
This is a collection of six essays originally presented at a 1993 conference organised by the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies at the University of Exeter. John Travis writes on English sea-bathing between 1730 and 1900; John Walton looks at the spread of sea-bathing from England where it began to other European centres during the period 1750 to 1939; Paul Thornton provides a regional study of coastal tourism in Cornwall since 1900; Nigel Morgan examines the emergence of modern resort activities in inter-war Torquay; and Janet Cusack and Roger Ryan write on aspects of English yachting history, the former focusing on the Thames and south Devon, the latter on the northwest.

The essays cover a broad time period and subject matter, but there are some common themes, with class the dominant one. Although sea-bathing first gained notice in the eighteenth century among the well-to-do for its supposed medicinal value, Travis and Walton both argue that the practice had a "pre-history" in folk culture. Thus its growth followed a route from folk custom to elite practice before it "percolated downwards" [Walton, 40] to the working class in the nineteenth century. Morgan notes the democratising influence of the automobile on Torquay's tourist trade. This caused a shift in the makeup of the holidaying public from the "cl ass es to the masses." [85] Only in yachting did the transition beyond the wealthy élite not extend to the working class (at least not before 1939); Ryan attributes this largely to snobbery [168]. Still, fear of the superior physical and sailing abilities of fishermen did not prevent yachtsmen from taking them on as crewmembers for races, which was permissible so long as they did not take the helm.

The importance of royal patronage in legitimising and popularising recreational pursuits is a common thread in Walton's case studies of Brighton, Nice, and San Sebastian, and Cusack and Ryan both recognise its role in the development of yachting. On a more practical level, improvements in transportation — from steamboats to trains to automobiles — encouraged mass tourism and permitted the emergence of seaside resort towns and even resort "clusters." [Walton, 46] With the onset of mass tourism, advertising assumed a key role, as Morgan makes clear for Torquay. As for image, Walton and Morgan both argue convincingly that, at least until 1939, local communities had a large say in how they wished to be portrayed to potential visitors.

There is little with which to quibble in this fine collection. Travis offers no explanation for the nineteenth-century transition in bathing circles from a medicinal focus to an emphasis on the physical activity of swimming, though he admits that this was "a fundamental change in the bathing ritual." [16] Citing Perry's work on Cornwall, Thornton seems to embrace the notion that, because tourism has become commodified, its shelf life is necessarily limited "like all mass consumer products." [76] That conclusion is contradicted by the evidence in this collection, which attests to the long and rich history of seaside tourism, and the industry's ability to adapt over time. While the commodity may indeed change, it gives every appearance of being here to stay.

James E. Candow
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


*Mare Balticum: The Baltic — Two Thousand Years* is a magnificently produced summary of Baltic maritime history, aimed at non-specialists. A "coffee-table book," this large-format volume
is not designed to break new ground; rather, it does an admirable job of introducing and synthesizing the main sweep of Baltic history over the *longue durée*. Ehrensvård and Kokkonen are academic historians who specialize in marine cartography; Nurminen is a business leader who is a serious map collector and student of maritime exploration. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Baltic's geography, topography, and hydrography are foregrounded here. *Mare Balticum* is lavishly illustrated to support its main focus, with a great many full-colour reproductions of rare historical charts, portolans, and atlas-maps as well as modern maps showing trade routes.

The story begins with the first recorded mentions of the Baltic, with a discussion of Pliny, Strabo, Ptolemy, and of Pytheas of Marseilles who sailed with Phoenicians from Cadiz in 320 BC to Jutland and “Thule” (possibly northern Norway). It then continues through the Vikings, the Hanseatic League, the Teutonic Knights, the rise and rivalry of the Danish and Swedish kingdoms, and the domination of the carrying trades by the British and the Dutch, ending with the coming of steam. The dominant maritime technologies of each epoch receive special attention, usually in sidebars or inserts. Thus, one gets good capsule histories of the Viking long-ship, the Hanseatic cog, the hulk, and the flute. There are also informative reviews of navigational tools and techniques such as compasses, goniometry, measurement of longitude, sounding, salvage, pilotage, and lighthouses. One minor critique: the analogous insects on various trades, e.g., grain, tar, fish, etc., are less informative than the descriptions of technologies.

Although all areas of the Baltic are covered, Sweden and Russia are examined particularly closely. For scholars and others who know little about the Baltic, or who view the Baltic through, say, a British or Dutch lens, the emphasis on the activities of the eastern Baltic monarchies will be especially useful. Thus, Russia's emergence as a Baltic power is traced concisely through the development of Russian knowledge about the seaways and coastlines. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Swedish contributions to marine cartography, coastal fortification design, and ship architecture are described well and succinctly.

*Mare Balticum*’s visual appeal and wide scope make it a delight for browsing; there are tidbits worth a pause on nearly every page. For instance, scattered throughout pages 39-100 are numerous seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cityscapes, some in bird’s-eye view, others depicted from the vantage point of a ship approaching the harbour. Among the cities featured are Tallinn, Reval, Stralsund, and Visby. Elsewhere one learns that Tallinn’s name comes from the Estonian for “Danish City,” a reminder of geopolitics and colonization in a bygone age.

We learn that the water levels of Stockholm harbour have been measured continuously since 1774, the longest series of such measurements in the world, that the Hanseatic merchants apparently did not make much use of map or compass, and that the Swede Johan Maansson, whose sailing directions for the Baltic were very influential when published in 1644, did not include any coastline sketches and determined distances by guesswork. Appendices provide detail on fifty-three naval battles fought in the Baltic between 1000 and 1855, and on sixty-eight historic wreck sites.

The editors have given us a valuable gateway to Baltic maritime history. *Mare Balticum* provides not only a good framework of that history, but, with its lush graphics, also provides insights into how the peoples ringing the Baltic have perceived and imagined, visualized and conceived of their shared sea. The book is thus a cultural history as much as a compendium of data on Baltic technology, mathematics, naval conflict, and economy. It deserves a place on bookshelves next to Johannes Schildhauer’s *Die Hanse: Geschichte und Kultur* (Kohlhammer, 1984) and the 1990 reissue of Blaeu’s *The Grand Atlas* by the Royal Geographic Society/Rizzoli. One final comment: *Mare Balticum* may also be an exemplar for fruitful collaboration between academe and the business world, sponsored as it was by the Nurminen Foundation (linked to the Nurminen business group); one can only hope that other commercial enterprises will emulate Nurminen’s good efforts.

Daniel A. Rabuzzi
Decorah, Iowa

With *An Atlas of Maritime Florida*, the team of authors led by Roger Smith, chief maritime archaeologist at the Florida Bureau of Archaeological Research, have created a model for future publications aiming to combine geographic, historic, and archaeological data in an examination of regional maritime activity. In order best to develop management programs for the location, assessment, protection and interpretation of shipwrecks, the historic and geographic context for the coastal region in question should be established. This small book is a public byproduct of a multi-year project supported by the Coastal Management Program in Florida. Broad questions addressed by both the study and the publication include: where were the traditional sailing and shipping routes? what were the sailing and navigation technologies that helped sailors avoid danger and arrive at their intended destinations? what were the principal hazards that resulted in shipwrecks and where were these most likely to occur? what aspects of commerce and industry determined the nature and routes of vessels in the different historical periods? what shipwrecks have been recorded or identified already and how are these distributed in space and time?

Shipwrecks, of course, attract great public interest. The most common popular type of publication dealing with shipwrecks, however, is the “wreck diver’s guide” following a formula which tends to focus on sites distinguished by their photogenic character or easy access for divers, while limiting the historic background to specifics of the wrecking events, and referring to geography only as far as to locate the most treacherous reefs and headlands. On the other hand, studies of regional maritime history, rare as they may be, generally ignore recent archaeological data gathered on shipwreck sites. The authors of *An Atlas of Maritime Florida* lay no claim to presenting new or original work, but the format of the resulting publication is new and original, and it is a format which merits recreating. At less than US $10 this soft-bound volume offers an inexpensive and inviting introduction to Florida’s maritime heritage. Six chapters are entitled the “Physical Environment,” “Growth of Maritime Florida,” “Maritime Industries,” “Navigation and Ship Types,” “Hazards and Aids to Navigation,” and “Ship Losses and Shipwrecks.” As would be expected from an atlas there are maps — about fifteen of them, though they tend to be a little simplistic and all are reproduced only in black, white and grey tones. Colour maps and some photos could well have generated a sufficient increase in sales to offset their greater cost.

An introductory study should skim a broad range of pertinent topics and stimulate as many questions as it addresses. This atlas does not disappoint on either count. The reader learns about maritime activities as diverse as wrecking, smuggling, windsurfing, and the creation of artificial reefs. Topics of a less regionally specific nature such as the development of navigational instruments and ship types are also superficially covered. The brief text tantalizes the moderately informed reader. For example, I was impressed to learn of the great number of native canoes, including the oldest find in North America (5,000 years old), which have been recovered archaeologically throughout the state. Yet I was left wanting more details as to the age and form of these early craft. I would also like to learn more about the rival activities of the Spanish, French and British expeditions to the peninsula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A local commercial fishery emerged in the 1860s, but there are few clues as to rigs or regional characteristics found on the local fishing smacks and smaller “chings.” And what about the effects of recent environmental damage? Many readers, including some younger ones perhaps, will feel that the authors sacrificed too much detail in their quest to keep the text brief and accessible. While an annotated bibliography would have better served the reader inspired to seek more information, this atlas lists forty-eight citations along with forty-six works recommended for further reading.

Studies based on the format provided in *An Atlas of Maritime Florida* could be usefully produced in many areas of the world. Considerable new data from archaeological sites under-water have been gathered in recent years by both professional and avocational underwater archaeo-
logical groups. Unfortunately the dissemination of this information has not kept pace. Too much data remain unpublished, while the majority of reports are technical or academic in nature and are rarely presented in a popularly digestible fashion. Compiling this data on a summary basis and setting it in an historic and geographic context has a number of benefits besides the obvious opportunity to educate and, one hopes, to entertain the general public. The diving public may also gain a better appreciation of some of the larger questions which may be addressed through the study of intact archaeological assemblages they tour on the seabed. The process of creating such a study also benefits professionals charged with managing these sites. Not only can the process go lockstep with the development of regional management plans for underwater cultural resources, as was the case with the creation of the atlas under review, but it is clear that the process of writing the atlas, in providing an all too rare synopsis and contrast of sites in a region, will help generate new and often interdisciplinary research designs for future archaeological projects. In terms of both process and product An Atlas of Maritime Florida remains well worth emulating.

Charles D. Moore
Ottawa, Ontario


Scientists and the Sea is a scholarly treatment of the development of what today is called oceanography. It begins with a brief sketch of thoughts and notions about the sea from the ancient Greeks to the Renaissance. Then, in some detail, the book describes the development of oceanographic ideas and theories from the mid-1600s through the late 1800s. First published in 1971, this reprint edition has been lightly revised with a new introduction, an expanded bibliography and correction of minor errors.

The first several chapters are a review, from the fragmentary information that exists, of the ancients' views of the nature of the ocean and oceanic phenomena. The second section of the book is a much more detailed look at the work carried out by seventeenth-century investigators, many of whom — such as Boyle, Hooke, Lavoisier, Whewell, and Huxley — are among today's great names in science. In the third section of the book, the role of the natural historians and "amateur" scientists of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century is documented. Emphasis here is on the development of the physical concepts of marine science (i.e., the study of tides, currents, the physical properties of sea water) — these being of practical interest to mariners and, in particular, the navigators of those times. Particularly interesting is Deacon's description of the many ingenious devices, such as protected thermometers and reversing thermometers, Hooke's sampling devices, and the messenger, that were designed to obtain information about the deep sea. Numerous illustrations of these early oceanographic devices are found in this section. The author also notes, during this period, the beginnings of marine chemistry — the chemical analyses of seawater and the recognition of the conservative properties of the major ionic constituents. The emphasis in the fourth (and final) section of the book is on life in the ocean. Major concepts (organism diversity and distribution, deep sea biology, the myth of Bathybius) are introduced along with significant pioneers in early marine biology like Forbes, Thompson, and Carpenter. The HMS Challenger expedition, its aftermath and its impact on oceanography are discussed in some detail.

The author suggests that she has written this account "within the western scientific tradition." More specifically, the book was written from a decidedly Anglo-centric perspective. We are therefore often subjected to tedious detail about the wranglings of the British scientific establishment while the contemporaneous accomplishments of other countries' marine scientists receive but brief note. As well, coverage of the various sub-disciplines is uneven throughout the book. This is perhaps more a function of the manner in which the science developed than a fault of the author. Deacon describes much of the early work in marine science relating to physical oceanographic conceptual development (waves, tides, currents, density, temperature). She also
documents the early studies of water chemistry (origin of salt, salinity concepts, etc.). Description of studies relating to life in the sea appears late in the book. Marine geology, other than a few notations on the retrieval of bottom sediments during deep sea soundings, is considered hardly at all, other than as it relates to the coral reef controversy and the debates between Murray, Dana and Darwin in the late 1800s.

Minor criticisms include the mildly distracting use of asterisks to mark corrections in the text and the use of English system units rather than SI. As well, some inconsistencies in font usage are puzzling. For instance, the term "deep-sea" often appears in a different font than the rest of the text on the page.

Scientists and the Sea, 1650-1900: A Study of Marine Science is not light reading but it should be considered required reading for any serious student of the sea. Deacon has done a great service to the field of oceanography in that she has helped establish the history of the multi-discipline. As well, in the second edition, she has supplied valuable and comprehensive references to information that has appeared since the first edition of her book. Of particular note is the bibliography to the second edition. These references and their annotations/comments alone would make the acquisition of Scientists and the Sea more than worthwhile. Instructors of introductory oceanography courses who wish to give more comprehensive historical information to their students than textbooks usually offer will find this volume invaluable.

William J. Iams
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


The commander of a destroyer escort re-commissioned for the Korean war chooses to remember here only some lighter times of instructive discovery and misadventure on patrol in Micronesia. The "emeralds" of his title merge his memoir with an earlier friendly one of Joseph Conrad. In Meredith's time the USS Hanna enjoyed what today's outsider might call a "gopher mandate" from HQ Guam to promote good relations while being seen to keep good order. The result is a prevailingly cheerful book, true to the author's personal journal of the period, about the temper and mood of a postwar island world not yet rising to post-colonial expectations. The value of the book to most readers will be a function of its personal, anecdotal style and the choice of incident with which the region's historical setting is sketched in. The good ship commemorated here was not finally scrapped until 1971.

The waters most traveled were the eastern Carolines — the scattered isles most explored there by commander and crew were (in the orthography of the day) Ponape and Truk — and, in the western Carolines, Ulithi, Palau, and Yap. Three patrols touched base in the Northern Mariannas, particularly visiting Chichi Jima. Journal notes and dioramic histories give the reader a sense for what Meredith found in the aftermath of the mid-century Japanese incursions or subsequently uncovered through archival work for each of these six ports of call.

Some readers will enjoy getting back the feel of life aboard a tight little Navy ship trying to deal softly but well with Japanese poaching. Others will find the notes on at least a hundred earlier ships of all sorts and nations (some few vessels luckier than most) worth sifting through. The reference list is sorted between works cited (about seventy-five items of particular interest to specialists) and further readings (equally many items sampling the historical and ethnographic literatures on the region). The graphics are a light gathering of old photos, pages from the author's journals, itineraries, and curiosities all germane to the lines of the book. This reviewer valued the book mainly for the enquiring mind behind it, and for a taste of island histories yet to be written. The villains of Meredith's pieces (whalers, missionaries, European or Asian empire builders) are perhaps not always given their day in court. But the author is perceptive and able to share his views with readers in the style of an accomplished travel author. He finds easy ways of backing up the camera to include himself in a handful of yarns without needing to strut and fret. At the same time, what we see of his emeralds at
mid-century is necessarily what was learned by a passing sailor, not what might have been heard at first hand, verified on deeper acquaintance, and recorded in the spirit of a Conrad or Melville.

George Park
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island


In 1546 Alasdair Crotach (hunchback), officially known as Alexander MacLeod, eighth chief of the MacLeods of Harris and Dunvegan, was laid to rest in his elaborate tomb in the ancient church of St Clement’s at Rodil on the isle of Harris. Among the numerous intricately carved figures and medieval scenes on his tomb is a Hebridean birlinn under sail, done with such meticulous technical detail that even the stitches on the panels of sailcloth are shown.

With this stone carving as a firm base, John MacAulay sets out on the long journey of probing into the early period of Hebridean maritime history. He describes the Viking colonisation and very cleverly argues in favour of Norse influence on early Scottish wooden shipbuilding, concluding with a proposal for a reconstruction of the hull of a birlinn inspired very much by the Norwegian Gokstad Viking ship excavated 1880. He then gives an account of "The craft of the shipwright": the sailors, extinction, transition, and relics of the birlinn. In all, MacAulay has proposed a very well disposed design, and his investigation is not all in the wrong; but...

...but the flaw in his thesis is that he, along with most people outside Scandinavia, regards "Norse" as meaning only Norwegian. In fact, there are a number (ten) of Viking ship finds of considerable size in Sweden, Denmark, and North Germany that might have given him valuable information about the design and construction of the birlinn, had he only delved a bit deeper. It is for instance very strange that, among the few books in his bibliography, MacAulay refers to Vikingskibshallens Badsamling by Morten Gothche of Roskilde, which is a very good book indeed about recent working boats of Scandinavia, yet MacAulay breathes not a word which might draw attention to the remarkable fact that the world famous Viking Ship Museum in Roskilde, Denmark has as its main exhibit several ancient Viking ships as well as a large number of publications, many in English, about them. Had he read but a few of them, his investigations would have been much more updated, and he would have had no need to lament in his conclusion that "It can be very frustrating to spend many hours of investigative work, without the benefit of material evidence, aiming to prove beyond doubt that legend and folklore are indeed fact."

According to MacAulay, a glance at a photograph of the ship carving at Rodil shows the birlinn to have a markedly deeper draft than the Gokstad ship and any other Viking ship. I for my eyesight cannot see it on the reproduction of the photograph in the book. But MacAulay, in consequence of this perception, proposes a reconstruction with sections that look like a mixture between the Gokstad ships and a Shetland sixareen. This would probably not be a bad boat, but it is startling to note that Colin Mudie, the well-known naval architect and designer of replicas of classic ships like the Matthew (which figured so prominently in last year’s Cabot 500 celebrations), arrived at a quite different and somewhat shallower bottom shape with slacker sections when he used the Rodil carving as a source in his reconstruction of Aileach, an admittedly smaller Hebridean galley for the "Lord of the Isles Voyage" to the Faroe Islands in 1991. Which bottom is closest to the model? Who is right? I cannot tell as, unfortunately, I have never seen the fair Isle of Harris. But a disagreement there certainly is.

John MacAulay had devoted a substantial part of the book to “Ship Blessing,” a Gaelic composition. This was an immensely positive surprise to me. This piece of ancient poetry is really something. Dr. Alexander Nicolson, the translator of the poem, says it best: "the first 181 lines are not only exceptionable, but quite unequalled in the whole poetry of the sea...the conception is original, the plan artistic, and the execution to a certain extent, in the highest degree, masterly." And he is dead right! That piece of poetry alone is worth the book’s weight in gold. For example, it is a common prejudice
among seamen that a frightened sailor with a bucket is the best pump you can have on board. Now, listen to this passage advocating some more positive qualifications for the baler:

Set ye to bale out the brine
An active hero,
Who will never faint nor fear,
For sea roaring,
Who will not get numb or weak
For the cold brine or hail,
Dashing on his breast and neck
In chill splashes;
With a great round wooden vessel
In his brown fist,
Ever pouring out water
In that rushes,
Who won’t straighten his strong back
From firm stiffness,
Till he leave not on the floor
One drop running,
And though all her boards were leaking
Like a riddle,
Will keep every bit as dry
as a cask stave.

The book ends with two good appendices. The first is a valuable glossary. Among other good words it mentions the Old Norse word “jomfru” for “purchase,” though unfortunately it does not state that jomfru in reality means “virgin” (good to know if you come across to Scandinavia one day, so much the more as we use the expression “to haul a purchase (jomfru) thin” in our ships!). The second appendix is a brilliant demonstration of the fact that place names in the old days were used as an aid to coastal navigation. Of course they were. It is quite obvious. Yet most people do not understand this. The Norwegian scholar Roald Morcken knew it, and wrote a treatise about it (Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1969 [Bergen 1970]). And, among other things, I am working with exactly those ideas right now.

MacAulay’s book is strongly marked by his love of his country, its landscape, its people, its poetry, and its boats. That certainly does him credit. And so does the pragmatic piece of advice that completes his conclusion: “Never be long upon the sea in autumn by your own will.”

Max Vinner
Roskilde, Denmark


This book is the latest in a long line of distinguished works on ship design and construction from David MacGregor’s prolific pen. It is not his best; that distinction still belongs to his classic The Tea Clippers, first issued in 1952 and updated in 1983. It is, nevertheless, an eminently worthwhile contribution that helps to fill a lingering void in the history of naval architecture.

As the author points out in his introduction, his latest effort is an expanded version of an earlier book, Schooners in Four Centuries, which appeared fifteen years ago. The new edition includes a re-written and expanded text, as well as numerous additional illustrations. It consists of eighteen brief chapters that survey the history and evolution of the schooner from its origin in seventeenth-century Holland to its use in our own time. The approach is categorical, but at the same time chronological. Beginning with a basic definition of the rig and a description of its European antecedents, MacGregor works his way through chapters on (among other craft) shallops and Chebacco boats, privateers and Baltimore clippers, naval schooners, Continental schooners, schooner yachts, pilot boats and fishermen, and the large multi-masted coasting schooners of turn-of-the-century North America.

Unsurprisingly, given his British citizenship and European orientation, the author is at his best when discussing developments on the eastern side of the Atlantic. Four excellent chapters detailing the history of the British schooner in the nineteenth century highlight the book. Especially illuminating is MacGregor’s discussion of the English topsail schooner, or “schooner-brigantine,” which combined square and fore-and-aft sails; although the standard schooner rig in Britain (and Europe generally), it is a relatively unfamiliar configuration to most North Americans and worthy of special attention. MacGregor is less successful in presenting certain American types. His commentaries on Yankee fishing,
piloting, and yachting schooners, for example, can best be described as superficial, but he does redress the balance somewhat with a fine section on East and West Coast coasting schooners.

