Adventures in the Sack Trade: London Merchants in the Canada and Newfoundland Trades, 1627-1648

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Introduction: Fish into Wine

The oft-made, if oft-challenged, assertion that the British cod fishery at Newfoundland was a multilateral trade is not a claim about the geographic path of every ship venturing across the Atlantic with a cargo of dried fish, but an economic analysis of the flow of goods. Whatever the itineraries of individual ships, this important early modern trade was essentially triangular. Mediterranean and Iberian ports imported Newfoundland cod and exported wine and fruit to English and Dutch ports, which in turn exported labour and supplies to Newfoundland. But the ships venturing to the fishery were normally not heavily laden, either in tonnage or value. In other words, if the Newfoundland trade was triangular, it was a flow with two steady streams and one trickle. The wealth extracted from the sea and the value added in making fish returned to England from southern Europe, whether in specie or in the form of wine, fruit, oil, cork or other goods. Only a small fraction of these returns were re-directed to Newfoundland.

England’s trade with Spain and Portugal grew rapidly in the first half of the seventeenth century, particularly during the shipping boom of the 1630s. Wine, much of it from Malaga, was a major English import from Iberia, although raisins and olive oil were also significant. The trade in these goods was no less seasonal than the trade in cod. Their respective commercial cycles meshed perfectly: raisins reached market in August; the vintage was shipped in September, October and November; and olive oil was sent in the winter. Commercial efficiency dictated that the sack ships carrying Malaga and other Spanish wines to Britain were, in the main, vessels that had arrived from Newfoundland with fish. The very name of these ships suggests the importance of sack, or wine, in this multilateral trade: "sack" derives from vino de sacca or "wine set aside for export."

The southern vertex of a sack voyage was not always Iberian or even Mediterranean. A similar trade developed with the Atlantic Islands. The London records of the Canary wine merchant John Paige suggest that between 1648 and 1656 fully one-third of the goods imported by his trading partner in Tenerife consisted of Newfoundland fish. The Azores lie directly on one of the most practical sailing passages to Newfoundland.
from Europe and Horta, on the island of Fayal, became not only a watering stop but also a market for fish and a source of wine and brandy. The Dutch experimented with taking Newfoundland fish to southern markets in the New World, but voyages like that of the De Cooinck to Pernambuco, Brazil, in 1636 were rare. By the 1670s a few New England ships bound for the West Indies were calling at Newfoundland, like the sixty-ton Nicholas which went to Barbados from Renews in 1677. These were still unusual voyages, however. Newfoundland's normal seventeenth-century trade linked it with England and the wine-producing regions of southern Europe, at the opening of the century typically with France and after 1620 typically with Spain or one of the Atlantic islands. The historiographic tradition which pits a sack ship interest against a fishing ship interest is no longer compelling, for the businesses of catching and freighting fish complemented one another. Most voyages actually combined the two. When ships were devoted completely to one purpose, they depended on a working relationship with a ship or ships devoted to the other. Not surprisingly, often both were operated by the same merchants. There were, however, regional differences. In the later seventeenth century, most North Devon vessels fished and took their own catches to market, while ships from the South Devon ports of Topsham and Plymouth were predominantly sacks. Dartmouth was heavily engaged in both aspects. London and Bristol freighted sack ships exclusively, although the latter's were much smaller. Any conflict of interest between fishing and sacks in this period was an intramural affair in the West Country as much as a "struggle" between the West and London. Earlier in the century, West Country sack ships were less common.

Convention has it that the early sack trade was supposed to have been dominated by London merchants. There is no doubt that some London vessels went to Newfoundland to buy fish in the first third of the seventeenth century. A few merchants in other ports like Barnstaple, Dartmouth, Weymouth and, particularly, Southampton were also freighting sacks. There were, however, few English sack ships before 1640. In the 1620s Richard Whitbourne noted "divers Dutch and French ships" buying fish at Newfoundland and his Discourse of Newfoundland is, in part, an exposition of how English merchants might displace the Dutch from the trade. In the early 1630s Trinity House complained that something like twenty-eight "strangers ships" were freighting fish at Newfoundland. Until this period Dutch sack ships were almost certainly more common than English. Hector Pieters sailed from Carbonear in 1634 in convoy "with our eleven Dutch and two or three English ships." Relatively low costs may have given the Dutch a competitive advantage, at least until 1637, when Charles I licensed a shipping monopoly, administered by the London wine merchants Kirke, Berkeley and Company, to apply a five percent tax on fish taken from Newfoundland in foreign bottoms.

This essay attempts to clarify how these London merchants entered the Newfoundland sack trade in the 1630s and 1640s. It considers Kirke, Berkeley and Company as interlopers in a new colonial trade. Given the practicalities of the trade it was not unusual for wine merchants to become fish merchants. The entry of these particular London merchants into the fish trade is unusual insofar as their interest in Newfoundland developed out of a prior interest in the Canada trade. A close look at their actual
commercial practice indicates that these metropolitan merchants depended on outport connections in the West Country. This was not a new phenomenon but typical also of the well-developed Dutch sack trade, which Kirke, Berkeley and Company hoped to displace.

