The Development of Strategic Concepts and Shipbuilding Programmes for the Soviet Navy, 1922-1953: Stalin's Battleships and Battlecruisers

Jürgen Rohwer

On 10 August 1939, only three weeks before Hitler's invasion of Poland, the People's Commissar and Chief of the Soviet Naval Forces, Flagman Flota 2nd Rank N.G. Kuznetsov, presented a revised ten-year shipbuilding plan in response to a request from the State Committee for Defense. It called for the four fleets — Far East, Baltic, Black Sea, and North — to contain by 1947 no less than 2,563,065 tons of combat ships and 465,836 tons of auxiliaries.1 If this had transpired, it would have put the Soviet Navy at the apex of the world's seapowers, with a combat fleet bigger than the British (2,149,164 tons), US (1,757,648 tons), Japanese (1,498,846 tons), German (1,041,983 tons), French (825,686 tons) or Italian (746,914 tons) navies.2 Especially impressive was the plan for thirty-one new battleships and battle-cruisers, a huge number compared to the forty big ships building and planned by the other six major seapowers combined.3 But why were Stalin and his advisers planning for such a big navy?

To understand this, we need to understand something about the historical development of the Soviet Navy. Prior to 1953 we can distinguish five periods characterized by very different strategic aims and shipbuilding plans. The first era covered the years to 1925. It was marked by frequent changes in naval leadership, as the Commissar for the Army and Navy, L.D. Trotsky, replaced Imperial officers with former non-commissioned officers, sailors and Bolshevik functionaries. In theoretical terms the "old school," which advocated a navy centered around battleships, held sway. But in practice, without great political support, the Navy was forced to make do with what it had. The few relatively modern ships were retained for active service, while older vessels were sold for scrap.4

The second period spanned the years from 1926 to 1935. It was an era in which some consolidation took place, as the remaining naval leaders realized the discrepancies between theory and reality. Strategic thinking turned slowly to echo the thinking of Red Army leaders like Chief of the General Staff M.N. Tukhachevski and Chief of the Operations Department V.K. Triandafillov, who proposed to counter any threat by deep mobile strikes into enemy territory with armoured and parachute forces. In this view, the Navy existed only to provide cover and to support the Army's sea flanks. As a result, in the plans of 1926 and 1928 the Navy placed an emphasis on active coastal defence with

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simple naval weapons that could be produced cheaply and without diverting scarce resources away from the Army. Even in the Second Five-Year Plan, promulgated in 1932, the stress was on large numbers of small and medium-sized submarines, four motor-torpedo boats, mines and naval aircraft, supported by destroyers and a few fast cruisers. The new dangers in East Asia and Hitler's Anti-Soviet policy led to the strengthening of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and the establishment of naval forces in the Arctic and Pacific.

At the end of 1935 a shift began that even today is not acknowledged by many historians. It was led not only by those who believed in a balanced fleet but also by naval proponents of a small-ship navy. The latter comprised the "new young school," and included men like Chief of the Naval Forces V. M. Orlov. These officers changed their minds and advanced plans for a navy built around a large number of big battleships, accompanied by many new cruisers, destroyers and bigger submarines. The building of a "Great Deep-sea and Ocean-going Fleet" became the theme of discussions and planning up to the outbreak of the Second World War.

The fourth period covered the Great Fatherland's War (1941-1945). The Navy was only in the initial stages of its build-up at the outset. Moreover, because of the dire situation that developed on land, the Navy was forced again to return to a supporting role. Yet even during these years planning continued for a different Navy.

Once victory was assured, discussions began about the nature of the postwar Navy. This quickly led to proposals for major new building programmes. Stalin was reluctant to grant the wishes of his admirals for aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and new types of submarines. Instead, he preferred big battleships and especially his beloved battle-cruisers. We may look now at the development of plans to build these big ships, which may serve as a model of Soviet warship building during the Stalin era. (For the other ship types — cruisers, destroyers, escorts, minesweepers and submarines — see table 1 for 1936-1940 and table 2 for 1944-1959.) Stalin was interested primarily in the battleships and battlecruisers as, in his view, the mightiest instruments of naval power.