Illustrations form the backbone of this study. The more than two hundred period photographs, historical prints and engravings, paintings, and architectural drawings — more than one for every page — nearly qualify The Schooner as a coffee-table production. Unquestionably, one of the genuine pleasures of perusing a MacGregor book is the expectation, seldom disappointed, of encountering several rare or previously unseen photos the author has uncovered in his wide-ranging pictorial research. This volume is no exception in that regard. About a quarter of the illustrations take the form of lines, sail, and construction plans, many drawn in MacGregor’s own hand, adding further evidence of why he has been called “the British Chapelle.”

Perhaps the most positive aspect of The Schooner is that, unlike previous books on the subject, it traces parallel developments in Europe and America, showing the cross-fertilization of ideas in hull shape, for instance, while simultaneously pointing out divergent patterns of design related to size and tonnage, multiple masting, centreboards, and the use of square sails. Since it is essentially a survey and summary of work already done, an inevitable weakness of the book is that it breaks no new ground. It does, however, bring together previous scholarship in a convenient, accessible format and places it in an international context. Those seeking detailed information on specialized aspects of schooner development will have to consult other, more narrowly focused studies, such as Basil Greenhill’s The Merchant Schooners and Howard I. Chapelle’s The American Fishing Schooners.

Regrettably, it is impossible to end this review without mention of the book’s poor copy editing, the ultimate blame for which lies with the publisher rather than the author. The most serious of many editorial shortcomings is the inexplicable omission of commas where commas should be: around nonrestrictive dependent clauses beginning with “which” or “who” (e.g. pp. 19, 21, 30, 54, 139, 144), and between lengthy independent clauses separated by “and” or “but” (e.g. pp. 14, 29, 34, 151, 166, 181). This carries to an unacceptable extreme the use of the “open” punctuation style that has become widespread in publishing as a cost-cutting measure; it literally confuses in many instances what the author is trying to say.

Notwithstanding the obstacles created by the editing process, time spent with The Schooner will be time well spent, especially for those unfamiliar with the vessels described, or those who have heretofore considered them too mundane. MacGregor has done his part to rescue the schooner rig from scholarly neglect and to reacquaint us with its manifold forms and uses.

Wayne M. O’Leary
Orono, Maine


This is a really wonderful book, for a variety of reasons, at a variety of levels. Despite its rather formal title, it is a surprisingly accessible second-level step to understanding just what it is you do when you are sailing. It is addressed to those who have sailing experience under their belt and who are looking to become licensed professionals. Yet it is more than just a study book for exam-crammers. It is also a guide to the how and why of much of what many seat-of-the-pants lifelong sailors know intuitively but would be hard-put to explain in words.

Most folks brought up under sail just know how the wind operates on a sail during a tack or jibe, but don’t know exactly why. Here are clear explanations, including descriptions of some of those quirky spaces we’ve all been in but weren’t sure why it happened — simple physics but puzzling sometimes, yet possibly critical in an emergency. The same goes for the fluid dynamics and gravitational physics of hull and rudder, seemingly simple, yet it kicks back on you at strange times. After reading this book, you’ll have an idea why.

It’s not an introduction to sailing — better you should get the oddly excellent Dummies Guide To Sailing for that — but rather, it is a step up to the theory of how and why it all happens. It also deals with handling historical rigs. Jibing a modern Marconi-rigged racing sloop is a lot
different from jibing a full-rigged ship! And, it is full of things for which you would otherwise have to go to other books, like rebuilding a clew, complete with stitching details. I can’t say that I am inspired by the “how-to’s” of helicopter rescue, but if I were the subject of it, I’d be mighty glad to know how it is done. And the section on weather, complete with an exciting example of a hurricane log, makes you realize how important being ahead of the game can be when you are far from the shore — it is one of the best tales of a northeast US hurricane at sea since the various descriptions of the CSS Alabama’s miraculous survival thanks to Lt. Lowe’s nautical acumen.

There are a number of sections that would put anyone off from becoming a professional sailor — details of the endless bureaucratic documents you have to have just to get from port to port with legal blessing, for a start — but, that’s the territory these days; even under sail, it’s a world of details that sometimes overwhelm the sea and sky. A section on shipboard middle management makes that clear, indeed.

If there is one key to why I liked this book, it is that it contains enough complexity to make you realize that you really ought to know more about what you thought you were accomplished at — and that it would be really exciting to go and find it out. For one like myself who grew up under sail and just “knows” the wind, the ship, the rigging, this is a good place to start, or for many of us, to rejoin the journey.

John Townley
Sea Cliff, New York


Smith Island forms a portion of the archipelago of marsh, waterways, and low-lying islands which separate the waters of Tangier Sound from Chesaapeake Bay. Like their forefathers, who settled there in the eighteenth century, the people of Smith Island are wholly dependent on their boats — boats designed for the watermen, as they are known locally, to harvest the crabs and oysters, which are the mainstay of their economy; boats to ferry their children to school twelve miles across the sound; and boats to drive around and have fun in. This book looks at the first of these categories.

Over the centuries, three distinct workboat types have evolved from the hollowed-out log canoes and bateaux used by the early settlers — crab-scraping boats, deadrise workboats and skiffs. Crab-scraping boats are designed to harvest blue crabs. This is accomplished by means of outboard-mounted crab scrapes, wide weighted nets designed to be dragged through the eel grass in shallow waters where the crabs like to hide during the peeler or soft shell stages of their molt. With their shallow draft and wide beam, these vessels are ideally suited to their purpose and their elegant lines reflect an ancestry which can be traced back to the days of sail when the crab scrapers were virtually small scale copies of the large oyster-dredging skipjacks. They are usually undecked and an awning is often rigged over the work area to protect both watermen and crabs in the heat of summer.

Dederise, or “baybuilt” workboats, range in size from thirty to forty-six feet and are used for crab potting and oystering. They are the Chesapeake Bay equivalents of the Maine lobster boat and the ubiquitous Cape Islander. The versatile V-bottom vessels boast powerful engines, a large work area and a fairly well-appointed cabin. They can be rigged with patent hydraulic tongs for oystering, or a mast and boom for hauling crab pots. They can even be used for crab-scraping, although, because of their draft, they are unable to work in very shallow waters.

Skiffs, the third and largest category of workboats found on Smith Island, are also the most widely used for personal transportation when running errands, visiting, or just "sporting around." Usually about eighteen feet long, fore and aft planked, with a shallow V-hull or flat bottom, the skiffs are powered by a transom-mounted outboard motor and can go anywhere among the narrow shallow passages which wind and loop through the vast marshes. They are also the ideal craft for certain types of work, such as
netting soft crabs, hand-lining, duck hunting, and hand-tonging oysters.

The Workboats of Smith Island is a very professional, informative and well-written account of Smith Island, its people and their boats. The many photographs used to illustrate the study are well chosen and cover virtually every aspect of the subject. The book is further enhanced by reproductions of Howard I. Chapelle’s 1940s documentation of the lines of a small crabbing bateau and a sailing skiff, which make an interesting comparison with those of Darlene, a modern crab-scraper, and Louise B., a deadrise workboat, both recorded in great detail by Richard K. Anderson Jr. in 1993.

The content and quality of the appendices, end-notes and glossary add to the impression that one has just completed a most enjoyable course on workboat recording and that Ms Johnson, through her study of the unique Smith Island fleet, has not only made a significant contribution to the study of such vessels, but has also set a standard against which future workboat studies will be measured.

Robin H. Wyllie
East LaHave, Nova Scotia


Books on boatbuilding history are rare enough, and books on Canadian boatbuilding history still more scarce. A year in which two such books appear is therefore cause for celebration. These two works have one notable thing in common beyond being about boatbuilding: they are both substantial, book-length treatments of subjects about which many people have heard a little.

Most of those with even a passing interest in the maritime history of the Great Lakes region will have heard of, or seen a photo of, a Mackinaw boat, a Collingwood skiff, or a Huron boat, to name but a few branches of this watercraft family. Especially in Ontario, a few more might associate the name of Watts with this type of boat. Very few indeed are likely aware of a seminal series of articles published by James P. Barty in Yachting magazine in the 1940s about the type. Beyond this, however, the story had not yet been truly told.

In the same way, most of those who have driven through or even heard of Ontario’s Muskoka district know of its legendary launches. Many have seen them assembled at one of their summer gatherings, row upon row of gleaming fittings and shining varnish. Those more in the know can recount the names of their builders, and speak with some knowledge of Ditchburns, Minettes and Greavettes. Some are members of the Antique and Classic Boat Society, and receive its journal Classic Boat. But unless you have assiduously read all of the back issues, or have looked through The Boatbuilders of Muskoka (Toronto, 1985), Bill Gray’s earlier volume, which he co-authored with boatbuilder A.H. Duke, or unless your family has summered in Muskoka for the last hundred years, you may not know much more about these boats. In both cases, then, the subjects were long overdue for an in-depth analysis.

W. Watts & Sons, Boatbuilders tells the story of one of the few families in Canada who could legitimately be called a boatbuilding dynasty. From Toronto and Collingwood to Vancouver, across several generations and for nearly a hundred years, the Watts family built boats. In the early 1840s brothers Matthew and William Watts, and a short time later their sister Jane, fled worsening social and economic conditions in their native Ireland and came to Toronto. Establishing themselves in a small way on Toronto Island, then a peninsula, they took up their old trade of boatbuilding. By the early 1850s, William had moved north to the townsite of Collingwood to build boats and to fish. He seems to have done both with some success, and as the family began to grow, eventually numbering fourteen children, so did their boatbuilding business.

That initial journey from the comparatively urban setting of late 1840s Toronto to the wilderness of the Collingwood townsite on the shores of Georgian Bay, and indeed the emigration to the
new world before that, established a pattern for
the men of the Watts family that eventually led
them all the way west to Vancouver via Port Ar
thur, James Bay and Hudson Bay, pioneering
as boatbuilders wherever they went.

The book is generously illustrated with
photographs and a few lines drawings. The qua-
ity of the photographs is outstanding, and they
alone are worth the price. Tracy Marsh is Direc-
tor/Curator of the Collingwood Museum, and
Peter Watts is the great-grandson of William
Watts. Peter has recently studied traditional
boatbuilding techniques, and Tracy has a long-
standing interest in the history of Collingwood
and the Watts family. Yet neither is a specialist in
maritime history or boatbuilding, so that this is
more a work of social and family history about
boatbuilders than it is about the boats themselves.

What weaknesses the book has stem from
this focus. For example, they make two assertions
about the Watts’ boatbuilding techniques that are
passed over but lightly and dealt with in a short
paragraph. The first is that Watts’ lifeboats were
built over a solid form with metal clenching
bands like the moulds used for wood-canvas
canoes. If that was the case, this is a very signifi-
cant example of production techniques being
applied to Ontario boatbuilding, and worthy of
further study. The second is that many of the
Watts lapstrake boats were built without moulds.
This technique is more often associated with
Scandinavian countries, and the boats built by
this method are characteristically bluff or pram-
bowed. Those are very different hull forms from
the Collingwood skiffs, with their sharp forefoot,
for which the firm is best known.

In both cases, this is important information
and could have been explored in greater detail.
There are occasional factual errors that also seem
the result of not having a trained eye for boats.
For instance, the boat illustrated in the construc-
tion plan on p. 179, designed to the Lake Yacht
Racing Association’s 20-foot rule by Toronto
naval architect T.B.F. Benson, is emphatically
not, as the authors assert, the same one that “can
be seen leaving the shop on page 162.” Try as I
might, I cannot see a “square-stemed Huron boat”
in the centre of the photograph on p. 34. In some
cases, the text is marred by poor proofreading, as
when the passengers on the ill-fated steamer Asia
return to their “births” [91] or when 1840s
Toronto is still referred to as York, which it had
not been since 1834. [5] The book also suffers
from an occasionally over-enthusiastic admiration
of the Watts’ boatbuilding work seen in isolation
which could have been balanced by a larger con-
sideration of their peers and context as boatbuild-
ers. Though they may have been outside the
scope and budget of the book, it would also have
been useful to have had a family tree for the
Watts’ extended family and even a partial check-
list of Watts-built boats.

These relatively minor drawbacks should
not, however, obscure what is in the end a consi-
derable achievement. W. Watts & Son, Boatbuild-
ers is a rich portrait of the history and legacy of a
significant Ontario family. The authors are parti-
cularly to be congratulated for forming their own
company to publish this and future books, and for
ensuring that the design is exceptionally attrac-
tive, and far beyond the standard usually set by
such works.

Wood & Glory: Muskoka’s Classic Launches
exhibits a similarly high quality of layout and
production. It belongs on the bookshelf, and
indeed the coffee table, of anyone with even a
passing interest in recreational watercraft. Wil-
liam Gray has written a substantial history of
boatbuilding in Muskoka during the heydey of
the pleasure craft era which captures the broad
sweep of the design, technological and commer-
cial development (and occasionally failure) of
these boatbuilders. He also writes from a deep
personal knowledge and appreciation of these
boats and with a connoisseur’s eye, and his
history is interspersed with the kind of detail so
important to the owners and restorers of these
boats: when did the windshield and ventilator
patterns change? what year was the spotlight
introduced? did one firm use a darker stain on
their mahogany than another?

His text is immeasurably enriched by the
photography of Timothy DuVernet, easily the
equal of other, better-known photographers who
specialize in wooden boats, such as the American
Benjamin Mendlowitz. One can only imagine the
hours of patient work that went into capturing
page after page of these launches at the dock, at
rest and underway. Armed with this book, one
will never see an older wooden boat or go to a
boat show the same way again.

Gray introduces readers to an era when "the
better sort of pleasure boat was built, not manufactured," and traces the rise of Muskoka as a summer destination for families with the means to become patrons of local boatbuilders. The builders rose to the challenge, and from just before World War I until just after the next war, they produced a quantity and quality of pleasure craft unique in the world. Some of these boats have been in continuous use since those times, often in the hands of their original owners; others have been returned to service after extensive rebuilding and restoration. When a number of them are gathered together, the result is a stunning display of care and craftsmanship.

Yet the book is more than just an appreciation and a celebration. Gray is candid about the boatbuilders’ business affairs, and extends his history to the larger social trends and forces that first created and then diminished a demand for boats like this. He raises the issue of modern restoration and repair of these boats, many now entering their eighth or ninth decade of service. He acknowledges that boats are dynamic objects, and were often modified every few years by their original owners to update their style or performance. For those carrying out a “restoration” this raises the question of just what state to which the boat is to be restored. He rightly criticises a tendency to over-repair and over-restore, and finds its origin in the competitive nature of antique and classic boat shows, subject to current and ever-changing notions of what is the “best” boat.

Throughout the book, Gray and DuVernet’s abiding affection for these boats shows through. The book is, like the boats themselves, a finely crafted and well-finished tribute to a unique era and an important chapter in the history of Canadian boatbuilding.

John Summers
Toronto, Ontario


In the world of canoeing, Bill Mason is a personality of mythical proportion. His paddling and tripping techniques are legendary. His sense of adventure, his reverence for nature, and his famous canoe instructional books and videos made him a Canadian wilderness icon. To attempt a biography of such a person less than a decade after his death therefore takes courage and sensitivity. There is always the risk of slipping into sentimentality and hero worship. James Raffan, however, succeeds admirably. Fire in the Bones probes beneath the surface of Mason’s accomplishments to reveal a man who was deeply religious and whose work was fired by a missionary zeal. For those readers who know Mason only as a great canoeist and wilderness man, Fire in the Bones is enlightening.

Born into a conservative middle-class family in the Winnipeg of 1929, Mason’s boyhood was influenced by a childhood growth deficiency, a severely religious and dominating grandmother, his emerging artistic talent and a love of the outdoors. He suffered a heart attack while still in his thirties and died in 1988 of cancer. In between, Mason was a film maker who won dozens of prestigious awards for his films about the Canadian wilderness. When his feature documentary, ”Cry of the Wild,” opened in New York City in 1974 it out-performed every major film at the box office with the exception of “The Exorcist.” After his film success, he turned to what he believed was his true vocation — painting — though he never attained the same level of accomplishment in this medium.

Raffan draws a compelling portrait of Mason as an artist driven not by ego or money, but by a need to share with others the beauty and wonder of the wilderness and, therefore, of God. Mason wrote that his work dealt with the spirit — "the spirit of man, the spirit of nature which is for me God." Writing with affection and admiration, Raffan describes Mason’s charismatic personality, his generous work with youth groups, the Mason broomball awards, attended by Pierre Trudeau. But Raffan writes without being sentimental and without overlooking the flaws that make for a true personality. His sources are Mason’s own journals and the memories of friends and family. The result is a very intimate and personal account. Raffan uses the information judiciously and with sensitivity as he recounts how Mason’s wife, Joyce, reached a turning point in her life after one of her husband’s illnesses. Raffan tiptoes gently around discussions of
family relationships and the central role Joyce played in Mason’s work. He is respectful but critical and hints at Mason’s obsessiveness and self-absorption as he describes how Joyce carried the burden of raising children and keeping house.

Raffan is balanced in his account of Mason’s role in developing the Canadian canoeing tradition, attributing the popularity of the famous canoe instructional films not only to his extraordinary talent as a filmmaker but also to sheer good timing. The films “Path of the Paddle” and “Song of the Paddle” were commissioned by the National Film Board in the early 1970s when interest in the wilderness, environmentalism and recreational canoeing were taking off. Partially the result of lighter, stronger boats and improved rail transportation, wilderness canoeing was riding a wave of popularity. Raffan explains that canoeing associations and canoeing camps were hungry for something to fill the growing demand for instructional programs. Raffan suggests that Mason’s canoe films almost inadvertently fed this need and gained him instant recognition and adulation. Raffan knew Mason personally and was inspired to write the book out of a desire to celebrate his life. In so doing he has provided an invaluable personal account of an important era in recreational canoeing in Canada. He has also given us a passionate and sympathetic account of the man whose name has become synonymous with the canoeing tradition in Canada. Fire in the Bone is indeed a celebration.

Karen Black
Toronto, Ontario


When invited to review this book I suffered that sinking feeling we remember from undergraduate tutorials: how had I missed the first edition of a book on my home city? I had not: this “second edition” is actually an up-date of Lane’s Liverpool, Gateway of Empire (1987).

The book sometimes exudes a Scouse patriotism exceeding even that for which this reviewer has been unjustly criticised: the zeal of the convert, perhaps, since Lane confesses to having been born a long way south of the Mersey. The cynic might view its four central chapters as rather disparate essays strung together by an introduction and what is, in all but name, an epilogue. That would be a hasty and inadequate judgement.

There are one or two problems. When the author uses B.G. Orchard’s Liverpool’s Legion of Honour (Birkenhead, 1893) as a source for the narrowness of Liverpool’s manufacturing base in the 1890s, he fails to take sufficient account of Orchard’s snobbery. When Orchard wrote that there were only five significant firms in all branches of metal-working, shipbuilding included, he actually meant that only five such firms were headed by individuals he deemed worthy of inclusion in his collection of potted biographies of the great and the good of contemporary Liverpool. He specifically excluded joint-stock companies. Liverpool’s manufacturing base was narrow, but Orchard is not the source to prove it.

There is one instance of maritime tunnel vision. On page 55 we are told that the phenomenon of the vast integrated company was “first seen in its modern form in the liner companies of Liverpool and London.” This is untenable: railway companies had been integrating since the Liverpool & Manchester first ran a connecting omnibus service in 1830; railways moved into shipowning and operation, civil, mechanical and electrical engineering, road and canal haulage, warehousing, cartage, port construction and operation, hotels, laundries and eventually domestic airlines. The LNWR even made its own soap. The major players controlled budgets and workforces exceeding those of the armed forces, and the capital of the top handful ran into tens of millions apiece, which was why there were persistent and unsuccessful attempts to control or nationalise them from the 1840s onwards.

Those seem severe criticisms, but this is a book of sharp contrasts in theme, in method and in mood. The author doubtless expected to find corresponding variety in reaction to what he has written. Some parts are carefully researched according to conventional scholarly methods, others are documented from a major oral history research programme which he co-directed. Much more, though, is the fruit of his own long experi-
ence, wise reflection and acute insight. Those penetrate every aspect of the city and its history and are difficult, perhaps impossible, to fault.

The "puff" on the rear cover seems at first remarkably ill-chosen since it comes from a review by jazz singer George Melly, descendant of an old Liverpool shipping family. Melly castigates Liverpool's inability to adapt: we who live there might attribute that failure in part to families like the Mellys who made their reputation in Liverpool and "adapted" by spending their money in London. Even worse, the review was published in The Guardian, formerly, of course, The Manchester Guardian. But what it claims is that Lane "encapsulates Liverpool's unique spirit." That seemingly wild and unmeasurable claim is one which the book fully justifies. It may not add much to the sum of human knowledge, but it does the understanding a power of good.

Adrian Jarvis
Liverpool, England


If the study of ports has largely been neglected by maritime historians, our knowledge of the development of Asian ports is even more unsure. For this reason the appearance of this generally useful, if somewhat uneven, collection is especially welcome. In many ways a sequel to Frank Broeze's earlier Brides of the Sea, this anthology of original studies on ports stretching from Aden to Vladivostok should be required reading for all maritime historians. But it should also be on the reading lists of all urban historians, for once again Professor Broeze has asked his authors to utilize the concept of "port city" as a conceptual framework. And since, as Broeze argued in the introduction to Brides and repeats here, the port city concept "means that the economic, social, political and cultural life of that city is also predominantly determined by and has to be analysed in the light of that port function," most of the essays will be of interest to an even larger audience.

Readers who pick up this book will find a collection that is diverse spatially, temporally and qualitatively. Spatially, the essays range from Hassan Saleh Shihab's study of Aden and Broeze's treatment of "Kuwait before Oil," through Mariam Dossal's analysis of Bombay and Sanjay Subrahmanym's examination of Masulipatnam, to Robert Valliant's essay on Vladivostok and Peter Rimmer and Toni Taniuchi's article on Japanese seaports. While Chinese seaports are absent, it would be hard to argue that this is an unreasonable geographic spread.

