

Toronto Harbour and the Defence of the Great Lakes Region, 1783-1870

Carl Benn

Introduction

The history of Toronto harbour and the defence of the Great Lakes region has two main elements. First, various military planners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries perceived merit in establishing a naval base at Toronto, although for the most part they were unable to fulfil their goals. Second, debate on Toronto's potential always occurred within a broader discussion of the region's strategic requirements. This paper will explore these two themes from the end of the American Revolution, when the British first took an interest in Toronto's naval potential, to 1870, when imperial forces withdrew from central Canada.¹

1783-1806

British authorities began to explore Toronto's naval prospects in the 1780s at about the same time that they purchased territory in the region from the Mississaugas.² But no action was taken until 1793, when the threat of war with the United States led Colonel John Graves Simcoe, the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, to build Fort York preparatory to constructing a naval base and dockyard at Toronto.³

The main flashpoint in the Anglo-American crisis was the area north of the Ohio River (figure 1), where tribes such as the Shawnee, Ottawa, Delaware, and Wyandot, fought US efforts to seize their territory. Britain was implicated in this war, partly because it had failed to evacuate a number of forts on American soil after the end of the American Revolution (figure 2). Known as the "Western Posts," these included Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagara, and Oswego. Although the British wanted to avoid war, it used the Western Posts as bases for agents to support the natives, in hopes that a tribal success would lead to the creation of a native homeland independent of the US and friendly to Britain. American hostility towards Britain grew to crisis proportions after the tribes inflicted devastating defeats upon two US armies in 1790 and 1791.⁴

The Northern Mariner/he Marin du nord, IV, No. 1 (January 1994), 1-15.




Figure 1: The Great Lakes Region in 1793.

Source: Courtesy of the Toronto Historical Board.




Figure 2: Fort Niagara, at the mouth of the Niagara River, was the strongest of the Western Posts. Some of the vessels of the British Provincial Marine can be seen in this c. 1782-1796 watercolour.

Source: Courtesy of the Old Fort Niagara Association.

The British government in 1791 appointed Simcoe to his post in the front line province of Upper Canada, and he arrived in the colony the next year. During this time, Simcoe identified three main concerns about the defence of his backwoods domain. First, the Lake Ontario naval headquarters at Kingston was vulnerable to assault, particularly in winter when the Americans could cross the frozen St. Lawrence and launch a surprise attack. Losing control of Lake Ontario could be disastrous for Upper Canadian defence because it was the central component of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes communications lifeline to the rest of the British Empire. Second, Lake Erie was the main water connection with the Detroit frontier and Britain's aboriginal allies, but in wartime it could be interdicted easily. Third, small garrisons guarding the Western Posts were military and political liabilities. Militarily, the deteriorating forts with their inadequate resources could be defeated one- at a time by the American army. Politically, Simcoe saw the British occupation of the posts as "an object of Jealousy of the Government of the United States" which could initiate the direct Anglo-American confrontation he hoped to avoid.⁵

To solve these problems, Simcoe recommended replacing the Western Posts with a network of defences within British territory. Three naval bases were to be cornerstones:

one on Georgian Bay, a second on Lake Erie at Long Point, and a third on Lake Ontario at Toronto. As well, he wanted to build border forts along the Detroit, Niagara and St. Lawrence Rivers. Simcoe also hoped to develop a provincial capital at London, a location he thought could govern the interior of the continent beyond the Detroit River to Britain's advantage should the western tribes ultimately carve out a homeland there. Finally, he saw a road network as essential to tie these points together and to reduce reliance on the Great Lakes for communications.⁶

The naval base at Toronto was the central component in this plan. Toronto had a good, defensible harbour which could be protected by shore batteries. If fortified, it could not only control Lake Ontario but also serve as the anchor of the "Toronto Passage" — a water and portage route between Lake Ontario and the proposed post on Georgian Bay. The Toronto Passage might prove valuable in maintaining communication with the upper lakes and the Detroit region if southwestern Upper Canada or Lake Erie fell into enemy hands. Moreover, Simcoe believed that Toronto's site away from the border would make surprise attack difficult. Further, he reasoned that since spring came earlier to Toronto than to Kingston, the Provincial Marine would be able to get onto the lake about two weeks earlier. Finally, Toronto was ideally situated to support military efforts on the Niagara Peninsula since it was only fifty kilometres from Niagara by water.

