
The International Congress of Maritime Museums was founded at a meeting of maritime museums of the Atlantic basin at the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich in 1972. This meeting was organized jointly by the National Maritime Museum and Mystic Seaport, Connecticut, in the belief, strengthened by recent experiences, that there would be great advantages in developing close links internationally between institutions with such strong common interests.

Twenty-five years later at its ninth full meeting (there had also been smaller regional meetings) the Congress, having met in between in Oslo, Mystic, Paris, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Stockholm and Barcelona, returned to Britain. Meetings at Liverpool, Portsmouth and Greenwich were attended by representatives of twenty-nine countries and some eighty separate institutions. There were a total of 120 delegates as well as some visiting speakers. The Congress is now one of the liveliest and strongest of museum international bodies.

The papers presented in 1997 fall readily into three groups: those which dealt with the problems of the maritime museum at the end of the twentieth century; the long drawn-out professional dispute over the ethics of the salvaging and exhibition of artifacts salved from the *Titanic*; and papers of general interest.

In the words of the (unsigned) Preface the papers in the first category "addressed the challenges and opportunities which arise from the rapid changes taking place in recreational activities and in the leisure industry around the world. Museums are no longer isolate places of scholarship, but often placed in the forefront of tourist initiatives as a part of a wider heritage industry." [5] I have quoted this statement because it sets the tone for the whole conference.

The principal papers on the general theme all emphasize the falling-off of visitor numbers to museums generally, and particularly to maritime museums, which has been characteristic, at least in the United Kingdom, of recent years. Professor Stuart Davies rightly put his finger on the significance of the fading collective public memory as things maritime move further and further from the normal everyday experience of most people. Shortage of money and the absence of a government policy (at least in Britain) for museums have driven some institutions virtually to cease to be museums at all and to become "all purpose leisure attractions." Although Professor Davies did not refer to this factor the deliberate extinction in some maritime museums of the scholar curator, still fortunately fundamental to the running of such great institutions as the British Museum, has also been a factor in the lowering of standards.

No less than four papers have as their subject the unfortunate controversy over the salvaging and exhibition of the *Titanic* material which has given rise to much criticism of the British National Maritime museums, and brought it into conflict with the International Congress. Graeme Hender-son in his paper "Underwater Archaeology and the *Titanic* — the I.C.M.M. View," ably presents the case of the Congress in this matter.

The professional papers are on the whole of a high standard. Among the most interesting are that by Alan Stimson on "Museums in Historic Buildings. Can you get it right?", Revell Carr of Mystic Seaport on the gains and pitfalls of programmes of evaluation of exhibitions, and Paul Rees on the real value of interactive displays (he is cautious in his verdict). There are four papers on different aspects of African slavery and its consequences, of which perhaps the most interesting is that of Mary Malloy on the employment of Afro-Americans in the merchant shipping industry of the United States in former years.

The "Proceedings" are nicely produced. An index, although not customary in this publication,
would have been helpful, as also notes on those contributors who do not appear on the list of participants. The views expressed are very much those of the individuals who spoke and there is some stimulating stuff here.

Basil Greenhill
Boetheric, Cornwall


The Yearbook of the Aland Maritimes Museum, published by the Aland Nautical Club, contains a wealth of articles that will appeal both to those interested in the history of cargo-carrying sailing vessels and to those wishing to acquire knowledge of the operations of small shipowners from the late nineteenth century to the present day.

1997 was the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Gustaf Erikson, famous for operating four-masted barques in the grain traded in the post-World War I and World War II eras. J. Harberg provides a synopsis of Erikson's life both as seaman and shipowner. At the time of his death, Erikson owned diesel and steam tonnage totalling 36,925 tons, in addition to four barques. His least successful vessel was the barque *L'Avenir*, purchased from Belgian owners in 1932. In forty pages, G. Sundberg records her saga. To obtain some return from his investment, Erikson in 1933 initiated Baltic cruises with *L'Avenir*. Only one voyage produced a profit. Later proposals to use *L'Avenir* as a hotel or as a Mediterranean cruise ship never matured. Consequently, when cargoes became available, the ship returned to the Australian grain trade. *L'Avenir* was finally sold in 1937 to German owners and renamed *Admiral Karpfanger*. She disappeared on her return voyage from Australia in 1938. According to one expert, *L'Avenir*’s long shelter deck, combined with a low head owing to less skilled stowage, would make steering difficult. Five museums, Mariehamn’s county records, and two retired captains’ memories were the sources for this interesting chapter.

Jocelyn Palmer’s illustrated account of her voyage in *Viking* from Australia to Falmouth, which took from March 11 until 27 July 1948, will hold the reader’s interest. The writer is responsible for all the fine English summaries of this interesting book’s chapters and reports. Equally fascinating are the accounts that reveal the personalities of those who served in the barques. One chapter, for instance, is devoted to John Sommarström, who served fifty years at sea. He rounded the Horn no less than eighteen times. Much of his service was as sailmaker in Erikson’s ships. His last voyage was in 1950 in *Passat*. Ashore he continued his trade and became one of the best guides to the museum ship *Pommern*. T. Palmer contributes another short chapter, “The Last Albatross,” about Captain Paul Sommarlund, who died aged 91 on Boxing Day 1996. He was the last member of the Aland branch of the Association of Cape Homer’s. The Association dissolves on its last member’s demise.

An illustrated article by J. Roger Toll concerns the galeas *Rea*, built in 1901 at Göta Aland for the firewood trade between Aland and Stockholm. The vessel became Swedish owned in 1905, and in 1939, the property of Swedish Film Industry which used her in two films. In the last, she was spectacularly blown up!

Steamship ownership made its appearance in Aland in 1927 when the Alpha company bought SS *Tabunbury*, and continued through until 1973. The chapter entitled “You Can’t Beat the Steam” was the result of a documentation project financed by the Aland Nautical Club. It is based on interviews with twelve who had served “in steam” and an unpublished memoir. An important part of Aland’s maritime history has thus been preserved.

In “Some Memories from the Ferry Epoch,” Captain Y. Hagerstrand, formerly senior master of the Swedish Slite Company, tells of his twenty-eight years’ experiences in the Sweden, Marchamn, Abo service. Unfortunately, the Slite Company’s financial difficulties ended his long career. Another essay by Captain J. Harberg provides a useful synopsis of Aland’s shipping industry from Aland’s provincial autonomy in 1922 until 1996. Harberg maintains that the activity can be divided into three separate stages, the last of which included the rise of ferry traffic. A curiosity in the latter’s beginning was the
acquisition of the British Southern Railway’s thirty-five-year-old cross-channel turbine steamer Dinard. (Your reviewer remembers a night passage in Dinard from Southampton to St. Malo in 1925. I was then nine years old.)

Finally, there is an eighteen-page summary of an academic study by K. Grundström about the career of Robert Mattson, from seaman to industrialist. It tells of Mattson’s business activities in both shipping and other enterprises from the 1870s until his death in 1935. There are also four chapters which provide information about the co-operation begun with the Hulls University, the Nautical Clubs, Museums, and Pommern foundations, as well as annual reports. Your reviewer enjoyed the entire book; its contents add not only to Åland’s history, but also to the records of seafaring activities in the Baltic area.

Dan G. Harris
Nepean, Ontario


This is the seventeenth in Howard White’s chronicles of the British Columbia coast. The series began as the result of a federal youth grant in 1972 and, by his own admission, White raised eyebrows by treating the 1950s as history “before they had acquired a sufficiently sepia-toned aura of antiquity in many people’s minds.” In this series, White and his collaborators set out to chronicle the characters and colour of the BC coast. Ironically, White himself has now become part of the phenomenon of which he writes. As well as being a onetime candidate for the NDP, White today presides over the active Harbour Publishing Company from his hole-in-the-wall office at Madeira Park, a small coastal nook well out of sight of Vancouver coffee shops.

In Raincoast Chronicles 17, White takes on an era familiar to many Northern Mariner readers — the “capricious paisley-trimmed decade of our own beginnings” — the 1970s. Hence, one chapter concerns the expenditure of an OFY (Opportunities for Youth) grant on the West Coast trail. The idea was to establish an advisory centre for hikers at one end of the trail. For the author, this job led to a series of community-oriented jobs. For middle-aged readers who remember their own youth, there is the hilarity of recognizing a familiar cast of characters (from government bureaucrats to fading hippies).

There is no theme to Number 17 although White claims this is the “medical issue” — because of Hamilton’s article about smallpox and other epidemics, White’s analysis of the illness-related decimation of the Kalpalin B and, Margaret McKirdy’s report on The People’s Home Medical Book, a sort of self-help guide for amateur doctors (‘Have a curved knife with both edges sharp and it should be placed in boiling water ... Call the patient’s attention to something on the other side of the room and while he is looking away press down hard.’) Ouch!

White’s Harbour Publishing is making an enormous contribution to our understanding of B.C. coastal life. Despite the arrival of American publishing interests and the difficulties of getting a Canadian perspective before Canadians, White continues to flourish from his humble coastal office. The Raincoast Chronicles are perfect for high school Social Studies work but also make a good read for adults. Mine are kept at my island place and have been read by cranky fishermen and Ministers of Education. They always stimulate discussion. Bravo Howard! Carry on!

Roger Boshier
Vancouver, British Columbia


This anthology celebrates twenty-five years of the publication of the quarterly journal Model Shipwright. The journal showcases the work of ship model builders, including the works of many of the leading international proponents of the art, miniaturists as well as those who work in the more common scales.

The last twenty-five years have seen a dramatic resurgence in model ship building. This may be due to more leisure time and the availabil-
ity of accurate plans, research materials, specialized tooling, building materials and equipment, including highly developed and reliable radio control equipment. While the quality of static models has advanced significantly over those years, many of what would appear to be superb static models are, in fact, operational radio controlled models, either power or sail driven. The journal, Model Shipwright, tends to chronicle the changes in model ship building over those years and has been a valuable source of information during that time period.

Since most articles are only a few pages long — few are as long as fifteen, and some consist of just three or four pages — there is rarely room for the presentation of much material of an instructional nature regarding model building. In those limited number of pages the general approach is for the author to present the history of the vessel presented, the research done prior to building, including plans and contemporary photographs, followed by an outline of the construction techniques employed, often accompanied by model photographs, a source list and bibliography, all incidentally very well produced. Despite the tight, cramped format, it is a well presented journal, very popular internationally.

In this anthology, John Bowen, who served for most of the life of the journal as its editor, has selected and reprinted twenty-six articles from the hundreds that have appeared since the journal’s inception. Because the volume celebrates a twenty-five year period, I expected Bowen to choose one article from each year, plus an additional and exceptional one. That is not the case. Some years are heavily represented; for example there are four articles from 1990, and two from each of 1977, 1981, 1983, 1988 and 1991. There are nine years not represented at all, including the first two and last two years of the publication. Clearly there were excellent choices published in the missing years, a view confirmed by a review of the journal index, as suggested by Bowen.

Still, the twenty-six articles which were reprinted here provide a good profile of the kind of material presented in the journal, albeit somewhat heavily weighted in favour of static models and miniatures. These include “Colonial Ship Yard Diorama of about 1785” by Harold Hahn; “Russian Circular Ironclad Novgorod” by Colin Gross; “Ketch-Rigged Sloop (1752) HMS Speedwell” by Dana McCalip; “Victorian Steam Launch Branksome” by D.J. Jacques; “Greek Paddle Frigate Epicheiresis” by Steve Kirby; “Whaling Brigantine Viola” by Lloyd McCaffrey; “HMS Anson” by J.J. Taylor; “Carmania Cunard Liner 1905” by John Bowen; “Xebec Mistique of 1762” by Peter Heritz-Smith; “Stern Wheeler Far West” by William Wiseman; “HMS Tartar (1734)” by Donald McNarry FRSA; “The Naval Gig” by Douglas Hamby; “HMS Diana (1794)” by Philip Reed; “Udenmaa Gamla, A Swedish Skerry Frigate (1760)” by A. Ludbrook; “HMS Belfast, A World War II cruiser at 1/50 scale” by Brian King; and the magnificent ”Confederacy, the Continental Frigate (1778)” by Justin Camarata.

This anthology not be an absolute necessity for those with a full run of the journal, but it makes an excellent primer for those considering subscribing to the journal Model Shipwright.

N.R. Cole
Toronto, Ontario


This is a work of prodigious scholarship, reflecting years of research by Christopher Andreae. Its coverage of railway history is comprehensive and individual maps are well supported by authoritative text and well-chosen photographs. Indeed, the railway sections are virtually impossible to fault, making this truly an indispensable magnum opus of Canadian railroad history. The index takes some getting used to but once mastered, is quite helpful. The quality of production of this large oblong volume is a tribute to the publisher.

In contrast, the coverage of waterways arguably lacks an overall grasp of their significance. The preface candidly explains that inclusion of waterways in this massive project was a second thought that gradually gained momentum. Lines of Country does indeed provide useful overview discussions of the evolution of marine transportation technology. In addition, the text and photographs cover an impressive breath of detail.
(Perhaps inevitably, errors can be spotted; CP Ocean Services took over the Allan Line in 1909, not 1917 as stated. [5]) However, an overall context of why and how waterways have been important in shaping Canada does not come through clearly. The author’s statement that “Canada’s 19th and 20th century railway development had much greater economic and social importance than waterways” [vi] is at least open to argument. It perhaps explains why waterways receive less authoritative coverage than does tracked transportation on land.

The two main disappointing features of the waterways section are its weak coverage of the development of the St. Lawrence Ship Channel and what can be learned from the maps. The Ship Channel linking Quebec City with Montreal (as distinct from the Seaway) was a major project that absorbed large resources, particularly between 1850 and 1914. It directly contributed to Montreal gaining such preeminence and then retaining for decades its role as Canada’s commercial metropolis. In fact, efforts to improve the channel are ongoing today. Probably the Seaway would not have been built without this deep water channel linking Montreal with the ocean.

The second major disappointment in the coverage of waterways is the maps. These show geographical locations but not much more. Their value might have been greatly enhanced if, for example, traffic flows in the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence system and how they have changed over the years had been illustrated. Cartographic analyses of traffic flows over the years in the Atlantic region and the West Coast would also have been instructive and valuable. Similarly, principal harbours are discussed in the text but there are no cartographic representations of relative traffic volumes and what types of cargoes have been handled. These reservations are not meant to obscure the fact that careful study of this reference resource will provide many insights into the role of waterways in Canada’s development. However, the reader should look elsewhere for authoritative overall coverage.

In summary, this is a magnificent and well-illustrated railway history that includes useful information on waterways.

Jan Drent
Victoria, B.C.

Ken Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, B.C.


This paperback edition of Hugh G.J. Aitken’s classic study of the Welland Canal Company is to be commended if only because the book has been out of print for so long. Since its original publication in 1954 this slim volume has been considered the definitive study of the canal’s early years.

The Welland Canal Company is of historiographical importance because it was one of the first post-war studies to break away from the Innis version of the staples theory. Aitken’s work is an example of “entrepreneurial history.” This approach to business history was embraced by Arthur Cole and his associates at the Harvard Business School’s Research Center in Entrepreneurial History during the 1940s and ’50s. Aitken defines an entrepreneur as a person who is “responsible for the inauguration, maintenance, and direction of a profit-oriented enterprise.” [111] An historian today would more likely describe William Hamilton Merritt as a promoter rather than an entrepreneur. Certainly in the early part of his career he was not a successful businessman. As a generator of profits the Welland Canal Company was a dismal failure. But as a transportation link in an age of economic imperialism it was a necessity. The question as to whether the canal’s construction was premature given the state of the Upper Canadian economy would be a difficult econometric problem. However to compare Merritt to such men as Francis Clergue would be a mistake because premature or not the Welland Canal became an important part of the colony’s economic infrastructure.

This volume remains a classic of Canadian business history. Perhaps all that is lacking in this new edition is a stronger introduction. While a "Note on Sources" mentions that material not available to the author in the form of three canal company minutebooks and several letterbooks is now held by the National Archives of Canada,
these documents have not been analyzed except to outline the factual data that Aitken missed. A further discussion of this documentation would have been useful. Equally helpful would have been an appraisal relating Aitken's work to the recent historiography of the Upper Canadian economy.

M. Stephen Salmon
Orleans, Ontario


This is an account of the abortive attempt to galvanize French bankers to finance the completion of a network of canals. In the seventeenth century the French had taken the lead in canal engineering and construction, overseen by the state, financed by a combination of sponsored private and state money, and privately-owned. The Briare and Midi canals were the glory of the Western world. Little progress ensued in the next century and the Revolution and Empire were disastrous. Napoleon talked canals — and spent French money on war. The professionalization of state engineers, trained in the École Polytechnique and the École des Ponts et Chaussées, was perfected, but their classical and mathematical training caused them to despise profit.

In the early years of the Restoration a “canal mania” built up among engineers and politicians, convinced that Britain’s rapid economic progress was due in part to her privately-financed canals. In 1817 Becquey, civil servant and moderate Royalist, was put in charge of the Grand Council of the engineers with the job of planning a canal network and organizing its financing by private companies or “associations.” Although these were years of intense investment and speculation, Becquey’s plan attracted only very lukewarm support from bankers such as Rothschild and Laffitte. Becquey’s plan was debated in the Chamber of Deputies where members shared his enthusiasm both for canals and for private financing, but few were convinced of his business acumen, indeed Becquey himself urged people to invest more as a matter of national pride than guaranteed percentage return.

Why such scepticism? Past experience suggested that the cost and time-scale for construction would vastly exceed the engineers’ plans — and both did so. Becquey’s canals took twice as long to build as he had suggested. In the end the project was launched by the state borrowing from private companies who were sweetened, not only by a tempting rate of return on the loan, but also by the promise of a share in the profits, even after the loan had been repaid. Ultimately the state had to buy them out.

Geiger lucidly explains the contrast between Britain and France, carefully walking the tightrope of avoiding a refutation of current wisdom that France was not intrinsically “backward” (which many contemporaries believed). In Britain canals were a response to economic growth; Becquey hoped that they would create growth. However France had no national market, her economy was less developed, her population more scattered and her surface area three times as large. Geology was unfavourable. In Britain navigable waterways were achieved at modest opportunity-cost; water supply and gradient were favourable in industrial areas. French waterways faced erratic water supply and awkward gradients. Improvements to rivers and the building of canals was bound to be expensive — not because engineers had grandiose dreams, but because ambitious schemes were needed to combat the terrain. Canal traffic attracted tolls, road transport was free. Geiger convincingly shows that canals were only an economic proposition in very limited areas where geography and existing economic growth were propitious to an inevitably slow method of transport. The author is particularly keen to demonstrate that Becquey’s failure did not indicate that the French were obsessed with a belief in centralised state control. Economic liberalism was shared by most notables in the 1820s.

