

A Lonely Ambassador: HMCS *Uganda* and the War in the Pacific

Bill Rawling

Though historians of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the Second World War have focused mainly on anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic, the RCN itself always kept one eye on the Pacific. In the 1930s Japan, and not Germany, had been the more important naval threat, and it was off East Asia that Canada's naval service could potentially deploy a properly balanced fleet of auxiliaries, escorts, cruisers — and later — aircraft carriers. In the event, only one RCN ship, HMCS *Uganda*, ever served for any length of time in that theatre, and even then historians have tended to concentrate on a single incident in its Pacific career, the decision by two-thirds of its complement not to volunteer for further duty when given the opportunity in May 1945.' Its history is of interest purely from an operational point of view, however, for *Uganda* was not only the sole Canadian warship to fight against the Japanese but also the only cruiser designed as such ever to engage the enemy.'

The acquisition of *Uganda*, and later *Ontario*, was born of personnel shortages in the Royal Navy (RN), which became obvious in 1943. With more ships than it could provide complements for, the Admiralty decided to offer some to Canada, whose navy was always open to opportunities to acquire a balanced fleet. After many perambulations too numerous to discuss in a short paper, the RCN and the Canadian government decided to accept *Minotaur*, a new ship under construction, and *Uganda*, which was undergoing extensive damage repair and refit in the US.³ The latter was one of the *Fijis*, ordered in December 1937 as part of the prewar rearmament of the RN and designed in accordance with the second London Naval Treaty limiting cruisers to 8000 tons displacement. Early battle experience, which included serious losses at the hands of the Luftwaffe off Norway and Dunkerque, led to modifications in those ships of the class not yet completed, of which *Uganda* was one. In its case, fire control arrangements were altered to increase the effectiveness of anti-aircraft armament. The modified *Uganda* entered service in January 1943 with the Home Fleet.' Its first operations were in the Bay of Biscay, intercepting blockade runners; from there, it carried out similar duties off the west coast of Africa, based at Freetown, before escorting convoys, mostly of troop transports, to North Africa. Operation Husky of 10 July 1943 was an augury of things to come, as *Uganda* took part in coastal bombardments to support the landings in Sicily; similar operations followed in August.'

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Figure 1: HMCS *Uganda*, November 1944.

Source: National Archives of Canada (NAC), PA 107875.

On 13 September 1943, while operating in the Gulf of Salerno in support of Allied landings on the Italian mainland, the ship was so severely damaged by a radio-guided bomb that it had to be taken in tow, and eventually made its way to Charleston, SC, for extensive work. The search for countermeasures began almost immediately, and soon after the names of the two cruisers to be transferred were announced, the RCN requested a pre-production model of a jamming transmitter on which the British were working.' Regarding modernization, the list of the most important items ran to three pages, including radar, barrage directors, aircraft plotting material, fighter direction communications, fire control, radar gunnery and tactical plotting communications, damage control, an action information centre, and more.' This was an attempt to incorporate the latest developments in naval warfare, particularly anti-aircraft, into the RCN.

With *Uganda* soon to join Canada's naval service, a new name was the norm. But a note from the RN to Canada's Naval Liaison Officer in London noted that there were good reasons to retain the ship's current identification.

With reference to...renaming of HMS *Uganda* on transfer to the Royal Canadian Navy, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that representations have been received from the Colonial Office that the Government and people of Uganda have taken a great interest in the ship and have asked to be supplied with accounts of her activities. They have also subscribed substantial sums for her equipment, and for comforts for the crew...A difficult position would therefore be created if the name were changed, and My Lords would be grateful if the Navy Board would consider the possibility of retaining the name Uganda for the ship on transfer...A similar position arose when HMS *Gambia* was transferred recently to the Royal New Zealand Navy. The New Zealand Navy Board agreed that the name should be retained, with happiest results between the Colony and the Dominion.'

Canada's Naval Board followed the New Zealand example, and accepted the Admiralty's request to retain the name, at least for the time being.'



Figure 2: Sailors of HMCS *Uganda* examining Kodak pictures.

Source: NAC, PA 140833.

Training the complement of Canada's largest warship would be carried out mainly on the job. At the first Québec Conference in August 1943, the Admiralty had offered to instruct RCN personnel in British ships. Berths were thus made available in *Belfast*,

Glasgow, *Sheffield*, and *Nigeria* in November, with further positions opening up in *Jamaica* the following February.¹⁰ It was expected that the RCN trainees would remain at their posts until about September 1944, a month before *Uganda* would be ready to sail again." By March, teams of eighty RCN ratings were serving in several ships, but it soon became apparent that there were not enough six-inch cruisers in British home waters to take on all personnel the Canadians were making available, even after the commander of the 10th Cruiser Squadron allowed an extra dozen in each of *Belfast*, *Nigeria*, and *Jamaica*. Possible solutions were not lacking: Canadians could be sent to the Mediterranean (which was not recommended on the grounds that these were proficient bombardment ships and should avoid having their crews diluted); they could be posted into eight-inch cruisers operating with the Home Fleet; or they could gain experience in capital ships. The latter seemed the best choice, since it offered the opportunity to train on six-inch secondary armament, similar to the Fijis' main battery, and some ratings found themselves in *Rodney* and *Warspite*, with the possibility of further teams serving in *Nelson*.¹²

Among those who were sent to the RN to learn about life and work aboard a large ship, experiences varied widely, but some accounts seem fairly typical. In early 1944, William H. Pugsley accompanied a draft of about 700 who made their way to *Niobe*; according to his account, "they felt they were forgotten men, a sort of Lost Horde." Able Seaman Andrew Lawson would have agreed, later recalling that "there were trains waiting for us in Liverpool, [which] took us to *Niobe* in Greenock, Scotland. We arrived in *Niobe* and they didn't even know we were coming — typical...They didn't know what to do with us. They sent us all on two weeks leave." But the situation soon improved:

When we came back we were relatively organized. They had a list of cruisers and everyday they used to muster the draft and they would call out (for instance), "*Jamaica* — we need this and this and this. Okay? I want two STs [Seamen Torpedomen], I want three stokers, I want two signalmen — over there — step out." So whoever wanted to do it, stepped out and that was the draft off to *Jamaica*, say.

Lawson, a gunnery rating, went with the next group into *Sheffield*, where he saw action on the Murmansk run against the Luftwaffe and the *Schamhorst*.¹⁴

Pugsley accompanied the *Jamaica* group, which immediately ran into accommodation problems, with no slinging billets available. "Eventually some were found, but several of the Canucks who lived and ate in my mess had to sleep miles away in odd corners nearer their guns." Still, they were better off than their brethren in corvettes and frigates on the North Atlantic, who often "had to be satisfied with curling up in some nook that was warm or dry." It was seldom both.

In the matter of food, though, I heartily endorse the opinion of all Canadian ratings who have served with the wartime Royal Navy, whose method of feeding men reminds one of the French peasant and his horse. The good man discovered that even though he gave the horse less to eat, it could still do as much work as before. So he went on cutting down the rations, day after day, but still the beast got through the day's work. Then

suddenly the horse died. Of course, if the peasant had known at what point in the process to stop, he would still have had his horse. He didn't know where that point was, but the Royal Navy knows — to a teaspoonful. I'll never forget, in the *Jamaica*, being handed a piece of cheese, 1" x 1 1/4" x 1 1/2" — yes, I measured it — and told that this, with bread, butter, and tea, was my supper. In the Canadian Navy supper is a meal (more or less), but in the RN it's just something to keep the stomach from yelling between tea and breakfast. It wasn't enough to keep the Canadians from yelling, and I wanted to yell right along with them. The only bright spot on the culinary horizon was that here in a cruiser the bread, though rationed to one slice per meal, was fresh every day, baked right on board.¹⁵

As we shall see, however, bread would be far less of a blessing for those who eventually served in *Uganda*.