Given the limited resources available, these were long-term objectives predicated on a resolution of the American war with the aboriginal peoples which might include dismantling the Western Posts rather than transferring them to the US. This was important to give the British a head start in fortifying their side of the border.⁷ Unfortunately, the international situation worsened in 1793, leading Simcoe to jettison most of his defensive plans to concentrate on the need for a good naval facility to meet the challenges posed by what seemed like an impending American invasion.⁸

The already poor Anglo-American relations deteriorated further with the outbreak of the Anglo-French war in Europe in February 1793. France attempted to persuade the Americans to invade Canada, and dispatched secret agents to the Great Lakes to undermine the alliance between the British and the natives and to preach sedition among French-Canadians. At the same time, Pennsylvanians built a post south of Lake Erie preparatory to creating a naval station to challenge British supremacy. In Vermont, influential adventurers arranged for thousands of weapons to be sent from France for an invasion of Lower Canada. In New York, settlers and redcoats exchanged shots outside Oswego. Most ominously, an American army under Major-General Anthony Wayne marched towards the centre of the native confederacy south of Detroit. British officials saw this army as a serious threat and expected it to try to cross the Detroit River and invade Upper Canada.

Faced with these dangers, Simcoe surveyed the Toronto region in May 1793, just after he learned of the outbreak of war with France, and moved to Toronto in July with the Queen's Rangers, who began to construct a garrison on the present site of Historic Fort York. Creating a fortified naval base at Toronto was crucial because he believed Detroit and Niagara were indefensible. General Wayne could easily capture Detroit; with

a fleet of batteaux and other vessels he could then transport his army across Lake Erie, march across the Niagara peninsula, and take Fort Niagara. Within a few weeks half of Upper Canada could be lost. With the fall of Niagara, there was nothing to stop Wayne from sailing across Lake Ontario to Kingston unless Toronto were defended. If fortified, Simcoe felt confident that the army and Provincial Marine could launch an effective challenge to regain control of the Niagara Peninsula and the west, assuming that his Lower Canadian compatriots maintained supply lines between Upper Canada and the rest of the empire.⁹

In 1793 Toronto harbour was a long bay which could be defended at its mouth (figure 3). Simcoe wanted to build two defensive works at the entrance, one on the south side at Gibraltar Point and another to the north, where Fort York now stands.¹⁰ The naval arsenal was to be located securely on the north side, two kilometres east of Fort York. To supply foodstuffs, goods, and labour to the Provincial Marine, Simcoe laid out a town and began to recruit settlers." Because of the war scare, he also began to move the Upper Canadian capital from the exposed border town of Niagara to Toronto as a temporary stopgap until London could be developed. In August Simcoe baptized his little community "York."¹²




Figure 3: Toronto Bay in 1793.

Source: Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, NMC-21768.

But Simcoe's grand plans for York were to remain unfulfilled because he could not obtain permission from his superiors to fortify Toronto. The governor-in-chief of all British North America, Guy Carleton, Baron Dorchester, was on leave when Simcoe moved to York, so Simcoe asked the acting governor, Major-General Sir Alured Clarke, for consent to develop the settlement. While Clarke authorized the establishment of Toronto as a civil measure to safeguard the capital, he balked at the more costly construction of a military post without Dorchester's approval.¹³ Upon his return to Canada, Lord Dorchester flatly rejected the request. There were three things wrong with York in Dorchester's mind. First, the colony's military force was too small to support an additional post. Second, he believed that resources should be applied to maintaining a strong position at or near Kingston to cover the vulnerable St. Lawrence supply route into Upper Canada. Third, he thought York too isolated from more established settlements and sources of supply in Lower Canada to meet the requirements of a naval force.¹⁴ Dorchester's disapproval meant that Simcoe could not use military funds to develop York because he could not get it designated as an official army post. Therefore, no fortifications capable of guarding a naval facility to fulfil broad strategic objectives could be built. Instead, in his capacity as civil governor of Upper Canada, Simcoe had access only to the more limited funds of the provincial treasury, which he used to erect barracks with minor defences for the local function of protecting the temporary capital.¹⁵