**Dutch Competition**

On 10 June 1620, David de Vries set sail from Texel for Newfoundland in a ship freighted by two Amsterdam merchants. He stopped at Weymouth, where he bought three guns for the ship and picked up letters for delivery of fish in Newfoundland. On 18 June he called at Plymouth to buy more guns. After a month at sea, he made land on 29 July in Placentia Bay "where the Basques fish." Tentatively coasting east and north from his landfall, de Vries arrived on 4 August at "Ferrelant...in Cappeling Bay." Here he found the fishing masters from whom he was supposed to buy fish but they were, unfortunately, sold out. De Vries managed to obtain a cargo elsewhere and on 10 September set sail, in convoy with four other ships, for Genoa. His chance encounter with another Dutch ship suggests there were others already trading at Newfoundland. Certainly the evidence assembled by Jan Kupp from the Amsterdam Notarial Archives supports this conclusion.

The Newfoundland voyage was a regular one for Dutch ships by the 1620s and remained so until the 1650s. Pieter Naadt took *De Profeet Daniel* of Amsterdam to Newfoundland and thence to Italy in 1656 on a voyage organized much as de Vries' had been in 1620. Although Dutch ships like *V Swerte Herdt* sailed to Newfoundland as early as 1601, it must have remained for some time a relatively undeveloped trade, since experienced masters were still in short supply in 1618. The Dutch took fish to Genoa, Civitavecchia, Naples, Lisbon, Oporto, and Cadiz as well as ports in France, like Bordeaux. Some of these voyages were rather complex, like that of the *Sint Pieter* which in 1627 went to Newfoundland, Bordeaux, to London "with wines," Topsham and back to Newfoundland. The ships were often large and well-armed, like the 240-ton *St. Michiel*, which sailed from Enkhuizen in 1623 armed with ten guns, four pederos, hand-guns, muskets, firelocks, pikes and "ammunition in proportion." The 300-ton */Vliegende Hart* carried sixteen guns when it went to Newfoundland in 1651. Not all Dutch sacks were this large, but they were rarely under 150 tons and their size and armament are usually stressed in the charter-parties.

It was normal to call at a West Country port en route to the fishery, just as de Vries had in 1620. Occasionally ports like Southampton or Dartmouth were involved, but Plymouth was by far the most commonly used: *De Luypaert* was to call there in 1658, as *Die Lilij, Den Waterhondt* and *James* had in successive decades since the 1620s. There Dutch ships would pick up a supercargo who would bring with him "letters of credit, documents or money" for Newfoundland fish. Ritsert Heijnmers, a Dutch merchant living in Plymouth, was to contract for fish there "or in Dartmouth or thereabouts" for *St. Paulo* in 1629. *De Hoop* embarked a "pilot" at Plymouth in 1637, who would "enjoy free bread and living" on board, although the freighter was to pay his wages. After 1650 the Amsterdam charter-parties often explicitly indicated that ships were not to call in the West
Country but were, like Coninck David in 1651, to go "straight to English Newfoundland according to his letters of credit." The Dutch sacks still carried supercargoes, but in the early 1650s ships like 't Kint or Prins Hendrick, bound for French ports like St. Malo or Nantes, probably bought fish from the French and would have carried French factors. The early Dutch dependence on West Country factors probably explains the vehemence with which Plymouth, in particular, defended the Dutch Newfoundland trade against legal restrictions proposed by London in the 1630s."

**Kirke, Berkeley and Company**

As a rule, early modern merchants were flexible in their commitment to particular trades. Commercial information, let alone security, was uncertain and it therefore made sense to avoid the concentration of risk that followed from rigid specialization. This was certainly true of the London wine merchants Gervaise Kirke and William Berkeley, who in 1627 set up the Company of Adventurers to Canada. These opportunists turned Britain's war with France (1627-1629) to advantage by obtaining letters of marque, permitting their vessels to mount a privateering raid on the "River of Canada." They applied this right to force their way into the lucrative fur trade the French had developed with the native peoples of Acadia and the St. Lawrence River. The attempt to broaden their trade was an astute business move, since there was a glut of wine on the London market. With several large well-armed ships, a certain amount of luck, and the help of the Montagnais people of the north shore, Kirke's three eldest sons were able to defeat a squadron of French ships and to take Champlain's trading post at Québec in 1629. This was a surprising success, for their "general," David Kirke, had little maritime experience beyond the wine trade between London and southwestern France."