A similar point might be made about the temporal sweep. Shihab, Subrahmanym, and Christopher Wake (whose study of Banten is absolutely superb) examine the period before 1750. Ken McPherson's convincing study of Penang and Dossal's analysis of the relationship between the food supply and public order in Bombay focus on the period 1750-1850. The century to 1950 is the principal focus for Broeze, Rhoads Murphey's study of Colombo, Malcolm Falkus' examination of Bangkok, and Valliant. The remaining four — Takeshi Yamasaki, Kanae Tanigawa and Gayl D. Ness on Kobe and Niigata, Hans Schenk on Alleppey, Keith Trace on the ASEAN ports, and Rimmer and Taniuchi — look principally at the post-World War II era, although the temporal boundaries are somewhat flexible.

Less alluring is the unevenness in quality. Some essays are first-rate. Dossal's on Bombay is imaginative and will serve as an excellent introduction to her other works on the city. Broeze's on Kuwait is, as all his work, fascinating and insightful. While the central argument in Subrahmanym's essay on Masulipatnam will be familiar to those who know his other works, some of his "speculations" are thought-provoking. My favourite essay is Wake's on Banten, which is well-researched, meticulously written and splendidly argued. There are also a number of craftsman-like pieces that are excellent introductions to the port cities involved. In this group I would place the essays by McPherson on Penang, Falkus on Bangkok, Valliant on Vladivostok, and Keith Trace on the post-1945 ASEAN ports.

The remaining essays, however, are disappointing in one or more ways. Hassan Saleh Shihab's article is far too brief, especially considering that he covers more than three centuries and
writes on a city whose history will be little understood by most readers. Rhoads Murphey's essay on Colombo is not nearly as insightful or stimulating as his best work. Yamasaki, Tanigawa and Ness' piece on Kobe and Niigata is marred by an argument which at times approaches old-fashioned geographic determinism. The chapter by Rimmer and Taniuchi is largely ahistorical, a pitfall that mars much contemporary history but which is especially bothersome here. Finally, there is Hans Schenck's essay on Alleppey. To be frank, each time I read it I get more confused about its purpose. Perhaps the subtitle will convey the crux of my confusion: "From a Port without a City to a City without a Port."

The unevenness, however, is not a reason to ignore this volume. Taken together, the essays reflect the state of the art. Indeed, on balance they provide a good deal of hope for the future, for collectively they are better than Broeze's Brides of the Sea or Franklin Knight's and Peggy Liss' Atlantic Port Cities, the two most important anthologies on port towns to appear in the last decade. Those of us interested in the history of port cities have a good deal for which to thank Frank Broeze and his contributors.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


Richard Hall, an English journalist with extensive experience in Africa, here tackles a task which has daunted historians — the history of the Indian Ocean from the ninth century AD to 1890. Hall tries to accomplish this through a series of vignettes (portraits of individual persons and places somewhere along the Indian Ocean's shore), rather than through a straight chronological history. This method can be used to good effect: carefully drawn miniatures may give a better image than a grand narrative and, as Hall rightly points out [513], no such a "big book" exists on the Indian Ocean. Hall's book certainly does not fill this need, nor does it pretend to try. It should instead be conceived as an exciting historic novel with some grounding in history. Such books certainly are a good read and may convey a good feeling for the topic although they may not always be very accurate or complete according to the most exacting standards of scholarship.

The vignettes allow for good story-writing and for bringing the great forces of history down to the level of individual persons, with all their weaknesses, with whom the reader can identify. This most strongly applies for the first part of the book, called "a world apart," which deals with the Indian Ocean and the South China Seas before 1498. Rather than giving an account of the ups and downs of the trade, Hall here seeks to convey a picture of the gorgeous, miraculous and often cruel east, familiar from The Thief of Baghdad, or of a wild and equally gorgeous Africa straight out of Rider Haggard's King Solomon's Mines. He does this by giving a series of long portraits of curious personalities full of fascinating details — such as the fact that Ibn Battuta always had a number of slave-girls with him, or that men in Calicut used to sew beads into their foreskin. [89] The disadvantage of this approach is that the reader is tossed to and fro about the Indian Ocean without much sense of time and place (except the general feeling that it is all very exotic).

With the coming of the Portuguese (the cannons of Christendom) Hall's task clearly became easier. The ups and downs of European empires are well described and provide the reader with a clear thread tying the story together. Not all parts of this period, however, are of the same interest to the storyteller. Hall now firmly omits any further reference to the seas east of Cape Comorin and focuses all his attention on the Arabian seas instead. He narrates the story of the Portuguese discoveries at considerable length (including those on the Guinea-coast) — this certainly makes for some tall stories — and then begins to focus upon East Africa and Ceylon. This is perfectly understandable for a writer whose preferred method of research for a historical work is "sailing down the East African Coast in a dhow and hitching lifts on the back of motorcycles in Sri Lanka"[511] rather than sitting in an archive. I am sure that most of us "dry-as-dust historians will envy him!

Although this may be a more beaten track than the previous period, we nevertheless get our
share of exciting stories, most of it now intended for the fan of Errol Flynn movies. There are lots of flashing daggers, firing guns or fiery adventurers but we hear little about trade and other such mundane matters. Nor did Hall feel that such a focus was necessary, because the cause of the decline of the Portuguese in India is that they “yielded to the temptations of the East” and all kept an entourage of female slaves, called “mossies” in Mozambique. But then every European was surrounded by a seraglio of oriental beauties, willing to rub their back — and more — after the slightest hint, [327]

Part three (an enforced tutelage) then concentrates on what the entire book had originally been intended to be — a book about the discovery of the sources of the Nile. Here the reader gets more than his share of “out of Africa” romanticism. Hall closes with the first signs of nationalism: a film set with the American Paul Robeson naked except for a leopard-skin round his waist and, in stylish European clothes, an African extra by the name of Jomo Kenyatta, [507] It certainly makes for good bedside reading.

Rene Barendse
Canberra, Australia


Vasco da Gama is one of those men whose name we remember from school days long ago and about whom we learned next to nothing, save that he made a famous voyage in that busy year, 1497. He is, of course, more significant for the Portuguese, for whom he stands as a metonym of their golden age, when a peripheral European state dominated the rich trade of a distant subcontinent. In fact, da Gama made three voyages to India. After the path-breaking voyage to Calicut in 1497-98, he returned as “Admiral” to the Malabar Coast in 1502-03 to make a spectacular attack on Muslim traders. The partial diversion of spices and other exotic Indian exports towards Portugal brought him wealth and fame. The violence and nepotism that typified his command brought troubles at court, however, and he remained in the political wilderness until 1523, when Dom Joao III sent him back to Goa, as Viceroy, charged with redefining Portugal’s presence in the East. He had barely made his policy of consolidation known when he died at Cochin in 1524, on Christmas Eve. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has set out to write a nuanced version of this crucial chapter in the history of European expansion, adopting an ironical viewpoint designed to escape Eurocentrism, both in analysis and in coverage of sources.

Subrahmanyam begins by tracing the memory of Vasco da Gama within the Portuguese tradition. He eventually finds its origins in the hero’s own lifetime, concluding that “the symbolic capital of the legend...could be made to yield actual financial, fiscal and material returns, in terms of a career trajectory that took Gama from a relatively marginal position in the lower nobility to a major landed title and position of grandee. [361] One of the strengths of the book is that it locates Gama within the socio-political landscape of late medieval Portugal. We have here a full background examination of the quasi-military Orders of Christ and of Santiago, which helps the reader understand the extent to which Portuguese expansion to the east was part of a political policy to contain Islam. This aim would, inevitably, come into conflict with commercial considerations and Subrahmanyam succeeds in relating this issue to the epic struggle between, on the one hand, the Portuguese monarchs like Dom Manuel who wanted a kind of royal capitalism in the east and, on the other hand, those like da Gama, who saw India as a place where a commercially-minded nobility might secure fortunes that they could later translate into landed rights in their homeland (as da Gama would do in his native Sines).

As he admits, Subrahmanyam oscillates between biography and history, but this generally serves his aim of going beyond history, in the straightforward narrative sense, to trace the historical formation of legend. In this vein, we can appreciate his well-illustrated discussion of the iconography of Vasco da Gama. Perhaps because of the focus on Portuguese legend, the book is more successful in presenting the Asian commercial context than it is in capturing Asian viewpoints on Vasco da Gama. Here, and occasionally elsewhere, the author gives what seems
to be arbitrary attention to a few minor and derivative conceptions of the hero (for example, a twentieth-century Bengali short story), leaving the reader wondering if a wider sampling of the literature of different ages might lend itself to different or further conclusions.

Subrahmanyam’s Vasco da Gama is comprehensive, well-referenced and generally clear, though several multi-page monster paragraphs have escaped editorial big-game control. At such moments the exposition drags and the reader loses all sense of direction in a crowd of Portuguese colonial officials and Indian princelings. In other words, the significance of the text is sometimes obscured by its own wealth of detail. In general, however, this is a convincing treatment of an interesting topic. Subrahmanyam alludes to various academic fads (he teaches at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris) but does not let his allusions come between the reader and a comprehensible analysis.

Peter Pope
St. John’s, Newfoundland


Published conference proceedings are enjoying something like an Indian summer. Often devoid of any sustained conceptual coherence, commercially unprofitable and rarely marketable, their predicted demise still has not yet eventuated. Here I am referring not to the fruits of tightly organized conferences and symposia with clearly defined themes and agendas, but to the printed reflections of talk fests where participants are given free rein to roam far and wide. The volume at hand is one of the latter category.

A meager three-page introduction–cum-acknowledgments precedes thirty-one papers and a two-page conclusion. Although the introduction emphasizes the “Factories” of the volume title as its central concept, the authors have taken any one or more of the title’s wide-ranging themes as their starting point. The result is a kaleidoscopic variety of offerings possessing few significant connections. The substance and quality, moreover, of the papers is extremely diverse. Most are too short, superficial and/or unoriginal. Attention may be drawn to the following five contributions.

J. van Goor, in his “Dutch Factories in Asia (1600-1800): Bridgeheads of Political, Economic and Cultural Interaction,” provides an attractive synthesis of the role of the VOC’s factories throughout the full span of the company’s Asian operations. His conclusion, that much depended on the political, etc. environment of each individual establishment, is not surprising, but has rarely been presented in such a neat fashion. B. Bhattacharya has added to his Coromandel oeuvre with a fine case study on the shipping industry and movements of one of the last of the active indigenous centres, Porto Novo, in the 1730s. Supported by some firm quantitative data, Bhattacharya paints a picture of sustained maritime activity from which, by contrast to the situation fifty years earlier, the Portuguese were absent. By now, however, the operations of the local Marakkayar (or Chulia) merchants in the Bay of Bengal and northeastern Indian Ocean were gradually joined by shipping links with western India, initiated and maintained predominantly by the English and Dutch East India Companies.

Two interesting studies deal with the factories of two minor participants in the trade of West Africa. P.O. Hernaes discusses the rise (and, later, fall) of the Danish establishments of Christiansborg and Fredensborg, and the transformation of its fort community from a “port of trade” to a “colonial bridgehead.” Inevitably, the Danes were involved in the politics and wars of the local kingdoms; once the economic base of the factories had been swept away through the abolition of the slave trade, their maintenance became problematic and costly. They were sold to Britain in 1850. Twenty-odd years later followed the transfer of the Dutch factories. Their functions and fate are discussed by R. Baesjou and P.C. Emmer in a solid and informative essay (The Dutch in West Africa: Shipping, Factories and Colonisation, 1800-1870”). Also here the end of the slave trade meant the fatal undermining of the raison d’être of the Dutch establishments as, by contrast to the situation in Britain, they possessed no parliamentary lobby that could argue for their value as
overseas markets and triggers for new imperialist ideas and ambitions. The eyes of the Dutch textile manufacturers were firmly set on the East Indies and, as the recruiting of African soldiers for the East Indies army remained but a ripple on the imperial oceans, the Dutch government did not hesitate to sell out to Britain.

The final essay of note is a further elaboration of J.N.F.M à Campo’s studies on the shipping world of the Dutch East Indies. In “Perahu and Kapal: The Interaction of Traditional and Modern Shipping in Colonial Indonesia,” à Campo discusses the intention of the Koninklijke Pakketvaart Maatschappij (founded 1888) to replace all indigenous sailing craft. Soon, however, the KPM discovered that there were two kinds of indigenous shipowners: those who competed with the KPM (and could be pushed aside), and those who complemented its operations through their low-ranking feeder services and in consequence continued to thrive. As à Campo himself acknowledges, this essay should be located in a broader context; existing and future studies of the Chinese and Indian coastal and regional trades, for example, could well be connected with it.

Altogether, this bundle offers meagre fare. Even with a proper introduction and conclusion its contents would have been thin. It offers no solid argument in favour of the publication of proceedings of such large and heterogeneous conferences.

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Western Australia


As Catherine Manning quite correctly notes in the introduction to her fine monograph, the history of the French in India (and the Asian Trade) has received far less attention in the extant historiography than that of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English. In her view, the reason for this relative dearth is “twofold.” First there is the fact that the French archives are by “no means” as extensive or well-preserved as those of the British, Dutch or Portuguese. Second, she blames the fall of colonial history from academic favor in the post-1945 period. Having worked extensively in these relevant archives, especially those in Lisbon and Goa, I would have to question the persuasiveness of the first of these reasons. And though her second point may be somewhat more convincing, the fact remains that such disfavor affected the historiography of all of the erstwhile colonial empires and not just the French. Manning neglects to mention another vital consideration in this lack of scholarly attention, namely the fact that the French were generally much less successful in their colonial quests in the Asian trade than their European rivals and, as such, have suffered in the historiography. She might also have noted that this lack of attention is much more notable for the seventeenth century and the schemes of Richelieu and Colbert than for the eighteenth century where Dupleix’s temporary successes have traditionally attracted scholarly attention. A good deal of fine scholarship, as Manning herself admits, was produced during the Third Republic by historians like A. Martineau, H. Weber, J. Sottas, P. Kappelin, and H. Froidevaux, to name just a few. Taken together, these works provided a comprehensive (more than Manning seems to admit) overview of the main outlines of the French experience in the Asian trade, an outline that for the eighteenth century trade has been skillfully fleshed out by the work of P. Haudrère in the last two decades.

The fundamental question Manning therefore confronted in compiling this study was obviously what to add to this impressive body of work on the eighteenth-century French Company? Her answer was to seek to place the French experience in the Asian trade firmly within the context and emerging outlines of “Indi an” historiography for the mid- to late Mughal period. That is to say, Manning details the French Company structure, trade, cultural exchange, and most importantly “traders” within the context of indigenous Asian structures, not within the dominate European “paradigm” which has generally determined the main lines of the historiography (in her view) from Martineau to Haudrère. Based on an impressive array of archival sources from the relevant collections in Paris, Aix-en-Provence, and London, as well as the main printed primary accounts including the massive diary of Dupleix’s trusted
assistant Ananda Ranga Pillai, Manning argues that the French "for the first time" in 1719 entered into the regional or "country trade" as the basis for the Company's activities and wealth. She argues that this seminal development was opposed to all earlier French ventures which had "concentrated" on their European trade (a claim which is perhaps a bit exaggerated considering the interest of Colbert and François Caron in the importance of the "country" trade). Moreover, this step meant that the history and fortunes of the eighteenth-century Company and its traders would be inextricably linked to the fortunes of the Indian and Asian economy during that period. Exploiting both Company and private investment and establishing links with indigenous merchants, French country trade in Bengal and the Coromandel (the areas of focus) would develop slowly in the 1720s and increase in range and volume in the 1730s. Ultimately, Manning argues that these forces (when combined with a 1741 financial crisis in France) worked to the disadvantage of the French, the loss of trade, and their eventual "marginalization" by the English EIC. Frustrated in the Asian trade by the prevailing economic climate, Dupleix's political schemes and the desperate gamble to once again embrace war as a means for colonial advancement both proved fruitless for the French as well.

Overall, Manning has provided a solidly researched contribution to the literature. While her tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the indigenous Asian structures may at times irk some readers, some may believe this approach constitutes a needed counter-weight to the Eurocentrism of the traditional literature that if nothing else will encourage needed debate and future research on the topic.

Glenn J. Ames
Toledo, Ohio


Little attention has been given lately to the price-history of the Ancien Régime in France. The publication by Markus Denzel on the price-currents of the eighteenth-century trading- and textile-manufacturing firm Kuster and Pelloutier (later, Pelloutier, Bourcard and Company) from Nantes therefore constitutes a welcome exception. From 1763 until 1793 Pelloutier and his partners established monthly, weekly and sometimes even daily price lists, giving prices of the commodities in which they traded, rates of freight for destinations in Flanders, Holland, Prussia and the Baltic area, as well as rates of exchange for Amsterdam, Hamburg and London. These price lists were sent to inland and foreign correspondents to encourage them to do business with the firm.

Denzel's book can best be characterised as a source book, prefaced by a detailed introduction. The author pays hardly any attention to the evolution of the prices in itself. The collection of price-currents constitutes the only available documentary source concerning the Pelloutier firm. Neither correspondence nor accounts have been preserved. Nevertheless, the Pelloutier archives are of great historical value. So far for the eighteenth century, no comparable collection of price currents, established by one firm alone, is known to have been preserved. The fact that the price currents are to be found in Nantes, that is in the city where they have been drawn up, is amazing. Normally they should have been sent to correspondents of the firm, and it was quite unusual for merchants to keep old filled-out copies for their own administration. Denzel does not seem to remark this exceptional fact — he certainly does not comment on it.

The book is composed of two parts. In the first half the author places the firm Pelloutier and its price current in a wider context, providing a valuable introduction on the position of Nantes in international trade during the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the century this city constituted the largest staple in Europe for the goods of the French West Indies. The port also played a prominent part in the allied slave-trade. In the second half of the century Nantes was rivaled by Bordeaux and Marseille, but even so continued to be of great importance.

The three partners in the firm Pelloutier were undoubtedly attracted to Nantes because of the growing profitability of the import and re-export of West Indian merchandise. Jean Ulric Pelloutier, André Gottlieb Kusters and Benoit
Bourcard belonged to the large group of German-speaking Protestant merchants who established themselves in the ports of the French Atlantic coast since the 1730s. They came respectively from Berlin, Leipzig and Basle.

The distribution in Northern Europe of sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo and other colonial goods was not the only type of business in which the enterprise was interested. According to the price currents the firm also exported merchandise from the hinterland such as wine from the Loire Valley, brandy, vinegar and salt. From the late 1770s the enterprise also re-exported South Carolina rice and tobacco from Maryland and Virginia. Concerning the imports, Pelloutier mentioned prices for raw materials from the Baltic region as hemp, iron, flax and tar. In explanatory notes Denzel analyses the provenance, the varieties and the use of the goods and their place within the activities of the firm. He also comments on the use of different currencies, money of account and weights and measures, which greatly contributes to the accessibility of the price currents.

The second part is made up of a series of charts, listing average monthly prices for all commodities, based on the price currents. These are well-ordered and clearly structured, though one could regret the absence of any indication on the spread of the prices and on the number of observations. Nevertheless, Denzel’s book is useful to anyone interested in eighteenth-century commercial or price history.

Anne Wegener Sleeswijk
Paris, France


This book is about James and John Bard, twin brothers who were born on the property of Clement C. Moore (of “A Visit From St. Nicholas” fame), just outside New York City within view of the Hudson River. As lads of twelve they produced a watercolour of the Bellona which, while under the command of Captain Cornelius Vanderbilt, had been at the centre of the flurry of litigation leading to the famous decision in Gibbons v. Ogden. Steam navigation in New York waters grew rapidly and the young Bard brothers set up as “painters,” their base of clients including shipowners like Vanderbilt, shipbuilders, engine founders, steamboat captains and others connected with the trade.

What they produced is these days categorized as “folk art,” which today is a sufficiently broad term to encompass what Lynda Roscoe Hartigan describes as a “gifted, commercially astute illustrator.” Art collectors may be emotionally attracted to a piece. But the Bards’ clients were ordering a “Ship Portrait,” a genre which demands a much more technically precise approach. Perhaps the single failing of The Bard Brothers: Painting America Under Steam and Sail is that, while it identifies the Bards’ business competitors in the New York region (i.e. others who might have been hired to illustrate these vessels), it does not set them in the more general context of the genre, offering instead more general remarks on the nature of folk art.

On the other hand one chapter in the volume does document the process of creating these images based on surviving partial works, preliminary sketches and other evidence. The Bards were meticulous. To have a piece look absolutely correct, perhaps for presentation as the vessel was finally completed, required careful research. As a result, the Bard steamboats are individual and alive, though the human figures were not as successful, looking stiff and awkwardly posed, and very similar.

Others in New York specialized in portraits of ocean-going sail, or yachts or pilot boats; the Bards painted inland and coastal steamboats. Their immediate clients were steamboat owners, shipbuilders, engine founders and captains. Some commissioned them for themselves (the Fletcher offices had some seventy); others ordered them as gifts for their clients or for presentation to the individual after whom the vessel was named. Sometimes multiple images exist for the same vessel as different clients placed orders. Priced between $20 and $50, a Bard was worth a month’s wages to an employee. Yet being a ship portraitist does not appear to have led to wealth and fame. John left the partnership around 1849
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(p perhaps to California) only to die seven years later in the hospital attached to the New York Alms House. John married the sister of a prominent Hudson River steamboat captain, yet he eventually died in obscurity in White Plains and is buried in the pauper's corner of the cemetery. Peluso and the Mariners’ Museum have produced a fitting memorial.

I first encountered the Bards at the Shelbume Museum in Vermont where reproductions of a couple of James' canvases were on sail. I was immediately struck by the luminous quality of the work and its apparent technical precision. Here was something special in the way of ship portraits. Originals are appearing at auctions these days, but be prepared to spend money. In the last couple of years Bards have sold for prices upwards of US $200,000. The volume includes a checklist of all that have survived, but the number falls somewhat short of the 3,000 to 4,000 estimated to have been created. Fortunately the Mariner’s Museum in collaboration with Anthony J. Peluso, Jr. has mounted an American tour of the Bards’ work. This volume documents the exhibition. See the exhibition. Buy the book.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


For much of its history, the imperial control of British North America is best understood in terms of the "Empire of the St. Lawrence." While geopolitics required an appreciation of the Great Lakes-Laurentian corridor as a military frontier, geo-economics privileged its role as a systems of communication. And if the dictates of real-politik required the establishment of treaties, boundaries, and defences along the Laurentian "line," those of real-economic required the technological upgrading of the Laurentian corridor by overcoming several natural obstacles: the rapids along the St. Lawrence; the falls at Niagara; the rapids at Sault Ste. Marie. And, of course, by-passing the Niagara Falls required the greatest ingenuity and effort. Thus, the "aesthetical sublime" became transformed into the "technological sublime" as the natural wonder of Niagara became subsidiary to the bridges, canals, and power-systems that "overcame" it (see Elizabeth McKinsey, Niagara Falls: Icon of the American Sublime [Cambridge, 1985] and David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime [Cambridge, MA, 1994]).

