

THE 1834 CRUISE OF HMS ALLIGATOR: THE BIBLE AND THE FLAG

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In September 1834 Governor Richard Bourke of New South Wales dispatched Captain George Lambert of HMS *Alligator* and a detachment of the Fiftieth Regiment under Captain Johnson to New Zealand to rescue a shipwrecked Englishwoman, the wife of whaling captain John Guard, her two children, and other crew members of the whaler *Harriet* being held captive after a conflict with Maori at Cape Egmont. The captives were retrieved only after a series of punitive actions in which Maori lives were lost and settlements destroyed, actions which were subsequently criticised by William Marshall, *Alligator's* assistant surgeon.² Marshall published an account of the episode in 1836, the year the House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines (SCOA) began its hearings. Its chairman was Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Parliamentary champion of the humanitarian movement that was then at the height of its influence. Buxton was moved by Marshall's criticisms of the expedition, seeing it as typical of the mistreatment of indigènes that coincided with British expansion, and included the *Alligator* expedition on the agenda. In 1837, the Committee's final report demanded a reappraisal of the Royal Navy's role in the south Pacific. For this reason, *Alligator's* comparatively minor conflict with the Maori deserves attention.

Various accounts of *Alligator's* activities survive, permitting a detailed examination of the expedition and assessment of its criticism. Identifying himself as a Christian humanitarian, William Marshall portrayed *Alligator's* punitive action as a brutal and inappropriate strike against innocent "natives." But his conclusions must be weighed against the reports of Captains Lambert and Johnson; Lambert's testimony to the SCOA; and the journal of one of Johnson's lieutenants, Henry Gunton. Were the Maori victimised? If not, how did Marshall's interpretation prevail? The SCOA's final report summarised the controversial aspects of the expedition and declared that:

The impression left with that tribe of savages must have been one of extreme dread of our power, accompanied with one of deep indignation. The Committee cannot refrain from expressing their regret at this transaction; because it occasioned a great sacrifice of life; because it may be fatal to many innocent persons; and because it seems calculated to obstruct those measures of benevolence with the Legislature designs to native and barbarous tribes.³

The evidence, however, calls most of these conclusions into question, suggesting that Marshall, Buxton and their humanitarian allies distorted the circumstances and impact of the expedition in order to bolster their demand for British "protection" of south Pacific islanders. Captain Lambert's actions were used as a foil for the paternalistic "Christianization and Civilization" policy that humanitarians believed would eliminate racial conflict on the frontiers of British expansion.⁴

The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, III, No. 4 (October 1993), 37-47.

New Zealand in 1834 was the focus of increasing economic, social and political pressures. European vessels, particularly whalers, had used the islands for replenishment since the 1790s; after the establishment of a Church Missionary Society (CMS) settlement at the Bay of Islands in 1814 trading activity increased. Most vessels calling at the Bay in 1834 were still whalers, but elsewhere there were ships trading in flax and lumber from shore depots managed by Europeans.⁵ Where traders ventured into untouched stands of timber, negotiated with new tribes for flax, or found themselves shipwrecked on the treacherous western and southern coasts, misunderstandings and violence were still common. The appointment of a British Resident to New Zealand in 1832 did little to alleviate the problem; James Busby exercised little more than moral authority and complained regularly that his office was not taken seriously.⁶




Figure 1: Sketch Map of New Zealand in 1834.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

Changes in the number and activity of Europeans in New Zealand paled beside the transformation of Maori society and politics produced by contact. Maori culture, steeped in the quest for *mana* (prestige), *utu* (vengeance), and reverence for the warrior, applied European technology to traditional goals with shattering effectiveness. In the area *Alligator* was to visit, the Waikato chief, Te Wherowhero, led 4000 warriors with muskets against traditionally-armed residents of the Taranaki peninsula in 1832, killing more than 1000 and capturing twice that number. Another powerful chief, Te Rauparaha, fought his way south to the island of Kapiti and from there led a series of devastating expeditions against the South Island until his death in 1835. Thus, in 1834 there was a great concentration of power in the Cook Strait area, while around Mount Egmont the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui peoples were armed, embittered and defensive.

