasted less than 4,000 officers and men. Consequently, for scholars interested in the Corps, diaries are, by comparison, rare.
To make one of those scarce journal sets available to the public, Mary Livingston has edited the diaries of her great-grandfather, Miles Mason Oviatt (1840-1880) of Cattaraugus County, New York, who enlisted as a private in the United States Marine Corps in 1862. Like many recruits before and since, he immediately regretted his decision. But also like most of those enlistees, he adjusted to the rigor. Oviatt matured on board the USS Vanderbilt and later on the USS Brooklyn. Eventually, he rose to the rank of sergeant.

Neutralizing marauding Confederate commerce raiders was the Vanderbilt’s main mission. In that global quest, the former mail and passenger steamer unsuccessfully chased raiders across the Caribbean and into the Indian Ocean. During the pursuit of the CSS Alabama, Oviatt describes both his responsibilities and the routine aboard the Vanderbilt, as well as his homesickness and seasickness. Not until an unidentified ship appears on the horizon and the Vanderbilt hurries to investigate is the daily routine finally interrupted. On another occasion, Oviatt gives insight into the difference between sailors and Marines. The Marines refused to participate in the traditional crossing the line frolics as the ship passed the equator. The leathernecks greeted the seamen with muskets, bayonets at the ready, when the sailors tried to press the issue.

In the spring of 1864 Oviatt transferred to the USS Brooklyn. The highlight of the diarist’s career came at the battle of Mobile Bay, when Oviatt, then a corporal, bravely manned his gun on the Brooklyn in the finest tradition of the Corps. For his devotion to duty in the heat of battle the US Congress bestowed on him the Medal of Honor. That same decoration and supporting citation are now part of the collection of Marine Corps Historical Museum in Washington, DC. Oviatt later went on to participate in the capture of Wilmington, North Carolina.

Interpreting this colorful Marine career, Livingston has provided helpful notations on Oviatt and the events surrounding his life, although the editor fails to note that during the Civil War, many Medal of Honor winners would likely not have been considered for the decoration by twentieth-century criteria. There are also some factual errors. Thus, we are told that the CSS Alabama was captured [173], while the role of USS Minnesota in Hampton Roads [165] and the impact of the Trent Affair [165] are misrepresented. Finally, the publisher should have removed the many superfluous photographs, reproductions, and the ancestral chart. Despite these shortcomings, Livingston’s commentary is usually complementary to the text and she should be commended for sharing the diaries of her ancestor with those many readers interested in the history of the US Marines.

Benjamin H. Trask
Newport News, Virginia


Beneath the Waters: Guide to Civil War Shipwrecks is a reference list of sunken ships (alphabetically by name) gleaned from the "Battle Reports" located in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (ORN). The guide lists the name of the ship, the date of its loss, its location, the vessel’s dimensions, cannon number and calibre. This is a succinct reference for those aficionados who would like a single reference that contains the names of virtually every vessel sunk during the Civil War. However, those who purchase this volume to learn more of the U.S. Civil War may be disappointed, for the volume contains no commentary, no historical analysis, and no actual history of these ships. It also contains no mention that many of the vessels listed have already been recovered, were looted, destroyed as hazards to navigation, studied archaeologically, or destroyed by time and environment. It is simply a list of some 1200 ships reportedly destroyed during this war along with a very brief author’s summary of the content of each ORN citation.

The author states his intent in the Preface: "The artifacts should be raised, preserved, and put on exhibition to remind us of the gallant and bloody struggle these men made to establish ideals." The guide is therefore apparently intended to allow divers and researchers to locate shipwrecks and recover Civil War artifacts (an ethically troubling concept archaeologically and an illegal act in many states since passage of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987).

In any review it is tempting to evaluate a volume in terms of what the reviewer feels should have been written, rather than what has. Since this list is described as a Civil War reference work it
should be evaluated as such. In this light the list may be a quick, useful reference (within the confines of the ORN) for Civil War enthusiasts and it reflects a good deal of patient research. It also represents the sorting of a large amount of primary source material, since the ORN is already an edited, down-sized, compilation of government reports and official sources. However, serious research will by necessity quickly bypass Beneath the Waters. The citations are too brief, are cryptically summarized, and only a handful of sources constitute the entire bibliography. The volume therefore falls short of its stated aim to be the "Ultimate Resource" on Civil War wreck sites. Regionally based reference works like Lee Spence’s, Shipwreck Encyclopedia of the Civil War: North Carolina, 1861-1865 and Shipwreck Encyclopedia of the Civil War: South Carolina and Georgia, 1861-1865 (Shipwreck Press, 1991) are not as far ranging in scope as Beneath the Waters but are far more comprehensive, containing narrative explanations of each site as well as a multi-source bibliography which includes the ORN as well as many other primary sources.

Bradley A. Rodgers
Greenville, North Carolina


The Saginaw was the first United States warship built on the Pacific Coast, at Mare Island Navy Yard (closed by the Clinton Administration) in Vallejo, California. She was a wooden 155-foot propeller driven sloop, lightly rigged, and drawing no less than eight feet. Her specifications called for a 32-pounder as a pivot gun and two boat guns. Later she was listed as sporting one 50-pounder Dahlgren rifle, one 32-pounder and two 24-pounder rifles. She was a handy little instrument of an expanding maritime empire. She was launched in 1859, and was soon deployed on China station but found herself in North American waters during the Civil War on patrol, guarding against Confederate actions. She cruised the Mexican coast for awhile, but before long her new field was opened: Alaska, acquired by the United States from Russia in 1867.

Saginaw made two cruises to southeast Alaska, in 1868 and 1869. This book is a record of those voyages, with special attention given to problems faced by commercial shipping on the northwest coast of North America, especially in British Columbia waters. Although other American gunboats had appeared before in Alaskan waters, Saginaw was the first to arrive by way of the Inland Passage. She thus had to pass through what were then British colonial waters, and her pilot, Robert Hicks, was an Englishman who served also as native interpreter. Saginaw was on the watch for native attacks on legal shipping, and the case of the American-registered schooner Growler, which had cleared from Sitka for San Francisco, attracted the attention of the gunboat’s captain, Commander John G. Mitchell. Growler went aground at Cape Chacon and was a total wreck. Some Haida discovered and plundered the wreck. It was believed the Indians came from the Queen Charlotte Islands, and accordingly Saginaw sailed there to investigate. Mitchell made some arrests, but the Haida informants all gave different stories. What happened to the Growler’s people was never proved with any degree of certainty, and all Mitchell could do was return the informants to their village. So often this was the case in gunboat diplomacy where specific details could not be supplied and confirmed. As for Hicks, he was later relieved of his duties, for although he kept the vessel off all rocks and brought her into harbour without touching bottom he seems to have wanted to take the Saginaw where and when he would. As Mitchell's successor, Meade, put it: "He is a good pilot and interpreter but has been spoiled for service in a man-of-war by being allowed too much latitude. In mid-journey he refused to take the vessel to Sitka and I was obliged to deal in a summary manner with him."

[55] Throughout these cruises the job of the gunboat was one of quarterdeck diplomacy – keeping the Indians quiet. Students of this subject will find a good deal of information on this theme here, though more editorial comment on the ethnographic side would be welcome. Several period charts help as a guide for the track of the steamer. Meade's two articles on Alaska, with attention to a coalfield, were published in Appleton's Journal in 1871 and appear here as an appendix. A Chinook language dictionary is also included. There is, sadly, no bibliography and no index.
Also missing is a general discussion of US naval policy for Alaska and a history, necessarily brief, of what that navy had been doing in those waters. An opportunity has been lost to elevate a local history to a national, even international one.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario


US Naval operations were far from glamorous during World War I and thus have received little attention. Jones argues that they were nonetheless important and analyzes the contribution of American battleships to Allied victory in this concise study. The addition of a US battleship division to Britain's Grand Fleet provided it with "unqualified superiority in battleships over the German fleet" [128] at a time when Russia's withdrawal from the war and defeats suffered by Italy had produced a sense of crisis in Britain. Jones also believes that German battleships posed a threat to US troop transports that was countered by battleships assigned to escort the convoys.

Little of this was clear to policy makers in Washington in 1917. For six months following American entry into the war, officials were reluctant to violate Mahanian strategic principles by dividing the fleet and dispatching battleships to European waters as requested by Britain. Only when discussions with Admiralty officials convinced Admirals Harry T. Mayo and William S. Benson that the vessels were needed to counter the German High Seas Fleet and to make possible the naval offensive advocated by President Woodrow Wilson, was Battleship Division Nine sent to join the British fleet in the North Sea. At virtually the same time three ships from Battleship Division Six were sent to Ireland to protect US troop convoys sailing to France.

Jones credits Benson for the decision to send the ships and Hugh Rodman, commander of Battleship Division Nine for his skill in working with British naval leaders and developing younger American officers. Jones considers the joint service with the Royal Navy to have been of great benefit to the Americans who made great advances in gunnery and communications while operating jointly with the Grand Fleet. He also shows that officers in both navies came to like and respect their counterparts in the other service, thus laying a firm foundation for working together during World War II.