This is the theme of Jackson's comprehensive survey: the herculean efforts to by-pass Niagara Falls by the several Welland Canals, and the economic transformation of the local region from a bucolic wilderness into a metropolitan system. Following an introductory chapter that presents an efficient overview of canal technology and historiography, Jackson organizes his study into "four distinct periods" of canal and community development to illustrate the theme of "an evolving landscape of change." [xiv]

Part I relates the completion of the "First Canal" (1829) to the Niagara River above the Falls, its extension to Lake Erie (1833), and the development of the "Second Canal" (1845). It was this period (1829-1850s) that witnessed the initial steps in the transformation of an essentially agrarian landscape into a canal-based urban-industrial corridor, especially after the arrival of the first railway in the region in 1853. Taken together, the flow of goods, the provision of services, the establishment of mill-sites, and the alignment of road and rail to bridge-points, all served to render the Welland Canal as "an innovative and vital force for urban formation and growth." [86] Jackson focuses on the emergence of seven "Canal river ports," five "inland villages," and two "industrial towns" that constituted "a powerful new base for future possibilities." [130] The varied life-histories of this rudimentary settlement system is followed in subsequent chapters in a series of detailed urban-biographies.

Part II addresses several factors in the defining-period (1850s-1914) in the development of the Niagara-Welland region: the construction of the "Third Canal" (1887); the dominance of steam-powered vessels; the generation of hydroelectrical power; the increased presence of large-scale industry; the growing importance of continental rather than local transport linkages. Like Canada itself, the Niagara-Welland region in this period passed from the age of commerce to
the age of industry and urbanism, and from local economic systems to the articulation of national and international connections. Moreover, with the construction of the Suspension Bridge across the Niagara River in 1855, rail connections with the United States were added to the region's growing nexus of transport routes. By 1914, the Welland was conveying some 3.5 million tonnes of freight "and had now broadened its trade to become an integral part of the Canadian and the Great Lakes economies of North America." [154]

Part III refers to the period (1914-1958) in which the "Fourth Canal" — the Welland Ship Canal — is opened to traffic (1932-3) and develops into "a national transportation artery." [269] But this is also a period of increased industrial use of electricity, the complementing of rail transport routes by electric-streetcar and automobile networks, and the merging of formerly isolated communities into a regional urban agglomeration.

Part IV opens with the incorporation of the Welland into the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, examines the operation of the system to its peak traffic year of 1979, and considers the historical significance and economic potential of this declining system of transport for development as heritage sites and tourist resources.

This is not a book for the canal-enthusiast concerned solely with the technological minutiae of industrial archaeology. Rather, it is a study that integrates transport developments into the economic and social processes that produce communities. Jackson defines his urban historical geography of transportation as a study of "land-use interaction at the detailed local and regional levels of interaction." [xii] This is its strength; it is also its weakness. From my perspective in Kingston — and certainly from that of other communities above and below Welland — there is a much larger picture that is somewhat neglected in Jackson's volume. Developments at the Welland were the crucial catalyst for changes throughout the whole system. The timing and scale of the navigational improvements there reverberated from lake-head to ocean-terminus, as size of vessels and volumes of traffic put pressure on some port facilities while rendering others inadequate or redundant. Indeed, perhaps the role of the Welland in national and continental linkages is the real meta-narrative of its development.

There are other weaknesses as well. Some may wish to draw attention to errors with regard to dates and nomenclature, but for me the principal deficiency is the inadequacy of Map 1, "The Welland Canals and their communities." Given the detailed discussion of routes, what is required is a much larger and more clearly labelled exposition of routes and places, together with individual maps for each of the several construction periods.

But carping aside, the author is to be congratulated for bringing a career-long study together in this volume. For students of the Niagara-Welland corridor, this is an effective overview of the history of the development of this crucial Lynch-pin in the Laurentian system and a thoughtful treatment of its relationship to the urban history — and urban future — of the region.

Brian S. Osborne
Kingston, Ontario


One day in 1848, an American whaling ship was sailing near the coast of Japan when a crewman approached the captain with an unusual request — he wanted permission to leave the ship and land on the coast of Japan. It was a plan with risk, as Japan was still closed to the outside world and foreign visitors faced an uncertain welcome. Nevertheless, he was allowed to leave the ship, and managed to land safely, though he lost the rudder from his small boat in the process. When his shipmates later saw the rudder floating in the sea, they mistakenly assumed their shipmate had been drowned, and reported this to his family.

The mariner concerned was Ranald MacDonald, born in Oregon in 1824 to Archibald MacDonald, clerk at a Hudson's Bay Company trading post, and his wife Koale' zoa, the daughter of a local Indian chief. MacDonald began work as an apprentice bank clerk in 1839, but found the work dull and decided to run away to sea. He made his way to New York where he joined the first of a series of sailing vessels that, years later, brought him to the coast of Japan.
Soon after landing on Hokkaido in 1848, MacDonald was taken into custody by the authorities and interrogated as to his purpose in landing. They seemed satisfied with his answers, but nevertheless placed him under house-arrest until he could be repatriated. In the year or so that elapsed before this could take place, he conducted English classes for a dozen or so Japanese interpreters. Some of these men later acted as translators between Commodore Perry and the Japanese government during negotiations for trade and other concessions for Americans in Japan. Long before then, in 1849, MacDonald left Japan on an American ship and signed on with another vessel in Macao. His adventures over the next few years included shipwreck on the coast of India, a stint on the Australian goldfields and a visit to England. He finally returned to Canada in the mid 1850s, much to the surprise of his family who had long thought him dead.

Around 1857, he and his brother Allan joined the gold rush to the Fraser River in British Columbia where they became involved in a variety of business enterprises. Ranald experienced more adventure in 1864 when he joined the Vancouver Island Exploring Expedition, which went on to examine a large area of wilderness, leading to the discovery of commercially important deposits of gold and coal. After this he worked in roadhouses on the Cariboo road, before settling into retirement. He never married; in his latter years, he lived with relatives at Kamloops and Fort Colvile until his death in 1894.

Modern interest in Ranald MacDonald derives from his role as the first teacher of English in Japan and as a symbol of the friendship that exists between Japan and North America. It has resulted in a Friends of MacDonald Society, a society newsletter, monuments to his memory in America and Japan, and various publications, including this work by Jo Ann Roe. She is able to describe the details of MacDonald’s Japanese experiences in some detail. Yet relatively little is known about the rest of his life, so that she has been forced to fill in the gaps from general sources about the times and places in which he lived. The book is attractively produced, and contains a selection of relevant illustrations.

Mark Howard
Melbourne, Australia


An international conference was arranged in the Netherlands in 1994 which concentrated on the history of European maritime labour between 1600 and 1900. A volume comprising all the national reports is planned, but as preparation of this volume has taken some time, the Norwegian report has been released as a separate research report by the author’s home university.

The original context for which this document report was written can be clearly seen in its structure: Saetra’s report conforms quite well with the guidelines defined by the conference organizers. First he describes in broad outline the development of Norwegian shipping and its demand for labour. This section also discusses the manning of the Dano-Norwegian and post-1815 Norwegian Navy as well as the fishing (mainly whaling) fleets. Saetra also pays attention to maritime wages which he compares with both Norwegian landward wages and those of foreign seamen. From all this he concludes that Norwegian wages were low in international comparison and that this was the main reason why so many Norwegian sailors deserted their ships in British or American ports. It is also quite evident from this that the merchant navy was almost exclusively manned by Norwegians.

The other side of the coin was that quite a high number of Norwegian sailors were to be found aboard foreign ships. This probably is the most interesting aspect of the report and therefore it should come as no surprise that the corresponding section contains more pages than the one on the domestic labour market. In particular, the author has devoted attention to Norwegian emigration to the Netherlands, and he makes it quite clear that this was the main target of both maritime and non-maritime emigrants during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The situation changed only at the end of the eighteenth century, and particularly after the Napoleonic wars. As thousands of Norwegian sailors were prisoners of war in Britain for several years, a substantial number (ca. thirty percent according
to one estimation) chose to remain in British merchant service after the war. Later in the nineteenth century, the USA and Canada also became important targets for Norwegian sailors looking for foreign employment opportunities.

It is to be expected that Saetra’s study will gain much wider circulation after the conference publication on European Sailors becomes available. However, in one respect this "pre-publication" may be of special importance. Its notes are unusually detailed, often including extensive tables and other types of data. As most of such appendices obviously will be cut down in the final publication, those who really need such information will have to refer to this version.

Helsinki, Finland


The geography of the world’s oil production has changed dramatically during the last quarter century. By about 1970 most of the oil consumed by the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America was still produced in the Middle East, Latin America, and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the economies of the industrialized states were heavily dependent on the policies of the oil-producing countries, as became all too obvious during the oil-crisis of the mid-1970s. This situation was radically altered during the latter half of the 1970s and the 1980s. Then rich oil-fields were discovered in the North Sea and many of the countries bordering on it became self-sufficient in both oil and natural gas producers; some — Norway most notably — became major exporters.

The present book is the history of Danish oil and gas production from the North Sea. It is the story of an economic success adventure. In 1970 Denmark was still dependent on imports for about ninety percent of its energy consumption; by 1996 it was completely self-sufficient and, indeed, an exporter of oil. Moreover, the whole Danish production is carried out by only one oil company.

The search for oil commenced in Denmark during the inter-war period but yielded no tangible results. In 1959 the German firm Deutsche Erdöld Aktiengesellschaft sought a concession to search for oil in Denmark. Then the adventures began. The wealthy Danish shipowner, A.P. Møller, could not accept the idea of Germans exploiting natural resources in his native country. He therefore wrote to the prime minister asking for an exclusive concession to seek oil and gas on Danish territory. This was granted and in 1965 A.P. Møller and his company started drilling. The first success came in the North Sea in 1968 and production began in 1972. Since then the trend has been almost invariably upwards; in 1973 the production of the submarine oil fields managed by A.P. Møller’s company and its collaborators was 134,000 tons; in 1996 it was more than ten million tons. Likewise the production of natural gas has increased from just of one billion cubic metres in 1985 to 5.7 billion in 1996.

This success story is told in minute detail by Morten Hahn-Pedersen. He recounts the story of the early beginnings of the search for oil in Denmark and of A.P. Møller’s first entry on the scene. Then he presents the story of negotiations with other states over drilling rights in the North Sea and of inter-company activities. The development of production technology and methods is covered in an interesting manner and there are special chapters on the evolution of the world market in oil. In this way, the history of Danish oil production is told within a world perspective.

The book is written as business history and concentrates on the story of A.P. Møller’s companies’ involvement in oil. As such it is an excellent narrative, although a somewhat broader perspective would probably have made it even more interesting for the non-Danish reader. Some statistical information revealing Denmark’s proportional share in North Sea oil production would have been both useful and interesting. As well, many readers would probably have welcomed a short summary of the effects of North Sea oil on the Danish economy. Which are the benefits and which are the economic and social implications of the exploitation of these new and rich natural resources?

J. Th. Thor

This is an excellent, informative, and thorough compendium of information on the history of the US merchant marine from the era of the American Revolution to the present. The bones of factual documentation are fleshed out with illustrative human interest vignettes. As the author ventures into the latter half of the twentieth century, such examples became more frequent, often drawing on personal experience to support the narrative.

Appendices include a bibliography, index, and a Chronology running from the first American lighthouse in 1716 to the Maritime Security Act of 1996. For those interested in delving more deeply into particular areas of the book's subject matter, there is an extensive section of "Notes on Sources." The author has made full use of multiple research sources, from traditional archives and libraries to the Internet, and there are few, if any, discrepancies in accuracy.

The histories of the giants of American shipbuilding and shipping, trade unionism, shipboard conditions, and the role of the mercantile marine in wartime are covered extensively. The use of wireless radio-telegraphy and Morse code at sea is also chronicled from its inception to its recent demise. Licensing procedures for all ranks and ratings of seamen are recorded, as are the extensive shipping histories of both World Wars. State and federal maritime academies receive due attention, as do the apprenticeship systems which preceded them. Wartime maritime training establishments for seamen and union-operated training and upgrading schools are not neglected. The final segments of the book explore containerisation, supertankers, and the trend toward "flags of convenience." In the Epilogue, the author becomes more personal, appealing to the emotions of his readers as well as their intellects. He draws on personal communication with three individuals — a merchant marine veteran of World War II, a practising ship's officer and pilot, and a young female cadet at the US merchant marine academy. Their views on the American merchant marine, compared and contrasted, linked with Butler's own understanding of current situations and trends in the maritime shipping industry, draw the book to its conclusion.

This effort is not only enlightening and thought provoking, as behooves any major historical perspective. The style is as easy to read and as entertaining as a novel. The occasional illustrations are well-chosen to compliment the text. The scholarship is evident throughout, but without the onus of pedantry. In short, it would be a valuable addition to the library of serious scholars and aficionados alike.

There is but one area with which I take exception. The author indulges at least one personal bias in the text. From his first mention of victualling he portrays the seafarer's diet in most unappetising terms. "Duff" is described as "a wad of boiled dough," rather than a dumpling. Thereafter, all descriptions of food tend to sound unappealing. Even toward the end of the book, shipboard food is generally portrayed as filling but unimaginative. My own experience with twentieth-century ship's cooks and crew diets would lead me to take issue with this perspective.

Despite this mild disagreement, I recommend the book as a worthwhile addition to the library of anyone whose interest encompasses its subject.

Morgiana P. Halley
San Luis Obispo, California


When coastal nations extended their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles from shore in the late 1970s, some lacked the technology and skills needed to exploit their new-acquired resources. They also faced the delicate diplomatic task of persuading the former distant-water fishing nations to withdraw from the unilaterally-declared Exclusive Economic Zones. One solution to these problems was a "Joint Venture," in which the coastal nation would fish with foreign boats and personnel while developing its own capabilities.

In US Pacific waters, this meant small American trawlers fishing hake or pollack and passing their catches, at sea, to big Soviet factory boats which processed and stored the fish that they
were no longer allowed to catch for themselves. To bring together US fishermen, among the most vocal proponents of individual liberty one can find, and Soviet trawlers, with their political commissars and centralized fleet management, was a recipe for trouble. To do so under the stresses of commercial fishing, as the Cold War heated up during the Reagan presidency was, to say the least, daring. Easing the inevitable friction before it could interfere with profitability fell to a team of American “representatives” or translators, one per Soviet ship, whose intended task was to serve as a communications link between the captains of the factory and catcher boats but who inevitably carried much greater responsibilities. In 1982 and ’83, Barbara Oakley was one of these. She was also a former Captain in the US Army, which was enough to convince many of the Russians that she was really a spy!

Her well-written and entertaining book is a revealing memoir of the resulting experience; it is not so much a description of life aboard a Russian trawler as a picture of the clash of cultures and attitudes, seen through the eyes of an educated American who would have found surviving on an American fishing boat tough enough, without the extra challenges of the Joint Venture. The story is replete with decaying factory ships (Russia’s best were fishing actively elsewhere), crews of questionable competence and motivation, over-zealous commissars, hot water for washing only once every ten days, a KGB agent who was placated with a water-pistol fight, Sears catalogues as the most prized gift a crew member could receive, and a run ashore in Portland, Oregon with Oakley acting as nurse-maid to the Russian crew while the commissar sought to persuade them of the evils of American capitalism. Through it all run the day-to-day tribulations of living and working on a trawler.

Hanging over Oakley’s whole experience with the Russians, however, was the vast and continuous consumption of alcohol which, as the Western world later learned, had become a major problem for Soviet society and industry. On the factory boats, drinking was more than just a pastime; the ultimate test of the merits of capitalism and communism, along with that of manhood and just about everything else, became one of seeing which side could remain on its feet after the other slumped to the floor. It was Oakley herself who taught the Soviet trawlemens the principal that the best cure for a hangover is another stiff drink, a “khair of the dog that beet me” as the Russians pronounced it, thereby giving her book a name.

Trevor Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia


This book is a scholarly treatment of recent events in the fisheries of the Gulf of St. Lawrence coast of Newfoundland, based for the most part on interviews with fishermen and local residents, supplemented with data from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The book contains seven chapters, including an Introduction, four chapters taking the reader through the rise in the small dragger fleet after 1965, the glory years of the mid-eighties, the decline of the late eighties and closure of the fishery in 1993. In between are chapters on social divisions within the communities and the future of these fisheries. The focus of this book is on Domestic Commodity Production (DCP), which describes family or household production of sellable goods as a way of life, and one practised in rural Newfoundland for many years. The future of DCP in modern capitalistic states such as Canada is the theoretical thread that runs through this work. A theme of the book is that government policies which were intended to play against the DCP fishery have been incapacitated by various unplanned circumstances, including the demise of the fish. However, the authors offer little hope that DCP will survive as a way of life without large government subsidies.

The strength of the book is in presenting evidence of how fisheries policy, of whatever stripe, can be subverted by unexpected responses from fishermen and industry. The shift from DCP to a “sort of” capitalist system of small draggers was accompanied by divergent incomes between these groups and by many social complexities. Thus, wives of small boat fishermen often worked in plants dependent on the dragger fishery. In the Newfoundland fisheries, there has always been a
tendency to keep as many people in as possible. This has subverted generations of state policies to the contrary. Thus, an intent of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in the dragger fleet may have been to reduce capacity, but in effect the authors argue it had the opposite effect, of effectively propping up marginal enterprises.

Palmer and Sinclair appear to empathize, but do not romanticize the DCP way of life, nor cover its warts. Their admiration for the ingenuity of rural Newfoundlanders is evident. But some passages illustrating materialistic short-sightedness, or worse, lack of any regard for the future, are disturbing. The driving force underlying illegal practice is simple: someone else may get more. When “under the table” sales of cod became a way of life, only one plant in the region, the FPI plant at Port-au-Choix, adamantly refused to buy illegal fish, and suffered for it. Despite these admissions, “the government” is still blamed for most problems with the fishery.

A weakness of this work is the minimal description of the ecological context in which the community dynamics were played out. The book, as with fisheries management and fishing people, tends to focus more on allocation issues (who gets what) than on the effect such allocations have on marine ecosystems — or on the ability of marine ecosystems to support such allocations. Although part of a chapter is devoted to the demise of the Gulf cod stock, don’t look here for any more than a superficial treatment of cod or the Gulf ecosystem. There is no mention of how changes in species, distribution and fish size may influence the success of different gear types and contribute to social controversy among users. There are also some annoying errors. A picture of a codend full of cod has a caption reading “redfish from the winter fishery.” The limited descriptions of cod biology and ecology are at times incorrect. For example, cod cannot adapt to colder water by developing blood antifreeze within several days, as claimed here (in fact, unlike some flatfishes, cod are a rather slow producer of antifreeze and require exposure to sub-zero temperatures to initiate any production). One intriguing aspect of human interactions with the sea has been our collective refusal to comprehend how our depredations on commercial species may impact marine ecosystems and their productivity. This book sheds little light on that with respect to DCP economies and people, that are supposedly “closer to nature” than the industrialists.

In summary, this book is a voyage into the future of the inshore fisheries in Atlantic Canada and Newfoundland. It is a well-travelled but frustrating journey. It is well worth reading, but be prepared to be depressed. The fishery emerges as a third world economy supporting, or struggling to support, a first world life style. Over all too familiar grounds, the authors point out that the future of the Unemployment Insurance Commission program will likely be the key factor that determines the social structure of future fisheries. Despite somewhat nostalgic yearnings for a return to a small boat fishery, few seem willing to accept the financial position and life style that are inevitable without massive government subsidies. The final line of the book quotes a fisherman: “Sure we could go back to a small boat fishery, but I for one don’t intend to have to starve again.” But lucrative fisheries cannot include everyone — hence the paradox. Palmer and Sinclair offer little hope that current directions and policies can resolve this paradox and reinvigorate the fishing culture and life of rural Newfoundland (under DCP or any other economic form). Governments can do no right, and fishermen appear to be their own worst enemies.

George Rose
St. John’s, Newfoundland


Treacherous Waters is an eclectic volume that takes the reader through a chronological survey of shipwrecks, both confirmed and rumoured, in the Kingston region of Lake Ontario from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries. It is obviously the work of someone actively and passionately involved in the study of the area’s marine tragedies and stories, and the sheer volume of the record Kohl has assembled is worthy of note.

The work is also highly idiosyncratic. It reflects the author’s particular and broad interest
in all manner of things relating to his subject, which is not only shipwrecks, but also diving, marine archaeology and preservation, and even the romance of human tragedy. The use of Kingston as a focal point for the discussion is similarly broad, and the book details events involving American ships and shores as well as those occurring in the southeastern Ontario region of Lake Ontario.

The research underpinning the narrative is thorough, if inconsistent. The author has clearly reviewed any sources that might touch upon his subject, but invokes many that are somewhat removed. Thus we find a lengthy quotation dealing with US divers using helium in the 1920s [17-18] inserted with apparently no contemporary relationship to the events on Lake Ontario that are under discussion.

The sources are mainly secondary works and newspapers, with some documentary and archival evidence. While lengthy quotations from newspapers are the norm in this work, Kohl occasionally moves to construct a literary description of the events. This practice underpins the human dimensions of his topic, even if it raises questions of objectivity or accuracy. All in all, these digressions are more interesting than troubling, and are identified as being derivative rather than original.

Given that the audience for this book will be, in the first instance, those who share the author’s interest in shipwrecks or local history, one could wish for a more sophisticated presentation of the historical context of the study and more rigour in the presentation of the stories. Some format for dealing with each event that recognizes the vast differences in information available would have added to the book’s importance as a dependable and complete record. Similarly, a few more well-placed maps, identifying the sites under discussion, would have complemented the narrative. The illustrations and photographs are of interest, although the quality of reproduction is unfortunate and underwater pictures of divers or ship’s wheels tend to look alike after the first few. Finally, the arrangement of end-notes is difficult and the use of language is sometimes confusing.