This is a study of failure, but itself is a very successful and thoroughly well-informed examination of how civil servants, politicians and businessmen tried to work together. Geiger’s account of why they failed has resonance for France today, almost as much as the 1820s. Experts in navigable waterways as well as those working on nineteenth century history will gain
This book offers a cogent political-economic account of the recent history of India’s shipping industry. The account is grounded firmly in an international context marked by persistent asymmetries of regimes and institutions and by enduring oligopolistic practices in the global shipping industry. This context also lends particular resonance to the author’s evaluation of domestic policy debates and conflicts within India about the shipping industry, and his argument for a more active role for the state in promoting it.

Since the book is both about regime and response, it is appropriate that the paradox of India’s “sophisticated elites” playing the key role among developing nations in efforts towards a reformed maritime transport regime while being much less successful in promoting the country’s shipping industry configures the author’s agenda: India’s share of world tonnage increased from 0.39 to 1.44 percent between 1948 and 1993. (According to another estimate in the book, the latter proportion might have been as high as 1.7:) Neither proportion befits a country of India’s size, potential, coastline, and maritime tradition.

The growth of the Indian shipping industry compares unfavourably with late developers such as Korea, Taiwan, and China, not to mention the FOC countries. State policy has played a major role in the promotion of shipping everywhere, and the book is naturally concerned to explore the relationship between the state and the shipping industry in India. But it is worth reflecting that Indian shipping grew faster than in the rest of the world until about the mid-1980s. During the same decades, India’s share of world trade has perhaps been arrested.

These variables are doubtless subject to so many diverse influences that one cannot generalize from them. Yet the broadly contrasting performance of Indian shipping and trade, relative to the rest of the world, during the years covered by Nayar lends particular significance to the domestic conflict — between shippers and shipowners — which he underlines as being a major determinant of shipping policy in India. In the self-reliant world of introverted, import-substituting industrialization, building a strong, domestic merchant shipping industry was an obvious object of public policy. Now, with the Indian economy looking outwards, the colour of the flag no longer seems to matter. While this may not be true for all times and all countries — one has only to follow the author’s gaze eastwards from India to recognize this — resource constraints will probably mean that investments in shipping will yield precedence in India to those in trade-related infrastructure for the foreseeable future:

This book, which is organized in eight chapters, will be of wide interest. The first two chapters summarize an extensive political-economic and historical literature bearing on power, markets and institutions, and the Indian shipping industry. Though the author’s use of some of these materials is motivated by his main arguments and is therefore rather uncritical, after sounding the cautionary note, I am inclined, in this instance, to welcome the sharper focus. The three chapters which follow present a largely chronological, policy-oriented account of the growth of the Indian shipping industry. Chapter 6 discusses the retreat of the Indian state from the shipping industry at a time of crisis and structural change in the latter, and the next two chapters, while welcoming the broad liberalizing thrust of public policies in the last decade, essentially makes a post-neoliberal plea for “restructuring” the relationship between the state and the market in India: But in an industry characterized by market imperfections at several levels, it will take a brave civil servant — and the Indian bureaucracy has never been honoured for bravery — to make the case for one set of offsetting, state support or subsidies, rather than another.

G. Balachandran
Delhi, India

Thanks to Heinz Haaker, an engineer willing to invest his time in historical studies, the story of "Henry Koch," a shipyard in Lübeck, has now been documented. From 1882 until 1934, 287 ships were constructed there. For a while, the shipyard, which specialized in iron- and steel ship construction, was the only shipyard and large industrial complex in the old Hanseatic city at the Trave. Today, only memories are left; nothing remains to recall the days of the shipyard or even of its founder, Henry Koch, who emerges in Haaker's book as a real pioneer.

The biography of Heinrich (Henry) Koch, which forms the first part of this book, is in itself an adventure story: Born in 1832 in Wischhafen/Elbe, Koch moved to Australia in 1851 as a sailor. There, captivated by the gold rush, he secured Australian citizenship and changed his Christian name into Henry. He purchased claims at Long Gully and installed seventy-six crushing devices. At age forty, he returned to Germany a wealthy family-man. In Lübeck in 1877 — by no means the most promising place for ship building in Germany — he founded the Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft Pioneer. He bought up the shipyard "Meyer" and in 1882 discontinued building ships of wood and instead launched into the new business of building ships of iron. He named this firm after himself. This shipyard specialized in iron freighters of 1,000 to 3,600 BRT. Koch was one of the co-founders of the association "Deutscher Schiffswerften e.V." in 1884. After his death in 1892, his sons took over and by the turn of the century had brought the company to new heights. In 1908 the company was transformed into a joint stock company: The reason for this, however, is unknown: New designs and constructions were now introduced, but the company would never recover from the effects of World War I: Instead, during the Weimar era, it went through a long destructive process. Hacker cannot clarify whether, towards the end, the competition of the newly founded shipyards “Flender” or the "Lübecker Maschinenbau-Gesellschaft," which received preferential treatment from the city of Lubeck, or whether such things as outdated techniques, errors at Koch or management were the main reasons for the collapse: The last ship to be built left the yard in 1930, after which the shipyard was deserted.

The second part of the book consists of a complete list of ships constructed at Henry Koch, including a detailed biography of all ships constructed there.

Haaker bases his study on impressive secondary and archival research. Though he cannot clarify everything which contributed to the collapse of the shipyard after the economic disaster of the 1920s, nevertheless this easy-to-read and nicely illustrated case history is a milestone in the industrial and shipbuilding history of Lubeck. It could be applied to an overall study of ship-construction development within the German Empire. Certainly, researchers should seek correlations in the history of industrialization in Hamburg and Bremen, the other two Hanseatic cities, as well as later industrial developments.

Hartmut Roder
Bremen, Germany


*Merchant Princes* is an interesting story, well researched and well told: This group was a microcosm of the Western Australian commercial world in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its history is a welcome addition to the relatively small genre of books concerned with pioneering business elites in Australia.

The first three chapters focus on the establishment of the merchant group and its struggles to secure an improved and appropriately equipped port for Fremantle. The goldfields of Kalgoorlie/ Coolgardie provided the final impetus in the late 1890s, both for the betterment of the port and for its preeminent competitive position as the overseas steamer port-of-call, in the contest with Albany. While many members of the group corn-
menced in wholesaling and retailing, they quickly formed links with shipping interests and agencies and from there diversified in different directions, including pearling, whaling, pastoral and mining activities, together with various forms of real estate in Fremantle: Some were also agents for overseas firms and this expanded and increased the intensity of the business network. Intermarriage within the group began in the 1880s, which helped consolidate business and investment interests.

Chapter Four is devoted to labour relations, which were dominated by British “Masters and Servants” Acts because these laws were in force in Western Australia until the arbitration act of the first federal government in 1901: The legislation was used extensively to break up strikes or potential ones, to thwart demands for wages and conditions and to manipulate the apprenticeship system: All unions found it difficult to operate in an economic environment controlled by the merchant elite. The first claims for wages and conditions were not made until 1889 and no industrial disputes occurred until the 1890s: The shipowners rejected moves for machinery and equipment on wharves until 1899 and so wharf work remained hard, casual and low paid. A branch of the Australian Steamship Owners’ Federation (1893) was formed in 1896 and was subsequently important in the lumpers’ industrial dispute in 1899. However, the resolution of that strike did significantly erode the shipowners’ powers and gave union members the right to secure employment. There was also industrial militancy in other sections of the workforce during the 1890s and the old, patriarchal mode of industrial relations was being increasingly challenged. The chapter concludes with details about the female labour conditions in the domestic work place and in the pearling and pastoral industries.

The remaining chapters concentrate on analysing the elite in detail. Chapter Five sketches in the political networks because the group provided a number of politicians, company directors, and, in addition, constituted much of the pro-Federation pressure in Fremantle: This is therefore a useful introduction to Chapter Six, “Power, Status and Paternalism,” which depicts the cultural aspects of the group and shows how it reinforced its power via the private school ethos and the way in which the law and religion were practised. Its influence also pervaded the Masonic Lodge and the Anglican and Congregational churches. In practice the group also focused on working-class betterment via Sunday Schools, temperance societies, charitable works, benefit and building societies, sporting and recreational clubs, music and drama societies and Mechanics’ and Literary Institutes; the establishment of the Fremantle sailors’ home, fire brigade and hospital were also assisted by their efforts. Evangelism and the avoidance of poverty were important underlying aims and motives for the elite’s energies.

The final chapter is devoted to the merchant princes at home and includes Brown’s criteria for distinguishing the institutional family — a large number of children, close family ties, the transmission of values between the generations and the acceptance of family control over education and behaviour. Although the merchant group came from the lower socio-economic levels in the United Kingdom, it was firmly bourgeois in Fremantle with all the attendant aspirations and conspicuous consumption. Many of the British social conventions gradually receded and the new society was less hierarchical. Changes were more noticeable with the second generation who married later, sometimes by intermarriage within the group, sometimes by “marrying down,” and had fewer servants: However, all citizens of Fremantle were equally vulnerable to the diseases which struck their port and even the elite had its share of drug and alcohol addiction and the accompanying suicide. None of the elite lived to their 80s and only a few reached their 70s, but the women went on into their 80s and 90s.

The author has succeeded in melding a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. She charts and explains the rise and decline of a colonial elite with a minimum of social theory and a maximum of readable, lucid prose. The book is not a conventional economic or business history although strands from each are either implicit or explicit in most chapters. Never far from the discussion are the various maritime aspects. They provide the warp and weft of the work, and it is that which distinguishes the book from other accounts of pioneering commercial elites in Australian colonial history:

G.R. Henning
Armidale, New South Wales
Philip Dawson's illustrated history of the P&O cruise liner *Canberra* may have been a bit presumptuous and therefore incomplete. As her draught currently prevents her from getting near enough to the cutting torches of a Pakistani breaker's yard to enable her scrapping, reports continue to circulate that Premier Cruises is eyeing her as a running mate for their new acquisition the *Rotterdam*, and a British leisure group has expressed interest in her as a floating hotel in Durban, South Africa. Therefore, until we know further what the future holds for "the ship of the future," this should be viewed as *Canberra*'s history in the livery of P&O.

As with his previous efforts, Dawson does a very credible job in recounting the life of the *Canberra* from the cradle to a possible grave. He effectively conveys the important place she holds in the evolution of ship design, both externally and internally. The story is humanized through the personalized recollection of both crew and passengers, not to mention shipbuilders. There is a wealth of anecdotes about luminaries who have sailed with her, as well as those not so luminous (for which P&O would surely have wished that the pleasure of their company had been indefinitely postponed). Considerable space is given over to *Canberra*'s role in the Falklands' war. Through it all, there is a diverse selection of illustrations and photos — largely black and white — to accompany the text:

Other highlights include a comical piece by *Punch* magazine's J.B. Boothroyd on his tour of the *Canberra* upon her completion and an article by P&O's Sir Hugh Casson for *The Architectural Review* of June 1969 entitled "A Ship is an Island." Casson set the right tone for the book and its subject when he wrote in part:

"Inhabited yet mysteriously unexplored, self-centred, secretive, wonderful, unique. Silhouetted against a horizon or towering white-topped above a quayside, ablaze with lights or gay with flags, it seems cut off in time as well as space .... Arrivals and departures are movements of effortless separation and rejoining .... The strip of water widens or narrows, a hawser splashes, a tiny figure signals from aloft and it is done: A lifetime has been cut, the real world drops away as suddenly as a garment:"

Against accounts such as these it is delightfully easy to let one's mind drift into a languid, carefree state, where the only decisions to be made concern dressing for dinner and putting a foursome together for bridge as the world glides by on the starboard side:

While this book is a must for every *Canberra* aficionado, it is not the book it should have been. Dawson did a far better job in detailing *Canberra*'s revolutionary ship design in his earlier work, *British Superliners of the Sixties*. While he discusses many vessels which influenced *Canberra*'s engines aft design, they are not illustrated as they were in his earlier work: The Bibby-like effect achieved with the court cabins is also more effectively conveyed in *Superliners*, where he provides, through the use of isometric plans and specific photos, a clearer understanding how natural light was brought into the inside cabins. Also, many of the public rooms which Dawson describes in detail are not illustrated, and the convertible cabin option, if mentioned, was done so only in passing.

The latter part of the book is given over to P&O's efforts to incorporate and duplicate as many of the distinct features of the *Canberra* as possible into her replacement, the new *Oriana*. It would not have been remiss to have included photo comparisons showing how successful the naval architects and interior designers were in accomplishing their goals. This was not done: Surprisingly, the book also lacks an index:

While Dawson's text conveys the right feeling for his subject, his selection of photos and illustrations in large do not: For a vessel which spent the majority of its career following the sun in an era when colour photography became the norm, I found the preponderance of murky black and white photos to be disconcerting. Many — particularly the interior shots — should have been replaced, where possible, with colour. It is clear from the text that the ship designers strove for a
ship which featured clean lines, uncluttered furnishings, vividly coloured fabrics, bright walls and ingenious illumination, but you would never know it from looking at this book. As well, Dawson's goal would have been better served if he had made greater use of pre-maiden voyage illustrations, such as the lido deck pictured on page 153 to provide a lighter, more uplifting feel: The poster which precedes the title page, depicting several dolphins leading the gleaming white hull of the Canberra across a placid, pastel-blue ocean backlit by a brilliant horizon, provides just the effect that Dawson should have tried to achieve throughout. This, along with the deficiencies mentioned earlier, marks the difference between a good book and a great one.

John Davies
New Westminster, British Columbia


RMS Titanic now lies submerged as much in ink as in seawater: Meanwhile, as each “new” study of the ill-starred liner eases down the editorial slips, two things almost invariably happen: First, the formal pieties of this modern morality tale are observed as we are ritually notified that pride went before the fall. This done, a claim to plumb hitherto murky depths or to throw light from a new angle is registered: Both books reviewed here run true to form. One, however, founders while the other glides more or less smoothly on.

Where the pieties are concerned, both dwell initially on the all but compulsory theme of hubris shattered by untameable Nature: There has always been some truth in this. Even so, it is surprising how seldom this oversimplified notion is questioned. Technological confidence, after all, was only part of a much more complex Edwardian mentality. As Barbara Tuchman, Robert Wohl and dozens of others have long shown, the age was well acquainted with anxiety. More specifically, Nietzsche, Freud, Croce and others had, at least for some, put a serious dent in straightforward scientific rationalism in the 1890s: One wonders, moreover, how many aboard Titanic shared W.T. Stead’s “Spiritualism” and his misgivings about modernity in its many guises. These new books, however, like so many of their genre, tend to state, rather than critically assess, the hubris theme. But how do they fare at the level of claims to new insights?

Dave Bryceson’s goal is to put primary sources, in this case newspaper clippings, directly into the hands of readers. He reasons that the best way to recapture the mood of the moment would be to watch the story unfold as contemporaries did, slowly and at times confusingly in the daily press. At first blush, this is a laudable ambition: It is unfortunate, therefore, that Bryceson does not fulfil it. His chief difficulties lie in the selection and presentation of evidence. Thus, in a book aimed at a general audience, too little thought is given to orienting readers towards the nature of the sources they encounter here. There is no brief introduction to the crowded world of British journalism: There is no discussion of how news was gathered, or of the kaleidoscopic range of papers available, let alone of the considerable differences between journalistic conventions then and now: Striving for immediacy, Bryceson sacrifices contextual and source analysis: But, then, what does this matter? This is a single-source book! There are, to be sure, very occasional snippets from the Times and a couple of other papers. Overwhelmingly, however, what Bryceson offers is a largely unannotated reprint of coverage by the Daily Sketch, a London halfpenny pictorial. This immediately raises issues of corroboration and representativeness: The casual reader is given no yardstick by which to gauge how typical a particular reaction or editorial slant might have been: One questions, in the end, the amount of genuine research lavished on this tome. Sources, after all, are scarcely a problem, given the magnificent national newspaper archives at Hendon. All things considered, Bryceson delivers a good deal less than the survey of the “British
National Press’ promised in his subtitle.

Titanic Voices, on the other hand, generally succeeds in its claim to clarify one aspect of the story: the impact of the disaster on the liner’s home port, Southampton: Tightly focused and carefully researched, this study rests on a solid and varied evidentiary base: Drawing on the riches of the Southampton Maritime Museum and the field work of the latter’s Oral History Unit, the authors also consult a broad range of newspapers and secondary sources: Meanwhile, the volume is laden with beautifully reproduced photographs, each neatly captioned: The result is a work which places the tragedy within the long-term history of the Hampshire town and its people. When this is done, some interesting things are brought to light. Thus, grand as she was, the new White Star vessel created less public stir than her sister Olympic had months earlier. Neither, in any case, generated the excitement that Adriatic had when, in 1907, she became the first major liner to call a job-starved Southampton home. Indeed, it was the promise of work, much more than the size or appointments of the ships per se, that captured the imagination of Sotonians: Given high unemployment in the area, competition for jobs on the liners was fierce, and was not a whit affected by Titanic’s loss. Indeed, the port continued to grow in importance until the advent of trans-Atlantic jet service, and several survivors among Titanic’s crew worked Cunard vessels well into the 1950s. All along, of course, the steamers grew larger and larger so that the “Queen’s” would have dwarfed Titanic, had she survived. In other words, the disaster had no long-term impact on the general shape of Southampton’s economy or on the rapid shift to seagoing leviathans plying the North Atlantic route: True, important safety lessons were learned and applied, but faith in and enthusiasm for technology survived April 1912. It is surprising, therefore, that the authors of this book fall back on the unqualified hubris theme, at least earlier in the book.

At the heart of the volume, of course, lie the ‘voices’ of those who witnessed the construction, provisioning and last hours of Titanic: Much of the oral and written evidence is now familiar fare, but a good deal is unique to this book. Strongest of all are the voices of the crew, so many of whom were Sotonians. It is at this level that the personal loss and psychological damage of the disaster is driven home. Southampton itself may have lived to prosper, but the emotional and economic effect on individual families registered like a thunderclap along street after street of this particularly devastated town. By documenting this in detailed and harrowing fashion, this book carves out a special place amid Titanic lore:

Even so, some points might be questioned: Were there, for example, only a thousand bottles of wine taken on board for the crossing? [54] More significantly, the authors’ assertion that administrators of the relief fund paternalistically “extended their remit to [judge] acceptable and non-acceptable social behaviour” in claimants seems strained at times: [256] Between 1913 and 1918 they cite excerpts from sixteen cases, of which only three could be reasonably described as commenting on the mode of life of beneficiaries: One of these was suspended for three months because of habitual drunkenness. Another was a widow struck off the rolls because she had not been supported by her late husband for some two years prior to 1912. There may be evidence to support the authors on this issue, but that which is presented here is slim and ambiguous. Still, to balk at this is to complain about a minor detail in a book otherwise eminently readable, lovingly produced and in all ways a better look at the Titanic disaster than that offered by Bryceson.