Over the winter of 1793-1794, the frontier crisis continued to escalate and Dorchester came to believe that war with the Americans was inevitable. As a result, he ordered Simcoe to re-construct an old fort one hundred kilometres south of Detroit to prevent Wayne's army from reaching the border. Fort Miamis, deep within territory the British had conceded to the US at the end of the Revolution, thus became Canada's forward defensive position. Its supply link was the Maumee River, which the British controlled with two gunboats, *Brazen* and *Spitfire*; a number of small vessels operating out of Detroit; and a defended post at Turkey Island at the mouth of the Maumee on Lake Erie.¹⁶

In August 1794, the Americans defeated the western tribes at Fallen Timbers, a few kilometres from Fort Miamis, and followed their victory by surrounding the fort and demanding its surrender. The commandant rejected the summons; during several tense days when the Americans probed its defences, the British stood firm. In the end, the Americans decided not to attack the well-entrenched post and withdrew south. Diplomats later negotiated the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (Jay's Treaty), and the next year the defeated tribes agreed to the Treaty of Greenville, in which they ceded much of Ohio and other territory to the Americans. Elsewhere, the Vermont invasion never occurred: the Royal Navy captured the *Olive Branch* carrying the Vermonters' weapons from France to America. French secret agents failed to foment revolution in Lower Canada or to turn the natives against the British, and Pennsylvania never established its Lake Erie naval base.

In partial fulfilment of Jay's Treaty, the British evacuated the Western Posts in 1796 in return for some American concessions, in the process defusing the remaining

crisis point at Fort Oswego, where American settlers and British soldiers had been shooting at one another. With this move, York's place in Upper Canada was secured, not as a naval station but as the provincial capital. Plans to relocate the seat of government to London were abandoned and the move from Niagara to York between 1796 and 1798 got the colony's offices and legislature out from under the guns of the new American garrison at Fort Niagara.

There was some government shipbuilding in the Toronto area even though the main naval post remained at Kingston. By the end of the century, the British had built three gunboats, a batteau, scow and, largest of all, the *Toronto*, a small government schooner, on the banks of the Humber, a few kilometres west of Toronto harbour and well outside the area that John Graves Simcoe had designated for his fortified naval base.¹⁷

1807-1814*

The treaties of 1794 and 1795 did not lead to long-term peace on the Great Lakes. In 1811 war flared between the western tribes and the US when the latter launched a military strike at Tippecanoe. A year later the United States declared war on Great Britain. War had been expected since at least 1807, and military officials had renewed the old debates on the relative merits of York versus Kingston as naval stations. This time the arguments favoured York. Increased settlement since the 1790s led some military planners optimistically to believe that the necessary supplies and labour for shipbuilding could be obtained locally. Strategists also thought York was a good site because the commander-in-chief of Upper Canada normally lived in the capital and could keep a professional eye on the dockyard's operations if it were located in the town. The main problem with York was that it was not fortified sufficiently to protect a primary naval post. To remedy this, Major-General Isaac Brock began the process of upgrading York's defences in 1811."

