
Davis describes the declining ability of inshore hook-and-line fishermen to compete with trawlers in the years between 1945 and 1982. In the period studied, the government and fish plant owners actively promoted the trawlers. The economic rationale for this policy was that fish plant owners were in need of stable supplies, which only trawlers could ensure, if they were to compete on the fresh fish market in the United States.

Davis' argument is strikingly akin to complaints raised by fishermen for centuries against any new technology that they did not themselves possess. Yet Davis does not compare his findings with data from other relevant fisheries. Thus, his argument is curiously parochial for all its anthropological jargon. Published in 1991 it is strange that Davis has not updated the text.

By way of conclusion, Davis proposes the "elimination of the use of non-selective, mobile fishing technologies such as otter trawls and seine nets...throughout Atlantic Canada." He argues that these technologies have resulted in the near destruction of fish stocks. He also believes that the trawl doors, bottom lines and rollers destroy marine resource habitats by tearing up the ocean floor. The government should buy out the trawlers and finance a refitting programme. Davis hopes that reduced catches will be compensated by better prices for higher quality. Increased unemployment for fish-plant workers should be compensated by the dole. In the long term Davis hopes that diversification of the products will provide more stable, higher-income jobs. Finally, management of the fish stocks should be left to the fishers themselves.

Davis does not refer to any literature in support of his accusations and beliefs. Indeed, research undertaken at the Danish Institute of Fishery Technology does not validate his view. Fifty years of intensive trawling in the North Sea have not ruined the ocean floor. Nor does he discuss how the industry would have fared, had his policy been effected. Indeed I would have liked a broader discussion of the relation between fishery policy and social policy, taking into account recent experiences. Surely fishery policy alone is unlikely to create sufficient jobs for the population of Atlantic Canada or anywhere else, when the trend of the industry is to rationalize and lay off the workforce. That process is inherent whether we leave the industry to itself or we engage in large-scale social engineering on the path Davis proposes.

Davis perceives that the first opponents to his scheme would be the fishers themselves. Their "myopic views" based on "individualistic utilitarian rationality" might undermine the best "interests of fishers, fish processors, fish plant workers and the government alike." Like so many Utopian
social engineers before him, Davis aspires to create the best of all worlds, only to realize that people do not want what he knows is best for them.

Poul Holm
Esbjerg, Denmark


The six thousand mile coastline of the island of Newfoundland constitutes an ecotone that supported over 1300 communities (especially fishing settlements or "outports") in the late nineteenth century. Most of the oldest outports are situated along the East Coast and Avalon Peninsula. Calvert, the subject of this superb interdisciplinary community study, is locally renowned, along with Ferryland, as the site of George Calvert's (later Lord Baltimore) short-lived attempt to establish a plantation in the early seventeenth century.

But Pocius does not dwell on the distant past. Combining techniques and insights derived from folklore, cultural and historical geography, ethnohistory and ethnography, he provides readers with a detailed portrait of everyday life in Calvert in the twentieth century. Although a folklorist specializing in material culture, Pocius goes beyond a study of things and grapples with various intangible aspects of outport subculture. His specific concern is the use of space: how residents socially construct the spaces in which they live. Since they still tend to share common spaces, including some of the means of production, he delves into the social infrastructure of the community.

Replete with numerous black and white photos, the 26 x 21 cm. book is divided into three parts: the social, cultural and historical context; technology, subsistence production, and the sociocultural landscape (including gender considerations); and settlement patterns, housing (both interiors and exteriors) and a debate on the dichotomy between tradition and modernity.

Calvert is a small, close-knit cooperative inshore cod fishing community, largely of Irish Catholic extraction. Pocius was hospitably accepted and responds by citing his informants by name, quoting them extensively and, through his photos, showing them at work and at home. He concludes that residents are not materialistic and that the incorporation of modern goods and technology does not mean that Calvert is in transition or modernizing. He found instead that new things are often used in socially old ways. The essence of community life in Calvert is "sharing," especially the resources of the land and sea.

Thomas F. Nemec
St. John's, Newfoundland


Coastal People. Contacts across the Cattegat and Skagerrak, c. 1550-1914 is the title of this thesis from the University of Aarhus, which includes a comprehensive summary in English. Poul Holm's aim is to describe
the coastal cultures of southern Norway, western Sweden, and northern Denmark. These regions all face the same waters, the Cattegat and the Skagerrak. Holm examines changing regional adaptations and contacts around and across these Nordic seas in a national and international context.

