
This is a collection of selected lectures delivered at the 1993 summer institute in early modern maritime history at the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island. It is the second such collection edited by Professor Hattendorf (see review in *TNM/LMN* VI, No.3: 49-50). Like its predecessor, it aims to provide the reader with a general introduction to some of the major themes and scholarly debates in maritime history. The subject is not widely taught in universities and colleges and good general histories rarely serve as useful textbooks. Though idiosyncratic in the selection of topics, this volume meets its editor's purpose which is to introduce interested students to the arcane maritime world of the age of sail and to render it more easily understood.

The twenty-four brief chapters are arranged in four sections that deal respectively with opening the Pacific during the second age of discovery, the science and practice of navigation, the Anglo-French struggle for empire, and the maritime legacy of empire. Student and scholar alike will enjoy Glyndwr Williams's four chapters on the Pacific voyages. Written with grace and learning, they present a succinct overview of the precursors, the explorers and geographers, their impact on science and philosophy, and the tragic aftermath of exploitation and death that followed unrolling the chart of the vast Pacific Ocean.

The next three sections, each containing five to eight chapters, are nearly twice as long as the first and quite different in content and tone. More obviously didactic, they are intended for undergraduate students — and perhaps their instructors in search of reading assignments. Karel Davids and Willem Mörzer Bruyns each prepared four chapters in section two covering the science and practice of navigation from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries. The authors have laid out the problems and the history of the solutions clearly, and while perhaps not to everyone's taste, an understanding of the subject is vital to anyone seeking to grasp the complexity and breadth of maritime history. While praising the inclusion of this section on navigation, however, the reviewer laments that a similar topic, like shiphandling, was not included in the collection.

Daniel Baugh and N. A. M. Rodger each contributed three chapters to section three dealing with the Anglo-French struggle for empire. A brief, rather dated look at American commerce is also included here but serves no useful purpose. Baugh and Rodger, on the other hand, present an excellent overview of the major imperial conflict that remained essentially maritime throughout the century. Their text introduces students to the distinctions between elements of naval power — ships, officers and men — and the foundations of seapower — fighting ability, strategic comprehensiveness, commercial and financial strength, and political will. One might complain that their treatment of the Royal Navy during the American War of Independence smacks of special pleading because America was not the Royal Navy's to lose. But, in addition to providing a clear narrative, they introduce readers to some of the questions being currently debated in the literature. And while it is not comprehensive, this feature adds interest to their treatment.

The four chapters by Roger Knight in the final section on the maritime legacy of empire are equally valuable. The editor's inclusion of a chapter on romanticism and the literature of the sea is misplaced. Knight, however, provides an excellent overview of the Atlantic economies during the score of years before 1800, the changing technologies and materials introduced, the naval dimension of the Anglo-French wars during the Revolution and Empire, and the last years of naval sail. Though these topics may appear eclectic, and certainly others may occur to readers, Knight's cogent, concise style of writing brings the volume nicely to a close. More than other authors, Knight fulfils the editor's aim to
introduce students to problems and debates as well as to overviews.

All things considered, this volume succeeds as an introductory textbook for undergraduates on sea power in the classic age of sail more successfully than did the first one published in 1996. The suggested readings that accompany each chapter are up to date and allow students to explore the topics more fully. One irony lies in the choice of frontispiece. It portrays a giant French battleship, a first-rate from the navy of Louis XIV. Built during the seventeenth century, it never put to sea during the classic age of sail.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


Here I am faced yet again with another of those splendid volumes produced by the Deutsche Schiffahrtsmuseum and Ernst Kabel Verlag. It is difficult indeed to sing its praises without repeating myself, since much of what I said in my review of Deutsches Schiffahrtsarchiv XVI (1993) in TNMLMN V, No. 4 applies here.

In the section on merchant shipping, we find the memories of Captain Scharf, the last Master of the North German Lloyd Europa, as well as the experiences of Gertrud Ferber who provided the kind of services to passengers together with secretarial duties for the Master of the NDL Bremen which foreshadowed those of the cruise directors found on passenger liners today. Both articles make us aware of the political pressures put on German merchant officers and crews by the regime of the Third Reich.

The last article in this section is (surprisingly for a German publication) devoted to Captain J.C.B. Jarvis, the famous Scottish master mariner whose invention of the brace winch earned him the sobriquet brace-winch Jarvis among seamen and owners of sailing vessels; among seamen because it made their work less dangerous and among owners because it saved them on crews. His inventions never really caught on in Britain but Scandinavian and German ship owners appreciated its advantages. I for one cannot speak of it too highly from personal experience aboard the four-masted barque Passai. Good grief, what would our lot have been if we still had to deal with long braces with a watch of eight or nine men at best!

In a section devoted to social history we find an article titled "Prayers yes - Schnapps, No; amity on board during a time of upheaval." It examines conditions on mid-nineteenth-century German merchant vessels, a time when seamen demanded better food and reduced working hours while in port and that the consumption of alcohol be strictly prohibited because it endangered the safety of the voyage and often lured masters and mates to excessive and rude behaviour. This problem surely existed in merchant fleets of other nations as well and it is to be hoped that more work will be done on this particular and still existing problem. Another article examines in detail the accidental death in 1907 of an apprentice of the German cargo-carrying training vessel, the Herzogin Sophie Charlotte belonging to the North German Lloyd while in Sydney, Australia.

Under the heading of fisheries and whaling Uwe Steffen tells in a thorough manner with beautiful illustrations the story of "Jonah and the Great Fish," not only as he appears in the biblical story but also how this story permeates Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions. Klaus Barthelmess and Britta Schleicher elaborate on an hitherto unknown pamphlet which contains a humorous poem about Portugal's fishmongers and peddlers of broadsides in the second half of the eighteenth century. It is a marvelously illustrated and extremely well annotated article.

Very much closer to our time is an article by Kurt Deggim who describes the beach fishery at Sorkau (in the former East Prussia) on the Baltic between 1930 and 1945. Boats, methods of fishing, handling of the catch and working and living conditions are covered in great detail and is also well illustrated.

The German navy is treated by well-known ship historian Arnold Kludas in an article on "Passenger ships as auxiliary cruisers — a short history of a ship category," and by Ursula Feldkamp who reports on the last voyage of the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse by her Master, Captain Meyer. Both stress the unsuitability of pas-
senger liners as auxiliary cruisers, an experience shared by the Royal Navy in World Wars I and II.

An illuminative article by Ekhardt Berkenhagen demonstrates that the history of art has not been forgotten in this volume. Supported by beautiful black and white and colour illustrations, he writes about Pieter van der Velde in the light of Flemish marine painting of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

Detlev Elmers touches on the archeology of ships. In his inimitable way, he tells us what can be learned from "Loose objects found on shipwrecked cogs." Do I have to add that Elmer's copy is enhanced by superb illustrations?

Much emphasis is placed on ship and boat building, particularly on the history of small craft. This volume includes Part I of an article on Saami boat building with its sewing and lacing techniques. It is a thorough study, well illustrated and wide ranging, which will interest all small craft aficionados. So will the article by Fred Hanke who writes in a continuing series on traditional boats in Germany, this time on wooden boats of the river Main. Plans drawn to scale of 1:10 are included.

The last pages give an extensive report on the activities of the Deutsche Schifffahrtsmuseum, its collections, its wide ranging research, exhibits, publications and lectures by its staff.

As I have said on more than one occasion, these northern European museum yearbooks are a joy to behold and a rich treasure of knowledge. When will maritime museums on this side of the big pond follow in their course?

Niels Jannasch
Tantallon, Nova Scotia


The eighth volume of this annual publication of Aland Islands' Nautical Club and Maritime Museum contains almost twenty articles and short research notes (plus a few annual reports). The themes cover a wide field, from ordinary shipping history to a description of the restoration of an eighteenth-century octant; chronologically, the range extends from early modern times to the late 1970s. What follows is a brief account of those articles which are of more than just local interest.

The volume opens with a description by Astrid Olhagen of an interesting replica, that of the sailing well-boat Jehu, which was launched in spring 1996. Such craft, which normally measured a good forty feet overall, were used to transport both live fish and passengers over the Aland Sea. The reconstruction was based on the well-known lines drawing from the 1760s by Fredrik Henrik af Chapman, plus a partly preserved wreck of a similar vessel. The replica was rigged according to the manner which was common at the end of the eighteenth century. The article includes a good number of pictures and presents a vivid account of a beautiful, well-sailing, newly-built "old-timer."

Quite logically, the volume continues with Jerker Örjans' short note on the history of the passenger traffic over the Aland Sea. This has a connection with the exhibition "The Childhood of Passenger Traffic on the Baltic" in the Mariehamn Maritime Museum in 1995. It is just a brief list of certain events which the author has regarded important but it may be useful in giving an easily grasped overall view of the development.

Next follows a long article on how Gustaf Erikson, the famous sailing-vessel owner, bought the Belgian sail-training ship L'Avenir in 1932. The article is written by the former curator of the Maritime Museum, Göte Sundberg, who has delved deeply in the archives of Gustaf Erikson (now in the Provincial Archives of Aland). It describes in detail how the negotiations, in which Erikson was represented by the well-known shipbroking firm Clarkson in London, proceeded. The article gives a vivid insight to the maritime markets of the early 1930s, albeit a fairly special part of them.

There are short biographies of two sailing-ship masters, Anders Wilhelm Jansson and Ragnar Lindholm (by Bertil Lindqvist and Göte Sundberg). Jansson (1839-1913) was an illegitimate son of a farm maid who not only became a master but even shipowner and became known as a very colourful person. Lindholm acted as master on many big windjammers owned by Gustaf Erikson but his career was marred by frequent ill-luck and shipwrecks. Both articles present an interesting micro-level view of the everyday life
There is even a Canadian connection, a description by master mariner Yngve Hågerstand of how he sailed a car-ferry over the Atlantic in the autumn of 1967. This ferry, the *Apollo*, was sold to a Canadian company for traffic on the St. Lawrence. Since the ship had been constructed for Baltic short-sea services and had a voluminous car deck the transfer was not any easy business. The buyer sent a full transfer crew to help the master and chief engineer but since they only included a few with any Atlantic experience they were not very useful. The voyage was stormy and both stem and bow ports leaked but finally the ship arrived at its destination.

In addition to this stormy business, the yearbook contains two stories of shipwrecks, those of the barkentine *Angela* in 1881 (by Ingwar Liewendahl) and the barkentine *Neptun* in November 1928 (by Helge Heikkinen). The latter is based on the author's own experiences and is an unusually vivid and dramatic description, but then he is an experienced writer who has published a number of maritime novels.

For those interested in landward cultural history there is a description of a captain's house from the 1880s and its inventories. There is also a description how Justus Harberg collected material and wrote a book on the history of Aland's machine-powered shipping, *Âlândsk sjôfart med maskindrivna fartyg*, which was published in December 1995. (As some readers may know, a history of Aland shipping under sail was published already in 1940 by Georg Kâhre.)

Clearly there is a continuing interest in shipping history on the Aland Islands. All the articles are again supplemented by short English summaries so that even those who do not command the Swedish language can at least follow the thread of the articles.

Yrjb" Kaukiainen
Helsinki, Finland


*Wooden Boats To Build and to Use* was the last book written by boatbuilder and small craft historian John Gardner before his death in 1995, and while it makes use of the same formula as *Building Classic Small Craft* (1977), *More Building Small Craft* (1984), and *Classic Small Craft You Can Build* (1993), it is perhaps the most successful of the lot.

This book contains an introductory chapter on the history of the small craft preservation movement, a brief chapter on *Centennial*, the 20-foot dory in which Alfred Johnson made the first solo crossing of the Atlantic Ocean in 1876, a chapter on the migration of the Hampton boat, fourteen chapters dealing with the history, construction, and replication of specific types (ranging in size from an eleven-foot, ten-inch Dion tender to a thirty-seven-foot V-bottom work launch), a chapter on scale half-models, a chapter on taking off boat lines, and a concluding chapter which comprises several brief essays on salient aspects of small craft construction such as caulking, steaming, and boatbuilding woods.

Readers familiar with Gardner's other books will recognize this mixture of philosophy, general small craft history, the history of individual boats and types, plans, detailed instructions, general information on boatbuilding, and information on the little known sub-skills of the boatbuilding trade. If this is the finest of Gardner's books, then it is because these various interests come together somewhat more harmoniously than in the earlier books. It is difficult not to suspect that even as he approached his ninetieth year, the multitude of facts at his disposal continued to constellation into an ever more coherent overview of the history of small craft.

This continuing intellectual growth is also behind the appearance of the word "use" in the title. All of the earlier titles refer only to the building of boats. This is because Gardner's involvement in the movement to preserve America's small craft heritage began in earnest in the late 1960s, a time when the focus of marine museums was beginning to shift from the collection of historic small craft to their replication. As Garner explains in the introductory chapter, this reorientation kept the artifacts relevant by preventing the loss of traditional boatbuilding technology and by providing boats which could be studied under working conditions. The success of this new approach eventually allowed even greater emphasis to be placed on the use of rep-
lica. By 1993, when Gardner wrote the talk which became the introductory chapter, he had become so convinced of the importance of using replica that he felt it necessary to admonish his colleagues that "As museum professionals, preservation is our business...so we had better understand that the way to preserve small craft is not to embalm them for static exhibits or to tuck them away in mothballs, but to get their reproductions out on the water, use them, wear them out and replace them." (p. 11)

While the use of replica has proven to be an excellent way for museums to stir public interest in historic small craft, Gardner saw in it a much deeper importance. Near the beginning of his concluding chapter he writes, "Building and using a small wooden boat helps wonderfully to reestablish and strengthen connections with the natural world that so many of us have lost or are in increasing danger of losing. Wind and water have not changed, and the age-old workings and needs of the human body and psyche remain the same and cry for expression and fulfillment in a cold world of artificial abstractions and flickering images." (p. 239) These words penetrate to the heart of the small craft preservation movement. Almost everyone senses that it is a profoundly important movement, but few people have been able to explain why this is so. In the last chapter of his last book Gardner has given license to preservationists to think and speak in terms of the human spirit. It is only in these terms that the importance of the movement can be adequately expressed.

Philip Gillesse
Kingston, Ontario


This is the last of Conway Maritime Press' twelve-volume encyclopedic "History of the Ship" to be published, though it is historically and chronologically the first. Others in the series continue up to the present day. The series has been an ambitious project, and its size and scope are reflected in both the content and format of the volumes and in their price (in Canadian dollars, the complete set would cost nearly $850 with tax).

All the volumes follow the same format, with an introduction and a series of free-standing chapters, each of which is written by an acknowledged authority in the field. The overall feeling is that of a general encyclopedia for specialists. That is, some background knowledge is assumed, but with this book a researcher familiar with, say, the vessels of Egypt and classical antiquity could gain a basic understanding of the state of knowledge about Viking-era vessels. At the same time, the best essays in the book are more than just literature reviews, though there is an excellent annotated bibliography at the end.

The book has both the advantages and the shortcomings inherent in such a collection of essays. There is unavoidably some overlap and repetition among the chapters. In some instances, this shows clearly how the same archaeological and pictorial evidence can be understood in different ways. Some chapters mention reconstruction projects which are not necessarily reviewed in the "Problems of Reconstruction" section. The writing style and level of detail vary considerably between chapters.

Some, as with Jeremy Green's "Arabia to China: The Oriental Traditions," read like extended summaries of archaeological reports, and cover large spans of time and geography in a very hurried summary. Others, such as Sean McGrail's "The Bronze Age in Northwest Europe" or Detlev Ellmers' "Celtic Plank Boats and Ships, 500 BC to AD 1000," are comprehensive and polished accounts, presenting extensive conclusions drawn from the available evidence.

On the positive side, each essay is written by a specialist in the field, and takes advantage of the most up-to-date research. In many cases new findings or interpretations are presented, though those not familiar with the individual fields may not recognize them as such. Sometimes, divergent interpretations are offered, and authors make it clear that they are departing from conventional wisdom. The book is sumptuously illustrated with photographs, maps, plans and drawings. A minor quibble concerns the illustrations, which are not numbered or otherwise keyed to the text. This
occasionally makes it difficult to follow.

The overwhelming impression that is left upon reading this volume is of the richness and complexity of the maritime tradition. It is evident that many of the conventional explanations for such epochal events as the first boats, or the introduction of oar or sail power, do not now hold up under scrutiny. Much has been learned in recent years, particularly in archaeologically-rich and well-studied areas such as Scandinavia, but a great deal remains to be explored.

Many disciplines have contributed to the understanding of the maritime past, including archaeologists, historians and ethnologists. It takes particular qualifications to do good research in maritime history, as Dr. Basil Greenhill makes clear in his introduction to the volume. Speaking of the history of pilotage and navigation, he suggests that they might best be studied by those who have had the experience of being pilots and navigators. The same holds true throughout the volume.

I would extend that principle to suggest that those who study early boats and boatbuilding should have some knowledge of the trade as it has been practised, and some first-hand experience of it themselves. Even though it is always necessary to control for modern bias in tools, techniques and attitudes, enough similarities remain to provide a worthwhile ground for the researcher's work. With such experientially-based understanding, I suspect that some of the features of these early ships and boats which seem quite mysterious to archaeologists would yield themselves much more readily to explanation.

All of the chapters would have been enriched, too, by more exploration of how the boats and ships were constructed: what of the fastenings? how were the planks gotten out? how were they shaped and fitted? were they bent? hewn? were there moulds or patterns of any kind? have tools survived along with the boats? are there evidence of repairs? use-wear? what species of wood were used? and so forth.

Finally, greater knowledge of the materials and processes of boats and boatbuilding would have prevented some odd statements, such as Lionel Casson's assertion that spritsails cannot be brailed up, which would no doubt come as a surprise to the users and builders of Thames barges or a variety of traditional North American small craft; or Jeremy Green's persistent confusion of waterways and limber holes.

Overall, this is a first-rate piece of work, and it fulfills the publisher's purpose of providing a basic first reference work for this most significant technology.

John Summers
Etobicoke, Ontario


"All ships leak...." With these words from the introduction, Thomas Oertling launches into a discussion of, until now, a poorly understood aspect of nautical accoutrements. In this small but detail-filled offering, the author traces the development of bilge pumps from the beginning of the sixteenth century, where pumps were laboriously made by hand, until the early twentieth century when mass production was the norm. Oertling not only describes the technical innovation and evolution of pump design over the period under consideration but also gives us a glimpse into the lives of the seafarers who had to rely on these machines to preserve their vessels.

It is quite amazing, considering the importance of pumps to a vessel's well-being (mariners generally deemed them more vital than sails, rudders or anchors) that so little has been written concerning them. It may be that, as William Falconer points out in his dictionary, they were so common and well understood that they hardly required description. Due to this paucity of historical data, the author relies heavily on archaeological examples of real working pumps for much of the information concerning these vital pieces of ships' equipment. Marshalling what pertinent historical accounts and descriptions that do exist, Oertling melds these with the archaeological information to produce a balanced and informative exposition of the subject.

The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter explores the nature of leaks in ships' hulls and the various techniques used by mariners
to detect and control these leaks. Dotted with historical accounts of sinking ships, the real human aspect of a ship in distress is highlighted as is the vital necessity of bilge pumps to the people on board. Chapter two deals with the tools and techniques used to manufacture wooden pump tubes, by far the most common type until well into the nineteenth century.

The next three chapters contain the essence of the book, the pumps themselves. In succession, the author deals with the three main types of pumps from the period under study: the bunpump, the common or "suction" pump and the chain pump. For each of the pump types Oertling describes their historical development, how they functioned, technological improvements and derivative types. To aid the reader with the technical descriptions, the book is profusely illustrated with photographs, the author's own line drawings and historical diagrams depicting the pumps in question. These have generally been placed close to the related text, requiring a minimum of page turning. On a slightly negative note, the small format of the book has rendered most of the historical illustrations to such a diminutive size as to be difficult to decipher.

The sixth chapter very briefly discusses later pump types, such as force and diaphragm pumps, that became popular during the later part of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. These varieties of pumps represent the apex of technological development of manual pumping systems for shipboard use. The final short chapter consists of a summary and concluding remarks. This is followed by chapter notes, a useful bibliography and a good index.

Overall, the book is well written as well as easy and pleasurable to read although the author occasionally slips into a terse, fact-filled prose that becomes distracting. However, this is a negligible fault. The author has admirably succeeded in bringing to light a hitherto overlooked aspect of naval technology that is deserving of intensive study. This book will be of interest to professionals and amateurs alike, from maritime historians to archaeologists to nautical enthusiasts in general. Museum workers and marine archaeologists will find it particularly useful as a manual for the identification, classification, dating as well as the assigning of the proper terminology to the various pump components they may encounter. In short, anyone with an interest in naval architecture or technology will find this book a valuable and worthwhile addition to their book shelves.

R. James Ringer
Ottawa, Ontario


To some extent these two books complement each other. Tradition and Archaeology contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar on "Techno-Archaeological Perspectives of Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, 4 Century BC - 15 Century A.D" which was held in 1994 in New Delhi. That seminar concentrated on the technological aspects of seafaring and recent archaeological discoveries in the Indian Ocean. Since earlier studies have been general and text-based, the seminar sought to examine and discuss the relevance of maritime archaeology in Indian Ocean studies. Athens, Aden, Arikamedu is a reprint of articles extracted from the journal Topoi. Orient-Occident in 1993, many of which in turn had been published elsewhere. While the former deals with a wider range of subjects, the latter is more geographically confined to Graeco-India and concentrates more on literary evidence. Both books are variable in their material and a little inconsistent.

The Delhi Seminar in "Techno-Archaeological Perspectives," which I attended, was highly stimulating. It brought together several different research fields that would not normally have been together; in fact the conveners went further and set the program in a non-thematic form thus preventing one from avoiding sessions and obliging delegates to sit through multi-disciplinary...
sessions. The result was surprisingly successful. I think we all discovered the extent of the overlap and cross disciplinary potential of our respective fields. To some extent, the book loses a little of this feeling. One issue that did surprise me was the disproportionate interest in what is a paucity of evidence for Mediterranean artefacts and culture in India. Both books dwell excessively on the Western (Greek, Hellenistic and Roman) presence in the Indian sub-continent while ignoring much of the reverse process and the significance of the people in the middle. Amitav Ghosh, a participant at the seminar (although not a contributor to these proceedings) underlined the significance of the complexity of this process, as illustrated for the Fatimid period in the Geniza documents and popularly described in his novel In an Antique Land.

The articles in Tradition and Archaeology can be divided roughly into the following subjects: trade artefacts (numismatics and ceramic), literary accounts, and nautical studies (shipbuilding and technology). Ray notes in her Overview the importance of ceramics and other trade items in demarcating routes and landfalls and not as indicators of "colonies." In his paper, MacDowall points out that many of the supposed finds of Roman pottery are in fact indigenous Indian ceramic products and that the Roman coins were imported not as currency but as a metal. The emphasis is towards establishing what is truly Western and what is Eastern. There are several interesting articles on trade from Southeast Asia and China, particularly Axelle Rougeulle, "Medieval trade networks in the Western Indian Ocean 8-14th century," which deals extensively with Chinese imports to the Islamic world. In the nautical studies, the paper by Deloche deals with iconographic evidence of Indian boat building from the second century BC c. to the fifteenth century AD. This important article should be read in conjunction with his later book Transport and Communication in India prior to Steam Locomotion, Volume 2: Water Transport (Oxford University Press, 1994). Significantly, he shows second- and first-century BC reliefs of vessels with planks joined with dove-tail inserts, reminiscent of similar fittings on the nineteenth-century BC Dashur boat from the Nile. The Ajanta paintings (c. 525-650 AD) are dealt with in detail and, contrary to Needham, he concludes that these are Indian ships. There are comments on the appearance of axial rudders in the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Finally, and most welcome, is some evidence that Indian ships had transom stems long before the Portuguese appeared in the Indian Ocean, thus dispelling one of the many Eurocentric myths that Asian shipbuilders mindlessly copied the European transom (and a lot of other things too). The time may come when scholars may suggest that axial rudders came to the West from the East, in the same way that gunpowder and cannon came.

**Athens, Aden, Arikamedu** has a more restrictive geographical range and concentrates more on literary sources. The single paper on shipbuilding by Varadarajan, deals with the sewing boat in India; it seems curiously out of place here, as she was a contributor on this subject at the Delhi Seminar where several papers were given and published on this subject. There is a long and interesting archaeological excavation report on the monuments of Socotra, though it is somewhat inconsistent with the rest of the essays. A lively review by A. Tchernia of the "Proceedings of the Colloquium on Rome and India: The Sea Trade" which was part of the eighty-eighth annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America. The author concludes the review (I refuse to review the review) by dispelling another myth: that Hippalus "invented" the monsoon. The writer emphasises that it has been shown for some time that a mythical Captain Hippalus was created through an erroneous interpretation of an adjective in Pliny's manuscript. Curiously, the "myth" is somewhat perpetuated in this volume (p.16) where J.-F. Salles quotes the "anecdote includes the discovery of the monsoon by Hippalus" but goes on in a footnote with a cross reference to Tchernia. The literary studies include topics on the Periplus, and the question of the trade networks within Arab-Persian Gulf and the Red Sea is dealt with by J.-F. Salles, lexical borrowing by M. Casevitz and A.B. Bosworth outlines the influence of geographical theory (Aristotelian in particular) on Alexander.

Both volumes come with extensive indices and together make interesting reading.

Jeremy Green
Fremantle, Western Australia

This book looks at a culminating episode in the history of Chinese seafaring. The Chinese had been active and successful long distance voyagers from the time of the Sung dynasty in the eleventh century A.D. The larger ports of Fukien, Chekiang and Kwangtung were trading on a much larger scale than any European centre at this time, and the Sung and later Mongol rulers maintained effective naval forces. With the accession of the third Ming emperor, Zhu Di (Yung le) in 1403, the overseas trade of China expanded; as well, the emperor and his successor organized seven government financed maritime expeditions. They were intended to "show the flag," to show China's power and wealth, to impress the various states and rulers from the African coast in the west to Sumatra in the east, and to develop diplomatic and trading contacts throughout this area. But then, after the last of these expeditions, China turned inwards; foreign voyages and travel were prohibited, and China lost her maritime supremacy in the Far East for the rest of the millennium.

The first three chapters review the development of Chinese seafaring during the Sung and Mongol dynasties, and the background to the career of the eunuch Zheng He (Cheng Ho) who was chosen by the emperors to command the voyages. A short fourth chapter describes the building of the ships for the seven Ming expeditions. The following six chapters outline the voyages, and the last two chapters examine legends and evidence for Chinese contact with various coastal parts of India, Africa, Indonesia and Australia, and the possibility of temporary or permanent settlements or colonies there.

The author has visited a number of the major scholars in the fields of Chinese history and maritime history. From them she has had assistance in translating some of the primary sources of the Ming period held in both Chinese and occidental archives and collections. There is only a short bibliography of primary and secondary sources, but the text has been augmented with quite extensive notes.

The main interest of the book for the maritime historian or archaeologist would lie in the description and discussion of the various types of Chinese seagoing vessels of the period, and of the navigational methods used. This material occupies quite a small part of the text, and tends to emphasize the size and role of the largest ships. These were said to be about 400 feet long and with a beam of 160 feet, a size which certainly presses the technical limit for ocean-going wooden sailing ships. This size would not be equalled in Europe even by nineteenth-century wooden bulk carriers. The beam is exceptional for a ship of this size, with a length/beam ratio of 2.5. For the serious student of ancient Chinese vessels, Needham's *Science and Civilization in China,* Vol 4.III would be more useful, supplemented by articles in the scholarly journals on China and maritime history and archaeology.

Overall the book is well written in a lively, and frequently dramatic, style. The human and social side of the period and the expeditions is fleshed out with imagination and colour. The illustrations complement the text. In the interests of making a good story, the author tends to make rather sweeping generalizations about subjects which are still uncertain or under serious debate. At what readership is the book aimed? It is probably only of limited interest to the serious student of Chinese maritime history and archaeology, but should appeal to anyone wanting a general overview of a very interesting period in Chinese history, presented in vivid and dramatic prose. The book should do very well in the public library system.

R.J.O. Millar
Vancouver, British Columbia


Trawling, or "dragging" as it is known in Atlantic Canada, is an ancient fishing method. It was only of local interest until the mid-nineteenth century, however, because the kinds of fish vulnerable to
slowly-towed nets could not be preserved by the available salting, smoking and pickling methods. Beginning around 1840, railway transport and new markets for fresh fish in the English industrial cities removed these constraints, provoking explosive development of trawling throughout the North Sea. A major new fishery appeared, soon to become the world’s largest, and the Industrial Revolution reached out to the fishing grounds for the first time.

Trawling lent itself to steam power (a development of the 1880s), to a degree that other fisheries did not, and thereby created the potential for widespread over-exploitation of open sea resources — modern concerns about over-fishing being largely a result of the advent of the trawl fisheries. The English trawler owners did not respond to this loss of their raw material by restricting production but rather by increasing technological efficiency and by moving their operations to undeveloped grounds. The latter sustained them, and their emulators from other countries, until the 1970s, when coastal nations (Canada included) extended their jurisdictions to protect coastal resources from the rapacious distant water fleets. One result was the sudden collapse of the principal British fishery, only some 140 years after its appearance.

Parts of this important story have been told before, though usually only anecdotally. Dr. Robinson has now provided the missing rigorous treatment in this superbly written and eminently readable book. Although not an exhaustive account, it does provide an authoritative overview of the business, labour and regulatory aspects of the tale, while also touching on the social history of the trawlermen.