James G. Greenlee
Corner Brook, Newfoundland

David Barron. Northern Shipwrecks Database. Bedford, NS: Northern Maritime Research, 1997 [P.O: Box 48047, Bedford, Nova Scotia, Canada B4A 3Z2]: CD-ROM. Minimum requirements: 386 PC with 2 Mb RAM, CD-ROM drive and monochrome monitor with DOS 3.2, Windows 3.x or Windows 95; MAC computers using a DOS card or the Soft Windows program. $95, personal use copy; $500 for institutional or business use.

Perhaps it is inevitable that book reviews should now regularly encompass CD-ROMs: The Northern Shipwrecks Database falls into this category. A private venture by the amateur marine archaeologist, author and publisher David Barron, who has written a number of self-published works, including Atlantic Diver Guide: Volume I, New-
foundland and St: Pierre, this database of more than 65,000 ships electronically incorporates his earlier compiled shipwreck lists with other sources to provide a mass of information on North American shipwrecks north of the fortieth parallel latitude. While his data on individual wrecks is not always complete because of source limitations, nevertheless a surprising amount does exist and is included here. This impressive collection, the only one of its kind of this magnitude to my knowledge, is a boon to anyone interested in the history of shipwrecks:

The data are organized as follows: Upon entering the program, the user is requested to select an area of North America: wrecks of the eastern region (e.g., the Atlantic), the central region (e.g., the Great Lakes), and the western region (e.g., the Pacific). Next, the researcher selects the nature of the record. Under Menu #1, the data are organized by date of loss, name of vessel, region of loss, area of loss, more detailed area, and latitude and longitude. This, for example, allows one to study a list of all shipwrecks occurring in 1830, or to go directly to a specific shipwreck. Determining precisely where vessels were lost may require some searching around; again, the data are only as good as the source material. Thus, when requesting information on Cape Ray, a well-known site for shipwrecks, surprisingly nothing came up. This second edition of the CD-ROM, however, like the first edition, will be upgraded as outside researchers contribute their additional findings to Barron. A regular mail and e-mail address are provided for that purpose:

Often, the amount of information supplied for individual wrecks is substantial, certainly for later periods: For example, I was interested in the wreck of the Harpooner, stranded in gale and fog on 10 November 1816, on the Newfoundland coast at St. Shotts, of the Cape Pine area and in the Cape Race region. After looking up the name, the format is tabular, providing the official wreck number, the name, the date, the cause, the type of ship, its registration, its port of origin and destination, its cargo, size of vessel, the owner’s and captain’s name, where it was built, and so on.

It is also possible to check wrecks under Recall Menu #2 by port of registry, place built, builder, owner, captain or master. A third menu provides not only indispensable information for contacting museums and other institutions, such as addresses, telephone and fax numbers, but all the references by which Barron built his lists as well. These are very useful for additional research, and consist of a list of nearly four hundred sources, many of which are secondary publications though some are primary sources, such as newspapers and Lloyd’s Register. The references are indiscriminate in the sense that they include both popular and scholarly sources. Some lead one to existing collections, like the US Coast Guard database: Yet it is also clear that some sources are not mentioned, such as Marine Court and Admiralty records, suggesting that more systematic research still needs to be done.

The software is generally easy to use, though not always perfect. In scrolling down the reference list and then examining a specific reference in detail, I found myself returned to the beginning of the menu rather than continuing where I left off on the list. This is a minor annoyance that could easily be modified. More problematic, probably for copyright reasons, Barron has restricted the use of this data to “Read Only.” This means that extracting information for cross-reference and statistical purposes is a cumbersome process.

In short, Barron’s database is a considerable accomplishment and valuable to student and scholar alike. Only five hundred copies are available, and the price is not cheap: In times of fiscal restraint, smaller institutions like my own would balk at purchasing one. However, for those interested in maritime history and who can afford it, I suggest that the money would be well spent.

Rainer Baehre
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


The Raad voor de Scheepvaart (Marine Court of Inquiry) was established in The Netherlands in 1909. It is an independent institute. When a shipping accident has occurred, the court decides whether or not to hold an inquiry, based on the results of the preceding investigations by the Scheepvaartinspectie (Shipping Inspectorate) or
the Rijkspolitie-te-water (River & Harbour Police): The purpose of the court’s inquiry is to establish whether a person is to blame for the accident and to see if any lessons may be derived from it: The court will reach a verdict after hearing all parties concerned and after having studied the relevant reports, documents, etc.. The court is entitled to take disciplinary action against a captain or any other ship’s officer who has been found guilty. All findings of the court are published in the Staatsblad, which is the gazette of the central government:

The core of the court consists of a chairman (a member of the judicature) and two members, a former master mariner and a former naval officer: Depending on the case in hand and the expertise required, the chairman may complete the court by choosing from some forty potential court-members, all of them having expertise knowledge of shipbuilding or ship-owning, navigation, the fishing industry, the merchant navy, and so on.

Met man en muis begins with some introductory remarks, followed by a selection of nine cases from the 3,300 that were brought before the court during the period 1909-1940: Minor complaints against ship’s captains form a relatively large part of these cases — too much liquor, frivolous women and unwise ship’s officers, amateurish navigation leading to a stranding, shelling by a German U-boat and horribly bad weather, to name but a few of the factors which played a role in these cases: Unfortunately, too often the author engages more in narration than in analysis of the cases and the court’s judgement about them:

The World War II period is left out without explanation. The third part of the book therefore concerns the years 1946-1997. Ten accidents pass in review, including the sinking of the passenger M.V. Klipfontein near Maputo (East Africa) in 1953, caused by false data in the hydrographic charts, the sinking of the cruiseship Prinsendam following an engine-room fire (Alaska, 1980), and the near-disaster of the passenger ship Prins der Nederlanden as a result of too close a passage along the coast of the Azores island Flores (1966). Here, too, the character of the book is marred by its descriptive rather than analytical character. There is a series of nice illustrations.

Leo M. Akveld
Rotterdam, The Netherlands


As the dean of St. John’s broadcasters, Paul Moth recently observed that it may be time to put Cabot behind us. Before we do, we might well take a look at Cuthbertson’s colourful booklet — probably the last of the brief, commemorative, illustrated volumes that will reach the bookstalls during this anniversary: This Nova Scotia historian sets out to place John Cabot and his adventures within the context of the late medieval commercial world of the Mediterranean and Bristol and to make this comprehensible and attractive to those with a casual interest in the past. He is also concerned to defend the case for a Cape Breton landfall, or at least to make sure it is heard, amidst the brouhaha at Bonavista and the murmur from scholars favouring the Strait of Belle Isle. This Cabot is copiously illustrated with period maps, paintings and colour photographs — all intended, surely, to catch the eye of the souvenir hunter.

Cuthbertson’s slim volume stands up well on the crowded shelf of Cabot quincentenary memorabilia. If the universe unfolds as it should, remaining copies of Bernard Fardy’s egregious John Cabot will soon be called for pulping. Ian Wilson’s colourful study, John Cabot and the Matthew, will continue to appeal to those who would like to believe that Bristol’s mariner discovered the United States, but is otherwise of interest largely for the pictures. The present volume is only half the size of Peter Firstbrook’s celebration of The Voyage of the Matthew and cannot match that memorial volume as a coffee-table presence. Yet Cuthbertson also brings the late-medieval maritime world alive in words and pictures. He manages to stay closer to the facts and, in this respect, his book can fairly be compared to Alan Williams’ scholarly booklet, John Cabot and Newfoundland, written for the Newfoundland Historical Society.

Although there is plenty of eye-candy here, this Nova Scotian Cabot is not entirely successful as a picture book: Images of Genoa, Venice and Bristol are welcome and striking, as are photographs of Colin Mudie’s Matthew, but must we
have two hackneyed paintings of Cabot’s departure? Or Prince Philip twice, let alone once? Some images are hazy and a view of Lisbon is almost totally obscure. The layout is erratic: white space has been squandered, so that the reader too often wonders what is caption and what is text: This is unfortunate, as many of the images here are fresh:

The text is of more consistent quality: Cuthbertson offers an interesting perspective on the cartography of the period and on the travel literature with which the Venetian mariner might have been familiar. The late medieval Europe sketched here is convincing and the author has a sure grasp of Cabotian texts and Atlantic geography. He is weakest on Newfoundland: the early European fishery began inshore and not on the Grand Banks [33]; black spruce grows far north of Cape Bauld [46]; there is no real evidence that Corte Real’s captives of 1501 were Beothuks [50]; and Bishop Howley cannot be called an “avid defender” of a Bonavista landfall. [61] Yet, within the context of a colourful essay designed to make a good case that Cabot reached Cape Breton in 1497, these are hardly important matters.

The volume was sponsored in part by the John Cabot Meeting Society, an organization dedicated to the commemoration of Cabot’s voyages as the beginning of North American/European relations. Given this provenance, it is curious that Cuthbertson pays little attention to First Nations. Like most of us, this time around, he prefers to dwell on the voyage of the Matthew.

Peter Pope
St. John’s, Newfoundland


Of the books published as part of the quincentenary of Cabot’s voyage in the Matthew, Peter Pope’s The Many Landfalls of John Cabot stands out as the most original and significant contribution to Cabotian literature. Pope goes well beyond the endless discussion of Cabot’s landfall to treat the question in historiographical context. He persuasively argues that over the centuries varying national traditions and competing nationalisms have shaped the landfall issue. Pope calls for a reconsideration of the very idea of discovery.

In his first four chapters, Pope reviews what we know about John Cabot and his 1497 voyage, the role John’s son, Sebastian, played in engendering centuries-long confusion, and the likely landfalls from Labrador to southwestern Nova Scotia. This review, however, is shaped by Pope’s belief that Cabot reached the North American mainland via Greenland, a revival of Newfoundland’s Bishop Michael Howley’s theory published in 1891: Howley, of course, had Cabot fetching up at Bonavista, whereas Pope favours Labrador/Strait of Belle Isle. Pope’s argument rests upon the wind directions given in the John Day letter (the most important Cabot document found this century), and his belief that English seamen knew of the traditional Norse trading route to Greenland.

Whether the result of his northern emphasis or not, Pope almost entirely omits any discussions of Cabot’s Venetian years, for which we have at least some reasonably reliable evidence. It was likely as a merchant/seaman in the eastern spice trade that Cabot travelled to Alexandria, and perhaps to Mecca as well, in search of information on the origins of the spices so avidly sought by Europeans. While in Venice, Cabot most likely learned celestial navigation and how to draw maps and make globes. Instead, Pope suggests that Cabot learned his seamanship while serving with the Portuguese, but for which he gives us no evidence: Nor does Pope discuss Cabot’s cosmography and how it differed from that of Columbus.

Pope’s initial chapters serve as an introduction to his thesis for the need to reconsider the meaning of Cabot’s 1497 voyage and its consequences. His starting point is Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of the ‘invention of tradition’ which Pope applies to the landfall debate at the time of the four hundredth anniversary Cabot celebrations. What he finds is that Canadian and Newfoundland historians practised a nationalistic selectivity of evidence, which allowed them to invent competing traditions on Cabot’s landfall. For such English Canadian nationalists as Samuel Dawson (at the time the Queen’s Printer for Canada), it
was necessary for Cabot to have landed on mainland Canada: As Columbus had not sighted mainland until his third voyage of 1898, in the words of the Reverend Moses Harvey (a St. John’s Presbyterian minister), Cabot merited the honour of the “man who first opened Northern America to European civilization.” [91] For English Canadian nationalists, Cabot also served to uphold English discovery in competition with French Canada’s veneration for Jacques Cartier:

In the case of Newfoundland, the notion of a mainland landfall was, of course, an anathema for those dauntless defenders of Bonavista, Bishop Michael Howley and Judge Daniel Prowse: On the Canadian side, Dawson just as vehemently upheld Cape Breton.

Within Newfoundland, a competition developed between Judge Daniel Prowse’s British North American nationalism and Bishop Michael Howley’s appeals to specific Newfoundland sentiment: Virtually single-handedly, Prowse saw through the construction of Cabot Tower on Signal Hill overlooking St. John’s and which Pope suggests best represents the triumph of Prowse’s version of Newfoundland nationalism.

Certainly, Prowse’s Cabot Tower outdid the Canadian nationalists, who could do no better than a plaque unveiling at Province House in Halifax. Out of these fierce nineteenth-century debates, whose origins lay in competing nationalisms, arose what Pope calls the invented traditions for the Bonavista and Cape Breton landfalls.

In penetrating further into Cabot mythology, Pope examines the changing meaning of discovery as a political act. Discovery of new lands in Cabot’s day meant to reconnoitre them or to make them manifest to Europeans: They assumed these lands to be inhabited. Cabot and Columbus hoped to reach Asia where they would find the great cities and wealth of which Marco Polo had so vividly written. Only later did the act of discovery come to mean land first seen and be associated with taking possession. Pope’s exploration of this change in meaning and consequences for Native societies of “Atlantic Asymmetry” form for this reader the most interesting sections of the book.

It was this asymmetry that made European conquest possible: In his conclusion, Pope chastises the attempt during the 1997 celebrations to remove the Discovery-word. He reminds us that we should not in the name of political correctness and invented traditions forget that European discovery has not meant possession of an uninhabited continent, but a conquest with dreadful consequences for Native societies.

Brian Cuthbertson
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Scholars have long thought that China had little in the way of a maritime tradition. The various dynasties are depicted as ruling over quintessential land-based tributary empires. The voyages of Zheng He in the early fifteenth century have been much discussed, and modern studies have delineated large-scale movements of Chinese to southeast Asia: Much of the rest of China’s four thousand years of maritime activity is little known. One of Dr. Deng’s aims is to rectify this misperception and show that in fact the Middle Kingdom had a very long and illustrious history of seafaring.

To support this claim his book covers a variety of areas, in all cases taking a very long view indeed: After an introductory chapter to set the historical and geographic scene, the author gives a detailed account of Chinese maritime technology. After early advances, he finds that from the late thirteenth century there was little innovation in nautical technology: The famous great ships of Zheng He were based on centuries-old designs, while China contributed very little other than the compass to the world’s knowledge of navigational techniques. The author then turns to the matter of the supply of ships, that is, how many there were, and delineates the various types of maritime commerce in which the Chinese engaged. He stresses that sea trade provided very good livings for the approximately two percent of the population who engaged in this activity. Chapter Five discusses markets and trade patterns, and explains in detail why China in the nineteenth century fell behind, becoming, in a pattern very familiar for Asia at this time, a mere exporter of raw materials: The final chapter
covers urbanisation, migration and the dissemination of technology.

The second theme of this book is to explain why China failed to keep pace with the West. The hoary chestnut of "Confucian values" as an obstacle to growth is briskly dismissed. Rather, using path dependency theory, he mostly follows Mark Elvin's influential notion of an "equilibrium trap," that is, that China reached a certain level and then no longer had any particular need to innovate: After about the thirteenth century, in both the dominant agrarian sector and also in the maritime one, China had quantitative growth but was in a qualitative standstill: [xiii] Indeed, it seems that the maritime sector, being small and somewhat peripheral in the total economy, suffered from this more than did the agricultural sector.

This book is certainly a courageous undertaking. Dr. Deng has used a vast array of sources, most of them of course in Chinese. His arguments are copiously documented, and as an economic historian, he is keen to quantify wherever this is possible. Sometimes indeed he seems to quantify just for the sake of it. He works out that maritime merchants had a thirty percent share of the country's total gross national product. [101] Readers more numerate than I will be able to evaluate the equation which underlies this claim, but on the face of it, it seems quite extraordinary, if only in light of the fact that only two percent of China's population participated in maritime activities, while eighty percent were in the agricultural sector. [161] Another rather pointless exercise claims to show that it is possible that over the next five hundred years the Hui Muslim population could become larger than the Han. [155]

It may be that Middle Kingdom ethnocentrism contributed to China's relatively undistinguished oceanic performance; on occasion Dr. Deng veers towards such attitudes. He claims that China was at the top of the "pan-Asian trading ring" but this is to ignore a long history of copious trade from India. [113, and also 132] Similarly, to say that the Chinese commercial fleet to Manila was responsible for the prosperity of the Philippines is true as far as it goes, but of course the other side of this trade, bullion from America, needs also to be considered: [149]

Despite these mild criticisms, this book is very much to be recommended. It is comprehensive, challenging, on many subjects authoritative, and always informed by a strong background in economics. It belongs in any library concerned with maritime history, or with the history of China:

M.N. Pearson
Lennox Head, Australia


This volume deals with the oldest extant Ottoman custom duffer, or finance record, from Caffa, in the south-eastern Crimea of the northern Black Sea region. It was compiled in 1485, ten years after the Ottoman conquest of Caffa. This particular type of duffer listed only arrears of custom dues of the port of Caffa. Nevertheless, it is unique in its importance for the study of the port of Caffa and the Black Sea trade system between 1487 and 1490. It supplies rich data about the goods, merchants and ship-owners and the routes by which these commodities were brought into Caffa and distributed from its port.

The volume is divided into three parts, beginning with an introduction to the characteristics of similar account books and a comparison of the present register to dufters of the sixteenth century from other parts of the Ottoman Empire: It also deals with the tax farmers and scribes indicated by the present drafter. There is a text in arabic, a translation, and an index of the text.

The second part contains several essays which examine the Ottoman Black Sea economy from the late fifteenth century until the second half of the eighteenth century. During this period the Black Sea became a thriving Ottoman lake: The first and the longest essay deals with the Ottoman customs systems, focusing on that of Caffa and Kilia, which was situated on one of the northern branches of the Danubian delta on the western coast of the Black Sea: The documents relating to Kilia demonstrate the application of Ottomanization and imperial standardization according to local conditions and circumstances in the period 1484-1570. This essay also dis-
The Northern Mariner
cusses the Ottoman principles of trade, rates and organization, comparing them to those of the Byzantine period. The author concludes this essay by summarizing the process which transformed the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake: This began with the gradual extension of control over navigation both through the straits and on the Black Sea between the second half of the fifteenth century and the late sixteenth Century. In the 1590s the Ottomans closed the Black Sea to international trade: The next essay deals with the captains and shipowners, including their origin and their itineraries according to the dufter of Caffa. It is clear that Caffa continued to trade with the small ports in the Black Sea, that itineraries remained consistently the same, and that the type of commodities did not change. The third essay lists the imported and exported goods in Caffa, according to the dufter, followed by another list of imports to the Crimean in 1750: Yet another short chapter concerns the production and export of grain from the Crimea and its dependencies between the late sixteenth century and the second half of the eighteenth: A list of imports and exports at Kilia is provided, taken from the local customs register of March-September 1505. From the late fourteenth century and through much of the fifteenth, Kilia, like Caffa, was in the hands of the Genoese, who controlled most of the maritime exchanges between the Black Sea and Europe: Without question it would have been interesting to make a thorough comparative study between the documents of both periods. The second part of the book closes with a discussion of the trade of Ottoman Kers [modern Kerch], situated on the strait connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, according to the regulation issued in Caffa in 1542. This regulation concerned exports, custom duties, passage dues and market dues.