This study emanates from a project in which a group of Scandinavian scholars worked with various subjects within the cultural and maritime history of the Cattegat-Skagerrak-region. The results from this project constitute a basis for the present work, but the author did not confine himself to compilation. As demonstrated by the extensive bibliography, he has also been tracing and reading almost anything in print related to his field of investigation.

On the other hand, references to related international studies on, say, long term social and cultural change or ecological history are amazingly scarce, the works by Fernand Braudel being among the notable exceptions. Both the long time perspective and the use of the concept of "mentalities" suggest a French influence. However, this is not a contribution to structural history in the vein of the Annales-school. Unlike the Mediterranean in Braudel's work, the Nordic seas and their environs are treated in this study as a more or less incidental spatial and environmental setting. Somewhat disappointing too is the claim that this study spans almost four centuries. The data concerning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are confined to some short conventional and rather sweeping surveys. Most of the book in fact deals with the period from c. 1800-1914, for which the sources are more abundant and accessible.

Kystfolk does not present the reader with a coherent diachronic description, nor does it attempt an analysis of the long term contacts and cultural exchange. Learning about some artifact or custom in one place and finding the same phenomenon in another location some years later does not prove that diffusion has occurred, let alone explain the process. The book does, however, give more value for money when it comes to detailed information on Scandinavian coastal communities in the nineteenth century. Using information mostly from printed sources, Holm succeeds in presenting various aspects of maritime culture like seafaring, trade, fishing methods, and religious movements, to mention a few. This information would otherwise be hard to find, scattered as it is in numerous publications.

Poul H. Moustgaard
Svendborg, Denmark


In his prologue the author contends that Grenfell was not a conventional missionary devoted exclusively to saving souls and mending bodies but an innovator who realized that the way to improve the appalling living conditions endured by the impoverished inhabitants of coastal Labrador was by way of social change. The case is made convincingly.

Drawing not only on the numerous books and articles written by Grenfell himself, Rompkey also makes extensive use of papers in private collections and public records to refocus attention on the social and economic conditions prevailing less than a century ago. Running through the inspiring story of one man and his cause is a regional history of what was one of the last untouched wild frontiers.

Rompkey traces Grenfell's career in
detail, from obscure medical missionary to legendary figure whose writings and lectures were to attract not only many followers in Britain, Canada and America but, more importantly for his work, funds to endow schools, hospitals and to operate support vessels. His formative early years were spent as a doctor in one of London's East End hospitals, followed by short voyages providing medical back-up to the North Sea trawling and drifting fleets; he was subsequently employed in a similar capacity with the distant fleets in the waters off north-east Canada. The reader shares the elation and frustrations of this remarkable man and his supporting team of like minded doctors, nurses and administrators. At the same time it is a salutary tale. In his enthusiasm to achieve results Grenfell frequently exceeded the authority granted to him by the Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen. He pursued a multitude of ideas, many of them good and practical, but without heed to the financial and human resources needed to make them enduring. He was not above ignoring the charitable constitution of the Mission by indulging in commercial enterprises to the chagrin of local traders, but it must be acknowledged his purpose was never for personal gain.

In his later years Grenfell was dogged by ill health and frustrated by the friction caused by his efforts to carry the same work load that he had as a younger man. He eventually resigned himself to fund raising, leaving the administration of the charity to others.

It is a tale well told. A larger scale detailed map would have been useful, but overall one welcomes the revival of a hero who was a legend within living memory.

Norman Hurst
Coulsdon, England


This ambitious textbook is designed for undergraduate courses in the historical geography of transportation. The author examines all phases of transportation from the sixteenth century to the mid-1980s including canals, roads, ocean shipping, railroads, aviation, and automobiles. The time span is vast but the physical area covered is confined to Western Europe (Italy, France, the Low Countries and Great Britain), and North America. The marine portions of the volume are limited to the two chapters on canals and North Atlantic shipping. The author appears more at home with railways than with ships.

Of the two marine chapters the one on canals is the better. In "Canals of the Renaissance and Industrial Periods" Vance provides a useful introduction to the early development of canals in Italy and the Low Countries to go along with the discussion of the canals of France. He takes great pains to show that the English canals of the Industrial Revolution were not the great innovations that they have been touted. The story is continued with North American canals, focusing on early American construction. The description of Canadian canals seems thrown in as an afterthought.