The technological evolution of trawlers and their gear, which permitted the expansion of the industry, is not adequately explained however. There are a few photographs of trawlers, giving some hint of their changing shape over a century, but there are no general arrangements drawings nor even a diagram of the layout of the working areas. Readers who have never been to sea on a side trawler may, therefore, miss some of the author's meaning. Indeed, the general reader might find that prior study of some illustrated and anecdote-laden account of deep-sea fishing would provide the “colour” missing from this book. Natural resource issues are dealt with equally briefly. The author correctly stresses the need for resource conservation and the implications for the industry of its failure to protect its own resources. He does not, however, explain such subtleties as the differences between halibuting and fishing for the smaller flatfish, which would go far towards explaining why Hull could send halibut factory ships to Greenland in 1926 even though no factory trawler was built before 1954.

More disappointingly, the book does not offer any comparisons to other fisheries. The growth of trawling was duplicated in other North Sea nations, notably France and Germany, while the conflicts between the large-scale trawl fisheries and smaller-scale, more traditional forms of fishing (so evident in Britain from 1860 to 1914) have been played out repeatedly elsewhere. They remain very much a part of the fisheries scene in Canada to this day. Parallels drawn with this broader experience would have served to illuminate the progress of the British fisheries. Such gaps aside, there are very few evident errors in the book. The only one noticeable to this reviewer is the author's tendency to equate "stern trawler" with "factory freezer trawler," thus ignoring the important wetfish stern trawlers built in the 1960s and ’70s.

This is not the final statement on the history of trawling but it is the most valuable contribution to the literature so far. It should be read by everyone who claims a say in fisheries policy matters and also as a case study of the rise and fall of a major industry under the special influences of a common-property resource, governmental management and international law.

Trevor Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia


Maine Sea Fisheries is a masterful addition to the all-too-limited scholarly literature on the fisheries of the United States. Its subject is Maine's oceanic fishing activity. However, the book is broader
than its title suggests. Since the author often compares and contrasts Maine's industry with its rivals in Massachusetts and Canada, and to a lesser extent with those in other areas of the United States, this volume offers an overview of North American fisheries throughout most of the nineteenth century.

Wayne O'Leary documents the rise of Maine as the preeminent producer of salt cod, mostly caught on the Grand Banks, in the two decades prior to the American Civil War. Maine also was an important participant in the pickled mackerel fishery. But between 1865 and 1890 there was a relentless decline in Maine's fortunes as Canadian fishermen proved to be more efficient in the Grand Banks salt cod fishery, while the Massachusetts ports of Gloucester and Boston dominated the growing fresh fish market. In part, Maine's deterioration reflected the under-capitalization of its industry. O'Leary also depicts many other economic factors that contributed to the virtual disappearance of Maine oceanic fisheries by 1890. Among these were the end of the federal cod bounty in 1866, Maine's distance from major urban markets, its relatively poor railroad connections, the state's loss of its former markets for fish products in the southern United States and Caribbean, the high cost of marine insurance in Maine, the disinclination of the state's mariners to pursue winter fresh fishing off Maine's coast, and the competition of Massachusetts which offered better wages and benefits to its fishermen.

A notable aspect of O'Leary's study is his analysis of the region's capitalist system. He laments the end of an economic democracy which featured, during the antebellum period, the widespread ownership of Maine's fishing fleet. O'Leary shows that in the post Civil-War era ownership became increasingly concentrated in the hands of larger business units which employed an exploited wage-earning underclass. *Maine Sea Fisheries* also will suggest to many readers that an equally damning critique of Maine's business community was its simple inability to adapt and hence to survive in an era of rapid change in markets and technology.

O'Leary bases much of his work on extensive data bases. This quantification appears in numerous tables printed at the end of his volume. Although primarily a study in economic history, *Maine's Sea Fisheries* also offers illuminating information on the social conditions of fishermen, including the many dangers and health hazards they faced.

One can only hope that O'Leary will continue his distinguished research on the North American fisheries. As he does, there are additional issues he may wish to explore. These include the benefits that Maine fishermen did or did not receive from the rights granted in the 1871 Treaty of Washington to use Canadian and Newfoundland inshore fisheries. While the author makes frequent reference to information provided by US Fish Commission representatives, he does not explain the nature of that organization and its work on behalf of the US fisheries. These contributions may not have been as substantive as the governmental bounty provided to Canada's fishermen in 1882. Nevertheless, the Fish Commission located new fishing grounds, supported US diplomatic goals regarding access to Canadian and Newfoundland fisheries, compiled life history information on important commercial fish species, developed a safer fishing schooner, and promoted more efficient fishing techniques. The Commission's activities demonstrated that the United States did not pursue a purely *laissez faire* policy toward its fishing industry.

O'Leary's study is distinguished by important new insights and by an impressive breadth of research. *Maine Sea Fisheries* recently was recognized by the North American Society of Oceanic History with a Lyman Award as the best book in maritime history published in the United States during 1996. That honor is richly deserved.

Dean C. Allard
Arlington, Virginia


There are forty-four tales about fishers and fishing on the Pacific Coast in this collection. Together they tell a fascinating story about life on the ocean waves in pursuit of that elusive bonanza that will cure all financial woes. The tide turns, strangely enough, and the reader soon begins to wonder, who hooked whom? Did the
fishe hook the fish or did the fish hook the fishe? The pursuit of the wily chinook salmon, geoyduck or whatever else that comes out of the deeps, often becomes an end in itself for the dedicated fisher. If you want to know and feel what commercial fishing in British Columbia was all about in the decades following the close of World War II then you should read this book.

It is difficult to be critical of these tales. They reflect actual fishing experiences in an environment that at times can be benign, is frequently challenging and occasionally brutal enough to demand human sacrifice. The unwary caught in the mighty grip of hurricane force winds knows the true meaning of human frailty. The aura of romance projected in 

*Working the Tides* is tempered with harsh realism.

There are references to fishing in the 1920s and 1930s but the stories are mainly about real-life experiences of living authors. They tell the stories of individuals and of small fishing families and capture the flavor of several generations of BC fishers.

One of the small confusions the reader may encounter is in the terminology. Chinook salmon, for example, are sometimes referred to as *springs* or *smileys*. These large, silvery beauties are the goal of every salmon troller who ever put on a hook, line or sinker in the ocean. At prices up to five dollars per pound and more when some of these stories were written, why would they not be called *smileys*? For the most part, however, the stories are easy to follow and the pictures and sketches throughout the book are an invaluable guide to what might otherwise be a mystery for many readers.

The stories tell yesterday's story of fisheries that now are changing so rapidly that no collection can "tell it like it is." The book presents a snapshot of a time that was but will be no more. There are hints of change in some of the tales and some concerns are expressed about proper conservation and the need to put something back. Today, the salmon fishery that takes up a large share of this collection is in the throes of revolutionary change. The federal government is reducing the number of fishing vessels from 4,400 to 2,200. Coastal communities that grew and prospered around commercial salmon fisheries are being transformed. Chinook and coho stocks are no longer abundant. Recreational and aboriginal fishers are demanding and getting a larger share of a diminishing supply of salmon. All commercial fisheries, whether for halibut, blackcod, sea urchin or whatever are now limited-entry fisheries requiring huge amounts of capital to buy an existing fishing privilege. The days when a lad or lass from a fishing village could start out with a beat-up old clunker of a boat, a one-dollar license and follow in daddy's wake are gone forever.

*Working the Tides* captures an era. The final tale, "The Old Captain Takes a Walk in the Sunshine," gently closes the door on the past. There is a tendency to write off the past until hit by nostalgia as we grow older. All too often, there is no one left to tell the stories we want to hear. Thank goodness the editors captured the spirit of an important era in the BC fisheries when they did and as well as they did.

Ron MacLeod
Surrey, British Columbia


*The Great Lakes* is a quite competently designed coffee table book. The historical images are superbly reproduced, in the case of some of them, perhaps for the first time in colour. Gallant's photographs dominate the work. They both illustrate Berton's text and provide their own story line. The images reach out over the Lakes, and illustrate the shore as frequently from an airplane as from the waterline. Gallant is, by and large, a fine-weather photographer, so the water level shots could have been taken from a canoe, so quiet are the Lakes. At the same time, if you have another general, illustrated history of the Great Lakes, you will already have seen most of these images (or their near equivalent), and Gallant's photos are not sufficiently outstanding to make this reviewer lay down the price of the book.

Nor, quite frankly, does the text justify the price. Berton made his reputation as one of Canada's great storytellers through the first-person narratives that were woven into his text. You wouldn't find many of these in Berton's bibliography this time (you won't find notes or a bibliography in this volume either, but then this is a coffee
instead most of the stories come from a fairly familiar corpus of secondary works. The first person comes from the author himself, who works in dimensions of the Klondike, his youthful terror aboard west coast passenger vessels, his impressions of Toronto and Chicago in the late 1940s, protests at Clayoquot Sound and birding at Point Pelee. Of history on the Lakes there is precious little: some geological history, the Griffon, the voyageurs skirting Superior, the Battle of Lake Erie, and a chapter on shipwrecks. The chapters on mining and forestry almost succeed in avoiding the lakes entirely. The single exception is Silver Island (which has the best historical photograph in the work). The shipwrecks chapter is full of mis-information. The myth of ten thousand shipwrecks (the author's italics) was exploded a decade ago by Patrick Folkes. The chapter dwells on the value of the salvageable "treasure" on the bottom of the lakes.

*The Great Lakes* has very little to offer readers of this journal. A survey of local bookstores indicates that many copies were produced, so you might want to keep an eye out for the remainder sales. In the meantime, for stories of the Lakes there is still no equal to C.H.J. Snider who, thanks to the editorial work of Robert B. Townsend, was back in print last year.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


When stonemason John Brown began constructing the massive limestone lighthouse on Georgian Bay's Cove Island in 1855, the stage was set for a lightkeeping history that would last almost a century and a half on the Canadian Great Lakes. In 1858 a precision-crafted Fresnel lens was installed atop the completed eighty-five-foot tower, tended by lightkeepers who for years endured long night watches, food shortages and poor living conditions. By 1991 Cove Island was the last staffed lightstation on the lakes, and when the final keeper vacated his snug, modern bungalow, 133 years of lightkeeping on Georgian Bay came to an end.

The history of Cove Island lighthouse and its guardian spans the tenure of all lights and lightkeepers on Georgian Bay, and it provides a fitting beginning to Lynx Images' tribute to the lights that guided shipping through the bay's treacherous waters. *Alone in the Night* is the first major Canadian book on Great Lakes lighthouses, and with its companion video, offers insight into the lives of the men and women who lived and worked on remote islands and headlands.

The authors make no pretense that theirs is a complete history of Georgian Bay lights. Rather, they have assembled a collection of personal histories and anecdotes that are as much a social history as a record of lightkeeping on Georgian Bay. Profiles of the lighthouses are interspersed with accounts of patronage, shipwrecks, murder and ghosts. The book also chronicles the rise and fall of commerce and industry on the lakes; lighthouses were tangible evidence of growth and prosperity as increasing numbers of cargo and passenger ships plied the Great Lakes in the late nineteenth century. As the twentieth century progressed, changing shipping patterns and improvements in navigation technology eventually led to the downgrading and de-staffing of all Great Lakes lighthouses. With de-staffing came demolition of many lights and keeper's houses, and this loss of architecturally and historically significant structures is one of the several issues explored by the authors.

Before profiling more than fifty Georgian Bay lights, the book begins with "lighthouse basics" — the impetus for construction, architecture and design of the towers, the people who kept the lights, and the development of lens and fog horn technology. Two subsequent sections look at individual lights, on Georgian Bay and on Manitoulin Island and the North Channel. An eclectic mix of history, interview material, anecdotes, archival and current photos, maps and charts presents a clear view of the rise and fall of lightstations, and presents a compelling argument for the preservation of the remaining structures.

*Alone in the Night* successfully dispels some popular myths about lightkeeping, recognizing
that it was not a job for romantic dreamers or those who were "going to write a book." Early keepers saw face-to-face the survivors and victims of shipwrecks, and endured an administration that was willing to provide a host of rules and regulations but no real training or logistical support. Yet the book also acknowledges the romance inherent in some aspects of the job — isolation, heroic rescues, and the incredible beauty of many lighthouse sites. The video's mix of aerial, underwater and sea-level photography accompanied by an evocative soundtrack creates some powerful images. Striking colour cinematography contrasts with old 8 mm footage, and through careful fades the viewer is transported from past to present, from well-maintained light­houses to today's derelict towers and empty foundations.

*Alone in the Night* presents an immense amount of information in an informative and engaging manner. Both the book and video provide a concerned and thoughtful commentary on a service and way of life that have all but disappeared in Canada. From the impressive limestone "Imperial" towers to the squat wooden sentinels on pierheads and rocky islets, all of Georgian Bay's lighthouses and their keepers played a crucial role in the economy and development of a young nation. Today their numbers are dwindling, and in telling their stories, *Alone in the Night* has preserved important elements of Canadian marine heritage that otherwise might have been lost to time and progress.

Chris Mills
Dryad Point, British Columbia


*Ghosts of the Bay* are two complementary travel guides to Georgian Bay which can be used as a set or bought separately. The book is of convenient pocket size and can be taken along readily. The video provides an impressionistic picture that probably is best viewed beforehand.

Each chapter of the book is devoted to an area of the Bay and contains many sketch maps, all of them cross-referenced to the appropriate navigational charts. The history of each place marked on a map is told concisely, with emphasis on human interest; the back cover promises "shipwrecks, ghost towns, shattered dreams," and, albeit briefly, this volume has them all. The numerous black-and-white pictures here are well selected and help attune the reader to the past. Many are familiar, but like the text, they probably will be new to the audience for which the book is intended. One of the authors has known Georgian Bay during a lifetime of summer vacations and both have travelled it by boat, giving them a feeling for the region as well as opportunities to search out anecdotes such as the one of Grandma Whalen, who started living in a tent on an island during the hay-fever season, and over the years developed the location into a booming summer hotel — which, like most summer hotels, no longer exists. They also have included present-day directions to historic places, warning small craft about specific navigational hazards or landing parties about dangerous overgrowths of poison ivy. Altogether the book is a well-organized, useful Baedeker to the historical places of Georgian Bay, particularly for visitors who come by water or have access to a boat. If one's interest in some specific place or event is sparked by the short treatment of it here, a wide range of material for further reading is listed in the bibliography.

One wishes that the video were equally well organized. It neither follows the geographical pattern of the book nor fully develops chronologically. It begins and ends with an actor somewhat resembling Benjamin Franklin with his high forehead and nose-perched spectacles but who pauses to caress a late-nineteenth-century photograph of a wife or daughter while writing a poetic description of the Bay. Otherwise it wanders. Its best part tells the history of Georgian Bay logging; clips of historical black-and-white movies are well blended with old still photos. Nearly as good is its account of commercial fishing. The most memorable effect in the whole tape begins with a modern video shot of a now-empty landscape on the Bustard Islands and then gradually superimposes on it a black-and white photo of the
old fishing station there with people, boats, and buildings that fit exactly.

Possibly we expect too much from presentations such as this because we regularly see highly professional computer-generated television commercials. But here the animations, such as that representing the foundering of the steamer Asia, are amateurish to the point of embarrassment. The production allows itself a certain artistic license. At times the still pictures displayed bear only tangentially on what the voice-over is saying. While, for instance, a retired fisherman tells about cutting winter ice from the Bay for refrigeration at the remote Bustards, the photograph shown is of earlier ice-cutting at well-settled Collingwood. While the video's narrator speaks of the annual gifts to the Indians at Present Island, we see a drawing of Indians of a different time at Coldwater. While the video's narrator speaks of the annual gifts to the Indians at Present Island, we see a drawing of Indians of a different time at Coldwater. When we are given old still pictures of a vessel, told about its wreck, and then without further ado are shown good modern footage of underwater wreckage, a strong question arises as to whether the wreck that we see is the wreck that was described.

The two efforts reviewed here are much different in usefulness. The video is an entertaining preliminary to a visit, but a viewer should not expect accurate detail. The book can safely be carried as a guide to the Bay.

James P. Barry
Columbus, Ohio


Reviewers for The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord are sent a style sheet of advice as to how they should go about the job, one canon of which is that the purpose of the book must be stated. In the case of this book, which is by turns engaging and infuriating, it is exceptionally difficult to judge where its objectives, or target readership, lie.

The economic, technical and business historiography of American ports is slim, and a substantial book promising four centuries of the behemoth constituted in 1926 by the merging of Norfolk, Portsmouth and Newport News was an enticing prospect. In fact it is nothing of the kind: hazy memory of those basic facts had to be confirmed from the Funk & Wagnall which clutters my study. Clearly if the formation of the port authority is not mentioned, then neither are the reasons for it: there is nothing whatsoever about the operation, funding or management of the civilian port facilities. Without local knowledge it would be possible to read at least half the book before realising that Hampton Roads is not simply the name of a channel, as shown on the useful general map of Chesapeake Bay.

Naval matters receive better treatment, but even here we find two problems. The approach is anecdotal, which inevitably brings about patchy coverage, and, particularly in the early part of the book, some stories are arranged biographically rather than thematically, leading to unhappy chronological athletics. There is an underlying moral agenda as well: the author seems almost to glory in the War of Independence, as in Union victories in the Civil War, but to become rather pacifist in the age of rocketry and nuclear weapons. This is not just a question of war being all right when the blood is well dried: it is based on the old idea of justice in war (as if there were ever any such thing) and it leads to the omission of any account of the Spanish-American War. Now Americans may not feel proud of that war, but it was the first in which armoured steam warships traded explosive shells from rifled breech-loading guns, and as such it was important. Instead we get an account of America's well-intentioned but ineffectual and irrelevant attempts to deal with North African piracy.

A block of chapters entitled "Ships and Shipping" promises better things, and chapters on pilotage and coal exporting do deliver some, yet there is still no overview of what the Port of Hampton Roads, or its predecessor bodies, were really about. Earlier chapters have told us quite a lot about railway development and the tobacco trade and a bit about forest products, but it never comes together. There is a lengthy section about the Leviathan and the United States, but these are included because the former was refitted and the latter built in Hampton Roads. Interesting, but while shipbuilding and the provision of port services often exist close together, there is no
necessary reason why they must. In many places where they did, one function was incomparably more important than the other: compare, for example, Sunderland and Hull. These two ships tell us nothing about the Port of Hampton Roads.

The book is not without merit. It is well produced and bound, though there are occasional errors, (such as reversing photos 8 and 9) and there are some well-chosen illustrations. The writing is often lively and always committed. The author has done a great deal of work with a wide variety of secondary and primary sources. That brings us back to the central problem: to whom is the book addressed? It is something more than a non-specialist "feel good" local history for the upper-middle-classes resident around Chesapeake Bay, but I cannot imagine that readers of this journal would find it worth buying even when remaindered. Had I not been on a longish train journey, I might not have even read it through to the end.

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Adrian Jarvis
Liverpool, England


This is a welcome re-print of the first serious attempt to trace the history of Cardiff as a port, published in 1939 to celebrate the centenary of the opening of the Bute West Dock. To this day, it remains the only comprehensive published account of Cardiff's maritime history, and has stood the test of time remarkably well. Its author, Edgar Leyshon Chappell, was a teacher by profession, but his committed Socialist views led him into local government in Cardiff, where he was an ardent advocate of improved town planning and social reform, particularly the so-called "garden suburb" movement.

Chappell was also an enthusiastic local historian who, in addition to the *History of the Port of Cardiff*, also wrote a couple of well-researched volumes on the history of the Melingriffith and Whitechurch areas of Cardiff in which he lived. All these books were — and still are — notable for their thorough research taken chiefly from published primary sources such as J.H. Matthews' *Cardiff records* and E.A. Lewis' *Welsh Ports Books. 1550-1603*. Chappell does, however, lapse at times, attempting on one occasion to justify a possible Viking presence at Cardiff with a passage taken from the City guide book for 1939!

Such minor quibbles do little to detract from this remarkable narrative history, tracing maritime activity at Cardiff from prehistoric times to the eve of World War II. Prior to the development of the iron industry in South Wales from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the port of Cardiff was of little economic consequence, being totally overshadowed by nearby Bristol, for many centuries the economic capital of the area. Chappell is nevertheless meticulous in the way in which he brings together scraps of information from numerous sources to create a convincing account of the maritime associations of medieval and early modern Cardiff. Particularly illuminating are his accounts of piracy and smuggling, which show how far-removed from reality are the stock images of rum and 'pieces of eight.' A favourite target of some Bristol Channel pirates were ships returning from Newfoundland laden with salt cod, whilst he amazingly succeeds in tracing the activities of one Welsh seaborne brigand who rejoiced in the name of 'Jones the pirate'!!

Cardiff's spectacular transformation into a major world port began in the 1790s with the construction of the Glamorganshire Canal to the ironworks of Merthyr Tydfil. Chappell provides us with a detailed yet lucid account of subsequent developments during the nineteenth century, charting the opening of new docks and their associated railway systems, and explaining the gradual displacement of iron production by the export of steam coal as the industrial bedrock of southeast Wales. He also notes the effect of competing dock facilities at Penarth and, most especially, Barry, upon the fortunes of the port of Cardiff in the latter half of the century.

1913 was the peak year for coal exports from the South Wales ports. Writing a quarter of a century after this economic pinnacle, Chappell was only too aware of the decline in Cardiff's coal trade, noting that in 1938, the total tonnage handled at the port was but 48 per cent of the figure for 1913. Whilst praising the efforts of the Great Western Railway (owners of most South Wales ports at that time) to diversify trade, the
History of the Port of Cardiff offers virtually no analysis of the reasons for this decline, and this is probably the major weakness of the volume for the present-day reader. This should not detract, however, from the value of his remarkable pioneering work; it is still unquestionably the best general introduction to the history of this remarkable port — which today imports coal!

David Jenkins
Cardiff. Wales


The winter of 1970-71 was probably the darkest hour in the history of the Port of Liverpool, at least in peace time. The "Container Revolution" — the technological change in the method of the carriage of goods by sea from break-bulk to transportation in containers — was having a major impact on the size and design of ships, the layout of port facilities, and the patterns of sea trade. The Liverpool docks had been built mainly in the nineteenth century for the general cargo ships of that time and, though they had undergone a continuous process of adaptation and modernization, the port facilities still consisted essentially of a line of finger docks with narrow quays backed by transit sheds designed for the temporary storage of relatively small consignments of general cargo. These physical structures were quite unsuitable for containers.

Moreover, the constitution of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and its capital structure were still based largely on the concepts embodied in the Acts of Parliament of 1857 and 1858 that established the Board. These legal and financial structures were likewise unsuited to deal with the rapidly changing situation of the last three decades of the twentieth century, just as the port industry's labour-relations arrangements were ill-equipped to adjust to the new technology.

The Board had started to tackle the physical constraints by the construction of the new container and bulk-cargo facilities at Seaforth — the largest and most costly development in the Port's history — but during the years of this construction the Board's fortunes fell into a slump.

Passage of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Act 1971, which transformed the Board into the Company and prescribed the framework for the modernization of its capital structure, therefore marked more than merely a formal or legalistic change. The Port of Liverpool was as near to terminal closure in the winter of 1970-71 as at any time in its 250-year history. The 1971 Act can be seen as a turning point and, though the Company was effectively on a life-support system for many years thereafter, it emerged in the 1980s as a thriving and self-confident business.

The 1971 Act was highly controversial at the time. Events moved so fast as to blur the wider view. Now that over twenty years have passed, it is appropriate to try to give a balanced account of the events of 1970 to 1974, and that is what Lynch attempts to do in Weathering the Storm. The book is not, however, a general history of Mersey Docks, even in respect of the period 1970-74, with which it is mainly concerned. It deals only with the financial crisis and its resolution, and that largely from a political and legal viewpoint. Such important topics as the construction of the Royal Seaforth Dock or the turbulent labour relations of the period are touched on only insofar as they impinged on the financial crisis. Lynch has also avoided making any explicit evaluation of the causes that were at the root of the crisis and the appropriateness of the steps that were taken to resolve it.

I must confess that I greatly enjoyed the book. Generally it is well written and informative. Lynch has, in many respects, achieved his objective. However, given the political and legal perspective taken by Lynch, the book is quite technical in places — as in its discussion of bankruptcy law in the United Kingdom — and will therefore be of greater interest to the accounting, business or legal historian than to the maritime historian or general reader. While Lynch's decision not to assess the causes of the crisis that confronted the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and the measures that were taken to resolve it is undoubtedly a prudent one, some readers will feel that Lynch's account is consequently incomplete.

G. Edward Reed
Ottawa, Ontario

Spindler's book is an exhaustive account of "New York and the American Trade with India (1784-1812)," based upon meticulous research using primary sources in the New York Historical Society, the New York Public Library, and the US National Archives. It is an important addition to our knowledge about the origins of United States trade with Asia, especially since commerce with India has long been neglected in favor of the trade with China. Spindler gives us an equivalent (partial only in so far as he covers "just" New York) to Louis Dermigny's magisterial work on eighteenth-century Canton trade; in other words, Spindler's achievement is impressive indeed!

Spindler's initial goal is to revise the view, held by Holden Furber as well as by G. Bhagat, that early American trade with India was almost exclusively a New England affair. Spindler shows conclusively that New York also played a leading role. His detailed use of merchants' letter- and account-books, price currents, and marine listings in newspapers amply offsets the general lack in New York archives of either ships' logs or customs records (the New England bias of earlier researchers stemmed from their reliance on the latter sources, which are widely available in Salem and Boston archives). He notes too that during this period Calcutta replaced Bombay and Madras as the main trading centre for New York ships. The book also documents that many of the Indian cargoes arriving in New York were owned by merchants from other American seaports (Philadelphia figured largely, besides the New Englanders), and that a thriving group of commission agents sprang up in New York to handle these goods. And, though hampered by the lack of statistics, the book also explores the United States coastal trade in Indian commodities.

The book is a mine of valuable data not only for the chronology, composition, and mechanics of the New York end of the trade, but for American-European-Asian trade in this period more generally. By describing in order the voyage of every single vessel that sailed from or to New York with India as its stated destination or India as its verifiable point of departure, Spindler weaves a detailed and intricate tapestry. Space does not allow the reviewer to do more than mention some of the strands of detail that will intrigue other historians of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century maritime trade. There is, for example, rich prosopographical data here on the merchants and financiers in the trade, on William Duer, John Jacob Astor, and hosts of others. There is extensive description, cleverly pieced together from disparate sources, of the intricate patterns of transoceanic trade and the workings of transnational markets. The India trade with New York was not simply a bilateral one but was linked with the trades to China, Southeast Asia, Europe, and even Latin America. The book includes voluminous descriptions of the goods imported from India, and reveals the depth of the New York market for such goods. (One telling example is given on pp. 386-7: in 1809, New Yorkers imported Indian textiles both directly from India and via England.)

The book's only major drawback is a non-scholarly one: its price. Few libraries in the era of university budget reductions, and even fewer individuals, will be able to afford this important work. Given the high price and the fact that most researchers on United States and Asian trade do not read German, I urge Spindler to summarize his key findings in an English- or French-language journal. In any event, New York und der amerikanische Indienhandel (1784-1812) deserves the widest audience possible among maritime and economic historians.

Daniel A. Rabuzzi
Decorah, Iowa


He has long been a valued colleague and friend. Last year I had the pleasure of co-editing a fest-schrift in his honour: M. N. Pearson and I. Bruce Watson (eds.), Asia and Europe: Commerce, Colonialism and Cultures: Essays in Honour of
Sinnappah Arasaratnam in the journal *South Asia* [Special Issue], vol. XIX, November 1996. Readers of this review may want to take my obvious partiality into account as they read what follows.

Arasaratnam has been very productive over the last decade or so. He provided a broad overview on maritime India in the seventeenth century (1994). He also published many articles, some of which are now conveniently collected in two volumes put out by Variorum. The present work constitutes the second chapter in the story, for it follows directly from his *Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650-1740* (1986). That study showed the resilience of Indian maritime and commercial groups faced with competition from Europeans. The book under review details the process by which British commercial and political power began to be felt on the Coromandel coast, which had the momentous and melancholy consequences we all know in the succeeding decades. Here then is a case study of the beginnings of underdevelopment, of the undercutting of local industry, and of the consequences of an extension of power by a newly industrialising and militarily dominant England. Arasaratnam's study thus complements very nicely comparable studies of other areas of India which felt the effects of British imperialism early on, notably Bengal.

The first six chapters of this book are broadly chronological. They take account of the various political and military events of the time: troubles with the Nizam, the Nawab, and Tipu Sultan. This is all familiar enough. What is new is the very detailed depiction of what the extension of British rule meant on the ground, that is for weavers, brokers, merchants and traders. The effects were catastrophic. The English were concerned to cut out competition from other purchasers of cloth, whether they be Indian or European. In the 1770s the English East India Company began to set up direct relations with the actual producers of cloth, the weavers. Middle men were cut out, and so the Indian version of the "putting out" system was undercut as the EIC got closer to controlling and subordinating the weavers. There was vigorous opposition from both the weavers and other would-be purchasers. However, as the area ruled or controlled by the EIC expanded, more and more coercion, some of it physical, was applied. Hand in hand with these events in India, in England machine-made cloth was being produced with greater and greater efficiency. By the end of the story, in 1800, the EIC had done away with all European competitors, and all intermediaries between the weavers and themselves as the sole purchasers. Consequently, the position of the weavers was also greatly reduced.