In their investigation of the *Alligator* expedition, members of the SCOA believed that innocent Maori had suffered from the time *Harriet* was wrecked on their shores. Committee members suggested that the shipwrecked crew had mistreated the natives, provoking an attack. This type of interpretation, relying on European agency to explain conflict with indigenes, was common at the time and is found throughout the report.⁷ Yet John Guard's testimony before Governor Bourke and other members of the Executive Council at Sydney contains information at odds with such Eurocentric assumptions.⁸

When *Harriet* was wrecked on 29 April 1833 all twenty-eight of the whaler's crew, including Guard's wife Elizabeth and their two children, took refuge on a Cape Egmont beach.⁹ Two crew members deserted, taking muskets and powder. Some time later, a dispute over the vessel's trade goods flared with the local Maori.¹⁰ The resulting conflict was considerable: twelve crew were killed and the rest taken prisoner, while leaders of several *hapu* (clans) were among those slain on the Maori side.¹¹ "Worth more alive than dead, Guard and five others were allowed to leave for Sydney in *Harriet's* whaleboat, accompanied by several Maori who were to supervise them until they returned with ransom for the rest.

Hearing Guard's testimony, New South Wales Treasurer C D. Riddell suspected that "the two men who deserted from the ship's company on the 4th of May might have urged the natives to plunder, and have advised them that, as Guard and some of his men were armed, and would probably make resistance, they must fight before they could obtain their object."¹² Guard, an emancipated convict, was untrustworthy and "his dealings with the New Zealanders have, in some instances, been marked with cruelty."¹³ Such suspicions persisted after the expedition sailed; Samuel Marsden, head of the CMS in Sydney, wrote to London that "some of the Europeans have been behaving ill to the Natives, which has excited them to acts of violence,"¹⁴ and communicated his concern directly to Buxton before the Committee hearings began.¹⁵ Since tales of disaffected whaling crews were common, it seemed reasonable to blame the two defectors for instigating the attack.

The Committee concluded that further circumstances might be disclosed, which might alter the whole complexion of the case, or, at least, afford an explanation and an apology for the conduct of the natives.¹⁶

Simply put, the members believed that European action had triggered Maori reaction.

This provocation/retaliation argument must be treated with caution. According to Guard, the shipwreck victims had not been attacked immediately. Indeed, two days passed before a group of thirty Maori came to the beach, observing the survivors with interest rather than hostility.¹⁷ Three days later the two deserters left, and soon a large group of fully-armed Maori warriors appeared to salvage what they could from the wreck. Three more days passed before the group on the beach was attacked, and then only after they objected to the way the wreck was being stripped.

Guard told Governor Bourke that although the two deserters had probably provided the Maori with powder and ammunition, he did "not think that they instigated them to the attack."¹⁸

Throughout early nineteenth-century Polynesia, peaceable travellers were greeted respectfully and expected to offer what possessions they had in return for the hospitality they would receive." Guard's account of the initial encounters between *Harriet's* crew and the Maori on the beach must be set in context. After investigation, the Maori probably decided to tolerate the strangers, noting the valuable European goods and weaponry aboard the wrecked vessel. The two crew who joined them had muskets and ammunition, further inducements to claim all the privileges of hospitality. Thus, when the Maori began to "plunder" *Harriet* and were resisted, an important partem was disrupted. Although the deserters may have contributed to the scale of violence by providing extra muskets and powder, they did not set the agenda. Simple, deadly misunderstanding likely produced the conflict, as it often did during the early years of contact in the Pacific islands.