Jones argues his points convincingly, provides a helpful diagram and map, and explains topics such as gunfire spotting clearly. This is an excellent study. It does not so much break new ground as it complements previous studies of Anglo-American naval diplomacy and American naval leaders and policies during World War I by providing a succinct analysis of the role played by US battleships in that conflict. It is certain to become the standard work on its subject.

James C. Bradford
Bryan, Texas


First published in 1982, this is the remarkable story about the scuttling of one of the world's finest fleets at Scapa Flow in June 1919. Journalist-turned-historian Dan van der Vat is a superb story-teller. His goal is to recount the history of the German High Seas Fleet: "its construction, frustration in war and peace, its humiliation and self-immolation in the name of honour and its salvage as a valuable source of uncontaminated steel." Much of the detail, at least for the period up to the internment, is familiar and the author has relied on standard works in his interpretation. For the rest of the story, the final anxious months for this once proud fleet, he has mined unused German archive material, eye-witness accounts and the recollections of survivors.

The German High Seas Fleet had humble origins. Initially the plan was to build light cruisers for raiding enemy commerce. This policy – a rational and sensible one for a land power – was set aside by Alfred von Tirpitz when he took over the German Admiralty in 1897. He believed that Germany should maintain a fleet of sufficient strength to inflict serious damage on the world's
most powerful fleet, even in a losing battle. Tirpitz’s “risk theory” was to govern German naval policy until the very end, unnerving the British in the process, leading to the naval race between the two powers and contributing directly to the outbreak of war in 1914.

When the war began, the British Grand Fleet and its German rival waited at their respective bases off the North Sea for the opportunity for a decisive engagement in the Nelsonian tradition. When it came at Jutland in 1916 the results were bitterly disappointing. Van der Vat sees the outcome as a German victory, tactically and morally, as British losses were greater than the German and the latter acted boldly and with greater dash. Jellicoe was too cautious but with reason: the risks were far greater if he lost. Strategically, of course, the victory was Britain’s. The Royal Navy retained undisputed mastery of the North Sea, denying the Germans further opportunity of fleet action. In fact, the shift to submarine warfare after Jutland demonstrated that the days of the traditional battle fleet were over. Britain’s Grand Fleet spent the rest of the war behind a screen of mines in a safe anchorage at Scapa Flow.

By the end of July 1918 Germany was losing the war, its land forces exhausted, its resources depleted. All that remained was its fleet, virtually intact, and ready for action. Could the fleet be used for one last ditch effort against the British, bolstering Germany’s position at the negotiating table and offering a stunning vindication of Tirpitz? The Admirals thought so but disaffected and war-weary crews thought otherwise and the plan was abandoned.

At the lengthy and difficult peace negotiations, Germany was stripped of her naval resources; seventy-four of her finest ships were interned at Scapa Flow to await the outcome of the peace treaty. There, Admiral Hans Hermann Ludwig von Reuter, a capable officer of the old school, endured the indignities of internment and the distractions of disaffected crews in the tight grasp of a Communist Soldiers’ Council. Convinced by four-day-old news reports that the British intended to seize the interned fleet and force a harsh peace on Germany, Reuter ordered the crews to scuttle. It was all a misunderstanding but fateful in its consequences: fifty-two of the ships went to the bottom. Germany’s magnificent High Seas Fleet was no more. For the British it was a blessing: their naval supremacy was still unchallenged. For salvage firms mining the rich scrap heap for years afterwards the scuttled fleet was a source of wealth and employment.

This book will appeal to both academic historians and the general reader. Its glaring weakness is the absence of notes and a detailed bibliography. But it is a well-written account, solid in its attention to critical detail and illuminating in its revelations about this important event.

David Facey-Crowther
St. John’s, Newfoundland


This is an excellent book. Its title should be read carefully, as the authors maintain their focus on the strategic, tactical and technological aspects of Japanese naval history throughout their analysis. The introduction acknowledges that a comprehensive history of the Japanese Navy would entail far more considerations, such as administrative structures, economic policies, civil-military relationships and so on. Nonetheless, although it neither covers all aspects of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) nor the entire period of the existence of that important Navy, *Kaigun* is an essential reference work for those interested in the IJN.

The apocalyptic fate of the IJN in the Pacific War looms large throughout the volume. The question implicitly and often explicitly evident throughout *Kaigun* is: How did the Japanese Navy find itself in such a disastrous state in 1945? The authors provide numerous answers to this fascinating question, and provide not only an excellent analysis of their main points of investigation but also significant insights into many issues with which they deal tangentially.

Their main arguments concern the serious shortcomings that developed in the Japanese Navy’s strategy, tactics, and technology as time went on, despite the impressive excellence of the IJN in certain areas. The greatest strategic weakness was the failure either to understand the requirement for or to develop a naval strategy that supported Japan’s national strategy. Clearly this
fault extended beyond the IJN, but the authors argue persuasively that the Navy focussed not on strategy but on battle. Though well argued, this aspect of the book might have been stronger had the authors defined the slippery word "strategy" better, for the term is almost meaningless without an adjective such as national, military, or naval before it. The authors do briefly try to extend their discussion to grand strategy, but again do not address the semantic jungle surrounding the term grand strategy with sufficient precision. Nonetheless, the overall thrust of their argument regarding the failure of the IJN to develop a naval strategy that would effectively support Japanese national goals is undoubtedly correct.

Tactically the Japanese excelled at surface warfare, especially at night. The authors argue that most Japanese thought focussed on winning one decisive battle, the penultimate goal – in the IJN's view – of naval warfare. As the Japanese expected to be outnumbered in most instances, they aimed for qualitative superiority. This approach succeeded in the Sino and Russo-Japanese Wars, but proved inadequate against the US Navy. Japan put immense effort into one particular aspect of qualitative superiority: outranging. This becomes the springboard for Evans and Peattie's examination of, among other things, super-battleships (Yamato), weapons (such as Long Lance and midget submarines), carrier aviation, and the supporting operational concepts.

Interwoven throughout these discussions is an analysis of the Japanese approach to technology. The Japanese proved highly successful at developing basic or "first level" technology. They suggest, however, a Japanese weakness in "second level" technology, where systems engineering is critical. They also argue that the IJN's emphasis on war-fighting excellence in weapons often compromised other qualities important in the longer term. The best example is fighter design, where pilot protection measures were sacrificed for performance. In the short run this gave Japanese fighters impressive performance. In the long run pilot attrition proved the Achilles heel of the Japanese naval air arm.

The overarching argument advanced regarding the IJN's strategy, tactics, and technology is that they were all conceived with a limited war that would be decided by one climactic battle in mind. The IJN's inability to envision a prolonged conflict led to its almost astonishing oversights in shipping protection and anti-submarine warfare, as well as pilot and aircrew training rates.

Kaigun supports its arguments with a wealth of references and notes that provide further opportunities for those inclined to more research in this area. The book is superbly supported by lines drawings (ships, planes, weapons, formations, et cetera), maps, tables, and photographs of prominent Japanese naval officers. Finally, there is an appendix containing short biographies of dozens of important Japanese naval officers.

This book is naval history at its best. It is essential reading for all those with an interest in the IJN, and it is also more than worthwhile for those with interest in any form of naval history.

Doug McLean
Orleans, Ontario


Over the past decade, numerous new studies of inter-war British foreign and defence policy have appeared, written by a generation of young scholars who have approached the controversies of this period from new perspectives, often based on research that is far more extensive than in previous works. As a result, these scholars have provided fresh insight and a deeper understanding of the difficulties confronting British policy-makers in the 1920s and '30s and the motivations behind their decisions. Joe Maiolo's work falls perfectly within this category as it presents a new interpretation of the importance of the German navy as a factor in British naval policy in the 1930s and it recasts the motivations behind the Royal Navy's policies toward disarmament, appeasement and the rise of the German navy.

Maiolo begins his study by examining the origins of the much criticized Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 which, he argues, must be viewed as part of the Admiralty's attitudes toward interwar naval disarmament. When placed in this context, Maiolo concludes, the agreement made sense for it was one part of an Admiralty strategy to use naval diplomacy and the global naval limitation system that had matured since the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 to secure British maritime strength. According to Maiolo, the Anglo-German naval agreement was meant not just to limit the German navy to a specific number of ships but also to certain types of ships in order to prevent competitive building in new classes, such as the German pocket battleships of the early 1930s, and to prevent the construction of a navy that could directly threaten Britain. Admiral Ernle Chatfield, First Sea Lord from 1933 until 1938, was acutely aware that Britain's naval supremacy was closely bound to a stable international order. Any radical changes that upset the international order would inevitably undermine Britain's position and lower her rank as a global and naval power. The Admiralty's construction programmes and naval diplomacy were designed to maintain that stable order and thus to maintain Britain's position as the leading maritime power. The Anglo-German naval agreement was an important element of this system.