The last three chapters of the book are more thematic. There is first a survey of long distance and coastal trade, and then of merchants, entrepreneurs and intermediaries. Both of these chapters use some data from the previous, chronological, chapters, but they enable the author to draw out some broader themes. The chapter on merchants shows what a varied group this was at the time, and also how the EIC was able to virtually eliminate competition. Indian merchants in particular suffered from a confinement of the space in which they could operate, and ended up losing their autonomy, and becoming instead intermediaries between the producers and the EIC: some of these *dubashes* (literally "two languages," a go-between or intermediary) nevertheless did very well indeed in this parasitic role.

Overall this book has much more to do with the land than the sea. It should be seen as an outstanding detailed analysis of the expansion of British power in its period and an expert disentangling of the consequences of this expansion on the economy and society of this important region in India. Do not be put off by the detail, for this is a case study of an absolutely fundamental and momentous process, that is the rise of the "west" to dominance, and the beginnings of the creation of a rich world and a poor world.

M.N. Pearson
Lennox Head, NSW, Australia


As a young man during the quarter-century leading up to Britain's imposition of the Treaty system on the Chinese empire, Robert Bennet
Forbes (1804-1889) was an important participant in most aspects of America's Canton trade. He rose from cabin boy to captain, was among the American pioneers in smuggling opium into forbidden coastal areas of China, and successfully (and profitably) commanded an opium receiving ship at Lintin before returning home a wealthy man in 1832. After losing this fortune, he returned to Canton in 1838 as head of the house of Russell & Co., the largest American firm in the China trade and a major participant in the illicit opium business, just as the Chinese authorities were beginning to crack down on the drug trade.

Forbes' correspondence was rediscovered when his home at Milton, Massachusetts was transformed into a museum in the 1960s. In 1969, the Massachusetts Historical Society catalogued both this and additional donated family materials and copied the entire collection onto microfilm. Scholars interested in the development of American trade with China have therefore had ready access to this important correspondence for some time. Now, Phyllis Forbes Kerr has transcribed and edited the portion of Forbes' correspondence that covers his second foray to Canton.

That experience encompassed a dramatic period in the history of western trade with China. Within two months of his arrival, Imperial Commissioner Lin arrived and launched the first serious attempt since the early 1820s to enforce government prohibitions on the importation of opium. Lin succeeded in forcing the merchants to disgorge a huge quantity of opium (as much as half the annual Indian crop) for destruction. By the time Forbes, a wealthy man again, departed Canton in May 1840, British and Chinese warships had clashed violently and full-scale hostilities were imminent — hostilities that would lead to the overthrow of the "Canton System," the imposition of western-style treaty arrangements on the empire, and the opening of further Chinese ports to outside trade.

Forbes' correspondence is a valuable scholarly resource. It provides vivid descriptions of the unfolding of these dramatic events, particularly of conditions within the Canton factories while they were blockaded by the Chinese authorities. It allows us to comprehend better the paradigm within which western merchants operated and especially their attitude towards opium as a trade commodity. Forbes' commercial status adds weight to the evidence his correspondence supplies to students of the American China trade, while it provides an important neutral commentary on Britain's road to the First Opium War.

Kerr's introductory essays give the lay reader an adequate background in which to place Forbes' correspondence. Her description of the "Canton System" is competent and her assessment of the place of opium in American trade with China is refreshingly honest, although she only hints at the full extent of its financial significance and the true scope of the involvement by Yankee merchants in this commerce. The two appended articles from The Chinese Repository round out her carefully considered presentation. Only the index is a disappointment.

Mystic Seaport presents Kerr's edition beautifully. The publishers have taken advantage of the rich resources of pertinent art available in New England to incorporate a wonderful array of illustrations by both western and western-influenced Chinese artists that effectively enhance the text. Furthermore, their reproduction quality is significantly better than in some of Mystic's recent publications.

These features may possibly provide a clue to the thinking behind Mystic's decision to publish this book. All the meat, Forbes' correspondence and The Chinese Repository articles, are easily accessible on microfilm. The history of the American China trade, however, still strongly fascinates a wider public. The trade was exotic, and could be unpredictable, dangerous, and profitable. Letters From China makes an important resource available in a very attractive package to a broader readership.

Paul E. Fontenoy
Beaufort, North Carolina


Two authors are linked by a common theme in this small but compact book which introduces the earliest beginnings of the "case oil trade" to the Far East, to the final development of the bulk oil
The first portion of the book, including nineteen pages, was prepared by Frederic A. Sharf and is devoted to a short review of the career of Captain Melville B. Cook. Specifically it presents a review of the compendium of essays Cook wrote during the course of the two voyages, between the years July 1887 and September 1889, to Japan in the Downeaster St. James. Cook spent a great deal of time travelling within a limited radius of each port in Japan in which the St. James was discharging case oil and loading homeward cargo, not at all neglecting ship's business or its accounts, but taking full advantage of the lures of learning all he could of this changing Japanese culture, its people and customs.

The door admitting Western trade and recognition had been pried open over thirty years before by Commodore Matthew Perry of the US Navy, so by the time Captain Cook and his family came to Japan, some travel books had been published, from which this Maine shipmaster gleaned much of his early education and guidance. He referred to them as he compiled his own notes, and wrote his own manuscripts for ultimate distribution to friends.

Frederic A. Scharf provides a good general background of what the early travel books amounted to, and he makes the point that "Captain Cook was the consummate tourist." Some detail is provided as to the business of the St. James' two voyages to the ports of Yokohama and Kobe, so that we do indeed see what the beginnings of the enormous Far East case oil trade were and what it later became.

The limitations of travel within Japan were imposed by the Japanese government to "treaty ports" only, but Cook managed very well to get around with permits to see a great deal of the cities and countryside adjacent to the ports of Yokohama and Kobe. Tourist hotels, living conditions and trains were already stamped by Western style and Scharf preserves the atmosphere of the 1880s as experienced by visiting shipmasters and Americans as well as Europeans who were widening the door to the island empire.

But it was the thirst for efficiently burning oil, and plenty of it, which opened Japan to necessary imports of kerosene from the United States Atlantic coast ports of Philadelphia, Brooklyn and adjacent waterways where refineries were being built. This is the point where Robert L. Webb, Curator of the Maine Maritime Museum, picks up the theme of "case oil" and carries it on into the 1890s and early years of the twentieth century. Webb has access to the newly documented and accessible Sewall papers, from which numerous examples of voyages of the Sewall ships of wood - and later of steel — are extracted. Over a hundred end notes include not only the pertinent facts that come from the Maine Maritime Museum archives, repository of the Sewall papers, but also serve as an enlarged bibliography of more source material. Many of the books Webb cites are well-known in the maritime history trade, but he also delves into publications and industrial reports of the burgeoning American petroleum industry.

From the beginning the Standard Oil Company dominated the scene. At first it was the Standard Oil's policy that the company was responsible only to produce the five-gallon cans of kerosene — two cans per case (hence "case oil") at the loading port, but it was thereafter the shipowner's chore to deal with ship brokers, charting agents and the importers at the ports of destination. Webb describes the commerce agents of the early trade which is a welcome education, too often neglected in many maritime historical books. Eventually Standard Oil saw the need, in the face of competition from Dutch East Indies Oil, to control the total costs of sales, transportation and distribution of its product, all of which still centred upon the practice of shipping kerosene, still in five-gallon tins, two to the case.

Sailing ships by the dozens and scores were thus charted for the very long haul from the United States to the Far East. As the aging wooden Downeasters wore out in the service, they were replaced by steel square riggers emerging from British, German and American shipyards, all competing for case oil cargoes.

Compressed into only twenty-two pages of text, this story of carrying case oil to the Orient is written in a clear and appealing manner. The tale of case oil for the lamps of China and Japan comes to an end with the growth of tank farms in the Oriental ports and the inevitable construction of bulk oil tankers. By 1914, the case oil trade was nearly finished, despite a few wartime stimulated voyages by sail through the Panama Canal and from the newly developed California oil
fields. The sailing ships went into other trades, those that came through that war, and only two continued sailing into the years of World War II, *Daylight* and *Lawhill*.

The book is supplied with large coloured contemporary Japanese prints from Cook’s time, a few sketches, and the pertinent photos of cases of kerosene being stacked, hauled, stowed and moved by hand labour. The absence of maps is a minor drawback to the book. Sailing ship track charts showing the various routes followed by the case oil carriers would have given the reader a better perspective of what the longest routes were. It must be said, however, that the final, definitive history of the case oil trade, as it was known in the sailing ship era, must yet be done. Both authors, Scharf and Webb, have provided a good introduction.

Harold D. Huycke
Edmonds, Washington


The partnership between the German National Maritime Museum at Bremerhaven and the Hamburg publishing company Ernst Kabel is a major force in maintaining the high visibility of maritime history with the general public in at least northern Germany. This book, containing the memoirs of the Mecklenburg merchant Theodor Cordua, introduced and presented by Ursula Feldkamp, is the latest in a long and successful series of monographs and edited diaries or reminiscences.

Cordua was born in a well-to-do landed family near the Mecklenburg town of Laage, not far from the independent Hanseatic city of Liibeck. He grew up during the Napoleonic age and, in contrast to his family, made it his life’s desire to go abroad and make his fortune in maritime trade. He insisted on gaining a commercial training and with some financial support from his father in 1817 set out, as so many Germans had done before him, for Amsterdam. Originally intending to settle in the West Indies (Liibeck’s horizons did not stretch any farther than that), he changed his mind and travelled to the Dutch East Indies. From July 1818 to February 1819 he resided in Batavia. He was unsuccessful in gaining a permanent position in a counting house, however, and after a short stint in the government finance department returned to Holland.

In 1820 Cordua, following his original intentions, travelled to the Dutch colony of Surinam and established himself as merchant and agent at its capital, Paramaribo. With, from 1824, a succession of partners he maintained this business until 1840. He overcame the losses caused by the great fire of Paramaribo in 1821 and branched out from the Amsterdam-Surinam trade into other areas in the Caribbean and in the mid-1830s also Madeira and Morocco. There, once again, he suffered grievous losses as his ship went down off Mogador. After the closure of the firm in Surinam he travelled through the Pacific Ocean and in 1841 settled in California. He made a spectacular rise to wealth on his large estate New Mecklenburg but, ironically, was ruined during the gold rushes that dramatically changed the fortunes of that state. In vain he tried to resurrect his fortunes over the next years until he finally returned to Germany in 1856. He had just finished writing his reminiscences, ostensibly for publication, when he died.

*Von Mecklenburg nach Ubersee* belongs with the higher quality merchant travelogues and memoirs like those of Meijen (1834), Duhaut-Cilly (1835), Boelen (1835-36), Moerenhout (1837) and Ida Pfeifer (1852), which provide important alternative perspectives from the far more numerous accounts rendered by naval officers and missionaries dealing with the non-European Atlantic and Pacific worlds. Cordua wrote not only from memory but used fragments of diary entries, business ledgers and journals, and many letters he had sent to his relatives in Germany. He was a sharp observer and wrote in good style. His account contains many passages with vivid and significant information. Ultimately, it will depend somewhat on the location and specific interest of the reader where he or she will mine the largest nuggets: the Chinese as the richest merchants in Batavia, the Surinam trade with Amsterdam or the Paramaribo slave trade, the growing presence of
German merchants, Cordua's career in Mexican California, or the conditions of the Hawaiian Islands in 1841 and 1852. Many readers will be struck by Cordua's decision to adopt the citizenship of Rostock in 1832 in order to bring a ship he probably had chartered under the Mecklenburg flag and thus avoid the embargo of the Powers against the Netherlands.

Cordua's reminiscences demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the genre. As the leitmotiv of the book is his career, the individual themes are discussed from his viewpoint: illuminating and often adding another window on the subject but hardly ever amounting to a comprehensive view or a definitive analysis. Coming from the opposite angle, the same applies to the information he supplies about commercial matters: these are often interesting and otherwise difficult to gather, but ultimately he does not reveal how the business really worked or where and how he set his entrepreneurial priorities and reaped his best rewards.

Feldkamp's brief biographical sketch of Cordua is useful but tantalizingly succinct, especially about the dynamics of his personal life (when he left Surinam, he did not take his black de facto wife and six children with him, yet looked after the education of his children in Europe). More problematic is that she has not provided any annotation to the reminiscences, preferring to let the text speak for itself. Unfortunately, texts do not speak for themselves and it is historians who have the task to give them meaning. Thus there is no historical context in which to understand and evaluate Cordua's ambitions, experiences, achievements and historical significance. Nor is there an apparatus to identify individual persons, places and issues, to draw the reader's attention to the correct spelling of names that Cordua rendered idiosyncratically (King Kamehameha I of Hawaii features as Keamamea), or to indicate from what source Cordua may have gathered his information. The transcription of the handwritten original seems, on the whole, to have been done competently, but a few errors have remained: Helvoetfluys should be Helvoetsluys (p. 72), and Silka should be Sitka (the capital of Russian Alaska, p. 150).

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Western Australia


Edward Beck informs his reader very early why he went to sea. It was to "see foreign lands and people." (p. 4) Born in 1803, he was apprenticed out at age 16 as a cabin boy to Captain Moyse, a fellow member of his parents' Quaker community. For four years he sailed aboard the Constantia, a coastal vessel of several hundred tons and a crew of eleven, freighting goods between several ports in southern England and Ireland. By 1823 he had grown tired of coastal voyaging and, with the help of his parents, he freed himself from his commitments to Moyse. Eager to see more of the world and to "get more sea time," (p. 29), he joined the Lady Frances, Robert Barry, captain, a vessel that carried timber between North America and northern England. For the next two years he sailed between Quebec and Sunderland in England. Then, at age 22, he signed on as third mate of the ship Woodford, Alfred Chapman, commander, on a voyage to India. The remainder of Beck's sea career was spent on such East Indies voyages. Over time he was promoted to chief mate and very briefly at the end of his career he was made master of an East Indies vessel. However, the appointment lasted only four days when the position was bought out from under him. Deeply disappointed by this event, he retired. We are not informed at what date or age this occurred, but we do learn from the editor that he was already living ashore by the time he married at age 34.

There is much in this biography to appeal to a variety of interests. Beck's writing is intelligent, descriptive and open. He offers an excellent account of life at sea and the ports he visited. His portrayal of the difficulties experienced on an 1824 voyage from Quebec to Sunderland is particularly vivid. For weeks after rounding Scotland, they met with contrary winds and the reader feels with Beck the frustration and irritation of being so close to port but being daily denied.

One great value of Beck's biography is its relevance to many of the more important issues currently debated by maritime historians. Some historians have argued that seamen came from the ranks of the dispossessed who created their own
The Northern Mariner

distinctive culture in which relations with those in authority were defined by conflict (Rediker, Lemisch, Fingard). Others view seamen as "merely landsmen who got wet," in which going to sea was merely a stage in their young lives before they settled ashore (Alexander, Morison). Some maintain that promotion to the quarter deck was limited to those who had the proper connections with the wealthy (Davis, Rediker); others argue that promotion was opened to anyone with ability and drive (Morison, Sager). Beck's journal challenges and supports many of these positions. He addresses class distinctions, mariners' relations ashore, their relations with their officers, and their relations among themselves.

In Beck's world mariners became "beings of a particular class." (p. 28) On occasion during his East Indies voyages they even suffered the lash, (pp. 169,201) Yet relations between the crew and masters of various vessels were just as frequently defined by friendship and loyalty. On board the Lady Francis, for example, lessons in navigation were offered every evening by the captain and mate. He considered the captain a pleasant, agreeable man, and was ready to "accompany my worthy Captain to any part of this world." (p. 83) In discussing mariners' behaviour ashore in Quebec, he complained that there was scarcely a night when they were not drinking, fighting, and making a disturbance. Yet he considered his fellow crew members on his trans-Atlantic voyages "to be a very decent set of men." (p. 48). Signing on as third mate on his first voyage to India, he expected those in the forecastle to be "drunk and vile." Instead, they behaved with "the greatest propriety." (p. 126). Beck's descriptions of seamen's varied relations with authority and with one another emphasizes the individual and complex behaviour of early nineteenth-century mariners, and of mariners of any age, for that matter. By so doing, he cut through many of the divisions separating the positions of maritime historians and for this reason alone his journal is of value.

The most pronounced weakness of the book lies not in Beck's memories but in the introduction. The journal covers only his years at sea. The editors, one of whom is Beck's direct descendent, fail to inform us about the mariner's earlier years or later life. As a reader, I expected them to research his life as much as is reasonably possible and to inform the reader of their efforts. Being deeply interested in the social lives of seaman, I was disappointed that both his early years and his later life were completely overlooked.

Despite this shortcoming, the journal is a good read for the general audience and contributes much to the current debate within maritime history, particularly as it relates to the first half of the nineteenth century.

Vincent Walsh
St. John's, Newfoundland


Books that are the products of conferences seldom satisfy their readers. Titles often do not adequately subsume their varied content. Content is uneven, some of it familiar and derivative, some of it (often not enough) new and original. How does this work, made up of twelve chapters and an introduction which originated with a conference held in 1993, measure up?

Gordon Jackson's introduction attempts to integrate the contributions in a discussion of the role of shipping in imperialism, yet less than half of them deal with that theme in any systematic way. Even less of an attempt is made to deal with ships as tools of empire. Only one contributor cites the works of Daniel Headrick, the essential starting point on this subject.

For the most part, contributions on British shipping and shipbuilding cover familiar ground and summarize previous work on Clyde shipbuilders and Liverpool shippers operating in West Africa. One under-studied aspect of the British shipping experience is addressed by Conrad Dixon in an analysis of the battle for status by merchant and naval ship engineers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But from the perspective of the book's title he might have used his considerable knowledge to probe the essential role of maritime engineers in shipping imperialism, a role hinted at in reference to crucial boiler repair on a stream during the river wars in Egypt. Another useful piece on British naval historiogra-
phy by Andrew Lambert, a historiography to which he has himself made a contribution, stresses the adaptiveness of Admiralty officials and innovative elements in naval ship design and deployment in the period 1815-1854.

The new and most interesting work in the volume concerns the Dutch shipping experience. Some of it may be known already in Dutch studies but is usefully made accessible to English-reading audiences. Though unnecessarily laden with a theoretical concept, referred to as a socio-technological system, Joseph à Campo's study of the packet service which the Dutch operated in colonial Indonesia during 1850-1914 is very illuminating. That service, run by three privately-owned companies, is shown to be intricately and intimately bound up with the colonial state. The Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, the last of the three companies, was inclined to identify more closely with government policies and the perceived nationalist interest than comparable British firms. Anita van Dissel, covering the same period, provides useful quantitative data on ships and personnel of the Dutch navy operating in colonial Indonesia. She estimated, for example, that eighteen warships and auxiliaries of the forty-six vessels in the Dutch naval fleet were operating in the areas in 1910. European and indigenous personnel manning the Dutch East Indies operation was more than 3,000. These calculations are part of an extensive set of time series.

Through a detailed account of the building, costs, specifications and operational life of the SS *Smit*, launched in 1884 which fatally grounded in 1898 off Korea, Abram Belder provides illuminating insights into its builder/owner's entrepreneurial style. Jan Dirkzwager provides a carefully researched case study into the transfer of mercantile marine technology from Britain to Dutch shipyards. The work in the 1860s of Bruno Johannes Tideman using models to predict the speed and power of ships is the centrepiece of the study. It suggests there may well have been a two-way traffic in the transfer of information between the two countries. Peter Schuman also deals in transfers between the two countries. He summarizes the mercantile law produced in Britain to improve the efficiency and safety of ship operations and the performance of their officers and seamen. He then sets out its influence on Dutch practice. He concludes that efforts aimed at preventing desertion as well as those improving the certification of officers was belatedly introduced and fell short of developments abroad. Frank Broeze explains the reasons for and the results of the German takeover of the Holland-America Line, 1902-17.

The book includes useful maps of the Clyde and its surrounding regions and of the Dutch East Indies. It also features a goodly number of illustrations of ship and persons which, unfortunately, are reproduced on soft paper with indifferent resolution.

To return to the question posed at the outset of this review, this work is representative of published conference proceedings. It does not stick sufficiently to its theme and it rehashes several familiar subjects. Nonetheless it does contain valuable work on Dutch maritime practice that also highlights influences from or comparison with the British experience.

Robert Kubicek
Vancouver, British Columbia


This monograph is one of the results of a long-term research project of the University of Bremen, with financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation). Supported by nearly 1,300 footnotes — many citing unpublished sources — and a bibliography of nearly 300 titles, the text clearly reveals the academic standard of this study. The goal of the authors was a social history of life on board German merchantmen between the last decades of the eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. This has seldom before been researched, in part because of the lack of sources. The authors therefore had to make use of other records as well, particularly in the chapters about steam ships, where both naval and British sources were used.

At the end of the eighteenth century ships..
were either owned by the captain or he was at least a part owner. The crew which signed on only for one journey usually hailed from the same district. Between the comparatively short trips they were able to stay in contact with their people. This was particularly true in winter time, when all shipping was stopped by weather conditions and legal regulations. The hierarchy on board was based more on personal experience and social tradition than on formal education. Since members of the crew were allowed to transport a certain amount of cargo for their own benefit — indeed, this was an essential part of their income — the ship's organisation had more the character of a joint enterprise. Accordingly, the crew members had certain rights. For instance, they could object against a change in destination if they had signed on for a particular one, or they could object against working the cargo. Of course the captain could charge crew members upon their return to their home port if they had misbehaved, but he was not required to do so if he had forgiven them. It is interesting to note that running away was only regarded as a crime if the sailor had received pay in advance.

This traditional system was no longer practicable when transatlantic voyages began after the end of the Napoleonic wars, and began to change, albeit slowly, not suddenly. Due to longer passages, contact with home was lost. Decrees led to sharply defined divisions between officers and the crew. The compulsory visits to navigation schools to obtain a mate's or master's ticket made a rise in hierarchy through experience alone impossible. At the end of this process the whole ship's company from the captain down to the cabin boy was divided into clearly defined groups, just as in a man of war. Moreover, the transition to this form of organisation also gave the captain absolute power, so that any kind of disobedience was now regarded as mutiny which had to be punished. The same applied to running away from the ship, now called desertion. The authors discuss at some length the degree to which these changes were provoked or influenced by legislation. Such changes in the social and working relationship on board also occurred on small coastal vessels, though shiphandling itself changed little from the eighteenth into the nineteenth century.

These developments coincided partially with the introduction of steamers with their profoundly different labour organisation. As steam engines were first installed, in most cases, in naval vessels, private owners adopted the military hierarchy in the engine room when they started making use of steam as well. And despite the fact that the steam engine provided the ship with its means of propulsion, the engine crew was regarded as inferior to the deck crew. This applied to the engineers as well, even though they had to repair and improve the unreliable early engines frequently. It took some time until the duties of engineers, stokers and coal trimmers and their necessary formal educations were defined. Throughout, the authors provide a vivid picture of the life on board of steamers, one of them having worked as a ship's engineer himself. Steamers needed a larger amount of capital, with the result that share ownership in a vessel gave away to share-holding companies. In turn, this reduced the captain's position to that of an employee.

In the course of their study the authors discuss several important and interesting aspects which are beyond the scope of this review. Other theories will probably need further discussion, such as the definition of a sailing ship as well as the work in the engine room as a kinematic chain in the sense defined by Franz Reuleaux. There are also a few minor mistakes. Thus, Heinrich Hauser did not sail on Pamir as passenger in the 1950s, but in 1930. Nevertheless, the book is highly recommended, and one can hope that it will stimulate further research in this field.

Timm Weski
Miinchen, Germany


After the Dutch Golden Age Holland no longer ruled the waves. Decay had set in, as the Dutch lost their maritime power to Britain. At home the Southern Netherlands broke away from the North to form the state of Belgium (1830). This was one of the more compelling reasons why the Dutch decided to write a new Commercial Code, one
free from "Southern influences." The new maritime regulations remained virtually unchanged till 1937 when the Seamen's Act of 1930 came into force. These regulations provide the essential question which the author attempts to answer in this book: why did it take almost one century to revise the regulations of 1838? In his quest to find an answer, Peter Schuman discusses Dutch shipping policy, maritime labour legislation, Seamen's unions and Maritime Conferences of the International Labour Organisations. The picture he paints through his discussion is a bleak one.

Under the influence of the Industrial Revolution the world of transport changed profoundly, with new ships, new kinds of jobs, new legislation and the rise of unions. Unlike neighbouring countries and the United States, the Dutch considered labour-related maritime law as a low priority issue because merchant shipping had a limited economic significance in the national economy. Even in the twentieth century Dutch maritime law was still influenced by a sixteenth-century decree issued by Philips II of Spain. The Dutch only began to clean up their act when Dutch vessels in the UK were confronted with the Seamen's Act of 1915, which was more demanding on the quality of ships than Dutch laws. From having been maritime leaders, the Dutch were now followers. For them the UK in particular was the master. Moreover, within the Dutch government, the Department of Economic Affairs, which favoured the employers' point of view, collided on an almost regular basis with the pro-employee Justice Department. The introduction of laws was therefore delayed whenever the economy demanded it. This political expediency was only abandoned in the 1930s.

Yet the Dutch government was not the only conservative element in the process. Well into the second half of the nineteenth century, Dutch shipping companies clung to the use of sailing vessels — in particular on the Dutch East Indies route — while in the rest of the world steam powered vessels became common. This, in turn, contributed to a slower rate of labour organization and working class consciousness among Dutch seamen. The first union of sailors was not established until 1893, the initiative coming from a Norwegian chaplain and his wife who worked in Rotterdam, one of The Netherlands major ports. Elsewhere, unions of sailors and stokers had contributed most to the social emancipation of seafarers, but according to the chairman of the American union, Mr. Andrew Furuseth, who visited The Netherlands in 1908 to prepare for an international strike, the Dutch workmen were "beautifully unconscious." Even after the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was established as a direct result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, it was the British who had the most influence on the Maritime Conferences of the ILO. In contrast, the voice of the Dutch representatives was a silent one. On more than one occasion these representatives lacked initiative, were blissfully unaware of procedural formalities or had no knowledge of the French or English language.

Author Peter Schuman is thorough as he develops his discussion, although he does miss a minor point. For instance, readers will notice that Schuman uses one word for desertion [desertie]; the more commonly used word for absence without leave from a merchant vessel, drossen, is not mentioned. Instead of page-sized tables, it might have been wise to employ more graphics. Yet it should also be said that some of the graphics that are employed are not well presented. Schuman's account of his sources and his bibliography are, however, exemplary, and excellent use is made of footnotes.

Overall, this is a good book, well written. Schuman's own research on the background of seamen and the question as to who was to become an officer and who was destined to become a sailor, really adds something extra to the book. Although the book includes a good English summary, it is a pity that the whole book is not available in English. So many more people might have enjoyed it.

Jacob-Bart Hak
The Hague, The Netherlands


Coastal shipping is one of the maritime sectors most neglected by scholars. Even in Great Britain, where coastal traffic has played an especially
important role in economic development, very little serious scholarship has appeared. Indeed, a recent comprehensive bibliography published in the *International Journal of Maritime History* on the history of the British coasting trade included only 295 items. Of these, a substantial number of the more scholarly contributions first appeared in the *Journal of Transport History*. This volume brings together eleven essays that were first published in the *JTH* over the past forty years as part of an ambitious eight-volume "Studies in Transport History" reprint series inaugurated by Scolar Press.

That the *JTH* has carried a high proportion of the scholarship on the British coastal trade re­ounds to its credit. But it also is in a sense a curse, since it seems on the surface to justify a collection of this length. Yet a careful reading of the contents calls this judgement into question. Indeed, I would argue that only five of the articles deserve to be anthologized: John Chartes' essay on Wiggins Key; Simon Ville's seminal work on wages and profitability in coastal trade during the Napoleonic wars; Freda Harcourt's paper on Irish steam shipping; and two splendid articles by the dean of coastal scholarship, John Armstrong. In fact, the inclusion of Armstrong's essays — one on freight-pricing policy before World War I and the other on the role of coastal shipping in UK transport — provide the best rationale I can think of for purchasing this collection. But the corollary, of course, is that more than half the essays are either badly dated (in approach, if not in years) or just plain weak. The only essay on which there might be room for some substantial disagreement is Derek Aldcroft's "The Eclipse of Coastal Shipping, 1913-21," which was an important enough piece when it first appeared in 1963 but which has been superseded by more recent work.

The idea behind this series — as with all of Scolar's many reprint series — is to collect essays that a reasonable university library ought to own but which, for one reason or another, might not have. Since the *Journal of Transport History* is not as widely held as it ought to be, there is a persuasive argument for this series. And on balance, this particular anthology probably ought to find a place on the shelves of at least specialist repositories. But a better idea for an anthology on coastal shipping would be to collect in one place all of John Armstrong's increasingly impressive body of work, some of which has appeared in journals with even smaller circulations than the *JTH*. That would be a volume worth owning, and I for one would be at the head of the queue to purchase a copy.

I wonder if Scolar Press pays finders' fees?

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


For anybody interested in the social history of seafaring Susan Hathorn's diary is fascinating, telling as it does the story of her honeymoon voyage from Savannah via the West Indies towards London and back to Savannah via Cardiff. Almost every detail of her daily life on board is vividly recorded. Catherine Petroski had meticulously researched and commented on Susan's life, her background and the environment in which she grew up.