Unfortunately for the Kirkes and their co-adventurers, the war had ended before they took Québec. Under the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1632), Britain was to restore both Québec and Port Royal to France. The Kirkes surrendered the former and returned to London, although not empty-handed. The elder Kirke, Gervaise, had died in 1629 and his sons were now in partnership with William Berkeley. The surviving partners never accepted the justice of damages they were forced to pay the French, and the family continued, for over half a century, to press a series of unsuccessful counter-claims. Nor did they accept their exclusion from the fur trade: the Kirkes and Berkeley continued to send ships to Québec and Acadia. At least two of these voyages ended in serious setbacks, however. In 1633 the French took Mary Fortune's cargo at Tadoussac and in 1644 an attempt by Isaac Berkeley in Gilleflower to trade near de la Tour's post on the St. John River in Acadia somehow ended with the French wholesaling the London goods in Boston, as part of a short-lived effort to build a commercial relationship with Massachusetts. It is likely that Kirke, Berkeley and Company were forced out of the fur trade in "the River of Canada," in the 1640s, by de la Tour in Acadia and the Cent Associës in Québec. By this time, they had another New World
interest, as commercial agents of the Newfoundland trading monopoly granted by Charles I to Sir David Kirke and several aristocratic associates. David Kirke, his wife, Lady Sara Kirke, and their four sons settled in Newfoundland, where he appropriated the resident fishing station of Ferryland, created at considerable expense in the 1620s by Sir George Calvert, the first Baron Baltimore. David's brothers, John and James, prospered as London overseas merchants in the decades leading up to the Civil War. After the Restoration, John inherited a court sinecure from another brother, Lewis, and could have retired from commerce at this point (he was then fifty-eight). Instead, he returned to the fur trade, investing £300 in the original stock of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) in 1667. This became another family venture: about 1672 his daughter Elizabeth married Pierre Radisson, the coureur de bois who explored Rupert's Land for the HBC. The Kirkes were thus active participants in the three major commercial arenas of seventeenth-century Canada: the St. Lawrence fur trade, the Newfoundland fishery and, finally, the new fur trade of Hudson Bay. In 1687, an elderly Sir John Kirke recalled that his family fortunes had been consistently tied to the part of North America that is now Canada. Historians have rarely noticed the connection.

Berkeley was born about 1586, making him a decade older than David Kirke, who turned forty in 1637. He was a substantial merchant of St. Helen's, Bishopsgate, and probably the senior partner in both senses, at least in the 1630s. Besides the sack and Canada trades, Berkeley was involved with Sir William Alexander's New Scotland Project as well as in trade to Virginia, Bermuda, Greenland and New England. He was typical of London's "new merchants" of the first half of the seventeenth century, at least as these interlopers are seen by Robert Brenner in Merchants and Revolution. The new merchants, often of obscure socio-economic background, pursued colonial North American commerce after chartered company-organized City merchants had abandoned it as unprofitable. This characterization fits Berkeley's partners David and John Kirke as well.

Brenner uses Berkeley's career as one of a number of convincing illustrations of his central argument: these new, interloping, colonial merchants provided the London leadership of the "Independent" faction, during the English Revolution of the 1640s. Berkeley became active in politics as an alderman and from 1642 served on the revolutionary militia committee. From 1643 he served on the customs commission which gave crucial support to the parliamentary Navy and, from 1649, held Commonwealth appointments both to the commission for the navy and customs and to the prize goods commission. Such political activity must have brought Berkeley into conflict with his sometime partner, Sir David Kirke, who took a consistently royalist position throughout the Civil War. This political divergence between two merchants with similar class backgrounds and economic interests raises an apparent counter-example to Brenner's thesis — but one with an explanation, discussed below. Whatever the political distance that developed between the original senior partners of Kirke, Berkeley and Company, the revolutionary London alderman was still in partnership with John Kirke in the late 1640s. Some of Berkeley's trading activities about this time led the Keepers of the Liberty of England to question his "good affection to this Parliament and Common-
wealth," which suggests that Berkeley's commitment to the cause may not have been as complete as the political activities catalogued by Brenner would lead one to assume. Berkeley seems never to have faced these political problems, for he died early in 1653."

In the 1630s and 1640s the Kirkes traded separately, severally, or as "Kirke, Berkeley and Company." This was neither a regulated nor a joint-stock company, but their clients and competitors normally referred to the commercial partnership with Berkeley in this way." The few surviving London Port Books of the period record their pursuit of the wine trade and suggest a shift in trading emphasis from France to Spain. Fortunately, from the historical point of view, they were exceptionally litigious merchants and Admiralty Court records confirm that in the 1630s the Kirkes broke into the Spanish wine trade and thus, almost inevitably, into the Newfoundland trade. In 1633 Kirke, Berkeley and Company let St. George to freight for a voyage to Barcelona and "other parts beyond the seas." This was, in part, a Newfoundland sack voyage and the freighter another prominent London wine merchant and sometime investor in the Canada trade, John Delabarre. In 1634 he freighted the 240-ton Faith from the Kirkes for a voyage to Newfoundland, thence to Cartagena and home. (It was entirely normal in the seventeenth century for the merchant owner of a ship to let it to freight and simultaneously take another ship on charter for freighting his own merchandise, as a simple way of spreading the risks of commerce.)"