The naval agreement was predicated on certain British assumptions about German shipbuilding capacity. As a result intelligence played a crucial role in detecting any German deviations from the treaty figures. Maiolo presents a detailed discussion of the Royal Navy's technical intelligence on the growing German navy. While there were some serious errors in intelligence gathering, overall, according to Maiolo, the RN's intelligence on German shipbuilding capacity was accurate. It confirmed earlier estimates that the Germans would not be able to build beyond the thirty-five percent ratio until well into the 1940s. The Anglo-German naval agreement, however, did not last as, by the late 1930s, the German navy began to attempt to exceed its limitations. As predicted by British intelligence, this effort was hamstrung by the limits of German shipbuilding capacity. This did, however, result in a breakdown in Anglo-German naval relations and began to present the Royal Navy with a serious threat very close to home. Maiolo traces these developments and discusses the controversies surrounding Admiralty war planning against Germany. When discussing the state of readiness of the Royal Navy at the beginning of World War II, Maiolo charts a new argument by not placing the blame on either financial limitations or the primacy of the RAF in Neville Chamberlain's thinking. Rather, he argues that the Royal Navy's policies in the 1930s were designed to leave it as the world's strongest naval power by the mid-1940s but that they were not designed to fight any one state. This meant that when war with Germany broke in 1939 the Royal Navy was not completely ready. It also meant, Maiolo asserts, that the navy had no choice but to support Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.

Thus, Maiolo presents a new and persuasive examination of the motivations behind naval policy in the 1930s. He also continues a recent trend in historical writing to show that the interwar naval conferences were not simply factors which limited and impeded the Royal Navy's power. They were also used by the navy to serve its own purposes. As well, Maiolo presents a convincing examination of the Royal Navy's intelligence on and estimates of the German navy. The only difficulty with this book is that it does not pay enough attention to the broader, global and imperial context in which the Royal Navy operated. The navy's mission was not just to protect Britain from the German navy. Rather, it existed to protect the Empire's sea communications and these were also threatened by another power, Japan. This book would have been more complete had Maiolo balanced his principal theme with some discussion of the questions surrounding Britain's Imperial defences in the Far East. Nevertheless this is an important work which should be read by students not just of naval history but also of British diplomatic history.

Orest Babij
Kingston, Ontario


Franklin D. Roosevelt's life-long interest in, and affection for, the US Navy influenced American national policy before, during, and between both wars. This intimate relationship is the theme of this small but overpriced volume. As a review of scholarship on the subject the book is generally successful, its eleven authors drawing on the extensive secondary literature about the man (little of their evidence is new). Like the subject, the essays are arranged in three chronological periods: the Woodrow Wilson era, when FDR was Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Secretary Josephus Daniels (1913-20); the Depression years when as president he was preoccupied with
the economy (1933-40); and World War II, which included rearmament, mobilization, and strategic decision making (1940 until his death one month before Germany's surrender in 1945).

FDR was an avowed interventionist who clashed with the patient and tolerant Daniels until they split over post-World War I criticism of the Navy by Admiral William S. Sims, an FDR favorite. Author Kenneth S. Davis, incidentally, relies totally on his 1971 book (!) for this essay and misuses the term "fleet in being." David Trask's short treatment of FDR's support of naval reformers also fills the gap between 1920 and 1933. Ronald Spector argues persuasively that Daniels and Roosevelt virtually reinvented the enlisted man by purging the ranks of minorities and foreigners in favor of technically skilled and trained majority whites to man the modern fleet.

FDR's first two Presidential terms revealed his style as manager of doctrine and policy in every aspect of the Depression-era government. In perhaps the book's most cogent essay Jonathan Utley affirms what New Dealers learned early on, that FDR's management style "was to allow anarchy to reign and to call it a plan." [63] A case in point was the 50,000 planes a year announcement that stunned the Navy in 1940 – not treated in the book but quite extensively in the reviewer's biography of Admiral John H. Towers. Thomas C. Hone, in a heavily-annotated and penetrating analysis, sees FDR as having supported his admirals "but with a catch: he would dictate the pace and nature of [prewar naval] expansion." [92] His insistence on new ships and better pay raised morale in a fleet on the brink of war.

Perhaps FDR was in fact a masterful strategist, as Hone believes, given Michael A. Barnhart's conclusion that Japan avoided tangling with him until forced to do so by its urgent need for oil in Southeast Asia in 1940-41; hence the Pearl Harbor attack and subsequent war that Japan knew it could not win. Waldo Heinrichs regards FDR as only deceptively an apparent "prebureaucratic" [117] great captain who seemed aloof as he evolved from an experimental President to a directly involved strategic leader after 1938. His personal direction of active US naval intervention in the Battle of the Atlantic after May 1941 initiated his role as a wartime leader.

FDR's close wartime relationships with his British counterpart Winston Churchill and his own chief of staff Admiral William D. Leahy are the subjects of essays by Harold D. Langley and Paul L. Miles respectively. Churchill clearly had the broader strategic view, especially with regards to postwar plans, while Leahy is credited as Roosevelt's strategic coordinator, starting with the North African invasion. But the true Navy leader was Admiral Ernest J. King who, biographer Thomas B. Buell observes, was typical of the brand of tough wartime leader that FDR appointed, in contrast to the politically savvy ones needed to deal with Congress in peacetime. FDR's relationship with King regarding Europe and the Atlantic is the subject of Jeffrey G. Barlow's fine essay; there FDR wisely followed the counsel of Churchill and King.

In sum, the implied message of these assessments of Franklin Roosevelt is that the United States was fortunate to have had a leader so well versed in naval matters as to keep the Navy on course – however unevenly due to economic and diplomatic pressures – toward its ultimate achievement as the chief instrument of global policing following his death.

Clark G. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


This book is an anthology of excerpts, drawn mainly from secondary works, connected into a narrative by the prose of Bruce L. Felknor, the editor, and intended to be a chronicle of the US Merchant Marine in wartime. It is divided into sections that cover all the major maritime wars of the United States from the American Revolutionary War through World War II. For many of these wars, Felknor drew his material mainly from dated secondary works such as Gardner W. Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution (1913); Edgar Station Maclay, A History of American Privateers (1895); Colyer Meriwether, Raphael Semmes (1913); and Lowell Thomas, Raiders of the Deep (1928). For World War II, Felknor, who served in that war as a merchant marine radioman, uses material drawn mainly from the Standard Oil Company's book, Ships of the Esso Fleet in World War II (1946), John
The Northern Mariner

Bunker, Liberty Ships: The Ugly Ducklings of World War II (1972), and after-action reports written by the commanders of US Navy Armed Guards on merchant ships obtained from Record Group 38 in the US National Archives. This section, comprising about a third of the book, is by far the most interesting part of the volume, with many vivid first-hand accounts of battles and enemy attacks on US merchant ships as well as the other trials, tribulations, and triumphs of the US Merchant Marine during World War II. In fact this book is, in essence, a tribute to the men – merchant seaman and US Navy Armed Guards – who served on US merchant ships during the war. The US Merchant Marine at War, 1775-1945, while of little value to academic historians, should be of great interest to history buffs and especially to those men who served on US merchant ships during World War II.

David Syrett
New York City, NY


Morris Beckman offers us a classic personal experience narrative. It treats not the entire duration of World War II, but only two voyages. Within this temporal period, however, an accurate picture of life at sea aboard British merchant vessels is vividly presented, and portraits of typical British seamen of that era are drawn, such as the severe, but just, captain, the helpful apprentice, the cook, Maltese Johnny, Wilkie, the “sea lawyer,” from the forecastle, and others. Beckman served as a junior wireless officer, and the ambiguous position of this rank in shipboard hierarchy is clearly portrayed. It is apparent, however, that the junior man felt the uncertainty of his station less than his superior, as he could associate with apprentices learning to be ship's officers. His friendship with one, Johnny Walters, is a major theme of the first voyage. The book closes with the discovery that Johnny was lost on his next voyage and the author's admission that his memories are not dimmed fifty-five years later and that he will never forget Johnny.

I suspect a subtle whitewash has been applied to Beckman’s shore-side exploits. If so, it appears to have been not a deliberate distortion of the facts, but simply recalling his own youthful misdeeds as inconsequential in comparison with those of older (and wilder) shipmates. Labour disputes aboard also receive candid treatment. On Beckman’s first vessel, the steward was "on the fiddle," providing food of very poor quality. The “forecastle crowd” complained to the captain several times during the voyage and the ring-leader, Wilkie, received repeated fines as a result.

The book covers the fool’s errands on which the new "Sparky" was sent, and practical jokes, such as shoe-polished eyepieces on binoculars. These ended when Beckman was sent for a bucket of steam and returned with an empty bucket, excusing himself on the grounds that the steam had condensed on the way back from the engine room.