The chapter on North Atlantic shipping, on the evolution of the merchant marine and steam navigation, is perhaps the weakest in the book. Here are repeated several factual errors including the hoary old myth that the first steamship on the Great Lakes appeared in 1818. For a geo-
graphy textbook, too much space is given to listing "firsts." Much of the chapter is devoted to narrating the development of North Atlantic steam passenger ships, with every advance in speed and tonnage delineated. This is done to the neglect of managerial and technological developments that allowed the merchant sailing ship to prosper into the 1870s. Similarly there is no mention of how these developments created the tramp ship in the nineteenth century, though note is made of the introduction of diesel engines and, later, of containers. Surprisingly for a geography text, there is no reference to Maury's sailing directions first published in 1847 and the subsequent improvement in average sailing times. Clearly, much marine scholarship published before the mid-1980s was not used in the preparation of this volume. Thus, neither Ralph Davis's pioneering work nor any of the early volumes of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project are cited in the notes.

From a marine point of view this volume is not a success. While it appears to contain a great deal of useful information for students of American and British railroads, students of marine transportation will have to look elsewhere.

M. Stephen Salmon
Ottawa, Ontario


With this collection of short essays, the Liverpool Nautical Research Society has sought to reflect the last three years of maritime study undertaken by its members; if nothing else, it attests the scope and enthusiasm of their endeavours. No fewer than nine contributors address a rich diversity of subjects, ranging from early Mersey steamships to Gold Coast surf-boats, from maritime biography to shipping in post-war Japan, though naturally a local dimension is evident in most.

More than a decade's active research informs Peter Davies' survey of post-war Japan shipping. After a succinct review of Japan's economic transition between the Meiji restoration and World War II, Davies proceeds to examine the policy of US occupation authorities which he considers critical to the reconstruction of trade and, hence, shipping. With some cogency, he dismisses the low-wage hypothesis of post-war success, and instead ascribes Japan's shipping ascendancy to superior managerial skill, reinforcing his case with a profusion of statistical data. Michael Stammers, as befits a museum director, prefers more aesthetic illustrations for his study of the Mersey sailing ferries, whose commercial demise on the Liverpool-Wirral routes came as late as 1865. The miscellaneous origins of these vessels will be an obvious source of fascination for aficionados of sail. Yet, as Stammers readily concedes, his conclusions are tentative and ample scope remains for further research. In "The Merseyside Records Centre: Its Holdings and Functions," Gordon Read aims to update Valerie Burton's definitive survey (*Business Archives*, November 1987), but provokes almost as many questions as he answers. Expansive on the nature of archival resources, he tends to evade the issues of function and policy objective, which consequently remain obscure.

The high quality of maritime biography is one of this book's main strengths. Adrian Jarvis offers valuable insight into the Mer-
The Northern Mariner

York docks administration in his account of Harold Littledale (1803-89), whilst students of transatlantic shipping will be intrigued by H. M. Hignett's own biographical vignette, "Charles Maclver of Cunard." These are complemented by Charles Dawson's concise profile of the Swedish marine engineer, John Ericsson, which focuses on his early collaboration with the shipbuilding Laird brothers of Birkenhead. With equal authority, Alan Scarth investigates the provenance of early Mersey steamships (c. 1815-19), explaining both technology transfer from the Clyde and the construction of the first Liverpool paddle-steamer. While "The Surf-Boats of the Gold Coast, Ghana" represents little primary research, it does allow James Cowden to examine afresh a nautical theme of perennial interest. In contrast, A. H. Campbell's discussion of "British small bulk-carriers" seems limited in empirical content and in analysis.

If a general problem pervades this work, it consists in the brevity of essays. Some are mere aperitifs: wide participation has its price. Nevertheless, the editor has arrived at an appropriate and, in my view, effective formula to present historical studies of both professional and lay origin.

Andrew P. Armitage
Liverpool, England


The age of the sailing ship is one regarded in the popular mind with affection and nostalgia. There is something wonderfully romantic about those old images of great tall ships under full canvas beating their way across deep-blue oceans. Equally there is an indefinable sadness in images of derelict hulks lying on sand bars or mud flats in the years after steam finally conquered sail. The flotsam and jetsam of transport revolutions touch some part of us that responds to a sense of lost golden ages, no matter how far from the reality of the time that sense may be. Boston clippers, Yarmouth barques or Finnish "peasant" ships—the emotional response to the demise of the sailing ship has been everywhere the same.