Because the bulk of the province's dockyard and other naval resources were in Kingston, the governor-in-chief, Sir George Prevost, decided to move the naval establishment to York gradually as the capital's capacity to house and defend naval facilities improved and as Kingston's dockyards decayed. There was, however, an immediate need to expand shipbuilding. Therefore, in January 1812 Prevost ordered the construction of a sixteen-gun, 128-tonne schooner, *Prince Regent*, at York. Completed in June, much of its metal work came from an old vessel wrecked on the south side of the harbour earlier in the century, perhaps presaging some of York's limits at supplying material for naval construction.²⁰

Anglo-American relations degenerated too quickly to move the dockyards from Kingston before hostilities commenced. York therefore played only a secondary role in the naval defence of Upper Canada.-Whatever aspirations existed to turn York into the province's main naval base died when the Americans captured the town in two of their three attacks on the provincial capital. This was in marked contrast to US reluctance even to attempt a serious assault on well-defended Kingston. As well, wartime exigencies led

to an expansion of Kingston's naval facilities and defences, helping to solidify its role as Upper Canada's main naval base.

The first attack on York in April 1813 had serious consequences for Canadian defence because the British lost both a new frigate meant to bolster the Lake Ontario squadron and a large quantity of naval supplies desperately required by the Lake Erie fleet. The frigate, *Sir Isaac Brock*, had been designed to carry twenty-six thirty-two-pounder carronades and four long eighteen-pounder guns. At the time of the battle, the *Brock* sat on the stocks in the naval dockyard (near today's Union Station); the British burned it before evacuating the town after their defeat in the Battle of York. The *Brock* was almost finished and would have given the British a significant advantage in the naval war on Lake Ontario. Ironically, it was supposed to have been completed several weeks earlier and to have sailed to the relative safety of Kingston, but construction had been delayed, in part because of disagreements between the shipbuilder and government officials and partly because of supply problems caused by York's relative isolation.²¹ The loss of the *Brock* made it difficult to challenge the Americans on Lake Ontario or to ferry supplies to beleaguered forces on the Niagara Peninsula who, along with their native allies, suffered severe shortages in the following months. The British also torched some naval stores destined for Lake Erie when they retreated; the Americans captured the rest. The loss of these supplies was a major factor in the defeat of the British Lake Erie squadron in September 1813, which was followed by the loss of southwestern Upper Canada for the duration of the war. Yet because the Americans only occupied Toronto for six days after the first attack and two after the second, the British were able to utilize the Toronto Passage to keep supply lines open to the upper lakes, despite the fall of Lake Erie. This allowed them to hold Fort Mackinac, which had been captured in 1812, and to keep supplies flowing across Lakes Huron and Michigan to their tribal allies in the north and west.

After the second attack in July 1813, the British began to build new defences at York. Today's Fort York, on the site Simcoe chose for a shore battery and garrison in 1793, dates from this time. The third attack on York occurred in August 1814, but the harbour defences were strong enough to deter the American squadron. The rebuilding of these fortifications was important because a four-vessel squadron operated out of Toronto Bay in support of British forces on the Niagara Peninsula in 1814. Commanded by Captain Alexander Dobbs, RN, the squadron ferried supplies and troops to Niagara and brought wounded and exhausted soldiers back to York. Without the defences, vessels at York would have been vulnerable and their loss would have been disastrous, since it would have forced the British to rely for supply on the 125 kilometres of miserable roads between York and Niagara instead of the fast water route across the lake.

1815-1870²²

Following the successful defence of Canada during the War of 1812, military planners on both sides of the border agreed on why the US failed to conquer the province: the

Americans did not sever the St. Lawrence River supply line by capturing either Kingston or Montreal. One droll British strategist wrote that "in the conduct of the three campaigns, a most wonderful deficiency of military knowledge and judgment, had been displayed on the part of the American generals."²³ The humour, however, was lost by the perception on both sides, best articulated by John Quincy Adams, that the Treaty of Ghent which ended the war was merely "a truce rather than a peace."²⁴