Officer training was also done on the job, since Canadians had taken advantage of opportunities to serve in British ships since before the inception of the RCN. Lieutenants R.M. Goslett and J.G. Mills, both RCNVR, were

appointed to *Niobe* for appointment to the Canadian Cruisers. On completion of the HACO [High-Angle Control Officer, for anti-aircraft] course, consideration should be given to appointing these Officers to similar RN Cruisers, additional, if arrangements can be made so that they may be recalled in ample time prior to the commissioning of the RCN Cruisers.¹⁶

Mills would eventually find his way to *Sheffield*, while Goslett went into *Jamaica*.¹⁷ Others were soon selected for gunnery duties, including Lt. W.M. Landymore as gunnery officer, Lt. H.H. McDonald as his second, Gunner McDerby as stores gunner, Gunner C.A. Sturgeon as an instructor, Gunner W.W. Bowditch as director officer, and Acting Warrant Officer O.O. Verge as ordnance officer. All would be required four months before the ship's trials, except for the stores gunner, who was needed a full year in advance. Lts. Goslett, Mills, and H.E. Makovski, the high -angle control officers, did not have to join until two weeks prior to trials.¹⁸

Landymore had previously served in the training cruiser *Frobisher*, beginning in August 1936, before moving into HMS *Emerald*, which a few years later the RCN would consider acquiring and converting into an instructional establishment. Having completed the long gunnery course, he served in *Belfast* as "Fifth Gunnery Officer," though the ship was, after having contributed to the sinking of *Scharnhorst* in December 1943, not very active. As Landymore related years later:

There wasn't much to be done in the flotilla work and Canada had taken over a 6-inch cruiser, the *Uganda*. She was in Charleston and I think the whole purpose of sending me to *Belfast* was to get me groomed up so I could run a 6-inch cruiser...And of course, they were identical. Every-

thing — there was more of it that's all, in the *Belfast*. So, by the time they wanted me back in Canada, I had already had a very, very good basic education in 6-inch cruisers.'

Before joining *Uganda*, he spent some months as head of the Division of Warfare and Training's gunnery section.

Makovski's experiences seem less typical, as he did not serve in an RN cruiser before being posted into *Uganda* (though he did spend some time in the armed merchant cruiser HMCS *Prince Robert*). He went through the ten-week HACO course at Chatham, followed by two weeks of aircraft recognition. On the latter, he commented that "I think it was just for something to do, waiting for transport back to this side again." Given leave in August 1944, he went to Charleston to join his ship, though his action station was haunted by its previous occupant. "She was damaged at Salerno...I was informed that where I was going to sit, was the after director which, of course, was the datum director for the ship and apparently this poor guy, my predecessor, had bought it there when she was hit."²⁰

Before the ship's complement could be tested in the harsh schoolroom of operations, the Canadian government had to decide where it would serve, for though Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) wanted to send the cruisers to the Pacific theatre, Cabinet had not yet officially endorsed the idea. The main obstacle was the prime minister, who insisted "that no direct commitment for Canada's participation in the Far East could be made until Canada was informed as to 'The Plan.'" In discussing the possibility of sending elements of the Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF) to the Pacific, Minister of Defence for Air C.G. Power suggested "that we would ourselves decide the extent of our contribution and whether our men would serve along with the Americans, we being a Pacific Coast nation, or with the British in India or in other ways. "' On 10 February 1944 the prime minister insisted in a message to Britain that we would "decide ourselves what contribution we would make toward the Japanese war." According to King's biographer, Jack Pickersgill:

it was the strongest assertion made thus far of Canada's position as a nation, demanding an equal voice on matters which pertained to her own forces. The British have been casually assuming that they would make disposition of forces generally both as to numbers, composition, location, etc. In this document, we have made clear we may decide to have our forces co-operate mainly with the United States, as we are a Pacific power, instead of those of Britain.²²

Mackenzie King took his defence of Canadian sovereignty a step further in mid-May, no doubt to the shock and dismay of his Downing Street audience.

I said we were co-operating together on the sea in the Pacific. Our men had been fighting with the Americans in Alaska and along the Pacific Coast, and their airmen protecting parts of our coast. It might be thought wise in the strategy of war for us to continue in that way, when attacking

Japan. I also said our armed forces had been co-operating with the Americans in the attack on Kiska. We had all combined together there. I assumed we had to consider this aspect in the war against Japan.²³

To complicate the matter even further, when Vice-Admiral P.W. Nelles, in his capacity as Senior Canadian Flag Officer Overseas, began to confer with the Admiralty, he found himself in the midst of controversy involving conflicting British and American attitudes. Off the record, officials expressed a concern over the "balance of power in the Pacific after Japan is beaten," insisting that regardless of how the war ended "England could not and would not give up her rights and could never agree to the USA achieving 'predominance' or dictating Pacific Policy." As far as the British were concerned, "Canada was also a 'Pacific Power,'" so that "neither could Canada afford to see the USA 'dictating policy' in the Pacific any more than could Australia or New Zealand."²⁴

Canada's place in the world, and with it the issue of the RCN's prestige, thus came to Cabinet attention. As a staff officer in the RCN's Directorate of Plans noted:

Canada as a sovereign state should have freedom to choose whether her contribution in the Pacific theatre of war should be located in the US [central and south Pacific] or the UK [Indian Ocean and southeast Asia] strategic area. No definite commitment in this regard should be made until the advantages and disadvantages have been fully considered.

The RCN's aims were clear: "to ensure that as far as possible 'Canadian identity' in the Pacific theatre is retained, so that any due battle honours may fall to the Canadian nation." How best to ensure that the RCN received credit for its work (an issue on which Mackenzie King was somewhat pessimistic) was still an open question. "It is possible, but by no means certain, that Canadian identity may be more easily retained by allocating our forces to the American rather than to the British theatre." Policy makers, however, had to keep in mind that RCN ships were similar to those of the British (and some were gifts from Britain); that the Admiralty had requested Canadian assistance; and that all precedents pointed to cooperation with the RN. Like his prime minister, this anonymous staff officer recommended a wait-and-see attitude.²⁵

There would be more waiting than seeing in the months to come, and even by August, as members of the RCN began joining *Uganda*, the ship's operational future was yet to be determined. The service's plan for Pacific operations, downsized from earlier unrealistic versions, was still impressive, envisaging two cruisers, two light fleet carriers, four tribals, ten destroyers, eighty-one escorts, a dozen Algerines, an anti-aircraft cruiser, and two landing ships, representing a total complement of over 20,000 officers and ratings afloat and ashore, not-so-coincidentally mirroring the number of personnel the RCAF and Canadian Army were each planning to send.²⁶ If it could convince its political masters, the RCN would thus have the balanced fleet that had been a dream since its earliest days.