But behind the nostalgia lies a story of technical change, an emerging world economy and concomitant global restructuring, and the rise and fall of national maritime economies. Modern shipping historians, assisted by a computer technology which finally permits the handling of vast quantities of data, have moved us beyond the vision of "Wooden Ships and Iron Men" into a hard-nosed assessment of the age of sail—its potential and its limitations for those regions which flourished briefly under canvas and then declined, having failed to make (for whatever reasons) the transition from sail to steam.

The first full-scale study of this kind was undertaken by the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project in the mid-1970s, the final results of which were published recently by Eric Sager with Gerald Panting under the title Maritime Capital (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). Sailing into Twilight is a parallel study, and a fine piece of work. It is not merely an analysis of one nation's fleets but sets Finnish shipping firmly and successfully in its international as well as national context. Kaukiainen addresses the "big" questions of economic development in a changing technological and economic world from the perspectives of structural change in the fleets, investment cycles, labour, productivity, income, profitability and competitiveness.
To be a good maritime historian requires statistical expertise, caution, good judgement, technical know-how, patience (in large doses) and imagination. Kaukiainen is amply endowed with all these qualities, and in pleasing proportions: this is a balanced book. It is also impressively wide-ranging in its consideration of pertinent explanatory variables, including those that are fiendishly difficult to handle, such as the "qualitative characteristics" of skill, know-how, education and entrepreneurship. Beyond that, there are several sections of the book devoted to data, methodology, measurement techniques and difficulties-discussions which are useful and build confidence in the author's conclusions.

In short, this is a lovely book. While one might quibble over the occasional awkwardness in grammar or sentence structure ("data" are plural in English), to do so would be churlish; it would, I think, also be beside the point, namely that this is a scholarly, thoughtful, careful and insightful analysis of Finnish shipping. If read with comparable analyses of other national fleets in mind, it makes a contribution to knowledge that goes far beyond the mere compilation of a national data set. It makes a vital contribution to the analytical jigsaw puzzle that international maritime history, in essence, must be. I recommend it highly.

Rosemary E. Ommer
St. John's, Newfoundland


This is another of those local histories which can only be written by someone with a good knowledge of their district and access to local sources of information, both recorded and personal. James Cameron, now retired, has been a journalist, editor and radio station manager; in World War II he served in the Canadian Artillery. He is the author of numerous books, booklets and historical papers dealing with Pictou County, Scottish and military history.

The book's first eight chapters deal with the shipbuilding industry, district by district. Shipbuilding had an earlier start in Pictou County than in most parts of Nova Scotia, when Captain William Lowden built several ships of up to 600 tons in the 1790s. After that, shipbuilding in the county followed the pattern seen in other parts of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island: inexpensive vessels of rather poor quality for sale abroad, together with their timber cargoes, in the 1830s to 1850s. Then came better quality ships, owned and operated by Pictou County residents in the coastal West Indian and world-wide trades, until sailing ships were supplanted by steel steamers at the end of the century. In the late 1800s, the county's most important shipping line was the Carmichael Company which, for many years, operated large steel sailing ships (built abroad) and steamers, as well as locally built vessels.

Cameron has some interesting comments on the failure of Nova Scotia shipbuilders to switch to steel construction. The Trenton steel plant was built at the turn of the century, and although a few such vessels were constructed, including the only Canadian steel three-masted schooner, the operators of the steel industry were concerned mainly with the development of the railway system.

Nevertheless, some steel ships were built in Trenton during World War I, and twenty-four standard "Park" ships, (4700 ton type), were built in the Foundation Maritime yard in Pictou (later Ferguson
Industries) during World War II. Appendices list the ships built (as far as is known) in the various areas and in Ferguson Industries to the present day.

The next section of the book is devoted to people: the shipmasters and other prominent seamen. While not necessarily complete, this is extensive and as detailed as possible. It is supplemented by a list, compiled in 1950 by Captain D.M. Mackenzie, of shipmasters he recalled. On the Navy side, the most prominent Pictou County officer was Rear-Admiral L.W. Murray, CIC Northwest Atlantic in World War II, who was rather unfairly blamed for not preventing the Halifax VE Day riot. This account of seamen includes quite recent graduates of the Coast Guard College in Sydney, Nova Scotia, but is rather short of information about marine engineers.

Apart from all this data, there are tales of disasters, shipwrecks, rescues and other adventures. I found little about the Caribou to Woods Island service of Northumberland Ferries; perhaps Cameron considers this more part of PEI maritime history.