Commercial arrangements with Dutch merchants may have given Kirke, Berkeley and Company further exposure to the fish trade before the "Grant of Newfoundland" to Sir David Kirke and his associates in 1637. This patent did not exactly exclude "strangers" from either the fish or the carrying trades, but it gave the patentees the right to levy a five percent tax on fish caught (primarily by the French) or carried (primarily by the Dutch). Both the Privy Council and the Kirkes presumed that the tax would drive the Dutch out of the carrying trade; it certainly brought the Kirkes into a new relationship with their competitors. In 1638 Lewis Kirke taxed a 140-ton Dutch sack ship £50 at Bay Bulls. The Netherlanders appear to have accepted the Kirkes' five percent tax on "strangers fishing" either as a cost of doing business or as a reason to avoid Newfoundland, unlike the French who protested vociferously. The companies "trading to the Plantations of Canada and Newengland" boasted in a 1639 petition to the Privy Council that they had "of late procured almost all the trade from Newfound land from the Dutch." Kirke, Berkeley and Company were no longer in the Newfoundland trade merely as shipowners; they were key players in a successful effort to pre-empt the Dutch share of the carrying trade."

After 1638 Kirke, Berkeley and Company appeared in court not merely as shipowners but as freighters or owner-freighters of ships in the Spanish and Newfoundland trades. The very names of vessels owned in this period by the Kirkes and their associates {John, John and Thomas, James, Pembroke, Hamilton, David and, probably, Lady} suggest that the ships were designated for their own ventures, under the patronage of their fellow Newfoundland patentees, Marquis Hamilton and the Earls of Pembroke and Holland. Most of these craft were London-based, but in the late 1640s David Kirke operated vessels from Ferryland. He shipped about twenty tons of goods to Boston on the
David of Ferryland in 1648. He probably also owned the Lady of Ferryland, which delivered fourteen tons of train oil to Dartmouth in 1647. These eponymous vessels are among the earliest known merchant vessels trading from Newfoundland. By 1640 Kirke, Berkeley and Company were in the Newfoundland sack trade with a vengeance; in fact, they had become major producers of fish.

**Voyage of a Sack Ship: The Faith of London, 1634**

The freighting and financing of sack ships in the first half of the seventeenth century are reasonably well understood. Kirke, Berkeley and Company's shipping interests merit closer examination here, as indications of their experience in the Newfoundland trade before commitment to the fishery after the proprietary patent of 1637 and appropriation of the fishing station at Ferryland in 1638. The itineraries of particular vessels are significant, because they indicate the trades in which the partners were involved. The 1634 voyage of the 240-ton Faith of London, freighted by John Delabarre from Kirke, Berkeley and Company, is of great interest because charter-parties, instructions to the master, and a number of Court of Admiralty examinations relating to the voyage have survived. These provide a vivid picture of the complex arrangements made for the voyage of a Newfoundland sack ship, as well as suggesting how the Kirkes' contacts with Newfoundland grew out of their earlier Canada trade.

In his instructions to the master, Thomas Bredcake, Delabarre told him to "make all haste possible" to get to Newfoundland before late July. There he was to load 4000 quintals of "good merchantable drie Newfoundland fishe of 112 lbs. weight to the quintall" from three Dartmouth ships, Eagle, Ollive and Desire. Delabarre had arranged with Richard Lane, an experienced fish broker of Dittisham near Dartmouth, for letters instructing the fishing masters to deliver the fish at eleven shillings per quintal, which Bredcake was to pay with bills of exchange drawn on Delabarre in London. Both the pre-sale of fish and the accompanying letters of credit were normal practice in the Newfoundland trade. Delabarre's instructions touched on almost every conceivable detail, even stowage and the possibility of default. What is not mentioned is where Faith would find Desire and its companions. Either Bredcake was expected to know where these masters preferred to fish or was to find them promptly through word-of-mouth.

The Newfoundland voyage went fairly smoothly. Faith arrived on 22 July and soon took on 3784 quintals. One of the Dartmouth masters "fayled of his number of fish," as Bredcake later put it, but with the fish supplied and 1000 quintals obtained from another fishing master, his ship had a good cargo. Once loaded, Faith was not to delay "but sail directly, and to be there one of the first, to Cartagena" and Bredcake departed on 8 August. In his instructions Delabarre had emphasized that "it doth much concerne me to be first at markett, in the saille of my fishe." Faith arrived on 1 October at Cartagena, where Bredcake sold 1635 quintals to the local factor for Delabarre's Spanish customer, John Romeno of Madrid. On 22 October, Romeno's agent sent Faith on to Barcelona, where another factor took most of the rest of the cargo. Romeno's factors were
to pay a deposit of 32,000 reals (£900) on delivery, or else to return Spanish goods for England. The fish would have been worth about 127,000 reals (£3575). If Faith were not reloaded at Cartagena, Bredcake was to go to Alicante, Majorca or Malaga for freight. Delabarre had specified that Faith should unload within twenty days and reload within thirty and had asked Bredcake "to be a good steward" and take "spetiall care that I runn in no daies of demurrage," that is delay of the vessel in port beyond the time agreed with Kirke, Berkeley and Company, in this case fifty-five days, with a penalty of £5 per day beyond that time.