The third part of the book consists of appendices, including tables and documents that shed light on Ottoman economic and administrative life on the Black Sea frontier: Undoubtedly the weights and measures, Ottoman and Crimean currency and the glossary with its detailed treatment on the items of trade will alone make this a valuable reference for the studying of Ottoman Trade and its documentation.


Donald Akenson begins his book by expressing a sympathy for counterfactual historical questions and then posing the one implied by his title: "So, what if the Irish had controlled more of the world in the modern era, say from the Protestant reformation onward? How would they have acted?" [4] We should perhaps ask whether this question is more interesting than similar ones that could be asked about other groups in other places — the Scots, say, or the Welsh: That it likely is more interesting to many readers, of Irish ethnicity or not, probably reflects the widespread currency of what Akenson calls "Irish essentialism," the conscious or unconscious acceptance of the notion that there is something special about the Irish:

In searching for evidence bearing on his question, Akenson dismisses the modern history of the Irish state as too much a product of partition and partition-related policies to be a fair example. He then considers nineteenth-century central Canada, going so far as to suggest that the civility of present-day Ontario is owing to a strong Irish influence. However, Akenson writes, the Canadian case is too complex and its historical literature too vast to permit concise summary. And, since this book took first form as the Joanne Goodman Lectures at the University of Western Ontario, we must concede the need for brevity.

So Akenson’s choice of an historical context where pure Irishness might express itself clearly is Montserrat from 1630 to 1730. Montserrat, a small British dependency in the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean, was largely settled by Irish people during that period. Using Akenson’s metaphor, Montserrat is the bonsai to nineteenth-century Ontario’s sequoia: Small in size (thirty-nine square miles) and small in population (some 4500 people in 1678, the majority white and the majority of them Irish), Montserrat at this time appears capable of being comprehended, if not completely because of limited historical records, then at least in its putative Irish essence.

The bulk of Akenson’s book is thus a description of the early days of Montserrat, of the

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time when it was a genuine colony and the majority of inhabitants were voluntary émigrés. One emphasis is an analysis of ethnicity using census data and Akenson convincingly demonstrates that Montserrat could not only be said to be Irish at this time but indeed was then the most Irish of any overseas polity. As well, however, there are descriptions, inter alia, of Montserrat’s early government and laws, how a sugar (and slave) economy gradually developed, and how the largely Catholic Irish and those of the Established Church lived with each other.

This part of the book appeals against easy summary: Despite limited sources, Akenson is able to invest his account with a richness of detail and appreciation of idiosyncrasy that would not survive a reviewer’s précis. Consider the story of “Indian” Warner, illegitimate son of Sir Thomas Warner (founder of the nearby St: Christopher colony) and a Carib slave who led Carib raids against Montserrat and Antigua in the 1670s. “Indian” Warner was almost hanged by William Stapleton, governor of the Leeward Islands and a former deputy governor of Montserrat, because Stapleton blamed him for the murder on Montserrat of Thomas Russel, one of Stapleton’s in-laws. “Indian” Warner was saved from hanging by the intervention of his legitimate half-brother, Thomas Warner, deputy governor of Antigua, but was later killed during a punitive raid on Caribs in Dominica led by the same half-brother.

It seems like an afterthought when, against this kind of background, Akenson returns to the question implied in his title. If Montserrat was Irish at this time, was there anything special about it? The answer is that the Irish on Montserrat behaved much as other early colonists (there and elsewhere) in matters such as their ownership and treatment of slaves, their actions when in positions of authority, and their role in the imperial expansions of the time. I found Akenson curiously diffident in this conclusion; surely not because it lacks the support of historical evidence, but perhaps because the evidence undermines the methodological premise of his book — that Montserrat might serve as a small laboratory specimen of Irishness from which the essence of the Irish might be distilled. His description of Montserrat’s Irish in their unique particularity and his evocation of the time, place, and circumstance are so vivid that any notion that they exemplify anyone but themselves is untenable on its face. There are clearly many differences between the Irish-Ontario sequoia and the Irish-Montserrat bonsai other than size.

Akenson’s final chapter, entitled “Usable Traditions,” examines the question of whether there are any significant remnants of the Irish in present-day Montserrat. (It is unfortunately possible that soon there may not be remnants of anybody in present-day Montserrat since as I write the island is under threat of volcanic eruption, the population has been reduced by two thirds to less than 4000, and total evacuation has not been ruled out.) He concludes that there are no such remnants, and refers, for example, to the conclusion of an eminent linguist that the only word in Montserrat English of clearly Irish origin is the one which refers to a female goat.

I know Montserrat well and, apart from the Tourist Board, few there take seriously the idea that the Irish bequeathed anything to Montserrat other than surnames and place-names, though there is a harp on the flag, a shamrock over the door of the Governor’s mansion, and an annual celebration on St: Patrick’s day (which, in fact, commemorates the slave rebellion on March 17, 1768). Akenson’s interest here, I think, results from his obvious affection for Montserrat and his disdain for the argument that an island lucky enough to have been Irish for one hundred years would not be so ungrateful as to have lost its Irishness. He wonders with characteristic felicity whether such a fiction might nevertheless benefit the island: “Professionally written history may be more accurate than are invented traditions, but usually it is less useful.” [186] If the Irish Ran the World will certainly be useful to any scholar of the Caribbean or early British settlement.

Daniel Stewart
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Joseph Miller’s 1988 monumental history of the Angolan slave trade in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries is widely acknowledged as one of the key products of the intense debate on slavery and slave trade that had started in the late 1960s and continued until the early ‘90s: The recent paperback edition of the massive text is the best testimony to its enduring scholarly value.

Miller employs the concept of merchant capital as the organizing principle of an enquiry that goes well beyond an exercise in economic and business history implied in the notion of merchant capitalism: The book weaves tightly together micro- and macro-history, environmental and human factors, the *longue durée* and the short term, and local and trans-continental aspects. It tracks the fortunes of both willing and unwilling participants in the Angolan slave trade, and discusses the factors, interests, and socio-cultural attitudes which supported it: The result is notably enhanced by Miller’s concerted effort to capture not only the impersonal economic realities but also the human dimension of this important segment of Atlantic history: The work represents a fine contribution to Atlantic history, a field which has recently gained autonomy in acknowledgment of the role of the Atlantic as a connecting rather than a separating space. This shift has begun to remedy the sometimes unproductive division of labour among Europeanists, Africanists, and Americanists:

The book opens in Part 1 with an innovative and rich reconstruction of the physical and human environment of West Central Africa. Here are provided crucial keys to the demography and political economy of enslavement and slave trading, in particular where the role of humans as economic and socio-political capital is concerned. Part 2 deals with the organization and logistics of the trans-Atlantic slave trade: The opening segment discusses the adaptations needed to make existing transport and exchange mechanisms suit the needs of the Atlantic slave trade. The subsequent chapters introduce the four key groups responsible for the movement of slaves from Africa to the Americas: the African suppliers; the Luso-Africans, sandwiched between foreign merchant capital and local African interests while serving as a crucial link between the two; the expatriate Portuguese and Brazilian slave traders in Luanda, the Angolan capital, who found themselves at risk both from the environment and the powerful metropolitan business interests on which they depended; and, finally, the shippers and supercargos responsible for the often inhuman conditions of the trans-oceanic transport.

Part 2 concludes with the slaves’ perspective of the voyage to America, from the moment of enslavement, through the ever-lengthening trek to the coast and the long wait for transport, to the harrowing crossing of the Atlantic:

Parts 3 and 4 deal with the demand side of the Angolan slave trade. Brazil, the final destination of most slaves from West Central Africa is covered first, followed by an analysis of the factors at work in metropolitan Portugal, which had both legislative and capital control over the Angolan trade throughout much of the period. The Brazilian and Portuguese roles are shown to have followed divergent trajectories: while the Brazilian involvement intensified and strengthened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Portuguese hold weakened despite attempts to reverse the process: In the closing chapters of each section, Miller explores the complex interplay of Brazilian, Portuguese and British financial, shipping, and political interests during the Abolition era.

The concluding segment, “The Economics of Mortality,” ties together the two key concepts highlighted in the book’s title: the high human cost of the Angolan slave trade and the economic forces that fueled it: While many contemporaries were clearly aware of the high mortality and social costs of the Atlantic crossing, a multiplicity of overriding economic and political interests not only prevented them from ameliorating the slaves’ condition, but often caused them to make the system more brutal than necessary:

In his Preface, Miller had expressed regret at having been unable to research the parts dealing Portugal and Brazil in the same depth as those on Angola itself. [xxii] While to the reader this point might appear excessively self-effacing, it is probably in these two geographical areas that the book’s findings will soon become only a stepping stone, albeit a very solid and indispensable one, for future research. As a whole, however, the book cannot be easily surpassed. The sheer volume of new information, derived both from printed sources and from extensive archival research in Portugal, Brazil and Angola, would by itself ensure its longevity: *Way of Death* also possesses, however, lasting value as an innova-
tive interpretation of a complex and difficult chapter in the history of the Atlantic basin: Real-
istic, meticulously documented, well organized, and accessibly written, the book has much to offer both to area specialists and the scholarly community in general.

Ivana Elbl
Peterborough, Ontario


Since the 1969 publication of Philip Curtin’s *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, which revisited the question of mortality on slave ships, historians have begun examining the mortality suffered by other groups of migrants. Shlomowitz has provided major empirical contributions to this field through his research on a number of non-slave groups who migrated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: This book is a collection of fifteen of his essays that were published between 1987 and 1994: The essays examine mortality suffered both by groups on the sailing ships and in their new location. Three of the essays examine migration to Australia; nine consider Indian migration to a variety of destinations; two examine Pacific Islanders; and one considers liberated African slaves. While a number of the essays explicitly compare the findings with other work, Shlomowitz also provides an introductory chapter to the collection:

Shlomowitz’ approach to studying mortality is decidedly empirical. Since most of the migrations he examined were completed under the auspices of the British government, a great deal of information was collected at the time. Shlomowitz has compiled these data from a variety of primary sources, ranging from the British Parliamentary Papers to publications and archives in Fiji and India. In each essay, Shlomowitz discusses the data problems that may bias his results. Usually, the biases are not serious but, in a few cases, he uses data even when it is not clear that they are sufficiently accurate to support his results. Each essay includes a large number of tables that provide his estimates of yearly death rates in total, by origin or location, by gender, over time, etc.: In a number of cases, Shlomowitz uses regression analysis to examine the correlates of mortality rates. Yet the empirical aspects do not overwhelm the essays; the material is easily accessible to those not empirically inclined: In many of the earlier essays, Shlomowitz is better at providing data on mortality than explanations. His later work, however, more explicitly considers factors leading to differences in mortality among groups.

The major cause of mortality for migrants was disease. Individuals who moved often entered an environment that contained diseases for which they had no immunity, thus causing death at a higher than normal rate. The number of deaths depended on the origins of the migrants, their age, and the severity of the new disease environment: Indian migrants to Assam and Malaya died at a high rate, at least partly due to the presence of cholera and malaria in these areas: Those working in the more benign disease environments of Fiji and Natal, on the other hand, experienced fewer deaths. Migrants to Australia died at even lower rates; in fact, adults sailing after 1854 were the first group whose death rate was similar to that of non-migrants: Particularly interesting are Shlomowitz’ findings concerning infant and child mortality. These results support work on European immigrants to the United States showing that the ocean voyage was particularly hard on the young. Though Shlomowitz explores various reasons for this result, no definitive explanation is provided.

For virtually every migrant group, the author finds that mortality rates declined over time. He argues that the fall in mortality illustrates the effectiveness of various government controls adopted. In a number of his essays, Shlomowitz shows that mortality declined at points in time when the government changed selection procedures or instituted improvements in the treatment of migrants, their working conditions, or in sanitation. Shlomowitz’ argument provides a valuable counterweight to some students of the slave trade, who suggest that the extremely high mortality of slaves was completely a consequence of them entering new disease environments when traveling to the African coast, waiting in the slave barracoons, sailing on the ships, or living in a
new area. Shlomowitz' message is that the governments and slavers involved in the slave trade were partially responsible for the high death rates. The finding that government controls were effective in decreasing mortality also bears on one of the major mortality controversies in demography. The fall in mortality within countries during the latter part of the nineteenth century has been alternately credited to improvements in nutrition or public health measures: Shlomowitz' work provides support for the importance of the latter factor.

Shlomowitz has put together a valuable book: As one who read these essays when originally written, I was impressed with the strength of the entire body of work. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in reading high quality recent work on the mortality of migrants.

Raymond L. Cohn
Normal, Illinois

Over the years, the various Cambridge Economic Histories have carved out an enviable niche in the scholarly world: Designed to make synthetic interpretations, debates and analyses available in convenient form to a broad range of scholars and students, they have become the benchmark against which similar enterprises must be measured. With a few notable exceptions, volumes in the various series have achieved these aims admirably. But the current book — the first in a three-volume series on the United States — presents more of a dilemma. If judged on the basis of scholarly attainment, the various essays are all competent pieces of work. But if viewed from the perspective of maritime history — a not unreasonable criterion given the marine nature of much early economic activity in North America — it is decidedly less satisfactory:

This collection of ten essays surveys economic change in America up to 1800. Significantly, the editors decided that this could not be done without also bringing in the West Indies and the colonies which, after the Revolution, became British North America (that they refer to them collectively as "Canada" is, however, an ominous sign). Unfortunately, the sentiment behind such a broad definition is not matched by the execution, especially in dealing with the colonies north of New England:

In a brief review, it is not possible to examine in any detail the interpretations in the individual essays: Instead, I want to focus on the maritime aspects in four of them: The volume begins with Neal Salisbury's survey of the economic history of native Americans. Although all the essays were written more or less in isolation, his choice of main themes sets the stage for what is to come: The focus is decidedly land-based, which diminishes the maritime side of the story: Indeed, it is only in the section of the fur trade that Salisbury brings in the maritime dimension. The important maritime activities of the various native peoples, both pre- and post-European arrival, are virtually ignored: Readers interested in what Salisbury might have done should consult the seminal essays in Charles A. Martijn (ed.), Les Micmacs et la mer (Montreal, 1986).

Equally disappointing from a maritime perspective is John Thornton's essay on "The African Background to American Colonization:" The focus here is on Africa rather than on either the slave trade or the lives of Africans in America. As such, it is a useful corrective to much of the writing on the trade, albeit a paper that could have done more with maritime issues. The "middle passage" from Africa to America remains a little understood part of the process, except for the increasing number of works that deal with the appalling mortality rates: It would have been useful for Thornton to have dealt with this segment of the "African diaspora:"

Better is John J. McCusker's chapter on "British Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies." The implementation of mercantilism required constraints on trade, which in effect meant restrictions on shipping. But, as McCusker rightly notes, it also gave an important boost to American shipping, which by the time of the Revolution comprised a significant share of the British Empire fleet: The special strength of McCusker's contribution — typical of all his work — is the bibliographic completeness: Although
the conditions of the volume limit notes and bibliographic references, McCusker manages to circumvent this better than any other contributor. The undoubted beneficiary of this is the reader.

The best essay in the book, however, is Daniel Vickers’ study of “The Northern Colonies: Economy and Society, 1600-1775,” which also happens to be the most explicitly maritime. While much of the essay deals with landward activities, a splendid ten-page section on the “seaport economy” should be required reading for all who would understand the maritime basis of colonial America. Vickers’ main contribution, however, is to put the maritime economy into the proper context. After noting that “many New World colonies cleared more ships with larger cargoes of far greater value than did any of the northern seaports,” he argues that the merchants who owned most of the trading vessels “played a vital role within the colonial economy but only in concert with the commercial interests of farm and craft families.” [238] In short, the maritime economy did not exist in isolation but rather was part of a larger whole: Most of the other authors in this volume would have written far more satisfying essays had they borne this injunction in mind.

Lewis R. Fischer
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It has always been a remarkable fact that the European East India Companies made hardly any use of the advantages to be gained by building ships in Asia. The arrival of the Europeans in Asia led to an enormous growth of shipping and trade in Asian waters. European vessels were not only employed in the European-Asian trade, but also in the intra-Asian or, as the English called it, the country trade. India had a long tradition and high standards in shipbuilding, and its teak forests provided the ideal quality of timber for ships: Yet the European companies preferred to build their East Indiamen at home. The English and the Dutch were quite aware of the excellent quality of teak ships — they were “as dry as a pot” according to an observer of the Dutch East India Company: But shipping interests in the mother countries protected their privileges successfully and discouraged the rise of a large-scale shipbuilding industry overseas: Only towards the end of the eighteenth century did the EIC have some of the ships required for the Bombay marine and its country trade built in India. Changing circumstances at the end of that century, however, gave rise to a different attitude and led to the development of new shipbuilding activities in Bombay as well as to a new forest policy and to a regulation of the timber trade by the EIC.

Michael Mann has written an interesting book on this subject. He explains how a combination of factors — the shortage of timber in England because of the depletion of the English oak forests and the independence of New England at a time when, because of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, a large fleet was needed — caused the naval authorities in London to turn to hitherto unused resources. The quality of the frigate Cornwallis, which had been built in India for the Bombay Marine and which arrived in London around 1800, impressed the Admiralty so much, that the ship was bought by the navy. Soon the Admiralty developed a plan, an "Experiment," to have two naval vessels per annum constructed in Bombay — one frigate and one ship of the line: Although this ambitious programme was never fully realized, the results were fairly good: in the period 1810-1831 the Bombay dockyards produced twenty-six ships for the Royal Navy (fourteen of them of more than 1200 ton) as well twenty-one other large ships. Between 1800 and 1820, 218 ships were build in Calcutta, only four of which were over 1200 tons.

The expansion by the EIC of its shipbuilding capacity was possible only if it was matched by a forest policy and timber trade that could provide the necessary wood for the newly built ships. The most detailed proposals for a coherent forest policy were made by Franz (or Francis) von Wrede, a German living on the Malabar Coast. He is a most interesting figure — it would not surprise me if he had originally come to India as a servant of the Dutch East India Company — who based his schemes on contemporary German methods of foresting. It proved difficult, however, to realize all his proposals: An attempt to survey all the teakwood resources on the Malabar Coast,
for instance, was never fully executed: Von Wrede may have been the first to outline a forest policy for India that included reproduction and maintaining the resources, but that goal was never reached, and was certainly out of reach after the dissolution of the Forest Department in 1823. The Company was more successful in organizing the timber trade, perhaps because it realized that it had to depend more on local traders.

Michael Mann’s book is a well-balanced study which gives insight into the way Great Britain tried to keep its place in the world during the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars, in part by encouraging shipbuilding in India around 1800, as well as through the first attempts by the EIC to formulate a policy for such thing as forestry and local timber trade during its transition from a trading Company into a colonial government. The book has a short English summary, perhaps too short to do justice to its contents.