Add this book to others of its type, the locally published histories of the various maritime regions of these provinces, and you will have a lot of interesting information at your disposal for a very modest price.

C. Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


The exclamation mark in the title of *Shipwreck!* is symptomatic of what is unsatisfying about this book. Certainly, a succinct introduction discusses a number of the issues contributing to shipwrecks: weather, fire, collision, human error, deficiencies in ship design, inexperienced crews. Few of these matters, however, are documented by the book's 101 photographs taken in British waters between 1872 and 1986, which focus attention on shipwrecks entirely as spectacle—a very narrow perspective indeed. There's a numbing sameness about the relentless procession of photographs surrounded, as it were, by figurative exclamation marks. Compounding the impression of sameness is the regrettabley poor quality of reproduction, which robs the images of much of their detail. That is a pity, because the author has drawn upon the resources of several institutions in Britain, such as the Royal Naval Lifeboat Institution, the Weymouth Museum, the Nautical Institute, the Royal Naval Air Station at Culdrose, and the picturesquely-named Blackgang Chine Museum. Many of the photographs are by members of the renowned Gibson family, whose work has already been seen to better advantage in the book *Island Camera: the Isles of Scilly in the Photography of the Gibson Family*, published in 1972.

Peter Robertson
Ottawa, Ontario


For the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of their shipping company, its present owners, Arnt Jacob Merland and Thorbjørn Morland, descendants of the company's founders, commissioned Gustav Saetra to produce a history of their firm. Saetra, Chief Archivist at the Aust Agder
Archives, did himself proud and so did the Mørlands, first by keeping such extensive archives of their company and then by opening their archives to the author and leaving him a free hand in making use of the archival material.

The result is an exemplary history of a shipping company, the likes of which I have never before encountered. Besides tracing the family history back to 1500, it covers every aspect of ship owning: building, buying and selling of ships; coping with technological changes; managing the company through recessions, two world wars and the always changing trade patterns. What is most striking about this company history, however, is the space given to the life and work of the seamen who served aboard the Mørland ships (including female crew members), the social responsibilities the company felt towards them, and the problems it encountered, as a company which believed in temperance, with crews who treasured their traditional strong drinks.

The author is very enlightening in covering the change-over from a national fleet manned entirely by Norwegians to present day Norwegian-owned ships under flags of convenience and under the Norwegian International Register manned mainly by Indian and Filipino crews. The Nor­lands tried to counter the international competition by such measures as reorganization and automation but, in the end, they were forced to follow world-wide trends. However, because of present (1991) developments in shipping, the Company is optimistic about the prospects of increasing the number of Norwegians aboard its ships.

The book, hardcover and printed on high quality glossy stock is a joy to behold. There are circa 170 illustrations, including many reproductions of snapshots taken aboard Mgrland ships, as well as extensive notes and tables. Together they create a veritable social history of sea-going during the past seventy-five years, a history that is of great appeal to me as a former merchant seaman and a history which could be an eye-opener to many marine historians who never had a chance to serve aboard ships. And, to top it all, the book is printed in two languages—again thanks to the Mørlands—in two columns per page, Norwegian to the left and English to the right!

Do write for a copy before they are all gone. It may be a long time before you will again find a shipping company history of such quality.

Niels Jannasch
Tantallon, Nova Scotia


David Holly offers an extended look at one of the longest lived steamboat lines in the Chesapeake region, mixing a fair degree of nostalgia with a fascination for the steamboats and the remarkable circumstances which allowed them to thrive through much of the nineteenth century.

The Weems Steamboat Company of Baltimore was incorporated in 1891 but the family had been actively involved in steamboat operations on the Chesapeake since 1819. They, (and in their wake, the author) date the history of the line from that earlier date when George Weems purchased the Surprise. It was a thoroughly inauspicious beginning: the purchase price was in excess of $20,000 in 1819 yet she was sold for $800 in 1822! Indeed, by the beginning of the Civil War, the line still consisted of only three vessels. This num-
ber grew steadily over the next forty years until the firm operated ten steamers. After a number of false starts the ante-bellum line had focused on serving the Patuxent River landings, later the Rappahannock up to Fredericksburg, and finally the Potomac to Washington. The Weems steamers linked all these tidewater landings and ports with Baltimore. In late 1904 the family sold out to the Maryland, Delaware and Virginia Railroad Company, a subsidiary of the Pennsylvania Railroad.