The execution of these instructions required a certain discretion. Delabarre wanted his own interest in the fish kept secret and warned Bredcake, "By noe means lett not my factor know that I have your ship absolutely out and home," asking him to tell the Spanish factor that he had the ship at £5 10s a ton for 240 tons. In fact Delabarre had freighted Faith from Kirke, Berkeley and Company for the Newfoundland/Spain and Spain/London legs at £5 per ton, calculated on the Spanish cargo delivered to London. This rate for sack ships became standard in the 1630s, although the normal practice was to base the charges on the tonnage of fish. Considered separately the freight on Newfoundland fish to Spain was about £4 per ton and on Spanish goods to London £1 10s to £2 per ton. The fact that the £5 per ton multilateral rate remained stable through the rest of the century suggests that the industry reached some kind of maturity by 1640. The problem that Kirke, Berkeley and Company faced in this case was that in late November a Lieutenant General of the Spanish galleys "violentlie and passionattly" ordered Faith's cables cut, so that it was lost at Barcelona and could not return to London.

Kirke, Berkeley and Company naturally wanted payment for freight to Spain and argued, against precedent, in the Court of Admiralty, that this had been implied in its contract with Delabarre. The ensuing mare's nest of documents filed in this and a related case indicates that the Kirkes and their associates were not the owners of Faith, but had freighted it in mid-April 1634 from its master and part-owner, Thomas Bredcake. They had it, with a crew of thirty-seven men and two boys, for nine months at £145 per month for a voyage "unto the Gulfe and river of Canada." The vessel was then to sail to Newfoundland, for a "full lading of fish," before proceeding to Spain for another cargo. A provision in the charter-party regarding the cost of gunpowder "spent...in defence" suggests that the owners and the freighters may have foreseen the possibility of French hostility. No sooner had Kirke, Berkeley and Company taken Faith on freight from Bredcake than it was let to John Delabarre for the Newfoundland/Spain/England part of the voyage, on the terms described above.

Clearly, the involvement of Kirke, Berkeley and Company with Newfoundland came as an extension of its efforts to participate in the Canada trade. According to Bredcake, the 1633 voyage of St. George had also been a combined Canada/Newfoundland venture, with Delabarre employing the vessel as a sack on the return voyage from the New World. This was certainly more efficient than the itinerary of the Phoenix of Yarmouth, which Kirke, Berkeley and Company had freighted to Newfoundland and
thence to Canada in about 1631. On 17 May 1634, *Faith* departed from the Downs for Canada under Lewis Kirke, accompanied by *St. George* and another vessel, *Aaron*, carrying hatchets, knives, blankets and other goods appropriate for the fur trade. Off the Lizard a storm broke *Aaron's* main and foremasts. After his little convoy limped into Plymouth, Lewis sent his brother James to London with the bad news; James returned with instructions from David Kirke to "give over his désigne for Canada and "proceed direct for Newfoundland." The Kirkes' decision to call off the Canada voyage may have been dictated by delay or by fear that two ships could not achieve what had been planned with three, recalling the loss of *Mary Fortune* the previous year. Whatever the exact reasons for the commercial disengagement from the St. Lawrence, it is evident that the arrangements Kirke, Berkeley and Company had made for the efficient deployment of its shipping had involved the firm in the Newfoundland sack business. In the mid-1630s, the Kirkes were not yet shipping their own fish, but depended on those apparently rare London merchants, like John Delabarre, with contacts in the trade.

The Rationale of Investment in Newfoundland

When John Delabarre freighted a vessel from Kirke, Berkeley and Company for a sack voyage, both parties could hope for substantial profits, if all went well. Table 1 is an estimate of income and expenses for a voyage to Newfoundland and Spain by a 250-ton vessel in the 1630s. The freighter stood to earn something like £465 on the Newfoundland/Spain leg, representing a profit of fourteen percent on expenses of about £3300, mostly for fish and freight. Earnings from wine or other goods shipped to England from Spain would add to this return, without much affecting costs, because freight charges for the whole voyage were normally based on the tonnage of fish shipped: "The retourne from Spaine haveing fraught free," as a 1616 estimate of profits noted. Since this additional income could be earned by reinvestment of proceeds from the sale of fish, successful trade on this leg of a sack voyage might double a freighter's profits. Shipowners like Kirke, Berkeley and Company could also do well out of such voyages. Against freighting income of about £1000, they paid for wages, victualling and annual repairs. Owners should also have set something aside for depreciation, even if not so conceptualized. If total annual costs were about £870, they stood to make £130 on the voyage. This was less than the freighter but represented about the same rate of return as the latter might expect on his cargo of fish."