Femme S. Gaastra
Leiden, The Netherlands


The volumes published to date in the Variorum series “An Expanding World” seek to make available revisionist interpretations by leading scholars on aspects of the European presence overseas. In the present collection, editor William Storey selected sixteen articles and book chapters by leading scholars that focus upon the role of science and technology in cross-cultural relations, 1450-1800. Storey sets the scene with essays by George Basalla and Roy MacLeod that create models for understanding the diffusion of Western science. In his 1967 essay, Basalla sought to construct a model for the study of cross-cultural relations connected with modernization theory that today is quite dated and Eurocentric. Writing in 1987, MacLeod criticized Basalla’s views and examined how the pursuit of scientific knowledge in the English-speaking world became an important element of statecraft.

The collection includes three outstanding essays on eighteenth-century overseas scientific expeditions by Francisco de Solano, Alan Frost, and Daniel A. Baugh. In the only essay in the volume not written in the English language, Solano studied Spanish eighteenth-century scientific voyages dispatched to fulfill political motives and to achieve other objectives. Beyond the collection of scientific data and defining the limits of Spanish overseas territories, Solano identified a strong metropolitan theme of “scientific conquest” connected with the expeditions. In many respects, Spaniards learned from the explorations about their overseas dominions and the Bourbon regime introduced broad administrative reform programmes: After 1820 and the achievement of independence in most of its former American empire, the Spanish government abandoned its commitment to expeditions dedicated to scientific discovery. Studying the British scientific explorers of the same period, Frost provides an even more explicit understanding of the relationships between science and politics: The immense natural history and ethnographical collections returned to Europe by the expeditions of Captains James Cook, George Vancouver, and other explorers served to cloak political purposes concerned with identifying new resources and viewing the military strength of rivals. Beginning with the circumnavigation of Admiral George Anson (1740-44), the British evolved clear ideas about the promotion of navigation and commerce. The result produced remarkable collections and new ideas by scientists such as Joseph Banks and Johann Reinhold Forster.

In his essay, Baugh considered retarding factors that made the seventeenth century (actually a 120-year period) something of a vacuum concerning Pacific Ocean exploration: This was followed by an epoch of almost hectic voyaging to seek valuable commodities, open trade, and to answer questions about unknown regions. By the 1760s, the British had developed seapower factors behind financial sponsorship of exploration to produce what Baugh terms “protective maritime imperialism.” The race to dispatch scientific expeditions, conflicts over the Falkland Islands, and the British settlement of Botany Bay underscored a head on competition with France and illustrated that while science was important, seapower was at the centre of British thinking.
The section on cartography and mapping originated with articles published in the journal *Imago Mundi*. First, J.B. Harley examined "cartographic silences" concerning maps from the sixteenth century forward, in which some states such as Spain suppressed or censored information while others such as England permitted publication. Spanish pilots were forbidden the right to sell charts under the penalty of death and many of the great trading companies of different nations maintained secrecy to deter competition. Moving to non-European cartography, Helen Wallis concluded that fifteenth-century Chinese maps were superior to anything available in Europe. Later, Jesuit observers in China failed to appreciate the remarkable achievements of Chinese science: For the New World, Louis De Vorsey and G. Malcolm Lewis discuss Amerindian contributions to North American mapping.

Storey included several essays that deal with contacts between Western and Eastern science. John M. de Figueiredo surveyed the cross-cultural exchange of medical knowledge between India and Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: While the practitioners of Ayurvedic medicine steeped in Hinduism encountered resistance and prejudices from Portuguese medical practitioners, over time some Europeans came to recognize that indigenous medical knowledge was often more effective than European techniques. Other essays treat the importation of Western science into Japan, China, and the Ottoman Empire. The Japanese at first embraced European science and technology during the Tokugawa period before turning to exclusion policies that left Nagasaki as the only port open to the world.

As is common in volumes of selected essays, some transitions are difficult and a few chapters may not be useful to all readers. From the aspect of chronology, it is disconcerting that the first few essays deal with the latter part of the period. Only after treating maritime themes connected with the eighteenth century does Storey turn back to the previous centuries for selections on cartography and contacts with indigenous sciences. Still, this is a useful compilation, and the section on eighteenth-century scientific expeditions is of special interest to maritime historians.

Christon I. Archer
Calgary, Alberta


For the nautically minded reader this well written and splendidly presented work offers a feast of information. It is also a wonderful adventure story, equal to any of the more familiar fictional accounts of life at sea in Britain's sailing navy.

While the book deals with a number of topics, including hydrography in the early nineteenth century, social life in colonial New South Wales, the biographies of the principal characters, botanical and geographical features of Australia and much else besides, its main purpose is to retell, using original sources, the story of four surveying voyages made along the north and northwestern coasts of Australia between 1817 and 1822. These areas were only imperfectly known in 1817, despite the work of Cook, Flinders and the French navigator, Baudin.

The British government had several reasons to order such a survey: The French were taking a renewed interest in the area, the increasing shipping traffic using the Torres Strait route from Sydney to India required accurate charts of such highly dangerous waters, and there was the need to settle the question of whether a river or deep gulf would allow access to the unknown interior of the continent. The command of the enterprise was given to Lieutenant Phillip Parker King, son of the third governor of New South Wales and destined later to be a major participant in the life of that colony: To assist him he had two skilled junior officers and a botanist. The first three voyages were conducted in the cutter *Mermaid*, a new vessel, fifty-six feet overall, built of teak in Calcutta: The last trip was in the 170 ton brig *Bathurst*, which was spacious, even luxurious, compared with her predecessor. Both vessels were purchased by the governor from private owners and fitted out at government expense.

Navigating a small sailing vessel close to the shore along the heavily indented northern coastline through uncharted reef-strewn waters was a nightmare with its constant threats to the ship's survival. King enjoyed phenomenal luck in
escaping disaster, although discipline and seamanship also contributed to his survival. The narrowest escape, however, was from a classic lee shore situation, largely of his own making, when only a few miles south of Sydney at the end of a long voyage: For suspense, fear and horror, his own account [257] rivals anything to be found in maritime fiction. Much technical information, particularly concerning the handling and maintenance of a sailing vessel in a variety of difficult situations, emerges from the narrative and its footnotes: Modern sailors will surely find this aspect of the book of great interest. In addition to the almost daily danger of shipwreck, King faced many problems that had to be solved without any outside assistance. Some, such as encounters with the hostile local aborigines, occurred during shore excursions: Others were the direct result of incompetence or fraud by workers in the dockyard at Sydney who, among other misdemeanours, had made the water casks out of staves originally used in barrels that had contained salt: Worst of all was the nearly fatal leak caused by the iron underwa
ter fastenings, fraudulently substituted for the more expensive copper variety by the Calcutta builders of the Mermaid, being eaten away by electrolytic action with the copper sheathing. Strained personal relations, caused partly by tropical heat, cramped space and extreme isolation, also had to be managed.

King's surveys were of a very high order and provided a firm base for later hydrographic work in the area. Of the thirty-two charts and plans he presented to the Admiralty in 1825, two were still in use during World War II, while the last plate was not withdrawn until 1955:

This is a handsomely produced book, lavishly furnished with splendid illustrations and maps. In a sleeve at the end there are facsimiles, reduced in size, of a number of King's original charts. The three appendices contain the official orders to King, a full list of stores and equipment carried by the Mermaid and a brief summary of King's charts. This book is highly recommended but readers are advised to have a good atlas at hand as they sail with King along the Australian coast.

John Bach
Coal Point, New South Wales


It is necessary to state up front that I find troublesome the publication of any statistical list which purports to be comprehensive. For one thing, the time and effort required to identify fully a maritime industry which is large in scale, wide in scope and long-lived make such a task difficult, if not impossible. Even if exhaustive and absolutely accurate in detail, such lists can still pose problems for potential users unfamiliar with the nature, limitations and reliability of the primary sources used, the objectives and operational parameters of the original research task and the particular goals and investigative skills of the compiler. The fact that fewer "lists" are now being published appears to be a recognition of the problematic nature of statistical profiles and may explain why it was necessary for the author to have a hundred copies of this book printed privately:

Obviously there are many factors which affect the overall reliability and usefulness of summary compilations, but to all is an exponential relationship between quality and the magnitude of the research effort. It would be easier, for example, to measure Dundee's participation in Northern whaling than to identify the whole extent of Scottish involvement in the trade. In *The Greenland and Davis Strait Trade: 1740-1880*, A.G.E. Jones attempts no less a task than the compilation of an inventory that "will provide the basis for a detailed history of the Northern Fisheries [whaling/sealing] from British ports, with histories of ships, masters and owners."

Clearly, publications intended primarily to facilitate research by others should at least be comprehensive and meet minimum standards of accuracy: This book, unfortunately, fails on both counts: Accuracy appears not to be the main problem, however, though information was not checked because "after five or six years of searching ... [the author did] ... not feel inclined to repeat it for the sake of complete accuracy."
is all right in Jones' view because the work "should have been done by those who have access to free or cheap labour and Public funds, but they have shirked the work." Unfortunately, there may be very good reasons why "others" did not take up the challenge — reasons he perhaps should have recognized: In any event, it is hard to justify offering a flawed document, no matter how heroic the research effort, with a flippant "so here is the list, with its faults."

The book's major fault lies in the fact that it is grossly incomplete. Jones appears to have only a rudimentary understanding of the strengths and weaknesses, the limitations in other words, of Lloyd's Register of Shipping (1764-1865) and The Register of the Society of Merchants, Ship-Owners and Underwriters (1800-1833). Simply put, these insurance records can not, in and of themselves, be used to provide a reliable measure of British involvement in Arctic whaling and sealing. Strangely, Jones acknowledges this problem: "The present volume ... provides an incomplete record, for which there is no alternative." In fact, there are an increasing number of alternatives. The Scottish trade, for example, has been well studied and was the focus of a Ph.D (C. Sanger, Geography, Dundee 1985) which has generated numerous articles. There are even more quality publications on British Northern whaling, most notably by Prof. Gordon Jackson of the University of Strathclyde. Whether Jones is unaware of this growing body of literature, or simply chooses to ignore it, is moot, in that their exclusion contributes significantly to the overall poor quality of this book. A twenty-two-page "Introduction," for example, which is intended to provide an overview of the trade, makes no reference whatsoever to "academic" sources: The "Introduction" is, therefore, as the author points out, "incomplete and confused," but not, unfortunately, because "the extant material is in tiny fragments in the newspapers of the day."

While Jones identifies some of the problems associated with the Registers, and thus his own list, this does not mitigate the inherent danger of using this publication in isolation, especially for those not familiar with the sources and/or young scholars. Perhaps paradoxically, the main difficulty is that this list is the result of an impressive research effort by a credible and well published investigator. The list contains some 15,000 entries, transcribed from approximately 15 million items. It is 147 pages long and is now published! It is thus easy to understand why those not familiar with the Registers, or with the true magnitude of the British Northern whale fishery, might view this list as both accurate and comprehensive.

My own investigation of the Scottish end of the trade (a minor component of the total British effort for most of its existence) indicates that Jones does not come close to identifying even fifty percent of Britain's involvement in Northern whaling and sealing during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, only one vessel is listed as having cleared for the whaling grounds from a Scottish port in 1764, when in fact there were nine. Similarly, Jones claims that there were no Scottish whalers in 1783, yet four sailed from Dunbar alone. Only sixteen vessels are included for 1816 when at least forty-nine cleared from nine different Scottish ports. Equally serious, from a Scottish perspective, is Jones' decision to stop collecting beyond 1880 (actually 1865) "because of the size of the effort in extracting a few dozen entries from the many thousand in each year, and the physical size of the volumes." This pretty well sums up the main problem with this book. It is not so much that Jones is not up to the task, but rather that the task is simply too ambitious, even for a dedicated researcher with an impressive work ethic and proven investigative skills. Between 1865 and 1900, for example, there were more than 640 individual Scottish whaling/sealing voyages! Additionally, the exclusion of these four decades prevents prospective scholars from examining such important events as Scotland's rise as an important whaling nation, the construction and use of steamers designed specifically for ice navigation, expansion into sealing at Newfoundland and off Jan Mayen (thus subsidizing the whaling effort and helping to reduce Greenland Right whale [bowhead] stocks very nearly to the point of extinction), an attempt to open up Antarctic whaling in 1893-94, and the development of winter stations in the Eastern Canadian Arctic, with their subsequent impact on indigenous populations.

In short, this publication may well do more harm than good if its serious limitations are not properly understood by those interested in the British Northern whale fishery as a whole, or individual regions, ports, vessels, masters or
owners. Sadly, this is undoubtedly the last thing the author would want. Fortunately the book, in its own small way, may do some good. While the author is to be admired for his industry and perseverance, the single most important message conveyed by his enormous and costly effort is that to be published, research projects should be planned carefully, justified fully and subjected to peer review:

Chesley W. Sanger
St. John's, Newfoundland


Greenlanders (Kallaalit) have a complex history of relations with Europeans, first with whalers, missionaries and traders and more recently with the Danish nation-state: Perhaps uniquely among Inuit, they have been able to exercise a relatively high degree of political autonomy since the inception of Home Rule in 1972. Nevertheless, the decisions Greenlanders can make about the way they live today are affected not only by the political systems — local, regional and national — of which they are a part, but also by global systems in which the policies of, for example, the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the European Union (EU), and/or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are influential:

Caulfield sets out this very complex state of affairs in order to contextualise contemporary Greenlandic whaling. It is most emphatically — and importantly — neither a story of "authentic tradition," romantically embedded in twentieth-century existence, nor one of "modernisation:" Instead, Caulfield explicitly describes a context in which cellular telephones as well as seal hunting are important. His central question is whether co-management regimes as they pertain to Kallaalit whaling, given their social costs and political complexities, can feasibly underpin a strategy of sustainable development: To address this, he moves back and forth between multiple story lines of historical reconstruction: of Greenlandic whaling, of the colonial relationships between East and West Greenlanders and Denmark, of local political and economic processes, and of the international political and economic processes to which local actions are inextricably tied. Greenlanders' marginalization in a number of these processes as well as their active strategies not to be lost therein are drawn out in detail: Caulfield also uses a more ethnographic approach to challenge the moral/cultural grounds on which Greenlandic whaling has been questioned. He examines the multiple ways in which Greenlandic social relations are mediated through whale exchange, arguing that the presence or absence of money in such exchanges does not necessarily mean they are "commercial" although the assumption that it does so lies behind many challenges to the "authenticity" of "subsistence whaling." And he explores the implications of a rhetorical shift in some IWC discussions from a conservationist stance (whaling is permissible if sustainable) to a moral one ("we" should not hunt "them"), which clearly privileges some cultural constructions of what whaling is "about" over others: If we are to take sustainable development seriously, Caulfield argues, we must be prepared to recognize its trajectory will not always go in the same direction, nor be conducted on the same terms.

Caulfield's project is ambitious and, for the most part, successful: The book should appeal to a varied audience, from historians of the Arctic and anthropologists interested in the complex hunter/gatherer relations to those who are concerned with issues of global marine resource management. The historical threads are crucial to a clear understanding of the complexity of the current situation and this is one of the few accounts bringing so many of them together in the Greenlandic context. It is, however, somewhat compressed and, I suspect, Caulfield's arguments lose some of their force thereby: As an anthropologist, I would have appreciated learning how he gathered his data, how people reacted to him, what he found easy, difficult, surprising, and the like. At an analytical level, Caulfield's strongest argument holds that money as a medium of exchange must be understood in its cultural context. I agree entirely and think that this is one of the most important points of the book. But because it is a strong argument, it would carry more weight for those not already convinced if there were a deeper discussion of how Caulfield
came to this understanding, contextualised perhaps in comparative northern material as well as by other theoretical treatments of similar arguments (e.g., Parry and Bloch, *Money and the Morality of Exchange* [1989]). Indeed, I would have welcomed more comparative discussion of northern material in general — of whaling practices, of Home Rule government, of gendered relations and of political strategizing — in order to draw out those processes which seem to be pan-Arctic and those which are uniquely Greenlandic. Given Caulfield’s familiarity with North American material, perhaps this is his next project: If so, I look forward to it!

Barbara Bodenhorn
Cambridge, England


With no other form of marine living resource has the pattern of overexploitation become more evident than with whales. Peak whaling seasons in the 1960s resulted in record catches of almost 70,000 whales: With the threat of extinction pending for several stocks, research on whales was boosted, yielding spectacular insights into their biology and behaviour. Fascination and extinction, these notions combined have had the effect of making whales a powerful symbol for the environmental movement since the early 1970s. No other form of sea tenure has undergone so radical a change in public opinion, concomitant moral values and ensuing politics as whaling.

In 1946, an international convention founding the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was set up by fourteen whaling nations. For many years it was a pure whalers’ club serving the interests of the industry. Then, during the 1960s, scientific advice gained a little ground in the IWC, and from the 1970s on, more and more non-whaling signatories joined the IWC in order to bring about an ecological change in whaling regulation: Mediagenic action by Greenpeace and the public relations of a host of other environmental and animal welfare organizations, all capitalizing on a billion-dollar donations-market, resulted in increased media coverage of the whaling issue and shaped public awareness. Today, a consensus has formed in the Western industrialized nations that whales are taboo for commercial exploitation: On the political and international level, this consensus is expressed in the IWC, where anti-whaling nations are having the decisive majority.

In this book Peter Stoett, who teaches political science, analyzes the international politics around the whaling issue. Whales are a common property but they are also the property of the person who takes them: Thus, they illustrate the notion of the commons, characterized by both a common incentive to conserve a resource and an individual incentive to exploit it. This principle sets the agenda, within which the actors — sovereign states, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and business interests — exert their relative powers. There is also a normative dimension to this interaction defining rights and obligations of the actors, as well as the question of cost allocation within an international resource management regime.

Stoett outlines his methodology in an introductory chapter, then describes the history of whaling and whaling regulation before moving on to the political setting. There he discusses the policies of several nation states within the IWC and of major NGOs around it. He elaborates on the current normative discussion concerning the ethics of killing whales and devotes a final chapter to the future of international whaling politics.