In general, Treacherous Waters offers the reader not only an impressive compendium of ships that sailed and never returned home, but also a diverse and often touching portrait of the interaction of man and nature in an environment that is far from gentle. While much of the book’s value lies in its recounting of individual ships and personal experiences, there is much to be deduced from its content regarding ship design, public and owners’ concerns regarding safety and support, and climate, commerce and technology as they merged in the development of shipping on Lake Ontario.

Katy Bindon
Kelowna, British Columbia


The worst shipwreck in the history of Lake Ontario, according to Arthur Britton Smith, occurred during the night of 31 October, 1780. It involved the loss of His Majesty’s Brig Ontario on the south shore of the lake east of the mouth of the Niagara River. Launched the previous May at the British shipyard on Carleton Island, the Ontario was the largest element of the Provincial Marine squadron at that time, mounting twenty-two long guns and a dozen small swivels. It measured eighty feet on the gundeck and was carrying about 120 sailors, soldiers, Indians, prisoners of war, women and officers, including the commodore of the Provincial Marine squadron on the lake and the commandant of Fort Niagara, when it founded.

The vessel was last seen about fifty kilometres east of the Niagara River just hours before a hurricane-like tempest struck from out of the northeast. Given the remoteness of the region during that period few details came to light about the disaster. In 1995 two American divers claimed to have discovered the wreck in deep water near Olcott, New York (almost thirty kilometres east of the Niagara). This discovery appears to have prompted A.B. Smith to write Legend of the Lake. In the foreword and afterword he suggests that the wreck holds a mint of archeological treasures and that an effort should
be made to raise it. It is a handsome book, filled with illustrations, including seventeen colour plates. Of particular note are detailed line drawings of the brig by the well-reputed, architectural draughtsman, John W. McKay, and a number of portraits and sketches by the marine artist, Peter Rindlisbacher (whose painting of the Ontario graces the cover).

Since the vessel sailed for barely six months and was involved in no event of historical significance, there is not much of a story to tell about it and little evidence of legendary importance. The nine chapters comprise mainly information about relevant people and places and detailed descriptions of conventional shipbuilding techniques and shipboard life. Facsimiles of period documents are inserted throughout, but, apart from one table, no footnotes or endnotes are provided. Indeed, the book (which the author describes as “a non-historical narrative”) is highly conjectural without direct reference to other authorities.

Serious students will be disappointed with the book, its lack of references, its need for a demanding editor and the seeming inclusion of illustrations for inclusion-sake. One glaring error concerns a well-known picture of the Point Frederick shipyard. The caption dates the scene as 1792, yet in plain view can be seen the fortification atop Point Henry, the lower masts of HMS St. Lawrence and the frames of HMS Wolfe and HMS Canada, none of which existed until the War of 1812.

This book will appeal to readers interested in improving their general knowledge of early marine history of the lakes. It should also suit someone who is just beginning to develop an interest in shipbuilding during the later 1700s era.

Robert Malcomson
St. Catharines, Ontario


Few historians would have the courage, let alone the depth and breadth of knowledge, to undertake a naval history of Great Britain since Anglo-Saxon times. Nicholas Rodger possesses all these qualities, of which this long-anticipated first of three volumes is a very impressive demonstration. Those who have read his previous books, The Wooden World, and the life of Sandwich, The Insatiable Earl, will not be surprised at his grasp of the numerous and complex issues which appear here.

Rodger declares that his work is based on secondary sources, since full documentary research on this time span would take more than a lifetime. However, a perusal of the notes and select bibliography makes clear that every up-to-date source has been digested, in more than one language, and that substantial documentary research has in fact been done. Added to a polished prose style, this has produced an extremely readable, scholarly and authoritative tome which will be the standard work.

In the thousand years covered by this volume there are innumerable insights and revisions of established views, only some of which can be mentioned in a short review. The Introduction contains some pithy comments on the precise dating of a “naval history” of England, pointing out that no British state was sufficiently sophisticated to possess a permanent “navy” before the sixteenth century. This book then, is not an institutional history of the Royal Navy, but “a history of naval warfare as an aspect of national history.” [xxv] This point should be emphasized, as the trend in maritime and naval history is to shun the practice of studying them in isolation, and to reforge links with wider historical issues. To this end, each time period has chapters or sections dealing with four major issues: policy, strategy and naval operations; finance, administration and logistics; social history; and the ships and weapons. For many, this will be a chief strength of this book: it firmly unites naval history with national history, to the benefit of both.

For the early centuries Rodger reorients our geographic conceptions, because the Anglo-Saxons had concerns on “The Three Seas,” facing the Christian Celtic world of the west, the Christian, Romanized Germans to the south, and the pagan, unromanized Scandinavians to the east. Such concerns made strong naval forces essential, and Rodger describes in some detail the methods by which ships and sailors were raised, and their
employment on numerous operations. A stimulating section on "The First English Empires, 900-1066," describes the rudimentary but effective administrative methods of the Saxons. Non-specialists will be surprised to learn that, contrary to much accepted wisdom, the Normans after 1066 showed no appreciation of naval forces and let the Saxon system disappear, "as the strong unitary state of Anglo-Saxon England" was replaced by a decentralized feudal system. [35] Ships became mere auxiliaries for land forces, and thus Norman armies moved at a fraction of the speed of Saxon armies. Marauding Danish fleets had to be bribed, there being no means to fight them.

The medieval wars are covered with painstaking emphasis on the geographic problems faced by the Angevin Kings: Normandy was lost to the French, but Gascony remained isolated on the Bay of Biscay, requiring defence and regular communications. King John continued the Norman blinkered approach, using ships only as a means of transporting troops between England and Gascony, instead of seeing their potential as a strategic strike force in their own right. This contributed to decline, as the French, hitherto landlocked, acquired seacoasts on the Channel, Atlantic and the Mediterranean, hugely weakening the English position. Even in the Welsh wars Edward I spent huge sums on land campaigns and castle construction, the latter proving to be white elephants. The Welsh usually ignored them and, when besieged, all ships desperately needed in France had to divert to save the pitiful garrisons. A fraction of the money, if spent on ships, would have given far better results. Henry V was a rare King who appreciated naval power, and began some rudimentary dockyard construction. One of his ships, Grace Dieu of 1418, was nearly the size of Nelson's Victory. Apart from such brief flashes, however, medieval English seapower was weak. Castile, the Scots, and Monaco all exhibited a deeper and more consistent appreciation of the role of the sea in warfare.

Another example of conventional wisdom challenged involves the development of a new style of warship under the Elizabethans, the broadside-armed vessel, which supposedly made obsolete the carracks and galleys of backward rivals. Rodger makes abundantly clear that this view is grossly oversimplified, and in many ways quite wrong. Mediterranean galleys had heavy artillery a generation before the sailing ship; firing from the bows and attacking in line abreast, they could batter impotent sailing ships with impunity, and it was this need to counter the superior galley that drove the development of new warships. Heavy guns were mounted facing aft, to protect vulnerable sterns from galley attack, but the bows of existing ships were quite unsuited to mounting forward firing guns. Hybrid sailing ships with banks of oars were tried, but the answer was found in the "galleons" of Elizabeth. These nimble ships "combined the forepart of a galley with the afterpart of a ship," [212] allowing heavy guns to be mounted facing fore and aft, with broadside guns as secondary armament. Rodger points out something which in retrospect seems obvious: numerous contemporary paintings of warships depict them firing the stern or bow guns, which ought to have been a clue that these were considered more important than broadside guns. Many historians, working backwards from Trafalgar, have been misled into seeking the origins of broadside gunnery, and even "line" tactics, and hence have dismissed the galley influence rather too soon.

These are but some examples of revisions of standard naval histories in this book. There are numerous others, and even accounts which are not novel are presented with shrewd insights to delight the reader, specialist and non-specialist alike. As well, the writing is very clear, often with shafts of wit, the illustrations are generous, the maps extremely useful, the footnoting very complete and illuminating, and the price quite reasonable. At the risk of sounding trite, no serious library should be without this book.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario


The focus of David Goodman's book is the state of Spain's naval forces (not of the merchant marine) principally in the seventeenth century.
Spain's naval history during that period has only recently become the object of research by Spanish and foreign scholars, despite the fact that the seventeenth century saw Europe's maritime powers greatly increase naval effort and warfare with the aim of breaking Spain's hegemony in Europe and of making inroads into her vast global empire. Goodman bases his monograph on extensive new archival research in Spain, carried out in a number of municipal and provincial archives but primarily in the main state archive of Simancas. The in-depth study is supported by notes, appendices, a glossary, an extensive bibliography as well as by a number of plates and maps.

The book begins with an introduction charting the rise of Spanish naval power in the sixteenth century. The author highlights the buildup of a Spanish Mediterranean navy of galleys which checked the expansionist forces of Islam in that sea and Philip II's switch to Atlantic priorities in the 1570s and 1580s. The latter was accompanied by the creation of a small but permanent Atlantic fleet and was intended largely to deal with the rising Protestant threat in northern Europe and to defend Spain's American empire. Following this brief outline of Spain's shift from a Mediterranean to an Atlantic naval power the discussion turns to the book's declared focus, the fortunes of Spanish naval power from the period after the defeat of the Great Armada, sent by Philip II against England in 1588, until 1665, the end of the long reign of Philip IV. As the title suggests, this was a period of major naval reconstruction in the wake of the 1588 disaster. That reconstruction consisted mainly of galleons for the Atlantic fleet and took place primarily in shipyards of the Spanish Basque provinces (traditionally Spain's prime shipbuilding centre for ocean-going ships), although a handful of galley squadrons continued to be maintained in the Mediterranean. In spite of the rebuilding of the navy the three-quarters of a century following the Great Armada were ones of defeat — not total defeat, for there was victory in the early 1620s and in the late 1640s and early 1650s, but predominantly of defeat nevertheless.

The remainder of the study is dedicated to explaining this overall defeat. In his analysis Goodman adopts a broader approach rather than dwelling only on naval battles and tactics. He examines the character and performance of the Spanish navy within the contemporary political, social, economic and technological contexts, investigating the funding, the war materials and the personnel that are central to the successful functioning of any navy. The body of the text is structured accordingly, being divided into two parts, one entitled "Money and Materials" and the other "Personnel." In the first two of the four chapters in Part One the author addresses the main issues of funding and the conservation of Spain's forests. He establishes that the cost of financing the navy was very high, placing a considerable burden on a debt-ridden treasury, and that there was a persistent shortfall of funds. With regard to the raw material for her armadas, until the 1660s Spain had far better measures for the conservation of naval timber resources than her principal enemies, measures which by the mid 1600s had effectively replenished stocks in the Spanish Basque region although not in Catalonia. Chapters Three and Four complement the first two in that they deal with shipbuilding (the building process, experimentation with design, the availability of craftsmen and the output of shipyards) and with the fitting out, arming and victualling of navy vessels. These two chapters add to studies carried out during the last two decades. In the three chapters of Part Two, Goodman focuses on the men (many also from the north coast) who were just as important as ships and guns for the outcome of Spain's naval engagements. The entire area of naval personnel is tackled: the recruitment of seamen, their opportunities for promotion, their kinship links, the status of seaman, and the quality and career patterns of naval administrators.

The volume draws to a close with a conclusion, wherein the writer attempts to explain Spain's naval decline to what he calls "the level of a third-rate naval force" [254] in view of his findings and making brief comparisons, insofar as existing scholarship allows, with the navies of Spain's most important adversaries, England, France and the United Provinces. His opinion is that the decline was not due to a failure of political will, a lack of timber resources or necessarily to inferior ship design, nor for that matter to corruption, inefficient accounting, imperfections in overall planning or to the poor conditions for seamen, all difficulties which beset other navies as well. Rather, Goodman identifies one of the main causes as being the shortage of funds;
navies everywhere were hugely expensive to build and maintain but the strain was greatest in Spain, accentuated by the crown’s recurrent financial crises. Other causes were low output from peninsular shipyards, in part because of a lack of monies but also because of a shortage of craftsmen. There was also a shortage of able seamen and of trained gunners which, coupled with outmoded gun-mountings, may have given rise to a lesser ability to fire artillery at sea. Added to these factors were the dated tactic of closing and boarding instead of stand-off bombardments and, supposedly, a greater contempt for the common seaman in Spanish armadas contributing to low morale.

Some of these conclusions may require modification in the light of further research, especially given the still considerable paucity of studies on the navies of Spain’s enemies. This notwithstanding, and although Goodman could have made use of Spanish Basque notarial archives, the volume is a substantial contribution to our understanding not just of Spain’s naval history but also of the Spanish military effort as a whole during the seventeenth century.

Michael M. Barkham
San Sebastian, Spain


This is the story of USS Constitution, the longest-serving vessel in the United States Navy, a story in which the famous frigate’s two-hundred-year career is carefully situated within the naval, diplomatic and social history of the United States. The 1997 edition revises and updates the original 1980 volume, expanding the description of Constitution’s War of 1812 encounters with HMS Guerriere and Java with new research uncovered by the author. Refitted and overhauled like the vessel itself, A Most Fortunate Ship brings readers right up to 1996 preparations for commemorating the ship’s bicentennial.

As the ship’s fifty-eighth captain (1974-1978), author Tyrone Martin treats his former command with the respect and reverence due a national treasure, yet he does not hesitate to recount the less noble moments of the ship and her crew. The first three chapters trace the tentative early days of both the US Navy and Constitution. The frigate was one of six naval vessels commissioned in 1797 by the new United States of America to safeguard American commerce from Algerine pirates in the Mediterranean. The ship was the product of a radical blend of British and French frigate design developed by Joshua Humphreys, in which the hull was reinforced by three pairs of diagonal riders that spread the weight of the gun deck throughout the structure and helped to reduce the forces which caused many warships to "hog" or bow downwards at either end. The other unique construction feature was the closeness of the frames, separated by only a couple of inches. This rendered the hull strong enough to withstand an enemy broadside and earned the ship its nickname, "Old Ironsides." Nevertheless, between the failure of the first two attempts to launch the vessel in October 1797 and a somewhat shaky shakedown cruise hampered by weak masts and weaker leadership, the future did not bode well for the Constitution. Fortunately, the appointment of Captain Silas Talbot in 1799 set the ship’s career on a proper keel, so that by 1804, the American consul general to the Barbary Regencies would dub Constitution "a most fortunate ship."

Chapters four to eleven recount the glory days of Constitution during the War of 1812 under captains Isaac Hull, William Bainbridge and Charles Stewart. This is followed by two chapters which highlight Constitution’s post-war patrol duties in the Mediterranean followed by a major overhaul in 1833 and 1834. Chapter fourteen covers Constitution’s Mediterranean and Pacific tours from 1835 to 1843, while the next chapter follows Captain John "Mad Jack" Percival who sailed Constitution around the world when he was sixty-five and his ship nearly fifty. The ferment of European nationalism in 1848 drew Constitution back to the Mediterranean for the last time, a cruise noted for the number of floggings administered and the visit of Pope Pius IX, the first pontiff to set foot on American territory. Chapter seventeen describes Constitution’s final operational voyage against the slave trade on the
The next twenty years were a low point in the history of “Old Ironsides” as it was refitted as a sail training vessel for young naval officers. Reclassified to a second-rate ship and then a third-rate, the frigate waited out the Civil War along with the rest of the Naval Academy in temporary quarters at Newpo rt. Several refits in the 1870s resulted in some major design changes but lack of money prevented the real maintenance of the aging vessel required. Constitution was then laid up in 1881 and left to decay quietly until 1896, when Massachusetts Congressman John F. Fitzgerald mobilized Congress to take an interest in the frigate just in time for its centenary. Chapter nineteen chronicles Constitution’s lengthy revival as a museum culminating in 1931 in a triumphant three-year tour (albeit in tow) around the United States. The final overhaul of 1992-1995 restored the famous diagonal riders leaving “Old Ironsides” ready for its third century of service.

Martin’s research makes extensive uses of the ship’s logs and letters from various Secretaries of the Navy and private collections as well as secondary sources which round out the historical context in which the frigate served throughout its chequered career. For a “fortunate ship,” Constitution seems to have experienced great difficulty with maintenance throughout its existence. Virtually every refit uncovered shoddy workmanship and inferior materials from the previous one. While this has more to do with chronic problems in US naval yards than the ship itself, it is possible that what really made Constitution a fortunate vessel was its ability to survive official neglect and so many misguided refits!

A Most Fortunate Ship includes more information about USS Constitution than most casual readers would ever want to know. But for those who share Commander Martin’s love of seagoing history in the time of sail, the story of the Constitution is a treasure trove of little-known facts about a great ship and all who sailed in it.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario


HMS Warrior was the first major all-iron warship ordered by the Royal Navy, in part to restore Britain’s pride and prestige after adverse criticism of the fleet’s performance during the Crimean War. The ship was laid down at Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Yard in May 1859 and commissioned in Portsmouth on 1 August 1861. Today, fully restored, Warrior is afloat in Portsmouth once again, at the Royal Naval Museum.

Following the completion of his earlier model of Brunel’s SS Great Britain, for which he was awarded a Gold Medal in the 1982 Model Engineer Exhibition, the author was inspired by a cutaway illustration of HMS Warrior prepared by Stephen Ortega, a remarkably gifted student at Bournemouth and Poole College of Art and Design. Mowll, a Church of England priest, was limited to working one day a week on the model, and therefore took sixteen years to research, design, and build his model of HMS Warrior. The end result is a large and remarkable working model of a vessel built in the mid-Victorian transitional period when virtually all aspects of warship building technology were challenged.

Research material was readily available in the form of the actual ship and the original builder’s model, which is held by the Science Museum in London; the original Admiralty plans also survive. The text is therefore fully documented. Even more impressive is the model itself. Built to the scale of 1:48 or 1/4 inch representing one foot, it is impressive, with a length between perpendiculars (BP) of 7.92 feet. The hull weighed approximately 145 pounds at her floating out trials (before masting and rigging).

The book begins with a review of the early hybrid steamships predating HMS Warrior, followed by a discussion on workshop equipment and materials, including the effect distance and the atmosphere has on colour. Mowll provides sound advice on scratch building, but he himself advocates seeking the advice and counsel of experts in other fields, and quite properly gives
credit wherever he did so himself. In twelve chapters, Mowll covers the building process, beginning with an excellent review of building the lath and plaster plug, replicating the plating and rivetting on the plug using masking tape with the rivet pattern imprinted into it, followed by the lengthy process of producing a glass reinforced polyester (GRP) hull. This approach to building a hull is an expensive and labour intensive process, with no guarantee of success. The effort in this case, however, was well worth the effort, for the hull is superb, right down to the look of rivetted wrought iron plating. The proof of the techniques used is seen in a number of close-up photographs. [e.g., 72] The process continues with chapters covering deck building, carving and casting the figurehead, outboard fittings, inboard fixtures and fittings, armament, ship’s boats, masts and yards, rigging and ropework, sails and flags, engine and boiler, the floating-out test, and finally the launching of the model in a rough sea, with a twenty-knot onshore wind, which she handled very well.

The extensive bibliography is arranged into categories such as engineering, history, working in metal, ships and the sea, modelling and other skills. This is followed by lists of suppliers of tools, equipment, and materials, along with a list of useful addresses, ending with the index.

Although long-term survival of the model was clearly considered throughout the building process, a few of the practices used could be cause for concern, depending on the conditions under which the model is exhibited. To avoid having to replicate carved detail such as the hawse collars [71] and entry port side carvings, [73] Mowll cast them in lead. Over time, lead fittings on a cased model can be destroyed when the lead turns to lead salts. Britannia metal, or the casting resin used to cast the figurehead, [61] would have been better choices. As well, Mowll used coffee to colour the sail material. Any tannins which remain in the fabric, even after a thorough washing, can react with humidity, become tannic acid, and thereby shorten the life of, or even destroy, the sails. Concerns also arise with regard to the longevity of rigging cordage which is secured with cyano-acrylate glues. When discussing acid etching using ferric chloride (actually a salt, not an acid), Mowll recommends its use as a pickle to neutralize solder flux residue. [78] Unfortunately, unless ferric chloride residue is neutralized, it can be reactivated under humid conditions. Neutralizing ferric chloride is easily achieved by immersing the part in a dilute solution of household ammonia and water, then rinsing under running water.

Regardless of these concerns, this is an extremely well-written and organized book, one which makes it clear that Mowll not only did a superb job of building the model of HMS *Warrior* but matched it in documenting and illustrating the processes employed. The model itself is fittingly on permanent exhibition in the visitors’ centre alongside the restored warship. One need not visit Portsmouth, however, to appreciate the author’s high standards which, incidentally, are complemented by the quality of the book; the illustrative and photographic reproduction is excellent and the footnotes are on the subject pages, eliminating endless page turning. In short, Mowll has created a valuable guide to the construction of a very complex model, using many interesting techniques. It is a great book and I recommend it highly.

N.R. Cole
Toronto, Ontario


Forty-five years are roughly equivalent to the span of a person’s career. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a single professional lifetime could witness what was perhaps the greatest revolution in naval architecture ever. In *Warrior to Dreadnought*, David Brown, former Deputy Chief Naval Architect of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, describes in imposing detail the tremendous progress which took place in British warship design during this period.

The grand sweep of events is followed chronologically, the twelve chapters walking through the evolution from the broadside battery
ships (e.g., *Warrior* herself), through the central battery ships (HMS *Bellerophon* of 1863), the appearance of the turret (naturally including a concise description of the loss of HMS *Captain* in 1870), the abolition of sails, the arrival of the almost modern looking ‘Admiral’ class of the early 1880s, the pre-dreadnought era, and the genesis of the *Dreadnought* — though only touching lightly on the recent evidence that it was the battlecruiser which was Admiral Sir John Fisher’s ultimate weapon. Not surprisingly, the prime focus of the time was on larger vessels, and the book follows suit. However, their smaller and less glamorous sisters are not neglected, and there is much valuable material on such things as torpedo boat destroyer design and the early cruisers. Safely contained within the appendices are such technicalities as the Admiralty Coefficient, ship stability, rolling, and structural strength. As in Brown’s other books, his keen interest in the men who were the naval architects is woven into a very readable story, leavened with the occasional bit of humour.