If such investments could be turned over once a year, a return of fifteen percent for shipowners and up to twice that for freighters makes the sack trade sound attractive. Indeed, successful voyages were appealing propositions. But the profits of one voyage might easily be eaten up by losses on others." Vessel insurance was rare in the seventeenth century; owners gambled that their ships would not be lost to natural or human forces. The division of ship ownership into shares spread this risk, but losses had to be made good from profits on successful voyages. Shipowning in the seventeenth century does not actually seem normally to have been very profitable. Yet as K. R. Andrews
Table 1
Estimated Annual Earnings for the Freighter and Owner of a
Newfoundland Sack Ship of about 250 tons in the 1630s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freighter £</th>
<th>Owner £</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4480 Spanish quintals fish @ 30 reals</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Profit on Iberian goods to England)</td>
<td>(575)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight charges</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>£3780</strong></td>
<td><strong>£1000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(£4355)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fish, 4000 quintals @ 11s/quintal</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight, £5 per ton, 200 tons</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilotage, port charges, bribes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance on cargo, @ 4% of £2200</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Insurance on Spanish goods)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages, 36 man crew for 8 months</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victualling, 36 men for 8 months</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Repairs</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenses</strong></td>
<td><strong>£3315</strong></td>
<td><strong>£870</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(£3405)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Profit</strong></td>
<td><strong>£465</strong></td>
<td><strong>£130</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(£950)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rate of Profit</strong></td>
<td><strong>14%</strong></td>
<td><strong>15%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28%)</td>
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**Note:** Profit on cargo from Spain (bracketed figures) should be regarded as a maximum.


has suggested, average profitability was a remote and irrelevant concept for shipowners, who paid more attention to the wide variability of profits and losses. Merchants must, nevertheless, have noticed the wide potential discrepancy between owners' and freighters' profits in the fish and wine trades, raising the obvious question of why anyone would bother investing in a ship. The answer seems to be that major shareholders had some call on the use of the vessel. In other words, while shipowning may not have been profitable, it facilitated commercial adventures, like the Newfoundland sack trade, with high profit potential. This analysis is certainly consistent with the number of owner-freighters in the sack trade, like the Delabarres and the Kirkes. Colonial merchants like David Kirke had additional reasons to commit financially to the cost of shipowning: to assure dependable communications, supplies and defense.

The critical factors tending to profit or loss had somewhat different impacts on freighters and owners. In the Newfoundland sack trade three were of utmost importance for freighters: procurement of a full cargo of fish; a good price at market; and a reasonably full return cargo to London. These concerns are evident in Delabarre's instructions to Bredcake, in which he stressed the obligation of the Dartmouth masters to provide Faith with fish, the importance of getting to market quickly, and Bredcake's duty to obtain a return cargo from Spain. The system of tying freight charges for sack ships to the tonnage of cod taken to market meant owners were even more dependent than freighters on adequate cargoes. Consider the earnings for freighter and owner estimated above. If the freighter obtained only two-thirds of a cargo of fish his costs would be proportionately reduced and he would still make at least £275. For the shipowner the voyage would result in a serious loss, since a reduced freight of only £670 would not even cover costs. Hence the great stress those letting ships to freight put on the quantity of fish shipped.

Kirke, Berkeley and Company voiced this concern in a curious case involving the 300-ton Hector, which had gone to Newfoundland about 1637, ballasted with relatively bulky rock rather than with lead. The Kirkes argued that when merchants freighted ships for the Newfoundland fishery they usually used lead for ballast, "in regard that
Newfoundland fish is a light commoditie." The freighters of *Hector*, they complained, had used stone ballast, reducing the cargo of fish by forty to sixty tons. At £4 or £5 per ton the shortfall in freight charges would have been about £250, more than the likely profit on the voyage. Ships in the Newfoundland trade actually did carry lead. John Rashleigh's small sack ship *Tryfell* carried about a ton and a half of lead on its 1608 Newfoundland voyage and a surviving 1640 London Port Book records exports of "birdinge short" and a ton of cast lead on *Sara Bonaventure* and 200 "pigges" of lead on *Judith*, both of London and bound for Newfoundland, while William Matthews took the *Marygold* of London to the Canaries carrying 100 "small pigges of lead" for William Berkeley. In this and other cases lead exports may indicate the intention to carry a light cargo like dry fish, which was not subject to impost and which therefore usually passed through British ports without record.\(^4\)

Disputes about ballast were less common, however, than litigation over good faith in securing an adequate cargo of fish. The unfortunate voyage of the *Thomasina* of London in 1637 was a case in point. It was on a time rather than a tonnage charter, which reversed the interests of freighter and owner relative to the size of the cargo. The critical importance of an assured supply of fish in Newfoundland remains clear. Immediately on arrival in Newfoundland the master, Thomas Shaftoe, took the vessel to Fermeuse, but his designated suppliers "had no fish to lade abord her but had sould it away." So Shaftoe took it to Cape Broyle, where the planter Robert Gord was "consigned for part of his ladinge." Unfortunately, Gord was just loading a ship with fish and the best he could promise was to make more fish "as soone as the weather would permitt." It took a month for *Thomasina* to obtain 600 quintals there. It then went to Carbonear, where Shaftoe managed to get 1000 quintals immediately. At this point the master warned the merchants' factor Walter Williamson that *Thomasina's* time charter had expired and it was due at market. Williamson objected that he had more fish to lade for his employer. At his "earnest intreatie," Shaftoe went for Trinity, taking on more fish, before making a late departure for Portugal in September. Once at sea *Thomasina* met "an extraordinary great storme," which it only barely survived, with the loss of its mainmast.\(^4\)