In anticipation of future hostilities, the British concentrated defence construction in the exposed St. Lawrence region, upgrading fortifications south of Montreal to stop an attack along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River route. In Kingston, the army replaced the 1812-era defences with a massive citadel in the 1830s, and further strengthened the harbour in the 1840s with a number of Martello towers and other works during the Oregon Boundary Dispute. Most ambitious was the Rideau Canal, built as an alternate water route. With these works, the British hoped supply lines could be kept open and reinforcements dispatched to Upper Canada quickly to retake any territory lost in the central or western portions of the province in the early stages of a war. Military strategists in the post-war era saw two roles for York. First, it was a position which could either cover a retreating army from the Niagara Peninsula or serve as a rallying point for the defence of that region. Second, it could protect communications along the Toronto Passage with posts on Georgian Bay and the upper Great Lakes, such as Penetanguishene and Drummond Island.²⁵

To a large degree, the period after the War of 1812 was an anti-climax in Toronto's naval history, although strategists continued to plan for its defence throughout the remainder of the century. In the 1820s, for example, Sir James Carmichael Smyth of the Royal Engineers hoped to replace Fort York with a "large and substantial Earthen Redoubt...having a fortified Keep within it, similar to...Fort Wellington in the Netherlands."²⁶ Sir James wanted new defences because he thought Fort York was only capable of serving as a harbour defence. But with improved settlement and roads, the Americans were no longer completely dependent upon water transportation to reach York; new works capable of meeting new challenges — along with the old — were needed.²⁷ In 1856, the army developed plans to build either Martello towers or a floating battery on the lake side of the peninsula because of fears that the Americans could bombard the city and harbour from afar with new forms of artillery. If necessary, the army also expected to sink ships in the channel to prevent the enemy from steaming quickly past the defences in armed steamers. In 1871, Canadian military planners still hoped to build Martello towers on the Toronto islands and in 1888 they wanted to place mobile batteries of heavy guns in the city to meet any threat the Americans might pose to the province's largest port.²⁸ In all these cases, no action was taken because the political will did not exist to spend the necessary money in peacetime. There were, however, two occasions when interest in the city's naval potential revived with tangible results: the Rebellion Crisis of 1837-1841 and the period of the American Civil War, the Trent Affair, and the Fenian Raids in the 1860s.




Figure 4: This 1842 plan shows Fort York with its harbour battery enlarged as a result of the Rebellion Crisis. Other improvements also were made to the defences of the 1813-1815 period fort because of the tensions of the late 1830s. However, ambitious plans to build a citadel comparable to those at Halifax, Kingston, and Quebec to protect Toronto at that time were not implemented.

Source: Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, C-137340.

Most people think of the Upper Canadian Rebellion in terms of William Lyon Mackenzie's comic-opera attack on Toronto in December 1837. What is less well known is that there were serious border raids along the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence system in 1838 which, in combination with other problems, kept the province on a wartime footing until 1841.²⁹ In Toronto, a guarded coal-storage facility was built at the government wharf for a number of armed steamboats acquired to protect Lake Ontario during the crisis. As well, harbour and landward defences were upgraded, although not as substantially as military planners had hoped (figure 4).³⁰ Much of the thinking behind these improvements stemmed from the expectation that Toronto would be an important naval base if the Rebellion Crisis led to an Anglo-American war.

During the 1860s war with the US again seemed likely and in 1862 the Royal Engineers quickly modernized Toronto's harbour battery at Fort York in the wake of the Trent Affair by installing seven eight-inch shell guns at the fort and other guns near the mouth of the harbour.³¹ Defence planners in the 1860s thought the best way to protect Canada was to combine a strong defence with naval counterattacks on the American Atlantic seaboard from Royal Navy bases in Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies. Concerned about the possibility of defending Canada, the British ordered Lieutenant-Colonel William Jervis of the Royal Engineers to prepare a secret report on colonial defence. Jervis was too pessimistic for the politicians, even suggesting that Canada might be indefensible in the face of the huge Civil War armies the Americans had created.³² Ordered to reconsider his findings, in a second report he suggested that strong fortifications were needed because British and Canadian forces would be outnumbered badly in a war. If strong enough, these forts might hold out through a campaigning season until cold weather forced the Americans to lift their sieges. By holding out, the local defenders could buy time for reinforcements to be sent from Britain both to preserve Canada and to attack the American coastal states. If such attacks were sufficiently severe, the British assumed they could demand the return of any conquered Canadian territory as part of a peace settlement.