In preparing this volume Holly had access to collections of business and family papers in the Maryland Historical Society, the Hagley Museum as well as private collections of the Weems descendants. These, combined with a wide range of newspaper citations and a range of articles and books on the Chesapeake, provided the basis for the account. The seven appendices show the range of interests of the author: twenty-four pages describing all the Weems vessels in the style of the Belgian Ship-lovers lists; eleven pages of steamboat schedules; twenty-three pages of notes on the history of the landings on the three rivers served at the turn of the century, and six pages of Weems genealogy. In addition, the author has assembled some ten pages of accounts, charters and construction agreements for various vessels and offers four pages of extracts from the company minute books after 1891. The respective paginations reflect the author's success in capturing different facets of the career of the Weems line. The evolving steamers and their varying routes occupy the better part of the narrative. Holly tries, with general success, to put this in the context of the other steamer operations on the Chesapeake. Much less attention is paid to the business side of affairs. Part of this is unquestionably because less data appears to be available, but certain issues could still have been probed more deeply. The first chapters assume that George Weems was in charge of most major operational decisions, although it becomes clear that he had partners, partners who were interested in other shipping. The return on investment might have been pursued more vigorously for the years where there was data. The chapter "Steamboat Life through the Years" is the only section to take a look at the nature of the crew and life aboard ship, ranging from the slaves used prior to the Civil War to "Old Nance," the cat and "prime ratter" aboard the Richmond. Throughout, the style of presentation presents the labour history in the same anecdotal style that graces the rest of the volume.

For the reader relatively unfamiliar with the Chesapeake, the volume is a minefield of tongue-twisting, unfamiliar geography. Unfortunately the charts are buried in the middle of the appendices, over fifty pages from the end of the volume. They are hardly up to the professional standards of presentation that characterize the rest of the volume. Otherwise the Johns Hopkins University Press and the Calvert Marine Museum have a volume of which to be proud. To the general reader with a good chart of the Chesapeake at his elbow the volume is a fairly good read.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


The author employed the financial records of the family tug line on Lake Michigan's
Green Bay between the years 1890 and 1917 as the foundation of this history. It attempts to capture and preserve the era of towing large rafts of pulpwood on Green Bay and the Upper Lakes, a topic that has previously received scant attention from historians. Exhaustive detail and technical data are supported by maps, a fine collection of photographs, graphs, and even a helpful glossary of abbreviations and terms. *Green Bay Workhorses* sets a high standard of research for future local and regional histories of the Great Lakes area.

Following a brief history of the Nau Tug Line, Burridge provides a chronological "biography" of each of the eleven tugs owned by the company, accompanied by a "Log" for each vessel drawn from local newspaper references. Unfortunately, this develops into a disconcerting repetition of the narrative. Frequent documentation of the great variety of vessels that were part of the busy traffic in and out of the port of Green Bay appeal to readers with a more than local interest in shipping. The author wisely reserves the more mundane financial details of the firm for the last chapters and finishes, in Chapter VII, with an account of "Rafting, Pulpwood and The Paper Industry" which transcends the Green Bay locale.

This is an important addition to Great Lakes scholarship, perhaps as much for its shortcomings as its strengths. Burridge eschews the tales of shipwrecks and marine disasters which have been all too characteristic of Great Lakes historical writing, but his book suffers from a near-fatal lack of any thesis. Burridge neither asks nor answers any questions beyond the trivial. His all too frequent recourse to newspaper clippings results more in a collection of the "stuff" of which history is made than history itself. This leaves the distinct impression that Burridge, having done very extensive research, has assembled a body of material that he doesn't know what to do with.

Mr. Burridge has presented the Great Lakes historical community with a significant challenge—to focus on the less sensational aspects of our maritime history without losing sight of the universality that pervades all human activities.

Frank Prothero
Port Stanley, Ontario


One of the pleasant results of the recent exhibit at the Vancouver Maritime Museum, commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the Canadian Pacific Railway's famous trans-Pacific "Empress" service, is the publication of a magnificent edition of former Dominion Archivist Dr. W. Kaye Lamb's history of the line.

Lamb has had a keen interest in the lore of ships since his boyhood, and he first wrote the story of the Empresses in a series of articles in the *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* in the 1930s and '40s. He wrote at a time when he knew and interviewed many of the pioneers of the trans-Pacific service, and before the operations ended for good during World War II.