Mackenzie King, who with all his faults always took his responsibilities as prime minister seriously, continued to guard the country's sovereignty, and insisted that such vessels would not support British colonialism. On 13 September, after a particularly difficult Cabinet debate, the prospect of doing so pushed him into one of his black moods:

Between demands that are being made for additional grants of money from Canada to carry on the war and the mixing of our troops with British troops and fighting what would certainly be construed as Imperial wars, I feel so strongly the consequences of acts of the kind that I said to St. Laurent after the meeting that I would have to consider whether I could allow my name to be associated with a Canadian Ministry that would go that far. I thought we had reached a crisis and that if it was decided our forces had to fight in southern Asia, I would have to say as Prime Minister, I could not agree to such a policy and would have to leave it to other Members of the Government to carry it out. He said to me he agreed entirely. He added that he thought the entire Cabinet were with me though they would not speak out.²⁷

The second Québec Conference in mid-September 1944 settled the matter once and for all as to whom the Canadians would join in the fight. In a meeting at the Chateau Frontenac, attended by Canada's Chief of the Naval Staff (Vice-Admiral G.C. Jones), the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the British Chief of the Air Staff, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the latter proposed "that RCN participation against Japan might appropriately be with the British fleet operating in the Pacific," along the lines of what the New Zealanders and Australians were doing. Vice-Admiral Jones agreed, and the deal was done it only remained to work out the details.²⁸ Mackenzie King's conscience had been eased by the British decision to focus their naval efforts in the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean, even though the Americans guarded the latter theatre with some jealousy, understandably given the blood they had spilled there.

The architect of the RN's contribution in the Pacific was Winston Churchill, who at the first Québec Conference demanded to be in on the kill — which meant assaulting Japan, not Burma. In November at Cairo he offered a British Pacific Ocean Force, the genesis of what would later be called the British Pacific Fleet (BPF). But demands elsewhere, such as the Murmansk convoys and the Indian Ocean, delayed the group's formation.²⁹ Planning continued through 1944, with the British approaching the Americans once again on 18 August. Although the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, objected to an RN presence on the reasonable grounds that it would be a logistical burden, the British insisted that they would organize the necessary fleet train. Franklin Roosevelt, who in this case believed operational requirements had to take a back seat to inter-allied harmony, settled the matter by accepting Churchill's offer.³⁰

As much as the Commonwealth wished to contribute to the war against Japan, only the US had the vast resources necessary to fight effectively in more than one theatre. Although the British had the best of intentions, building the Canadian cruisers before deadline was beyond their means, and only a few weeks after the decision to combine Commonwealth fleets under RN command, the Admiralty had to admit that:

we have recently had to give priority in the shipyards to the refits and repairs of landing ships and craft withdrawing from OVERLORD in order to ensure that these vessels are available in the Far East in time for planned operations...The effect on new construction has been most serious

and at Belfast in particular we are compelled to accept delays to the Canadian Cruiser *Ontario* [renamed from *Minotaur*] and the Light Fleet Carrier |

Ironically, the only large British vessel the Canadians could count on receiving in the near future, *Uganda*, was being refitted in an American shipyard.

As these decisions were being made, men started joining *Uganda* in August 1944, though not all were pleased with their new surroundings. As Makovski relates, "I heard a lot of grumbling and that sort of thing."³² He was not alone, and according to one of the ratings, Andrew A. Lawson:

I have to agree that it was a bad start, simply because there were so many men that really didn't want that draft and I can't understand why...I cannot understand the full reason why the attitude was such in this ship. I think in time, once we got to sea and started on our long trip to the Pacific, I think, much of that left.³³

Lawson suggested that the lack of leave prior to being sent to Charleston might have had something to do with poor morale, but a young officer, Lt. Ernest Chadwick, proposed that:

They were all corvette men and if they were half a mind whether they wanted to as soon as they got there they wished they hadn't. For one thing it was bloody hot. The other thing was they never arrived with the proper kit. Most of them had never even worn a proper uniform in their whole naval career...And there wasn't much to do in Charleston, either.³⁴

Despite the training complements aboard the British cruisers, two-thirds of the drafts had just completed service in smaller vessels, which may have explained such "poor attitudes," or perhaps "they didn't like big-ship routine." ³⁵

If such were the case., then *Uganda* was beginning its Canadian career with a complement divided between specialists who had practised their trade in the gunnery, torpedo, or engineering branches of RN cruisers, and the able seamen who had recently been removed from escort vessels in the North Atlantic. In command was Captain Edmond Rollo Mainguy, whose previous experience in large vessels included HMS *Barham*, in which he served as a midshipman just after the First World War, followed by postings into HMCS *Aurora* and *Patriot* and a tour in HMS *Frobisher*, the flagship for the 1st Cruiser Squadron. His previous command experience included *Vancouver*, *Assiniboine*, and *Ottawa*, though before being posted into *Uganda* he had spent most of the war ashore, as Commander (Destroyers) in Newfoundland and then as Chief of Naval Personnel and Third Member of the Naval Board. His executive officer was Commander H.F. Pullen, who also had considerable command experience at sea, including *St. Francis*, *Ottawa*, *St. Laurent*, and *Ottawa II*, all destroyers, before his appointment in *Uganda*.³⁶

The American shipyards had done their job well, and there was little for *Uganda's* new complement to do but clean up and wait for its ranks to fill out, the vessel receiving

orders to sail for Halifax on 17 October.³⁷ The ship was not completely ready for war, as much of the American-installed radar had become obsolete before the work was complete and had to be removed. Moreover, setting up the operations room (a new enough concept in itself) was an exercise in guess-work and speculation. According to Landymore:

Well, we knew what equipment we were going to get, but we had nothing about them [sic] except one or two very sketchy handbooks. So, Dick [White, Torpedo Officer] and I took these handbooks, showing pictures of [the equipment]. We identified (using my magnifying glasses) what kind of cathode arrangements they had. We found a cathode arrangement, measured it, and we converted all these things into sizes and then put them on the bulkheads. We laid out the whole Ops room with nothing. All we knew was the correct dimensions of one of the "idiot boxes"³⁸

On 21 October 1944 — Trafalgar Day — *Uganda* was with some ceremony officially transferred from the RN to the RCN in a USN shipyard.³⁹ The British suggested the ship make its way to Britain as soon as possible to complete its refit, so a shake-down cruise would have to wait until *Uganda* was deemed ready. As a result, the ship's first few months were quiet as it sailed to the UK for trials, with only three or four sea days in each of October, November, and December.⁴⁰ There was thus time to take care of further personnel matters; for example, "Knowledge of Japanese Language...required for "Y" [Intelligence] Officer duties in HMCS *Uganda*. Propose Lt Cdr **(SB)** W.A. Small take courses but unlikely complete in time for operations. Recommend Japanese speaking relief be drafted at once."⁴¹ Posting an RCN officer of Japanese descent was out of the question, as even Canadian-born *Nisei* were not employed by the naval service until after the war was over, and although nine European-descended members of the RCN attended S-20, the Canadian Army Japanese Language School, how many actually completed the course is unknown.⁴² It was certainly intense, and "nervous breakdowns among the candidates were not uncommon," so it is quite likely that only a few actually managed to graduate.⁴³ Not one seems to have made it to *Uganda*, no doubt because such language skills were pre-empted for employment with NSHQ's Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Meanwhile, *Uganda* had undergone its working up in December 1944 and was operational. As the ship's surgeon, R.K. Thomson, reported, it was none too soon.