During the first period plans were made for the modernization of the three remaining battleships in the fleet and the recovery of a battleship laying at Bizerte with the Vrangel squadron. Some people also proposed to build eight new battleships. In February 1924 the Soviet delegate E. A. Berents, Chief of Naval Forces from May 1919 to February 1920, demanded at the Rome Conference that the USSR be given a limit of at least 491,000 tons of battleships, almost as much as was allowed Great Britain and the United States.

But these unrealistic dreams were deferred during the second period. Only the three remaining battleships were thoroughly modernised, but nothing was built. On 8 May 1928 a major conference was convened by the Revolutionary War Council to decide the kind of fleet the country needed. A serious clash ensued between Chief of Staff of the Red Workers and Peasants Army (RKKA) M. K. Tukhachevski, and Chief of the Training Administration of the Navy M. A. Petrov, when the former demanded that the Army be given priority and the latter advocated a big-vessel navy. Petrov was relieved of his duties, largely due to some fabricated accusations. The decision was taken to build up the coastal artillery, to prepare mine barrages and to construct a great number of small submarines and motor torpedo boats.
While the "young school" carried the day internally, by the early 1930s the debate over building more large ships spread outside the Navy. Diplomats argued that the need to support foreign policy, especially in areas like East Asia, with visible weapons like heavy warships, was great. Shipbuilders also articulated their desire for bigger warships.12

We now know that in 1935 Central Design Bureau No.1 (TsKBS-1) of the National Shipbuilding Administration (GLAVMORPROM) worked on six design studies for battleships of between 43,000 and 75,000 tons. On 24 December 1935 these were presented to the Chief of GLAVMORPROM, R.A. Muklevich.13 Moreover, in the autumn of 1935 the Italian Ansaldo yard in Genoa was asked to prepare plans for a 42,000-ton battleship; these were delivered on 14 July 1936.14 That these were not isolated occurrences initiated by some naval enthusiasts is clear given that Tukhachevski's successor as Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.I. Yegorov, on 16 January 1936 sent a request to the Chief of the Naval Forces of the RKKA, Flagman Flota 1st Rank V.M. Orlov, asking for an additional shipbuilding program. This led to a report by Orlov to the Peoples Commissar for Defence, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, in which he asked for a general revision of the tasks given to the naval forces and for a change from light surface vessels to "capital ships," quoting the intense interest of the General Staff in such changes. Voroshilov then ordered the Naval Staff to prepare a ten-year plan to build up the fleet.15

The sudden change of mind by the Chief of the Naval Forces, who had previously supported the "young school" approach, and Yegorov's request to include at least six aircraft carriers in the new plan, supports the supposition that such shifts could only have occurred if they were in accord with Stalin's wishes. He had at this time achieved so dominant a position in the Politbureau and the Party's Central Committee that no one dared to oppose his will.

In the following months a real flood of plans appeared. Orlov at first selected two of the six proposals for battleships, one of about 57,000 tons for the Pacific and one of about 35,000 tons for the Baltic and Black Sea. He also asked the Design Bureau of the Baltic Yard on 21 February 1936 to draft a set of plans, but when the proposal resembled the British Nelson-class ships, with three big triple gun-turrets on the forecastle, it was rejected. On 15 April 1936 the Naval Staff proposed fifteen battleships, twenty-two heavy and thirty-one light cruisers, 162 destroyers and 412 submarines.16 On 13 May 1936 Orlov instructed his deputy, Flagman 1st Rank I.M. Ludri, to order the Research Institute for Warship Construction to draw up draft plans, and two days later the technical requirements were sent by the Shipbuilding Department of the Administration of the Naval Forces.17