These articles have long been out of print. Fortunately Dr. Lamb is still keenly interested in the history of shipping and able to up-date his original articles so that they are now available for the first time to seafarers. It is a record of a great era of luxurious ocean travel, and a record of the great ships themselves: how they were financed and built, how they were captains and crewed, their operations in peace and war, and how they ended their lives.
Appendices include specifications of each ship, traffic statistics, service performances and record passages. The book is lavishly illustrated, with a full colour picture of the figure-head of the first Empress of Japan on the cover.

Norman Hacking
North Vancouver, British Columbia


This is the first of an ambitious series of books by noted marine historian Frank O. Braynard, with each volume designed to tell in depth the story of several great (and inter-related) liners. For his first volume he has chosen the big three of the Hamburg American Line—Albert Ballin's Imperator, Vaterland, and Bismarck. The goal of a fortnightly trans-Atlantic service maintained by three ships of comparable stature, was not to be obtained by Hapag any more than it had been by the White Star Line. The intervention of World War I saw to that, and the subsequent dispersal as reparations resulted in the three sisters ending up in the employ of three different lines under their more famous names Berengaria, Leviathan, and Majestic.

Braynard has produced a highly readable and well-illustrated history of the three liners, making use of his extensive research into every facet of their lives. His choice of illustrations culled largely from his own private collection makes for a product which does not have to rely on the same tired images seen in many other titles.

Having lauded Braynard's entertaining and breezily, conversational style, it pains me to have to say that this work is very much flawed. For a book that so extensively illustrates the marvellous interior design of these three superliners, nowhere is the name Charles Mewes, Hapag's famed interior designer, mentioned. This omission is an unforgivable oversight. Even worse is Braynard's use of this book to help flog the 12,000 unsold volumes of his six-volume series on the Leviathan. There is no subtlety in the sales pitch, and it is amplified by the brevity of his chapter on that liner. For information on her restoration after World War I and the structural weaknesses that caused her almost to crack in half in a storm, we are told little, other than to read the Leviathan series. The Leviathan has been Braynard's lifelong passion—hence the mammoth series on this one liner—but the blatant sales pitch made in an effort to clear his cellar, detracts from what could have been an important work, and it cheapens the final product.

Braynard raises a number of questions and lines of thought which could have been explored in some greater depth. Could the use of one-way wiring, which was the root cause of the series of fires which spelled the end of the Berengaria, also explain the fire that ended the life of the Majestic in her final incarnation as the British training ship Caledonia! The number of third class passengers carried on the Imperator's maiden voyage exceeded third class capacity by some 700, leaving one to wonder if at that time price cutting on higher class accommodations was as common as it is today.

To conclude, Classic Ocean Liners would have benefitted from having the story of the three liners interwoven chronologically rather than recounted separately in a somewhat disjointed fashion. Footnotes would also have been preferable to weaving the source of quotations (including the publisher's) into the text.

Classic Ocean Liners is a book that no
ocean liner enthusiast would want to be without and for that reason I would recommend its acquisition; however, it should have been much better.

John Davies
Vancouver, British Columbia


When first published in 1959, this book was an immediate success, presenting in readable form the vast panorama of ships and shipping from the dawn of nautical history to the first century of our time. Written by a mariner, it has been of inestimable value to the student of pre-history, and it underlines the major contribution of the men of the sea in the growth and development of the civilized world today. Egyptians, Sumerians, Minoans, Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, all take their places in this pageant of the seas, from the primitive craft to the great sailing ships of the Greeks and Romans at the end of the era.

Egypt and the Persian Gulf mariners were the first to use sail, and together with their South Arabian cousins controlled the East African sea-route by ancient right from pre-dynastic times. However, the dominant sea-people from the earliest days were the Minoans and Phoenicians who were finally ousted by the Greeks and Romans in a mastery of the sea-lanes which took them as far as India and Malaya before the present era. To the ordinary reader the essence of the story is not in the orderly sequence of historic events, but in the author's unique ability to convey the authentic atmosphere of the fierce sea-fights, naval battles, piracy, plunder and sharp trading in ancient times. People, places and events are so vividly portrayed that their lives and times come alive to provide an absorbing story of men and women not so different from ourselves.