Stoett is correct in ascribing a future to whaling. At present — the book is up-to-date until 1996, but the IWC meetings in 1997 and 1998 have not come up with significant changes — there is a stalemate between anti- and pro-whalers within the IWC. From the ecological point of view, even ardent anti-whalers admit that regulated catches could be safely made from selected and closely monitored whale stocks. But the revised management procedure which would allow for some whaling is to be embedded in a management scheme with additional qualifications that “would not be met by whalers in fifty years, and probably never.” (*BBC Wildlife*, June 1994) If this attitude is not overcome, the IWC will break up. Stoett fails to mention that several anti-whaling nations have recently resorted to a new tactic which is likely to speed up this process: their IWC delegates admit that the whaling
moratorium could safely be lifted, but they claim to lack the democratic legitimation of their government’s constituency to consent to resumed whaling. This is the first instance where, with reference to domestic policy, the principles of science and rational discourse in international resource management have been given up:

In his discussion of the ethical dimension Stoett relies mainly on Anglo-American literature, the extensive Scandinavian literature — much of which is in English — is largely neglected: He therefore does not recognize the two main reasons of Japan and Norway to continue whaling in spite of the immense costs of whaling — because of government subsidies and boycotts — and the loss of political prestige. If they succumb to the political pressure exerted by anti-whaling nations on account of an irrational perception of whales, they would allow for a legal precedent to be set: A later resumption of whaling would then be almost impossible, and there would be the danger of similarly irrational arguments being applied to other living resources. The second reason is rooted in traditional strategic thinking: Present-day whaling is community-based whaling (as opposed to capitalist whaling supplying a world market with raw material). Taking the economic mainstay from these communities, the danger arises that these coastal settlements might be deserted, an idea which in spite of all military changes still vexes our nation states’ strategists.

Despite these shortcomings and an inadequate index this is a useful book which should be consulted by all scholars interested in the history of whaling:

Klaus Barthelmess
Cologne, Germany


The main title of this book is less enigmatic than at first appears, such is the range and profundity of experience in the history of the fisheries of Canada’s eastern seaboard. There is already extant a very considerable literature on these fisheries and of the people and communities involved in them. Such, however, is the scale and variety of the topic that it has been possible in this volume to add to it and update it with a pot-pourri of topics and themes. The studies deal with episodes which vary on a time scale from half a dozen years to a century or more, and on a spatial scale from the local through the provincial to the national and international. Yet appropriately it is Newfoundland that occupies centre-stage in the light of its long involvement in — and degree of dependence on — the fisheries. There are a total of eighteen papers, in which the work of historians is supplemented by that of anthropologists and others, and the extensive documentation is a de facto recognition of the extent of previous related work. While in time everything from the prehistoric to the modern is dealt with, understandably the detail and variety of treatment increases through time in harmony with the increase of available records: The work is in four parts, dealing respectively with the early fishery (three chapters), the eighteenth century (two chapters), the nineteenth century (four chapters) and the twentieth century (nine chapters).

In the first part an initial chapter gives an overview of archaeological material. Although there was human occupation from c. 11,000 BP, the earliest phases are very sparsely known. A contribution on the sixteenth-century fishing voyage shows how medieval technology and organisation were adapted to new demands in the exploitation of the northwest Atlantic from European bases, while a study of the sixteenth-century fishery of Portugal shows the “enormous voids” in the evidence for the widely accepted view of a big-scale fishery of that country at that time.

In the second part, a chapter on the eighteenth-century French fishery shows how the well-recorded conflict between the French and British has overshadowed the more basic conflict between resident and migratory fishing interests. A chapter on the New England fishery at Canso 1720-1744 shows an instance of European interests being displaced at a relatively early date.

The section on the nineteenth century strikes a more domestic note. Two chapters add further instances (at Miscou, New Brunswick and the Gaspé) to the well-studied theme of truck relationships and to the “deep and lasting scars” in
their legacy. At Harbour Breton, Anglican church records are used to investigate the theme of transition from frontier work-camp to settled outport. Probably most telling in this section is a study of late nineteenth-century Bonavista which shows the importance of the informal sector of the economy (as a complement to the fishery) in allowing the community to survive and continue.

The first chapter in the last section is effectively a fitting focus for the whole work: in "Recurrent Visitations of Pauperism: Change and Continuity in the Newfoundland Fishery," James Candow presents a masterly summary of Newfoundland experience, and brings it up to date in the way that "technology and greed, along with the failure of science, economics, politics and regulation, have brought us to the brink of the ecological abyss." A chapter on beach women at Grand Bank makes good a defect in much historical work in fisheries in recognising the importance of the female contribution. Modernisation efforts are covered in a chapter on steam trawling in Nova Scotia earlier this century, and in that on Stewart Bates, the Canadian fisheries minister in the period immediately after World War II. Two papers deal with the mounting international fishing effort in the northwest Atlantic in the twentieth century, and which accelerated so much in the 1960s; significantly and expressively, the second of these is entitled "The Fish Killers." Three papers deal specifically with marine biological research and conservation: the first summarises earlier work in Newfoundland; the second shows how the practical accumulated experience of fishermen is a necessary complement to the work of fisheries scientists; and a somewhat melancholy final chapter details the commercial annihilation of the northern cod stock, the cause of which is still a matter of dispute among fisheries scientists, and the management of which has been seriously complicated by inadequate communication between different interest groups.

In all the components of this work add up to a coherent whole. The fisheries of this region have already exercised commentators and analysts for many generations. There is every indication that more books like this will be needed well into the new millennium:

James R. Coull
Aberdeen, Scotland


_Cheap Wage Labour_ is an analysis of shore work and shore workers in British Columbia’s fish processing industry from the mid-1860s to the mid-1980s. At the outset the book identifies the unconscious connection made between fishing and masculine pursuits and the ideal of adventure. However, once the fish is brought to shore, cleaning and preparing it for consumption was often accepted as women’s work. Muszynski says that "the various activities connected to fishing also reflect the gender dichotomization of various sorts of labour." [4]

This book uses the discipline of sociology and political economy with an expansion of Marx’s labour theory of value to incorporate race and gender as principles that legitimized the payment of cheap wages to aboriginal women, immigrant women and men including those from China and Japan and who worked in the salmon canning industry. The author says that salmon canning was carried out in a factory setting right from the beginning. "The assembly line was adopted ... workers focused on one set of tasks: cleansing the fish, butchering it, making the cans, placing the fish in them, cooking the contents, soldering the cans to seal them, testing for leaks and lacquering cans:" [5] In addition different groups were assigned particular jobs and were segregated from one another. For example, "all male ‘china gangs’ were hired and paid by Chinese contractors to make the cans, to butcher the fish ... aboriginal women were hired most often to clean the fish and fill the cans." [6] Even when these two groups did the same type of work — fill the cans — they were separated from each other and paid according to different systems, specified by gender. The task of this book, then, is to “develop a general theoretical framework that can help us understand how salmon canners engaged their shore plant labour forces according to criteria of race and gender.” [9] In an attempt to develop this general theory, the author was required to incorporate a far-reaching literature that examines broad but complementary issues: writings in the area of race and gender, feminist
writings on patriarchy and Marxian analyses of imperialism and colonialism and immigration law.

_Cheap Wage Labour_ is a complex book for several reasons: the material appears to be Muszynski's doctoral dissertation, although in the acknowledgments she says that the "dissertation served as a starting point to the present study:" It contains an assortment of side debates with various theorists that one engages in when writing a thesis. The scope of the work is complicated because the author weaves a variety of important interlocking strands of relationships that are labyrinthine, multilayered and ever changing during a period of 120 years. Not only does the book address the social construction of race and gender in the fisheries of British Columbia but also the social construction of the "Chinaman" and the "Jap." The discussion includes the involvement of patriarchy, capitalism, exploitation, ideology, and the role of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union in the fate of the cheap labourers.

Whether or not the author successfully developed a general theoretical framework to debate the issue is somewhat questionable for the concluding comments contradict what was said on page nine, noted above. Muszynski says "what we need is not more grand theory but analysis that takes into account the diversity and complexity of lives as people live them from day to day. This is the feminist project — not to discover the one theory that will explain everything, but to bring forward diversity at all levels of analysis, using theoretical understanding as a way into the complexity of the social world in which we live." This she has done.

Although the book addresses the issue of cheap labour in the canning industry of British Columbia it should attract a wider maritime academic readership. As the book is laden with the jargon of political economy it will not likely be accessible to a general readership. It will, however, make a contribution to the existing literature on work, race and gender in the academic community and it most certainly will increase awareness and interest in this most engrossing and worthwhile topic.

Anna Leslie
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


Sensing a good story in the run up to the Gulf War, the popular press made much of the fact that women, as they understood it, were for the first time going to be present in ships of the Royal Navy as they went into action. Yet the marriages and deaths section of _The Naval Chronicle_ published between 1799 and 1818 contained several references to women who served in the navy during the Napoleonic Wars and more recently in _Female Tars_ (reviewed in _TNM/LMN_ April 1997) Suzanne Stark dealt with the whole question of women aboard ships in the age of sail: Probably the best remembered life of a woman in the services all those years ago is that of Hannah Snell:

A resume of her life reads like a synopsis of a Henry Fielding novel. Abandoned as a young wife, she adopted the name of her brother-in-law and dressed in men's clothing, set off to track down her husband, was pressed to the army, deserted, joined the Royal Marines, was wounded in action, returned home and revealed her true identity. Celebrity followed as she appeared in music halls around the country. In 1750 Snell collaborated with printer and publisher Robert Walker who produced a best seller, followed shortly afterwards by a more detailed serialisation of the story. Anyone with personal experience of barrack room life will question immediately whether or not it would be possible for a woman in her twenties to be able to conceal her gender from shipmates for four and a half years.

In this well-produced and readable booklet genealogist Matthew Stephens uses Walker's text as the basis of a fresh study of Snell's life. He tries wherever possible to verify statements with facts from public records and contemporary third party reports. While it is a fascinating literary investigation, it also stimulates some interesting side issues. For instance, how could a semi-literate sailor of the mid-eighteenth century recall with any degree of accuracy the timing of events over the previous five years or so?

On account of the wounds she received Snell was granted a pension of five pence a day which indicates that the authorities were satisfied that she did in fact serve in the Marines: In _Britain's
Sea Soldiers, his history of the Corps, Field devoted a whole chapter to her experiences. By going back to Walker's account and ignoring the embellished secondary versions that have appeared over the years the author has given fresh impetus to the story and will certainly stimulate local historians to see if they too can find traces of Snell's progress as she toured the provincial music halls and, in so doing, fill some of the gaps in this remarkable life. There is no doubt it is a good tale that has lost nothing in the telling.

Norman Hurst
Coulsdon, Surrey


Nineteen articles assessing the capacities and exploits of selected Admirals cannot be reviewed in detail in only a few hundred words. But Jack Sweetman's book is worth buying, even at today's ruinous prices, because the selection of both writers and Admirals has been carried out with skill and discrimination. The editor wastes some time in his introduction justifying his choices, most of whom are self evident. There are some surprises, and perhaps the most notable is the article on Admiral Suffren, whose claims to greatness are both explained and questioned all in the same exceedingly effective treatment. The strength of the contributions concerning Tromp, Blake and Michel de Ruyter are salutary reflections on the seventeenth century, that era of sanguinary contests and high mortality: it is right, in my opinion, that the Dutch should figure so strongly. The series is certainly not overburdened by contributions concerning American admirals. Clark Reynolds' chapter on Halsey is especially well done, and it is worthy to stand beside Philippe Masson's, since it gives Halsey a much needed shove towards ordinary mortality: altogether a delightful piece.

The editor draws his contributors together with a very useful narrative that constitutes a naval history piece on its own: He is highly enamoured of the effect on fighting of technological development, and the treatment of signals and fleet manoeuvring between Tromp and Nelson is strongly drawn. This is a difficult subject and Sweetman would not expect to be complimented on writing the "definitive" exposition on the subject, but the treatment does clarify the subject for debate and does not muddy the water as so many of such accounts have done.

Yet technological concentration has its dangers: It is possible that the edge of judgment when applied to certain characters by their expositors sometimes needs a wider anchorage. This is true of Ruyter who comes across as a skilful Admiral more than as the saviour of his country in days when both the French and the English threatened to choke off the United Provinces. Ruyter, man of genius, almost single-handedly prevented this. It is in the folk lore that the English wrestled the trident from Dutch hands by 1675: Yet Sir Charles Wilson has shown that the city of London only surpassed Amsterdam as European money-mart capital by 1780. In other words Ruyter provided long term solutions to Dutch problems. In the same way, in the Great War, Admiral Jellicoe held the naval weapon of survival in his hand. While he was in Iron Duke he kept the Eastern approaches, and at the Admiralty, he kept the western approaches from the submarine. In both capacities he was triumphant. We need to lift our eyes from the scene of action from time to time. Old fashioned nationalistic purposes have a bearing on naval affairs. Still, this book illumines events in a refreshing way.

Donald M. Schurman
Victoria, British Columbia


The Nelson industry continues to generate books and articles on Britain's most famous fighting seaman. This, the first of a seven-volume collection of Nelson's dispatches and letters, will make the task of research a lot easier by making readily accessible in affordable paperback form a vital
part of the source material which must be used by
anyone writing anything about Nelson.

Apart from a brief foreword by Michael
Nash, the book is a straightforward unedited
reprint of the original 1844 edition: The foreword
is a succinct account of the life of the compiler,
Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas: From a naval family
himself, Nicolas entered the Royal Navy at the
tender age of nine in 1808, three years after
Nelson’s victory and death at Trafalgar. Put on
half-pay as a lieutenant in 1816, Nicolas took up
a literary career which peaked with the publica-
tion of the work now being reprinted: The careful
scholarship and his knowledge of the sea in
Nicolas’ notes help the reader identify people and
events which might otherwise be obscure.

Although Nelson went to sea in 1770, as a
midshipman on HMS Raisonable, the letters do
not start until April 1777, when the eighteen year
old passed the examination for lieutenant. They
are prefaced, however, by a valuable autobiog-
graphical note in which Nelson sketched the main
events of his life from his birth in the Norfolk
parsonage of Burnham Thorpe in 1758 until
October 1799, a year after his annihilation of
French admiral Bruey’s fleet at the battle of the
Nile. The 430 letters and dispatches in volume I
cover the years between 1777 and 1794: During
that time, Nelson was promoted captain and sent
to the West Indies where he displayed great
ingenuity and imaginative leadership in the ill-
fated 1780 amphibious operation against St. Juan,
Nicaragua. After a short period on half-pay in
1781, followed by a year on the North American
coast, he returned to the West Indies where, in
1787, he married Frances (Fanny) Nisbet on the
island of Nevis. From 1793 he served in the
Mediterranean under Lord Hood and Vice-Admi-
ral Hotham where he lost the sight of his right eye
and achieved fame at the siege of Calvi in
Corsica. It was in 1793 that he first met his future
lover Emma, the wife of Sir William Hamilton,
the British ambassador in Naples: Emma is de-
scribed in a letter to Fanny as “a young woman of
amiable manners, and who does honour to the
station to which she is raised.” [326]

The often long and frank personal letters
from Nelson to his wife, relatives and friends,
especially HRH William, Duke of Clarence,
Captain Cuthbert Collingwood and Captain
William Locker, together with the official dis-
patches to the Admiralty and Secretaries of State,
provide the basic evidence for any examination of
the development of his character. Detractors have
often accused Nelson of excessive vanity but
there is no indication of this trait in the early
letters. They contain little self-praise and do not
draw attention to his own bravery and daring. The
letters do, however, contain hints of other charac-
ter traits for which he later became well known:
his devotion to duty, his concern for the well-
being of the sailors under his command, and his
generous nature. In September 1793, after a long
period off Toulon, he wrote of his sailors: “here
there is no prize money to soften their hardships:
all we get is honour and salt-beef. My poor
fellows have not had a morsel of fresh meat or
vegetables for near nineteen weeks.” [325]

Although this is the first volume of what will
be the most accessible and complete set of Nel-
son’s own writings, for research purposes it must
be used, of course, in concert with other Nelson
documents, most notably the large collection in
the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich and
in various papers held in the Public Record Office
at Kew. Chatham Publishing is to be congratu-
lated for embarking on this long-overdue venture,
the completion of which we look forward to with
pleasurable anticipation.

Gerald Jordan
Toronto, Ontario

Robert Gardiner (ed.). Nelson Against Napoleon:
From the Nile to Copenhagen, 1798-1801. “Chat-
ham Pictorial History” series; Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1997. 192 pp., illustrations, maps,
sources, appendix, index: US $49.95, Cdn
$69.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-642-6. Canadian
distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines,
ON:

The "Chatham Pictorial Series,” co-published in
England by Chatham Publishing, was created to
provide an illustrated view of major events, ships,
and periods of British naval history. The many
paintings and prints created by artists and engravers
during the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries provide a superb means of achieving the
goal of the publishers: In the case of Nelson
Against Napoleon, the wealth of contemporary
material contributes to an excellent visual survey
of the period. This is the second of five volumes intended to cover the wars with Republican and Napoleonic France between 1793-1815.

The "Chatham Pictorial Series" was inspired by the 66,000-piece collection of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England: Additional sources of illustrative materials are the Admiralty Collection of ship drawings supplemented by charts from the Navigation Department and personal journals kept by the Manuscript Department, Greenwich: The illustrations and complimenting materials were then brought together and grouped to provide a contemporary view of specific dramatic events and historical actions. The coverage is extraordinary in its detail given the fact that each volume has been dedicated to a relatively brief period of history. The volume should have value to generations of future historians seeking illustrations for their own works since it represents an excellent guide to the extent and nature of materials available at the National Maritime Museum.

Gardiner's narrative sets the scene, describes the players, and places historical events into perspective. The narrative is well presented. Unfortunately no effort is made to support the text with any form of documentation: While the work is not intended to be a historical monograph for research purposes, minimal citations should be mandatory: The "List of Sources" at the end of the work certainly suggests that with a little more effort this could have been done. The result might very well have been a volume worthy of substantial professional respect since the work is so much better than the run-of-the-mill coffee table selections: Let us hope that this serious short-coming can be modified in future volumes which would enormously increase their worth to scholarship.

With regard to the profusion of illustrations the selection of materials in charts, paintings and prints is excellent. One reservation is that quite a few of the illustrations are split between two facing pages in a clumsy layout that serves no publishing purpose. An example is a print of a 74-gun ship-of-the-line [14-15] which leaves the reverse image of the ship almost totally destroyed in the fold. This is frustrating and accomplishes nothing with regard to the fundamental layout of the book while damaging the overall product. Furthermore, with the modem capacity for reproduction enhancement through either printing techniques or computer scanning there is no legitimate reason for illustrations to be so dark as to obscure details, or for maps and charts to be illegible. Regrettably some of the illustrations suffer in this manner as in "A View of the City of Malta" [21] which is quite dark, and the "Plans of the Battle of the Nile" [31] whose details are blurred. Clear battle plans are critical to following the basic narrative. One sometimes has to hunt for the descriptions of the illustrations when they do not appear on the same page.

The section on Egypt admirably illustrates the naval and military challenges of that campaign from both the French and the British perspective. The unfortunate Anglo-Russian invasion of the Netherlands in 1799 has many interesting and valuable maps and illustrations but the principal map [121] certainly could be printed in a clearer manner. With the sophisticated reproduction and computer enhancing techniques available today there is no excuse for this shortcoming in so expensive a work:

The volume concludes with a highly interesting and worthwhile "Notes on Artists, Printmakers, and Their Techniques" which complements the text and should be a helpful guide to collectors of these materials from the period.