The ship left refit yards and proceeded to working up exercises by the middle of the month. It was noticeable that the attitude of the ship's company improved as soon as the ship left the refit yard, where the presence of dockyard matey's and the constant turmoil and dirt offered no incentive to cleanliness of ship or person, or to orderliness of mind. It was considered by the PMO [Principal Medical Officer] that the ordinary rating could not see progress, and the fruits of his labours were sour during periods of dockyard refit. This plus the lack of healthy and varied recreation was to a large degree responsible for the high incidence of exposure to, and development of, venereal disease, and infestations of

scabies and pediculosis pubis [Ugh]....The morale of the ship is good and is improving. This is going to be of vital importance in keeping the psychiatric casualties to a minimum. Several cases have arisen who could not be retained as useful ratings. Several have been seen who show evidence of instability, which is apt to become more marked under difficult conditions which may exist in the Pacific.⁴⁴

Thomson's comments portrayed a typical morale problem in a ship that was not doing much, although great things were expected. Active operations might provide a cure.

Uganda began its voyage on New Year's Day, 1945, and the following month confirmed that morale was easier to maintain as the ship sailed towards an operational theatre and possible adventure. Still, there was room for improvement, and while stopping at Alexandria for bilge cleaning and gunnery training, the ship's surgeon reported:

The main drops in morale are temporary and almost without exception coincide with lowering of standard of any one meal. The food is being maintained at a fairly high quality level, although this is accomplished with difficulty. Vegetable supplies are variable and precautionary treatment requires much time and effort. The oatmeal purchased in Alexandria was found to be infected by "Mealy Bugs." These do not poison or impair the porridge but they act as an effective barrier to its consumption. Alterations in the refrigeration department are going to increase work and beef handling but promise more adequate and safe meat thawing....From the view point of morale and a attitude towards medical care it is interesting to report that those ratings who have been faced with the possibility of hospitalization ashore invariably say, "Whatever you do, don't leave me here. Take me with you when you go."⁴⁵

Whether it was through eagerness or disgust at conditions in Egypt, the good doctor was unable to say.

Uganda's complement began to suffer from a variety of ailments — brought on by heat and exposure to tropical bacteria, viruses, and fungi — while still at Alexandria in February. One who would never forget such assaults on personal comfort was A. Murray Rogerson, a member of the lower deck.

Athlete's foot ran rampant throughout the ship. It was impossible to control and we could cut everything possible away from our shoes to let the air circulate around our feet, and ankles. Some had it so bad they would spend half an hour at times in the Sick Bay with the Sick Bay "tiffy" pulling dead skin away.⁴⁶

Dermatological problems were also rampant, but since "the Medical Officer was to be seen around ship with a skin rash which he was unable to clear for himself...there was little hope for the crew's problems."⁴⁷

Various small creatures also conspired to make life difficult, especially when they got into the food.

In the tropics everything multiplied — of a crew of 900, two men were detailed for spraying cockroach powder through the mess decks to at least try to control them. It was not out of the ordinary to be munching on your de-hydrated peas and carrots to feel a sharp "crunch." That was another roach being broken up. Flour deteriorated into a life form — a tiny worm with a white body and a little black head. It would be found in the bread which was baked aboard ship. At first we would pick the worms out, but as we were told, and came to realize, they would not hurt us, we just ate them with the bread and called it our meat ration for the day.⁴⁸

By the time the ship joined the 4th Cruiser Squadron of the BPF in early April, the crew had adjusted to the fauna, if not to the heat.

The BPF had started to come together in late 1944, when Sir Bruce Fraser was appointed Commander-in-Chief on 22 November. Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings, who would actually command the fleet at sea, was his second; Rear-Admiral Philip Vian was to lead the carriers; and Rear-Admiral E.J.P. Brind was put in charge of the 4th Cruiser Squadron. Admiral Chester Nimitz, commanding one of the two main American thrusts in the theatre, hoped to use these ships in upcoming operations in the central Pacific against Okinawa. The island was part of the Ryukyus, which with Formosa:

form an eastern wall protecting the Japanese lifeline through the East China Sea. Whether the Allied Nations wished to invade Japan directly, or by way of China, airfields and an advanced naval base had to be set up somewhere in the archipelago. Formosa was the only alternative to the Ryukyus; and Formosa had been ruled out in September 1944. Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to seize and exploit "one or more positions in the *Nansei Shoto*" (as stated in their directive of 30 October), there could be no doubt that Okinawa would be position number one.⁴⁹

Planning began on 25 October 1944, as the Battle of Leyte Gulf reached its climax, with orders ready to be issued by 9 February. By this time in the war the USN in the Pacific rotated the command of its main fleet, so that when it was under Admiral R.A. Spruance it was called Fifth Fleet and when under Admiral W.F. Halsey it was Third Fleet. The Seventh Fleet supported General MacArthur's operations in the Philippines at this time. L-Day was set for 1 April, but much preparation was necessary. "In order to obtain control of air and ocean before invading an island so close to Japan, enemy air power, especially in view of the kamikaze technique, had to be pared down as far as possible before the expeditionary force hit the Ryukyus," wrote one student of the campaign. "Not much opposition was anticipated from the now decrepit Japanese Navy," since it had been all but annihilated in the Philippines. B-29s and carrier aircraft struck the island, and naval bombardment forces moved into position eight days before the scheduled landings

"to give Okinawa and the vicinity a complete working-over." The invasion force was composed of the Tenth Army's three marine and four army divisions, the landings to take place on a four-division front over five miles of beach.⁵⁰ The BPF's role, if any, was only determined when the assault was barely weeks away. "Not until mid-March, and after a good deal of pressure from London, did they decide that Fraser's ships should take part in operation 'Iceberg;' and even then they inserted a proviso that they could be transferred elsewhere at seven-days notice."⁵¹



Figure 3: Decks of HMCS *Uganda* after her bombardment of the Sakishima Island airstrip of Sukama, south of Okinawa, [Japan], 12 May 1945.

Source: NAC, PA 112980.

Uganda's arrival, just days after US forces launched what was one of their most ambitious undertakings of the war, was well-timed, allowing the RCN to participate in the largest campaign of its kind. In support of the operation were 1200 USN ships, including fast carrier strikes against airfields on Kyushu before the landings took place. Of greater import to Commonwealth ships were interdiction missions against the Sakishima Gunto, a group of islands between Okinawa and Formosa that represented a source of some concern for American planners. Even at this late stage, the Japanese Army had substantial

air forces in China, including sixty-five airfields on Formosa which could use the Sakishima Gunto and its aerodromes as a staging area for both conventional fighter-bombers and dive-bombers as well as kamikaze.⁵² Disrupting the use of these facilities was a task for the BPF, alternating with American Task Group 51.2.