Some well-known vignettes of World War II at sea are inserted into the narrative, including the stories of the Rawalpindi, the Jervis Bay, and the San Demetrio. The duties and typical lifestyle of wireless officers are laid out plainly, and all is presented with warmth and understanding as well as eloquent prose. Some attention is also paid to seamen’s off-duty pastimes. "Chippy" carves wooden animals of great beauty and delicacy, which he sends home to his wife, who sells them. The chief wireless officer is an inventor. Another man writes poetry. Others play games such as draughts (checkers) and chess. Beckman, himself, studies Spanish with the assistance of Pablo, one of the forecastle crowd.

The British merchant seafarer's attitude toward the war is summed up by Beckman's shipmate, Johnny: "we're civilians, Sparky. A postman carries on posting. A butcher sells his meat and a merchant seaman plies his trade." "Being a merchant seaman is more dangerous than being a postman or a butcher," responds the author. "Aye," says Johnny, "It just shows that we both chose the wrong trade."

The book reads easily and the content is enlightening, although clearly intended for a popular, rather than academic, audience. There is one distressing note, however. The volume is riddled with printer's errors. As well, there is scarcely a page without some discrepancy in line spacing, from single, through space-and-a-half, to double. These distract the reader. With this caveat, I heartily recommend the book to any whose
interests include its subject matter.

Morgiana P. Halley
San Luis Obispo, California


Allied forces destroyed forty-one German U-boats and damaged thirty-seven others in May 1943, leading German submariners to call the month "Black May." It marked a turning point in World War II, for by its end Germany conceded defeat in the North Atlantic, withdrawing its U-boat fleet from the main convoy routes. As such, it figures prominently in the literature of the Battle of the Atlantic but this is the first full-length study of this fateful month. Michael Gannon is well-qualified to write this story; he is the author of *Operation Drumbeat*, a groundbreaking and controversial account of the 1942 U-boat campaign in American inshore waters.

His approach is both thematic and chronological. *Black May* begins with an extensive discussion of the course of the Atlantic campaign up to May 1943, including technological and tactical developments and introducing the leading personalities. He addresses the German successes of March 1943 and describes the incredible feat of U-515 in sinking seven merchant ships on the night of 30 April/1 May 1943. Nearly half the book is devoted to the battle for convoy ONS 5 from 29 April-7 May which lost thirteen ships to a large wolf pack before the surface escort, in a stunning reversal of fortune, destroyed four U-boats on the final night of the battle. Shorter chapters review the role of Coastal Command's air campaign in the Bay of Biscay and German failures to mount attacks on convoys HX 237, SC 129, and SC 130. An interesting chapter reproduces transcripts of secretly recorded conversations of German POWs in British hands in an effort to get inside the minds of the U-boat men in the spring of 1943. Finally, he reviews the U-boat kills not mentioned in the previous chapters and assesses the reasons for Allied success.

Gannon realizes that the story of the defeat of the U-boats has been told before and that his approach cannot be conventional. He challenges official historian Stephen Roskill's claim that the Allied convoy defeats of March 1943 caused despair within the Royal Navy, arguing Roskill based this claim on a single source. Instead, Gannon contends that cautious optimism prevailed at the end of March in Western Approaches Command and the anti-submarine establishment of the Admiralty. He downplays the role of code-breaking in the victory of May, suggesting that while special intelligence was valuable it was not decisive. In addition, he pokes a few holes in the reputation of Sir John Slessor, head of Coastal Command. In general, however, there is no radical re-interpretation of the events of May 1943 here: *Black May* will not spark the controversy of *Operation Drumbeat*.

Gannon is at his best when describing the chaotic action around ONS 5, skilfully weaving together disparate German and Allied sources to produce an authoritative and compelling narrative. Although Marc Milner has written that the Royal Canadian Navy watched the events of May from the sidelines, Canadian surface escorts do make an appearance in Gannon's text as the close escorts of threatened convoys. Unfortunately, in a rare error HMCS *Drumheller* becomes HMS *Drumheller*, thereby robbing the RCN of its only U-boat kill of the month! No evidence is produced to refute or support Milner's speculation that Canadian-escorted convoys were reinforced with American or British support groups deliberately because of their suspect RCN close escorts.

Gannon's conclusion of the reasons for Allied victory is also conventional, stressing that it was a team effort and that a variety of factors – Allied scientific and technological superiority, the proper application of air power, tactical developments, the obsolescence of the U-boat as a weapons platform, among others – contributed to the German defeat. Though reluctant to point to a single factor that was responsible for the defeat of the wolf packs, he does in one passage assert that it was due to the quality – largely technological – rather than the quantity of Allied forces arrayed against them. In his conclusion, however, he quotes an estimate that it required 100 Allied persons engaged in anti-submarine warfare to match every U-boat man and twenty-five warships and a hundred aircraft to match every U-boat! Reconciling this apparent discrepancy is a challenge for another naval historian and shows that there is still much room for debate about 'Black May" and the defeat of the U-boats. Still,
Gannon has produced a well-researched and highly readable account of this decisive month.

Robert C. Fisher
Nepean, Ontario


This is not "just one more" U-boat book in an admittedly already flooded market. The point is important, for the production of U-boat literature seems bent on re-discovering and re-narrating the exploits of every boat, skipper and minor player in the pantheon. The wartime navy of no other country commands so much attention as Hitler's band of brothers. All this explains the skepticism with which one picks up each new title. Refreshingly, the editor of Silent Hunters offers well-researched studies of commanders whose unique stories have largely escaped critical scrutiny. In doing so he avoids simply regaling us with further remarkable adventures, though his authors do deliver entertaining accounts that enhance the burgeoning canon. The book's value lies in correcting the often self-promoted stereotypes and allowing the human dimension of U-boat commanders to emerge. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide context and depth.

The collection opens with Eric Topp's poetic meditation on his class-mate Engelbert Endrass. It was written at sea in 1942 some weeks after Endrass had perished with U-567. An important document of the time, it reveals attitudes on key issues such as camaraderie, Nelsonic commitment to duty and the abiding challenge of seafaring. The reflections are preeminently humane, without political overtones. Topp, now known internationally as the black sheep of the U-Boot-Kameradschaft for having repudiated his wartime past, might perhaps have updated his reflections. Certainly, his deep sense of loss abides, but his attitudes have shifted. New readers needed to be shown that side too. Timothy Mulligan's chapter "Karl-Friedrich Merten and the Prussian Tradition" is finely-honed. U-boat buffs will recall Merten as the cantankerous, petulant old sweat squabbling with publicist Lothar-Gunther Buchheim of Das Boot fame about the nature of history. Merten came off in this public debate as a self-characterized Colonel Blimp refusing to accept even fair criticism of the Nazi years. That was unfortunate. For as Mulligan's even-handed critique convincingly shows, Merten emerges from his many ambiguities as a man of personal integrity and courage.

The virtually unsung Ralph Kapitsky (U-615) upstages the accounts in its vivid knock-down-drag-'em-out death throes in the so-called "Battle of the Caribbean." Yet here too, author Gaylord T.M. Kelshall, invites us to contemplate not only the man, but the significance of his venture. One of the most distinguished rear-guard actions of the war, it triggered significant American strategic responses. Equally unlauded until Eric Rust's sensitive and magisterial portrayal in this volume was Fritz Guggenberger (U-513), a "Bavarian U-Boat Ace." One appreciates in this chapter both the historian's grasp and the personal encounter which shaped it. Equally well handled is Jordan Vause's fine analysis of "Victor Oehrn: the Ace with No Name." Vause skilfully explains the meanings and motivations which informed the life of this self-effacing staff officer, a man who lived a tale as engaging as that of Kapitsky. Oehrn had planned, among other things, Prien's famous sinking of the Royal Oak in Scapa Flow. Vause's work is among the most important of the book.

For those concerned with questions of war crimes and justice, Dwight Messimer's engrossing study of Heinz-Wilhelm Eck will be the linch-pin of the volume. The British trial and execution of Eck in November 1945 is arguably one of the nastiest pieces of Allied victor's justice on record. Messimer lucidly examines the record of Eck's sinking of the Peleus, the machine-gunning both of debris and – the point in dispute – survivors; he details the trial and the legal precedents. Significantly, he reveals the potential "tu quoque" arguments (which were never raised in defence). Allied forces themselves had committed "crimes against humanity" with impunity in both the Atlantic and Pacific (the Laconia affair, USS Wahoo, and the machine-gunning of survivors from Eck's own U-852). Central to defence arguments were the still relevant principles of operational necessity and superior orders. Silent Hunters is a welcome addition to the U-boat library.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia

Eric Grove’s introduction to this book describes it as “the most powerful justification of the convoy system of Warfare ever written.” It is one of the Admiralty’s Naval Staff Histories of World War II and this Navy Records Society edition makes what is undoubtedly an important study widely available for the first time. The society has thus made a valuable contribution to future study of the both world wars at sea.