Susan's family, the Lennans, were farmers on the opposite bank of the Kennebec river to the Hathorns. Although the Lennan family landholdings were steadily declining, Susan had an excellent education at Mount Holyoke Seminary and before her marriage at the age of twenty-five she taught school in Richmond, Maine. The Hathorn family, also from a farming background, was on the way up, acquiring real estate in Richmond and operating a small shipyard. By 1855, the year of the eldest son's marriage to Susan Lennan, they had built three brigs and the barque *J.J. Hathorn*. To the Lennans it must have seemed that their daughter had made a very satisfactory match. Jode Hathorn, aged twenty-two, was about to take the *J.J. Hathorn* to sea as captain for the first time.

Susan quickly adapted herself to life at sea. She was a hardworking captain's wife and there are no grumbles in the diary about the often uncomfortable conditions in which she found herself. She learned to note the vessel's position, she washed and ironed, she cleaned the state­room, she slaughtered bedbugs and cockroaches,
she sewed obsessively, she nursed the injured second mate, she audited the ship's accounts. She was intelligent and made constant notes not only on the vessel's position but about seamanship — "we beat back and forth for a while, then hove to." (p.121) For relaxation, Susan enjoyed reading — Sir Walter Scott, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Thomas Moore, Shelley and Byron — a pleasure she shared with her husband. Jode also played the accordion.

Petroski's researches have included much information about the London streets around Elizabeth Bragge's lodging house in America Square where the Hathorns stayed for sixteen days. Susan described the other guest, the card games, the shopping, the visits to Madame Tussaud's, the Crystal Palace, St. Paul's, the Tower of London, the Thames Tunnel, and the Crimean War medal ceremony.

Susan's diary is so interesting that I should have liked to have read the whole of it rather than edited excerpts. Perhaps the novelist takes over too often from the historian. The book is sensibly divided into monthly chapters. Thus an introduction containing the research material for each month followed by the full diary entries would have avoided repetition. Also, although Susan never makes this solecism, the editor refers to the vessel as "it."

The J.J. Hathorn sailed light to Cardiff, where there was much socialising with other Maine captains while she loaded iron for Savannah. Since March Susan had been pregnant but it was only after the return home in September that she started sewing an extensive layette for the baby.

The book ends in a series of tragedies perhaps as typical of the time as AIDS in the present — the baby was born in November but by then Jode had sailed off again in the J.J. Hathorn. His gravestone in Richmond records his death at Trinidad de Cuba on 8 May 1856, aged 23 years 5 months. No amount of research can recover the circumstances. He never saw his daughter Josephine who died two years later. The J.J. Hathorn was lost with all her people on a passage from Liverpool towards Havana in 1861. Jode's younger brother Jefferson, aged twenty, had signed on as mate. Susan returned to teaching. In 1865 she was married to a widower, Dr. Abial Libby and brought up a step-daughter and three children of her second marriage. She died in 1906.

The book has a very serviceable index. It is a pity that this scholarly work has been produced with a flimsy cover and that the well-chosen illustrations are so inadequately reproduced.

Ann Giffard
Cornwall, England


In most of the areas that count, this is a very good book — it won the Organization of American Historians' Frederick Jackson Turner Award. Peter Way has skilfully and artfully drawn a broad picture of the life of the labourers who dug the canals of North America before 1860. He has coped with the problems inherent in a study which covers a large territory, different political jurisdictions and, most important, a work force which left few written records behind it. That he has produced such a fine book despite these problems is a tribute to both his scholarship and his imagination.

Way necessarily paints with a broad stroke as he discusses workers on waterways from the American South to the Province of Canada. He succeeds, nonetheless, in giving a convincing account of work practices, labour relations, and community life among the navvies. Way sees canal labourers as especially worthy of study because they illustrate important changes in the economy and in work. Most working class history has concentrated on skilled labour. The standard account is of a transition, during the nineteenth century, from artisan to worker during which people struggled against "de-skilling" and for control over their work. Way points out that this picture is distorted because it portrays only a minority of the working class. Like canal navvies, most labourers had few skills to lose and no power to be eroded. That truth coloured their relationships with employers, in which workers were severely disadvantaged almost all the time, and their culture, which Way sees as one shaped out of alienation than of sense of community.

This is a useful counterweight to the artisan-
to-worker thesis and to idealistic accounts of working class culture. It can lead at times to an undervaluation of worker resistance, however. Way does discuss strikes but only rather briefly. He more often describes labourers as people acted upon than as people acting on their own initiative. A small matter illustrates this well. During the 1840s, canal labourers often came into Montreal to fight for the Reformers during provincial and municipal elections. Way talks about the riots which resulted from one such intervention in 1844. The navvies, he contends, were dupes of the politicians, risking their lives for small bribes; they had no real stake in the elections, since few of them had the vote. Perhaps so. What this may overlook, however, is that politics in that period was much more than just voting. People of all sorts participated in many ways, including by election brawling. The navvies may indeed have had a stake, recognizing differing social and economic programmes between the parties, programmes which affected the lives of navvies as much as anyone else. They were not alone in waging politics by riot since other groups, such as the sailors who burned Quebec's customs house several years later, adopted the same tactics.

This speaks of a fundamental deficiency of Way's broad brush approach. One of his central theses is that canal labour was caught up in an inexorable process of change, in the emergence of an industrial capitalism which knew no boundaries of place or religion or ethnicity. The process worked itself out almost identically in the American Deep South and in French Canada. There is much to this, of course, and that justifies Way's decision to discuss North American canal work in its totality. There is something lost, though. Local context does count. It is apparent that the state played a more prominent role in British North America than it did in most parts of the United States and that influenced labour relations. It is equally apparent that some things which Way ascribes to pure economics sprang from other sources. He notes that an unusually high proportion of violent episodes on canals took place in Canada. This he explains by the fact that Canadian canal building took place mostly after the depression of 1837, when wages fell and working conditions worsened. This is true but what it does not account for is the very high incidence of violence in Canada generally in the 1840s. Worker violence on the canals was related to economic conditions in significant measure but it was also influenced by more general social factors in British North America which generated bloody conflict far from the banks of the canals.

Peter Way's general sketch has its shortcomings. They cannot obscure the great strengths of the account, however. That the book is written in colourful and often powerful prose only increases its appeal. There may not be much here for specialists in maritime history but it is worth a read for anyone even mildly interested in the history of working people.

Michael S. Cross
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Willem F.J. Mörzer Bruyns is senior curator of Amsterdam's Scheepvaartmuseum and is a renowned authority on early navigating instruments. In 1995, The Mariners' Museum of Newport News, Virginia, engaged his services for three months as its first Huntington Fellow to provide an analysis of the Museum's collection of navigational instruments. As a result, what had been a collection of unknown quality has become one of international stature through the application of his knowledge. This book is the result of his contribution to The Mariners' Museum.

The "deep and awe-filling mystery" behind the ancient navigator's ability to find his destination is revealed in this book. Elements of Navigation steps through history in the development of the various aspects of navigation, quickly at first, from Egyptian times to the start of European expansion, then more slowly as it concentrates on the period from 1700 to World War I, the era best addressed at The Mariners' Museum. Beyond the daily habits of the sun, Polaris and prevailing winds, the first navigational tools were a free-floating lodestone to give direction and a pole or lead-line to provide depth. Ocean navigation resulted in the development of the quadrant, astrolabe and cross-staff for the determination of
latitude, starting about 1460. The mechanical calculation of dead reckoning provided an update to one's position. The book discusses the development of the log and magnetic compass from simple devices to more sophisticated tools. Mariners of old sailed by previous routes as laid out in "rutters" (equivalent to sailing directions or pilots). Charts were originally a rarity but developed over time from hand drawn originals to engraved printings. Mathematics and the invention of logarithms aided the mariner. The last element of determining one's position, longitude, is examined by describing the various methods; the eclipses of Jupiter's moons, magnetic variation as a function of longitude, lunar distances, and finally the chronometer. The establishment of astronomical observatories and the provision of time signals in ports are all mentioned. Navigation is not without knowing one's depth and Bruyns has not forgotten that aspect for he also treats the measurement of depth as an element of navigation.

By 1911, when radio direction finding came into the arsenal of tools available to the navigator, the author claims that navigation had no major innovations until the advent of radar in the 1940s. I beg to differ on that point, because the gyrocompass was developed shortly before World War I and acoustic depth measurement was developed during and after that Great War.

The book is well written, seems to be factually correct from the checking I can do, and carries a slight bias towards Dutch and American examples, though this is understandable given the author's nationality and publisher. Pages from old books, sections of charts and photographs of old instruments are excellently reproduced, in part due to the high quality of paper used.

The book is typical of, and ideal for, museum bookstores that tend to strive to provide concise facts in an informative way. The real aficionado will have to research other books, a sampling of which are provided in the bibliography. I was able to find The Mariners' Museum on the Internet at http://www.mariner.org where contact can be made for the purchase of the book. The Museum has a library to support research, and the Museum itself is well worth the visit. I know, I've been there; I would go back.

David Gray
Ottawa, Ontario


Peter Whitfield's latest work is a historical and visual overview of ocean chart-making over ten centuries. The book is not designed to reveal or put forth any new ideas or theories on the subject of ocean map making but introduces us instead to the history of this fascinating area of cartography.

During the early 1990s we were flooded with an impressive number of large cartographic books coinciding with, or promoting the 500th anniversary of Columbus's New World encounter. Since then the number of more or less similar books has fallen to a trickle. When I first received this book, I expected it to be in the same vein as these earlier works. This was a mistake since this is a much more scholarly book, thorough and truly historical in its approach of the subject.

The cartographic and graphical illustrations scattered throughout its pages are superb. Many famous maps from diverse sources are gathered here; the reproductions are certainly not restricted to unique documents from the British Library but include famous pieces from collections throughout Europe and America. Yet the illustrations do not follow the flow of the adjacent text, and some may find this a distraction or a source of frustration. It should however be understood that this work has a dual function: on one level it is a historical discourse; on another, it is a graphical grouping of related cartographic works. The book is therefore both a serious dissertation on the evolution of ocean cartography and navigation, and a collection of beautiful maritime charts and illustrations to be enjoyed. All maps have their sources indicated for clarity and reference and are accompanied by appropriate and informative explanations. Major and minor landmarks of maritime chart making such as the Pisan chart, the Juan de la Cosa world map, maps by Ribero, Maggiolo, are mentioned and presented in their historical context. Whitfield clearly explains the true historical or cartographic value of each and points out the differences between the decorative world maps, the fantasy-maps and truly functional navigational charts.
After discussing the nature of navigation before the advent of cartography, the author gives us a historical account of the evolution of maritime chart-making in relation to major political, historical events and scientific and mathematical discoveries. As the evolution of chart-making is intertwined with the histories of kingdoms and empires as well as major figures of cartography, a major overview of European history and events is particularly valuable to illustrate the motives and significance of many maps. In this respect, Whitfield presents with ease and clarity major historical events that left their direct or indirect mark on the evolution of navigational chart making. Nor does the historical overview stop with the accurate charts of the nineteenth century. Whitfield continues with a brief account of twentieth-century nautical charting advances.

He also offers us something more than just a history of chart making. He manages as well to give us some understanding about the difficulties navigators experienced and their relationships with the cartographers of different eras. And though his book is based largely on the evolution of European navigation and chart making, it also touches briefly upon navigation and chart making in other civilizations. Whitfield does however argue that the nautical cartographic experience is mostly European centered.

There are no footnotes, but the work is indexed and includes a short bibliography of similar works for further study and reference.

Marc Cormier
Toronto, Ontario


An introduction to this narrative of a voyage around the world by the renowned sailor and author John Rousmaniere (*Fastnet, Force 10*) should be sufficient recommendation for this engaging book of a voyage in those far off days when, despite the looming clouds of war (to use the cliché), life passed at a more leisurely pace and voyaging around the world was a rather more rare adventure them it is today. And though many today are quietly ploughing the world's oceans and seas in search of adventure of freedom or whatever, the headlines often capture the sponsored racing crews or individuals squeezing computerized hulls through God's oceans in search for more speed.

Donald Starr and his crew of eight "pilgrims" sailed with the ebb tide from Boston Harbor on the day of the summer solstice 1932. *Pilgrim* was designed by the famous American designer, John Alden and built in Boothbay Harbor, Maine. Rigged as a schooner she nonetheless carried a yard and squaresail and set a "raffee," a small triangular sail set between the yard and the foremast head ("kites" on square-rigged ships). A number of well-known figures attended her launching, including Warwick Tompkins (of *Wander Bird* fame) and Sterling Hayden who, before becoming an actor, was a Gloucester schoonerman sailing on the great rival of *Bluenose*, the *Gertrude L. Thebaud* and later on Irving Johnson's *Yankee* as first mate. His own account of a circumnavigation aboard *Wanderer* written years later is a classic tale of the sea.

Donald Starr was a cruising man, stated Rousmaniere in his introduction, and *Pilgrim* is Starr's faithfully recorded narrative of an unhurried cruise from Boston south to Panama on through the Panama Canal toward the beckoning islands of the South Pacific. Chapter 14 is titled "Timor Laut, the Banda Islands and Komodo." The log entry for September 12, 12:10 pm reads: "Sighted Timor Laut or Yamdena Island in the Tenimber Group ahead. Apparently we have been set a little to the south. Stowed light mainsail & raffee & straightened things up." This chapter is particularly engaging. The Bandas, then under Dutch administration, were famous for the nutmeg trade as early as the sixteenth century and William Bligh and his eighteen men landed at Kupang on the southern coast of Timor following the mutiny and a remarkable open-boat journey of 3,600 miles. These latitudes mark roughly the halfway point in the voyage. They search for the fierce Komodo dragon on Komodo Island before sailing on to Bali and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) then Singapore, Jakarta, Malacca, Penang, Nicobar Islands and on to Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Once across the Indian
Ocean they entered the Red Sea where they encountered fierce winds as the German steamer *Resolute* passes, "which was flying the Hitler flag on the jack staff forward." Into the Mediterranean winter gales bedevil *Pilgrim* as she surges westward between ports in the eastern and western Mediterranean like a horse galloping for home. On 5 July 1934 *Pilgrim* drops anchor in Boston Harbor, the end of a voyage which Starr described as "some 28,500 miles of days and nights afloat with good companions, threading the channels and ports of strange and friendly waters and lands with no disasters to mar the recollection." (p. v) One might add that the companions included, at various times, a menagerie of a monkey, white rats, a sloth, coati mundi, a tortoise, a cockatoo and four cats. And except for a four-month delay in Panama trying to discover the source of a serious leak which had developed in the Gulf Stream, and the usual engine repairs and maintenance, the passages wend their way amiably unhurried and unflustered.

I do not think this book and the voyage it recounts would have had half the appeal if it were written about a modern-day cruise. At the risk of sounding bad tempered, it would have been filled with glossy photos of places now available by the next charter flight, filled with laments for the once uncluttered places now available by the natives, and *Pilgrim* would be adorned with every technological aid imaginable: there would be no sense of discovery; of distance away! Nostalgia is your companion as you board *Pilgrim* and therein lies much of its charm.

Donald Starr writes simply, but manages on occasions to let fly some stratospheric hyperbole: in Nuku' alofa (Tonga) he exclaims, "We were soon enmeshed in the cordial tentacles of the social octopus." (p. 180) And we may be excused if the occasion that prompted this outburst leaves us baffled: "It is appalling to think of the number of gross misconceptions of pure fact-finding lodgement in the human mind against which not even such tangible and verifiable means of refutation can be brought as the registered identity of a 73-ton schooner." (p. 371) But these idiosyncrasies serve only to spice his prose (he was an attorney), along with log entries and the excerpts from the personal journal of "Hod," the chief engineer. The book includes a glossary "with arcane words and terms unique to a schooner." And the end-papers provide a track of *Pilgrim* around the world. Appendices A, B, and C deal with, respectively, "The Crew of the Schooner *Pilgrim*," "The Making of a Schooner" and "The Pilgrim's Leak." The latter was never completely cured despite four months of intensive investigation in various yards in Panama and which involved removing her copper sheathing no less than twice, and moving from one yard on the Caribbean side to another on the Pacific side to attempt yet again another assault on the source of the leak! *Pilgrim* was sold and in one of her later lives was featured in the August 1937 issue of *The National Geographic*.

As the stock broker would say, this is recommended as a "buy." And by the way, if you don't know where Hiva Oa is — Robert Louis Stevenson called this the "Man Eating Island" — or if you get muddled between the Tuomotus, Tahiti and Tonga, then perhaps you should arm yourself with an atlas and enjoy *Pilgrim*'s progress as she weaves her passage through a time, and places, that we will never see quite the same again.

Geoffrey H. Farmer
St. John's, Newfoundland


In the last years of the Republic there is a brief preliminary to the subject of the admirable book of Drs. Bounegru and Zahariade. Appian records that in the war against Mithridates, Marcus, the brother of the Roman commander Licinius Lucullus invaded the Moesi. Entering the river (the Ister/Danube) where six Greek cities "...are neighbours to the Moesi he took away from [one] Apollonia the big [statue of] Apollo which is set up on the Palatine Hill." Later (35 BC) Octavian approached Moesia from the opposite direction following his invasion of Illyria. Pushing inland through Pannonia, "not yet," Appian says, "under Roman rule," to Siscia, the city of the Segestani on the river Save, he wished to acquire it, "intend-
ing to use it as a supply base against the Dacians and the Bastarnae on the further shore of the Danube/Ister, into which the Save flows." Appian adds that Octavian had ships on the Save which were intended to bring victuals to him on the Danube. Dio describes Octavian's siege of Siscia "which had strong walls but relied chiefly on two navigable rivers the Colops which flows round its walls and the Save into which the Colops flows. Caesar (Octavian) acquired boats built by his local allies; and bringing them down the Ister into the Savus, and up the Savus into the Colops, he attacked the enemy with footsoldiers and boats at the same time and had some naval engagements on the river, the barbarians building boats of single logs." The Pannonians surrendered.

It seems then that as early as the Mithridatic war Rome was interested in Moesia as a future frontier province, and that not long after Octavian saw Pannonia and the Danube in a similar light. However it was not until 10 AD that Roman naval units were posted on the Danube. In the meantime Augustus had established a permanent navy with its two main fleets, at Misenum and Ravenna, the Ravenna fleet providing riverine and maritime support for legions manning the eastern frontier. The epigraphy of the early empire attributed four liburnians, twenty-three triremes, five quadriremes and two quinqueremes to the Ravenna home fleet and to the eastern provinces six liburnians to Alexandria, two to Syria and two to Moesia.

Drs. Bounegru and Zahariade see the creation of the Moesian fleet first (20 BC-10 AD) as accompanying the transformation of the Danube into a frontier, and then as an accomplishment to the formation of Pannonia and Moesia as imperial provinces, the fleet then either under praetorian command from Ravenna or under provincial authority. There is evidence of inscriptions that the names Classis Flavia Moesia (and Classis Flavia Pannonica) were adopted during or after the reign of Vespasian, possibly under Domitian.

The authors in their Introduction underline the importance of the recent excavations in the ports of the lower Danube and in the Crimea, revealing inter alia bricks with the stamp of the Classis Flavia Moesica and of the praetorian Classis Ravennatis. Added to the literary evidence and to the iconography provided by Trajan's Column and representations of merchant ships on the altars and funerary columns found in the Danube delta, the new archaeological material has enabled the authors to put together a unique traité d'ensemble of the Classis Flavia Moesica.

The gratitude of at least one reader may be recorded for making accessible in the French language the substance of so much material published in the languages of eastern Europe.

The authors do not claim to be pioneers, recognising the valuable work that has already been done, even as long as more than three centuries ago by J. Scheffer in his Militia Navaliun, forgotten but not entirely out of date. They mention O. Fiebiger's article in RE under classis as for a long time the sole attempt to face the problems of their subject and also a special chapter in C.G. Starr's The Roman Imperial Navy (1941) as necessary reading for such as now face these problems. They mention favourably more recent writers thereon such as D. Kienast, Em. Condurachi, A. Aricescu, M. Reddé and O. Hockmann.


The book is most useful in bringing up to date, and in adding details of, the picture of the fleet's operations in support, with military aid and supplies, of the imperial legions defending a very wide frontier, from the province of Pannonia to the boundary of Syria, against constant pressure from a number of barbarian nations. The authors detect "phases successives de reorganisation" from the Aurelian pattern (161-180 AD) to Diocletian and the tetrarchy (284-304) and then to the later modifications by Constantine. Their conclusion is that Ravenna continually appointed the praefectus of the Moesian fleet, decided the number and type of the ships and inspected the troops and the ports, while the remaining matters directly concerning the life of the province, the building and maintenance of the port facilities, the recruitment of the manpower required, victualing, immediate intervention when and where danger threatened, transport of troops and supplies, were set on foot by the provincial authority and the fleet commander in collaboration with legates of the legions. The latter might then find themselves in command of small naval squad-
rons. The command post of the whole Moesian fleet was Noviodunum, close to the Danube Delta, but it appears that it was neither efficient nor convenient to keep the whole fleet there, when not in action, and squadrons were accordingly kept at various ports upstream.

The warships of the Moesian fleet were exclusively liburnians, like Mucianus' Black Sea fleet of 69 AD and Trajan's first Dacian fleet in 101-102 A.D., apart from the emperor's flagship. The fact that epigraphy only records two moesian liburnians is no clue to the strength of the fleet which must have been great considering the area of patrol. The names of the two recorded liburnians, Armata and Sagitta, indicate their characteristics. Ships which were "armed" were those equipped with a ram. The name Sagitta indicates qualities of light weight, speed and sharpness. There is no need to suppose (as the authors do) that maritime differed from riverine liburnians. In 47 AD Corbulo brought his triremes up the Rhine through the main channels and the smaller liburnians by a shorter route through creeks and canals; such ships clearly had shallow enough draft to be safe on the Danube. The rest of the fleet consisted of "round ships," horse transports and other onerariae as shown on Trajan's column.

The liburnian ship-name Armata and the name of the Danube ports, Pristes Sexaginta meaning "sixty liburnians armed with rams" imply that there were liburnians without rams. These were probably the type of ship called lusoriae which are known on the Danube and also on the Rhine. They are probably lembi/liburnae which are light, fast (but not sharp), suitable for fleet communication, reconnaissance, and troop transport. Another port name, Ratiaria, appears to have been adopted for the similar reason that it indicates the shipping accommodated there, in this case rates, rafts, which were used for the construction of river bridges.

The many misprints are trivial and do not with three exceptions create problems for the reader. The first exception is on p.46 lines 4-6 where for "asymétrique" read "symétrique," for "prouve" read "proue" and for "proue creuse" read "proue creusé." The second is the word hippago (p.59 l.4) for a horse river-transport. The Latin word is either hippagogus from the Greek or hippocus. The third is the place name Sexaginta Prista and Pristis and in the map captions Sexaginta Pristis and Sexaginti Prista.

The maps present problems. There are two opposite page 1 which are repeated larger on pages 89 and 90. Map 1 had the caption "Ports et bases de la flotte (Classis Flavia Moesica) au Bas Danube et à la Mer Noire aux 1-III siècles" followed by a list of the ports and bases. The caption of Map 2 is similar but centuries are IV-VI and the list of ports and bases is different. In both maps the ports and bases are given the marks either of "supposé" or of "attesté." In Map 1 there are three places numbered 14, 15 and 16 marked as "supposé" but not named in the caption list, though the places are Istria, Tomi and Callatis and they are mentioned in the text, the first very often (see index). The last name in the place list in the caption of Map 1 is Halmyris which appears in the list of bases on p.11 as Murighiol but is only identified as Halmyris on p.36. In Map 2 there is a place numbered 16 (in fact Odessus p.82) but not named in the caption. The river Olt mentioned (p.25) as the eastern boundary of the original Moesia Superior is shown but not named in the maps. Singidunum (modern Belgrade) is also mentioned (p.25) as a port for the fleet but is not named on the maps although covered by them. Charax, which is mentioned six times in the text and in the subject of Fig.29, does not appear in the map (Fig. 25) of the Crimea where it is said to be. (p. 2) These omissions do not diminish the value of the book but they cause the reader frustration which may be avoided in a future edition.

Withholding comment from the generalisation on page 47 is more difficult: "les navires de guerre se distinguaient par le nombre de rangs de rames et de raneurs étant donc monères, dières, trières, tétrères, pentères, hexères et ainsi de suite." There in no evidence in antiquity for warships of only one rank (or file) of oars and oarsmen nor is there evidence of more than three ranks (or files) of oars. The oars in ships of higher denomination than three are rowed by more than one oarsman to some or all of the oars. The monères is a ship with one rank (or file) of oarsmen on each side of the ship "et ainsi de suite" (see my Greek and Roman Oared Warships 1997).

John Morrison
Great Shelford, Cambridge

There is a passage in one of John Wyndham's novels in which two scientists travel together by train. The British Astronomer Royal reads a lurid thriller, his companion a heavy tome. In real life, the choice is not so stark, but finding a book that is engrossing and interesting enough to serve as leisure reading and yet is intellectually satisfying is not easy. Playford's book fits the bill.

That does not mean it is trivial, although the subject lends itself to lurid treatment. In 1711 a VOC treasure ship was wrecked on the barren coast of Western Australia. Playford, then a young man, discovered the wreck site in the early 1950s, and his life-long obsession became the recovery of its immensely valuable cargo and a proper scientific and responsible investigation of the site. Playford is no seeker for personal gain: he is a scientist himself, an eminent geologist. Playford spent much time on his interest. He first visited the site in 1954, was involved in expeditions that year and in 1958, and kept a close interest in other expeditions after that. He worked with the Western Australia Museum Board to help preserve the wreck, and did his best to help recover looted coins and artifacts.

There was a lot to loot. The *Zuytdorp* was carrying around 133 sacks of mainly silver coins. When divers eventually managed to get to the wreck itself in 1964 — or 1967 — they found what came to be known as the "carpet of silver." The uncertainty of dates reflects how the details of what happened at the wreck site were deliberately obscured. Adventurers flouted the Western Australian and then Commonwealth laws on historic wrecks and between 1980 and 1986 the site was comprehensively looted. Very little of the silver has been recovered. Other items from the wreck — in particular guns — were preserved. And more was found on shore — evidently some of the survivors survived for quite a while. They built fires from the wreckage in the hopes of signalling to passing ships. But they were never picked up, and no one knows what happened to them. Even so, in the early nineteenth century, the local Aboriginal population still talked about the wreck and the survivors as though it were a recent event.

This raises many fascinating issues which Playford explores coolly and crisply. The book begins with his own first visit to the wreck site. Two chapters set the scene for the wreck — one on the VOC, which contains an extremely good outline account of the company, the other on the *Zuytdorp* itself, its final voyage and speculation on what happened based on other VOC shipwrecks on the Western Australian coast. The third chapter concerns the identification of the wreck itself, both by "modern" Australians and by their Aboriginal predecessors, whose descendants have been dispossessed of the land in the region. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss early expeditions to the site and the later looting. There are graphic accounts of diving in such dangerous waters and a description, damming in its import, of the relationships between official and amateur marine archeologists and treasure hunters. The last chapter speculates on the possible fate of the survivors, on the basis of what was found on shore and on local Aboriginal legends. Playford carefully describes the controversial theories of Daisy Bates, that shipwrecked or marooned Dutch sailors intermarried with Aborigines, producing a mixed racial stock — still part of the context of political debate in Australia. But he is unconvinced.

This is a well-written, measured book which also conveys the excitement of the people involved in finding a shipwreck of such importance. The maps are excellent and the photographs both technically good — as one would expect from a geologist - and evocative. It is a pleasure to read and provides much food for thought.

Richard Pennell
Parkville, Victoria, Australia


Until the publication of his *Journal* in 1953, Augustus Hervey was known mainly as the probable legitimate husband of the Duchess of Kingston, who was tried for bigamy in a scandal-
uous case. The *Journal* revealed another facet, the dashing naval officer, well connected, resourceful and amorous. Michael Holmes draws heavily on the *Journal*, but points out that it covers only thirteen years. This book attempts to illuminate the other parts of an intriguing career.

Such a treatment of a significant naval figure is always welcome, and much fresh material is presented. There are some faults, however, many of them revolving around the author's sympathy for his subject. Often Hervey's versions of events are accepted to inflate his significance, and his shortcomings are sometimes glossed over. There is an unfortunate sensationalist taint to the subtitle: "a naval Casanova." Obviously one understands a wish to increase sales, but this myth should be disposed of. Hervey did bed numerous women, when on duty in the Mediterranean especially, but his total is, frankly, not that impressive. Indeed as a rich twenty-something aristocrat afflicted with raging hormones, and the leisure accorded a navy captain in peacetime on detached service, one is almost surprised he did not do rather better.

He admits that he chased anything female, fifteen-year-old girls or aging widows, and he frequently paid huge sums for the services of actresses and courtesans. Why any of this is considered either remarkable or deserving of Hervey being described as "one of the most promiscuous men of his age" is not apparent.

That said, his naval career is interesting enough. He came from a prominent Suffolk family, raised to the peerage under Queen Anne and promoted to the Earldom of Bristol under George I, the title Hervey would inherit in 1775. He entered the navy as a typical younger son, the way greased by parental influence. Advancement was delayed by the family's politics but he made Captain in 1746, and his service under Byng in the Mediterranean in the 1739-48 war was creditable. Denied a peacetime command he drifted to the Opposition, and did much to force changes in the 1749 Navy Bill, which did not endear him to the Admiralty. In 1751 he requested a 40-gun ship and was insulted when Lord Anson at the Admiralty only offered a 20-gun frigate. At this point one loses sympathy for Hervey: to offer any ship to a political opponent in peacetime was an act of great generosity, and Hervey should have been grateful. Yet he wanted to refuse because a small ship was beneath his dignity, and also because he was beginning a love affair and did not want to be away. Financial need made him accept, but he continued to despise Anson.