On 27 May 1936 the Council for Labour and Defense decided on the distribution of new ships for the four main fleets: thirty-five percent were to go to the Pacific, thirty percent to the Baltic, twenty-three percent to the Black Sea, and twelve percent to the North. In June 1936 the Committee for Defense proposed that by 1947 there should be no fewer than twenty-four battleships.18 On 13 August Orlov approved the technical requirements for two types of battleships: "A" (Project 23) and "B" (Project 25) along the lines the Central Design Bureau and the Design Bureau of the Baltic Yard had proposed in a recent competition.19 On 26 November Orlov picked two revised designs for ships of 41,500 and 26,400 tons, the first armed with nine sixteen-inch guns and the second with nine twelve-inchers.20 On 28 November Orlov presented the new "Big Ocean Fleet"
plan to the Eighth Extraordinary Soviet Congress, which was summoned to ratify a new constitution. On 3 December the Naval Administration issued a contract to the Chief of the Shipbuilding Administration to build two "A" and two "B" ships at Leningrad and four "B" ships at Nikolayev by the end of 1941.²¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Changes in Soviet Naval Plans, 1936-1940</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ship Type</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Destroyer Leaders</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrol Vessels</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Submarines</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Submarines</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Submarines</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* See text.

By this time it was absolutely crucial to know Stalin's wishes. At the end of 1936 he convened a conference of naval commanders at which for a final time divergent opinions were aired. The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, I.K. Kozhanov, pleaded for submarines and small ships, while the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, M.V. Viktorov, argued for the big-ship model. When Stalin said that "you possibly do not know what you need," he must already have decided to build a large ocean-going fleet.²²

Moreover, in January 1937 Stalin initiated a thorough reorganization of the Naval Command and the defence industry. The Peoples Commissariat for Defence Industry under M.M. Kaganovich was separated from the Peoples Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and the Second Main Administration of this new Commissariat became the Office for Shipbuilding, under Deputy Commissar R.A. Muklevich.²³ Orlov also became a Deputy
Commissar for Defence for the Naval Forces. The new organizations met on 28 January to decide on a work plan, which was completed in April. But before the heads of the new organizations could present their plan to Stalin, they became victims of "Yeshovchina," the purges against the leaders of the Army and Navy. Three of the five Marshals of the Army, as well as most of the Fleet Commanders, many flag and staff officers, and even some of the heads and leading engineers in the design bureaus and the shipbuilding yards, became victims, which needless to say disrupted the planning processes.24

Nonetheless, planning did continue. In May 1937 the planned twenty-four battleships were divided into eight type "A" and sixteen type "B" units. Four of each type were to be laid down in late 1937 and early 1938.25 After discussions a new plan for "Building a Great Ocean Fleet" was presented on 15 August by the new Chief of the Naval Forces, Flagman Flota 1st Rank M. V. Viktorov, and his deputy, Flagman 1st Rank L. M. Galler, and approved by Voroshilov. This scheme included only twenty battleships, but six were designated as part of Project 23 (the programme to build the 57,000 ton battleships), while Project 25 was cancelled, ostensibly due to sabotage, for which the builders V. L. Bzhezinskii and P. O. Trachtenberg were purged. In its place, fourteen ships of a new Project 64 — 48,000 tons with nine fourteen-inch guns — were decreed, increasing battleship tonnage by thirty-five percent. In addition, there were now to be ten 23,000-ton "Washington cruiser-hunters," with nine ten-inch guns (Project 22). Voroshilov presented this plan to Stalin in September 1937, but no document with Stalin's signature has survived.26

In December 1937 Viktorov was relieved, arrested and sentenced to "the highest amount" on 1 August 1938.27 We can assume that this reflected Stalin's dissatisfaction with the battleship designs. This assumption is buttressed by the fact that on 16 January 1938 the new Peoples Commissar for the Navy, Army Commissar 1st Rank P. A. Smirnov, and the Chief of the Main Staff, Flagman 1st Ranga L. M. Galler, presented a revised plan, omitting the smaller Project 64 battleships but increasing the number of large Project 23 craft. Instead of the Project 22 heavy cruisers, new 35,240-ton battle-cruisers with nine twelve-inch guns (Project 69) were substituted once the size and armament of the German battleship Scharnhorst became known.28