The naval staff histories generally reflect tactical doctrines current when they were written. Most are straightforward narratives that attempt to present engagements and campaigns in a factual manner. *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping*, as Eric Grove explains, is a naval staff history with a difference. Indeed, in today’s jargon this is a staff history with an attitude. Its origins are important to an understanding of the book’s perspective. The head of the Naval Historical Section, Rear Admiral Bellairs, was horrified by a 1949 internal RN paper exercise to study the lessons of the recent war and to project them onto a future war. This study viewed sinking submarines around convoys as “defensive” rather than “offensive” and supported attacking submarines "at source." Bellairs turned two of his staff, Lt.Cdr. D.W. Waters, RN and Commander F. Barley, RNVR, who were already busy on a trade defence project, to producing an analytical "digest of all of the relevant facts" of the Battle of the Atlantic in order to counter what was regarded as wooly thinking, namely the view that convoys were too "defensive" a strategy to protect shipping.

Waters and Barley painstakingly compiled extensive statistics and buttressed their text with references to their exhaustive analyses. Because they saw that many lessons about defending shipping against submarines were common to both world wars they included a brief discussion about World War I. Their study was ready in 1952 but did not appear until 1957 after internecine struggles with the RAF about how the priority given strategic bombing over maritime operations and other controversial topics should be handled.

*The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping* was published in two parts: a narrative and graphs, tables and plans in the second volume. The Navy Records Society edition combines the two original volumes and includes amendments by the Naval Historical Branch up to 1996. However, these updates to the statistical tables appear separately and the reader has to flip back and forth to avoid drawing conclusions from information that has been superseded by more recent analyses. Arguably one of more important amendments is to a table (appendix 2 in Vol. I) showing U-boats destroyed by cause (the new version is on page xlvi), i.e. how many losses were due to ships and how many to aircraft etc. This shows that the numbers destroyed by ships and shore-based aircraft are now known to be somewhat smaller (both account for twenty-nine percent). If shipborne aircraft and sinkings by ships and aircraft together are added ships were involved in forty percent. The number of those lost to “unknown” causes has increased. Waters and Barley produced several ingenious pictorial graphs to illustrate points like an "Analysis of U-Boats Sunk In Relation To the Convoy System" (plan 19), "Bay Offensive" (plan 22) and "Graph of the U-Boat War" (plan 38) showing the interaction between developments by Allied anti-submarine capabilities and the U-boat fleet. None of these are truly useable in the reprint and enlarged photocopies will be required. Presumably these problems resulted because the costs of adequate reproduction would have been prohibitive.

There is no list of sources but the authors’ original 1956 introduction stresses the value of the meticulous German naval records, which had been captured and were available. Waters and Barley suggested that this was probably the first time in history that a statistical study could be based on the records of both sides. In his introduction, Groves makes clear that Waters was aware of the impact of signals intelligence on operations. However, the narrative does not concern itself with diversions of convoys or the insights gained from knowledge of U-boat dispositions and developments in general. While a useful plan (number 54) shows the growth of anti-submarine surface forces under British operational control the narrative does not describe the evolution of allied plans. To be fair, this study
was projected as the first in a series on the Battle of the Atlantic and it was seen as making available findings which would provide a context for more detailed accounts.

This study is a vigorous defence of the effectiveness of convoys in ensuring that shipping reaches its destinations. It points out that until May 1943, sixty-five percent of all U-boats destroyed fell to convoy air and surface escorts. One of the most telling findings is that sixty percent of all ships sunk by U-boat were not in convoy. For the war as a whole the loss rate for ships not in convoy was twice that for ships in convoy. (It is not generally appreciated that the legendary "aces" of 1939-40 achieved most of their results against unescorted ships.) Waters and Barley also have trenchant observations on the relative successes of hunter-killer groups acting independently of convoys and on the greater effectiveness of shore-based aircraft in escort and support of convoys as opposed to area patrols over the Bay of Biscay and the Northern Transit Areas.

The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping makes its case clearly, contains many insights and is based on rigorous analyses. The foreword by Eric Grove, which sketches in British post-war thinking on the defence of trade, is a bonus. The cost of the volume is daunting, but this book certainly belongs in academic libraries. Cost-conscious individuals can qualify to buy copies for £30 by becoming members of the society.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


When the Royal Navy's standard "Short" MTBs (Motor Torpedo Boats) proved early in the war to be rather under-gunned when taking on their natural opponents, the Kriegsmarine's faster S-boats (or E-boats as the Allies called them), Fairmile Marine came up with their D Class motor launches, a heavier but faster model of their B Class Fairmiles. The "Dog Boats," as they became known, either as MTBs with torpedoes, or MGBs fitted just with guns of various weights and capacity, were able to carry the battle to the enemy. Admittedly, the steel-hulled diesel-powered E-boats, at 43 to 45 knots, could usually outdistance the slower 30- to 32-knot Dogs. But with an armament that increased during the war from a single 40-mm "po nm-pom" and a couple of 20-mm Oerlikon or .303 machine guns to two 6-pounders in power mountings, four Oerlikons in two power-driven mountings, twin .303 or even .5-inch twin machine guns, they were formidable fighting machines and usually controlled the field if they got in a few hits. Some were fitted with torpedo tubes, mine-laying capacity, and depth charges specially modified for dropping across the bows of merchantmen. All were gasoline-engined. The crews were usually three or at most four officers and thirty to thirty-two men.

In service by the spring of 1942, they were 115 feet long, of about 105 tons, and 228 of them served in some thirty-one numbered flotillas, although twelve were lower numbered ones that were re-numbered in October, 1943. Canadians, nearly all RCNVRs, served in many of the British flotillas, and in February 1944 LCDR J.R.H. Kirkpatrick took command of a Canadian flotilla. Tommy Fuller, Doug Maitland and Corny Burke, all RCNVRs, also commanded RN flotillas in the Med. There were Norwegian and Dutch-manned flotillas in this number as well.

As the title suggests, this book is largely a straightforward description of the activities of these Dog boats at war in the Channel, the North Sea, the Mediterranean out of Malta and amongst the Greek Islands. There is hardly a significant action fought by the Dogs anywhere that Reynolds, who was himself a commander of one, has not covered. Thirty-seven boats were lost, mostly due to enemy action or to mines and 237 men killed. But at high speeds, at night, close to shore and often in confused running gun fights and smoke, there were many collisions with both the enemy and own forces, and a few lost to stranding. Reynolds tells us there were over three hundred actions in which Dog boats were involved, and I would guess that after his first fifteen-page introduction he has described a good two-thirds of them, some quite comprehensively. There were clandestine operations to enemy-held coasts, mine-laying operations, and MTB-to-E-boat stand and fight battles.

If one wants a more detached assessment of the developing fighting strategies and tactics for
these MGBs/MTBs, of which there was almost none in the early days, a supplemental book would be Captain Peter Dicken's *Night Action: MTB Flotilla at War* (1974). And for the building criteria, problems developed in driving wooden-hulled boats at high speeds in rough seas, and changes made due to war experience, W.J. Holt's "Coastal Force Design" paper in *Selected Papers On British Warship Design In World War II* (1983) is recommended. With their late-war collection of guns, they were not handsome ships: one new CO commented "Is that the boat or the box it was delivered in?" [4] But it is a well-told account of this part of the Coastal Forces war.

Fraser McKee
Markdale, Ontario


In October, 1943, USS *Borie*, a four-funnel flush-deck destroyer, was an escort in a Hunter/Killer group with the carrier USS *Card* north of the Azores. In a night time action *Borie* engaged *U-405* in a remarkable battle in which *Borie* rammed the U-boat. The two vessels, both nearly sinking, engaged each other, firing at point-blank range until *U-405* sank. *Borie* then proceeded to join her group but had to be abandoned and was sunk by her escort partners. It has been called the most spectacular surface battle in the US Navy since the days of John Paul Jones. Captain Wise USN (Rtd.), a naval historian, contacted a participant, Bob Maher, and persuaded him to write about his old ship and her remarkable battle. This book is the result. Maher is a fine writer and *Sailors' Journey Into War* is an interesting report of the battle as well as a humourous account of life in the US Navy.

In June 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Two Ocean Navy Bill authorizing a tremendous expansion of the US Navy. Maher's story begins a month later. He was sitting on his front porch with his mother when a bunch of friends drove by. They were off to Jersey City to join the Naval Reserve and he went along with them. It turned out that he was the only one of the group accepted and he signed up immediately for one year's active service duty. In November, with only the most rudimentary training, Maher was drafted to USS *Borie* in Norfolk, Virginia. Almost immediately, *Borie* was off to Coco Solo on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. This was to be her home port for the next two years.

*Borie* had been built during World War I and was a familiar type in the Canadian Navy. In September 1940, as part of the "destroyers-for-bases" deal, President Roosevelt had turned over fifty similar vessels to the British and Canadian navies. Maher's impression of *Borie* was identical to the reviewer's impression of HMCS *Niagara*, ex-USS *Thatcher*, the ship on which he served for over a year: living conditions were primitive, but these destroyers were fast, well armed and, with tender loving care, dependable and seaworthy.