The second principal criticism of *Alligator's* mission was her use of force to produce "extreme dread" and "great sacrifice of life." The evidence, however, suggests that the Maori were neither as passive nor their losses as heavy as the Committee believed. First, the complicated sequence of events before the final confrontation suggests the poor organization, rather than ruthlessness, of the expedition. Lambert secured the eight male members of *Harriet's* crew from the Mataroa *pa* in exchange for the four Maori who had accompanied Guard to Sydney.²⁰ He then proceeded to the Te Namu *pa* to retrieve Elizabeth Guard and her young daughter; her son was being held further south, at Waimate.²¹ At Te Namu it became clear that irresponsible interpretation was playing havoc with negotiations; the two men assigned to interpret by Governor Bourke admitted offering ransoms for the woman and children against Lambert's orders.²² Learning that the Te Namu chief Oaoiti was responsible for Elizabeth and the baby, Lambert decided to take the chief prisoner, hoping to exchange him for the captives.²³ But Oaoiti was badly wounded by Guard's crew in the process, against the captain's wishes. By this stage, it was clear that civilian interpreters and crew not technically subject to Lambert's authority were taking matters into their own hands, compromising the captain's attempts to retrieve the captives without force. The Te Namu people, convinced their chief was dead, deserted their *pa* and took the prisoners to Waimate for consultation and greater protection.²⁴

Sailing to Waimate in these confused and hostile conditions, Lambert despatched his senior lieutenant, William Thomas, in a boat to begin fresh negotiations. When a musket was fired from one of the *pa*, Lambert opened fire with the ship's guns, but rocks prevented him from getting within effective range of the fortifications. A gale drove *Alligator* offshore until 6 October, when he again tried unsuccessfully to send the boat for the child. Two days later, he ordered the soldiers and marines to land with a six-pound carronade from the colonial schooner *Isabella*, which had provided troop transport. Guard's crew also went ashore, and after a skirmish during which Maori were killed, the last of the captives were released. There had been no European casualties.²⁵

Although Lambert insisted before the Committee that he had bombarded Waimate only after Thomas and the boat's crew were fired on, Marshall had a different perspective. Citing evidence he had obtained from missionaries in New Zealand, he argued that muskets were often fired in greeting.²⁶ Like the "pillaging" of *Harriet*, this might have been another example of fatal misunderstanding: it seems unlikely that the Waimate people would have chosen to fire only a single shot if their intention were to kill the boat's occupants. The Committee, however, made much of the unfairness of *Alligator's* response, inspired by Marshall's dramatic description of the *pa's* inhabitants desperately trying to surrender during the broadside:

When the firing began, the natives hoisted a white flag-but after some minutes had elapsed, lowered it again, and then, after a second pause, re-hoisted it....At

one time, a tall, athletic native got upon a house-top, and held up to our view with one hand, the little captive boy, while with the other he repeatedly waved the white flag over his head. In vain! The work which had commenced in anger, was continued in sport.²⁷

"Entering into the New Zealanders' feelings," the Committee wondered when:

it appears that promises had been made to them and they had not been kept, and their chief having come forth for the purpose of negotiation, was seized, ill-treated and wounded; one of their men fired a musket without any evil intention, and this was returned by carronades upon their fortification; what must have been the impression made by such conduct upon the minds of the natives?²⁸

Marshall described his own state of mind, which "was that of horror at the time, so much so, that it was with the greatest difficulty that I could remember the situation in which I stood as an officer."²⁹

Lambert disagreed with every aspect of Marshall's account, insisting that the musket shot was fired at Lieutenant Thomas in anger and that "very little damage could have been done" by the subsequent bombardment since "from what I learnt from the chief afterwards, nobody was hurt."³⁰ His statement is confirmed by the observations of Lt. Gunton who, observing the bombardment from *Alligator's* deck, noted that "when the shots struck the *Pah* [sic] many of them left, others walked about upon the beach, quite unconcerned, others ran to where the shot had struck, and endeavoured to pick them up, others still continued firing off their muskets at us."³¹ Since Lambert had risked killing the captives he was meant to rescue, his action was reckless and it was fortunate for both European and Maori occupants that it was so ineffective.