Nelson Against Napoleon is a very good work, one that is well worth considering for addition to libraries both public and private.

William Henry Flayhart III
Dover, Delaware


This book is a study of the origins and evolution of a highly-specialized naval vessel — the coast defence ship — from 1860 to date. The author’s starting point is the famous engagement between the iron clads, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia in Hampton Roads and it is his thesis that this battle, and the subsequent action at Lissa four years later, led to the creation of the coast defence ship,
a small heavily-armed and protected warship with a limited range and mission:

George Paloczi-Horvath is undaunted in his efforts to trace the evolution of this oft-neglected class of fighting vessel: With a text accompanied by plentiful illustrations he takes us through the historical permutations as various world navies experiment with the coast defence ship. As he points out, it is often the maritime forces of lesser powers, who do not foresee offensive action in wartime, who were particularly attracted to this type of vessel, for it packed a maximum of punch for a minimum of cost: Thus Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia were the leading players in developing the classic coast defence ship. There was also the Royal Thai Navy, whose Japanese-built coast defence vessels, armed with 8-inch guns, were decisively beaten by the Vichy navy at the battle of Koh-Chang in February 1941, “the only French naval victory of either World War conceived and executed by French forces entirely alone and without even the implied support of an ally.”

An interesting aside in this book is the author’s discussion of the origins of the so-called German “pocket battleships” of World War II. Their design originated in a perceived need on the part of the Kriegsmarine in the immediate aftermath of the Versailles treaty to construct a coast defence ship that would counter similar vessels in the Polish and French navies but evolved beyond that to become a high seas warship of great offensive power.

It is quite clear, however, that one of the problems inherent in designing a warship with a limited function is that, if that ship’s eventual opponent does not play by the rules, the specialized vessel is in trouble. By the time of World War II, the coast defence ship was obsolete and the fates of those manned by the Norwegian, Finnish, Danish, Dutch and Thai navies make for rather depressing reading. Most of the European vessels that survived the initial German attack were converted by their captors into anti-aircraft ships, which is a fitting comment on the changing nature of naval warfare in the 1940s:

The author is clearly entranced by this minor warship type and his work will appeal to readers with a similar fascination. The problem is that Paloczi-Horvath ignores a major part of the story of coast defence warship development. He concentrates on gun-armed vessels, yet makes almost no mention of the concomitant evolution of the motor torpedo boat (now commonly termed the fast attack craft) whose origins can be traced back to within a decade of the ironclad action at Hampton Roads and which played a major role in naval warfare in shallow waters in both world wars. The marriage of the Whitehead torpedo with the small, fast attack craft powered by the combustion engine resulted in a deadly little warship that, ton for ton, was far more effective than the shallow-draft miniature battleships that fascinate the author: This is a curious omission in a book devoted to a century of the history of naval coast defence.

Michael Whitby
Almonte, Ontario


One is tempted to welcome the appearance since 1994 of two successive major studies on the Austro-Hungarian Navy where none of their scope had been published previously in English on this major naval power of World War 1. Both books, the one by Milan Vego reviewed here and the earlier but much larger and more extensive The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary 1867-1918 by Lawrence Sondhaus, do overlap each other in content and purpose. Unlike the Vego study, the Sondhaus book has much more detail throughout on naval budgets, the powerful internal politics surrounding warship construction and especially his analyses in depth of the successful multi-racial structure of the fleet’s personnel, all since 1867. In addition, it is a continuum of Sondhaus’s earlier The Habsburg Empire and the Sea: Austrian Naval Policy 1797-1866 published in 1989:

To be fair, Vego clearly is not attempting to duplicate Sondhaus. Rather, his book is a complete diplomatic history of the place and role of Austria-Hungary as a sea-power with the world’s six largest navy in the persistent and ever-danger-
ous maneuvers of the European great powers during the uncertain decade that finally led to the start of World War I in the summer of 1914.

Between 1904 and the war’s outbreak, the European powers sustained competing alliances and built large armies and fleets to confront each other rather than finding genuine ways to maintain the peace: For the Habsburg empire, success with the latter would have meant continuity for the very long peace of the reign of octogenarian Emperor Franz Josef I: Austria had fought its last European war before World War I in 1866, less than a decade after Franz Josef had mounted the imperial throne and half a century before he died in his bed at age 84. Vego’s main theme, therefore, is how Austria-Hungary between 1904 and 1914, as a centuries-old European empire and unaccustomed to war for several decades, played its own lively role in pre-war great power diplomacy. Few realized when war finally broke out in 1914 that the empire had but four years left, or that its newly expanded and potentially powerful navy would also disappear in late 1918:

Sondhaus has written detailed chapters on how an allegedly land-locked empire — which indeed it never was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with its long Croatian coastline on the Adriatic — became a self-sufficient sea-power. In contrast, Vego’s overall emphasis on diplomatic history understandably gives such complex developments more cursory treatment: In “Summary and Conclusions” the compact closing chapter that would have served the book better at its beginning, Vego writes: “by 1904, the Dual Monarchy possessed the solid industrial base needed for the maintenance of a strong navy and merchant marine. Six years later, Austria-Hungary became almost entirely self-sufficient in the construction of its naval needs and armaments.” Had this statement been his book’s opener, readers with little or no prior knowledge of Austria-Hungary as a sea-power would better have understood from the start why the Habsburg empire’s foreign policy before 1914 always included naval strategy. This was the case even when this tinier Austro-Hungarian version of the contemporary Pax Britannica meant no more than enabling Vienna to maintain control of the Adriatic Sea with its strategic opening to the Ionian and Mediterranean Seas against the powerful Italian Navy on the one shore and the oppos-
proved unsuitable, Moffett pressed for the introduction of catapults. In 1920, Moffett, witnessed first-hand the superior capabilities of airplanes in spotting the fleets’ gunfire during its annual gunnery exercises. Convinced of the merits of naval aviation Moffett pressed for the creation of a bureau of aeronautics.

Brigadier General William Mitchell, former head of the Air Service in France, had other ideas however. He proposed a separate and independent air service encompassing naval aviation: Prior to 1919 the US Navy was uncommitted to aviation, but Mitchell’s proposal set off alarm bells within the navy and marked the beginning of a lengthy inter-service rivalry for control of naval aviation played out between Mitchell and Moffett.

On 12 July 1921, Moffett and his supporters won a key battle when the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) was created with Moffett — the first “air admiral” in the US Navy — appointed as its chief. During his tenure as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics Moffett introduced several important initiatives including revision of the Navy’s procurement policies and the introduction of the five-year reserve program that provided many of the aviators for World War II: Less successful policies, however, were the introduction of the flying deck cruiser, the rigid airship program which was abandoned in 1935 shortly after his death, and the building of small aircraft carriers. “He misjudged the value of airships and of the flying deck cruisers, and erred in his preference for small rather than large fleet carriers.” [231] That said, Admiral Moffett’s most important contribution was his campaign to indoctrinate the Navy as a whole to the value of aviation for the defence of the nation.

This book is an important contribution to the scholarship despite its flaws. The publication is riddled with typographical errors — as many as three to four per page — which detract from the flow of the book: In addition, there are problems with capitalization, improper line-spacing and footnoting style, missing words and parentheses, and inconsistencies with the font: These problems should have been caught before the book went to print: In this reviewer’s opinion, these egregious errors mar what is otherwise an excellent book:

Shawn Cafferky
Victoria, British Columbia


German submarines paid a terrible price in the two World Wars: 178 were lost in the First World War and 784 were lost in the Second. Paul Kemp’s U-Boats Destroyed provides details of the loss of every U-boat sunk during the two wars, arranged in chronological order by the date of loss: With each U-boat he includes the name of its commanding officer, the date, location, and cause of its loss, number of casualties, and a narrative description of its destruction. He does not include the losses of Germany’s wartime allies. The book fills a void in naval historiography: existing reference works on U-boat losses are incomplete or long out of date. Naval historians have revised the record of the loss of many U-boats in recent years and Kemp brings this research together in one well-organized volume.

The book is particularly valuable for World War I because it provides the names of warships or aircraft responsible for sinking U-boats which were not provided by earlier authorities for that war: A reading of the accounts of submarine losses from the 1914-1918 war holds some surprises. The cause of loss of a high proportion of U-boats is not known. Many disappeared at sea without trace, claimed by mechanical failure, bad drill, drifting mines, or other marine accidents. Some patterns also become apparent: during the early years heavily-gunned decoy merchant vessels (known as Q-ships) were effective U-boat killers but in the last two years of the war their successes tapered off when U-boat tactics changed. On the other hand, the first U-boat sunk by an aircraft occurred in September 1917. Some of the famous commanders who lost submarines in the First World War included Otto Weddigen, who had torpedoed and sank three British cruisers in one day, and Karl Dönitz, Commander-in-Chief of German U-boats in World War II.

For that war, the loss of the U-boat of one of the most famous commanders has been revised: U-47, which, under the command of Gunther Prien, had sunk HMS Royal Oak in Scapa Flow, was thought to have been destroyed in an attack.
by HMS Wolverine. It is now known that the destroyer had attacked another U-boat which survived to record the encounter in its war diary. In the absence of reliable evidence, Kemp speculates that an accident or a drifting mine claimed Prien’s boat. From a reading of *U-Boats Destroyed*, the trend appears to be to attribute more U-boat losses to marine accident or mechanical failure than was previously thought the case: When firm evidence of a kill had been lacking, assessments in the immediate post-war period tended to credit U-boat losses to promising attacks carried out in the area at the right time by Allied units. Recent research has shown that another U-boat was often in fact the target of these attacks or that the supposed victim radioed base sometime after the attack, forcing a revision of the record:

Two such revisions of interest to Canadians include credit for the sinking of *U-484* which has been taken away from HMCS Dunver and Hespeler and awarded to two British warships. Conversely, it is now believed that HMCS Drumheller played a role in the sinking of *U-338* which was formerly attributed to the RAF. In the preface, Kemp acknowledges that his book is not the last word on the subject and that research will continue to lead to revised assessments. Since the publication of the book, German research has cast doubt on RCAF claims for the sinking of *U-669* and *U-420* in 1943; their cause of loss is now listed as unknown. Similarly, Kemp was not aware that *U-184* radioed base a few hours after the attack by a Norwegian corvette in November 1942 which has been credited with its destruction; its cause of loss is now uncertain.

Some additions would have improved the volume. Statistical tables on rates of loss by month and year and percentages of losses to different causes would have enhanced the value of the book to researchers. Sometimes a notable event like the first U-boat sunk by American forces in the Second World War will go unrewarded. Still, *U-Boats Destroyed* is an important addition to the naval bookshelf and will take its place alongside Jurgen Rohwer’s *Axis Submarine Successes* as one of the indispensable references for the study of German submarine warfare.

 Robert Fisher  
 Nepean, Ontario

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This crisply written book covers the six-year campaign of the Royal Navy in just over 150 pages, many of them taken up with the more than 150 photographs and maps included in this slim volume. Given the remarkable amount of activity this period of the Royal Navy’s history encompassed, it will come as no surprise that this book does not provide much depth in its treatment of events. It covers all the salient events, usually with a pithy analysis but sometimes with only a quick overview or summary of the results. The book has neither footnotes nor bibliography, but it is generally well researched and errors are few:

The author suggests a bias towards naval aviation in his brief acknowledgements, and many of the pictures and some of the text does reflect a strong interest in the aerial aspects of the naval war. This bias is not overwhelming, although some unevenness in the treatment of events is occasionally evident. Perhaps the most noticeable example of this is Jackson’s discussion of Operation Pedestal, the three-day convoy battle fought to re-supply Malta in August 1942. In this operation the Royal Navy endeavoured to escort fourteen merchant ships into the beleaguered island in the face of hundreds of Axis aircraft as well as significant submarine and surface forces. The first two days of the battle involved RN aircraft carriers, and are covered in some detail in almost two pages of text. The climactic third day, when almost all of the merchant ships were sunk, is accorded a brief three sentences:

The pictures are the best part of the book. All are black and white, and while many are quite small, most are crisp and clear: the author and publisher did excellent work with the graphical production of the book. The pictures are all well chosen, and if there are more of aircraft than some might expect, all are interesting.

There are two appendices, the first showing “Principal Royal Navy Ship Losses 1939-1945” and the second “Auxiliary Trawler Losses” for the
same period. That these lists come to ten pages speaks grimly of the costs of the war to the RN.

Those who have read widely about the Royal Navy in World War II will find nothing new here, but may enjoy the quick overview: Those new to this period of naval history will find the book a good read and summary: And the pictures are worth a quick look by all:

D.M. McLean
Orleans, Ontario


In this engrossing book, Sherod Cooper, a former merchant seaman, recounts the story of the SS *John W. Brown*, one of the last two surviving examples of the most renowned one-of-a-kind cargo ship ever built: The fleet of 2,710 hastily built but highly functional Liberty ships was the product of the greatest emergency ship-building program ever and contributed considerably to bringing World War II to a quicker end: The *John W Brown* is therefore a truly remarkable vessel — a survivor of the most protracted and unremitting sea-war in human history:

The book opens with a carefully researched chapter on Liberty ships generally, and then leads into the construction of hull number 312 at the Bethlehem-Fairfield Yard in Baltimore: Named in honour of an American labour leader (who, incidentally, was born in Prince Edward Island, Canada), the *John W. Brown* served valiantly, steaming 139,000 miles and carrying some 114,000 tons of cargo as she and her sisters served in the cause of liberty, a cause for which they were aptly named.

The book features many highlights of the illustrious ship’s career, including her spectacular maiden voyage from the United States to the Panama Canal, thence via the west coast of South America, Cape Horn, Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, returning via the Cape and South Atlantic to New York via Bahia, Brazil. In all, it was an eight-month, 33,000-mile passage during which she voyaged mostly alone and over dangerous waters: Another seven war-time voyages across the dangerous sea-lanes of the North Atlantic to Mediterranean and European seaports are well documented, including her last wartime voyage in convoy ON-305.

She continued in service until November 1946, when she arrived in New York City and was transferred to the Board of Education of New York City for use as a vocational high school: There she remained for the next thirty-six years: In 1982 the *John W. Brown* was placed in the Reserve Fleet: Then, in 1985, she was acquired by members of Project Liberty Ship and berthed at Baltimore. There she now serves as a National Monument, after volunteers expended more than 300,000 man-hours to restore the vessel to her original wartime configuration: When she visited Halifax, Nova Scotia in the summer of 1994, every thorough detail onboard, including her wartime armament, reflected a truly unaltered example of the original.

In *Liberty Ship*, Sherod Cooper provides us with an opportunity to learn about the life and time of a single merchant ship, in war and peace. Yet his book is equally important for the way it records the unbounding contribution made by the countless thousands of unsung men and women who built and sailed these ships at a time in history when the allied world stood on the brink of defeat. The author as well as the publisher therefore deserve a hearty commendation for their excellent contribution to an important branch of maritime history; theirs is a very readable book, a genuinely absorbing and permanent treatise of inestimable value that belongs in every library.

R.F. Latimer
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


The wartime exploits of Canadians operating as part of the Royal Air Force between 1939 and 1945, either as members of RAF squadrons or as members of RCAF squadrons within the RAF, have been widely documented: In particular, the
record of 6 (RCAF) Group in Bomber Command and of Canadian fighter pilots received much attention in 1995 during the commemorations of VE-Day. The contribution to victory of the Canadian squadrons operated by or in conjunction with RAF Coastal Command has received far less attention, though it was scarcely a less hazardous undertaking. *Canadian Squadrons in Coastal Command* attempts to redress the balance.

The book relates the history of eight Canadian squadrons which were associated with RAF Coastal Command. Six were formed specifically to operate within it: 404, 407, 413 and 415 in 1941 with 422 and 423 following in 1942. Number 162 Squadron from the RCAF’s Eastern Air Command was loaned to Coastal Command for the last seventeen months of the European war and 10 Squadron RCAF operating long range patrol flights between Gander and Iceland came partially within its operational control. In addition, although not mentioned in the book, No: 405 Squadron, RCAF was loaned from Bomber Command to Coastal Command in the critical period from October 1942 to February 1943.

The account covers the large number of aircraft types used ranging from obsolescent Handley Page “Hampden” twin-engined torpedo bombers and Short “Sunderland” long range flying boats to Fairey “Albacore” biplanes and their tasks of strike, convoy escort and anti-submarine duties. The area of operations covered ranged from the North Atlantic and Western Approaches to the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay. Examples are given of how they, in common with other Coastal Command and squadrons also participated in other duties such as the early thousand-bomber raids of 1942:

Tables provided as appendices credit the squadrons with sinking or damaging twenty-five U-boats and almost a hundred surface vessels. Although not provided by the author, we know from other sources that the price was some 160 aircraft and over six hundred aircrew lost, slightly less than a typical Main Force heavy bomber squadron operating continually over the same forty-month period.

The recounting of this operational history is divided into a chronology by year and then sub-divided into the basic record of the strike and ASW activities. The research apparently took into account both primary and secondary sources and reflects the contributions of survivors. Tabular details of attacks made against submarine and surface targets and comparative details of representative aircraft flown and their squadron codes are provided: Also included is a selection of photographs of varying quality, some of which are well known while others of crews and individuals are likely from personal collections. No credits are provided for the photographs. A map showing most of the operational area of the Canadian squadrons is included along with a glossary of terms and abbreviations employed.

Unfortunately, despite a well-intentioned effort by the publishers, who are well known as the Canadian distributors of military, naval and aviation titles, this book is disappointing in many respects: Most significantly, from a substantive perspective it is almost completely devoid of analysis, taking instead, within the simple chronological and functional sub-theme framework noted earlier, a “stream of consciousness” approach to the recording of events: This almost certainly reflects the information gleaned from the operational diaries of the squadrons concerned fleshed out by the recollections of aircrew with whom the author corresponded. There are also omissions. The temporary loan of No. 405 Squadron, RCAF to Coastal Command is not mentioned at all. Nor is the policy issue of “Canadianization” which is covered in Volume 2 of *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force*, mentioned in the book’s bibliography. Another regrettable omission is that of any comprehensive data on the squadrons themselves, their numbers of operations, commanding officers, bases, losses awards and the higher formations to which they were assigned: Neither is there any final summary of the contribution they made. The story simply peters out with the disbandment of No. 162 Squadron in August, 1945.

Beyond that, the book requires a thorough editing for content and style and its basic design is not well conceived. Non-standard abbreviations are employed for some ranks, the units of measurement for speed are not universal although such information is easily obtained, and typographical errors were allowed to slip by as, in Appendix D where 423 Squadron has digits transposed. A two-column layout with copious subheads is used and it seems out of place in a book of this size.
Despite these shortcomings, this book will appeal to those readers wishing access to the largely unpublished detail on the operations flown by Canadian squadrons in Coastal Command and many of the individuals concerned: The definitive story, however, still remains to be told.