The author did not skimp on the illustrations — a variety of sketches, drawings, and (usually) clearly reproduced plans from the National Maritime Museum are scattered throughout. The illustration of the protective deck system [133] is particularly good. The many photographs are well chosen and often not commonly seen, and those from the usual sources include negative numbers. The only criticism that this reviewer has with the entire book is that for some strange reason, the photo captions generally carry the ship’s launch date, and not that of the picture itself. This will be a major nuisance for serious ship-buffs.

The real value of this book is the wide range of information which Brown brings to life. Examples abound: the importance of coal in the protection scheme; the loss of the sloop *Condor* in 1901; US gunnery during the Spanish-American War; evidence that damage from shellfire varies with the square of the shell weight instead of its cube. Technical information of all sorts is blended with explanation of the ship design process.

The author makes it clear that despite popular opinion, the British Admiralty did in fact encourage innovation, and took a sensible approach in its implementation. A good example [43] explains how the Admiralty ordered the first experimental (Coles) turret before the plans for Ericsson’s version were known, and that HMS *Prince Albert* had been ordered before the famous battle between the *Monitor* and the *Virginia*.

*Warrior to Dreadnought* is not inexpensive, but is good value for money. Anyone with an in-depth interest in late nineteenth/early twentieth century navies and/or the naval architecture of the time will find it well worth adding to their library.

William Schleinhauf
Pierrefonds, Québec


In 1898 Admiral Tirpitz, under the authority of Kaiser Wilhelm II, secured the sanction of the Reichstag for a battlefleet of fixed size. His achievement cast a backward glow of mythic inevitability over the preceding century. Now Lawrence Sondhaus, already well-known for his excellent two volume study of the Habsburg Fleet between 1815 and 1918, has re-examined the issues.

Before 1848, the Prussian Navy consisted of a training corvette and two row gunboats. This was no accident. Prussia had more to fear on land; she was dominated by Russia, challenged by Austria, and threatened by France. With little trade to protect, and not much coast to defend, the navy was a "luxury" she could not afford. Although Friedrich List linked a navy with economic expansion and national unity, it took a Danish blockade in 1848 to persuade the Frankfurt Parliament to buy ships. The Danish war witnessed three important initiatives in coast defence: a submarine, pioneer mines and the destruction of a Danish battleship by coastal batteries. After the war, the Prussian fleet remained insignificant, lacking an officer corps and dependent on Britain for ships and engines. The underlying question remained, should the navy be a coast defence force, or a trade protection fleet. Prussia could not afford a sea-control battlefleet.

A second Danish war increased pressure for
an effective navy, not least because the main fighting force in the North Sea had been Austrian. It participated in the conquest of North Germany in 1866, the year that Alfred Tirpitz joined the service. Despite purchasing large ironclads the Navy spent the Franco-Prussian war in harbour, a humiliating situation for the officers. Under General von Stosch’s regime the Navy was well-run and freed from dependence on British engineering; but it was also increasingly “militarized,” with a strong emphasis on caste and honour that led to the collapse of 1918. Stosch’s strategic ideas, which Sondhaus dismisses, were summed up by the sortie corvettes and armoured gunboats, intended to clear the approaches of the main German ports. As France was far stronger at sea, it is difficult to see what options Stosch had. Germany’s main weapon against France was the army. Stosch’s regime was crippled by his partisan response to the loss of the ironclad Grosser Kurfurst in 1878. His successor, General von Caprivi, had similar strategic views, relying on torpedo boats to save money for the army. He built small coastal battleships and fast cruisers to add to the confused agglomeration of types, of various ages and roles, that cluttered the list of the German Navy.

When Wilhelm II came to the throne in 1888 the navy finally took command of its own destiny, with disastrous consequences. A combination of commercial growth, colonial aspirations, industrial money and political ambition created the opportunity to establish a powerful German Navy in the 1890s. The question remained, what sort of navy? Despite reading Mahan, the Kaiser was a cruiser enthusiast, but Tirpitz had been converted to seapower theory. He combined Mahan and Clausewitz to create a political role for the enlarged battlefleet that was vital to secure the prestige of the service. The opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895 gave the Navy strategic options against France and Russia, but they were land-based powers. When Anglo-German relations collapsed in early 1896 Tirpitz argued that Germany needed a battlefleet to deter Britain. As she was already facing France and Russia, it would have been more logical to conciliate the British, but that would not have served his agenda. Fundamentally insecure after the humiliations of 1870–71 and 1878 the Navy was obsessed with status and refused to consider the inevitable response from Britain. Britain would not be deterred and a naval threat would prompt her to begin an arms race. As Sondhaus concludes, the roots of disaster for Imperial Germany, and for its most characteristic instrument, were laid in 1898. In 1919 the Imperial Navy committed suicide in order to pass on an untarnished ideal to those who would follow. That the Navy had played a major part in destroying the state it was meant to serve was an irony lost on Tirpitz and his followers.

It would be hard to fault this measured, skilful assessment. It should be an object lesson to all service leaders. Armed forces should serve the state and not, like the navies built by Tirpitz and Gorshkov, contribute to their downfall.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


The editors of this collection of essays have augmented the historiography of British defence policy from the 1850s to the 1930s by illustrating the degree to which the concept and strategy of imperial defence played an integral role in British military planning and execution, and not merely a supporting one. Throughout this period diplomacy, imperialism, nationalism, navalism and overseas commerce were inextricably linked, making imperial defence planning a founding principle of continued British global power. Not surprisingly, the main focus of each of the eight chronologically-arranged essays is British naval strategy (or the attempt to adopt a coherent naval strategy) in the context of rapid and confusing technological change. This is especially fitting given that the book is dedicated to the distinguished naval and imperial historian, Donald Schurman, whose writings and musings have influenced a generation of scholars, including the contributors to this volume.

After a shaky start with an awkward, speculative account by Karl Revells on the legacy of
the Crimean War for Imperial Defence planners, the interpretive value of the study improves markedly and some excellent articles follow. Among them, John Beeler examines the evolution of imperial defence strategy and ideology in the last half of the nineteenth century from the basis of Schurman's own seminal work, which Beeler generally lauds but also criticizes as a "retrospective appraisal." [45] Beeler concludes that despite a growing tendency towards naval concentration in "home waters," the needs of imperial defence played a strong role in determining the direction of British "grand strategy" in this critical period. Even at the height of the Great War, as Keith Neilson amply illustrates, British military policy was heavily influenced by the perceived need to lay the groundwork for improved postwar imperial defence, especially in the Middle East and India. London sought to adopt expedient policies in chaotic times which would advance immediate war aims while directly benefitting imperial defence strategy. John Ferris points out that, notwithstanding common assumptions regarding the absolute decline of British naval strength after 1919, a closer analysis of the international strategic context and a more sophisticated comparison of the Royal Navy with other contemporary fleets indicates that imperial defence remained predicated upon a British naval supremacy which lasted (and even grew) until the end of the 1920s. Ferris reminds us that the calculations of naval power must also include shipbuilding capacity, and here Britain remained ahead of her rivals until the late 1920s. Other contributors to this work include Nicholas Lambert, David French, Greg Kennedy and Orest Babij. While several of the authors' research and findings seem merely to confirm published information, nonetheless the articles are interesting, detailed, far-ranging and offer authoritative insight into pre-1939 British naval, military, imperial, diplomatic and economic history. All the standard tenets of imperial defence are covered in this collection: coaling stations, Two-Power Standard, Colomb and other naval theorists, Pax Britannica, alliance requirements and treaty complexities, guerre de course, close blockade, the effects of technological advancement on naval strategy, the Washington Conference, the London Naval Treaty, main fleet to Singapore and more.

The result is an informative treatment of British military policy from the perspective of imperial defence, as opposed to the more traditional "continentalist" view, made perhaps inevitably predominant as a result of Britain's participation in two European wars in the first half of this century. This volume provides a comprehensive review of Britain's lasting imperial defence dilemma — that of defending its imperial lines of communication, its global trade and, therefore, its pre-eminence, in an increasingly complex, uncertain and challenging international environment. This was especially a naval responsibility and no easy task. "Far-flung Lines" indeed.

Serge Marc Duflinger
Verdun, Québec


At first sight one might be forgiven for wondering how on earth another book on this subject could expect to make much of an impact. Yet anyone who knows Dr. Cowman could hardly imagine him trudging along the same well-trodden route to Pearl Harbor without discovering some interesting byways that a multitude of other experienced practitioner's had either overlooked or rejected. So under Ian Cowman's guidance what the uninitiated might suppose would be just another jaunt along very familiar terrain can become challengingly different. Cowman, whose own years at Bond University may have actually encouraged his penchant for revisionism, is convinced that his findings will demonstrate only too clearly just how flawed the more conventional interpretations of Anglo-American naval relations have been in the past. While his oddly-titled book certainly has elements of revisionism about it, whether his analysis is any more accurate than those whose work he seeks to supplant is another question altogether.

He divides his well-researched book into two parts, beginning with an exploratory survey of Anglo-American naval planning in the Pacific. In
the opening two chapters, Cowman unearths and then discusses various plans of the British and Americans as far as the Far East is concerned. While quite interesting in themselves, most of these ideas were basically impractical in the post-Washington Conference era and yet, as Cowman shows, they were still retained by a succession of war planning officers on both sides of the Atlantic. A heretical view might suggest that they may have been retained more because they provided useful theoretical axioms or benchmarks against which other policies in the region could be measured rather than as operational plans that could be implemented at short notice. Cowman would not agree.

Let us take Hong Kong as an example. Cowman points out that the entrenched Admiralty view was that in the end the Washington treaty provisions would be swept away and a more sensible rearmament policy would take hold that would enable the British to re-fortify Hong Kong and make it immune to outside influences. Although the Washington system does collapse by 1935, rearmament is back in vogue thereafter, the fate of Hong Kong is not improved. Indeed by the end of 1937 the prospect of the British being able to hold Hong Kong indefinitely against a sustained landward attack by the Imperial Japanese Army becomes almost unconscionable. That Admiralty war planners and others still pinned their hopes on some miracle in which an Eastern Fleet could sortie in Singapore and then use Hong Kong as an advanced base for a naval confrontation with Japan almost defies belief. Not even Anthony Eden, whose dramatic strategic initiatives in the autumn and winter of 1937 were based on his fervent desire to work jointly with the Americans at almost any price, ever really believed that Hong Kong could be held and used in this way. According to Cowman, Admiralty contingency planning lurched on, surviving the Backhouse era (of which, sadly, little is said), committed to the defence of the Malay Barrier and offensively inclined in the region north of it. Cowman’s contention is that this policy has been misunderstood by virtually everyone who has ever written on this subject in the past. He says that too much attention has been given to the fate of Singapore and not sufficient has been focused on that of Hong Kong and Manila. It is an interesting observation.

Part II dwells somewhat episodically with Anglo-American naval relations in the turbulent years of 1937-41. After two fairly pedestrian chapters notable as much for what is missed out as for that which is actually included, the final one devoted to “Cooperation without Collaboration” is the revisionist tract. Unfortunately, the startling effect of Cowman’s work is dulled by the fact that his findings have already seen the light of day in several articles that he has already published on these matters. Curiously he does not mention any of his published articles in either his endnotes or in what must be a very select bibliography. Quite why he fails to record these items and omits other important works from his book when he could not fail to have used them, is almost as fascinating as reading his version of who was responsible for sending Force Z to Singapore.

By materialising more than a decade after the bulk of the works that were published on this theme, Dominion or Decline looks suspiciously as though it has been caught in something of a time warp. Although Cowman seeks to enliven the action by a subtle manipulation of a rather hackneyed plot, there is a limit to how much even he can rewrite history.

Sadly, Ian Cowman will not get the opportunity to read this review. I had submitted it before I learned in December of the tragic news that Ian had been found brutally murdered at his new home in Fiji. All those who knew him will have been shocked at this quite appalling crime and the very distinct loss to the academic community resulting from it. Ian Cowman was never an establishment figure, he was too unconventional for that, yet, he developed an interest and expertise in diplomatic and naval history that made him one of the leading exponents of this craft not only in his native Australia but also around the world. He loved to challenge accepted theories and discover alternative and often provocative ways of looking at them. On the whole, Ian may well have been seriously underestimated by his peers. I am particularly sorry that he will not be able to tilt a few more academic windmills and demonstrate those swashbuckling talents that set him apart from so many in our profession.

Malcolm H. Murfett
Singapore

Beginning in 1906 with the Dreadnought, the first all-big-gun battleship, and ending in 1952 with the Jean Bart, about 170 battleships and battle cruisers joined the fleets of the world, some eighty percent of them in the first fifteen years. René Greger covers all these ships in detail. He does so generously, for he includes ships that other authorities would exclude, namely the Courageous, Glorious, and Furious of World War I and the Alaska and Guam of the next war. Indeed, he includes, with photographs, the Béarn, Saratoga, Lexington, Kaga, and Akagi, all of which served, mostly with distinction, though none of them as battleships or battle cruisers.

There is at least one lines drawing, usually quite good, and one photograph of each class of ship. For those that lasted long enough to be modernized, there are additional drawings and photographs. Besides the normal data, Greger lists the weight of each ship's armour as a percentage of normal displacement. In a few cases armour's share of displacement was forty percent!

While the book is obviously a catalogue, it is also more than that. First generally and then for each of the powers, the author provides brief essays on the development of the battleship and battle cruiser types and their performance during the wars. There is no evidence in any of these that by the time he wrote, the author had encountered any of the important revisionist work of Professor Jon Sumida on Admiral Sir John Fisher's intentions when he created the first “Dreadnought” battleships and battle cruisers.

Be that as it may, the dreadnought battleship and battle cruiser became popular symbols of both high technology and national power. As Greger puts it, they "had a spellbinding effect on governments" [8] as well as on their citizens for eight or ten years. But as these great ships showed their inability to yield victory in war, fascination turned to disillusionment.

Alas, the author has not produced a flawless book. For example, in discussing the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau he tells us that "during the Norwegian operation both units received serious damage when torpedoed by British submarines." [63] He is only partly correct. One was hit by a submarine; the other was torpedoed by a destroyer. Greger's problems with the US Navy seem greater than those with other navies. For example, on both pages 207 and 216, he tells us that the Pennsylvania class battleships mounted ten 14-inch guns, though the correct number was twelve. On page 231 he gets that number right, but on the very next page he says that after a torpedo hit in August 1945, the Pennsylvania "came close to sinking at Wake Island." The event did occur, but far westward, at Okinawa. He also tells us that when modernized between the wars the Nevada "was fitted with turbines in place of her stem reciprocating engines." [223] In fact, the Nevada always had turbines. It was her sister, the Oklahoma, which had reciprocating engines. She kept them until she perished at Pearl Harbor.

While in general the book's designer did his job well, in detail his design often fails, for time after time a ship is portrayed with either her bow or her stern clipped off. This is a shortcoming both foreseeable and preventable.

Readers of this book who are familiar with the US Navy's ships will overcome shortcomings of the sort outlined. Their reward will be a rich understanding of the major fighting ships of the Continental European powers in the twentieth century. Those ships not well known in North America are well worth knowing. René Greger opens wide the door to that knowledge.

Frank Uhlig, Jr.
Newport, Rhode Island


The vast literature on the US Navy and naval aviation in World War II is now augmented by Peter Kilduff's US Carriers at War. It is difficult to evaluate this book properly as it does not fit neatly into any one category. Published in an oversize format, this book is a collection of
anecdotes and topics about US Navy carrier operations in World War II. In that manner, it succeeds admirably. The various chapters are dedicated to narratives of individual themes about carrier operations: torpedo bombing; the air battles of the Battle of Midway; carrier activity in the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa; escort carriers; a discussion of USS "Cowpens"; a brief dissertation on Commander David McCampbell, the US Navy's ace of aces; night fighter operations; an operational mission from USS "Hornet"; and a chapter on USS "Intrepid," now a floating museum in New York Harbour. The nature of the book means that there is no unifying narrative. Yet this also means that it need not be read at once. Rather, it is a book for a Sunday evening or rainy afternoon, one to dip into, read a couple of chapters, and put away for another opportunity.

Within these limitations, Kilduff's book succeeds well. It can be read enjoyably by the novice to US naval or carrier warfare, yet experts in those fields should also find the photographs and anecdotes useful. It is in the visual material that the book shines. The cover bears a magnificent colour reproduction of US Navy SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers sinking the Japanese aircraft carrier "Akagi" in the Battle of Midway. The front endpapers carry an excellent map of the Pacific Ocean, the venue for most of the US Navy's carrier activity in World War II. Photographs of ships, aircraft, or relevant personnel appear on almost every page of the text. The rear cover has two striking photographs, one a head-on shot of a carrier flotilla, the other an excellent side view of an aircraft carrier (which, incidentally, provides an excellent depiction of the camouflage scheme seen on many US Navy carriers during the war). The photographs will be of aid to modelers or marine artists.

The text is helpful as well, and illuminates some aspects of US Navy carrier operations not always well-covered in other works. For example, the chapter on "Jeeps at Sea" deals with the role of US Navy escort carriers — small, slow carriers built to escort convoys. The tactics developed by the aircrews of these carriers led to the development of hunter-killer tactics, where one aircraft would "hunt" an enemy submarine and another would perform the "kill." The emphasis in this chapter is on USS "Bogue," "king" of the escort carriers, with seven "kills" of German U-boats and one Japanese submarine, and partial credit for two other U-boats. Another chapter on US Navy carriers in Operation "Torch," the 1942 landings in North Africa, illuminates an area of carrier operations frequently overlooked by historians.

In short, this book has something for everyone — readers unfamiliar with carrier history will read it for information and pleasure, while even the expert is sure to find a few nuggets of new information. Do not expect a serious, scholarly study of carrier operations. Nevertheless, and subject to its limitations, this book can be recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Anthologies and "Illustrated Stories" are not everyone's cup of tea. Too often they are sketchy, light weight and incomplete reviews of their subjects. Not so in this case; not surprising, given the authors: Cdr. Jeff Tall is the Director of the RN Submarine Museum at Gosport, and Paul Kemp is a photograph curator at the Imperial War Museum and naval historian. Both are experts.

As the title says, the book covers RN submarines from "Holland 1" of 1901 to the latest in Trident-class SSBNs. There are several hundred photos, many of them unique, of all classes of submarine. There are the traditional ones of surfaced boats entering and leaving harbour, of their Jolly Roger flags and crews gathered on deck. Yet there are also glimpses of life on board in every department, battle and collision damage, target periscope views and targets exploding, divers' photos of sunken boats and even a German photo of the captured submarine HMS "Shark" in the Skaggerak. These are supplemented by drawings of everything from the operation of nuclear power plants to on-board magazines to missile flight profiles.

By far the most fascinating portion of the book is the carefully prepared two or three page
connection narratives, and the extensive cut-lines under the photos. Each points out the items of note in the photo. One example is typical: “J.7 in Plymouth Sound on completion. J7 had a different layout to the others in the class in that the control room was placed aft of the machinery spaces. This arrangement, with the bridge and conning tower 60 ft further aft than usual, gave the boat a curiously elongated appearance.” [54]

Yet the book offers more than just technical comments aimed purely at present and ex-submariners. There are photos and descriptions of operating bases, prisoners-of-war on both sides, and even the odd photo of successful enemy submarine crews, such as that of the Italian Enrico Toti just after sinking HM S/M Triad. There are touches of humour — a photo of a practicable aerial torpedo firmly embedded in the casing of Walrus, or a miniature submarine painted surreptitiously across the stem of a frigate that had been claiming too many successes against 1950s target submarines! There is a photo of the World War I submarine S.1 which, although immobilised by engine problems off the German coast, boarded and seized a German trawler that came out to capture her and employed that ship to tow S. / home to Yarmouth!

There are the usual large selection of photos of badly damaged boats that reached home, and of salvaged boats that did not, often in the latter cases with no survivors; even a few photos taken deep under water. We all seem fascinated by these examples of operations gone awry. A few but very brief biographies of notably COs are included, but this is more about the boats than their crews. There are many little gems for those who have served in submarines: some will be belatedly encouraged by photos of boats expended in postwar trials to determine actual pressure hull failure depths: two “S” class boats with a maximum diving depth allowed of 300 feet failed at 532 feet and 647 feet. The book is full of useful items such as this.

If one can stand such a mixed bag of detail covering some ninety-five years of operational history in “The Trade” (as its pre-war members self-deprecatingly called it), this is a great book and well worth adding to a naval library.

Fraser McKee
Markdale, ON


The submarine branch of the Royal Dutch Navy was founded in 1906 and has been commemorated in books on its twenty-fifth, fortieth, sixtieth, seventy-fifth and eighty-fifth anniversaries, and now at its ninetieth. These books differ widely in approach, from memoirs of former commanders to historical surveys. Jalhay’s book is simply a list of all submarines under Dutch command, sixty-two in all. Each book includes standard technical information (displacement, speed, diving capacity, armament, cylinders, crew size, etc.) and the names of the commanders. All of the boats had conventional rather than nuclear propulsion. At the moment four are still in service. The career and the ultimate fate of each submarine is also related, and if something of more than passing interest occurred, this too is mentioned. Thus, we learn about the research voyage of the K XVIII in 1934/35.

Some boats were given to the Dutch by the British and US navies during and after World War II, but most were built by Dutch shipyards — before World War II in Flushing by the “De Schelde” and in Rotterdam by (Wilton-) Fijenoord and the Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM); after the war by the two latter ones. At the moment, only the RDM is still equipped to design, construct and repair submarines. Then there were those submarines of a
special type, the so-called three cylinder-boats built from 1954 to 1966. This was a construction system not followed in other western navies.

Readers should exercise caution which impression of Jalhay’s book is used. Much incorrect data appeared in the initial printing, though most of it was corrected in the second impression which appeared in December 1997.

In recent years, the wrecks of three submarines, lost in World War II, have been discovered. The O-22 disappeared in 1940 and has been found off the South Norwegian coast. The other two have been located in the South China Sea, north of the Malaysian island of Tioman. The O-16 was hit by a recently laid Japanese mine on 15 December 1941, and the K XVII six days later, not far from the place where the O-16 had sunk. The causes of these two disasters had long been unknown, and were the subject of considerable speculation, such as wrong navigation, and going astray in a British minefield. Sons of the commanders of the three boats are responsible for these latest investigations: Ort about the O-22; Besançon about the K XVII; the brothers Bussemaker about the O-16. Paul Van Royen, head of the Institute for Maritime History of the Naval Staff, has coordinated and expanded the research on the latter two boats.