Marshall's exaggerations also influenced the Committee's primary concern: the breakdown in command and control after the landing party received the last of the captives and the extent of the resulting "slaughter." Marshall's emotive account claimed that a number of sailors, manning the carronade, were left with Lt. McMurdo on the beach while the soldiers formed up on the cliff, augmented by marines, under overall command of Captain Johnson. The child was brought from the *pa* on the shoulders of the chief who had taken charge of him, accompanied by six warriors. On hearing that ransom was still denied the chief turned back toward the *pa* and was shot by one of the sailors, while another snatched the child and ran for the boat. Meanwhile, Marshall recalled:

Ensign Wright...an amiable young man and humane officer, hurried along the line, breathless with haste, and crying to the men at the top of his voice to cease firing; for some time he was entirely disregarded, and not only generally disobeyed, but, in some instances, laughed at; nor, until several dead bodies were seen stretched upon the sands, could the united efforts of himself and the other officers put a stop to the frightful tide of slaughter. Shortly after, Captain Johnson joined us, evidently suffering intense anguish of mind: the firing from below had begun not only without, but contrary to and in direct disobedience of his express and positive orders.³²

The soldiers pursued the Maori back to Waimate as the carronade was being hauled from the beach, and razed the entire settlement when they found it abandoned.

Lambert told the SCOA that no one had ordered the sailors or soldiers to fire, claiming that a sailor fired the first shot when one of the chiefs attendants seemed to be lowering his

musket. Marshall, on the other hand, noted afterwards that the sailors argued about who should have the "distinction" of the first shot, and that instead of firing on the suspicious warrior, they had shot the chief, who was carrying an unloaded musket.³³ There seems to have been a complete breakdown in discipline; perhaps due to the lack of overall command Lambert remained aboard *Alligator* to prevent it from grounding in heavy surf.³⁴ The sailors might also have been influenced by stories from Guard's men. Marshall suggested that gruesome accounts of their experience with the Maori brought emotions to a fever pitch and may have fuelled racist antagonism.³⁵

Nevertheless, this debacle was not a massacre. Once again, a bungled operation invited exaggerated criticism. Although a serious breach of discipline had occurred with fatal results, it is by no means clear that the Maori were left "in extreme dread" after a "frightful tide of slaughter." The exact number of Maori killed was unknown; Captain Johnson's report to Governor Bourke mentioned "considerable loss on the part of the natives,"³⁶ but Lt. Gunton's journal told a more detailed story. When they heard musket fire on the beach below, he and his soldiers "went to work, but the cliff hanging over the part where they passed, only four were killed. We were now about to return to the boats and re-embark. Having got the child, we neither wished to destroy their Pahs or shoot any more of them."³⁷

When the Maori began to return fire as they withdrew to the *pa*, Gunton was ordered to cover the party hauling the carronade from the beach. Both sides shot rather ineffectively in the heavy flax, and although Gunton noted bodies in the bush as he advanced, there were not many. Lambert estimated twenty Maori dead in his official report³⁸, but in testimony before the SCOA confessed that there were many contradictory reports and refused to commit himself to a precise number.³⁹ Marshall's vivid account must have swayed the Committee, and its conclusions about the "great sacrifice of life" made the Maori seem overwhelmed and victimised: "Soon after the child appeared on the shoulders of a chief, who had, as it seems from Mrs. Guard's declaration, been his protector; they see the child snatched from him, the chief slain, his body mutilated, and a destructive fire poured upon them from musketry and cannon."⁴⁰ Afterward, as the soldiers advanced toward the *pa*, Marshall observed the Maori "whom we drove before us" retreating, he believed, in fear.⁴¹

The abandonment of Waimate was prudent. The two *pa* were superbly situated, with natural cliffs on both sides, and the only means of access was by a rope ladder designed to admit only one person at a time. Captain Johnson admitted that "he thought from their natural strong positions we should never get possession of them, provided they were at all defended, excepting with the loss of many of our men—but that as we had been sent we must make the attempt."⁴² The Maori defending the *pa* had been in an excellent position to resist infantry, but realized the value of a strategic withdrawal after the soldiers began dragging *Isabella's* six-pound carronade toward the *pa*. Since their hostages were gone and the hoped-for ransom unobtainable, further resistance would have been risky in the face of unknown strength.⁴³ Although *Alligator's* earlier bombardment had little effect, the Waimate people must have been concerned when they saw the carronade being brought closer. Eat Her in the expedition, Mataroa's inhabitants had decided to compromise when they released *Harriet's* male crewmen without the promised ransom, telling the interpreter Battersby "that they would not have given up the Sailors without ransom to any small Ship, but seeing so strong a force, they thought it better."⁴⁴ Those at Waimate made a similar strategic decision, but Marshall's account stressed fearful flight rather than deliberate withdrawal to enhance the picture of victimisation.⁴⁵