Maher's duties involved the maintenance of all the torpedo and gunnery fire control equipment. In this he was largely self-taught, studying all the appropriate manuals. He ended up as gun director pointer above the bridge, an ideal spot from which to observe any action involving his ship. During 1940 and 1941, *Borie* was at sea much of the time carrying out patrols around the Panama Canal and working up at leisure. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, *Borie* was ready. Soon she was engaged in Caribbean patrols at a time when the Germans had a happy-time sinking merchant ships there, one after another. The institution of convoys finally lessened the slaughter there, though the U-boats continued to wreak havoc in the Atlantic.

Not until mid-1943 were the Allies able to tackle the U-boat problem effectively by forming Hunter/Killer Groups. It was then that *Borie* became part of a screening group for USS *Card*, an Escort Carrier. Their task was to act independently against any reported concentration of U-boats. One of their first targets was *U-91* which had sunk the reviewer's destroyer, HMCS *Ottawa*, the previous September. The submarine escaped! The very next day, however, *Borie* engaged and rammed *U-405*. The ensuing action, a truly historic event, is described in vivid detail.

Of particular interest to me was the fact that Maher served so long in the same ship. Recently, I had occasion to speak to the former Gunnery Officer of Prinz Eugen, who said that he spent the entire war in that ship. In contrast, our people in the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy seemed to be in a state of perpetual change during the war. The one time my ship had the same crew for any length of time was in Algonquin when we
were based in Scapa Flow for over a year and the drafting depot could not get at us easily. USS Borie impressed me as being a more efficient crew than a Canadian equivalent, in large measure because most of them really knew their ship.

All in all, this book gives valuable and exciting insight into a heroic action and life and service in an old destroyer in the US Navy.

L.B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


For those interested in the Aleutian campaign in the north Pacific during World War II, one of the great "what ifs" of that bitter fight was the prospect of active Soviet assistance or belligerence in the anti-Japanese struggle. Had Joseph Stalin opted to scrap his 1941 neutrality pact with Japan in favour of fighting side-by-side with American forces in the north Pacific in 1942 or 1943, perhaps the bloody road to Japan from the south and central Pacific might have been replaced by a strong and decisive attack upon Japan's home islands via the Aleutians and eastern Siberia from the air, sea, and land.

Stalin, facing the titanic death struggle with Nazi Germany in Europe, declined to enter the war with Japan until three months after the German surrender. Even then, the paranoid Soviet dictator refused to allow American aircraft to use Siberian bases and would not permit American troops to use Soviet soil to attack Japan. Only a small group of American weather experts, needed to provide vital forecasts for the anticipated invasions of Japan, were permitted to set up their facilities in eastern Siberia.

Yet Stalin was not averse to accepting American material aid. The lend-lease program used Alaskan air and sea routes to deliver arms and supplies to the Red Army, routes the Japanese made no effort to interdict. Project HULA, as Russell points out, grew out of an American promise at the 1945 Yalta conference to provide the Soviet navy in the Far East with badly needed ships and amphibious warfare techniques. In all, 149 American ships – including frigates, minesweepers, and landing craft infantry (large) – were transferred to Soviet control at the Cold Bay facility in Alaska, while 12,000 Soviet officers and ratings underwent intensive training at that same base before the program was abruptly terminated on 5 September 1945.

Though short, Russell's account of this little known aspect of Soviet-American relations is highly informative and interesting. He provides a useful historical and political context for the project, presents short biographies of the leading American and Soviet personnel, discusses the merits and shortcomings of the ships given to the Soviets, and offers a liberal sampling of interesting photographs including a fascinating shot of a senior Soviet admiral playing a pinball machine at Cold Bay. For those with strong quantitative tendencies, Russell lists each ship by type, transfer date, and ultimate disposition (most of the ships ultimately were returned to the United States, excepting those lost when the Soviets invaded the Kurile Islands in August 1945).

Though Russell lists the primary sources he consulted for this short study, unfortunately he offers no formal notes. Those wishing to delve further into the topic should consult Russell's short footnoted article on the same subject in Fern Chandonnet (ed.), *Alaska at War, 1944-1945: The Forgotten War Remembered* (1995).

Galen Roger Perras
Calgary, Alberta


Here is one lucky naval officer; a rare survivor of imprisonment by the Japanese who was not subjected to the usual level of brutality inflicted on "guests of the Emperor." However, he suffered his share, from starvation, harsh conditions, and random beatings by camp guards.

John Michel originally wrote his wartime memoir in 1948, shortly after the events occurred, though it is only now being published for the first
time. This may account for the clarity of this well-written account of a young US Navy officer’s experiences during the Battle of the Java Sea and later while a POW.

Written as it was back then, the book is larded with cheerfully racist remarks about enemies and other echoes of a simpler time; some are unconsciously hilarious, such as “The [Swiss] girls spoke English fluently, but with a slight British accent.” We get insights into the relaxed pre-war days in American naval stations in the Philippines and China stations. After America entered World War II in late 1941, Michel’s destroyer, USS Pope, sailed east to Java and participated in several sea-battles against the Imperial Japanese Navy. There’s a salty sense of how a four-stacker like USS Pope, a relic of World War I, managed to acquit itself as well as the rest of the out-moded US Navy warships. In the Coral Sea clash, over eighty enemy ships were defeated by a mixed Allied force of American, Dutch, and British vessels. The author describes the battle’s manoeuvres well, but in separate accounts scattered though the book, as he tells it the way he gradually learned details later. Interestingly, though Michel has high praise for the Royal Dutch Navy in combat, he is less complimentary about the Dutch army’s resistance to the Japanese invaders.

When Michel’s ship was sunk, he managed to make his way to Indonesia, only to be captured, the start of four weary years of imprisonment. The author was often moved from place to place, being at one time or another in Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. Among repeated incidences of brutality and privation, it is the hopeless sense of monotony that most strikes the reader about life in a POW camp. Yet, through it all, Michel is able to recall numerous cases of personal kindness and self-sacrifice among his fellow prisoners that must have helped to raise spirits in such dire surroundings.

Michel’s liberation and home-coming in 1945 is described with all the restrained aplomb of a naval officer. He returned to sea duty, and served during the Korean War, not far from the scenes of his earlier travail, then joined the US Naval Reserve, retiring with the rank of captain. Now, readers of navy lore can be grateful that Captain Michel eventually did publish his story.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


This book is a collection of essays, most derived from papers given at conferences or published in a variety of journals between September 1991 and October 1997. The author offers it as "a useful record of the evolution of 'medium' power thinking on the post-Cold War role of navies.” It does provide such a record, although because of its structure, it tends toward distracting repetition.

The essays show very well the difficulties naval people have in explaining themselves to the public and to politicians. The author painstakingly shows, in concrete terms, what naval platforms can do, how these capabilities can be exploited nowadays and how to avoid naval jargon.

Throughout, the theme runs that there is not much new in the use of naval ships as extensions of the power of the state that owns them. Naval ships have unique attributes, and have had for centuries, in international relations, both warlike and non-warlike. This includes their special status in law, as extensions of their nations' territories, which gives them a symbolic value that is not a feature of armies or air forces.

Technology and expense have driven navies away from specialized ships to general-purpose ones. Generically, the ships most capable of operating throughout the spectrum of naval operational capabilities are frigates. An aircraft carrier can conduct surveillance over a huge area, but it is not much direct use in shipping control or imposing sanctions by search or apprehension of individual vessels.

Naval ships are versatile because they are self-contained and can accomplish a wide range of tasks. Designed for combat, frigates can also generate electricity for a small town, make potable water, serve as a small hospital, provide workshop facilities and skilled technicians, provide control centres for complex operations, and even carry a helicopter which can perform many roles, from inspection of merchant ships to rescue. Frigates can be used over a very large range of situations. As well, the skills required for naval ships to be able to fight, ensure that little if any re-training is necessary for them to perform roles in maritime crisis management.
The author addresses multilateral operations, cautioning that the training required for ships of different nations to operate together is demanding and time consuming. I can attest to that. We operated with the Royal Navy from the time of our navy's inception but not until after World War II did we operate closely with the US Navy. When I joined, we had separate sets of signalling and tactical books depending upon which navy we were working with. The development of common doctrines in NATO led to all NATO navies being able to operate together.

The NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic, operating since 1968, is a shining example of an international operational naval force, and other NATO standing forces have followed it. Commonwealth navies can operate together – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and indeed India and Pakistan. The US Navy has made herculean efforts to train other allies in operating together, usually through major international exercises such as RIMPAC in the Pacific and UNITAS around South America. However, the author holds out little hope of a United Nations naval force; the effort that would be required to achieve it makes it an impractical idea.

This is a useful book for the student and the specialist. It is however, not for casual reading.

D.N. Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario


Early in this study, the author explains that "For as long as Russia has existed as a count ry, and particularly during the twentieth century, the Arctic has occupied a place of prominence in its national development." [4] Russia's Arctic attachment embodies both the nationalistic attachment Canada feels for its Arctic and the strategic importance the United States places on the North. Russia's Arctic population far exceeds Canada's, but both nations' Arctic holds a wealth of valuable natural resources, and the Soviets have committed far greater resources – men, money, and equipment – to translating their emotional attachment into economic and military development.