Numerous such examples in Hervey's career make it difficult to share the author's enthusiasm for the subject. In the Mediterranean in 1757 he served under the aging Admiral Osborne, and Saunders (later to carry Wolfe's force to Quebec). Hervey's *Journal* criticizes both for their indolence and lack of imagination, and implies that Hervey supplied most of the good ideas and much of the staff work. Holmes accepts this, and expresses surprise that Saunders could be so useless here, yet so talented at Quebec. That Hervey was exaggerating a trifle never seems to occur as an explanation. It also transpires that much of Hervey's advice involved sending him on independent cruises on enemy coasts. In 1758 he served under Hawke, skilfully commanding the inshore squadron at Brest, though he unfortunately returned to England just two weeks before the Battle of Quiberon Bay.

The *Journal* ends there, and the rest of Hervey's life must be charted from less exciting sources. His remaining war service was creditable: under Rodney's command in the Caribbean he captured St Lucia, and was present at the capture of Havana. Here again the author bubbles over with admiration, comparing Hervey with Marshal Ney, as one of "the bravest of the brave" for standing on his quarterdeck exposed to enemy fire. True, this was very courageous, but hardly uncommon in naval battles.

This was to be his last command. In a peace-time England, Hervey turned to politics, unfortunately joining the Grenville faction which enjoyed just one short bout in office. He shifted his allegiance to Sandwich, and it paid off somewhat with a seat at the Admiralty in 1771. His major contribution here seems to have been a revision of the Guard Ship policy, but he managed to avoid thorny issues like dockyard reform or timber procurement, even though he had been vocal for years on supposed corruption in those areas. This was not a sparkling record, and one suspects advancing age and illness affected his energy. His attendance dropped off at the Board, and finally he resigned in pique at not being promoted to the second position. By then he had succeeded to the Earldom of Bristol upon his brother's death, and
felt a nobleman could not serve under a commoner, as Sandwich proposed. Sandwich was happy to ease him out at that point. Hervey offered to serve in the American War, but in what had become typical fashion he dithered away the chance of a command by constant delays. He died shortly thereafter, having briefly enjoyed the huge income of the Earldom.

How to assess Hervey? This might not be the final book on the subject, but it seems to indicate he was a solid though not brilliant performer. He was prickly, sensuous, arrogant, brave, and given to horrid errors of judgement (such as his hasty marriage). A more balanced book on Hervey is doubtless possible, but future authors might reasonably question if the subject is worth the labour.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario


Before commenting specifically on these books it would be helpful perhaps to say a few words about the *Chatham Pictorial Histories* series of which these are the initial volumes. Under the editorship of Robert Gardiner, who has to his credit the recently completed twelve-volume *History of the Ship* of which he was Series Editor, Chatham Publishing has set about tackling systematically a problem that has been long neglected. In the custody of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, are some 66,000 prints, drawings and paintings, 100,000 plans of ships draughts and a photographic collection of a quarter of a million items. Apart from volumes of illustrations compiled in the 1920s and '30s by the likes of Moore, Bowen, Chatterton and Robinson the archive as a whole in sadly under used and knowledge of its scope largely unrecognised.

Published in association with the NMM, each volume in the first Series presents three hundred high quality reproductions of contemporary prints, paintings and charts from the collection, many published for the first time, supported by authoritative commentaries on the events depicted. As this review is being prepared the third volume, *Nelson Against Napoleon, 1798-1801* is due to appear. *The Campaign of Trafalgar 1803-1805* is scheduled for November 1997 with volumes covering *The Victory of Seapower, 1806-1815* due in the spring of 1998 and *The Naval War of 1812* in the autumn of that year. For those prepared to commit themselves to purchase the five volumes covering the Napoleonic Wars a subscription arrangement is on offer enabling buyers to make a saving of £5 on each volume. On completion of this first batch the reader will have access to fifteen hundred contemporary illustrations focused on a twenty-two year period at the high point of sailing naval history.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged scope of the Museum's collection a weak spot is pictorial material of American origin relating to the Revolution of 1775-1783. To overcome this deficiency a number of leading institutions in the States have contributed examples from their archives.

The text of *Navies and the American Revolution* is arranged in four sections — "The War at Sea and in the Dockyards," "America and the West Indies," "European Waters," and the "East Indies." Within these categories Robert Gardiner, Nicholas Tracy, David Lyon and Roger Morris have contributed background commentaries to events, each of which is illustrated by an average of five plates. Also running through the sections are a series of thematic pieces dealing with such subjects as "Royal Dockyards," "gunpowder," "Supplying the British Army in North America," "Copper Sheathing," and "The Carronade."

Stephen Cumbley joins the panel of experts; otherwise the arrangement of *Fleet Battle and Blockade* is along the same lines with a pattern of commentary and thematic material concentrating on a four-year period when the Royal Navy began
to demonstrate its mastery over the world's oceans. It is perhaps inevitable that in dealing with this period not all the illustrations are new to the reader but that in no way detracts from the overall value of the work.

Each volume concludes with a series of notes by Julian Mannering on artists, printmakers and their techniques. The high quality of the reproductions lend themselves to closer scrutiny with a magnifying glass to bring out some of the finer detail. Captions are clear and include NMM reference numbers for the benefit of those who might wish to call up the originals or purchase photographic copies.

These then are no mere coffee table books but serious works of reference. Success with this first series will surely encourage the publisher to return to the Collection for further compilations. In his preface the Editor draws attention to the fact that an ongoing copying programme has made three-quarters of it available on microfilm. This is welcome news indeed for overseas museums and galleries!

Norman Hurst
Coulsdon, Surrey


In this book, David Lyon presents case studies of sea warfare from 1759 to 1815. He examines selected battles, from Quiberon Bay to the bombardment of Algiers, for lessons in how sea campaigns were waged and what were the essential ingredients to success. Using examples from his chosen actions, along with a scene setting introduction and thoughtful picture captions, he summarizes the many technological, social, strategic and cultural aspects to the sea war of this period.

This is a handsome and deftly written book, aimed at the popular market, but also of some interest to the scholar and knowledgeable naval buff. The very familiar ring of the title does raise the question: "Do we really need another book on sea battles in the Age of Nelson?" Bookshelves in shops and libraries already groan under the weight of titles and subtitles along the line of "the Age of Nelson" and "Nelson's Navy." The market, as stimulated by the likes of Patrick O'Brian, clearly wants these books but given finite publishing resources, one worries that fresh and worthwhile scholarship may be passed by for yet another haul over these well dragged grounds.

In his introduction, Lyon touches the issue of the great and, in other eyes, sometimes dubious elasticity of the term "Age of Nelson." Seldom restricted to Nelson's career, or even his lifetime, the term can be stretched to serve many goals or markets, from the Seven Years' War to the end of the Napoleonic, sometimes to the end of fighting sail and even to the twilight of Royal Navy supremacy. "Remember Nelson" could be used to justify all sorts of things, from rum consumption to rigid traditional doctrine which had little to do with Nelson. Lyon is clear on his definition (from Nelson's birth to the end of the Napoleonic Wars) although he acknowledges that the less marketable term of "Sea Battles in the Age of George III" would perhaps be more accurate.

The appeal to a popular market and readers of sea fiction is clear in this book, with a foreword by Alexander Kent and sprinkled references to authors like C.S. Forester and Patrick O'Brian. Care is taken to introduce naval terminology, avoiding the technical jargon that can so easily make a discussion cryptic. Lyon is not afraid to make interesting present day references, for example comparing Baltic naval stores to Persian Gulf oil.

Not surprisingly, many of the battles cover familiar ground. There is little new in Lyon's conclusion that Nelson's success owed as much to a superb team as his personal brilliance. Lyon does keep his study fresh by looking at less exhaustively discussed actions such as the Danish-Russian oared clash at Svenskund in 1790 along with an interesting exploration of the ships, plans and strikes against Napoleon's invasion preparations.

Perhaps the most rewarding feature of this book, to a knowledgeable reader, is the rich and skillfully utilized visual content. The illustrations are rich, not in large or lavish coffee-table category, but in their variety and skillful interpretation. The book was published in conjunction with
the National Maritime Museum of Greenwich and makes good use of Greenwich's tremendous collection. Vessel plans and models are put to equally good use, for example in the chapter on Flamborough Head, nicely clarifying the issue that *Serapis* was not a frigate. Many contrasting views are offered of a single engagement. They are used not merely to illustrate but to explore the knowledge, style, aims and bias of artists. The tactical discussion is thus enhanced by adding a level of cultural significance to the battles: how they influenced not just the outcome of campaigns but popular and naval culture. Thus, such comments as "Another artist wallowing in the dramatic possibilities of storm, gunfire and wreckage" (p.31) display a lively critical style, not distracted by the grandeur of big battle scenes.

While not the "definitive account" of eighteenth and early nineteenth century naval actions, as promised in the book jacket, Lyon's book succeeds both as a popular introduction and as a refreshing visual examination of this much explored topic.

Dan Conlin
Halifax, Nova Scotia


The literature of maritime and naval history contains one specific branch that this reviewer finds delightful — the history of individual ships — and a word needs to be said here, at the outset of this review, about the genre. Captain Stephen Roskill set the standards in his classic work on HMS *Warspite*. For all the technical details, for all the recounting of the refits, that book portrayed the character and personality of the ship — much like a good biography. A ship history is a superb introduction to naval history generally, and so it is with Anthony Deane's *Agamemnon*.

As a subject of study, *Agamemnon*, has the benefit of association with Lord Nelson, who always referred to her as his favourite ship. This 64-gun ship of the line, of the third rate, "the finest ship I ever sailed in," said Nelson in 1795, seemed, like *Warspite*, always to be in on the action. Thus this book is very much war history, for *Agamemnon* was at the centre of events, at the Battle of the Saintes, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar, the summit of her career. Duties in the West Indies followed, and she was in on the Battle of Santo Domingo. In South American waters she had long service, until she came to grief in Moldanado Bay, off the coast of present-day Uruguay, in 1809. She was nearly constantly on active service for twenty-eight years. This richly told book covers nicely the several encounters and near-scrapes of the ship, and handsomely illustrates the Royal Navy of the era.

Anthony Deane has a personal connection with the history of this great warship. Sir Anthony Deane (1638-1721), King Charles IPs scientific naval architect, was ancestor to the author and flourished almost a century before *Agamemnon* was designed by Sir Thomas Slade, senior surveyor of the Royal Navy. Seven ships were built to the speculations of the ship between 1762 and 1783, *Agamemnon* being the third. As Deane points out, they each had distinctive features and characteristics. The details of the building of *Agamemnon*, at Buckler's Hard, her launch, fitting out, and maiden voyage are provided. So are details of the wooden world of her times.

The story of *Agamemnon* in relation to South American history is especially welcome, for the record of Royal Navy history in Latin American waters has not been fully told and remains underappreciated. The author does not explain specifically how the *Agamemnon* came to be sent to South America. However, it seems clear that this was part of a general naval buildup to provide security to the Portuguese royal family, which arrived in Rio de Janeiro early in 1808. The waters of South America were then incompletely surveyed, and the perils both ashore and afloat were many. With the Royal Navy as guarantor of Brazil's independence, quarterdeck diplomacy was important to Whitehall's policies. More could have been made of this aspect of this ship's history which is otherwise superb, and a great credit to author and publisher.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario

The River Plate is best known in British history as the site of the December 1939 battle which led to the dramatic scuttling of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee. At the height of the Napoleonic wars, however, the River Plate was the area of a much longer but little-known and certainly less successful campaign. Between late March 1806 and January 1808, units of the Royal Navy participated in five amphibious landings and in assaults upon Buenos Aires, Moldanado and Montevideo. Buenos Aires was captured in June 1806 only to be lost to a popular uprising in August. Moldanado and Montevideo fell to the British but a final grand assault on Buenos Aires was defeated. British forces withdrew from the River Plate in January 1808.

Overshadowed by the battle of Trafalgar, and by events on the European continent, such operations are seldom mentioned in the standard histories of the Napoleonic wars. This 135th volume of the Navy Records Society publications is a welcome collection of documents which serve to remind us that although the great fleet battles have received almost all the glory and attention, the Royal Navy's functions for most of the war were to disrupt enemy trade and to convoy troops to amphibious landings in which sailors often fought alongside soldiers. It is probably true to say that most sailors of the Royal Navy participated to some degree in amphibious operations during the long wars with Spain and France in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The great Nelson had taken part in the invasion of Nicaragua in 1780 and lost his right eye at the siege of Calvi in 1794. None of these operations utilized large numbers of men. At a time when casualties in a European land battle such as Austerlitz numbered at least 100,000 men, the attacks in the River Plate area involved at most 15,000 British soldiers and sailors. Major-General Beresford captured Buenos Aires in two days with a mixed force of just 1,500 soldiers, marines and seamen.

A fine introductory essay by the editor, John Grainger, puts the River Plate operations in the contexts of both the global war against Napoleon and the struggles for independence in South America. Conceived by Sir Home Popham, naval commander at the Cape of Good Hope, and entered upon without authorization from London, the campaign, although minor in itself, had important consequences. One of Popham's objectives was to open up new markets for British goods. Like so many Englishmen at the time, Commodore Popham believed that free trade would bring prosperity to the region and reconcile the local population to British rule. He was sadly mistaken. An unlooked-for result of the expedition was to spark not only local resistance to the British but the popular uprising against Spain. The apparent unwillingness of the Spanish Vice-roy to defend Buenos Aires, the ouster of the British by local forces and their successful defence of the city against the second British assault, combined with the British capture of Montevideo, removed all legitimacy from Spanish authority and stimulated the revolt which led by 1810 to independence.

The events of the campaign are documented in valuable detail. Inevitably, most of the documents are the official accounts of the leading British participants, Commodore Popham, Rear Admiral Stirling who replaced Popham in December 1806, and members of the government. However, a significant number are taken from the letters, diaries and memoirs of junior officers and provide illuminating details of events from a very different perspective. Unfortunately, Grainger has been unable to find any accounts from the lower deck. Sensibly, overall, the book does not follow a purely chronological pattern; this would have added confusion to an already complex collection of material. The documents are arranged according to commander (Popham, Stirling, Murray), with the exception of one set on "Reactions and Plans in Britain." Within each section the documents are presented chronologically. In addition, there is a list of relevant British government ministers, two maps, and several pages of brief biographical notes. The result is a remarkably clear picture of the whole operation from the points of view of the government, the commanding officers and the junior commissioned ranks.

In sum, the collection succeeds at two levels. Broadly, it provides an expose of the immense difficulties which had to be surmounted in order
to carry out amphibious operations during the Napoleonic Wars. The haphazard bargaining and bluffing through which Popham collected soldiers and ships for the expedition, the lack of established supply lines or of any sound intelligence about the enemy's strength were far from unique to the River Plate campaign. Closer to earth, or sea, the makeshift way in which such operations had to be carried out, and their results, is shown in fascinating detail. John Grainger has provided a volume which meets fully the high standards of the Navy Records Society's publications.

Gerald Jordan
Toronto, Ontario


This book is the biography of an American naval officer who, despite playing a major role in the Civil War, did not reach the highest rank. Phelps received little recognition in his lifetime and, until now, had been neglected both by his own service and by historians of the Mississippi campaigns. In *Ironclad Captain* Jay Slagle allows Phelps to tell his own, very human story.

He grew up, in every sense, in the service, encountering sex, politics, travel and death before he had reached the rank of midshipman. After active coastal and riverine service in the Mexican War Phelps displayed considerable ability on a scientific detachment, before returning to sea. His Civil War began with the evacuation of Norfolk Navy Yard, where he personally set fire to the *Merrimac*. He was then detached to the western rivers, where he found his *forte*. As a dynamic, aggressive and intelligent river warrior Phelps was the moving spirit of the Mississippi campaigns. The four senior officers he served under, Rodgers, Foote, Davis and Porter, relied on him to conduct independent operations, lead the fleet into action, serve as flag captain and take on all the most demanding tasks ashore and afloat.

Bursting with self-confidence Phelps was highly ambitious. His sense of professionalism, sharpened by the Retirement Board of 1855, reflected his own high standards, and his disgust at the poor quality 'passed over' captains who had been returned to the Navy by political influence and sent out to command on the rivers. Too many of them would fail again. These men stood in his way. He did not see the obvious irony that his own career had depended on political patronage from the outset. He had no quarrel with patronage, only with the abuse of the system that produced inefficient officers. Furthermore he was not impressed by the Navy's greatest wartime hero, David Glasgow Farragut, whom he saw at close quarters during the operations around Vicksburg. He considered Farragut to be impulsive and irresolute. By contrast Phelps own combat performance was exemplary. He proved cool under fire, and a dynamic improviser in adversity. Perhaps his finest hour came during the retreat of the disastrous Red River Expedition of 1864, when he had to abandon his own ship, and lead a number of small and weak craft past strong Confederate batteries. Though he had commanded large armoured ships and led squadron operations, he was by then still only a Lieutenant Commander. Disappointed of the promotion that he believed he had earned, Phelps alienated the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, with his incessant lobbying. Once his usefulness on the Mississippi had passed, Welles therefore allowed him to resign his commission and take a highly paid civilian job, nine months before the war ended. This was a curious decision, for Phelps would have been very useful in the river operations that characterised the end game of the war in the East, notably on the James River. He had far more experience of Confederate ironclads and mines than Atlantic coast officers. Instead he made a second career in Pacific coast shipping and trans-isthmian canal projects, before moving into Washington local government and the diplomatic service. He died in 1885, while serving as Minister to Peru.

As a major player in the key naval campaign of the Civil War Phelps was eminently worthy of a well-organised, clear and effective biography. Jay Slagle has done him justice; allowing Phelps to speak for himself gives readers the opportunity to reach their own conclusions. This book is a major addition to the literature on the nineteenth-century United States Navy and the Civil War. *Ironclad Captain* is a credit to the author and the
press. Highly recommended.

Andrew Lambert
London, England


At first glance, the terms, "naval aviation" and "World War I" seem mutually exclusive. "Naval aviation" evokes air-to-air combat over the South Pacific in the 1940s, or modern jets being launched from steam catapults. "World War I" evokes trench warfare, the first generation of U-boats, and of SPADs, Nieuports, and Fokkers in dogfights over the Western Front. Yet, as with so many other aspects of aviation, World War I left its imprint on naval aviation. It is a little-known subject, because there was very little air-to-air combat at sea; it was definitely not the stuff of pulp magazines in the 1920s and 1930s. R.D. Layman's book therefore fills an historical lacuna.

The term "definitive" can and must be applied to this book. Layman thoroughly covers most aspects of naval aviation, including seaplanes, observation balloons, anti-submarine aircraft, zeppelins, and the first attempts at aircraft carrier construction. Most attention is given to the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) of Britain's Royal Navy, for it is of that service that most of the records and documentation has survived. However, Layman gives due tribute to the naval air services of other countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and the United States. All had such air arms, and all are discussed in varying degrees of detail.

The book will delight lovers of World War I aircraft trivia. Aircraft are lovingly dissected and analyzed for technical and operational merits and demerits. Aircraft carrier enthusiasts will enjoy reading about the first attempts at deck-landing aircraft. It is nearly incredible to realize just how far technology took aircraft carriers and naval aviation in a span of some fifty years.

While the geographical focus is on the North Sea, other areas of naval aviation operations have not been slighted: naval air operations in the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign, the Suez Canal, and the hunt for the German cruiser Königsberg in 1915 in German East Africa are all chronicled. The result is a balanced, full account of naval air operations in World War I.

Yet this is not merely an account of operations. The conceptual role of naval aviation in areas such as strategic and tactical offence, aerial combat, aerial reconnaissance, sea lane defence, and attacks on sea lanes are all related herein. It can be seen from Layman's account that the foundations of naval aviation were laid down in World War I, with surprising contemporary application to the problems facing today's maritime strategists. Truly, this book proves that "the more things change, the more they stay the same."

Finally, personalities are also discussed. Admirals are frequently perceived as hide-bound, conservative types resistant to change and innovation. Layman helps dispel that stereotype. He shows that admirals throughout Europe evinced interest in the use of aircraft even before the fighting began in 1914. Indeed, several nations, such as France and Germany, planned aggressive expansion of naval air arms. Those plans were severely disrupted by the outbreak of World War I. Layman does deal objectively with one objection to shipborne aircraft often attributed to admirals — that the oil and gasoline from aircraft dirtied the ships. Layman emphasizes that numerous sailors were washed overboard, and that oil and gasoline dripping on a ship's deck did nothing to improve an already-risky situation. Therefore, the admirals' objection to shipborne aircraft may have had a legitimate basis in crew safety.

The text is accompanied by good photographs and helpful appendices. It is marred slightly by its somewhat textbookish tone and a few maps would have been helpful. But these are small criticisms. This work is recommended for World War I and naval aviation enthusiasts. The cover carries a reproduction of an oil painting depicting a Sopwith Baby floatplane flying near HMS Lion at the German fleet's surrender in 1918; the difference between that image and an F-14 flying near USS Eisenhower in the 1990s is surprisingly small.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado

From the passage of the English Elementary Education Act, 1870, when "national education and social awareness became within the Navy a reality," (p.ix) through to the Falklands war victory, Captain Wells, who joined the Royal Navy in 1929, has traced social change in his service. Any single volume work governing such a topic over a century and twelve years of unprecedented technical and social change must necessarily move quickly. The space given the various time periods is well balanced, but the method of treatment undergoes a subtle change.

For the first sixty years Wells relies heavily on published memoirs, and indeed that offers one of the great strengths of the book. It reintroduces many published accounts which otherwise may have been left unnoticed. Any serious student of social history of the late Victorian navy will be grateful for this departure point. For the period of his own service, Wells introduces his own personal observations and those of his many friends. They are cited in the notes by name "to author" without date. This obviously changes the book from a work of an historian, (but arguably not detached) to that of a participant. Be cognizant of that gradual shift. This introduces the normal difficulties of the bias of the participant. In the six chapters that use personal communications, a total of only five references are to non-commissioned personnel. The continuing importance of class well into the post-war navy, and comparisons of habitability between RN and USN ships are interesting, if not disturbing; more comment from sailors would balance the discussion of class. (The RN emphasis on class gives an interesting sidelight on the RCN mutinies.) A second specific concern may be the result either of bias or sloppy editing. The assertion that RN "lesser flag officers...headed... Canadian embryo naval forces" (p. 136) is of course wrong. Was the RCN lumped with the Australian and New Zealand navies because Wells, representing RN bias, believed it to be true or because the manuscript was not properly edited? Poor editing of fact is obvious in the two dates provided for Wells' joining the navy (January 1939, p. vii; May 1929, p. 151). Poor editing for style erupts periodically.

Wells identifies three major watersheds in the social evolution of the navy: Fisher's tenure as Second Sea Lord; the Geddes Axe, and finally the years of and following Mountbatten's tenure as First Sea Lord. Wells would suggest that only the third period dealt with change satisfactorily. Of the first, when Fisher campaigned for improved education of officers, and interchange-ability of engineering with executive officers, Fisher's own character, the revolutionary nature of much of what he proposed, and the fact that society by comparison had not perceptibly shed any of its class values all worked against success. Thus the status of engineering officers remained a difficult point for years to come. During World War I the RN had expanded with too many permanent personnel, hence the need to cut back with the economies of the ten year rule. Officer ranks were ruthlessly pruned and a two-tiered system for sailors pay was introduced which set the stage for the Invergordon mutinies. Again, change was not handled smoothly. World War II completed the change in society started by the previous war, and the RN was compelled to notice. By contrast with the previous attempts, the arrival of Mountbatten at the Admiralty heralded a more sensitive and sensible approach to change. Family life styles led to shortened foreign deployments. Assistance was now given to families, previously left to fend for themselves if their existence had been acknowledged at all. New weapons and sensor technologies demanded and got a thorough review of the trades structure. Now the navy was prepared to let tradition go in the face of change, as it had not been under Fisher. This assessment is of interest as the considered opinion of a participant, supported by the individuals mentioned in the notes.

Richly illustrated, with a twelve-page detailed chronology, this book can be recommended as a good beginning to a large subject. Remembering that it was written by a man who was almost 80 in the publication year, its shortcomings may be more easily overlooked.

William Glover
London, Ontario

Band of Brothers: Boy Seamen in the Royal Navy 1800-1956 by David Phillipson lends whole new meaning to the term "child labour." The author recounts his juvenile days spent shortly after World War II at HMS Ganges, the Royal Navy's principal boys' training establishment at Shotley Point near Ipswich on the Suffolk coast, and indeed, the first of the "stone-frigates," for it opened its doors in October 1905. Phillipson characterizes Ganges as a "Victorian time-capsule embedded in the post-atomic Royal Navy," for the treatment accorded boys by the Royal Navy even in the mid-1950s differed little from that meted out in 1914 or 1790.

Of course, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, people took for granted that ten- or twelve-year-olds, mere children, would leave home to go to sea. Boys began work in rural communities at that age. Anyway, a seaman needed to start young to literally "learn the ropes." In the mid-eighteenth century no such rating as "boy" existed in the Royal or merchant navies. Boys aged from nine to seventeen were entered on a ship's books as "servants," a misleading word. They served not as domestics, but as apprentice seamen. Frequently boy volunteers consisted of unwanted children, waifs, runaways, strays (but not juvenile criminals). Not all boys volunteered. A ten-year-old might be safe from the press-gang, but any lads much older were not. Ship's officers often ordered brutal punishment, "cuts" or caning, usually six or twelve strokes — sometimes in two installments — for the most trivial offences. The boy, strapped down, bound hand and foot with trousers down, would be beaten by a seaman with all the strength and venom he could muster. The boy's bottom after twelve strokes resembled raw beef, and crew members would have to carry him to sick bay for attention. When peace finally arrived in Europe in 1815, impressment in the Royal Navy ceased, but flogging persisted.

Some older boys worked aloft on the highest yards. Occasionally these "upperyardmen" died from falls, an occupational hazard for all seamen. The Admiralty enjoined that all boys should be exercised in bending and reefing sails daily. Naval seamen manned guns when battle offered, and officers detailed one or two boys to each gun. Boys carried powder from the magazine, collected cartridges in lidded pouches and ran with them to their respective guns. Often gunpowder would ignite from flying sparks, red-hot shot or flashback from gun breeches, inflicting frightful burns on the boys. However running from their quarters meant certain death at the hands of their officers; most boys made the best of a hazardous situation and fought bravely and cheerfully.

Although Phillipson did not join Ganges until January 1947, sweeping social and political changes during the first half of the twentieth century, plus two world wars, had exercised little or no influence on the British Admiralty's philosophy of indoctrination and training of its boy entrants. Meals had changed little. The average naval cook could be "relied upon to ruin good food." Ganges sausages "came to us pale and all but raw, like swollen fingers of a corpse, though generally likened to another part of cadaver's anatomy by the ungrateful recipients."

Typically many boys, separated from home and parents for the first time, hated Shotley. They found it hard to come to terms with Naval routine. Phillipson's drill instructor one day in a rage flung a rifle at a hapless lad, who fumbled the catch. The muzzle smashed the boy in the mouth, cutting his lip. Tears welled in the boy's eyes and trickled down his cheeks. The instructor, a bit nonplused, muttered: "All right, son, all right — no call for that. Remember the more you cry the less you piss!" After forty weeks of instruction under that "kindly" drill instructor's tutelage, Phillipson went to sea in December 1947 in HMS Ulster, a destroyer of the Boys' Training Flotilla based at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth.

Not until 1 April 1956 did the Admiralty finally abolish the rating of "boy" in the Royal Navy, thus ending three centuries of tradition. Juvenile recruitment virtually ceased, and Shotley closed in 1973. Other sweeping changes took place in the service at large. The Navy abolished the rum ration, and consigned Jack Tar's hammock to history; living space aboard now included bunks. Phillipson performs yeoman service in tracing Band of Brothers' three-centuries-old tradition and richly embroidering it with colorful personal recollections. He finds one

This account of a thirty-nine-year career in the Royal Navy begins when the author, as a six-year-old boy, fell under the navy's spell while standing on the jetty in Boulogne staring at the sleek lines and sinister power of a British destroyer lying alongside. His aunt saw this excess of boyish enthusiasm as a simple case of his having "bats in his belfry," but his mother was closer to the mark. "Not bats," she replied. "Seagulls!" Seven years later, after surviving the ordeal of the entrance exams and personal interview, he passed into the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, as a naval cadet, age thirteen.

Cadet training at Dartmouth was a mixture of academic studies, practical seamanship and engineering, all focused on the day when the aspiring naval officer would join the Fleet. Yet mastery of these subjects was only part of the curriculum. The overriding objective of the system was to instil in the cadets the precept of instant, precise and unquestioning obedience; a brutal discipline, totally unacceptable by today's standards, but hallowed by generations of practice, was enforced by senior cadets and cadet captains as the means to accomplish this end. Accompanying this and related to it was the concept of "duty" which, according to Nelson's dictum, was "the great business of a sea officer." The inculcation of these precepts begun at Dartmouth continued in the training cruiser and the Fleet which the young naval officer first joined as a midshipman. Anderson's account of his experiences shows vividly the way these precepts were developed in the practice of his day. For example, a sense of duty was indelibly impressed upon him when, as a midshipman in charge of the pinnace coming back wet, cold and tired from a late run, he let his coxswain take the boat to the boom while he flopped exhausted into his hammock. He was sent for the next day by the Snotties' Nurse who told him in no uncertain terms: "You will carry out any duty, at any time, to the best of your ability, until it is completed and, if necessary, at the cost of your life." That was the standard to which the British naval officer was trained.