Finally, the SCOA worried that *Alligator's* activities would jeopardize the trading prospects of subsequent Europeans. This obsession with retaliation underscored the Committee's belief in the predictability of Maori reactions, creating a problematic future for New Zealand which required official British management. Buxton noted that Riddell's dissenting letter to Governor

Bourke told of fears in the Sydney business community that *Alligator's* use of force might endanger the lives of other British subjects in New Zealand.⁴⁶ Samuel Marsden wrote to CMS headquarters in London that the Maori would "take their own redress" if provoked, adding that one of the New Zealand missionaries was on his way to London and could provide more information.⁴⁷

Marshall agreed that retaliation was likely, but Lambert dissented, claiming that missionaries on the spot had told him they were certain that the expedition's violent visit would subdue the Cape Egmont area.⁴⁸ This seems borne out by the evidence of Captain Hobson of HMS *Rattlesnake*, who visited New Zealand in 1836: "I...feel convinced that the very appearance of a man of war in that quarter will have considerable weight, from the terror in which we are held by the natives, in consequence of the severe chastisement inflicted on them by the *Alligator*."⁴⁹ Indeed, the long-term economic and political consequences of the destruction of fortifications, crops and canoes must have been severe. The Cape Egmont people had barely repelled previous attacks from the neighbouring Kapiti and Waikato and were now open to conquest by their old enemies. The SCOA, so interested in casualties inflicted by *Alligator*, ignored these broader, Maori-oriented issues. Despite their avowed concern for Maori welfare, the Committee chose to focus only on British behaviour—the expedition's alleged misdeeds—and long-term British interests.

"Those measures of benevolence" proposed by the SCOA during the *Alligator* hearings included increased British intervention in New Zealand and the south Pacific to protect Pacific islanders victimised by European contact. The Royal Navy would have a specific role to play; the Reverend William Ellis, a South Pacific missionary, testified that visiting naval commanders symbolised British authority in the islands and should act with tolerance toward the indigenes they encountered, promoting above all the spread of Christianity through missions.⁵⁰ This echoed Marshall's recommendations in New Zealand, which called for the establishment of a mission at Cape Egmont and an end to military intervention in cases of racial conflict. The British government should "substitute, in its stead, a humane policy towards those nations upon whom it is too much the custom to look down with contempt."⁵¹ With regard to the conflict he had witnessed, Marshall argued that "a humane policy" would have been to investigate the Maori perspective first, using missionaries as interpreters, and to avoid the use of force except in self-defence.

It is easy to see how Marshall's views found favour with the SCOA and why it chose to amplify his importance during the course of the hearings. Buxton, one of the most vocal advocates of aboriginal rights in Britain, had already received information about the *Alligator* expedition directly from CMS leader Samuel Marsden in Sydney before the hearings.⁵² Although both Lambert and Marshall testified, Buxton was already inclined toward Marshall's perspective, interviewing him first and giving him twice as much of the Committee's time. By simplifying the issues surrounding the *Alligator* expedition and reducing Maori motivation to bewildered resistance and blind retaliation, the SCOA ignored the complex nature of Maori society. Even Marshall declared that "it is exceedingly difficult to speak as to the motives of the natives,"⁵³ but the Committee chose to generalise anyway. Consciously or not, the humanitarian perspective was a useful justification of imperial expansion. Depriving the Maori of active agency invited intervention in their religious, social and cultural lives—familiar humanitarian demands for increased mission activity in New Zealand to protect the natives "from acts of violence, oppression, fraud & injustice committed upon them by Europeans."⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Admiralty defended Lambert. Letters of commendation from Governor Bourke, Rear Admiral Gore and the Secretary of State noted that he had followed his instructions and conducted himself in a complicated situation with forbearance; these were duplicated in a special file which merely noted the Committee's opinion.⁵⁵ Lambert was from a distinguished naval family and his career suffered no harm; he retired a full Admiral. Of greater long-term significance for the navy was William Marshall and his perspective.