Uganda's primary role was thus to help protect the carriers against air attack while British fighter-bombers beat up Japanese aerodromes. The ship's career in the Mediterranean having been cut short by an aerial bomb, it was fitting that its first shots against the Japanese were fired from its anti-aircraft weaponry on 13 April, when four enemy machines attacked the fleet. No ship suffered damage, but the episode showed that the British force still had much to learn about fending off Hirohito's pilots. High-flying planes having been detected, Rear-Admiral Brind ordered a high barrage, but the result was not the kind of coordinated fire plan he had a right to expect. Some ships, thinking they were supposed to deter enemy attack, fired below the clouds, while others, attempting to engage the Japanese before they could begin to dive, fired blindly at estimated range and height. Worse, warning radar, which operated on a wide beam to cover as large an area as possible, may not have been able to "hand off" information to gunnery radar, whose narrow beam allowed a ship actually to engage a target.⁵³ Fire discipline was also a problem, and on another occasion "the sky was full of puffs — a gunnery officer's delight. Bill Landymore spent most of his time pressing the cease fire button. He couldn't stand the waste of this sort of random stuff."⁵⁴ With anti-aircraft operations becoming a cruiser's most important role, senior officers could be forgiven if such incidents caused them considerable concern.

The main challenge in the Pacific, however, as the Americans had warned, was in the realm of logistics. The USN had developed a remarkable system of supply and repairs based on fleets of auxiliaries, which allowed task groups to remain on station almost indefinitely. The British, however, in spite of similar plans dating back to the 1930s, found themselves with their hands full maintaining the North Atlantic lifeline and looking out for German raiders such as *Scharnhorst* and *Tirpitz*. Thus, when it came time to assemble a fleet train for the BPF, as the Admiralty's historical section later admitted, "the whole venture was therefore necessarily a scramble."⁵⁵

Re-oiling, for example, though familiar to many of the Canadians who had served in the North Atlantic, was nonetheless a technique still in development, as Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian reported, with commendable honesty.

We at once began to experience some of the difficulties which were to be ours throughout this period. The British method of fuelling big ships at sea, which was by means of buoyed hoses trailed astern of the tanker, was primarily at fault. It was an awkward, unseaman-like business compared with the American method, in which the two ships concerned steamed along abreast of one another a short space apart. For some reason we had failed to benefit from American experience to fit our tankers and warships with the necessary tackle to employ this method. We were to suffer for it until we did so. Furthermore, our tankers of the Fleet Train, hastily collected and hastily fitted out, were often inexperienced and ill-equipped. The fuelling gear would become entangled, or

hoses would burst. On such occasions fuelling took up to six hours longer than it should have done; and only by steaming at full speed through the night could the flying-off position be reached in time for our first day's operation.⁵⁶



Figure 4: Bombardment by HMCS *Uganda* of Sukuma Airfield on Miyako Jima, Sakishima Islands (vicinity), 4 May 1945.

Source: NAC, PA 136073.

That assessment was equally applicable to one of the Canadians' first re-oiling attempts, which Makovski described as "the worst thing that ever happened to the ship." The incident occurred on 3 May, when "we got stranded for three hours with about five hundred feet of oiling hose wrapped around our screws."⁵⁷ The tanker *San Ambrosio* had finished its work when the hose parted; *Uganda* tried to tow it, but the tube wrapped around a starboard propeller and eventually a diver had to be sent to cut it loose.⁵⁸

The next day was far more satisfying, as the ship joined the action in the bombardment of airfields on Myako Island, part of the continuing campaign to hinder its

use as a staging area against American operations in Okinawa. As Vice-Admiral Rawlings reported to Admiral R.A. Spruance:

The plan for the opening of operations was...To make airfields of the SAKISHIMA GUNTO unserviceable by bombing runways and air installations...To conduct an offensive against flak positions and to assist in cratering runways by ship bombardment...To maintain an offensive CAP over the islands...The particular plan for the first day was for the bombarding force to bombard MIYAKO airfields and flak positions at about noon, from medium range, with the Carrier Force about 30 miles to the southward, so that their Radar would not be fouled by land.⁵⁹

Armchair admirals might argue that against airfields air attack might be more effective than bombardment, but the decision on how to deal with such a target had to take into account a variety of factors. A ship's guns, in a direct shoot, were far more accurate than an aircraft's bombs, while ensuring success was far easier for the former than for the latter. If the initial bombardment were unsuccessful, a ship had but to continue firing, while a missed bomb run forced a pilot to return to his ship to rearm, a process requiring several hours. The nature of potential opposition also had to be considered, both anti-aircraft and coastal artillery posing special hazards to pilots and sailors respectively, and Rawlings knew the Japanese airfield would be well protected by flak. Finally, the Vice-Admiral argued that "the effect on morale of ships of the bombarding force would be most beneficial," a not unimportant consideration when crews spent months at sea.⁶⁰

The bombardment began at 1205 as the cruisers *Euryalus* and *Black Prince* fired air bursts over the anti-aircraft defences of Nobara airfield, while the battleships *King George V* and *Howe* targeted the runways and associated facilities. When this phase of the operation was completed, *Swiftsure* and the New Zealand cruiser *Gambia* took over the shelling of Nobara while *Uganda* concentrated on the Sukama air strip.⁶¹ There was no reply from the Japanese, and Rear-Admiral Brind was pleased with the results.

The organization worked very well which is creditable to all concerned since time at Leyte only permitted very short meetings, and it was not easy to arrange exercises at sea to ensure complete understanding and precise communication procedure...The task of the pilot from "Formidable" who did all the spotting for Cruisers was difficult, particularly as firing time was short and *Swiftsure* and *Gambia* were at the last moment ordered to shoot simultaneously instead of separately. He was quick to understand requirements and acted promptly, definitely and correctly...HMCS *Uganda* fired at...Sukama air strip. It was unfortunately not possible to arrange air spotting for her, but she had a better view of her target than had the others. *Swiftsure's* spotter reported that he saw a few of *Uganda's* salvos and they were well on the target. From this and *Uganda's* report I think that an accurate shoot was carried out.⁶²

Rawlings agreed, reporting that "in particular the bombardments by the six inch cruisers were highly successful, their shoots were admirably controlled by the air spotter, ranging was quickly carried out and fire for effect was accurate. Both the airfields allocated as targets for the Cruisers were well plastered."⁶³

The bombardment was thus a success, and also a boon to crew morale, but any immediate benefit was quickly overtaken by events. While the cruisers, with their anti-aircraft weaponry, were off Miyako, the aircraft carriers, stationed some thirty miles away, became targets for Japanese air strikes, and *Formidable* suffered temporary damage when a kamikaze crashed into its flight deck.

At about 1100 three small groups of bogeys were detected to the westward, and were soon followed up by a fourth. Probably 16 to 20 enemy aircraft were employed with some acting as decoys. Fighters engaged one group working round to the Southward, but one Kamikaze group penetrated to the carriers and was first detected when a plane was seen diving on the Force. Analysis shows that this group escaped detection either because, in the absence of the Bombarding Force too many of the reduced number of Radar sets were fully engaged tracking the diversionary planes, and too few acting as warning sets, or else because they made a very low approach followed by a very high climb at about 15 miles range.⁶⁴

This was as close as Rawlings would come to suggesting that splitting up his force was unwise, and Vian, responsible for the carriers, himself admitted later that "I was not sufficiently alive to the effect on our defensive system which would be caused by the temporary absence of the radar sets and anti-aircraft armament of the battleships. The Japanese were."⁶⁵

In the months that followed, *Uganda's* war continued, the ship now exclusively focused on defending the fleet against air attack, and the day after victory was officially proclaimed in Europe the Japanese demonstrated their continued determination to fight. As A. Murray Rogerson recorded in his diary:

At 1615 radar picks up six enemy aircraft at sixteen miles. First thing we know they are diving in at Fleet and are these suicide bastards. Two passed down our starboard side — opened fire with everything we had. She crashed on bow of *Victorious* destroying aircraft on deck. Another crashed on her stern. A *Dinah* came in on *Howe* and *Howe* blew her to bits when she opened up. At the same time two more attacked *Formidable* — one of which was shot down and the other crashed on deck among planes with great explosion and upper deck spread with flames. D[amage] control goes into action at once and got it out in about fifteen minutes. Quite a few casualties — eight of enemy shot down during day.⁶⁶

Mainguy was able to provide a minute-by-minute description of the attack. Warning was issued at 1647, and eight minutes later a kamikaze was seen to hit *Victorious*, followed

thirty seconds later by another, both being seen to burst into flames on impact and ricochet off the armoured flight deck and into the sea without causing serious damage. A minute later a kamikaze headed for *Howe* burst into flames and missed its target. Then, at 1705, *Formidable* was struck by a twin-engined plane, and a third of its flight deck seemed to be ablaze, but the ship reported itself operational at 1730; an hour later the fleet retired from the area.⁶⁷

Canadians at home were soon apprised of the adventures of their compatriots in the Pacific, with the Halifax *Daily Star*, Montreal *Daily Star*, Halifax *Mail*, and others producing blow-by-blow descriptions for a news-hungry public.

The Canadian cruiser came through the 35-minute air attack unscathed and had the satisfaction of hurling several hundred rounds of ammunition, both long and short range, at the attackers...The highlight of the day for the Canadians, however, was the sight of a British ship firing her anti-aircraft guns after a suicide plane had crashed on her deck in searing orange flames. Through the billowing smoke, bright flashes of the carrier's ack-ack could be seen firing at a second attacker, which was shot down. Courageous British gunners, surrounded by blistering fires, kept their weapons pumping until the sky was cleared of the enemy, and within 15 minutes the fire blazing on the flight deck was extinguished.⁶⁸

For those worried about relatives in the Pacific, such reporting could not have put their minds at ease.

It had been a close call, and only the carriers' armoured flight decks, which sacrificed capacity for survivability, prevented the fleet from losing half its air strike capability. As Brind reported to his superior:

The disappointing feature of the attack, as you have already pointed out to the Fleet, was that although we all knew the direction of approach and that the enemy had evaded our fighters at about 25 miles the Fleet did not bring them under intense and effective gunfire before the attack developed...Much can be done to effect improvement by practices during the fuelling periods and by your direction I have been arranging practices for the Fleet.⁶⁹

Rawlings suggested that "the difficulty of aircraft recognition when friendly and enemy planes are in vicinity of the Fleet is an ever present problem," which would have to be obviated without delay.⁷⁰

Uganda's complement would perhaps have the opportunity to fine-tune its skills while on picket duty, acting as an early warning station thirty to 100 miles from the main fleet. The task had been particularly hazardous since the early days of April, so the ship's crew must have gone about its work with some apprehension. Certainly, US vessels had fared poorly against kamikaze tactics.

These radar pickets stopped a high proportion of the attackers, though the tactics of the enemy in concentrating on the more distant pickets, in particular, resulted in extremely heavy losses from enemy air attacks being suffered at first because the stations were too remote from the Combat Air Patrol and the number of vessels in each was too few for protection against multiple attacks. Of the 19 ships originally provided with fighter direction equipment, one was sunk by a mine, and four by suicide aircraft, eight were seriously and three slightly damaged by suicide attacks. Of the 14 replacement ships, one was sunk, five were seriously and two slightly damaged through the same form of attack. Nevertheless, it was considered by Admiral Spruance that the enemy committed a serious error in concentrating upon the pickets instead of attacking the transports."

That they were serving an important purpose was probably small consolation to the complements of picket ships, as their "stations were the premier posts of danger in this Okinawa operation. Destroyers and other vessels assigned to this duty suffered tremendous losses," so that by 10 April the more exposed stations were manned by no fewer than six craft of various types.⁷²

Unlike the Americans, Commonwealth ships were not well endowed with the sophisticated electronic equipment such early warning work required:

In the absence of any destroyers fitted with adequate Radar or Communications and in view of the pressing need to identify homing strikes and other aircraft before they close to within 30 miles, it has been necessary to use a cruiser, which can ill be spared from the AA screen and provides all too good a target to enemy aircraft.⁷³

Even then there proved to be too few cruisers to carry out normal anti-aircraft duties and also serve as long-range observers; "in consequence hostile aircraft have on three occasions [already by mid-April] penetrated the screen and fighter melees have taken place within the gunnery zone, much to the detriment of target indication and AA gunnery."⁷⁴ There was no alternative, however, so cruisers of the BPF rotated through the hazardous task, though when on 12 and 13 May *Uganda* and *Wessex* took up their positions, "no difficulties were experienced and no enemy sighted."⁷⁵ When the Canadian ship was called upon for similar duty on 20 and 21 May, "nothing of interest occurred in her vicinity," and results were the same on the 24th and 25th.⁷⁶ Thus, although Samuel Eliot Morison could refer to the period of 6-12 April as "The Ordeal of the Radar Pickets," May proved to be far kinder.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, when on 27 May the Fifth Fleet became the Third Fleet, "with a count so far of 90 ships sunk or damaged badly enough to be out of action for more than a month, this operation had proved to be the most costly naval campaign of the war." The last large-scale kamikaze attacks were from 3-7 and 21-22 June, but were "small and relatively undestructive."⁷⁸

Even if the enemy chose not to harass the pickets, they could still take the opportunity to evaluate their equipment and procedures in what had essentially become

a dry run. Communications were not a problem, although after one shift on picket, *Swiftsure* reported "occasional fades with *Uganda*."⁷⁹ Radar gave good results, as operators could rely on three main types: 281, the principal air search radar for British heavy ships, designed to detect aircraft at long range; 277 for surface search, in effect attempting to detect other ships, but which could also be used to pick up low-flying aircraft; and 293, a target indicator able to give bearing and, in the case of aircraft, height.⁸⁰ Making the various parts of the system work together required skill, however, for since Type 277 could not "interrogate" contacts to determine if they were friend or foe, an operator had to put the Type 281 onto the proper bearing to do so. It was perhaps because of such needs that "the two Fighter Direction Officers and the ADR [Aircraft Direction Room] Crew were continuously extended throughout the period as Picket Cruiser."⁸¹

On 25 May the battle to capture Okinawa came to a successful close, and though mopping-up operations would still require some time, the BPF was no longer needed to mask the Sakishima Gunto. Part of the fleet thus made its way to Sydney, and the remainder to Manus, but before its arrival the latter group received orders for Operation Inmate, its mission to "neutralize air installations in Truk Atoll in order to decrease the threat of air attack on own forces and to provide battle experience for newly reporting units," notably the carrier *Implacable*.⁸² Truk had been a German colony before the Japanese captured it in the First World War, and it was well defended (though not so well as to earn the nickname "Gibraltar of the Pacific" the Americans had given it). On 12 March 1944 it had been decided not to try to take the position by storm, but instead to neutralize it — it would be the most important Japanese facility to be allowed to "wither on the vine" in the Americans' island-hopping strategy.⁸³ After over a year of periodic air raids and no reinforcements, the garrison at Truk was seriously weakened, cruelly reduced to serving as target practice for elements of the BPF.