Efforts were also made to attract foreign assistance. Between 1936 and 1939 negotiations took place with the US government and American companies over orders for battleships, armour and heavy gunnery. The firm Gibbs and Cox in 1937/1938 delivered several plans for large battleships and aircraft carriers. As well, the Czech firm Skoda was asked to build naval guns, and the Swiss firm Brown-Boveri received an order for 70,000-psi turbines.29

While the purges continued, changes in the top positions followed at frequent intervals, until April 1939 when the young Commander of the Pacific Fleet, N. G. Kuznetsov, was tapped to become the new Peoples Commissar for the Navy. On 10 August he and Galler presented a new plan with revised strategic missions for the fleets. The Pacific Fleet had to be able to defeat the Japanese, to support ground forces operating along the coasts, to destroy enemy naval bases, to disrupt the enemy's ocean communications, to strike at its fisheries, and to defend Soviet sea communications in East Asia. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to be capable of defeating the Germans, as well as the navies of Poland, Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states. Moreover, it was given the
responsibility to support landing operations. Its submarines were to be able to sink 120,000 gross registered tons of German shipping monthly. And its coastal component had to defend the Soviet coastline along the Gulf of Finland. The Black Sea Fleet had to be able to defeat the Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish navies. The Northern Fleet had to reckon with the German Navy supporting Finnish forces with two *Bismarck* battleships, five heavy cruisers, two pocket battleships, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, minesweepers and aircraft. Since there was fear of a German strategic landing in the Soviet Arctic, the Northern Fleet had to be able to disrupt the enemy's sea communications in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian, North and Greenland Seas. In addition it had to defend Soviet ocean communications with neutrals as well as home communications and the Arctic fisheries.

To fulfill these tasks the plan foresaw fifteen 59,150-ton battleships (Project 23) and sixteen 35,240-ton battle-cruisers (Project 69), in addition to many cruisers, destroyers, submarines and smaller vessels, and even two aircraft carriers. By Stalin's orders details were to be kept secret, and even the fleet commanders did not get full information. The projects, and especially plans for the big ships, had to be presented to Stalin, who made comments and proposed changes; his approval was final.

**Why Stalin Forced a "Big Ocean-Going Fleet" from 1936-1940**

Because Stalin avoided written orders, we have no direct documentation of his thinking. But it is likely that he indicated his preferences to his closest associates, who in turn alerted the naval decision-makers. Given Stalin's mistrust and his predilection for brutal reprisals, such hints would have been enough to explain the sudden change in general naval strategy away from a small ship, coastal, and defensive navy to a large ship, ocean-going force in early 1936. Stalin's change of mind was probably evoked on the one hand by shifts in international geopolitics. He did not expect much from the "collective security" policy proposed by his Commissar for Foreign Relations, M.M. Litvinov, because he did not trust Great Britain and had doubts about the French. This meant that the growing threats from the Japanese, Germans and Italians could only be countered by becoming the strongest military power in the world. And because all the great powers had started to build up their navies, the USSR also needed the biggest navy, especially because of the fear that all its potential enemies might act in concert, a perception reinforced by the German-British naval agreement of 1935. Since the backbone of big navies was the battleship, it followed that Stalin needed the most and the biggest battleships of all. But in 1939 neither the Red Army nor the Navy were nearly strong enough. When Hitler's aggressive policy forced Stalin to choose between an alliance with either the Western democracies or Germany, he selected the second option. In part this was because Hitler offered to divide Poland and to give way to Soviet ambitions in the Baltic states, while the Western nations would not allow Stalin to support Poland against Hitler by sending the Red Army into the country.