Connected with the missionary community in New South Wales, Marshall wrote his criticism of the *Alligator* expedition out of Christian conviction.⁵⁶ His unabashed piety had won out over duty often enough during the course of *Alligator's* cruise for one of his superiors to remind him that he could not question the captain's orders and that the penalty for undermining his authority was "death by sentence of court martial."⁵⁷ One assumes that the atmosphere in *Alligator's* wardroom was not altogether cordial. Marshall would find a happier berth as the surgeon of HMS *Soudan* on her pioneering humanitarian expedition to the Niger in 1841, the flagship of Buxton's hopes for the Christianization and civilization of Africa. Like many others, however, Marshall lost his life when fever decimated the ships' companies.⁵⁸

Had Marshall lived, he would have seen his views endorsed by his fellow naval officers. The Committee's report, and Marshall's willingness to favour his conscience over service loyalty, were signs of a deep change in Britain's approach to Pacific islanders and other indigènes. The change flowed through the Royal Navy, with the appearance in command rank of naval officers who had grown up during the age of evangelical faith and humanitarianism, and who shared Marshall's perspective of the *Alligator* episode. For example, in 1850 Captain John Erskine of HMS *Havannah* concluded that in the 1830s "many of the visits of ships-of-war [to New Zealand], before alluded to, had been attended with lamentable affrays with the natives; and indeed it seemed to be too much the custom to consider such visits as expeditions to search out offenses."⁵⁹ Erskine, first Senior Officer of the new Australian Division of the Royal Navy, was determined to set a different course which supported the activities of missionaries and defended islanders from European depredations:

A more enlightened policy (the original example of which had been set by the illustrious Cook) has, however, been adopted by some of our officers; and, on further examination, it seemed doubtful whether most of the atrocities said to have been perpetrated by the islanders had not been provoked by acts of aggression or misconduct on the part of the white men.⁶⁰

Similarly, the first Bishop of New Zealand, Augustus Selwyn, who served aboard HMS *Dido* as chaplain in 1848, wrote that "All the great and gallant nations of the world who possess naval power, have crimes to answer for...It is called "summary justice," which is in fact a violation of all justice....A few years ago a broadside from the *Alligator* was supposed to have frightened all New Zealand."⁶¹ Praising changing attitudes, he called for an end to times when a visiting naval ship would "practise with ball cartridge upon the native villages."⁶² The *Alligator* expedition had become a landmark by which subsequent commanders judged their humanitarian progress.

The *Alligator* episode helps to illustrate the changing role of the Royal Navy in the south Pacific during the early nineteenth century. What seemed a straightforward mission—rescuing a white woman and children from Maori captivity—became an ill-disciplined jumble of raw nerves, a vivid illustration of culture shock as European and Maori communicated without understanding. It also became a symbol of bloody reprisal for the humanitarian lobby in Britain as it sought to control British interaction with Pacific islanders generally. Blending Christian compassion with cultural superiority, members of the investigating Select Committee pitied the Maori as victims, doomed without conversion and indoctrination into the values of industry and commerce, prescribing missionary and naval support. Reaction to the *Alligator* expedition helped bring forces to bear on the Maori and other Pacific islanders that, by attempting to undermine their social and cultural framework, were as crude and relentless as any broadside.