After some air warning and engaging exercises, as well as bombardment and communications training, the little group made its way to the bypassed Japanese base and prepared to shell it.⁸⁴ Rawlings transferred his flag into *Uganda* for the operation, which began on 15 June. According to Ernest Chadwick, "We closed right up to Truk. We had no opposition at all. That was sort of a Sunday picnic."⁸⁵ Hugh Makovski was able to provide an idea of the crew's attitude: "That was a huge joke. Everybody was in training, at this point, in shore bombardment. We'd had shore bombardment when we were in Egypt on the way out. But this was to be a practice deal for ourselves, Newfoundland, and another."⁸⁶ According to Makovski the shoot was a success, but one of the pilots involved told a different tale, later writing that the operation "had been ghastly."

The shoot had been a complete waste of time, as the ship's r/ts [radio-telephones] had not been working properly. Furthermore, one of the ships reported that her "gunnery table" aiming system was u/s [unserviceable] and she was shooting independently. This she did all over the place, and confused the rest...However, shore bombardment was important to the Navy for it was the only independent contribution which the non-carrier fleet was capable of making in the Pacific. It therefore figured large in their reports to their Admirals and to the Press, and thus the history

books, in spite of its insignificant accomplishments and vast consumption of valuable stores.⁸⁷

Such an evaluation may seem rather harsh in light of the advantages of accuracy and effectiveness cruisers offered, but this was after all an indirect shoot. Signalling procedures had to be near-perfect, and the Admiralty's Director of Gunnery and Anti-Aircraft Warfare saw problems, relating that "This is really a tale of communications disasters and, apart from technical failures, amounts to another strong recommendation for adequate pre-bombardment exercises with the aircraft airborne." He further insisted that the "results were disappointing."⁸⁸

Mainguy's report on *Inmate* made clear the fact that the Canadians had as much to learn about bombardment missions as about anti-aircraft operations. In the brief period allowed for training on the way to Truk, *Uganda* had not once successfully completed an exercise with a spotter, and during the operation communications proved so inadequate that *Achilles* had to act as a link between the Canadian ship and the aircraft. Even then, "three way communication only ensued for short periods." Brind concluded that "under the circumstances a direct bombardment could have been effectively employed, but at the late stage this was apparent and since there was no reason to doubt Run 1 had been effective it was not employed."⁸⁹

The apparent breakdown in communications is of interest. *Uganda* had, as we have seen, been fitted with fighter direction facilities, but these have been rated as "primitive" by recent authors on the subject, and were obviously not up to the kind of communications load imposed by bombardment operations.⁹⁰ This was borne out at Truk, where the pilot reported that he had been able to establish contact with *Achilles*, but not *Uganda*. "After a period of ranging with HMNZS *Achilles*, R/T contact failed, and although both aircraft transmitted long and frequent transmissions to both ships and flew directly over them, no further contact was established... HMNZS *Achilles* was heard endeavouring to pass the spotter's initial orders to HMCS *Uganda* without success."⁹¹

Truk was *Uganda's* last operation of note. Although the ship continued to operate with the BPF until the end of July, it did so as part of the cruiser/destroyer screen, the main work of attacking Japanese facilities being left to the Fleet Air Arm. Picket duty could still be somewhat unnerving, as it placed the cruiser out on its own, and one gunnery officer commented that he hoped "not to leave anyone with six inch bricks at their feet." For the most part the cruise was uneventful, though poor living conditions, especially the heat, continued to undermine crew morale.⁹² A. Murray Rogerson remembered that when movies were shown in the hangar, "it would be so hot, with so little air, that the rig to wear was mostly a towel and a pair of shoes. At the end of the movie the deck would be wet with perspiration running off our bodies."⁹³ The powers-that-be were not ignorant of the situation and tried to mitigate conditions whenever they could, on one occasion requesting from NSHQ the number of Canadian personnel expecting to be serving in the Pacific in future, "in order to estimate beer requirements."⁹⁴

In mid-July *Uganda* began sailing for Canada to take on a new complement, hoping to work up in a few weeks and return to the BPF in time to begin operations against the Japanese home islands. It arrived in Esquimalt on 10 August.⁹⁵ But even as the ship was docking, two atomic bombs had already been dropped on Japanese cities, and

on the 14th Emperor Hirohito broke a tie vote in his Cabinet to force his empire to surrender. Nuclear war thus obviated the need for a balanced fleet, and Canada's contribution to the Pacific was cut short before it could develop in either quantity or quality. The conflict's quick end must have come as something of a blow to the admirals and policy makers within the RCN, their focus on the campaign against Japan having brought little in the way of prestige or ships. The two carriers, with accompanying cruisers, fleet destroyers, and other vessels totalling scores of ships, which NSHQ had hoped to acquire for East Asian operations and retain into the postwar era, were reduced to a grouping of a single light fleet carrier, two cruisers, and miscellaneous craft. In neither numbers nor organization could it be described as a balanced force. Of these ships, only one had taken the war to the enemy in the Pacific, and even that contribution was later overshadowed by the nature of its end, two-thirds of the crew, when asked, choosing not to volunteer for further service. At the time, such action was seen mainly as an administrative bump easily resolved by sending *Uganda* to Esquimalt to take on quickly-found replacements, but the atomic bomb interrupted that process so that Canada's only large contribution to the war against Japan was out of action at the decisive moment.

It was also still developing towards its full potential. In the same way that the huge expansion in anti-submarine escort vessels had required two years and more to train complements almost exclusively on the job — before they approached an acceptable level of efficiency, *Uganda's* bombardment and anti-aircraft operations in the Pacific demonstrated that Canadians had much to learn about running larger ships. Truk was most certainly a case in point. Hiroshima and Nagasaki prevented the officers and ratings of the RCN from learning the full range of intricacies involved in running a balanced fleet, though in all fairness there is no record of any complaints on the part of the participants. To them, war's end was a sufficient good in and of itself, and all else was secondary.

NOTES

* Bill Rawling is currently a member of a naval team working on the official history of the Royal Canadian Navy for the Canadian Department of National Defence.

1. For more details on the volunteer issue, see Bill Rawling, "Paved with Good Intentions," *Canadian Military History*, IV, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), 23-33. For a more general history of HMCS *Uganda*, see Stephen Conrad Geneja, *The Cruiser Uganda* (Corbyville, 1994).

2. The Prince ships — *Prince Robert*, *Prince David*, and the rest were converted from commercial vessels and hence designated auxiliary cruisers.

3. Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty (ADM) 1/18371, Director of Personnel (DPS), Minute, 8 February 1944; National Defence Head-

quarters, Director General History (DHist), 148th Meeting of the Naval Board, Minutes, 28 February 1944.

4. Alan Raven and John Roberts, *British Cruisers of World War Two* (London, 1980), 198-202 and 296.

5. J.M. Thornton, *The Big "U"* (New York, 1983), 7-11.

6. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group (RG) 24, vol. 11, 751, CS 269-1, F.L. Houghton to Secretary of the Admiralty, 21 December 1943.

7. NAC, RG 24, Acc. 83-84, 167, boîte 3634, 8060-CCL-31, British Admiralty Maintenance Representative, Washington, to Chief of the Bureau

of Ships, Maintenance Division, US Navy, 24 November 1943.

8. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11, 732, CS 153-15-1, Admiralty to Canadian Naval Mission Overseas (CNMO), 30 May 1944.