These principles guided Anderson's career until his retirement in 1969. During the war he served in Motor Torpedo Boats in the Channel and the Mediterranean, in a sloop in the Atlantic and a destroyer on East Coast convoys where he obtained his first command. After VE Day he was sent to the East Indies, and in 1945 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence in Occupied Germany. He later commanded HMS *Contest*, served as the Commander of the Royal Naval Barracks, Devonport, and as Staff Officer (Plans) to the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, DC. He was Head of Section 2 of the Naval Intelligence Division during the Suez Crisis, and later became Commander of the Naval Air Station at Yeovilton and Naval Attache at Bonn. He ended his career with promotion to rear-admiral and as appointment as Flag Officer, Admiralty Interview Board responsible for the selection of future naval officers.

Anderson enjoyed a varied and interesting career which he fleshes out here in a series of personal anecdotes related with humor and affection against an historical background just sufficient to establish a context for reminiscences. He relates the influence of the Fisher reforms at the turn of the century which in fact created the navy he entered in 1930. He describes the effects of post-war reductions between 1919-1933, and the state of the Royal Navy at the outbreak of the war in 1939. He comments on the effects of the creation of the Post and General Lists which effectively shut off opportunities for command to many officers and proved shattering to morale with serious consequences in the recruitment of Junior officers. In short, Anderson had told an interesting story very well. His book is bound to interest anyone who seeks a personal account of the navy before and after World War II, and, of course, it is the personal account which adds realism and balance to historical analysis.

Vice-Admiral McGeoch has responded to critics of Lord Louis Mountbatten by firmly removing the principal warts they claim to have identified. In McGeoch's opinion Philip Ziegler, the highly acclaimed biographer of Mountbatten, just doesn't know enough about the old navy. Only born in 1929, and not a professional sailor, "Ziegler's judgement of Lord Louis' professional competence as a captain of destroyers is hopelessly adrift." (p. 52) But wait, did not Ziegler arrive at his judgement on the evidence of Mountbatten's professional colleagues and superiors at the time? Indeed he did, and according to Ian McGeoch their judgement was either clouded by envy, or suspicion of the popular and charismatic Lord Louis, or they were themselves unqualified to judge because they were out of date and of limited ability. The officer principally singled out for that assessment is Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, the victor of Matapan and ultimately the First Sea Lord, held in high regard at the time but not, apparently, by admirers of Mountbatten.

The brilliant young Mountbatten as Chief of Combined Operations, according to this account, achieved all his aims. That astonishing revelation depends on some careful reassessment of events. Having inherited a most unsatisfactory organisation from Sir Roger Keyes, Mountbatten, says the author, made it thoroughly professional, and was responsible for developing the techniques that made the Allied invasion of Europe possible in 1944. McGeoch, in other words, accepts Mountbatten's own version of events. Thus Dieppe, "admittedly at a fearful cost," showed that this was not the way to carry out an assault landing. McGeoch rejects Brian Loring Villa's arguments in *Unauthorised Action*, which accused Mountbatten of authorising Operation JUBILEE without Cabinet authority, on the grounds that in this first book by someone who is not a military historian, all the evidence has been selected to prove a tentative hypothesis.

McGeoch deals too cavalierly with Villa, and fails to come to terms with the primary sources that have served Villa well. Moreover, he glosses over the fact that Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay had more to do with the development of combined operations than Mountbatten. In 1944 Ramsay drafted a letter to Cyril Falls, who had stated in the *Times* that Dieppe "proved to be the source from which almost every lesson affecting future operations...was derived." He did not think that Falls really believed that, and after careful consideration of every "lesson" said to have been learned, pointed out that "It was not until they [amphibious operations] were removed and placed under service ministries and planned and carried out under their direction that sanity prevailed. Dieppe was a tragedy and the cause may be attributed to the fact that it was planned by inexperienced enthusiasts. Because as was only to be expected some rather elementary mistakes were made, it is claimed that valuable lessons were learned." (Churchill Archives, RMSY 8/21).

McGeoch also takes on those who would criticise Mountbattten's performance as Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia. That the American General Stillwell did not get along with Lord Louis, and the feeling in many quarters that Mountbatten was not the man for the job, are acknowledged. Here, however, there is less for the apologist to challenge. McGeoch reflects the opinion of most observers that Mountbatten carried out his functions skillfully. His further service as Viceroy and Governor General of India also receives appropriate complimentary treatment. "For a Rear Admiral aged just 48, it was a shore job somewhat above and beyond the call of duty," writes McGeoch. A nice understatement.

Mountbatten's return to the navy, where he served as Fourth Sea Lord, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and First Sea Lord, was propitious. He proved to be a superb administrator and negotiator, an astute planner and, as always, very good on public relations. His elevation in 1959 to Chief of the Defence Staff allowed him to deploy all these qualities.

McGeoch claims to have disposed of the criticisms directed towards Mountbatten. In my view he has not done so with respect to his handling of a destroyer flotilla nor the Dieppe raid. A man of lesser stature would not have emerged with his career unscathed from these episodes. His intelligence and his undoubted ability to inspire loyalty are beyond question, and these qualities had a lot to do with his ability to survive such disasters. So did his genius for public rela-
tions. True, he had laid the foundations of a brilliant naval career with outstanding course results and a talent for technical innovation. He had also built up a watertight insurance policy by his extraordinary personal life-long campaign, strongly supported by his wife Edwina, and trading on his royal connections, to become accepted and remarkably well known in every corner of society on both sides of the Atlantic. The particularly tragic manner of his death, at the hands of an Irish terrorist, underlined the indivisibility of his private and public persona.

With these observations in mind, *The Princely Sailor* is well written, informative and entertaining; it should stir up a few lively discussions.

W. A. B. Douglas

Ottawa, Ontario


This is a good book and a good read! The authors and editors have put together a fine volume to complete the naval trilogy beginning with *The RCN in Retrospect* (1982) and *The RCN in Transition* (1988). The editors give proper credit to Maritime Command, the Naval Officers' Association of Canada, the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, and the Pacific and Maritime Strategic Studies Group at the University of Victoria, for funding publication.

The book is a collection of the papers presented at the Fleet Historical Conference which took place at the Maritime Warfare School in Halifax in October 1993 (I was greatly privileged to participate in that conference as a panel moderator). Together they explore many facets of Canadian naval identity.

Foreigners are mystified and puzzled by the Great Canadian Quest for identity. They are mystified because they find it easy to recognize Canadians, and they are puzzled by our preoccupation in searching for something so obvious to them. Professor Michael Howard, strategist, and the British guest mildly mis-quoted in the introduction of the book, who happened to be in town for the conference, actually said: "If you find this Canadian naval identity, what are you going to do with it?" Good question.

Canadians tend to use the word "identity" to mean the collection of myths, images, lore and stories that make up their soul, whether national, naval or whatever. The trouble may be that our myths have too many sources for us to handle collectively. The trilogy of which *A Nation's Navy* is part, as well as the outpouring of excellent Canadian naval books over the past few years, helps greatly to build our collective soul.

The Australian naval historian James Goldrick comes right to the point by asking: "[has] either [the Australian or Canadian Navy] emerged as a truly national entity or simply as a construct of an alien culture?" He says that the critical requirement for any navy is a capability to conduct war at sea, so that some distinction must be drawn between elements alien to the national culture because they impose unnecessarily different values, and elements unique because they are integral to naval efficiency. That is, navies can be different from other organizations in a nation state, and should be different to the extent required to work well.

Three chapters, by William Glover, Graeme Tweedie and Siobhan McNaught, provide an excellent analysis of Canadian naval origins. The birth-pangs of the Navy reflect the turmoil which had been roiling, according to Tweedie, since well before Confederation, about Canada's place in the world and in the Empire. Siobhan McNaught points out: "Concern about maritime security was only one issue. At least as important were questions about Canada's freedom of action and responsibilities with respect to Great Britain." Glover reminds us that the Fisheries Protection Service was fashioned by Laurier to advance Canadian interests that were in conflict with those of the United States, intending that it should evolve into a Canadian Navy. By 1904, Marine and Fisheries was the largest department of government and the service was equipped with modern ships. Britain did not support the principle of local navies, preferring to improve Anglo-American relations, but by 1910, having pulled the Royal Navy back to its home waters to counter the increasingly powerful German Navy, Britain had become keen on full-fledged domin-
ion navies, and the Royal Canadian Navy staggered into existence, Canadian all right, but not entirely certain what that meant. There was general agreement amongst all political parties that Canada's interests lay in being part of the Empire, but the manner in which Canada should serve the Empire was fiercely debated.

If there is a fault in the book, it is that it assumes that the Navy as it evolved lost touch with the society in which it lived, that its Canadianism was a sham, and in particular that its officers consisted of closet Brits. In fact there were a lot of dedicated imperialists in Canada until the early fifties, as evidenced by the extraordinary way Canadians flocked to the colours to defend the mother country in two world wars, and they felt themselves none the less Canadian for being happy and passionate Imperialists. After all, the Statute of Westminster was enacted only seven years before World War II and a Canadian flag, in 1967.

Canadian society was indeed evolving away from the Empire, in common with the rest of the Empire, but it is quite wrong to judge the early officers of the Navy as non-Canadian. Brooke Claxton said (quoted by Glover): "I had convincing evidence that the senior officers of the Navy, just as the senior members of the Conservative party, were away out of line with Canadian sentiment..." Perhaps not non-Canadian so much as non-Liberal!

However, as Glover points out, by 1949 the Navy needed to draw up a new social contract between officers and men. This was accomplished in a very Canadian way, through a Commission of Inquiry into incidents which had taken place in ships. The resulting Mainguy Report, named for its Chairman, was a model of rapid action which might well be examined with profit today. The last incident into which it inquired occurred on 15 March 1949, and the report was delivered in October 1949. It remains the basis for the leader-led relationship in the Canadian Navy to this day.

The other chapters all add breadth to the book. Marc Milner, Michael Hadley and Fred Crickard are stage setters. Catherine Allan's fascinating account of the Canadian Naval Operational Intelligence Centre, Jan Drent's excellent paper on "A Good Workable Little Fleet" which reveals how Admirals Harold Grant, Nelson Lay, and Frank Houghton, all in positions to design the ships and equipment of the modern Navy, succeeded in doing so, all show scenes of the evolving navy. Bernard Ransom, David Zimmerman, William March's "Evolution of HMCS Royal Roads," and Serge Bernier's "The Navy's First French-Language Unit" fill out the people picture.

Finally James Goldrick's "Comparison of the Australian and Canadian Naval Experience" and James Kiras' "the Maritime Command, National Missions, and Naval Identity" look to the future while Vice Admiral Peter Cairns' "Points of Departure: Towards the Next Forty Years," is a summation of the conference which he had convened as Maritime Commander.

The RCN was firmly Canadian when it began in 1910, but in common with the rest of Canadian society, was not quite sure what that meant. Clearly it knows what and who it is today. We can be proud that it serves this country so well, and dare to hope that it continues to do so. This book is essential to any good naval library.

D.N. Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario


Few tasks are as daunting as being asked to select roughly five hundred photographs depicting naval warfare during World War II for a special compilation. No matter how hard one tries, getting a combination that manages to please everyone is almost impossible. Nonetheless, photo essay works are relatively popular with history buffs and publishers alike.

The editor of this volume, Paul Kemp, is with the Imperial War Museum's Department of Photographs. As such, he has been able to provide us with an excellent selection of images and a very well organized volume. The photographs are presented in eleven defined sections, covering virtually every naval aspect of the war. Given the constraints with which he had to work, Kemp has managed to include prints that provide a revealing glimpse of both sides of the fence. One example of this are the images of Axis warships on convoy
duty. The portraits of commanders from some of the various major navies makes another interesting touch. Strangely, only one officer from the Imperial Japanese Navy and none from the Russian and Italian fleets are depicted. No one, however, can argue against the individual officers who are portrayed.

Each section is accompanied by a descriptive though general account that gives some background on the events in that sphere of conflict. The actual text is perhaps the weakest element in the volume, in part because it is lacking in detailed analysis and investigation. For some inexplicable reason, the publisher chose to use a relatively large print for the text. This reinforces the feeling that something is missing, and creates the impression that the publisher deliberately restricted the word count for the volume. Clearly, the photographs are the focus of the work, but readers would benefit from a more detailed discussion of the events themselves.

As in other works of this type, the images included are a mix of well known and other less frequently published photographs. While they bear the mark of careful selection, the publisher's layout has deprived them of some of their impact. Many of the photographs cross over the spine of the volume. At least equally disappointing is the decision to use lower grade paper instead of the coated type usually employed in this type of work. This tends to dull the image, and de-emphasize the impact of the pictures. Researchers and writers will be further disappointed to learn that none of the photographs are accredited. This means that the publisher has in essence given us the equivalent of winning lottery numbers, without advising where or how to claim the prize. This shortcoming is further compounded by the complete lack of reference to the archives and private collections that were consulted.

Despite these minor irritants, most readers with an avid interest in wartime photographs and naval history should benefit from this work. It offers a good cross-section of images depicting most aspects of naval conflict during World War II, and this is exactly what it set out to do. In short, this is one book that you should acquire for the photographs, not the text.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Point Claire, Québec


Two quite distinct U-boat books have been launched by the US Naval Institute Press into what many might think is an already glutted market: one an old salt's recycled memoirs (as told to a British writer), the second a thoughtful analysis and critique by an American historian. Both are well worth reading and make valuable contributions to literature on German submarines. Unfortunately for the memoir, however, the cover design projects a false image: "Hirschfeld" writ large in gothic letters over a "teutonic" painting of a statuesquely profiled German sailor, steely-eyed rambo-zambo gaze reaching into the distance, jugernaut-jaw jutting defiantly against the dangers of the sea and the violence of the enemy. And beneath it all a stylized U-boat knifing through daunting seas with Nazi banner unfurled. Here, surely, is he-man stuff. Was it perhaps this ugly image from the past that made the British writer confess awkwardly in the preface that "I depart from the tradition of apologizing when introducing the personal account of a German serviceman of the Hitler period."? It is a rather odd statement, given that no such tradition of apology exists. Nor should it.

Fortunately, the Hirschfeld whom readers have come to know in his original editions — *Feindfahrten: Das Logbuch eines U-Bootfahrers* (Wien: Paul Neff Verlag, 1982) and *Das letzte Boot — Atlantik Farewell* (Munchen: Universitas Verlag, 1989) — is neither the political dinosaur the cover of the American edition proclaims, nor the inflated hero. He was, to quote the German expression he once used of himself, but a "little sausage" (*ein Wurstcheri*) in the midst of large-scale events. Therein lies the special virtue of his
books. They are as unique as the memoir of Ernst Kaiser, the lower-deck writer who preceded him with *QXP* - *ein U-Boot auf Feindfahrt* (Herford: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1981). Most naval memoirs have been written by officers and former officers, and leave us in little doubt about how battles were won and discipline maintained — at least from the upper-deck perspective. The lower-deck perspective is at once more narrowly focussed, down-to earth and sometimes whimsically ironic. Between these two worlds lies the realm of the lower-deck communicator: aware of the signal and cypher traffic, of the relationships among officers, and the command links between ships, packs, and shore commands.

Hirschfeld's originals, like the American composite, are well-narrated accounts of the experience of a wireless operator, based on his wartime notes — the "log book" of the German title. He served six war patrols in U-109, and then, on promotion to Warrant Officer, aboard the larger, and more famous, snorkel-equipped U-234 which was allegedly carrying uranium oxide ore to Japan when it surrendered to the USS *Sutton*. It is clear that Hirschfeld experienced much. What we miss, however, is any indication of what the experience actually meant, and of how he deals with the record of German history.

For reflections about meaning and value we turn to Jordan Vause's *Wolf: U-Boat Commanders in World War II*. Concerned about the prevalence of stereotypes, particularly the wartime propaganda and 'Hollywood' image of the U-boat skipper that still survives despite postwar analyses, Vause sets out to humanize them. By providing a series of engaging portraits — for example, of Victor Oehrn, Wolfgang Liith and Jürgen Oesten — Vause achieves a balanced and persuasive account. Specialists will already be familiar with Liith, especially in light of Vause's pioneering biography of the man. But they will gain new and refreshing insights into such relatively obscure men (on the book-market) as Oehrn, who was one of Grand Admiral Dönitz's most important planning officers, and Oesten, Knight's Cross winner and skipper of U-61, U-106, and U-861. These are by no means of arcane interest, but broadly relevant to submarine history.

Vause writes with an easy flair that permits one to read his book — as I did — in virtually a single sitting. Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the text are the narrative portraits of the man who is more responsible than any other submariner or archivist for preserving the U-boat record: Horst Bredow, director of the U-Boot Archiv in Cuxhaven-Altenbruch. A former U-boat officer, Bredow survived the perils of submarine warfare and on pondering the grace of survival devoted all his human and financial resources to founding the Archives he continues to manage almost single-handedly. It provides incomparably valuable resources to researchers, while marking rites of passage for aging veterans. Vause's portraits of Bredow both introduce and conclude this volume, thus providing a vivid frame-work that quite properly evokes the intangible aspects of image and meaning that can either uplift, haunt, or obsess.

When drawing his conclusions together at the end of a long reflective journey through biographies of command Vause astutely observes: "no two commanders were the same and it was a futile exercise to force them into a single class with a common image." While recognizing the role of "even false" images in uplifting and inspiring a culture, he cautions that "false images can also burden people...with reputations they do not deserve." (p.224) In attempting to rehabilitate his skippers from the distortions of propaganda and popular lore, Vause has engaged himself in a moral undertaking. Yet he is wise enough to recognize the pervasiveness of ambiguity and leave us to our own thoughts about public image and historical truth.

The market for U-boat books and film never seems to have reached the saturation point. The theme has such a grip on the imagination that we can expect more. At least two film companies have documentaries in mind, and a commercial press is preparing an anthology about 'second-string' skippers not otherwise featured in monographs. When, one wonders, will either reviewer or author borrow an expression from matelot Ernst Kaiser's book-title of 1981 and sign "QXP" at the end of his script? That was, after all, how German communicators keyed off their message: end of transmission.' But whoever reads it, won't really believe it is true.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia

Operation Neptune, the naval side of the invasion of Europe in June 1944, was so vast an undertaking and the expected interference of the Kriegsmarine so anti-climactic that good books on the subject are hard to find. James Foster Tent helps fill that gap in a most satisfactory manner with this book on the best weapon the Germans had to interfere with Operation Neptune: that superb product of German technology, the E-boat.

Tent opens with the Lyme Bay Disaster on the night of 28 April 1944, a scant forty days before D-Day, when German E-boats (or officially *Schnellboote*) paid a lightning visit to the English shore of the Channel, savaged a convoy of valuable LSTs, sinking two, seriously damaging a third and costing 749 US combat engineers and sailors their lives. The convoy was escorted by a Flower-class corvette, its destroyer escort having failed to appear. Tent describes the Allied reaction, including the temporary disagreement among senior officers, before the decision was finally made to request the help of RAF Bomber Command. There is a brief but effective section on the history of Bomber Command, followed by a description of 617 Squadron and the technology of strategic bombing. Tent's narrative includes the career of Barnes Wallace and his efforts to develop the 12,000-pound Tall-boy bomb, which became the chosen instrument for the destruction of the E-boats and their concrete pens.

D-Day intervened before the attack was launched. Tent recounts the events of that day, and the limited German reaction to the invasion, including the part played by the E-boat flotillas and the difficulties under which they performed. Not until June 14 was the RAF ready for a massive assault on Le Havre, which had become the main E-boat base once Cherbourg became threatened by American ground forces. The process of photo reconnaissance, photo interpretation, ULTRA decryptions and plain good luck which spelt the end of the E-boat flotillas as an effective force in the English Channel are all described. The retreat of the few remaining E-boats to Holland and Norway completes the rarely told story of cooperation between coastal forces and Bomber Command.

Tent winds up his story with an analysis of the dangers posed to the invasion by the E-boats. Elsewhere in his book, he also gives a brief description of coastal forces and their development from 1866 through the British CMBs of World War I and on to the 1920s and the design process which resulted in the diesel-powered E-boat. There is no question that the E-boats were a superb weapon, miles ahead of any similar weapon on the Allied side. Ironically, it may have been too good; its high diesel engines were exceedingly sensitive with an average service life of 400 hours. Moreover, the German builders faced enormous difficulties in meeting the Kriegsmarine standards for scarce materials. It was partly for this reason that there were only thirty-four E-boats in the Channel on D-Day. Finally, politics in the Nazi court diminished the effectiveness of this weapon.

*E-Boat Alert* is an exceptionally well-researched book, to judge by the extensive notes and list of sources. Yet it is also a good, and at times exciting, read that is highly recommended. I cannot close without pointing out one error that slipped by either the author or his editor. HMS *Scimitar*, the missing escort that night in Lyme Bay, was of World War I vintage all right, but she was one of the Admiralty "S" Class, built at Clydebank, and not an old four-stack destroyer. She sank a U-boat in 1941.

David Fry
Toronto, Ontario


Fortunately for those not involved in the planning and design of the warships used by the Allies during World War II, especially the Canadian Navy (all of whose ships were British designed),
at the end of the war the Director of Naval Construction in London set his various design teams the task of recording their wartime activities and decisions, and the reasons therefor. These reports were never published, but now, in an interesting and useful three-volume series, they are available for scrutiny. This volume covers most of the ships employed by the RCN — all but destroyers and cruisers: corvettes, frigates, various minesweepers, MTBs and MGBs, and Fairmiles. It also describes the decisions related to submarines, sloops, depot ships and Admiralty motor fishing vessels.

It is not a book for the casual reader. But for those interested in the why and wherefor of our warships' selections and designs it makes for a quite fascinating read. Those sailors at sea in these ships often felt that the designers took little cognisance of the needs or even the experiences of the final users. Yet time and again in these pages the design team modified their plans to meet hard-gained experiences which had been reported back. One gets the impression that the user problems often were related to the hard facts that ships were used for purposes, or at least in locations, for which they were not designed — uses demanded by the Admiralty's operations division when the planning of many years before had not envisaged those employments. The corvette was a typical case. Planned for coastal convoy work with an initial crew of twenty-nine (two officers!), they were required, as soon as the U-boat war developed, to serve in mid-Atlantic, with crews of fifty, then up to seventy-four or more. The design team soon appreciated the need for the extended foc's'le, more spacious bridge, even a modification in the flare of the bow to meet heavier seas. As technology advanced, so the designers had to shoe-horn in both equipment and operators: advanced and extra asdic sets and "Hedgehog," augmented anti-aircraft fire power, rocket stowage, and so forth. They were, in fact, very receptive to comments from sea by the users, a heartening realization.

There are many snippets of interesting details: in the crowded corvettes crew stress resulted in a calculated twenty-three per cent lost time; in the frigates this was reduced to an estimated fifteen per cent. The frigates were originally to have had turbine engines; when construction yards were sought it developed that they would be largely built by the corvette builders, whose expertise was with steam triple-expansion, so they settled for that — and a drop of three knots in available speed. The Algerine 'sweepers were innovatively designed to be both fleet sweepers for all types of then-known sweeping and as escorts. For the MTBs, the main problem was the lack of a suitable engine and the strain of high loads moving fast in heavy seas "which had a disastrous effect...suffering frame damage." (p. 86) The Fairmile motor launch was designed for conversion in forty-eight hours from minesweeper to MTB to anti-submarine vessel. The book's sections are filled with such comments, problems faced, and not always resolved. Suitable equipment for planned use was always a difficulty: builders for complicated engines, gun turrets to withstand long exposure to salt water, radar that would fit on small ships, or sets that could be squeezed into whatever room was still available in constricted radio shacks or navigation spaces.

Each class of vessel is described in detail as to estimated requirements, the final design, dimensions, speed, weight, stability measurements, costs and then modifications proposed and made. It is possible to trace developments within each class, and then the more major transformations, such as from Flower Class corvette to frigate to Castle class, and to compare these with the almost ideal sloop design (of which the RCN probably wisely acquired none — they were complicated to build, and required a more experienced crew than we could provide until late in the war). This is an expensive book for its type, but a valuable addition that should resolve some conundrums as to why things were as they were.

Fraser M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


The hidden meaning in the title of this important book is the relentlessly expanding US Fleet during World War II and the inability of certain political forces to arrest its growth - notably the
leaders of the US Army, the US Army Air Forces, and the Office of War Mobilization. Credit (or blame) belonged entirely to Admiral Ernest J. King, the dynamic commander in chief of that Fleet throughout the war whose singular and dogged determination to keep building overcame the opposition. In this apparently revised dissertation Joel R. Davidson has not only revealed a new dimension of that remarkable man's role in the real victory — over the Axis powers — but in so doing has demonstrated the not always held view that the US Navy excelled in wartime political and bureaucratic battles.

Although the author endeavored to focus on the processes by which American leaders determined the scale of naval expansion, the archives of bureaucratic agencies that he milked omitted personalities and therefore actual account of how decisions were made. Thus he has had to infer the thought processes and agendas of the individuals involved. Fortunately, his inferences generally ring true. Particularly revealing is the fact that King's army counterpart, General George C. Marshall, avoided directly challenging King's expansion program largely to preserve unity on the strategy and policy making Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the navy, King resented the fact that a civilian, Undersecretary James V. Forrestal, had charge of procurement of ships and the other tools of war, especially when Forrestal tried to economize on shipbuilding after becoming Secretary in April 1944. Their relationship was icy at best.

But no one in the US government was able to wed the sizes of the armed forces to overall strategy, so that the navy's ship expansion was divorced from strategic planning. Nor were any of the Joint agencies that were created to achieve such unity able to overcome the parochialism of their competing army and navy members. The biggest crisis occurred during 1943-44 when it appeared that manpower seemed to be inadequate for the many new warships (and merchantmen) under construction. The army agreed to place a cap on its size, but the navy refused to do the same. King nevertheless got his way by the end of 1944 and kept construction programs working until three weeks before the war ended. In fact, during 1945 he and Forrestal came together in pressing for new and better ships, not for battle but to comprise a powerful postwar fleet. In this they succeeded.

Davidson faults the government in general and the navy in particular for not creating unified planning organizations for resource allocation and goes so far as to say that more objective leaders could have done better — a position with which he seems uncomfortable, and understandably so. Quantitative yardsticks had been the norm in building all the world's modern navies from the mid-nineteenth century.

The only glaring omission in The Unsinkable Fleet is the aviation component of the US Fleet. Aircraft carriers are treated but naval aircraft only once — in mid-1944. The procurement levels for these were the work of Congressman Carl Vinson and Admiral John H. Towers in 1940-42, and the literature on the subject is ample, including this reviewer's biography of Towers. Davidson, however, gives Vinson his due in supporting King's ship construction programs in 1942 and again in 1944-45. Indeed, a closer look at Vinson might have led Davidson to the very possible conclusion that Vinson was the most objective procurement planner of all.

Clark G. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


This is a carefully selected collection of over one hundred photographs, presumably from the Imperial War Museum in London, mainly of Royal Naval escort vessels, convoys, merchant ships and bomb damage in Liverpool. Each photograph is captioned with a brief and informative explanation.

In the longest and most critical battle of World War II, Britain's resources were strained to the limit. The only way it could carry on was with tremendous amounts of material imported by sea from Canada and the United States. In their effort to break the supply line, the Germans used ships and aircraft, but mainly submarines. The British merchant fleet was the largest in the world, consisting of about 4,500 ships, large and small. When ships sailed independently, the chances of being torpedoed were greatly intensified. On the other hand, when ships sailed in convoys that
were protected by escorts, attacking submarines almost always faced stiff opposition. Convoys of a maximum of seventy ships protected by naval escorts therefore became the pattern. At first the convoys were escorted by a pair of destroyers a few hundred miles into the Atlantic. The destroyers then picked up a UK-bound convoy and escorted it back to port. However, it soon became apparent that escorts were required for the whole of the Atlantic passage.

In early 1941 a Western Approaches Command Center was established in Liverpool in a new headquarters located in a heavily protected waterfront basement under Derby House. Here escort commanders, convoy commodores and ships' masters, all based in the same port, got to know each other.

As the war progressed more escorts, mainly corvettes and frigates, became available and hunter/killer groups of sloops and corvettes were formed to seek out submarines on passage or forming up for wolf pack attacks. Because they were not directly concerned with the safe and timely arrival of convoys, hunter/killers were free to take up the chase of U-boats as they were detected and to hunt them to exhaustion without being confined by time. There are excellent photographs of Captain Walker and his successful ships as well as other ships which also became noted U-boat killers. In contrast to these groups, whose role it was to seek and destroy the enemy, the chief duty of Canadian escort groups was to drive and keep U-boats away from the convoy; they would try to sink attacking submarines only when the opportunity presented itself. Most times they were denied a good hunt, having to hurry back to cover their own protective area near the convoy.

The main western departure point for convoys was Halifax, Nova Scotia while Liverpool became the major eastern terminal with warships based at Gladstone Dock. At Birkenhead nearby, the Canadian destroyers and corvettes first used Greenock as their eastern terminal. In 1941 a splendid safe base for Atlantic escort vessels was established in Londonderry in Northern Ireland. Ship repair facilities in Belfast were used by Canadian ships from time to time. Liverpool, within German bomber range, was very heavily damaged and photographs of the damage appear in this book.