NOTES

- * Jane Samson is a Post-Graduate Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London, where she is currently completing a PhD. This year she also holds a Caird Junior Research Fellowship at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich.
1. *Alligator* was a sixth-rater, probably a frigate, launched in 1821 at Cochin: J.J. Colledge, *Ships of the Royal Navy* (London, 1987). Her twenty-eight guns would probably have consisted of twenty-four nine-pound and four three-pound guns, but these would have been supplemented by carronades (twenty-four or thirty-two-pounders); 1 laiton Stirling Lecky, *The King's Ships* (London, 1913). How many of these *Alligator* carried is unknown; the one used against the Maori at Cape Egmont came from the colonial schooner *Isabella* and was a small six-pounder.
 2. William Marshall, *A Personal Narrative of Two Visits to New Zealand in His Majesty's Ship Alligator* (London, 1836).
 3. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers [BPP]*, "Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)" ["Report"], VII (London, 1837), 22.
 4. For a contemporary description of this viewpoint, see W. Howitt, *Colonisation and Christianity* (London, 1836); for an examination of its development, see Chris Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830* (London, 1989), especially 147-154; and Jane Samson, "'Protective Supremacy.' The Royal Navy, Pacific Islanders, and the Limits of Benevolence, 1829-1859" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1993), chapters 1 and 2.
 5. The word "European" in this case is used as an equivalent to the Maori *pake ha*, and includes Europeans, Americans and other "whites."
 6. See, for example, the Bourke/Busby correspondence in Great Britain, Public Record Office [PRO], Colonial Office [CO] 209/1.
 7. An astute analysis of the humanitarian "retaliation theory," including its adoption by the Royal Navy, may be found in Dorothy Shineberg, *They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific, 1830-1865* (Melbourne, 1967), and Samson, "'Protective Supremacy,'" chapters 7 and 9.
 8. PRO, CO 209/1, "Examination of Mr. John Guard, Master of the Barque *Harriet* before the Executive Council, 22 August, 1834."
 9. Somewhere in "Harriet Bay," as shown in figure 1.
 10. "Harriet Bay" was within the territory of both the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui peoples; they shared the Waimate fortifications at this vulnerable time, but it is unclear which group was involved in the altercation with *Harriet's* crew.
 11. Mitchell Library, Ms. A2892, Lt. Henry Gunton, untitled manuscript journal, 30 August-13 November 1834 [hereafter "Journal"]. Gunton's account is a good example of the way in which the names of tribes, *hapu* (sub-tribes, or clans), chiefs and other leaders, and *pa* (fortified settlements) can become confused. He usually refers to clans as tribes, and names them according to the *pa* they occupied. Made without detailed knowledge of Maori political and social organisation, confused observations were common in nineteenth-century accounts. In this essay, only tribal, *pa*, and personal names are given in the text, as these were the easiest to verify.
 12. PRO, CO 209/1, Riddell to Bourke, 25 August 1834, enclosed in Bourke to CO, 23 September 1834.
 13. *Ibid.* Guard had come to New South Wales as a convict in 1815, but after obtaining his ticket of leave in 1820 he joined the sealing and whaling trade in New Zealand. One contemporary described him as a fraud, embarking with his wife as a passenger on the *Harriet* and later masquerading as "Captain Guard" in Sydney; see Auckland Institute and Museum, Ms. 279, Robert Leeds Sinclair, "The True Account of the Loss of the Barque *Harriet* of Sidney on this Coast and the Masacrer of the Crew" [sic], European trade with New Zealand in the 1820s and 1830s relied on Maori good will; thus Guard, who lived for many years at Cloudy Bay near Cook's Strait, could not have allowed "cruelty" to guide his relations with them. See entry for Elizabeth Guard in *The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, I (Wellington, 1990).
 14. University of Birmingham Library [UBL], Church Missionary Society [CMS] Mss., Marsden to Clerical Secretary, 25 September 1835.
 15. See *ibid.*, Marsden to Lay Secretary, 22 January 1836, in which he states "I wrote to Mr. Buxton MP & gave him some information relative to their [the Maori's] treatment by the Europeans."
 16. *BPP*, "Report" (1837), 20.
 17. PRO, CO 109/1, "Examination of Mr. John Guard."
 18. *Ibid.*