9. *Ibid.*, Secretary of the Naval Board to Secretary of the CNMO, 19 June 44.

10. PRO, ADM 1/18371, Admiralty to Commander-in-Chiefs, 25 November 1943.

11. *Ibid.*, Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, 2 February 1944.

12. *Ibid.*; DPS, Minute, 2 February 1944; DPS to Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ), Ottawa, 18 March 1944.

13. William H. Pugsley, *Saints, Devils and Ordinary Seamen* (Toronto, 1945), 152.

14. DHist, Biographies, Report of Interview with Able Seaman Andrew A. Lawson, 1987.

15. Pugsley, *Saints*, 153.

16. NAC, RG 24, Acc. 83-84, 167, vol. 1782, 4939-103, Secretary of the Naval Board to Senior Canadian Naval Officer (SCNO), London, 21 January 1944.

17. *Ibid.*, SCNO London to Secretary of the Naval Board, 7 March 44.

18. *Ibid.*, Director of Warfare and Training to Director of Plans (DoP), 24 January 1944.

19. DHist, Biographies, Report of Interview with Rear-Admiral William Moss Landymore in Halifax, 19 July 1966.

20. *Ibid.*, Report of Interview with Commander Hugh Eric Francis Makovski, 2 April 88.

21. J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I* (Toronto, 1960), 642.

22. *Ibid.*, 643.

23. *Ibid.*

24. DHist, Angus L. Macdonald Papers, 80/12, folder 2, Nelles to Minister and Chief of Naval Staff, 20 June 1944.

25. NAC, RG 24, vol. 8150, Naval Service Secret (NSS) 1655-2, Staff Officer (Plans) to DoP, 24 June 1944.

26. *Ibid.*, DoP to Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, 7 September 1944.

27. J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record, Volume II* (Toronto, 1968), 74.

28. NAC, RG 24, v. 11,960, TS 4-18, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes, 14 September 1944.

29. Peter C. Smith and John R. Dominy, *Cruisers in Action, 1939-1945* (London, 1981), 29 and 55.

30. S.W. Roskill, *The War at Sea: The Offensive, Part II* (London, 1961), 186-187; Roskill, *White Ensign* (Annapolis, 1960), 426; Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War* (Boston, 1963), 423; and Morison, *Victory in the Pacific, 1945* (Boston, 1960), 103.

31. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11,751, CS 153-10-1, Albert Victor Alexander to Nelles, 11 October 1944.

32. DHist, Biographies, Makovski, Interview.

33. *Ibid.*, Lawson, Interview.

34. *Ibid.*, Report of Interview with Commander Ernest Maurice Chadwick, 1989.

35. *Ibid.*, Makovski, Interview.

36. John M. MacFarlane, "Canada's Admirals and Commodores," *Maritime Museum Notes* (August 1992), 30 and 38.

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38. DHist, Biographies, Landymore, Interview.

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40. *Ibid.*, "Monthly Return of Days at Sea and in Harbour."
41. *Ibid.*, CNMO to NSHQ (R) *Uganda*, 29 November 1944.
42. G.N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada, Volume II* (Ottawa, 1952), 269.
43. Roy Ito, *We Went to War* (Stittsville, ON, 1984), 213.
44. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11,732, CS 153-15-18, Report of Medical Department, HMCS *Uganda*, December 1944.
45. *Ibid.*, Health Report, HMCS *Uganda*, January 1945.
46. DHist, Biographies, A. Murray Rogerson Diary, footnote to 19-21 February 1945.
47. *Ibid.*, footnote to 7 April 1945.
48. *Ibid.*, footnote to 19-21 February 1945.
49. Morison, *Victory*, 79.
50. *Ibid.*, 88-90.
51. Roskill, *War*, 333.
52. Morison, *Victory*, 79-80, 89-90 and 94.
53. PRO, ADM 199/595, Brind to Vice-Admiral Second in Command, BPF, 18 April 1945.
54. DHist, Biographies, Chadwick, Interview.
55. *Ibid.*, Makovski, Interview.
56. Philip Vian, *Action this Day* (London, 1960), 175.
57. DHist, Biographies, Makovski, Interview.
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59. *Ibid.* Rawlings to Commanding Officer (CO), US Fifth Fleet, appendix 1, 3 May 1945.
60. *Ibid.*
61. PRO, ADM 199/595, *London Gazette*, supplement, 2 June 1948.
62. PRO, ADM 199/590, Brind to 2ic BPF, 13 May 1945.
63. *Ibid.*, Rawlings to CO, US Fifth Fleet, appendix 1, 25 May 1945.
64. *Ibid.*, Rawlings to CO, US Fifth Fleet, appendix 1, 4 May 1945.
65. Vian, *Action*, 185.
66. DHist, Biographies, Rogerson, Diary.
67. PRO, ADM 199/590, Mainguy to CO, 4th Cruiser Squadron, 10 May 1945.
68. *Halifax Daily Star*, 31 May 1945.
69. PRO, ADM 199/590, Brind to CO, 4th Cruiser Squadron, 13 May 1945.
70. PRO, ADM 199/595, Rawlings to Vice-Admiral 2ic BPF, 9 May 1945.
71. Admiralty Historical Section, *Naval Operations, Okinawa* (London, 1950), 48.
72. Morison, *Victory*, 178.
73. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11,499, SS 11600-1, appendix B, Letter to Deputy Director, Signals Division, 15 April 1945.
74. *Ibid.*
75. PRO, ADM 199/1041, Mainguy to Rear-Admiral Commanding 4th Cruiser Squadron, 17 May 1945.
76. *Ibid.*, Mainguy to Brind, 25 May 1945.
77. Morison, *Two-Ocean War*, 542.
78. *Ibid.*, 555.

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79. PRO, ADM 199/1041, *Swiftsure* to Rear-Admiral Commanding 4th Cruiser Squadron, 17 May 1945.
80. Norman Friedman, *Naval Radar* (London, 1981), 193-197.
81. PRO, ADM 199/1041, McLaughlin to Rear-Admiral Commanding 4th Cruiser Squadron, 17 May 1945.
82. PRO, ADM 199/1510, Brind to Commander-in-Chief BPF, 2 July 1945.
83. Samuel Eliot Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshals, June 1942-April 1944* (Boston, 1951), 319.
84. PRO, ADM 199/1510, Brind to Commander-in-Chief BPF, 2 July 1945.
85. DHist, Biographies, Chadwick, Interview.
86. *Ibid.*, Makovski, Interview.
87. R. Crosley, *They Gave Me a Seafire* (Shrewsbury, 1986), 161.
88. PRO, ADM 199/1510, Director, Gunnery and Anti-Aircraft Warfare, Minute, 13 October 1945.
89. *Ibid.*, Brind to C-in-C BPF, 5 August 1945, enclosure 4.
90. Raven and Roberts, *British Cruisers*, 311.
91. PRO, ADM 199/1510, Brind to Commander-in-Chief BPF, 5 August 1945, enclosure 6, "Report on Bombardment Spotting."
92. DHist, Biographies, Rogerson, Diary, 15 July 1945.
93. *Ibid.*, 23 June 1945, footnote.
94. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11,751, 46-8-1, CNMO, Naval Assistant (Policy and Plans) to NSHQ, 13 July 1945.
95. NAC, RG 24, vol. 11,732, CS 153-15-7, Naval Officer in Charge, Esquimalt, to NSHQ, 11 August 1945.