For any historian or naval enthusiast this little book provides a true picture of the life and times of the foremost British port participating in the Battle of the Atlantic.

L.B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


Timothy Dubé and his collaborators at the National Archives have produced a worthy successor to Jerry O'Brien and Glenn Wright's excellent *Sources for the Study of the Second World War* (Public Archives of Canada, 1979).

Like O'Brien and Wright's work, the present survey is organized according to the record groups the National Archives has created for government departments and agencies. Beginning with Record Group 2, the Privy Council Office, there are descriptions of thirty-six record groups, ending with RG 145, the Canada Labour Relations Board. The accounts vary in length from a single paragraph for agencies, like the Canada Relations Board, that had only one or two very specific functions in the war effort, to over twenty pages for the Department of National Defence (RG 24).

The important contribution of the present work is that it goes well beyond the official papers in each group. The bulk of each entry is a description of personal papers, held by the Manuscript Division of the archives, of participants in the activities of the particular department or agency. There are equally full references to the relevant photographs, art, audio tapes, maps, plans and films in the 'sectors' of the archives that specialize in these media. Although one has access to the finding aids for all of the various subdivisions of the archives in the reference room at the main building, it takes considerable knowledge to know where to begin to look among the diverse collections. The present publication goes far in supplying that knowledge. Such a tool is
especially useful in these times when government restraint and the proliferation of records have made it essential that researchers are well grounded before they make demands on the increasingly precious time of archives staff members.

Readers of this journal will not be surprised at the further evidence that Canadian seamen were less likely than soldiers and other landlubbers to keep comprehensive papers. There is however a quite rich selection of personal photograph collections of naval personnel (pp. 21-2) and, to a lesser extent, concerning shipbuilding, (p. 34) Other good news is that several collections of papers and photographs of members of the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service are now available, (pp. 21-2) as are sources in a variety of media for war artists who recorded both naval and shipbuilding activities, (pp. 22, 34)

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


This welcome book is a complete record of every ship lost and every success against enemy warships experienced by the Royal Canadian Navy in World War II. I have been looking forward to its publication for a long time. It must have been in 1994 that Fraser McKee told me that he and Bob Darlington were collecting the material for it. I cheered them on, only guessing at the amount of research necessary! Well, they did it, did it well, and have presented it to us pretty much in accordance with the definition of a "chronicle" they give. Of necessity, there is some analysis and interpretation.) Each chapter and table deserves its own review, but I shall only pick a few for special comment.

Chapter 19, describing the sinking of Ottawa by U-91, is a great story of action, bravery, survival, humour, and a very big "what if?" CNRS member Yogi Jenson, then a Sub-Lieutenant and the ship's gunnery officer, has told how the shore staff intended, when they were last in Londonderry, to fit Type 271 radar before she sailed. For some reason, the Captain countermanded this, and so Ottawa sailed on her last operation with the inadequate set she had. (The full story is told in TNM/LMN II, No. 2) What if Type 271 had been fitted? Would Ottawa have detected U-91 - presumably on the surface as was their habit - when encountering the approaching relief destroyers? Yogi, I know, says "Yes."

Chapters 21 and 22 relate good anti-submarine actions by two corvettes in the Mediterranean in early 1943. In the first case, Ville de Québec brought a U-boat to the surface with an accurate urgent attack, then sank her by ramming. About a week later, Port Arthur, after a good deliberate attack, forced the Italian submarine Tritone to the surface in obvious difficulties. Helped by some gunfire from an accompanying escort, she, too, was sunk. It is worth noting that this period is usually reckoned as one when our Navy's stock was selling a little low, after some disastrous convoys in 1942. In those two particular actions, there was no doubt about the results. There were, however, many other occasions when it was difficult to claim a "kill." Of necessity, certainly from the aspect of Operational Intelligence, it had to be a tough analysis — there was no sense just thinking that we had one less enemy to cope with. Accurate numbers and locations were essential, hence the sometimes niggardly assessments of the day. The authors are persistent in their use of all references, including interviews with participants in the action and the analysis, to make this point. Prescott's action over a period of some hours against U-163 west of Spain, confirmed as a "kill" through detailed analysis of all records in the 1980s, is typical.

Some of the actions described here are still clouded by uncertainty. Take, for instance, the loss of Athabaskan as described here. Peter A. Dixon offers a different explanation for the sinking in an article appearing recently in Canadian Military History V, No. 1. Dixon re-examined the action in the belief that a torpedo fired from a British Motor Torpedo Boat might have caused the second, and critical, explosion.

For sheer bravery and seamanship, Chapter 65 is significant. Quite apart from all other considerations, surely the "bulk canallers" and the "bulk lakers" did not really belong on the North Atlantic. The survivors of the Lady Hawkins — seventy-six of them in one boat under the Chief
Officer - hung on for five days in January 1942, until picked up. Then there was the epic voyage of the survivors from Point Pleasant Park, sunk in early 1945 — three boats with forty-two souls and 375 miles later - who arrived off the Kalahari coast of southwest Africa before they were rescued. As we all know, it has been an uphill struggle for our merchant mariners to gain proper recognition; these stories help to achieve this.

This book is attractively written, well-illustrated and full of facts. There is useful information about post-war service or disposal of all the ships. I like the headings of the chapters, each an appropriate quotation or aphorism. The humour of the day is there, too, all of which makes the book a very good read. Still, I cannot help "picking" a few "nits"! For instance, my gunnery training tells me that the order to fire starshell has always been "Illuminate," not "Ignite." (p. 152) I also hope that the crew of Liverpool Packet pulled to Cape Sable Island, and not Sable Island, as there is a considerable difference in distance, (p. 236) Finally, with reference to p. 252, Stephen Roskill states in The War at Sea, I, p. 34 that ASDIC is an acronym for "Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee" and that it dates from 1917. I'll go with this.

Enough! This is a good book, both as a reference and as a remembrance. Like so many others, I have been aware of most of this history, personally or otherwise, for more than fifty years. The Canadian Naval Chronicle, brings it all together.

Ian A. Macpherson
Newport, Nova Scotia


The bitter fights had no names, only convoy designations and numbers marked on a chart. Some historians refer to them collectively as the "Battles of the Convoys." The phrase "Battle of the Atlantic" was first given public expression by Sir Winston Churchill. It was an unremitting battle, fought for nearly six continuous years without intermission, period of recovery, or moments free from danger. It extended over 2,000 miles of hostile ocean and destroyed some 3,000 allied merchant ships carrying approximately 28 million tons of food, petroleum, equipment and war supplies as well as 158 Allied naval ships, some 800 German U-boats. The lives of 45,000 Allied merchant and naval seamen were lost, as were 32,000 men of the Kriegsmarine — a total greater than all other naval battles combined in the past 500 years.

Postwar Casualty by Doug Fraser, himself an officer in the Allied merchant navy, maritime historian and peacetime journalist, tells the compelling story of the role Canada's merchant navy played in that battle. Using available source material, personal recollections and reminiscences, Postwar Casualty is arranged into twelve comprehensive sections that cover major aspects of Canada's wartime merchant navy: how the fleet was established; the emergency shipbuilding program; the demand for and training of seamen; and the convoy system. Fraser then carries his account into the post-war period, explaining how that merchant marine became a casualty of post-war policies, and most importantly, the shameful story of the sailors who had risked their lives at sea only to be neglected in the fifty years that followed by a forgetful country, with special emphasis on Canada's collective indifference to the shipping industry in general and merchant seamen in particular. The result is an engaging book that is certain to rekindle the memories of those who served, even as it awakens the interest of students of our maritime heritage. Along the way he gives attention to some of the little known activities of wartime sailing, like repairing telegraphic cable in dangerously exposed locations at sea. The text is supported by photographs which include well-worn Canadian merchant ships that served with distinction, among them the CNS 'Lady' boats, 'Park' ships and war-damaged merchant ships, as well as the wartime Halifax-based Western Union cableship, Cyrus Field.

Fraser's treatment of the merchant marine's postwar experience could easily cause his book to become a polemic. Yet his research is both factual and broad. Moreover, while he relives some of his own experiences, Fraser also draws on his long career as a journalist and editor in radio and television. His post-retirement career as political advisor and speech writer provides insight into Canada's consistently negative policies on the
merchant marine, which he presents as the outgrowth of an insular society and a post-war withdrawal from the womb of colonial security. His observations on political and public attitudes, including the shadowy world of political connivance as practised by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, reveal what he sees as the narrow vision of a nation in which decisions are conveniently postponed and staff advisors move reluctantly out of the nineteenth century. The picture of the postwar years and the dismantling of a merchant marine service which suffered a casualty rate more than twice that of the RCN, is not a pretty one. Canada's merchant marine veterans became the postwar pariahs of an ungrateful nation.

All this makes Postwar Casualty an inestimable contribution to a branch of maritime history that should be made available for distribution in libraries, universities and high schools for the benefit of future generations.

R.F. Latimer
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


As its title implies, this book tells the story of the sinking of HMT (His Majesty's Trooper) Rohna, which resulted in the death of over a thousand US soldiers, the worst incident involving a ship transporting American troops in World War II.

Following the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, the Royal Navy introduced a series of Military Convoys from the Clyde to Gibraltar designated KMS (slow) and KMF (fast) to provide reinforcements and supplies for this war theatre. These convoys were later extended eastward into the Mediterranean as Allied forces captured more enemy-held territory. With the invasion of southern Italy in September 1943, the terminus was extended eastward to Alexandria, including ships for onward routing to India. This resulted in a far more effective use of mercantile tonnage as ships no longer had to use the Cape route to the Middle and Far East. By the fall of 1943 these convoys were operating like a tram line with "leavers" and "joiners" at each major port as the convoys sailed eastward. This volume of traffic did not escape the notice of the German High Command, who attacked them in the Mediterranean with aircraft and U-boats.

Forgotten Tragedy covers the story of one of these convoys — KMF-26 — and in particular a ship in the convoy, HMT Rohna, carrying US Army personnel to India from Iran. Rohna, of 8,602 GRT, had been built in 1926 for the British India Steam Navigation for use on the Singapore-Penang-Madras run, with accommodation for sixty passengers. At the outbreak of World War II she was requisitioned by the Admiralty for use as a troopship. On 25 November 1943, Rohna sailed from Iran with 2,000 American troops aboard and joined convoy KMF-26 at sea bound for India. The following day the convoy was attacked fifteen miles northeast of Bougie by thirty German HE-177 aircraft from 11/KG 40 with Henschel HS-293 glider bombs and nine torpedo-carrying aircraft. One of the glider bombs hit Rohna about fifteen feet above the waterline on her port side, flooding the engine room and starting a fire. The ship remained afloat for less than one hour, and as she settled by her stern, the bolts holding her engines and boilers sheared off, allowing them to crash through the ship's side. Rafts were launched and only her starboard lifeboats could be lowered. Many were overloaded and swamped. A total of 1,015 soldiers were lost, together with 147 of the ship's crew and gunners. In terms of American servicemen lost, it was a tragedy surpassed only by the 1,103 killed aboard USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor.

Carlton Jackson describes the loss of the ship and the rescue and experiences of the survivors. It is a compelling read, particularly the epilogue which recounts the lives of the survivors during the remainder of the war. However, while the data on the US serviceman and German fliers involved in the incident is very well researched, the naval/merchant ship aspect is skimpy and contains a number of errors. For example, twelve ships are incorrectly identified as to type. Thus, the Dutch passenger liner Marnix Van St. Aldegonde is identified as a destroyer while the destroyer HMS Winchelsea is identified as a battleship. Nor is the author correct in stating in the introduction that "no history of World War II" mentions the Rohna
tragedy. This may be true of American books, but
the loss is written up in The War at Sea (III, Pt. 1,
p. 209), the Official British Naval History of
World War II by Captain S.W. Roskill.

John K. Burgess
Calgary, Alberta


Dr. James S. Peters II writes of the experiences of black US Navy veterans who served during World War II on land, sea and ammunition depots. He places the experiences of individuals within the larger historic contexts of segregation and discrimination generally in the Navy. He also outlines his own account of his experiences in the Navy, where he was a psychologist-teacher at Great Lakes Navy Training Center, and places them alongside those of other black men who served at the same time as he did.

He shows that until 1942 African-Americans could only serve as mess-attendants and stewards, but after the opening of general service, they could be trained to other posts, including signalmen, radio mechanics and teachers, though not as commissioned officers. The route to higher advancement, he shows, was blocked: blacks were able to become Petty Officers but even then that was difficult. It was not their lack of educational qualifications or ability that kept them back but racial discrimination. Not until after the war was total integration in the military achieved; those who, like Dr. Peters, pioneered in the Navy during World War II helped bring it about.

Much of the book concentrates on recording his account of how in some focused way he and his fellow black Naval Veterans, who served at Great Lakes, witnessed and participated in this phenomenon — how, for instance, he personally suffered from blatant discrimination, by meeting all the publicized requirements for specialist ranking as a Welfare Worker, assistant to the Chaplain, for example, but being denied it. He does this by briefly outlining his experience and juxtaposing it with excerpts from accounts re-
corded at the "World War II Black Naval Veterans of Great Lakes celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of Admissions of African-Americans into General Service of the US Navy on 20th June 1992." These accounts revealed the strength and courage these men had to show in the face of outright discrimination and of the degrading, humiliating conditions they were made to endure.

The bulk of the book, a hundred pages, is devoted to a series of descriptions, mostly in appendix form, which range from an account of how the Black World War II Naval Veterans of the Great Lakes organized themselves in September 1982, to a series of research documents on such matters as the Special Training Program at Great Lakes for 1945, to a transcript of the Minutes of the Reunion of Band Members of Great Lakes Training Center in the spring of 1973. As well there is an Appendix on the veteran's constitution, correspondence and press releases.

Obviously, the material in these appendices is of historic worth in and of itself, but such material is usually the primary evidence on which a scholar bases his or her analysis. To devote so much space to such material detracts, I feel, from the power of the actual testimony. There is a tension, therefore, in the book between the oral history, the memoir and the source material which is never adequately resolved.

Chris Howard Bailey
Portsmouth, Hampshire


In the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the US Navy rushed a team of hard hat divers to Hawaii. Their job was to assist in the massive salvage of the sunken battlefleet and get as many ships as possible into the war. The divers, flown in from San Diego, arrived to find flames and smoke still rising from Battleship Row and a thick coating of bunker oil floating in the harbour, coating everything.

Edward Raymer was the lead diver of the group. "None of us second-class divers could be
considered experienced, since our training had been minimal, and we had little or no practical experience. Our biggest achievements were our new-found abilities to burn and weld underwater." (p. 11) In short order, Raymer and his shipmates gained more practical experience than they ever could have imagined.

Until now, the only detailed account of the salvage dives and activities at Pearl was Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin's *Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal* (US Navy History Division), Raymer's book is an excellent complement to Wallin's, and any scholar interested in the Pearl Harbor story, as well as salvage diving or the Pacific War should buy *Descent into Darkness*. Those interested in the fate of USS *Arizona* will also be interested in the book, as it offers a fairly detailed sense of what the Navy's divers saw and encountered, and those impressions and facts have never before achieved wide distribution. Given the gruesome nature of the dives, it was probably wise that Raymer waited more than fifty years before publishing his reminiscences.

In a compelling, first-person narrative, the author recounts his adventures in the darkness of overturned and half-sunk battleships, including detailed accounts of dives on USS *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *California*, and *West Virginia*. He tells of the difficulties of working in pitch black, oily compartments with decaying bodies floating above his head, of the mistakes made, of moments of heroism, occasional panic, and fortitude. He does paraphrase conversations he had at the time, reconstructing them with the aid of his "memory and the personal reminiscences of a few surviving members of our old diving crew." (p. xiii) The conversations should therefore be read with a note of caution, and for flavour only; as Raymer himself notes, "the dialogue reflects the language the actual characters would have used under the circumstances.... [and]...portrays their personalities accurately."

Raymer also recounts his adventures ashore with his buddies, drinking, chasing women, occasionally catching them, and outfoxing officers. It is an honest account of young men at war, and off-colour tales notwithstanding, should be read for that content, too, lest too sanitized a version of the war experience ever be perpetuated. In this fashion Raymer's book joins Theodore Mason's *Battleship Sailor* (NIP, 1982) and Alvin Keman's *Crossing the Line* (NIP, 1994) as unvarnished views from the ranks of the enlisted.

Despite the title, *Descent into Darkness* also includes an account of Raymer's service in the South Pacific as a salvage diver at Tongatabu, Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Raymer's activities provide an interesting side note to the campaigns waged there, including repair dives on the battle damaged USS *Portland* and what it was like pulling survivors and the dead from the bloody waters of Iron Bottom Sound.

*Descent Into Darkness* is illustrated with a selection of photographs showing the battle-damaged ships at Pearl, the salvage operations, and Raymer and his mates. Because of wartime restrictions, and poor visibility — or none — there are no images of the divers at work, or what they saw at Pearl Harbor. For underwater imagery, Raymer used a detailed drawing of the sunken *Arizona* done by the US National Park Service's Submerged Cultural Resources Unit, and for readers interested in more of the same, Daniel Lenihan's edited *Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona Memorial/Pearl Harbor National Historical Landmark* (National Park Service) is recommended.

James P. Delgado
Vancouver, British Columbia


The Battle of Midway, one of the most decisive engagements in history, has not lacked for coverage. Dozens of participants, biographers, and historians have assessed virtually every aspect of the conflict. That either side could have emerged victorious is shown with clarity in this account.

The principal strengths of this work are its concise narrative treatment of the battle and its concluding chapter in which Smith analyzes the factors that "weighed in the balance which finally tipped toward Fletcher and Spruance and away from Yamamoto and Nagumo." (p. 167) Smith
argues convincingly that American planning was superior to that of the Japanese because Admiral Yamamoto's plans depended on the United States reacting as anticipated, while American plans were far more flexible and left initiative to the commanders on the scene. He believes that Yamamoto's overall ploy of attacking Midway to lure the remaining US fleet into a climatic battle was sound. Had Japan succeeded the entire Pacific might well have fallen to her.

Where Yamamoto failed was in his organization of the Japanese task forces sent against Midway. He separated them so widely that it was impossible for them to support each other. Smith correctly points out that "the battle was ultimately decided by three American carriers opposed by four Japanese carriers, and yet Japan had eight carriers deployed in the operation." (p. 169) A "tragic under-estimation" of the American intelligence system led Yamamoto to send four carriers ahead of his other forces and place them in a position from which only luck could extricate them. In the ensuing battle luck favoured neither side. Nor did either the Japanese or the Americans display more courage or heroism. What the Americans had in their favour, besides signal intelligence that tipped them off to Japan's target, was radar. American aircraft, especially fighters, were inferior to Japanese Zeros, but radar gave Americans "those vital minutes of extra warning against incoming Japanese air strikes that was denied to the Japanese. It made all the difference." (p. 171) The second American advantage was leadership. Smith vindicates both Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance against their critiques arguing that both made essentially the correct decisions based on shrewd judgments concerning the enemy. These stand in stark contrast to the "dazed rumblings" of Chuichi Nagumo and the "muddled orders" issued by Yamamoto during the battle. He calls Midway the battle that showed the Japanese could be stopped and argues that it marked the coming of age for the US Navy. One might say the same things about the Battle of the Coral Sea a month earlier.

Smith lists no primary sources and only twenty-three secondary sources in his bibliography. There are no notes to guide readers. Instead, he depends on his crisp prose and the force of his arguments to support his judgments. Many specialists will undoubtedly take issue with several of Smith's assessments. When the first edition of this work appeared in 1976, it received little attention from historians on either side of the Atlantic. One hopes this edition will gain more.

James C. Bradford
College Station, Texas


Sea-borne "Special Forces" is a term with a certain mystique about it. To most of us in the West, it conjures images of superbly-trained American SEALS or British Commandos. We know very little about similar amphibious units of other countries operating in World War II. So it is all the more interesting to read Yuriy Strekhnin's account of the Soviet Navy's Danube Reconnaissance Detachment. This absorbing book owes a good deal to James Gebhardt, its translator, who also added numerous informative chapter notes not found in the original Russian version. Told in spare undramatic prose, it describes gallant raids by Soviet naval infantry behind German lines, conducting partisan warfare, battling the SS, and sabotaging enemy transport.

Dramatic as it is to read of ceaseless combat, their main role was intelligence-gathering; to uncover Nazi intentions ahead of time, and find weak points in enemy forces. Strekhnin uses interviews and personal accounts of veterans to convey how the Detachment carried out hazardous missions. Those missions were assigned by the Black Sea Fleet staff because, though they often fought far from bodies of water, the job of these sailor scouts was to help Russian ships wage war more effectively.

Mariners will be interested in learning what manner of vessels were allocated to this inland naval duty. When it entered the Danube River estuary, the Danube Flotilla consisted of thirty-six armoured cutters, twelve mortar boats, twenty-two minesweepers, and fifteen rubber boats, as well as twenty smaller craft. The ships were manned by naval personnel, and supported a
strong combined force of artillery units, the 369th Separate Naval Infantry Battalion, and the Reconnaissance Detachment.

In passing, this book indicates how many naval actions must have been fought on the Eastern Front, both between opposing ships and in support of land forces. They took place mainly on rivers, where Soviet armoured cutters often formed the spearhead for advancing army troops. However, they could not have steamed successfully into enemy occupied waters without their way being cleared first by the reconnaissance commandos, through providing intelligence or defeating opponents. Often, the scouts would capture a German prisoner with the intention of taking him back to headquarters for interrogation, then find themselves fighting for their lives as SS units came in pursuit. The matter-of-fact language of veterans' reminiscences emphasizes the horrific circumstances of their adventures — boat handling, night patrols, brutal combat, icy waters, killing Russian traitors — all with full awareness that their own capture would lead to torture and death. During many missions, they depended greatly on Soviet civilians, who repeatedly risked their lives to help without question.

The narrative follows their battleground from the North Caucasus coastline of the Black Sea to the Crimean peninsula, then into the Danube River through Hungary and Austria to final victory in Czechoslovakia. So huge a canvas might make events hard to follow, were it not for Strekhnin's recounting of individual stories of participants in the detachment's combat escapades. The only disappointments are the lack of photographs or index, and the inadequacy of the two maps. Still, this is an informative look at some little known fighting sailors.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


For complexity, few military operations can equal that of an amphibious landing. Not only must its land, air and sea elements be well coordinated, the invading force must also take into account the vagaries of weather and tides, not to mention the fact that as its men and machines wade ashore, they will likely come under heavy attack from an armed opposition lurking on or very near the beach. Despite all of these problems, the twentieth century has witnessed numerous successful landings, including the spectacularly successful Allied invasion of France in June 1944, the largest amphibious operation in history and one that sealed the fate of Hitler's Germany. As Theodore Gatchel notes in his preface, this puzzle — the claim that amphibious landings were so difficult versus the evidence that they were so often triumphant — is what prompted him to study the defender's point of view.

Using numerous examples of amphibious operations ranging from Gallipoli in 1915 to the Falklands in 1982, as well as Germany's abandoned attempt to invade Britain in 1940, Gatchel tries to prove that defending against amphibious assault is far more difficult than effecting one. Attackers have often succeeded, he says, because they possessed some crucial advantages over the defender: air and sea superiority; the ability to pick the time and location of the landing; the existence of a specialized amphibious assault doctrine as opposed to an absence of a doctrine to defend against such attacks; unity of command.

These are good points, but one comes away feeling that Gatchel has not really proven his argument. His argument concerning Gallipoli is a case in point. That operation, designed by Winston Churchill to knock Turkey from the war (in the long British tradition of conducting war on the periphery rather than facing a stronger foe on the continent of Europe), failed to achieve that goal. Not only did Turkey not collapse, the Anglo-French forces that landed at Gallipoli, after months of failing to break out from their beachhead, had to withdraw ignominiously after suffering more than 250,000 casualties. Yet, Gatchel argues, because the Turks could not defeat the invaders at the water's edge, the campaign demonstrated Turkish weakness, especially at the command level. Australians and New Zealanders, having lost so many men at Gallipoli for no tactical or strategic gain, might disagree with that conclusion. Yes, the Turks did not defeat the
attack at the water's edge, and yes they could not throw their enemies into the sea, but once ashore the Anglo-French forces had all they could handle just to cling to their precarious foothold. They had no hope of winning.

Additionally, Gatchel makes poor use of some events that might have improved his case. His account of the battle for Guadalcanal is cursory at best, a true shame as the struggle for that tiny island offers an excellent opportunity to see how two fairly evenly matched foes (at least when the campaign began) conducted both offensive and defensive amphibious operations. Furthermore, the sad case of the August 1942 landing at Dieppe by a largely Canadian force, a force that was nearly annihilated on the beaches, is mostly ignored. Admittedly Dieppe was a raid and not intended to be a permanent landing. Yet its spectacular failure would seem to offer a nearly perfect example of what not to do when one is the attacker, and a textbook example of a near perfect defence. Perhaps most surprising, given that Gatchel is an ex-Marine, there is not nearly enough said about the fascinating development of Marine amphibious doctrine in the interwar period. Theodore Gatchel is correct in saying that the claims that the amphibious landing is the most complex form of warfare seem odd given the record of success such assaults have enjoyed. Unfortunately, I do not think he has managed in this book to explain why this has been the case.

Galen Roger Perras
Calgary, Alberta


Since 1970, perhaps the greatest development in studies of World War II has been the attempt to uncover the signals intelligence record and to incorporate that into the history which it shaped. This process started in sensationalism and ended in scholarship, i.e. it became simultaneously more boring and more accurate. It began with a few books which made great claims on the basis of small evidence and continued with a growing number of monographs and articles written from an increasingly large base of documentation. Now, twenty years and millions of words later, there is a real literature about signals intelligence and its effect on World War II, and the time is right for a critical bibliography of the field.

Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide is an unusually good example of that genre. Myron Smith has written in the field of intelligence history and he has also read widely in the literature, even in the more specialised sources like the journal Cryptologia or the "United States Cryptologie History" series published by the National Security Agency's Center for Cryptologie History. His introductory essay puts the literature into its own historical context. The bibliography is especially useful regarding the article literature and is up-to-date in its coverage to the end of 1994 (though, curiously, Smith mentions the more peripheral works by "Nigel West" on World War II signals intelligence but not his main publication in the field, "The Sigint Secrets"). However, beginning in 1995 many significant works are overlooked, like Antony Best's Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, Avoiding War in East Asia and Carl Boyd's American Command of the Sea Through Carriers, Codes, and the Silent Service, among others. Nonetheless, this volume will be the standard bibliography in the field for works published between 1970-1994, and it compares favourably in quality with other bibliographies of intelligence.

If this work has a weakness, it flows from its nature: by definition, any bibliography must seek to be inclusive, and include a host of tangential or minor works, which may hamper as many readers as it helps. In this case, it certainly seems unnecessary to include so many general military histories (like John Keegan's Six Armies at Normandy, David Fraser's Alanbrooke or Carlo D'este's Decision in Normandy) simply because their author offers a passing opinion on the value of ULTRA. On the other hand, Smith does avoid the trap which so often ensnares authors of military bibliographies — the tendency to include everything written on a topic without attempting to gauge any of its value. He offers frank and sensible comments on the value of the works which he addresses. This is particularly useful, given the number of bad books which litter the field.

Smith understands that the very issue of the value of intelligence is problematical and draws
particular attention to the methods of scholars who have addressed this problem and to writers who have debunked sensationalist claims. He also understands the controversies regarding how intelligence affected specific campaigns and draws them to his reader's attention. Smith's section on the battle of the Atlantic, for example, notes not merely the many specialist accounts of intelligence but also the works of students of the campaign as a whole like Marc Milner and David Syrett, who downplay claims for the influence of intelligence on those events, though in the process he also conflates the somewhat different views of these authors. Because of Smith's breadth of research, his grasp of the historical and scholarly context and his willingness to call specific works bad or outdated, this bibliography will prove valuable to any neophyte in the field and useful even to old hands.

John Ferris
Calgary, Alberta


This is the eleventh of a planned twelve-volume series aimed at those with a basic knowledge and interest in sea power. It is therefore written in simple, but not simplistic, language. Experts are unlikely to find much new here, and laymen may be deterred by the complexity of the subject. These caveats aside, this is a useful and well-written introduction to the myriad complexities associated with anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Submarines have left an indelible mark on naval warfare in the twentieth century, and dedicating an entire volume in this series to the countering of one type of vessel alone is indicative of that impact. While narrowing the focus to one type of warship may seem excessive in one respect, the range of considerations involved in combatting submarines are considerable.

Gardner, an ex-Royal Naval officer, brings his comprehensive practical and theoretical knowledge to bear in this volume. His book sketches the history of ASW in this century in a brief but vivid chapter and then outlines the key characteristics of submarines so that his readers will understand the essential nature of the underwater opponent. The book then covers the range of considerations involved in ASW, starting with the nature of the ocean itself, then working through the detection and weapon systems — along with very important supporting organisations such as wide area surveillance systems — to the point where the way these interrelated warfare systems and skills operate together can be outlined. The final chapter discusses what the future holds for ASW.