The sack trade was not without its risks — a major one, besides those common to all deep-sea voyages, was that a full cargo of fish would not be obtained. As the owner of ships let on tonnage charters for the Newfoundland sack voyage, Kirke, Berkeley and Company was dependent on the ability of its freighters to obtain full cargoes of fish. Generally, merchants who managed to keep their vessels in a particular trade had the opportunity to build the local relations that assured the good cargoes and quick turns arounds essential for regular profits. This was probably particularly true in the Newfoundland trade. Metropolitan interlopers, whether based in Amsterdam or London, may have found it difficult to find assured cargoes without the assistance of West Country brokers like Richard Lane or Ritsert Heijnmers. The relationship between Kirke, Berkeley and Company and John Delabarre in the 1630s suggests that the latter had the experience and contacts to secure fish cargoes that the former did not. From the Kirkes' point of view this relationship would have been less than satisfactory, since the conditions of the
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tonnage charter left them, as shipowners, open to serious loss if the freighter's Newfoundland contacts failed. Control of their own Newfoundland plantation was not the only way metropolitan merchants like the Kirkes could find a footing in the Newfoundland trade, but it certainly would have achieved this end if it guaranteed a supply of fish.

The Patent of 1637 gave both the merchant associates in the Newfoundland Plantation some of the protection of a privileged chartered company. In other respects Kirke, Berkeley and Company were typical new merchants in their personal involvement in the kind of commercial and productive innovation provoked by colonization. Sir David Kirke's willingness to settle in Newfoundland and his perseverance in the development of Ferryland as a node in his circum-Atlantic trading network are nice examples of this kind of personal commitment. He and his brother John, in particular, are good examples of the "new merchants," no less than William Berkeley, notwithstanding their political divergence in the 1640s from the Independent alderman. The existence of royalist merchants does not, necessarily, detract from the plausibility of economic interest as a determinant of individual allegiance at the outbreak of Civil War in 1642. The royalism of the Kirkes was, in fact, quite consistent with their dependence on royal favour for their commercial rights. This was a pattern of behaviour more often seen among the privileged Merchant Adventurers and the Levant and French Company merchants but certainly comprehensible, given the circumstance of these particular new merchants.

Since it was the designated commercial representative of royal patentees, Kirke, Berkeley and Company was not a trading interloper in a legal sense, although some West Country merchants and the second Baron Baltimore, Cecil Calvert, certainly saw it as such. The Newfoundland Plantation was yet another alliance between new merchants and aristocratic oppositionists with colonial interests. The case of the Kirkes certainly confirms Brenner's emphasis on alliances between Charles and overseas company traders, between the parliamentary aristocracy and the colonial-interloping leadership, and between the latter and London retailers, ship captains and tradesmen. But it also suggests that these alliances could be politically complex and that close association with ordinary maritime folk was not confined to the pro-parliamentary colonial-interloping leadership. Sir David Kirke's Newfoundland plantation was not simply a creature of London investors. What he appropriated at Ferryland went beyond physical infrastructure. His fishing station at Ferryland had close connections with the West Country port of Dartmouth, which habitually sent ships and men to the south Avalon. Part of what the Kirkes co-opted was a human infrastructure bridging the Atlantic. In the end these metropolitan merchants were no less dependent on the vernacular commercial practices of a small British outport than the Dutch traders they successfully challenged for control of the sack trade.

NOTES

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8. See, for example, Innis, *Cod Fisheries*, 54; Stephens, "West-Country Ports," 94; and Starkey,
"Devonians," 166. Cf. the earlier discussions analyzed in Matthews, "Historical Fence Building."


10. Cell, English Enterprise, 105, has another view.


16. Kupp, "L'intérêt hollandais," 567; GAA, NA 693, J. Vrolyck, Declaration, 19 August 1628, in NAC, MG 18/012/116; GAA, NA 738, J. Oort and A. Jacobsen, Charter-Party, 3 April 1623, in NAC, MG 18/012/34; GAA, NA 1574, E. Schot and P. Veen, Charter-Party, 9 May 1651, in NAC, MG 18/012/139. English sack ships were not usually this large and, contrary to conventional historical wisdom were normally smaller than the "fishing" ships they served; Pope, "South Avalon Planters," 120-125.

17. GAA, NA 1539, P. Emanuelss and J. Jacobs, Charter-Party, 27 May 1658; GAA, NA 170, W. vanHaesdonckandB. Lelij, Charter-Party, 6 April 1624; GAA, NA 409, J. Thierry and W. Jonas, Charter-Party, 26 April 1634; Rotterdam City Archives, Notarial Archives, Jan van Eller, West India Company and J. Touteloop, Charter-Party, 8 June 1642, in NAC, MG 18/012/206, 37, 84 and 325; GAA, NA 239, J. Harmensz, Power of Attorney to R. Heynmers, 19 May 1629, in NAC MG 18/012/77; GAA, NA 674, P. Timmermanand G. Romyn, Charter-Party, 6 May 1637, in NAC MG 18/012/114; GAA, NA 1534, J. da Costa and G. van Lynen, Charter-Party, 9 June 1651, in NAC MG 18/012/154; GAA, NA 2114, G. Belin and J. Kint, and G. Belin and S. Vallom, Charter-Parties, 10 and 17 May 1653, in NAC, MG 18/012/167 and 168. The hypothesis that the West was wary of offending the Dutch for fear of threatening the supply of Baltic naval stores seems far-fetched; see Matthews, "Newfoundland Fisheries," 78-82.