These are two interesting booklets. Both are well documented and lavishly illustrated and worthy tributes to the memory of the crew members who were all killed. The only survivor of the O-16, who was in the sea for thirty-five hours and whose story about the hit was not believed by the officials ashore, has now been vindicated.

Jalap R. Bruijn
Leiden, The Netherlands


U-boat War Diaries potentially provide the researcher with a wealth of information. Originally submitted on completion of a patrol and circulated in eight or more copies to key offices in the German Navy, they were designed to provide rapid and graphic insight into crucial aspects of the war at sea. Kept purposely telegraphmatic by the use of abbreviations and cryptic commentary they enabled staffs — and subsequent historians — to reconstruct the patrol. For specific times of the day the Diaries record everything from navigational data and meteorology to tactics; they record details of attacks, and include summaries of key radio communications. Some Diaries are exceptionally terse; others seem to have been written by a novelist. Senior officers appended their adjudications of the mission, thus indicating how the U-boat and crew were regarded as having performed. Of course, just as when using other official documents, researchers must be judicious in their use.

Now, along comes Heinz Guske to warn the researchers and story-tellers among us that we have been led by the nose. A former Petty Officer Communicator who worked as a sausage-maker in England for some twenty-five years after the war, he learned during a 1985 reunion of his former shipmates from U-764 — to which he apparently was not invited — that his former CO had distributed a booklet about their exploits based on the U-boat’s War Diary and the skipper’s memory. It was all lies, claims Guske; not only the skipper’s published yarn, but the War Diary too. Apparently shocked both by the skipper’s performance and the collusion of certain members of the crew, Guske took it upon himself to set the record straight. Zealous to a fault, Guske proclaims his broad and urgent mission: “there is far too much false information being bandied about, of which [this book is] but the tip of the iceberg.” Indeed “anyone with both the time and the inclination for doing proper research into these matters could probably fill a whole book just by quoting the errors and giving the facts thereto.” [168] His mission is no less than rescuing truth from the hands of historians who are incapable of interpreting naval documents.

With the regularity of an automatic chipping hammer Guske flays his victim in a monotonously repeated three-fold pattern: in page after page, he follows a few examples from the Diary by a section labelled “Fact” (in which he offers his truth in place of the Diary’s fiction), and then writes a “comment/explanation” section in which he twists the blade. “It is no doubt that HQ had been totally fooled by this CO’s story as told in the KTB [War Diary] and it would not surprise me in the least if the reader [of this book] would
also be led to believe what he entered" there. [44] Guske was especially miffed that the Staff Officer Operations judged U-764's captain an "attack spirited" commanding officer. Quite the contrary, as Guske drums home. With a pervers sense of righteousness, Guske quite literally peppers his idiosyncratic pages with repeated charges of his former captain's "arrogance," "superciliousness," "unprofessional behaviour," "laziness," "gross incompetence," and "insubordination."

This spiteful vendetta against a former U-boat commanding officer, whatever his shortcomings, is a tiresome polemic. Methinks he doth protest too much.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia


This is the story of two ships and three men. The ships are the ex-American flush-decked destroyer HMCS St. Croix and the German submarine U-305. The men are Lieutenant Commanders Harry Kingsley, RCN and Andrew Hedley Dobson, RCNR, the two commanding officers of the St. Croix, and Lieutenant Rudolf Hermann Robert Bahr, the captain of U-305. *Deadly Seas* chronicles the stories of these three men and the two ships during the Battle of the Atlantic.

The careers and fates of Kingsley, Dobson, Bahr, St. Croix, and U-305, are in many respects similar and, to some degree, intermixed. Kingsley was the St. Croix's first captain until replaced by Dobson. The destroyer and most of her crew, including Dobson, were lost in September 1943 when the St. Croix was sunk by U-305 in the battle for Convoy ON 202/ONS 18. Several months later, in January 1944, Bahr was killed when U-305 was destroyed by HMS Wanderer. Overall it is an engaging story.

The book is marred by a number of small factual errors. For example, the Germans never took El Alamein, [93] the Allies never sent supplies to the Russians through the Black Sea, [168] HMS Fidelity was not a destroyer, [227] and HMS Woodpecker was a Black Swan-class sloop. [315] Yet these are minor criticisms, particularly when it is taken into account that *Deadly Seas* is what the authors call "a docudrama or work of historical recreation." [333] As such there are no footnotes in *Deadly Seas* and the book is, in essence, a mixture of fact and fiction. This makes it difficult at times to tell which is fact and which is creation. *Deadly Seas* is not unique in this regard. Other books on the Battle of the Atlantic, such as Michael Gannon's *Operation Drumbeat*, also use historical recreations with made-up conversations and the like. Probably one reason for this is that the Battle of the Atlantic was a time of high historical drama in contrast to which the historical sources, such as after action reports, tend for the most part to lack human interest. Still, the invention of events or conversations without proper documentation has the potential to be unjust and misleading. For example, where is the evidence that Kingsley was an ineffectual commanding officer or how can the authors be sure that Bahr, or any other U-boat commander, had the information and the intellectual ability to conclude that the Allies were reading German codes? For what it is worth, this reviewer believes that historians must use documents as they find them and have no business recreating events.

Several other questions are raised by the fictional component in *Deadly Seas*. Should the book be reviewed in a scholarly journal such as *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord*? And if the answer is yes, should it then be reviewed as a historical novel or as a work of history? Casting aside such considerations, *Deadly Seas* is undeniably a cracking good read.

David Syrett
New York, New York


This is an account of British and US merchant ship management in 1939-1945. The focus is on the problem of maintaining British imports for sustenance of the population and industry. At
centre stage are the British Ministry of War Transport and its American counterpart, the War Shipping Administration, civilian agencies that bore the major responsibility for the imports programme.

The book draws upon three lines of analysis of the Anglo-American alliance that have been particularly prominent in studies done since the early 1970s. The first is the tradition of distrust and competition that the two nations only partly overcame in forging the alliance. The second is Britain’s industrial backwardness that underlay its decline relative to the United States. Lastly are the warts and sharp practices of US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that have come more clearly into view with the opening of archives.

In the context of civilian management of merchant shipping, the application and development of these insights makes for grim reading. Smith details how utterly unequal British transportation industries, especially shipbuilding, were to the challenge of war. He also shows how ineffective the government was in reforming industry’s demoralized, hidebound management and detoxifying its relations with labour (one of the union leaders proclaimed Hitler to be a lesser menace than Britain’s own business class). Rather than plunging into this domestic quagmire, Churchill elected to rely on the United States to make up shortfalls and replace merchant ship losses. This was one of the ways in which he tried in 1940-1941 to draw the neutral Americans into the war. He believed Britain could acquire control over pooled alliance resources, and thereby maintain its strategic leadership.

Churchill was successful to the extent of persuading Roosevelt of the need to provide US ships to maintain British imports. As a result, Ministry of War Transport officials educated their American counterparts while building an intimate working relationship with them. This did not address the fundamental problems of British industrial weakness and Churchill’s own inclination to dodge the difficult details of merchant shipping priorities and organization. The prime minister’s enthusiasm for new military ventures, and readiness to divert shipping from the import programme to deploy and support armed forces in combat theatres, hindered the efforts and undercut the authority of civilian shipping managers.

The difficulties became worse when the United States entered the war. The demands of the American forces far outstripped the initial expansion of the US merchant fleet. To preserve his freedom of action, Roosevelt made his promises of shipping aid for Britain in an ambiguous, carefully hedged manner. This effectively condoned the US military’s habit of ignoring the War Shipping Administration, which senior officers regarded as a puppet of the British. In 1942-43, moreover, the prime minister and the president patched up profound strategic disagreements among their respective armed forces by agreeing to do everything: maintain pressure on the Japanese in the Pacific and prepare for an early invasion of northwest Europe as the Americans demanded, while pursuing the British-led offensive in the Mediterranean. Britain had to divert its own merchant shipping to carry US forces to meet all these objectives. Here was the genesis of the British imports crisis of late 1942 to early 1943, and the withdrawal of shipping from the routes to India that helped produce famine there.

The centrepiece of the book is the Churchill-Roosevelt summit at Casablanca in January 1943. Incredibly, the leaders, while acknowledging the gravity of the shipping situation, did not include in their delegations the civilian officials with accurate, detailed knowledge. The result was confirmation of the decisions to press forward on all fronts at the expense of further diversions of British shipping to lift US troops. At that very moment British imports were slipping to less than half of the levels assessed as the bare minimum. Members of the British delegation who smelled disaster held their tongues for fear of worsening the serious tensions with the Americans that already had been created by Churchill’s interventions into the management of US seaborne trade.

The resolution of the deepening crisis had nothing whatever to do with the prime minister’s endeavours to win control over US shipping. In May 1943 the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force achieved a victory over the German U-boat assault against North Atlantic convoys, thereby virtually eliminating merchant ship losses. In the following months, the outpouring of new merchant ships from fully mobilized US industry provided definitive relief through sheer abundance. Combined management of priorities was no longer essential, a fact that made Britain’s
beggar status glaringly apparent. Smith concludes that Churchill's attempts to sidestep domestic economic problems through bold diplomacy with the Americans had in the end only emphasized British dependence to the detriment of the strategic influence the prime minister was determined to preserve.

This account is a convincing one. The author is notably successful in using archival research to show precisely how bureaucracies understood complex economic issues, and how that understanding influenced or failed to influence large strategic decisions. The story, however, is not quite so new as Smith suggests in the text. As his own splendid endnotes and bibliography reveal, there has been a great deal of work done on the problem of British imports, the management of seaborne trade and the logistical dimensions of Anglo-American strategy. The British civil and military official histories series and the massive US Army official history project produced a score or more of detailed volumes that directly bear on these subjects. Smith mentions a few of these works in his text, but only to correct or endorse particular points. He should have devoted a few pages to introduce this important literature, little known except to specialists, and taken some care to highlight the salient issues and controversies within it. As it is, the compact, tightly argued text assumes a great deal of prior knowledge on the part of the reader.

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


For me personally this was a very difficult book to review; indeed, were it not for the gentle persistence of our Book Review Editor, it might just have fallen through the cracks in my desk. Not to put too fine a point on it, a greater part of these memoirs (those of Corson fils) closely parallel my experiences in the Royal Canadian Navy, both in details and, I am afraid, in time. Terms and concepts and realities of midshipmen's journals, Snotties nurse, captain's "doggy," the paralysing introduction to "kitchen gear" as a method of propulsion for ship's motor boats, all brought back memories — dare I say it — of my cruiser time. There is even a Kenneth Mackenzie in the book [76] but it is not me.

The book is about the Royal Navy time of a father and son, whose careers spanned the years 1904 to 1963 — what the author terms the "Steam Turbine - Rifled Gun Era" [xi] to separate it from the current Tom Clancy era of naval operations. The book started with the author's discovery of a small packet of his father's letters written between 1905 and 1916. The author's own career covered the period 1943-1963, and the two, father and son, coincided during World War II when Corson senior was an RN retread officer in Bombay at the same time that his son passed through on a posting. Both men spent the largest parts of their careers, if not east of Suez, then outside home waters.

One of the potentially most instructive periods of naval history of their time is bereft of diary entries. The elder Corson soldiered on in the RN through the bleak years after World War I including the trauma of the 1921 Washington Conference on naval armaments, without apparently putting pen to paper. This is a distinct loss. He also took the "show-the-flag" tour of HMS Renown. This ship called at ports on both of Canada's southern coasts, but other than making the common error of misspelling "St. John's, New Brunswick" and experiencing the awesome tides of the Bay of Fundy, it seems to have left no lasting impression. [82] We have plenty of accounts in fact and in fiction of the derring-do of a fighting naval career, but we have very little on the trials and tribulations of peacetime naval operations of that era.

While it might be uncharitable to say that Corson floundered at the increasingly technical aspects of a modern naval career, his repeated references to "iron decks" on his newer ships is something of a give-away. He also professes to have found the old style of messing, in the right hands, better than the US-style central messing. [229] His brief comments on his engineering training — the paucity of — gives us the key to this aspect of his career. [90-1] Corson's account of "sailoring east of Suez" [170] gives an insight into how the British government and the RN
slowly came to grips with the reality that between them they no longer had to police the world’s oceans. There is sufficient of a hint in the text to suggest sorrow at the passing of this era. There is also evidence that perhaps the time had come to pass this responsibility to others.

I was perplexed by the choice of title. Corson himself notes the vitality of the morning watch as a ship slowly takes shape after night. [101] But he quotes his father as writing that in the middle watch “one can write fairly flowingly,” [50] and perhaps the clue is there. In the final analysis therein lies my disagreement with the book. It is written with a greater care as to how it was written rather than for the actual stories it has to tell. It is too diffident.

Kenneth Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, British Columbia


*Really Not Required* is a naval autobiography about one man’s Battle of the Atlantic. Colin Warwick, a Royal Navy Reserve officer, commanded a big coal-burning anti-submarine trawler, HMS *St Loman*, manned by reserve officers of various Commonwealth navies and fishermen reservists of the Royal Naval Patrol Service. Warwick’s wartime odyssey begins with the Norway expedition in 1940 followed by coastal convoy duty off Scotland where he sank his first U-boat. After Pearl Harbor, *St Loman* was assigned with twenty-five other Royal Navy A/S trawlers to the US Navy to combat U-boat activity on the Eastern Sea Frontier of the United States. There Warwick accounted for his second probable submarine kill. That tasking completed, Warwick’s A/S trawler group followed the U-boat activity to South African waters. Warwick bagged his third U-boat in the Mozambique channel while on convoy duty. His success was rewarded with command of a new frigate, HMS *Rushen Castle*, and an assignment to the Gibraltar convoys of Admiral Max Horton’s Western Approaches Command. There he served from 1943 to 1945.

The book is an interesting mixture of operational and social history based on the author’s recollections. Readers who follow the wartime missions of Warwick and *St Loman* will gain the impression that the A/S trawlers were the gypsy ships of the Royal Navy. *St Loman* and her class were a basic commercial deep-sea fishing trawler design to which an asdic set, 4-inch gun and depth charges were added. All were coal burners with a single three cylinder steam reciprocating steam engine capable of driving the ship at twelve knots. These ships were simple, dependable, versatile and required little support. They operated out of coastal villages from fishing boat quays and did the odd jobs of the navy as well as conduct their regular escort operations.

Like their commercial fishing counterparts, the success and efficiency of the A/S trawlers depended largely on the knowledge and ability of their captains. Colin Warwick, who was awarded the DSC and Bar as well as being mentioned in dispatches, was one of the most successful of these. He survived his baptism of fire and the harrowing experiences of the Norwegian campaign by his wits and ingenuity. This early part of the book is easily the best, as the action is constant and well described. Left to his own devices, Warwick developed his own tactics on the spot to survive air attacks and he applied his practical innovative approach later to developing trawler A/S tactics. Warwick’s commentary clearly suggests that his innovative ideas were initially treated disdainfully by his regular navy seniors and were accepted only after he proved they worked. He argues that this disdain stemmed from a mind set represented in the regulars interpretation of RNR as meaning “really not required,” hence the title of the book.

*Really Not Required* also gives the reader a rare insight into the personality of a small ship manned entirely by reservists. The crew of *St Loman* was close knit and Warwick developed routines that got the most out of the professional mariners who were temporarily in uniform. What worked practically and maintained morale was the order of the day. Characters were given latitude not allowed in bigger ships as long as this did not detract from ship’s efficiency. Warwick’s anecdotal descriptions of life aboard ship, interesting characters, runs ashore, wartime romances and creative solutions to compassionate problems provide useful and, often entertaining, insights
into the culture of the reserve navy. Warwick's personal experiences and his world view are presented frankly and honestly. He is a compelling character and his narrative captures the spirit of the times.

The recollective nature of the book makes the narrative uneven in places. For example, there is little written on the period 1943 to 1945 when the author was escorting Gibraltar-United Kingdom convoys. Sometimes the social narrative receives more attention than operations. Out of context with the flow of the narrative is the inclusion of Admiralty reports and other officially sourced information pertaining to the general progress of the Battle of the Atlantic and U-boat operations. The author may have received these during the war and included them in the book as a matter of interest. It reinforces the impression that Warwick made a thorough study of the business of killing U-boats. He was in on five kills during the war.

While Really Not Required may be categorized as popular history it is of interest to Canadian students of the period as it affords an opportunity for comparison, particularly of attitudes, between regular and reserve navies. There is a remarkable similarity between the circumstances of the RCNR/RCNVR and the RNR/RCNR. Moreover, a number of RCNVR officers served in Royal Navy A/S trawlers and little is known of their experiences. Insights on the reception and treatment of reservists by regulars in both St John's and Halifax are also illuminating. Halifax's lack of popularity as a port of call appears to have been universal.

W.G.D. Lund
Victoria, British Columbia


As a former superintendent of a reserve fleet mothballed in California, Captain Walter W. Jaffee was in a unique position to research and document the history of US-built wartime merchant ships. His latest book, a revision of an earlier edition, deals specifically with one ship, as the title indicates. Yet in developing this story, the author also provides a broader picture of the Victory class ships and how they were employed in war and peace.

The book is fittingly dedicated to the United States Merchant Marine veterans of World War II and in particular to Joe Vernick and John Smith, the two men who were determined not to let the nation forget the important role performed by non-military seamen. Central to the efforts by these men was the procurement of the Lane Victory and its subsequent and continuing role as a memorial-museum in San Pedro, California.

To set the stage, Captain Jaffee describes the transition from the Liberty ship building program to that which produced the faster and more efficient Victories. It was a transition which, not surprisingly, was delayed by conflicting schools of thought within the bureaucracy. As a result, the first ship of this class was not launched until February 1944. Eventually a total of 534 various types were constructed.

The focus of Jaffee's book, the Lane Victory, was delivered from the California Shipbuilding Corporation of Los Angeles in June 1945. The ship's involvement in World War II was therefore brief. Lane Victory sailed on her first voyage on 10 July, loaded with military supplies for the Pacific theatre of war. Barely a month later, on 14 August, Japan surrendered unconditionally whilst the Lane Victory was homeward bound. After a brief career, chiefly in the Pacific, the Lane Victory was moth-balled in May 1948 only to be activated for service in the Korean War in October 1950. By October 1953, the ship was back in the reserve fleet where she would remain for thirteen years before being once again activated, this time for sea lift duty in the Vietnam war. Lane Victory concluded this chapter of her history in April 1970 and, with the instinct of a homing pigeon, returned again to the reserve fleet. Thus, during the twenty-five years since being launched, Lane Victory spent more than half her time carefully preserved in the reserve fleet.

Jaffee then turns our attention to the transfer of the vessel's ownership to the Merchant Marine Veterans organization in October 1988 for conversion to a maritime museum and to serve as a memorial. As in the case of other preserved wartime US merchant ships, Lane Victory makes
summer day trips where wartime conditions are re-created complete with gunfire for the benefit of the paying passengers. Further income for maintenance is derived from the movie and television industries, both of which have utilized this authentic historical set. Plans were made for the Lane Victory to join the preserved Liberty, Jeremiah O’Brien, on a voyage to the Normandy beaches in 1994 but this trans-Atlantic voyage had to be aborted because of engine trouble.

Apart from the evacuation of over 7,000 Korean refugees, by no stretch of the imagination can it be claimed that this ship had a distinguished career. The author has tried to enliven his account through the extensive use of anecdotal material from formal crew members. These range from the humorous to the bizarre. Jaffee also devotes an entire chapter to the efforts made to obtain full veteran status for wartime merchant mariners. This will be of particular interest to their counterparts in Canada who have waged a similar campaign. The author’s claim that the United States is the only nation to deny this status is incorrect, as Canadians can affirm. Towards this end, I commend Postwar Casualty: Canada’s Merchant Navy by Doug Fraser (Pottersfield Press, 1997) for Jaffee’s enlightenment.

This book will almost certainly interest former crew members, patrons and volunteers. Others might be less enthusiastic with the amount of questionable detail and lack of drama.

Gregory P. Pritchard
Blue Rocks, Nova Scotia


Nine papers presented at a 1991 conference on World War II in the Pacific have been revised for this anthology published six years later. As in most such collections, they are only loosely tied together thematically and are of uneven quality and importance. That said, however, all are concise and add something to our understanding of the US role in the Pacific war, with some attention to Japan regarding the last months of the fighting.

After D. Clayton James introduces the book by "Rethinking the Pacific War" with a useful overview of major books on the subject, Michael Schaller shrewdly analyzes "General Douglas MacArthur and the Politics of the Pacific War." Amidst the broad sweep of the general’s posturing and self-deception throughout the war, the reconstruction of the details of his meeting with Franklin D. Roosevelt at Honolulu in 1944 to decide on liberating the Philippines is the most interesting example. MacArthur insisted that all of FDR’s motives were basically political rather than strategic, a conclusion which Schaller rightly questions.

Ronald Spector uses "technical, social, and logistical" factors as the "Fourth Dimension of Strategy" in the Pacific but confines his discussion to the American public’s attitudes toward the Japanese, characterized by hatred, early fears of the US ability to defeat them, and the demand for their unconditional surrender. Spector also appears as one of the many survey history book and textbook authors that Kenneth J. Hagan uses to support his argument of "Guerre de course Triumphant"—not only were American submarines the principal weapon against Japanese seaborne commerce, but victory could have been achieved two years earlier if subs instead of the surface fleet had been the basis of US strategy! (Hagan has presented this unique theory in other writings.)

Daniel K. Blewett blames the problem of "Fuel and US Naval Operations in the Pacific, 1942" on poor prewar logistical planning that was not reversed until more and faster tankers began to appear in 1943. Gregory J. W. Urwin gives an excellent account of "The Defenders of Wake Island and Their Two Wars, 1941-1945." Most of them won their second war, for survival in Japanese prisoner of war camps, largely because they were kept together at Shanghai in their original disciplined units. Urwin’s heavy use of oral interviews makes his account entirely convincing.

By contrast, Kathleen Warnes’ essay, "Nurses Under Fire: Healing and Heroism in the South Pacific," though interesting, is confined mostly to vignettes from only a few published sources.