The treaties between Germany and the USSR had important consequences for the Soviet Navy. During a visit to Berlin, Peoples Commissar for Shipbuilding I.T. Tevosyan requested assistance for the Soviet naval buildup. Similar requests ranged from the plans for the battleship *Bismarck* and the carrier *Graf Zeppelin*, to the purchase of three heavy
cruisers, armour plates, gunnery and equipment for four light cruisers, to heavy gunnery, fire control instruments, torpedoes, minesweeping gear, submarine periscopes and batteries. Hitler, however, was reluctant, allowing only delivery of the incomplete heavy cruiser *Littzow*. But he made an offer that had curious results: in Germany the rearmament of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, planned for 1941/1942, had to be postponed. To use the fifteen-inch turrets, already in production, the planned eight 22,145-ton *Panzerschiffe* were cancelled in July 1939 and replaced by three 28,900-ton battle-cruisers. When the war began, however, all orders for big ships were cancelled to free building slips for U-boats. As a result, the six fifteen-inch turrets could be used to meet Tevosyan's request. This enabled reconstruction of the battle-cruisers *Kronshtadt* and *Sevastopol*, already on the ways, with German fifteen-inch turrets, fire control equipment and searchlights. The new design (Project 69-1) was approved by Admiral Kuznetsov on 18 October 1940.

Meanwhile, in discussions about the August 1939 plan, Tevosyan forced the Navy to drop some requests to fit shipbuilding capacities, which had not expanded as had been hoped. The revised plan, approved by Kuznetsov on 27 July 1940, reduced the battleships to ten and the battle-cruisers to eight; six and four of these were to be built in the Third Five-Year Plan, and the remainder (plus two carriers) in the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

The short interval from the summer of 1940 to June 1941 was accompanied by rising tensions and an accumulation of intelligence about a probable German attack on the USSR. This re-orientated the armament industry to the needs of the Army, and forced naval leaders to propose a stop to the big-ship programmes to free space to build light ships and submarines. When Kuznetsov proposed to scrap the two battle-cruisers already on the ways, Stalin disagreed and ordered their completion. On 19 October 1940 the decision was taken to finish the three big *Sovetskii Soyuz* battleships and the two *Kronshtadt* battle-cruisers, but to postpone other battleships, battle-cruisers and carriers.

When Hitler attacked, the Soviet Navy was far from the condition its leaders had predicted and lacked a strategic plan that matched reality. It took time and some major losses before this disjunction was overcome. On 19 July 1941 it was decided to postpone for the duration of the conflict the 221 vessels and submarines — including the three battleships and two battle-cruisers — still under construction. But even during the difficult years of fighting, the construction bureaus continued to improve the designs of the battleships, battle-cruisers and submarines. By July 1941 the central construction bureau TsKB-4 had produced the technical specifications for an improved battleship (Project 24). The first drawings were finished in March 1942; in July the construction details were worked out; and in January 1943 more precise requirements were produced. By the end of 1944, the final drawings existed. The battleship now had a standard displacement of 75,000 tons and nine sixteen-inch guns, as well as improved anti-aircraft armament and armour. The battle-cruisers were similarly enhanced. When German deliveries for Project 69-1 were cancelled, planning changed in May 1941 to a new Project 82, first intended as a heavy cruiser of 20-22,000 tons with eight-inch guns; by 1943/1944, this had expanded to 25-26,000 tons and nine-inch guns.

When victory was no longer in doubt, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov in January 1945 ordered commissions to work out plans for postwar shipbuilding. The Navy now demanded four battleships and ten battle-cruisers, as well as six heavy and six light aircraft carriers. But in a September 1945 meeting convened by Stalin, in which members
of the Politbureau, Shipbuilding Administration and Navy participated, Kuznetsov's proposal to reduce the big-gun ships to four each and to build aircraft carriers instead was debated. Stalin disagreed and allowed only two light carriers, but permitted the completion of the battleship *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, then mothballed in Molotovsk, according to an improved Project 23-NU; he also approved later the building of two 75,000-ton ships (Project 24). But he insisted that seven Project 82 battle-cruisers, which he liked so much, be started, albeit not with nine-inch guns as Kuznetsov wanted but with nine twelve-inch guns and improved armour and secondary artillery, so that the ships now came to 36,500 tons. Two were actually started in 1952, only to be scrapped after Stalin's death and the drastic change in naval planning that occurred when the Minister of Defense, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, said that surface ships had lost their earlier role, and Secretary General N.S. Khrushchev ordered the ways to be cleared of unnecessary ships.41

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Types</th>
<th>Request VMF 1944</th>
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<td>123</td>
<td>74</td>
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Source: See text.
What was Stalin's Role from 1944 to 1953?