Jervis recommended that either London, Hamilton, or Toronto be fortified for the defence of Canada West.³³ He seems to have provided three choices to win support from politicians representing the different communities, with the hard choice of a particular locale to be determined after the easier decision to re-fortify had been made.³⁴ Of the three, Toronto was most desirable in Jervis' thinking. He saw a re-fortified Toronto as admirably suited for a secondary naval base, as a rallying point for troops, and as the gateway to protecting the upper lakes along the route of the old Toronto Passage - attitudes comparable to Simcoe's seventy years earlier. Unlike York in the 1790s, however, Toronto in the 1860s was a major urban centre with a population of 50,000 capable of meeting many needs of a military force, and was the hub of an important railway and steamship network with good communications to other strategic points. To fortify Toronto, Jervis recommended building earthworks around the entire city; exploiting the defensive potentials of the deep Humber and Don River valleys, which guarded the city's eastern and western approaches; creating both permanent and mobile batteries at key locations (equipped in part with modern, large-calibre, rifled guns); and erecting a massive harbour battery one kilometre west of Fort York along with two Martello towers on the Toronto islands (figure 5). But these plans were never implemented and the end of the Civil War and the rapid demobilization of most of the Union Army saw a return of peaceful Anglo-American relations and a loss of interest in Toronto's naval potential.




Figure 5: Jervis' proposed defences for Toronto in the 1860s included two Martello Towers (the two dots on the islands), a heavy shore battery (the short dark line near the mouth of the harbour), and a ring of earthworks around the landward approaches to the city (the broken lines).

Source: Courtesy of the Devon County Council Archives, U.K.

Conclusion

In 1870 the British government transferred Toronto's defences to the three-year-old Dominion of Canada. While this analysis ends at this point, it should be noted that Canadian forces maintained Toronto's harbour defences until the 1880s.³⁵ But in the earlier period, much of the naval history of pre-Confederation Toronto was a story of failed aspirations and debate characterized by broad discussions of the defensive requirements of the Great Lakes as a whole. Between the 1790s and the 1860s, particularly during crises, military planners assumed Toronto could play a central role in the naval defence of the Great Lakes. In every case, command decisions by others, or enemy action, or frugal politicians, or the passing of a crisis, resulted in Toronto playing a smaller — but not inconsequential — role in Great Lakes defence than anticipated. Finally, the naval history of colonial Toronto, introduced in this article, is an important part of the broader topics of both British North American defence and the history of Toronto harbour.

NOTES

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Nautical Research Society in Toronto in May 1993. Carl Benn is a full-time curator at Fort York and a part-time history instructor at the University of Toronto. His most recent book is *Historic Fort York, 1793-1993* (Toronto, 1993), and he is currently completing a study of the Iroquois in the War of 1812.

1. A major motivation behind this was the absence of studies examining Toronto's naval history. Although bits and pieces of other works make passing reference to this topic, my recent book, *Historic Fort York, 1793-1993* (Toronto, 1993) is the only general study of Toronto's colonial military history available. The most important broad work on this period is J. Mackay Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871* (Toronto, 1968).

2. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group (RG) 8, C Series, British Military Records, CCCLXXXI, Instructions to Gother Mann, 29 May 1788: "You will examine the mouth of the French River and that of River Matchadosh upon Lake Huron, likewise Toronto...and give every information how they will answer for shipping, and of what size; whether the Country adjacent is propitious for Settlements, and if these, by the nature of the ground, can at small expense be defended."