The question of Hiroshima receives two differing treatments. Herman S. Wolk examines "General [H.H.] Arnold, the Atomic Bomb, and
the Surrender of Japan” to reveal that Arnold opposed the A-bomb because it “stole the thunder” from the conventional B-29 bombings in bringing on Japan’s surrender via air-sea blockade rather than by invasion. Stephen E. Ambrose and Brian Loring Villa entitle their essay “Racism, the Atomic Bomb, and the Transformation of Japanese-American relations.” They show that the ethnic/racial hatred was mutual on both sides, then concentrate on a much-ignored explanation for the dropping of the two A-bombs: “The key to inducing a quick surrender and reconstructing Japan was the same — to split the imperial institution from the military.” [195] Henry L. Stimson and Joseph C. Grew convinced President Harry Truman that by retaining the emperor, the US would immobilize the die-hard generals who wanted to fight on against the US invasion. The authors argue that this result was superior to the US surrender-occupation policy in Germany and refute many claims of Gar Alperovitz in his denunciations of the bombings.

A photo block of American domestic propaganda posters is supplemented by photographs in the essays. A cumulative bibliography and detailed index round out this thought-provoking volume.

Clark G. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


In 1945 the French navy consisted of an ill-assorted mixture of vessels derived from pre-war construction, American and British lend-lease warships and even Italian and German ships taken as reparations. Ports dockyards and construction facilities were either war damaged or in a state of neglect and disrepair. Finally, the nation, struggling to write a new constitution and faced with the enormous economic burden of post-war reconstruction, was simply unable to define a clear strategic mission for the armed forces.

Professor Phillipe Quérel has written a first-rate study of the reconstruction and development of the French navy during the Fourth Republic. The author argues that after devising a very ambitious naval building program, naval authorities quickly adapted their ambitions to the economic and political realities of the moment. The period 1950 to 1955 marked the height of naval construction. Professor Querel is fully aware of the role played by the United States which provided extensive financial and technological assistance. American aid and American aircraft, for example, formed the backbone of the French naval air arm. A growing American commitment to Asia led to a decline in assistance, but France had already made good use by then of American contributions.

Naval leaders also had to deal with the issue of the proper roles and missions for the fleet. They could not do this in isolation since the navy had to function within the context of national policy. Ultimately the navy found that it had to perform two diverse roles: contributing to the protection of the French Union and operating as an alliance partner in the Brussels Pact and North Atlantic Alliance. Naval participation in the Indochina and Algerian conflicts increased the navy’s financial burden at just the time when new technologies were beginning to have a substantial impact on naval construction and tactics. Budgetary restrictions and the uncertainties in the choice of naval platforms caused primarily by technological change in turn reduced the pace of naval construction during the late 1950s. The navy, nevertheless, did a credible job and the Fifth Republic inherited a fleet that lasted into the early 1990s and provided a basis for a new naval policy after the liquidation of the colonial empire. A new definition of national policy based on national independence and nuclear power provided for a sound basis for a coherent military policy.

Professor Querel handles the complex interactions of policy, economics, technology and naval strategy with clarity and skill. He has produced an important and illuminating study of the navy and the Fourth Republic, and the problems faced by the French navy in uncertain times have a remarkable resemblance to the problems facing many military institutions today.

Steven Ross
Newport, Rhode Island

In *The Coast Guard At War*, Alex Larzelere relates a story which until now has been untold. His book is both timely and interesting.

While the US Coast Guard conducts marine management missions similar to those of its Canadian counterpart, it is also an armed force in being. The Coast Guard trains for both peace and war and has participated in every major conflict in which the United States was involved. During the two world wars, control of the US Coast Guard was even transferred from the Treasury Department to the US Navy. No such transfer occurred during Vietnam, possibly because the United States was never officially at war. This left the Coast Guard free to manage its own resources and to negotiate involvement in the conflict through inter-service agreements. This is not to say that the Coast Guard was reluctant to participate. As Larzelere demonstrates, Coast Guardsmen contributed enthusiastically and bravely to operations in Vietnam.

The range of Coast Guard missions was impressive. In 1965 the US Navy lacked the resources to interdict effectively North Vietnamese infiltration of weapons along the South Vietnamese coast. At first the Navy sought the use only of Coast Guard vessels but the final agreement resulted in fully manned 82-foot cutters being transferred to Navy control for operation "Market Time." Various cutters were to serve in Vietnamese waters until they were transferred to the Vietnamese Navy in 1971. Other missions included more traditional Coast Guard tasks such as aids to navigation, port security and explosives loading, albeit under wartime conditions. For instance, the Coast Guard set up a LORAN-C network in Thailand and South Vietnam which allowed pinpoint bombing of North Vietnam. This system was transferred to civilian contractors and abandoned only at the final moment of South Vietnam's defeat. Perhaps the most dangerous Coast Guard mission was flying Jolly Green Giant HH-3E helicopters and C-130 Hercules with USAF Aero Rescue and Recovery Squadrons.

Larzelere recounts these exploits in an easy, readable style. Having commanded USCGC *Point Banks* during the early years of the war, he knows of what he writes. His text combines first-hand accounts, gleaning from numerous interviews with people who served in Vietnam, with a straightforward narrative of events based on both primary and secondary sources. Larzelere also gives some insight into how the various inter-service agreements came about, how individuals reacted to the prospect of service in Vietnam (usually with unalloyed enthusiasm), how the Coast Guardsmen viewed their South Vietnamese allies, and to a lesser extent, how the Coast Guard failed to capitalize on what was learned in Vietnam.

*The Coast Guard at War* is attractively presented. The photographs complement the text, the maps are easy to use and a glossary and chronology of events provide ready references. There are many end notes but an abbreviated format compels readers to peruse virtually the entire bibliography each time they wish to verify a source.

The Coast Guardsmen who served in South East Asia were professional volunteers who apparently had few misgivings about America's role. That the controversy surrounding that war is not addressed in the book is likely due to the fact that Larzelere's interviewees were mostly officers who continued to make the Coast Guard their career after Vietnam (most retired as Captains). To a certain extent, therefore, the story of the non-commissioned Coast Guardsmen in Vietnam remains to be explored.

Larzelere has done an excellent job of recording the US Coast Guard's involvement in Vietnam. This fascinating and enjoyable book is highly recommended.

Richard J. Summers
Surrey, British Columbia


This book recounts the details of an astonishing top secret maritime mission — code named "Jennifer" — by the US Central Intelligence
Agency during a dangerous period of the Cold War. Using a ship specially created for the task, a brave group of men attempted a hazardous and unprecedented underseas exploit.

Author Clyde Burleson has compiled the fascinating story of the enterprise, which involved famous names like Howard Hughes as well as intrepid sailors and scientists on a perilous high-seas adventure. The tale reads like a combination of an outlandish spy novel and a science fiction tale, yet is about real-life accomplishments. To unravel this mystery, Burleson had to penetrate a good deal of official secrecy before he could write the first edition of his book. Its publication in 1977 caused much controversy, revealing as it did facts about the American government going to enormous expense and lengths to retrieve a Russian vessel in an act of high-tech intelligence gathering. The publicity brought him a flood of additional information by participants and informants, which led to this second edition, containing much more detail. The human story emerges most strongly, despite the understandable emphasis on technical achievement.

Though heroes emerge amidst a wealth of nuts-and-bolts explanation, today’s reader cannot help but wonder at the huge effort made back then. Seen well after the collapse of Russian-led communism, in a world where the once mighty threat of the Soviet Navy now rusts in ports from Archangel to Vladivostok, one might ask, “But why; to what end?” Well, it was a tough, nastier world in 1974, and advanced-design Russian submarines ranked worryingly high as potential enemy weapons. Burleson does a good job of setting the scene, unravelling the tale of just how the Jennifer Project came into being. It is a commentary on how the technical and financial power of US private enterprise still needs to be called upon by the military whenever there is urgent need for massive innovation.

Incredibly sophisticated technology was already in place, though, when this drama began in March 1968. Operators of “Sea Spider,” the US Navy’s world-wide network of underwater tracking sensors, determined that a Soviet G-class submarine had exploded underwater in the North Pacific. American intelligence kept a close eye on the Soviet Navy’s frantic attempts to retrieve the wreck, and was quick to act when Russia gave up eventually. The sunken sub, with its ICBM missiles and electronic systems, promised a vast pay-back of military information, vital for learning Moscow’s state of attack readiness at sea. But the wreck lay three miles deep, far beyond equipment capability at that time. So for help in scooping up the submarine, the CIA turned to that eccentric yet brilliant billionaire, Howard Hughes, and the “do-anything” expertise of his giant Summa Corporation.

We learn about the team’s planning, design, and development work to construct the purpose-built Glomar Explorer — a ship two football fields in length, and equipped with a gigantic claw to gather up parts of the broken submarine. One can sense the homework and devious probing Burleson must have used to gather so many threads of the account. This later edition benefits greatly from individual reminiscences and leaked documentation to reveal how the US Navy, various intelligence agencies, and Hughes pulled off one of the greatest feats of maritime recovery.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


Ronald Reagan became president of the United States in large part due to his promise to overcome the legacy of Vietnam, which had crippled American foreign policy and military effectiveness in the 1970s. Among his inheritances was the growing incidence of state-sponsored international terrorism, epitomized by “the Qaddafi problem.” So that the apparent success of Libya not be allowed to encourage other radical states, Reagan promised that future violations of international behaviour would be met by an American policy of “swift and effective retribution.”

Faced with an unconventional threat, Reagan responded with conventional force. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy, based in the Mediterranean Sea, would bear the brunt of the effort against Libya. Another factor dictating involvement of the Sixth Fleet
was Qaddafi’s use of an exaggeration of the baseline principle of contiguous seas to lay sovereign claim to the 250-mile-wide Gulf of Sidra. Firm believers in the freedom of the seas, the United States could not accept restriction of a large portion of the Mediterranean.

Either in response to confirmed Libyan involvement in terrorist activity, or under the guise of freedom of navigation exercises, the ships and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet were engaged in action against Libyan forces on at least three occasions through the 1980s, most spectacularly in August 1981, March 1986, and in a joint operation with the US Air Force (USAF) in April 1986. This volume traces the progress of that confrontation. It is written by a former US Navy surface warfare officer, as part of a series from the US Naval Historical Center designed “to highlight for officers and sailors the vital contribution of the Navy to America’s national security, economic prosperity and global presence during the contemporary era.” [iii]

Stanik knows his subject and his audience. This pamphlet (one hesitates to label its fifty-two-page, oversize format a book) is loaded with high-quality photos and after-action briefing maps. As might be expected, it is heavy on description of the various actions. For those who keep score, the Libyans lost two fighters (in the first engagement in 1981 — thereafter their air force remained out of range), two corvettes sunk (in the first combat employment of the “Harpoon” missile) and another damaged, and the destruction of a good portion of their coastal antiaircraft defence network and specific terrorist-related targets, all for the loss of a single USAF F-111 aircraft (the US Navy suffered no losses).

Just as predictable, analysis is light. Still, Stanik has skillfully interwoven key thematic elements. He charts a traceable resurrection in American military confidence. But he leaves the distinctly mixed impression that, while the US Navy succeeded in demonstrating its ability to sail where it wishes with impunity, there are limitations to the application of overwhelming military force. Despite the promises of Reagan’s policy, there were caveats both to its swiftness and its effectiveness.

Stanik has written a good, concise examination of the US Navy in action, in just the sort of operation in which the world’s policeman can be expected to be engaged in the coming decades. International pirates are neither a new construct, nor limited to the Barbary coast.

Richard H. Gimblett
Blackburn, Hamlet, Ontario


*Missile Inbound* is a fascinating and well-written story of the formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the May 1987 attack on the USS *Stark* in the Persian Gulf. As several others have rightly pointed out, this book should be read carefully by every serving naval officer regardless of rank and by all politicians and other public servants who have anything to with a nation’s naval forces. In fact, there are lessons here for the whole military community.

It may seem too simplistic to say that this is an "I told you so!" saga, yet that would be an absolutely accurate description of this compelling book. Putting aside the intriguing quandary raised by the authors of whether there was a political motive behind the actual attack by an Iraqi fighter, the *Stark* incident is a classic example of how basic war-fighting skills, fundamental to the very survival of a modern warship, can be eroded with ease by a peacetime mindset. In this case, a warship was sent ill-prepared into a combat zone with the result that thirty-seven people lost their lives.

Why did this happen? As the authors explain, there were several contributing factors. First, the basic organization of the US Navy at the time did not make a clear enough separation between operational readiness in a combat zone where the warship was distinctly “in harm’s way” and the non-combat readiness requirements that are part of the everyday life of a warship in peacetime. *Stark’s* commander was as concerned with completing his ship’s readiness check list as he was with defending the ship. True, he was not expecting the Iraqis to be a threat. But that is exactly what happened. Whether by accident or through political chicanery, *Stark* was attacked by
an Iraqi fighter which fired two Exocet missiles at the ship. The lesson should be very easy to understand: in an uncertain situation, which the Persian Gulf was at the time, the unexpected can be just as dangerous as the known threat. For this reason, in a combat zone even non-belligerents must be able to defend themselves. Being in “harm’s way” is more than just operating in the face of a known threat; it means having to operate in uncertain and unpredictable situations and thus being able to defend the ship at all times. Somehow, this point was lost on Stark.

But perhaps this situation is symptomatic of the way naval and military forces were required to operate under tight political control during the Cold War and in the various “threat ambiguous” situations associated with UN operations. One only has to recall the numerous bleats of the disarmament community that modern military forces no longer need all the traditional skills to realize that the full implications of incidents such as the Iraqi attack on the Stark are still not being taken to heart universally. The nature of warfare may have changed at the political and strategic levels, but the fundamental requirement for ships and individuals to protect themselves when attacked has not changed one iota.

The fact is that the USS Stark was in “harm’s way,” albeit not as a belligerent, and was unprepared to defend itself and its people adequately. Although the commander was found accountable and rightly dismissed from his ship, one has to ask whether others higher up the chain of command should share in the blame. The bureaucratic requirements of running a modern warship should not be allowed to impede the ability of the ship to defend itself adequately when in a combat zone. The transition from a non-threatening situation to one where threats might exist should include not only a rigorous “shake down” but also a rigid removal of administrative distractions. This, too, is a lesson from the Stark incident.

Perhaps the commanding officer was guilty of “careerism” in that he may have placed greater store in his superiors’ view of his ship’s theoretical proficiency than in moulding his ship’s company into a combat-ready team able to defend the ship and carry out the operational mission. This is a question that readers of Missile Inbound must answer for themselves. They may also want to ponder the broader implications of this question.

Another vitally important issue addressed in Missile Inbound is the institutional reaction to the Stark incident. The link between the failure of Stark to defend itself and the subsequent incident in the Persian Gulf where the USS Vincennes engaged an Iranian passenger jet believing it to be an Iranian fighter in an attack profile is real. Again, political and operational requirements became confused. In order to protect itself, a ship in a high-risk environment engaged a suspicious contact that met the criteria of a threat to the ship. Was this overreaction or was it a correct response under the circumstances? The lesson is clear: if ships are expected to defend themselves in such ambiguous situations, mistakes may be made. Nor should we forget that a warship is a symbol and its loss can provide enormous propaganda potential. It is thus in every state’s interest that its warships be able to defend themselves. Where warships are used diplomatically or in crisis management roles in uncertain threat conditions, the state has an obligation to ensure that they be able to defend themselves. Not only must the ships have the right fighting equipment but they must also be sailed under rules of engagement that are explicit in establishing the commanding officer’s right to determine when he is under threat and his right to take appropriate action.

Missile Inbound provides the basis for healthy discussion of these very complex issues that are fundamental to the way in which warships are often employed today. The Stark incident brings home the consequences of sending an ill-prepared warship in harm’s way. The lessons are both political and operational. For this reason, Missile Inbound should be required reading for all naval officers and especially for their political masters.

Peter Haydon
Bedford, Nova Scotia


The subject of this book is important. Understanding the relationship of navies to their industrial foundation can provide insights critical to budgetary policy, economic growth, and strategy.
formulation. Used carefully, the ability to construct warships can suggest future political and economic directions even in the uncertain geopolitics of our multi-polar world.

In this work, Todd and Lindberg seek to understand the symbiosis between the defense industries of greater and lesser states and the navies they serve. Rather than attaining their goal, the authors inadvertently offer an example of what frequently passes for defense analysis both around the Washington DC Beltway and in the academic hinterland. The sources Todd and Lindberg use come mostly from defense-related secondary and periodical literature. While this gives their prose the crisp texture of cutting-edge analysis, the informed reader longs for more. Penetrating insight emerges only from research in depth and true experience. Primary sources, although more available than ever before, played no part in Navies and Shipbuilding Industries. Neither did one of the most influential secondary historical works on the subject of the military/naval-industrial symbiosis, William McNeill’s Pursuit of Power. These documents and this kind of current secondary literature offer the perspective of centuries and the kind of data and experience that gives analysis true authority. As a result Todd and Lindberg make very fundamental mistakes. For example, they assume as one of their primary hypotheses that the existence of a national navy implies a corresponding industrial base to support that force as well as a significant merchant marine. The best historical literature would have demonstrated the fallacy of this supposition before the authors initiated their study. It also took Todd and Lindberg 169 pages to conclude that new warships usually cost more than the vessels they replace. Thus, they argue, the cost of a technologically advanced shipbuilding industry has discouraged newly industrialized countries from emulating the near self-sufficiency of major naval powers. This is hardly insightful and, by 1996, certainly not the stuff of revelation.

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This study’s focus on world navies over the last two decades also leads to mistaken assumptions about naval strategy and planning. For the US Navy, a power projection strategy did not begin with Ronald Reagan’s Pentagon but with the first perception of the Soviet maritime threat some forty years earlier. The maritime strategy of the 1980s was actually a more ambitious reprise of the planning guided by Admiral Forrest Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations in the first postwar decade. Knowing this puts a significant and different spin on the more recent Maritime Strategy. It suggests a cycle of force-projection versus stand-off strategies that begs for analysis in view of the affect this dynamic has on the important symbiosis that inspired this book. One must also consider the ambitious global reach of this work. Scores of countries are mentioned and categorized in an effort to understand the naval-industrial complex. Given its topic and scope, the lack of deep research and historical experience quickly demonstrates that the authors’ ambitions far exceeded the authority of their sources.

Meaningful analysis requires a broader perspective over time. It also requires scholarship that demonstrates a mastery of the best secondary literature. Even with these characteristics, no defense analysis can stand without an intimate knowledge of the primary sources. Only archival research and oral histories can bring a scholar close enough to the naval-industrial symbiosis to permit insightful and credible comment.

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Staff officers, Maritime Force Development cell, Maritime Command. Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada. Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1997. iv + 43 pp., figures. No price; paper [not for commercial sale, but individuals can receive a copy by writing to: Maritime Command Public Affairs, PO Box 99000, Stn Forces, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3K 5X5. It can also be downloaded from the Navy’s home page: www.marlant.nf.ca/cdnnavy.html]

This is a rather curious publication in many ways. It seems to be an in-house Naval paper but it is clearly intended to achieve the laudable objective of putting the Canadian “naval case” to a wider audience. In this it succeeds, but only up to a point. Its good intentions are marred somewhat by some needless errors of analysis that weaken it significantly and give the document the feel of a slightly below-average postgraduate thesis.

The document is footnoted which has the benefit of revealing the relatively limited sources used by the authors. One source mentioned in the
glossary at the end— but nowhere in the text and never properly cited fully— is our own UK Maritime Doctrine statement, BR 1806. It is a pity, however, that this document was not more fully absorbed. This might have prevented, for example, the strange definition of sea denial as “a tactic usually reserved for inferior fleets which seek battle with an opponent only when the conditions favour victory.” Classical sea denial usually avoids battle completely and goes for the enemy’s merchant ships or other assets which he is seeking to deploy by sea. And, in any case, does not any fleet, however superior, only give battle when conditions favour victory?

There are serious problems with the discussion of naval diplomacy too. I would not allow a student to get away with highly questionable sentences like: “Survelliance is a less significant aspect of naval diplomacy, although general observation of activity in the vicinity of Canadian naval forces is a routine activity. No or, at most, low intensity levels of conflict are anticipated in presence operations.” At best, these display considerable analytical confusion.

The document gives the general impression of having been inadequately staffed. It begins, discouragingly, with a flat contradiction. The “Executive Summary” states that “Despite changes in technology, proliferation of non-state actors, and changing definitions of security, the nature of war will not change.” Then on the opposite page we are told— far more soundly but in flat opposition— that the document’s assumptions are that “the century will see little diminution in human conflict. While the nature of war may change substantially given the developments of technology...” And, rather later, in an important table of missions and roles, “Unilateral Power Projection” is placed under “International Operations” rather than “National.” Is there not some contradiction here?

There are far too many other highly questionable statements. The authors seem confused as to the basic dynamics of warship design when they are misled into repeating some apparent intelligence assessment that the trend is to “smaller and cheaper ships with technological advances being used to increase their capabilities.” Those technological advances will probably cost far more money than the ship steel of a larger hull. Also, where is the evidence for smaller ships? The trend for some time has been to an increase in average dimensions.

The discussion of threats to naval forces is especially disappointing. No distinction is made between nuclear and conventional submarines and the section oscillates confusingly between platform- and weapon-based analysis. The important section on Military Technology Modernisation is also flawed. It relegates to a footnote the important point that naval forces pioneered much that is included under “information warfare.” More seriously it misunderstands the nature of co-operative engagement— perhaps the key naval development of the next decade. Nor can the discussion decide how many ‘C’s and ‘I’s should be multiplied in describing command control and intelligence and related systems.

Some non-Canadians might be disturbed to read in this official publication of Canada’s intention to extend its EEZ illegally to cover more than 200 miles and to defend it with anti-ship missile-equipped frigates. That may not be Canadian policy but it is certainly what the document seems to say. This is more an example of an inadequate drafting procedure than anything else. This is a great pity; with a bit more work, this interesting document could have been so much stronger and therefore better suited to the highly necessary task of selling the need for naval forces within the inhospitable Canadian political environment. Maritime Command should commission a new draft as quickly as possible before too many light blue and khaki wolves gather at the door.

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ERRATUM

Two errors appear in the review of David A. Thomas and Patrick Holmes, Queen Mary and the Cruiser: The Curacoa Disaster (TNM/LMN 7, No. 4 [October 1997], pp. 131-132). The review included the erroneous statement that the one author and the captain were not the only surviving officers of Curacoa; in fact, they were. As well, where it was stated that the accident must have been “unavoidable,” it should have read “avoidable.” The editors regret these errors.

The Editors