19. An overview of this subject is W.H. Pearson, "The Reception of European Voyagers on Polynesian Islands," *Journal de la Société des Oceanistes*, XXVI (1970), 121-153. For examples of "exchange disputes" between Maori and Europeans, see Anne Salmond, *Two Worlds: First Meetings between Maori and Europeans 1642-1772* (Auckland, 1991), especially 216-219.
20. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 156.
21. Te Namu was southeast of Cape Egmont, beyond "Harriet Bay;" Waimate was further to the southeast, about halfway along the southern coast of the Taranaki Peninsula. Note that Marshall, Lambert and the others all referred to Te Namu as "Numa."
22. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 153.
23. Oaoiti had saved Elizabeth's life when others at Te Namu had demanded her death, and had provided her with a house specially designed for privacy; Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 189-190. After her return to Sydney, there were rumours that she had given birth to twins fathered by Oahiti; see "Elizabeth Guard," *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, I, 165.
24. These motives emerged during a discussion Marshall had with two Maori warriors near Numa; Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 178-179.
25. PRO, Admiralty [ADM] 1/215, Lambert to Rear Admiral Gore, 1 March 1835.
26. BPP, "Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)," ["Interim Report"], VII (London, 1836), 442.
27. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 194-195.
28. BPP, "Interim Report," 442.
29. *Ibid.*
30. BPP, "Interim Report," 450.
31. Gunton, "Journal."
32. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 202.
33. *Ibid.*, 226.
34. BPP, "Interim Report," 452.
35. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 164. Marshall frequently accused members of *Alligator's* lower deck, Guard's crew, and the soldiers of the Fiftieth of blatant racism and a desire to kill Maoris regardless of circumstance, but space prevents this interesting issue from being pursued here.
36. PRO, ADM 1/215, Lambert to Gore, 1 March 1835.
37. Gunton, "Journal."
38. PRO, ADM 1/215, Lambert to Gore, 1 March 1835.
39. BPP, "Interim Report," 450.
40. BPP, "Report," 22.
41. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 204.
42. Gunton, "Journal."
43. Prudence when confronted by British ordnance was a feature of the Maori Wars in later decades, due largely to the inability of the original *pa* design to resist cannons; James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Penguin, 1988), 43-44.
44. Gunton, "Journal."
45. In fact, the Waimate Maori felt confident that they could appropriate some of *Alligator's* strength by adapting the design of her cutwater for the figurehead of one the canoes built to replace those destroyed by the expedition. British Museum [BM], Additional Manuscripts [Add. Mss.] 19954, f. 66, item 78.
46. BPP, "Interim Report," 437.
47. UBL, CMS Mss., Marsden to Clerical Secretary, 25 September 1834. The missionary was William Yate.
48. BPP, "Interim Report," 452.
49. PRO, Foreign Office [FO] 58/1, Hobson to Bourke 8 August 1837.
50. BPP, "Interim Report," 511.
51. Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, preface.
52. There is a letter in PRO, FO 58/14, 192, addressed to Buxton but unsigned. It may or may not be the letter from Marsden. The tenor of Marsden's remarks may be reliably confirmed in UBL, CMS Mss., Mission Book (1836), Marsden to CMS, 22 January 1836.
53. BPP, "Interim Report," 438.
54. UBL, CMS Mss., Marsden to Lay Secretary, 22 January 1836.

55. PRO, ADM 1/2088, Bourke to Lambert, 17 November 1834, enclosed in Lambert to Admiralty, 8 September 1835.

56. He had been an assistant surgeon in the Royal Navy for ten years, but during that time had applied (unsuccessfully) for ordination in the CMS. Before *Alligator's* departure for New Zealand he had been using the mission press in Sydney to produce religious tracts for seamen, and there he met the missionary William Yate, over from the Bay of Islands to reproduce the Book of Common Prayer in Maori. See Marshall, *A Personal Narrative*, 23.

57. *BPP*, "Interim Report," 442.

58. The expedition was abandoned and the humanitarian cause damaged; see William Allen and T. R. H. Thomson, *A Narrative of the Expedition Sent by Her Majesty's Government to the River Niger in 1841* (London, 1848).

59. J. E. Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise Among the Islands of the Western Pacific* (London, 1850), 3.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Selwyn College Library, Cambridge, Selwyn Papers, D/1/c, Selwyn to Selwyn, 17 June 1848.

62. *Ibid.*