John McCannon's fine book, Red Arctic, is an extensively and meticulously researched account of "the zenith of this perennial campaign ... the 1930s, when the USSR launched what was perhaps the most systematic and all-encompassing sequence of Arctic expeditions in the history of polar exploration." [4] McCannon provides a unique view of this Arctic development and the "Arctic myth" of the 1930s. He reflects on the myth's place in Stalin's "socialist realism," and uses the North to answer broader questions about both the USSR under Stalin and the "socialist-realist worldview." [9]

Stalin launched his "revolution from above" in 1928, with his first Five Year Plan. Industrialization was just one component of a much larger plan to mobilize Soviet society and transform it along Stalin's socialist vision. One arena of his modernization drive was the Arctic. McCannon contends that this Arctic drive mirrored both the successes and failures of Stalin's nationwide program. It had the same spirit of "gigantomania," the same "unreasonable and highly ... unrealistic demands [of pace and development] handed down by the state," and it was "inextricably intertwined with the great human tragedy that was the GULAG." [176-77]

Russia's foray into the North preceded Canadian Arctic exploration, but like Canada, Russia's initial attention was both sporadic and unsystematic. Yet the 1930s saw a distinctly different view of the North. After settling outstanding land claims in the early 1930s, the Canadian government turned away from the North, focusing its attention on the Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe. Stalin, however, initiated a program that poured resources into polar research and development, "tamed" the Northern Sea Route, surveyed previously uncharted areas, built "outposts, factories, and cities ... throughout the barren tundras," and conquered the North Pole in 1937, making the USSR preeminent in Arctic exploration and development. [12-13]

McCannon presents the "two Arctics" of the 1930s. The first was the hidden, "grim Arctic of prison-camp labor" and the growing pains of development. He traces Glaysmenvorput (GUSMP), the "scientific-research and transport agency" of the Arctic [173] from its birth in 1932 through its final death in 1970. McCannon describes the men and forces that carved out the Soviet presence in the Arctic. A "deliberate
GUSMP's mandate was to explore and develop the Soviet Arctic. McCannon documents not only the gigantic size of GUSMP, but its equally extensive territory, responsibilities, obstacles (political, bureaucratic, and environmental), and power.

The other Arctic was the public and heralded one of heroic air, sea, and land explorations. Stalin used the image and accomplishments of these exploits from 1932 through 1937 to create the Arctic myth and reflected Stalin's socialist realism. But the Soviet Arctic's golden age ended in 1938, the victim of operational and bureaucratic troubles and disasters, and the increasing government focus on the threats and clashes with the fascist states of Europe and Japan. McCannon traces GUSMP's fall from its height in 1937 to its nadir in 1939, but also notes its "recovery" by the end of the decade, the importance of the Northern Sea Route during the war, and its active Arctic agenda through the 1950s. It was not until 1970 that GUSMP ceased to exist.

The concluding chapter is especially interesting. McCannon projects the Arctic myth in both a Soviet and worldwide context, noting its ties to aviation's development, mass media's growth, and the study of twentieth century dictatorships. He contends that the Arctic myth in Soviet culture and society was "the real-life Soviet experience [best] suited for incorporation into the socialist-realist framework....contribution directly to the shaping of socialist realism itself." He concludes that "perhaps the most important thing about the Arctic myth is the way in which it has been imprinted indelibly on the national memory of modern Russia." With the hardships facing Russia today, even if the Arctic heroic can never be separated "from the horrific [human] price" paid for such successes, its glory must be a welcomed memory.

Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel
Omaha, Nebraska


This book explains Canadian policy and Canada's dilemmas regarding the Arctic archipelago and the Northwest Passage. It covers the period from before World War II to 1996 and is concerned with the developing relationships between Canada and the United States in an arena where cooperation in actual endeavours was close, even when the ultimate aims of the two countries were different. The Soviet Union, lurking in the background on the other side of the pole, was the sinister presence that provided the impetus for a great deal of the activity that went on.

This is a very important subject for Canadians. Although the author is American, a Canadian perspective is apparent and it is not surprising to learn that Dr. Alec Douglas (formerly the historian for the Canadian Forces) headed the Center for Canadian Studies at Duke University when the dissertation that developed into this book was first being prepared. The author appears to have had access to documents and people who had been involved in Arctic events and decisions.

The August 1940 meeting between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York is seen as a pivotal event. The two leaders worked out an agreement that provided the cooperative basis between the two countries for the defence of North America. A Permanent Joint Board of Defence was established to make recommendations to both governments. The PJBD was subsequently involved in the decision to build the Alaska Highway and to establish air routes both westward to supply the Soviet Union and eastward to the European theatre, and which led to the construction of American airfields and meteorological stations in northern Canada and Labrador. The Ogdensburg Agreement became the foundation for continental military cooperation during and after the war.

In considering the post-war period, the views of the Canadian and American governments were often quite different on particular issues and concerns. Yet the actions they took furthered the aims of both. Thus, the Distant Early Warning chain of radar stations was essential for continental defence as wartime alliances gave way to Cold War hostility. The large American presence in the Canadian Arctic for the construction and re-supply of these installations caused some concern in Ottawa, and Elliot-Meisel correctly examines in some detail the viewpoints (not always identical) of Canada and the US military and State Departments. The activities of the Canadian Navy icebreaker Labrador in 1954-56 were sovereignty related and advocates of that program were bit-
terly disappointed when the ship was transferred to the Department of Transport in 1958. Yet increased use of Coast Guard and civilian Canadian ships in the Arctic, including support of US installations, in the late 1950s and early '60s effectively promoted a Canadian presence.

The two events that brought the issue of the Northwest Passage and the difference between Canadian and American views to the consciousness of Canadians were the experimental transit of the Northwest Passage in 1969 by the tanker Manhattan and in 1985 by the USCGC Polar Sea. The fact is that the United States had no evil intentions but they stood by the principle that dominant maritime nations have always held, which is the right of passage through "international" straits. Canada's position, that the Northwest Passage is not an international strait but Canadian internal waters, was challenged by these events. The book is recommended to anyone wanting to have the niceties of these arguments explained in concise form. The author's view is that it would be to the advantage of the United States as well as Canada to reach a bilateral agreement with respect to the Passage that would address American defence concerns, guarantee Canadian sovereignty and facilitate the cooperation between the two nations that has flourished in the last fifty years.

Copious annotations and references make the chapter notes a useful guide to just about everything published on the subject. One of the appendices is a list of Northwest Passage transits, supplied by the Canadian Coast Guard and supported by maps showing the various routes which the author has classified in a convenient manner. This book is concise, complete and recommended for any shelf of books on Arctic matters.

C. Douglas Maginley
Ottawa, Ontario


This is a study of how cutbacks in the defence budget have degraded shore-based maritime aviation at the very time defence and foreign policy have made its capabilities more important than ever. Maritime patrol aircraft are the only resources in the Canadian Forces that can rapidly reach the furthest limits of the Arctic and the Economic Exclusion Zones on the Atlantic and Pacific, and then linger long enough to do useful surveillance and enforce Canadian sovereignty over these vast reaches. It is also the only resource with combat capability that can be rapidly deployed overseas, as it was to assist in the embargo of arms shipments in the Adriatic Sea during the early part of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.

Yet the communications, surveillance and self-defence equipment of the Canadian Force's long-range CP 140 Auroras and CP 140 A Arcturus have not been upgraded to meet the demands of these and other tasks that are multiplying in their nature and complexity. The airframes of the aging Auroras, still the most capable of the machines, are being further stressed with repeated landings and take-offs for training and short to medium range missions that could readily be carried out by less expensive types. Even so, the CP 121 Trackers, which had once performed much of this work, have not been replaced since their retirement in 1990.

The author suggests that the necessary linkage between national policy and defence funding has come unglued. Drawing on historical research published during the last fifteen years, he rightly emphasizes that the concern by successive governments about sovereignty over coastal waters has been the driving force in the development of Canadian maritime forces since Confederation. Maritime air patrol, because of its powerful surveillance capability, moreover, was especially important in the origins and growth of the air force in 1918 and after. The Royal Canadian Air Force had top priority in rearmament during the 1930s and during World War II in large part because of the government's abiding worry that if Canada could not more effectively control its ocean approaches, the United States would do the job. In that event, Canada would become a puppet state. From these beginnings grew Canada's little known but large and highly successful maritime air forces of 1941-5. Although their prime mission was anti-submarine warfare, the government and military always made full use of the leverage this capability provided to assert Canadian sovereignty within the western alliance. The re-establishment of RCAF maritime units with the intensi-
fication of the Cold War in the 1950s built on that experience and had virtually identical objectives.