Christopher J. Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


Hector Mackenzie wrote his book in response to the eternal question asked of most war veterans, “What did you do in the war, Daddy?” *Observations* is therefore an addition to the already-staggering number of World War II memoirs: Specifically, it is Mackenzie’s attempt to capture his recollections of life in the wartime Royal Navy and its Fleet Air Arm for his family and a more general readership. This is not a serious, scholarly study, although Mackenzie does devote the last chapter of his book to a discussion of the aftermath of World War II:

What can be learned from this book? First, it is an account of one man’s service in the Royal Navy. As such, much is here: travels to foreign climes — the USA, South Africa, Algeria, and the Arabian peninsula, among others: The contrast between the relative prosperity of American life even during wartime and the rigors of British life on the home front is captured vividly: There are accounts of the inevitable romantic interludes, of boring duty watches, the endless minutiae of service life, training programs, visits home, and the privations of British life during the war, and some combat narratives.

Mackenzie goes beyond that to discuss areas not often mentioned in wartime accounts: naval discipline (very harsh but not brutal); the treatment of pregnant servicewomen (summarily discharged, regardless of marital status); naval funerals (sometimes unfortunately botched); and several minor issues: The perils of having wartime allies are also shown — Mackenzie relates one incident where American fighter planes mistook an FAA aircraft for the enemy and shot it down. (The problem of “friendly fire” is found in every war, up to and including the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict.)

In the last chapter, Mackenzie assesses the gains and losses derived from World War II: He defines his personal gains as learning to deal with people of varied backgrounds, the opportunity to see the world, and the benefits of military discipline: His personal loss stemmed from the time spent away from a civilian occupation while in the service. More broadly, he regards as beneficial to British society the breaking down of the rigid British class structure, the affirmation of the indomitable English spirit, and the development of a “caring society” through a social welfare net (though subsequent developments made that social welfare net a problem). The costs to British society include the loss of life, the incredible financial burden to Britain, and the paradox of American postwar aid to Germany and Japan which helped those former enemies prosper in the long run more than Britain, the bankrupt victor: (This concept was satirized, of course, in Leonard Wibberly’s 1959 novel, *The Mouse that Roared.*)

While readers of *Observations* should not expect a scholarly treatment of naval life in World War II, the book does serve as a useful source of information on the often humdrum life in the Royal Navy in those years. Subject to its inherent limitations, it is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Although pre-1914 war planning of the Great Powers has been the focus of scholarly study, that by the United States has received little attention: Edward Miller analyzed *War Plan Orange* (1991) — a work surprisingly absent from the bibliography of this book — but no other war plan has received similar attention. The only published study of the combined plans of the Army and the Navy, to say nothing of the Air Force, for any war or era is Ross’ *American War Plans 1945-1950*
Thus one approaches Ross’ most recent work with anticipation. He opens with a brief survey of strategy at the outbreak of war and the forced abandonment of pre-war plans when Japan destroyed much of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and Germany threatened to capture the Suez Canal and to cripple the Soviet Union. During 1942 “Europe First” plans gave way to limited offensives aimed at containing Japan in the Pacific and to landing an army in North Africa to relieve pressure on British forces in Egypt.

Shifting emphasis, the rest of the book focuses on the formulation of strategy by Allied leaders and, as his subtitle, *The Test of Battle*, implies, the influence of operations on strategy. Ross depicts 1943 as a year of consolidation, during which Britain and America reached a tentative consensus on basic strategy and solidified their positions in Europe and Asia, but during which neither nation developed specific operational plans for either theater, much less for any campaign. Indeed, Ross admits that by 1943 “the Second World War was in large measure a war of production and attrition” [64] rather than one of strategy, war planning, and execution.

From mid-1943 through the war’s end, Ross’ focus remains the debates over strategy rather than on the process of war planning or the war plans themselves, perhaps because the formulation of specific plans was rendered virtually impossible when British and American leaders were so divided on how best to implement strategy (the Soviet Union is virtually ignored): Moreover neither the civilian nor the uniformed leaders of each nation could even agree on which campaigns to press most vigorously: In Asia, for example, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt argued over whether to attack the Japanese empire on the west through Burma or across Sumatra. Meanwhile, American generals and admirals in Washington and the war zone competed to make the Central or Southwest Pacific the main line of advance toward Japan. Eventually, the United States pursued both approaches “as much by accident as by design” The availability of resources often determined the selection of objectives (as in the case of Luzon vice Formosa) and events on the battlefield set operational timetables (as when Japanese resistance in the Philippines blocked the southwestern prong of the dual advance, allowing Central Pacific forces via Okinawa).

Some readers may be disappointed that Ross does not devote more space to the process of planning and war plans themselves or to the role of air power in the formulation of strategy. This is not to detract from his accomplishment, an insightful analysis of Allied strategy, but to wish he would now produce a more comprehensive study, one focusing on the formulation, content and execution of war plans per se:

James C. Bradford
Bryan, Texas


When I was asked to review this small volume, it was suggested that — as a Naval Constructor — I would perhaps not be greatly interested, that indeed “you prefer design and gestation, not dismantling and termination.” It seemed to me that this splendid phrase demanded a greater audience and I am glad to provide it.

The intent of the authors of *To Sail No More* is to review the relatively short-lived industry, following World War II, of scrapping and recycling the raw material of naval vessels. A government agency, the British Iron & Steel Company (BISCO), administered the industry on behalf of the Admiralty, disposing of surplus vessels to some two dozen ship-breaking facilities. Usually these consisted primarily of a tidal berth so that, as the vessel became progressively dismembered, it could be advanced, to end finally as some skeletal remnants on a mud berth.

This is a curious little book — less than a hundred pages, numerous photographs, and very little text. Yet the range of activities involved in the breaking up of warships has been thoroughly reviewed and appropriately recorded. in considerable detail — with photographs that include the three Canadian Tribals: Nootka, Cayuga, and Micmac. Some might regard this as somewhat of a hum-drums subject. Yet the endeavour presented some interesting technical problems: toppling the mast and superstructure of an aircraft carrier, well
beyond reach of available cranes; burning through the twelve-inch thick barrels of 15- and 16-inch guns; and, interestingly, having a garden furniture organization to utilize teak decking. Nor was the endeavour financially insignificant, with nearly half a million pounds sterling surplus available from the demolition of a battleship. As well, there was always the opportunity to accrue additional funds from nickel bearing armour plate, copper wire, and bronze propellers — the latter realizing £300 per ton vis-à-vis £12 for steel. Even bringing the vessels to the breakers was somewhat of an adventure, with grounding of the unwieldy tows being not unusual: Indeed, the towage of HMAS Australia from Sydney to Barrow — 101 days at 4.8 knots — must be something of a record. Sometimes, however, the hulls were used as experimental vessels in testing the effects of various explosive charges — perhaps a more honourable “death” for a warship.

Nevertheless, this volume will probably not appeal to the general reader. If there is a connection with a particular vessel, then there might be some reward: This reviewer served in Rodney and took Vanguard on her measured mile trails, so it was nostalgic to see their ultimate demise in the 1950s and ’60s. Still, we must welcome this account of a somewhat morbid “industry” which peaked in about 1950 and was essentially concluded by the 1990s: Perhaps, in view of the price — about $30 — you might try and persuade your local maritime museum to obtain a copy:

S: Mathwin Davis
Kingston, Ontario


As Norman Friedman notes in his Introduction, “This is a remarkable book.” Although it is not an all-encompassing compendium of Soviet and Russian warships and auxiliaries, it goes a very long way in filling in the gaps in western understanding of the Soviet fleets: The book also goes into some of the details of the demise of the Soviet fleet after the collapse of Leninism and the complex re-birth of the Russian fleet.

In some respects, there is so much new information in the book that it can impede a serious re-evaluation of the rationale for the various programs and of the concepts of matching weapons systems to specific designs. Yet the data on the various designs is presented largely by design class and usually coincides with NATO categorization which makes the book fairly easy to use. Also, the Editor’s frequent and often copious notes are a great help in understanding and using the huge amount of data found in the book:

The problem this truly fascinating book presents is one of how to re-assess the earlier western analyses of the Soviet Navy: For instance, how well does the ground-breaking work of Mike McGwire and his colleagues stand up? We have tended to hold the Soviet five-year planning cycle as the time-line against which decisions and designs could be evaluated; the Pavlov book throws some doubt on that concept. Although several designs were clearly locked into the central economic planning model, a number of major shipbuilding decisions were not: It might seem that some of the decisions on strategic designs, such as the Typhoon-class SSBN, were made outside the five-year planning model. There are even references to a ten-year plan for the development of the Soviet fleet.

Another intriguing aspect of this remarkable book are the many gratuitous comments about the fate of some designs and designers and the obvious impact of politics at the end of the Stalin era. Invariably, these raise more questions than one could expect a work of this nature to answer. Why, for instance, was the seventh Typhoon-class SSBN broken up on the slip? Also, the saga of the design and construction of the large aircraft carriers Kuznetsov and Varyag is only touched upon, yet the few glimpses offered are enough to spark the imagination: One has to bear in mind that the data was assembled by a naval architect and did not necessarily focus on the naval staff and political planning processes or on the operational aspects of the various designs. Let us hope that these will all come later.

The possibilities for research that Pavlov’s book creates are seemingly endless. Not only will we have to go back and re-examine the early western analyses, there are also some interesting
comments on basing, especially of submarines, that warrant further examination. And the entire history of Soviet submarine accidents will need re-thinking in light of Pavlov’s comments about various fires and accidents. Another line of research may lie in the actual designers themselves: Pavlov is careful to associate each design and often the modifications with one of the designers and thus with the design bureaus. This is clearly significant. But why? Did the designers have a degree of freedom in interpreting the staff requirements? Friedman offers some insight into this puzzle in his Introduction, when he states that the Central Design Bureaus could sometimes “sell the navy something quite different from that envisaged (by the naval staff).” [xvii]

What this book means is that the study of the Soviet Navy did not die with the end of the Cold War; rather, the next phase is just beginning. Does all this really matter? Is it still relevant to know how the Soviet Navy evolved? The answer, of course, is “Yes.” There is a need to understand the planning process by which the Soviet designed the fleet upon which so much western naval effort and money were spent in seeking a counter. In exactly the same way that we still find the development of Tirpitz’s navy or that of Raeder two decades later intriguing, the evolution of the Soviet fleet, especially under the leadership of Sergei Gorshkov and its post-communist transition, is no less fascinating.

Pavlov’s book is a first attempt to throw much-needed new light on an important topic. It provides an enormous amount of food for thought as well as being a major reference work. However, it needs the accompanying analysis of the decision-making process to make it complete: We can only hope that this will be the next offering.

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This is an encyclopedia of naval weapons systems described in 860 pages, about 2400 equipment or system entries, and almost a million words. Its predecessor, The Naval Institute Guide To World Naval Weapons Systems 1991-1992 (Annapolis, 1991) was compiled at the end of the Cold War. This volume spans the momentous changes in maritime strategy and information technologies since then — the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” — and which continue today. It is not easy to read, for it assumes a detailed and comprehensive knowledge of sensors, combat direction systems and weapons systems. It begins with fifty-three pages of “prefatory notes” on radar, electronic warfare, sonar, optronics and infrared devices, lasers, identification (IFF), and missile guidance along with company consolidations, system designations and abbreviations. The main body of the book describes sensors, combat direction and weapons systems by country of origin in chapters on Surveillance and Control, Tactical Data Systems, Strategic Strike Systems, Strike/Surface Warfare, Anti-aircraft Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, and Mine and Mine Countermeasures: The volume concludes with an Index and an Addendum.

The book is aimed at the systems specialist and the defence, computer and telecommunications industries, much of it reading like a catalogue of brochures from arms and technical trade shows. Prior knowledge of equipment designations is necessary even to use the Index intelligently. The level of detail is impressive but caution is required. Some equipment descriptions are dated and others are inaccurate: For example, on page 414, the Canadian Patrol Frigate Class is shown to have only six sets of RIM-7M Sea Sparrow missiles completed by 1987. In fact, all systems are installed in the twelve “City”-class frigates. On page 32, Stand-Alone Link II is not fitted in the Royal Navy’s Type 42 destroyers as stated, but is used in ships without an automated command and control system and the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.

Country information and details of weapons suites by class of ships is dispersed but can be gleaned with substantial page shuffling. To find details about the Canadian Patrol Frigates’ weapons systems, one has to go to pages 413 and 460, under “United States,” to find the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile system and the Phalanx Close-In-Weapons System; then to page 257,
under "United States" in the Strike/Surface Warfare chapter, to look up the Harpoon surface-to-surface missile; and finally to page 693, in the Anti-submarine Warfare chapter, again under the United States, to find out about the MK46 MODS (Neartip) torpedo. The book is not well organized to bring out country-to-country comparisons and should be read in conjunction with other references such as Jane's Fighting Ships or The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World:

On the other hand, if you can follow him, Norman Friedman's Introduction, parts of the Prefatory Notes and his preambles at the beginning of some of the chapters and country sections, particularly those on the United States, provide excellent descriptions and analyses on how naval technology is adapting to commercial information technologies, new concepts of littoral sea-land-air warfare, and the proliferation of naval platforms and weapons systems in coastal and island states in the Mediterranean and Middle East, South Asia and the Western Pacific: (Lists of users by country appear at the end of each equipment entry.)

For those with the necessary knowledge, there is some discerning information. The section on Sonar in Prefatory Notes is an excellent historical review of the subject as well as its application to surface, submarine and airborne platforms. On the other hand, the section on Optronics and IR Devices is difficult to follow without detailed technical knowledge: Descriptions of "Spot Trackers" and "Imagers" \[xxxii\] or Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) \[xxxiii\] as "180 detectors in vertical line array..." does not tell the general reader much. This reviewer had to read a number of primers to refresh his memory on the basic principles of air defence, surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, radars, and command systems and naval electronics warfare, in publications such as Navies in the Nuclear Age by Conway Maritime Press, to reach a threshold of knowledge necessary to understand, even partially, the author's detailed descriptions.

Nevertheless, for those who persevere, the book is insightful as well as character-building. The chapters on Surveillance and Control and Tactical Data Systems underline the point made by Friedman in the Introduction, that Command and Control (C2) systems, both intra and inter-platform, are key developments in littoral warfare with its need for rapid reaction time and the prevalence of target ambiguity. Combat direction systems may not be as visually impressive as sensors and weapons, but they are the key to reaching full platform potential. Likewise, at the Task Group and Fleet level, command information systems are essential to reach strategic and operational potential: Given the cluttered conditions of sea-land-air warfare as it evolves in coastal areas and enclosed seas, accurate and real-time combat direction is not only the key to success but the antidote to failure. The USS Vincennes Iranian Air Bus disaster in 1988 in the Gulf was as important an incident in pointing out the need for accurate combat direction and a recognized maritime picture as was the sinking of the Eilat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the prelude to the age of the tactical missile in sea warfare:

Evidence of technology adapting to the new geographic realities of coastal sea warfare and the globalization of naval weapons systems can be gleaned from this voluminous book. Some of the woods that can be discerned from the trees include the merging of land strike and surface warfare capabilities; warships in Theatre Missile Defence; navigational warfare (GPS); data fusion (intra-ship, inter-ship and formation, and international security systems and Fleet); the integration of surveillance, search and attack radar and sonar systems; the growth of integrated shipborne electronic support, attack and protection systems (ESM, ECM and ECCM respectively); the need for tailored Electronic Warfare threat signature libraries; the merging of EW with electronic intelligence (ELINT); advances in infrared and optically guided and controlled weapons with laser attack systems; the return of active sonar in wide-area search along with the adaptation of towed arrays as shallow water bistatic receivers; continuing work on non-acoustic submarine detection; low-cost ASW weapons for shallow water defence against submarines; and integrated surface ship torpedo defence systems.

As Admiral Richard Hill said in his review in the Naval Review (January 1998), this book is a technical and professional piece that makes no concessions to amateurs, but it is a testimony to the personal achievement of Norman Friedman:

Fred Crickard
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Winifred Quick Collins has lived an extraordinary life and her autobiography makes for extraordinarily good reading. Rising from Sub-Lieutenant to the highest ranking woman in the US Navy, Winifred Quick shaped naval policy concerning women and the jobs they would perform. Her work lead to a direct increase in enlistment, morale, educational standards and opportunity for advancement. Most importantly, the changes were real, substantial and permanent.

The author enlisted in the WAVES during World War II. Her graduate studies and work experience in personnel made her the ideal candidate for the job of WAVE personnel officer, and she took on the position with an eye to shaping navy policy towards women and the jobs they would perform. Remaining in the service after the war, Mrs. Quick eventually rose to the rank of Captain which, at that time, was the highest rank for female officers in the Navy.

*More Than a Uniform* is superior to many of the accounts of ex-service women because it does not shy away from the discrimination and double standards that have plagued women who choose military service as a career: The author does not dismiss the hurdles women faced with that time-less excuse, "But that is the way people thought back then...:" Instead, she highlights the problems, how they were created and usually, how they were solved. For instance, in one of the more remarkable accounts of this book, Captain Quick describes her investigation of inadequate promotions for senior female officers. It turned out that navy intelligence investigators routinely accused women of lesbianism because they may have been seen holding hands with another woman or because the two women shared an apartment: Instead of making a decision about the woman, intelligence would pass its report filled with unsubstantiated innuendo on to the male officer who would be employing the woman should she get the promotion. Most often, these male officers would refuse to consider the woman, with the result that the job then went to a male. Meanwhile the security clearance was left in an indeterminate state so that the women never knew why they had been denied a promotion. These investigations and other discriminatory practices were quickly ended by the author.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this book is the author’s attitude towards women in the Navy as a whole. In order to increase morale and enlistment, Captain Quick focused on both the personal and the professional. Invisible barriers to advancement were made visible and then removed: Educational opportunities for women were increased, as were promotions and posting opportunities. She designed new and improved uniforms which were easier to care for and which "flattered" the female form. A woman, it seems, should not have to look like a man in order to succeed in a man’s navy.

This is the essence of Captain Quick’s long and highly successful career. She, and the women she supported, succeeded because of their intelligence and superior job performance. But her approach was often contradictory; she struggled to remove sexist and gender specific discrepancies in personnel evaluation and career progression, yet she emphasized physical differences in dress and personal grooming. Women should be allowed to wear their hair longer because women “look better” with long hair. Navy women were to be smart and well turned out; she decreased the acceptable weight limits to ten pounds beneath the insurance industry’s standards. The mess dress was redesigned to include a skirt with a slit up the side and a tiara-style head band.

This work is strictly autobiographical and as such, the author shies away from abstract discussions of the role and significance of female participation in the US Navy. Captain Quick does not evaluate the changes wrought in society by service women, changes in military thinking or the attitudes of servicewomen themselves about their role. What this book does chronicle, however, is the extraordinary life of one of the most powerful women in the US Navy and her contributions to that service. Captain Quick’s wit and honesty makes this factual account a fascinating tale.

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