3. The Province of Upper Canada consisted mainly of modern-day Ontario south of the Hudson Bay watershed.

4. For a complete discussion of the frontier crisis as it affected Toronto, see Carl Benn, "The Military Context of the Founding of Toronto," *Ontario History, LXXXI* (1989). For an alternate interpretation, see Malcolm Macleod, "Fortress Ontario or Forlorn Hope? Simcoe and the Defence of Upper Canada," *Canadian Historical Review, Ull* (1972). A good military history of the Ohio Valley conflict by an American historian is Wiley Sword, *President Washington's Indian War, 1790-1795* (Norman, OK, 1985). A book which covers the story from a native-centred perspective is Gregory Evans

Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore, 1992), esp. chaps. V-VI.

5. E.A. Cruikshank (ed.), *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe, with Allied Documents Relating to His Administration of the Government of Upper Canada* [hereafter *Simcoe Papers*] (5 vols., Toronto, 1923-1931), I, 339-343, John Graves Simcoe to Sir Alured Clarke, 31 May 1793.

6. *Ibid.*, I, 144, Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 28 April 1792; I, 18, Simcoe to Sir Joseph Banks, 4 January 1791; II, 67, Simcoe to the Duke of Richmond, 23 September 1793.

7. *Ibid.*, II, 57, Simcoe to Dundas, 20 September 1793; III, 42, Simcoe to Baron Dorchester, 5 September 1794; I, 173, Simcoe and Alexander McKee to George Hammond, 1792; and I, 343: Simcoe to Clarke, 31 May 1793.

8. *Ibid.*, I, 338, Simcoe to Clarke, 31 May 1793.

9. *Ibid.*, I, 338-339, 343.

10. Today, Fort York sits nine hundred metres inland because of lakefill operations between the 1850s and the 1920s rather than on the waterfront as it did before the mid-nineteenth century.

11. *Simcoe Papers*, I, 283-287, Simcoe to Dundas, 21 June 1794.

12. The province changed the name back to "Toronto" in 1834 when it incorporated the town as a city.

13. *Simcoe Papers*, I, 355, Clarke to Simcoe, 14 June 1793.

14. *Ibid.*, II, 136-137, Dorchester to Simcoe, 27 January 1794. Simcoe acknowledged that there probably were no more than fifteen families of settlers between Burlington Bay and the Bay of Quinte, a distance of two hundred kilometres. John

Andre, *Infant Toronto as Simcoe's Folly* (Toronto, 1967), 37.

15. *Simcoe Papers*, I, 355, Clarke to Simcoe, 14 June 1793; II, 63, Simcoe to Dundas, 20 September 1793.

16. *Ibid.*, II, 179-180, Simcoe to Dorchester, 14 March 1794; II, 292, Dorchester to Simcoe, 23 June 1794; II, 211, Simcoe to Richard England, 18 April 1794; II, 238, England to Simcoe, 19 May 1794; and II, 246 and III, 13-14, "Report of British Deserter John Bevan," c. 21 August 1794.

17. Carl Benn, *The King's Mill on the Humber, 1793-1803* (Etobicoke, 1979), *passim*.

18. Important works related to this section of the paper include Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (1882, repr. Annapolis, MD, 1987); C.P. Stacey, *The Battle of Little York* (Toronto, 1971); and Carl Benn, *The Battle of York* (Belleville, 1984). See also the essays by Stacey, Hitsman, Winton-Clare, Humphries and Preston in Morris Zaslow (ed.), *The Defended Border* (Toronto, 1964). A good general history of the war is J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812* (Toronto, 1965). A competent bibliographic work on the War of 1812 is John C. Fredriksen (comp.), *Free Trade and Sailors' Rights: A Bibliography of the War of 1812* (Westport, CT, 1985), esp. 104-105.