This publication is a discussion paper rather than polished scholarship. It is repetitive in places, and there are slips (German submarine operations in the western Atlantic made comprehensive maritime air patrol from Canada and Newfoundland an urgent necessity from the spring of 1941, not the summer of 1942, as the author suggests on p. 9). Nevertheless, the argument is persuasive, and there is a good deal of valuable information on a subject that has been too long neglected.

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


Former deputy chief of staff for operations in the South Vietnamese Navy, Capt. Kiem Do, with the assistance of Julie Kane, offers an interesting account of several aspects of the war over Vietnam. Born in Hanoi, the author chose sides in Vietnam's civil war and served twenty-one years in the South Vietnamese Navy. He held a number of senior appointments, including Chief of Staff of the Mobile Riverine Force, which operated throughout the Mekong Delta. As the third most senior South Vietnamese naval officer when Saigon fell in 1975 he planned the escape of most of the South's navy and the mass evacuation of naval personnel and families to the US Subic Bay naval facilities in the Philippines.

This is a deeply personal account tracing Kiem Do's life from his birth in Hanoi, to youthful participation in the Viet Minh, midshipman training in France for the Bao Dai navy, the rise and fall of the Diem and subsequent regimes in South Vietnam, and through some detailed riverine exploits and eventual flight from Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) to America where he rebuilt his life, his family and prospered.

There is very little work available on the experiences of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Ironically there is more work in English available on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong than on America's allies. Perhaps this is because

the winners write the history, perhaps because too many Americans are still ashamed either of their support for the war or because of the way they turned against their allies and sealed the fate of men like Kiem Do. But even losers are entitled to their history – no matter how uncomfortable it makes readers.

The book provides no supporting documentation, except for family pictures, and cannot be said to be a scholarly account, but then, it was not meant to be. Kiem Do's moving account – neither history nor full biography – is largely an autobiographical recounting of his experiences and observations from boyhood to refugee camp. Several naval actions are recounted, including operations against the Binh Xuyen gangs in the Mekong during Diem's regime, a battle with the Chinese over the Paracel islands – with its own touch of American perfidy – and naval operations during the final collapse of South Vietnam and, most movingly, the extraction of the heavy fleet units of the South Vietnamese Navy from beneath the communist guns. In brief, this is a tale of loyalty, love, forlorn hope, betrayal, humiliation, survival and new beginnings.

The specialist may find these stories of interest. A general reader will find them moving. I found them both.

Michael Hennessy
Kingston, Ontario


The proceedings of the eighth Annual Sea Power Conference have been published in this, another of the very handy books for which the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie has become well known. Peter Haydon reports in his foreword that the conference "examined international shipping from an international perspective."

Indeed, the fifteen articles provide the reader with a very broad view of the international maritime shipping environment from many more perspectives than just nationality. The entire industry is examined from market, legal, military, regulatory, and technical points of view, to name only a few. The incredible breadth of the material presented
in such a small volume makes it an excellent "gateway" resource for readers and researchers looking for introductory material that will lead to more detailed sources. Many of the articles, although unfortunately not all, are written in a scholar style that is well supported by footnotes and contains much interesting data set out in tables and graphs.

While the whole body of the work goes very far towards bringing the reader a broad understanding of the international shipping environment, it falls somewhat short in dealing with the subject that the title leads one to believe is the central theme of the book. Peter Haydon describes in the foreword how the widely diversified backgrounds of the conference delegates "led to many spirited discussions on various aspects of the shipping industry and its place in the national strategic calculus." Yet the reader is left to wonder what these debates must have been about. Although the evident trends towards international regulation, non-national corporate ownership, and "just-in-time" inter-modal delivery are well described, and these aspects do present some obvious vulnerabilities to disruption, the basic question of whether or not these issues make international shipping any more or less of a strategic concern than in previous times is not clearly and confidently addressed.

The lead article by Robert Thomas is a prime example of the book's overall inability to address the central issue. He begins his essay by using the question: "Is shipping still a strategic issue?" as his title and then sets out a number of other questions as the sub-headings for his work. Each area reviews some aspect of the economic importance, governmental policy, legal framework, and strategic concerns about international shipping. While the analysis contained in each sub-area is fine and thorough, the conclusion to the article ends by posing a series of seven additional questions, which leaves the reader wondering whether the questions will be answered in the subsequent chapters. They are not.

The conclusion to the whole book, also written by Thomas, amounts to a very scant two-and-a-half pages. The over-supply in the world's shipping capacity and the extreme efficiency of the containerized cargo system are mentioned, once again, and then we are left with the declaration that: "Finally, trade always finds a way to get through." This anti-climactic statement creates the impression that the whole book is somehow incorrectly titled; that in some way too much has been attempted. The final result is therefore mildly disappointing. A change in title would have helped researchers locate the many fine articles that have only a passing relevance to "the strategic importance of shipping." It would also have helped the reader adjust his or her expectations as to what was to be attained through the very interesting and challenging reading contained in these pages.

Kenneth P. Hansen
Toronto, Ontario


Ocean areas called straits are those that are narrow waterways cutting between land formations. A list of the well-known straits of the world would include the Strait of Dover, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. These straits, amongst others, are some of the mostly heavily utilized waterways in the world, and are critical both for the facilitation of trade and for military security.

When the jurisdictional reach of coastal states was a mere three or four nautical miles, there was little interference with the passage of vessels through the great straits of the world by adjacent states. However, when coastal states began to exercise national authority over waters out to twelve, then two hundred nautical miles, the fear by trading and military states was that this extension of authority would lead to interference with passage through straits.

Dr. Bing Bing Jia describes the detail of the careful balance that is seen as critical between the authority of adjacent states over activities in straits and the navigational freedoms sought by the users of straits. That balance, which owes its origin to the early twentieth century, was a critical part of the negotiations that led to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The balance set out in the 1982 Treaty is simply stated: through straits used for international navigation, vessels are to enjoy rights of transit passage. Of course, the devil is in the detail.

The detail divides into three questions. When
is a waterway a "strait used for international navigation" in which transit passage applies? What is meant by transit passage? Does transit passage exist for all vessels through all international straits or does transit passage arise only for those states which are parties to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention?

Regarding the first question, "straits used for international navigation" is not defined in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Is a strait international if the waterway connects high seas areas or must the waterway have a history of having been used as a means to connect high seas areas? Respecting the straits noted in the first paragraph (Dover, Malacca, Hormuz, Malacca) there is no debate that these are straits used for international navigation. Bing Bing Jia concludes that the critical criterion respecting the existence of a strait used for international navigation is not geography but navigational use of the waterway. Of course, the strait must meet the geographical requirement of connecting open or shared seas areas but the geography alone does not make a waterway an international strait through which transit passage rights exist.

Regarding the second question, "transit passage rights" mean that vessels cannot have their navigation through an international strait impeded or prevented by adjacent states. It is important to note that not only do vessels enjoy transit rights through straits used for international navigation but that there are also flight rights over straits used for international straits. While vessels cannot have their navigational rights impeded, vessels still have to comply with certain local laws. One implication of transit passage, however, is that a failure to comply with local laws does not give rise to a right of seizure, rather the response is by way of a complaint made to the flag state of the passing vessel. Precisely what is covered by transit passage rights is open to debate. Must passing vessels respect navigational aids, traffic separation schemes, safe navigation practices, non-fishing zones, non-pollution zones, and, in the case of submarines, must they transit on the surface?

The principal focus of Bing Bing Jia's inquiry is on the third question – whether the transit passage regime in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is binding on all states (part of customary international law) or only binding on those states which are parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. The question is important since the United States, like Canada, is not yet a party to the Treaty and, thus, if the transit regime is not part of general international law, strait states need not yield to US vessels and aircraft rights of transit passage. The author meticulously examines the statements and actions of the states of the world in order to assess whether the transit passage regime is part of general international law. The conclusion is that sufficient state practice does not exist to pass the rigorous threshold used by the transit passage regime through states for international navigation as part of customary international law. One can quarrel with the result, but not the methodology.

Canada has long maintained that there are no straits used for international navigation in Canada. Thus, for example, Canada does not consider the Northwest Passage or the Strait of Juan de Fuca as subject to the international law regarding straits. The United States clearly takes a contrary view regarding the Northwest Passage. The official US position is that the Northwest Passage is an international strait through which vessels of all flags may pass unimpeded. Since a 1988 bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States, the two countries have agreed to disagree about the Northwest Passage. Bing Bing Jia appears to side with Canada's views respecting the Northwest Passage.

Regarding Canada and the third question, Bing Bing Jia comments that "Canada does not consider the [Law of the Sea Convention] regime of transit passage as customary law." [174] To the reviewer, the evidence presented does not support such an unequivocal statement. Canada's true position is more likely to be supportive of transit passage as part of customary international law. Such a posture would be consistent with Canada's trade interests and Canada's military relationship within NATO and with the United States.

Bing Bing Jia's text is a thorough and highly technical analysis of the many issues regarding the international law respecting straits. Law of the sea specialists in the academic community, the Canadian government, and the Canadian Navy will want to examine this book carefully.

Ted L. McDorman
Victoria, British Columbia