20. On the Montagnais alliance see Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers*, 200. David Kirke's comrades-in-arms were his brothers, not his sons, as Trigger suggests.


25. Berkeley paid £34 annual rent in Bishopsgate in 1638, where he was still living in the 1640s; see PRO, HCA 13/54/413, W. Berklye, Examination, 10 January 1639; Dale (éd.), *Inhabitants*, 131; Dale, "Citizens of London 1641-1643 from the State Papers" (unpublished ms., 1936); W. J. Harvey (éd.), *list of the Principal Inhabitants of the City of London 1640, from the Returns Made by the Aldermen of the Several Wards* (London, 1886), 3.
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28. PRO, HCA 23/17/53, Keepers of the Liberty of England, Interrogatories, in Keepers vs Berkeley, et al., c. 1649, asks the libelled merchants "hath they any way expressed their good affection to this Parliament and Commonwealth of England" —a curious question to put to a commissioner of the Navy. This led me to distinguish the Newfoundland and Canada merchant Berkeley from the London alderman in an earlier discussion (Pope, "South Avalon Planters," 107n). There were a number of contemporary William Berkeleys but John Paige’s correspondence makes the identity in question certain. See Paige to G. Paynter and W. Clerke, 1 March 1653, in Steckley (ed.), Letters. Besides the London alderman, we might note the Governor of Virginia; the author of Nepenthes (1614); the ship’s master importing Canary wine in 1664, who might be a son; and the re-emigrant from Bermuda in the late 1650s. On the latter two see PRO, E 190/50/3, London Controller, Port Books, 1664; and PRO, HCA 13/76, J. Bristoe and J. Bantley, Examinations, in Berkeley vs. Morris, 24 February 1669.


33. Davis, English Shipping, 228ff, 338ff; Cell, English Enterprise, 18-21.

34. PRO, HCA 15/5, J. Delabarre, "Memorandum for Master Thomas Breadcake," 1634, is transcribed in Davis, English Shipping, 236-238. On Lane see Cell, English Enterprise, 19. See also Letters of John Paige, passim.


36. Kirke and Delabarre, Charter-Party (1634); Kirke, Interrogatories, in Kirke vs. Delabarre (1635). On rates, see Davis, English Shipping, 236 and 239. The Dutch sometimes used this tonnage system; see GAA, NA 410, 53-54v, G. Bartolotti and D. Jonas, Charter-party re: Den St. Joris, 20 May 1634, in NAC, MG 18/012/55. See also Bredcake, Examination, in Kirke vs. Delabarre (1635).

37. Bredcake, Libel, in Bredcake vs. Kirke et al.; Examination, in Kirke vs. Delabarre; Kirke, Interrogatories in Kirke vs. Delabarre. "When Ships are fraughted going and coming, there is nothing due for freight until the whole Voyage be performed. So that if she perish, or be taken in the coming home, all is lost and nothing due unto her for any freight outwards." Gerard Malynes, Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, The Antient Law-Merchant (2nd ed., London, 1636), 98.


40. Because the normal working life of early modern vessels is not clear, rates of depreciation are uncertain. Davis, English Shipping, 376, suggests four percent annual depreciation, or £100 on a ship worth £2500, a ratio adopted here. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, 32, suggests ships rarely survived more than fifteen years, implying a somewhat higher depreciation.


43. John Scantlebury, "John Rashleigh of Fowey and the Newfoundland Cod Fishery 1608-20," Royal Institution of Cornwall Journal, New Series, VIII (1978-1981), 66; London Searcher, E 190 44/1, 91v-93, Port Books (Exports of Denizens), 1640. For another cargo of lead and dry fish see W. Bayley, Deposition, 4 February 1653, in H.E. Nott (ed.), Deposition Books of Bristol (Bristol, 1948), II, 139. For problems with freighting ships by the month, from the freighters' point of view,

44. PRO HCA 13/61, 50-51, P. Milbery, Examination, 8 May 1648; G.A.A., NA 631, 68-70v, J. Oort and J. Schram, Charter-party re: De Coninck David, 1 April 1624, in NAC MG 18 012/35; J. Paige to G. Paynter and W. Clerke, 16 January 1650, in Steckley (ed.), Letters; Davis, English Shipping, 345. The Kirkes sometimes let ships to freight on time charter, but those they freighted for Newfoundland sack voyages in the 1630s were let on tonnage charters.


46. Brenner, Merchants, 184, 650, 686.