From Stalin's reactions in the discussions, reported by some participants after 1989, we must assume the following. The situation in 1945 had changed greatly. The Soviet Union needed a period of reconstruction to repair the great damages to its industry. And now there was a much more powerful probable enemy. Soviet threat perception saw the primary dangers from the far superior strategic air power of the Western countries and their great amphibious potential. So while the admirals tried to revive the concept of a balanced homogeneous fleet with all types from the aircraft carriers and battleships, Stalin was now much more concerned with the available capacities of industry and the build-up of necessary forces to counter the perceived most dangerous actual threats. But against the wishes of the admirals he continued to push his cherished battlecruisers while he neglected aircraft carriers; warship building depended not on new concepts but rather on proven designs. Thus, the dismissal of Kuznetsov on 17 January 1947 had its roots in his diverging proposals for the composition of the fleet, and the accusations in the trial that he and three other leading admirals had given secrets to the British were only subterfuges. Reinstalled in 1951 by Stalin to manage the new programme, after Stalin's death in 1953 Kuznetsov clashed several items with Khrushchev and Zhukov until the explosion of the Novorossijsk in Sevastopol harbour provided a new but unfounded opportunity to demote the admiral again.

NOTES

* Prof. dr. Jürgen Rohwer, a former editor of the journal Marine Rundschau, is Vice-President of the International Commission of Military History and Chairman of the International Intelligence Study Group. He has written extensively on naval history in a variety of countries.

1. Central State Archive of the Naval Forces (TsGA VMF), Gatshina Narodnyi Komissar (VMF SSSR), 10, 8, 1939, 9911/ss/ob., f. 1877, op. 3, d. 56, l. 140-142.


6. TsGA VMF, f. r-1483, op.-l, d. 431, l. 9 and d. 502, l.-7-8, 110, 133.

7. E.A Shitikov, V.N. Krasnov and V.V. Balabin, Korable-stroenie v SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi vojny(Moskva, 1995).


10. Stenogramma zasedania RVS SSSR s Kommanduyushchimi vojskami MVO, UVO i
The Northern Mariner

BVO i nachal'nikami morskich sil Balkijskogo i Chernogo morej ot 8-go Maya 1928 gods. ZGASA, f. 4, op. 1, d. 752, l. 213.


17. Gribovskii, "Linejnye."

18. TsGA VMF, f. r-1483, op. 1, d. 501, l. 112-113. Tablica rasiregeleniya po teatrach po programme stroitel'stva voenno-morskogo flota. TsGA VMF, f. 1877, op. 9, d. 56.

19. Gribovskii, "Linejnye."

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. N.G. Kuznetsov, Nakanune (Moskva, 1966), 257.


25. TsGA VMF, f. r. 1483, op. 1, d. 431, l. 9 and d. 502, l. 7-8, 110, 133.


31. Narodnyi Komissar VMF SSSR, 10 August 1939, 9911/ss/ob. TsGA VMF, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 56, 1-140-142. See also Rohwer and Monakov, "The Soviet Union's Ocean-Going Fleet," for details about the plan of 10 August 1939, 856.


34. Siegfried Breyer, "Sowjetisches Schlachtkreuzer mit Krupp-Kanonen," Marine-Forum (Marz 1991), 301-303; and Jürgen Rohwer, "Weltmacht


37. Prikaz Narodnogo Komissara Voenno, morskogo flota SSR, No.00263,23 Oktyabr 1940g. There also details about the changes for the other types of ships and submarines.


40. Ibid., 43-49.