19. William S. Dudley (ed.), *The Naval War of 1812* (Washington, DC, 1985), 268-273, A.H. Pye to Sir George Prevost, 7 December 1811; and Edith G. Firth (ed.), *The Town of York 1793-1815* (Toronto, 1962), 78-80, Andrew Gray's "Report Upon the Expediency of Removing the Marine Establishment from Kingston to York," 12 March 1812.

20. Firth (ed.), *The Town of York*, 80, Noah Freer to Isaac Brock, 27 April 1812; and C. Winton-Clare, "A Shipbuilder's War," in Zaslow (ed.), *The Defended Border*, 167, 169.

21. Firth (ed.), *The Town of York*, 288-289, Ralph Bruyeres to Prevost, 28 January 1813.

22. The most useful works which study the broader military history of colonial Canada in the post-1815 period are Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908* (London, 1967); and Charles P. Stacey, *Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871: A Study in the Practice of Responsible Government* (rev. ed., Toronto, 1963).

23. NAC, RG 8, Series II, VII, Military Memoir of the Province of Canada by Capt. W., 26 July 1856.

24. Quoted in Boume, *Britain and the Balance of Power*, 9.

25. NAC, RG 8, DXIV, "Report on the State of Fortifications and Military Buildings in Upper and Lower Canada," 20 November 1816.

26. Firth (ed.), *The Town of York*, 18, Smyth Report on Defence, 1826.

27. *Ibid.*; and NAC, NMC-23140, "Plan of a Pentagonal Fort Containing a Casemated Fortified Barracks for 200 Men Proposed to be Constructed at York U.C.," 20 November 1827. Fort Wellington, built outside Ostend during the Napoleonic Wars, mounted forty-six cannon but required a relatively small garrison for defence. A similar fort in Toronto could only have been taken through a lengthy siege which would have given the British time to dispatch reinforcements to the provincial capital. Fort York, on the other hand, might not have been able to hold out against a determined enemy freed from the constraints imposed by dependence upon Lake Ontario to keep its supply lines open.

28. NAC, RG 8, Series II, VII, Military Memoir of the Province of Canada, 26 July 1856. Storms and erosion separated the peninsula from the mainland by the 1850s. The development of the new "Eastern Gap" for shipping in later years along with changing military technology rendered Fort York obsolete as a harbour defence by the 1880s. NAC, RG 9, Militia Records, II, AI, XXXII, P. Nobelton-Ross Memorandum, 1 August 1871; and

NAC, RG 9, II, AI, CCXXI, Inspector of Artillery Memorandum, 20 December 1888.

29. A useful military history of the Upper Canadian Rebellion is: Mary Beacock Fryer, *Volunteers and Redcoats, Rebels and Raiders: A Military History of the Rebellions in Upper Canada* (Toronto, 1987).

30. NAC, RG 8, CCCCXLIX, List of Expenditures, 1837-1838, c. 1839.

31. Two of these shell guns can be seen today behind the Marine Museum of Upper Canada. For a discussion of shell guns, see Roger F. Sarty, *Coast Artillery. 1815-1914* (Bloomfield, ON, 1988), 6-9; and David McConnell, *British Smooth-Bore Artillery: A Technological Study to Support Identification, Acquisition, Restoration, Reproduction, and Interpretation of Artillery at National Historic Parks in Canada* (Ottawa, 1988), 95-102.

32. William F.D. Jervois, *Report on the Defence of Canada and the British Naval Stations in the Atlantic* (London, 1864).

33. Canada West was the new name for Upper Canada after 1841 when Upper and Lower Canada were joined as the United Province of Canada. In 1867, the United Province was divided into two provinces, Ontario and Quebec, within the newly-created Dominion of Canada, which comprised these provinces plus Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

34. William F.D. Jervois, *Report on the Defence of Canada (Made to the Provincial Government on the 10th November 1864)* (London, 1865).

35. For analyses of Canadian defence planning against American threats after Confederation, see the relevant sections in Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power*; Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto, 1988); and Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of the undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939* (Montreal, 1977).