Those looking for simple solutions to the problems of ASW will be disappointed here. Gardner does not provide a cookbook full of ASW solutions. Instead, he approaches the problem in a general way and points out broad approaches that have proven successful in the past while noting that no solution is likely to be permanent because of the dynamic nature of the problem. He also couches his language in a frustratingly qualified way, rarely giving absolute statements about what is and is not effective. He notes that advances in detection technology may open the way to easier detection of submarines, but then observes that previous advances in detection technology have been matched by improvements in submarine design. This is a wise approach that may be frustrating, but is entirely reflective of naval warfare as it really is, as opposed to how pundits would prefer it to be.

On the whole Gardner achieves the aim of the series, which is to provide a comprehensive yet easy-to-grasp introduction to an important aspect of sea power. The pictures and illustrations are well chosen to illustrate the various descriptions and subjects discussed. The book is not referenced, but general indications of where material is derived from is occasionally given. There is no doubt of the author's expert knowledge, but on the other hand there are times when references might have been useful. The suggested reading is a short list, but does outline the most useful volumes available today. In short, this book is exactly as described by the publisher, a useful quality that should be encouraged.

D.M. McLean
Orleans, Ontario

This welcome study, co-authored by Ron Barrie of the Coast Guard, uses the same format as Ken Macpherson's books on wartime Canadian destroyers, frigates, and minesweepers. It carries the story forward, describing not only the twenty ships of the three classes based on the *St. Laurent* design but also the four gas turbine "Tribals" and the twelve "City"-class patrol frigates.

Outstanding photographs have always been a hallmark of Macpherson's books and there are many good ones here. The preface promises that alterations to ships due to major modifications will be shown and in most cases this is valid. There is a short description of the genesis of each major class and a brief history of every ship. These try to include highlights and feature some collisions and groundings. The DELEX program which enabled the already venerable family of *St. Laurent* and derivative classes to continue operating until the City-class frigate program yielded results (fourteen years from cabinet decision to first ship in service!) is also described. The authors note that published material on post-war ships is "often skimpy." Although their bibliography is thin and does not include items like *RCN In Retrospect* and *RCN In Transition* (both of which have useful material on the origins of the *St. Laurens* and Tribals) they have gathered an impressive amount of detail on individual ships. Another Macpherson hallmark is the provision of useful tables and lists. *Cadillac of Destroyers* delivers, with appendices listing commanding officers, major refits/conversions and participation in UN actions in the Adriatic and off Haiti.

The design for *St. Laurent*, done in 1947-48 by Captain Rowland Baker and his team, marked a technological "coming of age" for the Canadian Navy. The class were instantly dubbed "Cadillacs" by their sailors because of the contrast with the World War II-era destroyers to which they were accustomed. The distinctive new destroyer escorts, the first warships designed entirely in this country, were later equipped with other innovative systems developed in Canada, like variable depth sonar, helicopter handling equipment, data processing systems and CANTASS. The first seven *St. Laurens*, originally designed for mass production in an emergency, eventually became unique in NATO navies because of their longevity in service, some for almost four decades. These ships had such long operational lives because of extensive refits and meticulous maintenance. The true dollar cost of keeping them in service so long (because successive governments were unwilling to embark on new ship programs) would make uncomfortable analysis and reading.

The Avro *Arrow* continues to excite national interest because it had the potential to out-perform fighters being produced by other countries. In their own way the *St. Laurens* were as innovative and outstanding a warship as the *Arrow* was an interceptor. Yet the "Cadillacs" do not stir the same emotions across Canada, perhaps because their program went on to completion and the ships saw many years of hard service. The *Restigouche*, *Mackenzie*, and *Annapolis* classes were all improvements on their predecessors. The *Mackenzies* were never significantly modified because funds were not available but their sisters — the *St. Laurens* and the other classes — all had their operational capabilities enhanced.

The Tribals and City-class patrol frigates have also been successful designs, comparing favourably with warships produced for other navies. They too have taken many innovative Canadian systems to sea and arguably are more capable for their designed tasks because technological advances have resulted in sensors and weapons far more capable than those that were available for the "Cadillacs."

There are a few errors. The caption under a picture of a ASROC launcher (p.13) places it in the wrong class of ship. A 57mm gun in a City-class frigate (p. 14) is incorrectly identified as a 5-inch mounting. "Nixie" is described as a "torpedo system" rather than as a torpedo decoy device, (p.69) There are a few errors in spellings and dates in the extensive lists of commanding officers. As for omissions, it is unfortunate that *Athabaskan* and *Terra Nova* are not shown in their Persian Gulf configuration.

*Cadillac of Destroyers* is a pleasing record of post-war destroyers and frigates built in Canada. The foreword is by Rear Admiral Timbrell, CMM, DSC, *St. Laurent's* first commanding
officer. Because the pictures appear to have been scanned for publication, not reproduced from photoplates, they lack the clarity and impact of those in Macpherson's *River Class Destroyers*. Nevertheless, Vanwell has produced another attractive volume complete with striking pictures and much detailed and useful information.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


This book is an example of a recent trend in writing history which I have seen called "creative non-fiction." The author makes no bones of this fact, cheerfully admitting that it is a pastiche of destroyers' experiences, as delineated in their logbooks, done up as though one ship had been front and centre during the operations. There is even a valuable Canadian prize for such a genre, if my memory is correct. As an historical process it is not one that catches my fancy; instead of telling a story "like it was," it gives a false impression of the times and gives dangerous scope for an author's own biases or preferences to intrude. It also tends to downplay the long periods of utter boredom that most warship crews endured between engagements.

Furthermore, the title of the book should probably be revised to read "from the deck of an *American* destroyer in the Korean War," for its experiences are totally of the US Navy. Distressingly, from a Canadian standpoint, there is not the slightest indication that the RCN participated in that far-off conflict. Given that the author bemoans the anonymity of the Korean War, it is a shame that in his attempt to redress the balance he did not write a more balanced version himself. After all, the Korean War *was* a truly United Nations matter, and it was possibly the last time that there was a reasonable balance between American forces employed and those of other countries, particularly the Commonwealth,

Alexander describes in some detail the sort of actions that gave a final fillip of the imagination to that disappearing breed, the true "Gunnery Officer." No one who has read accounts of the Korean War (and yes, notwithstanding Alexander's strictures, they do exist — and very good ones, too, though from the Canadian standpoint) can escape the fact that this was a shoot-'em-up battle of the gunboat diplomacy kind, at least from a naval standpoint. In many ways the war in Korea was a throwback to the sort of scrap the Canadian naval staff had been longing to fight, where guns were arbiter. Indeed, the treasured Canadian Tribal-class ships were in their element there, and reigned supreme as "trainbusters." Not a hint of this, however, appears in this volume.

This is particularly poignant at this instant as this review is being written, for I have before me the announcement of the death of Read Admiral Jeffrey Vanstone Brock, one of the more progressive and successful officers in any navy during the Korean War. It was he who led operations at Inchon, the expedition with which the exploits of the mythical USS *John J. Borland* begin. I also have in front of me Marc Milner's two volumes on the RCN and the long Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, and which remind us of the privations of those who served in that war. Regardless of the discomfort of warships in the 1950s, they were nothing like those who served in corvettes and their equivalent. Neither did the Korean conflict match the ferocity of the Battle of the Atlantic, where submarines represented a large part of the menace to warships. On the other hand, given that the Korean War probably impressed upon large-ship navies the possibilities of mine warfare, the book is helpful, although that story should be told from the point-of-view of whose doing the sweeping.

Otherwise, to me the only value to me was the way in which Alexander criticized General MacArthur, who receives short shrift in the book, an interesting feature. All in all, however, Canadians would do well to save their book-buying budget for a Canadian book, and perhaps the best is still Boutilier's *The RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968* (UBC Press, 1981), where can be found an account by a Canadian participant of "The Destroyers' War in Korea, 1952-53."

Kenneth S. Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, British Columbia

For this reviewer, naval memoirs fall into two general categories. First are those that give insights into events of the past; ones that take the reader beyond documents, beyond standard accounts, beyond the obvious to provide important first-hand knowledge of events and personalities — in other words memoirs that serve as good history. Second are those that are just a good read. They may not blaze new trails or provide dramatic insights but they serve as pleasant diversions of the maritime kind — "brain candy" for the armchair matelot if you will.

*Bluewater Sailor* is definitely of the latter category. And that is no put down. Commander Don Sheppard's rich, salty account of his service in US Navy destroyers is a wonderfully entertaining sea yarn. By utilizing a fair degree of artistic licence, Sheppard condenses his experiences from a long career in destroyers into the twenty-four-month period in the late 1950s when he served as Electrical Officer and Engineering Officer in USS *Henshaw* (the names of the ship and individuals have been changed to protect the innocent).

The book opens with Sheppard joining the ship. He quickly makes a name for himself by turning his department around but that is just the first of a series of challenges in which Sheppard, a mustang commissioned from the ranks, fights to win the respect of his fellow officers, many of whom are snooty academy men, and to overcome his own insecurity. He ultimately wins the battles within and without, yet his accounts of the various hurdles he overcomes are illustrative of more than the human condition as it applies to the US Navy destroyer service during that period. By describing the operations and routines of a destroyer with the Pacific Fleet during that period, *Bluewater Sailor* serves as a useful primer on naval operations and shipboard life at the time.

Under normal circumstances, that would make *Bluewater Sailor* good history. But it stops being that in that it is peppered with reconstructed dialogue and plenty of line shooting. Simply put, Sheppard surmounts every obstacle in his path and looks very good doing it. For example, he takes responsibility for the successful prosecution of a Soviet nuclear submarine that is shadowing his destroyer's carrier task group. Good stuff. But Sheppard then describes how he boards a US Navy sub during a training exercise and leads it in a successful attack against the same carrier task group. Then, he returns to *Henshaw* and leads the task group in a successful attack against the US Navy sub! It is not that Sheppard should not be taken seriously — the fact that he rose to the rank of Commander and captain of his own destroyer as a mustang is testament to a fine career — it is just that he appears too good to be true. While this detracts from his memoirs being good history, it in no way takes away from the fact that, like a good sea story, it is just plain entertaining. And that makes it worthwhile reading.

Michael Whitby
Almonte, Ontario


In the century since Alfred Thayer Mahan first put pen to paper, naval strategists have attempted to codify the elements of maritime warfare. With the disappearance of superpower confrontation, and in its place economic factors driving so many other facets of modern life, perhaps it is time to re-visit the simple imperative of our capitalist system, to keep the sea lanes open for free trade. The essence of this already had been summed up in the naval prayer: "that [the Fleet in which we serve] may be... a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions."

As those immortal words infer, this concept is nothing new, reflecting as they do the limited, economic expansion objectives which characterized the centuries-old maritime struggles between England and, successively, Spain, the Netherlands, France and the United States. Prompted by the total warfare experience of two World Wars, however, Western navies tended to lose sight of this. Maybe that helps to explain what went wrong in the Persian Gulf.

For eight years, from 1980 to 1988, an in-
conclusive war of attrition was waged in the southwest Asian desert between the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and the zealots of Revolutionary Iran. Although the confrontation was dominated by operations on land, there evolved an important maritime dimension. On the eve of the war, approximately 60 percent of the world's oil (some 16 million barrels per day) was being carried by merchant ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Tanker Wars chronicles the attempts by both Iran and Iraq to gain leverage through the control of merchant shipping routes and the destruction of enemy and allied merchant ships. It also details the abject failure of the international community to do much for the first six years to halt the attacks on merchant shipping, and then its one-sided intervention (favourable to Iraq) for the last two years.

Navias and Hooton present a meticulous and balanced account of the progress and import of this aspect of the Iran-Iraq War. Some one hundred vessels under a variety of flags were in the Shaft al Arab and became "constructive total losses" (CTLS) in the opening crossfire. The first premeditated anti-shipping attack came over a full year later, in October 1981, when Iraqi Super Frelon helicopters attacked the Liberian bulk carrier Al Tajdar. Significantly, it was also the first use of the weapon which became synonymous with the Tanker War — the Exocet missile.

From there, the authors trace the escalation in Iraqi attacks through 1982 and 1983, the delayed but inevitable Iranian response in 1984, through the full-blown Tanker War of 1985-86 which resulted in Western naval intervention in 1987 — a total of 411 ships known to have come under attack. Their saga culminates with a chapter on the Second Gulf War of 1990-91, and ends with an ominous description of Iranian rearmament with ex-Soviet and Chinese weaponry.

They cover use of the full range of available land, sea, air and mine conventional weapons. They deal adequately with the conduct of operations, though their focus is the effect upon trade. Indeed, their primary data source is Lloyd's of London Maritime Information Service. As such, they situate the Iran-Iraq War in its proper historical context as a modern example of limited maritime economic warfare. But it is one with several bizarre twists: neither protagonist could be considered a naval power, yet both exerted profound influence upon maritime trade; and, because of the recent preference for flags of convenience, those powers which ultimately intervened had the least immediate material interests.

The proliferation of effective anti-ship weaponry throughout the Third World should give pause to anyone concerned with the free flow of trade by sea. Regrettably, the price of this volume will put it beyond the reach of most readers. But for anyone who has the institutional requirement to analyse trade warfare in a modern context, it is well worth the investment.

Richard H. Gimblett
Blackburn Hamlet, Ontario


This book examines the Royal Navy's contribution to the Falklands War in 1982. Michael Clapp, appointed Commodore Amphibious Warfare in 1981, commanded the Falklands Amphibious Task Group the following year and was jointly responsible not only for planning the amphibious assault but its execution and follow-up operations. Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Royal Marines, was then Commander Marines' Landing Craft Branch at Poole and had commanded the Falklands Garrison three years earlier. While posted to the Falklands he had sailed around the coastline surveying the beaches. Because of this intimate knowledge, he was co-opted as Landing Craft Commander. Their story, written largely in the first person, provides a unique account that focuses primarily on the battle in San Carlos Water northwest of Port Stanley.

Hitherto, all eyes were on operations in support of NATO on the Central Front in Europe. Little thought had been given to operations in far distant waters. The Royal Navy's main role was to support the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic by providing submarines to engage Soviet ballis-
tic attack submarines and surface ships, as well as maintaining its own nuclear deterrence. In addition, British warships would provide anti-submarine support to the Striking Fleet Atlantic as well as convoy protection in the Atlantic, Channel and North Sea. Protection of the northern and southern flanks of NATO would be provided by a joint international amphibious task force. This Amphibious Task Group was "expected to sail early in a crisis and certainly early enough to be received by the host nation before hostilities began." (p. 4) This role, timely reinforcement of the Northern Flank, kept the art of amphibious warfare alive, but just barely. A series of budget cuts caused the navy to be "seriously undermanned and equipment was often incomplete." (p. 3) Efforts to streamline the armed forces had reduced the navy's operational capability with no reduction in commitments. The surprise invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina in early 1982 threatened to stretch the already meagre resources of the Royal Navy to the limit.

Clapp gives a detailed account of the operation, paying particular attention to command and control issues, communications, and logistics. The latter, although not particularly exciting, is crucial to the success or failure of any operation. This was especially true in the case of the Falklands War as the British were forced to operate 8,000 miles from home and had to take everything with them. Unlike the planned-for amphibious operations on NATO's northern flank there was no 'host nation' to provide secure shore facilities, jetties and beaches to off-load supplies. Instead, the Royal Navy faced a hostile enemy which was dug-in and operating in close proximity to its home bases.

A number of key lessons emerged from the war and should act as a handbook for future amphibious operations. Firstly, improved coordination was required especially as it relates to the loading of stores. The hastily assembled force, with its tons of supplies, were improperly loaded and steps had to be taken to rectify the problem during the stop-over in the Ascension Islands. Nevertheless, these measures failed to resolve the logistical problem and delays in off-loading equipment and supplies continued to plague operations in San Carlos Water throughout the war. To be fair, a lack of merchant shipping coupled with the fact that many of the ships were not designed for amphibious operations contributed to the problem.

Secondly, more attention had to be given to joint Army/Navy amphibious exercises. The 5th Infantry Brigade, according to Clapp, had little "understanding of joint operations and was plagued with communications problems" (p. 225). One particular incident, among many, stands out. 2nd Parachute Regiment "hijacked a chinook helicopter to bring forward the Brigade's communications equipment, only to be diverted from this task to push the Paras forward. Attempts to sort out the communication problems ended in disaster when the Commander of the Brigade despatched a helicopter forward without informing anyone else. The helicopter was subsequently shot down by a British frigate which was waiting for the nightly Argentine Hercules flight whose probable flight path was similar to that taken by the helicopter." (pp. 225-6) The combined forces overcame many, if not all, of these problems because of their training and professionalism, good leadership, and a willingness to get on with the job under extremely trying conditions. A recurring theme throughout the book is the importance of flexibility and improvisation to stay abreast of the ever-changing tactical situation.

The book is interesting and extremely well written. More important, it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of amphibious operations and the campaign in the Falklands. It will make a valuable addition to the naval library.

Shawn Cafferky
Victoria, British Columbia


From the beginning, and despite assertions to the contrary, this book is firmly locked in the icy grip of Cold War thinking and one has to ask "Why was it written?" Although published in 1996, it is largely filled with data made available three or four years earlier and based on a very out-of-date concept on the way in which the Russian Navy would evolve after the Cold War. It is based on a simple fallacy: that the Russian and US navies
have nothing in common save the ownership of weapons of mass destruction. The inescapable fact the book overlooks is that even though the Russian Navy remains the world's second largest in terms of the number of ships in its inventory, the majority have little or no combatant value. Hence any comparison with the Americans is invalid. Despite this reality, Meconis and Makeev, in an act of glorious self-delusion, still maintain that the Russian fleet will retain its international standing. From this perspective and under the motivation that one of the aims of the book is to remove "the few remaining Cold War icebergs" (p. 10) one is hardly inspired to keep reading. But one does out of sheer curiosity.

Reading on, one is struck by a series of nagging doubts about the book, not least of which is the question "for whom was it written?" From the discussions of US maritime strategy and force plans one could easily come to the conclusion that the authors know little about sea power and less about the role of sea power in American defence and foreign policy. The discussion of Russian sea power is equally unconvincing and is more akin to the fading dream of equality held at the end of the Gorbachev era than the realities of today. The various statements of future Russian naval policy are completely inconsistent with assessments published in Jane's Fighting Ships and by the Center for Naval Analyses.

Only when the authors get to "Naval Arms Control" do some of the questions of audience begin to be answered. But the text reads far more like the highly idealistic agenda of the February 1991 Moscow naval arms control conference than straight thinking on today's problems. This view is strengthened further when the authors begin to discuss such things as constraints on the operations of submarines and express a desire to impose limitations on the "size and activities of U.S. antisubmarine forces in designated areas near the Russian coast." (p. 87) These sentiments quickly turn into an attack on submarine building programs in the belief that "there is no need for Russia to squander precious resources on new forces capable of protecting its own SSBNs against western ASW forces if there are other ways to ensure that a second-strike nuclear force is maintained." (p. 99)

All of a sudden, one begins to get the idea that the book has a distinct political agenda — one that seems left over from a previous era: that the US and Russian navies are the greatest in the world and should cooperate together in keeping the peace at sea. The only problem is that the authors forgot that the great Soviet fleets are no more. According to Arkadiy Pauk and Igor Sutyagin, "The Russian Navy: Now and in the Future" (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1997), "the Russian Navy is suffering today from a combination of Russia's severe economic conditions and mistakes made in the navy's development in the Soviet period." (p. 36) Yes, there is some residual capability in the Russian Navy; they can still launch a ballistic missile from the waters of the Arctic and they can still send a submarine out to shadow an American Task Force. But their operational ability is distinctly limited, as they themselves freely admit.

In time, we may see the Russians back at sea on a wider scale and we could well see them as a full member of some multinational naval force. But this will take time and will be a secondary factor to economic renewal. The dream of large-scale US-Russian Naval Cooperation envisioned by Meconis and Makeev died long ago. In many respects, logic of their book is as puzzling as the Russian Navy itself, which is still somewhat of a riddle, wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

Peter Haydon
Halifax, Nova Scotia


This is the latest proceeding of the annual Dalhousie Maritime Security Conferences. In 1995 the subject of Multinational Naval Forces was addressed by a series of papers on political and military planning, organisational considerations and recent Canadian experiences of UN-sponsored or endorsed operations. Thirteen presentations are reproduced here, together with a summary and analysis of subsequent syndicate discussions that took the form of a hypothetical crisis management exercise.

The list of participants reveals that the workshop was rather less international than in
earlier years. The discussion therefore tended to be coloured by Canadian concerns and preoccupations. The uneasiness of the politico-military relationship in Canada is noteworthy from a British perspective as is the Canadian problem of the political desire to impose a "peacekeeping" paradigm on situations for which it is inappropriate. The papers made clear the difficulties — and importance — of distinguishing between peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Unfortunately there was no one to provide the latest British naval doctrine on the distinction between "constabulary" and "combat governed" tasks that can be helpful in analysing this problem. Foreigners will however appreciate the clear description of the political and military planning processes in Canada. The sections on intelligence and media relations are good generic summaries of the problems.

The paper on the possibility of a standing UN force is flawed by the misunderstanding of what was intended under the auspices of the UN Charter's Military Staff Committee, something this reviewer tried to make clear in "International Security" some years ago. It is just not true to say that the aim then was standing forces. What was envisaged were earmarked national forces declared to the UN rather as forces were later declared to NATO. The intended command system was via the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee with no role for the Secretary General. Several of the objections the author found to a UN standing force rested on the assumption that like a peacekeeping force it would be subordinate to the normal civil UN bureaucracy, a situation that has done much to discredit UN operations in recent years.

NATO has provided the industrial standard for international operations and an excellent chapter most usefully sets out how this works and how it might be extended beyond Alliance members. There are also informative chapters by Americans on the key issue of the development of combined doctrine, something that has gone much further since the Conference was held.

Of considerable use for reference are the accounts of Canadian operational experience of multinational forces in the Adriatic, Somalia and the Gulf. The Adriatic chapter could have been more extensive as this was in many ways the most interesting application of combined marit ime power in the post-Cold War period. However, the description of the Canadian auxiliary Preserver's role off Somalia is comprehensive and provides a good example of the potential of such a ship in this situation. It is also good to have a published account of the Canadian co ordination of combat logistics in the Gulf War, something of which the Canadian Navy was very proud at the time. The latter also contains some enlightening material on command and control matters.

The syndicate discussions provided differing approaches to the problem of a UN response to a regional aggressor trying to take control of an international strait. These reflected, above all, the problems of creating effective UN politico-military institutions, the central problem that bedevils all discussion of "UN" military action.

Multinational operations are the standard form of contemporary naval action and the experienced Canadian voice is worth hearing on the issue. The book provides a worthwhile contribution to the literature on the subject.

Eric Grove
Hull, England


What a curious little book! It fails miserably as an academic study of the People's Republic of China and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as the book is devoid of analysis, insight or critical thought. The book fails as a non-academic work as it lacks lucidity and contains facile platitudes passing as insightful commentary (i.e. "it is time for Asia and the rest of the world to realize the vulnerability" of fishing resources).

The mistakes and oversights are legion. In chapter one, for example, the Strait of Malacca is referred to as being part of the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia, leaving out Singapore's key position in the Straits. Another example concerns the island dispute in the South China Sea. The author, without providing any support, states that China (presumably the People's Re-
public of China) has a strong historic claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands based on abundant evidence. It is stated that Japan has recognized the PRC claim, an assertion the Japanese would hotly deny. The competing claims to the islands fails to include those of Malaysia and Brunei — a remarkable omission.

The Canadian angle in this book is that China, like Canada, refers "to the link between conservation and marine pollution." What this means is open to interpretation. Also, several 1992 articles in Maclean’s dealing with the Rio Environment Conference figure prominently in the relied-upon sources.

There is no question that the PRC is beginning to assert itself in ocean relations. There are serious ocean resource disputes in the South China Sea and in North Asia in which the PRC has a critical role. The PRC has recently ratified the UN Oceans Treaty and simultaneously took action allegedly inconsistent with the Treaty, thus raising serious questions about the PRC’s commitment to the Treaty and international law and order. Marine environmental protection has not yet been high on the policy agenda in the PRC, this needs to change. There are countless legal, political, environmental and strategic questions to be explored in a study of the PRC and the law of the sea. None of these interesting and important questions are addressed in this book.

Ted L. McDorman
Victoria, British Columbia


The sale of marijuana was outlawed in the United States by the Federal Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 and its mere possession by the Boggs Act of 1951. Nevertheless, the enormous demand for this substance, widely considered to be less harmful than alcohol, less addictive than tobacco, and with some therapeutic qualities, led to the long and complex contest between smugglers and enforcement agencies described in this book — a contest that continues in Canada and the United States today. Charles Fuss, Jr. has held senior positions in more than one agency involved in drug interdiction, including the Office of National Drug Control Policy in the Executive Office of the President. No one could therefore be more qualified to recount the story of the efforts to stop smuggling by sea.

At first marijuana entered the United States from Mexico or was home-grown. However, a combination of increased demand in the 1970s, together with effective interdiction efforts (directed principally at the Mexican heroin crop but also affecting marijuana), caused suppliers to begin importing marijuana by sea from Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica. The ebb and flow of the long drug war are covered in Sea of Grass. It is all a great gamble: complex operations involving fast boats, surveillance, deception, chases and great profits for the smugglers, create excitement for both sides. At first, fishermen faced with a downturn in their industry could make good money running a few loads of grass. The US Coast Guard at the time considered its function to be maritime regulation and safety, and was reluctant to get into drug interdiction; the Navy had no involvement at all. Penalties were light, and so smuggling was attractive. By the late 1980s, this had all changed. Combined operations worthy of a Tom Clancy novel involved search aircraft, Coast Guard, and naval ships of every kind. The importation of marijuana by sea dropped, and the Colombian drug barons shifted to cocaine, a commodity more easy to conceal and to deliver by air. The sea blockade has therefore been scaled down, and marijuana supply has returned to land routes or is home-grown, although Canadians know from several seizures on both coasts of drug mother-ships that some still comes by sea.

Sea of Grass describes the operational history of American anti-drug forces. While these particular efforts were comparatively successful, overall drug use has expanded. This is a social phenomenon which presents a paradox. Failure to interdict illegal drugs leads to ruined lives and urban crime. Success means enormous legal expenses, as the taxpayer pays for both prosecution and defense and prisons become overcrowded. It is a lose-lose proposition. Fuss notes that demands for action by the public were not so much
anti-drug but in response to the rising crime rate as addicts robbed for drug money and gangs fought each other over the right to control the trade. The first wave of baby-boomers wanted their recreational drugs and saw little wrong with marijuana and occasional cocaine use. Their attitude today is curiously ambivalent: although they now "run the world" they have not legalized pot and do not seem to be recommending it to their children who, in any case, tend more towards chemicals like "ecstasy." In the meantime, over-worked police and Coast Guard forces only manage to intercept about 10 per cent of illegal drugs, while convictions, if obtained, often take years. One cannot help thinking that there must be a better solution to this problem.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


Marine geologist, naval officer and former army subaltern, SCUBA diver, underwater explorer, showman. Dr. Robert Ballard is all of these, and his discovery of the wrecks of Titanic and Bismarck has given him world-wide celebrity. No surprise, then, that his autobiography can be found in so many bookstores: a mass-market, rather than scholarly work. It is what you might expect — an entertaining read that takes you on a tour of the high points of Ballard's career.

Little space is wasted on Ballard's childhood and youth — in two paragraphs, we learn that he was fascinated by marine life and submarines, and that he grew up in San Diego. The rest of the book concerns itself with the story of his professional life. All the major events are covered: his post-graduate studies in marine geology; the quest for the Titanic; exploration of the Roman wreck Isis (named by Ballard); finding the Bismarck; the survey of the wrecks off Guadalcanal; the JASON Project. No startling revelations, and these tales have been told elsewhere. Ballard's work for the US Navy is touched upon — notably the examination of the remains of the submarine Thresher, but of course his most interesting achievements probably fall into the "secret" category. He was fortunate in being able to benefit from the Navy's interest in deep sea exploration, at a time when the Navy had deep pockets.

What will be new for most readers is Ballard's geological work: studying hydrothermal vents close-up, and his contribution to the theory of plate tectonics, new and controversial at the time he was preparing for his PhD. Ballard was an early evangelist of the manned submersible as an up-close investigation tool, something not appreciated by his seniors in the geological sciences. After much academic in-fighting, Ballard's faction triumphed.

It is of course impossible to spot where Ballard did the writing, and where McConnell can take credit. The book is certainly fast-paced, and there are no tedious asides into scientific minutia. Unfortunately, some errors have crept in: HMS Prince of Wales was not a battlecruiser (p.358); HUMS Kirishima was neither larger nor more heavily armoured than Bismarck (p.397); and the fact that Bismarck did not "implode" is not proof that she was scuttled rather than sunk by Royal Navy gunnery, (p.379) He does point out, though, that the flyer who spotted Bismarck on 26 May 1941 was an American in RAF service (there are a few places where stereotypic "rah-rah" American flag-waving is all too prevalent).

The nice selection of illustrations, all in colour, are more than just a collection of "he was there" images. There are action photos of his teams, artifacts, the research vessels and submersibles, and of course the remains of Bismarck and Titanic. Two minor proofing issues: the photo of the wreck of USS Barton was reproduced upside-down, and of course "the HMS" for the Australian Canberra should have been simply "HMAS."

Explorations was written with Ballard near the summit of his career — a public relations exercise and source of funds. It is to be hoped that there will be a follow-on version some years hence, more contemplative and less gung-ho. He is not short on self-confidence — but then the book only touches lightly on his private life. It would be interesting to learn more about Ballard the man, with more depth, less ego, and an index.

William Schleilhaus
Pierrefonds, Quebec