This edition has been totally revised, though Casson still places the ancient Land of Punt in the Red Sea, and Ophir in India, when according to authoritative sources Punt was not in Egypt's home waters but a distant three-year return voyage down the coast of East Africa; the journey was described in meticulous detail by Queen Hatshepsut's naval expedition in 1475 BC. Africa was known as Ophir in King Solomon's day, and that is the translation from the Hebrew language. A fully explanatory bibliography completes this concise, well-illustrated history, and further evidence of early Mediterranean influences in the Americas is to be found in James Bailey's important book, The God Kings and the Titans (Hodder and Stoughton, 1973).

Edmund Layland
Cape Town, South Africa


Both these books survey European encounters with Canada, from St. Brendan's puta-
tive voyages to the first colonial settlements. One comes from the Canadian Museum of Civilization and a member of its staff; the other from a small publisher in Halifax and a writer previously unknown in this field. Both are addressed more to the casual reader than the scholar.

Canada Rediscovered is a sequel to McGhee's Ancient Canada, an illustrated tour of prehistoric Canadian cultures and sites. By profession McGhee is a specialist in arctic archaeology with the Archaeological Survey of Canada. In his spare time, he is our most interesting general writer on archaeological mattCTS.Ancient Canada was a striking and original work, certainly worthy of a place beside the lavishly illustrated works on old-world archaeology for which so many bookstores seem to find room.

Canada Rediscovered is rather less impressive because the territory is so much more familiar. On the heterogeneous collection of European sailors who bumped up against Canadian shores before 1600, McGhee writes well and chooses sensibly, but most of these voyages left no archaeological traces. McGhee summarizes his scholarly analyses (surely the best currently available) of Norse and other pre-Columbian voyages to North America, and writes with enthusiasm about the recently excavated Basque whaling stations at Red Bay, Labrador. But on Cabot, CorteReal, Cartier and the rest, he is sailing familiar historical territory, conjecturing from what scattered maps and scarce documents suggest about a host of minor European voyagers. He does it well, and his text is supported by many well-chosen colour illustrations (some were commissioned for this book).

Without the public subsidy or the colour illustrations of McGhee's book, J.J. Sharp's survey of the same voyages takes the form of an old-fashioned narrative, with many quotations from the explorers' own writings and from published works about them. It is also overpoweringly familiar. Less rooted in original sources or special expertise than the major works in the field, it also lacks the critical spin of the discovery-as-genocide works inspired by the Columbus anniversary. It seems to me worthy but undistinguished, one more title on an overcrowded shelf.

Where the two books differ, McGhee is usually more detailed and his analysis more persuasive. Perhaps inevitably, both are inclined to make the most of even the slimmest evidence. Sharp, to shore up his belief that there must be something to the legend of St. Brendan's voyage, cites as evidence McGhee's 1974 discovery of an allegedly Irish inscription on stone from St. Lunaire, Newfoundland. McGhee himself seems to have repudiated that, nor is it mentioned in his consideration of Irish Atlantic voyages.

Both works consider shipbuilding, navigational techniques, seamanship, and mapping as aspects of their story. McGhee is generally more informative, but neither work is strikingly new on these matters. Sharp cites his sources; McGhee, who has surely read more, does not.

Neither book gives more than a nod to the controversy about the meaning of discovery that the Columbus anniversary has provoked. McGhee, however, can point to the "re" in his title, and to his previous book on native perspectives to balance this one. Sharp is absolutely Eurocentric.

To my eye, the same question haunts both books. How badly do we need another illustrated popular survey of the early voyages?

Christopher Moore
Toronto, Ontario

A leading historian of the early history of maritime discovery, Quinn collected twenty-five of his articles and book chapters for renewed publication in this volume. The essays, dating from the 1940s to the 1980s, illustrate Quinn's great breadth of interest in European exploration from broad synthesis to specialized topics related to the geography, cartography, and literature of marine exploration. While most chapters focus upon British exploration, Quinn has a masterful grasp of the forces that impelled all of the European powers to establish American colonies. His 1987 Walter Prescott Webb lecture "Colonies in the Beginning: Examples from North America," is a fine analysis of the different impulses that drove the European powers. While it is difficult to categorize the essays, several relate to the exploits and voyages of familiar maritime figures or their backers such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir Humphrey Gilbert and Richard Hakluyt. Quinn examines aspects of the European background to exploration and diplomacy and he explores both successful and failed attempts to colonize the North American littoral from Newfoundland to Florida. His essay on the abortive French colony in Florida, 1562-1565, fully portrays the religious divisions and hatreds of the sixteenth century as the Spaniards, commanded by Pedro Menéndex de Aviles, butchered the Protestant settlers in cold blood.

Quinn possesses a remarkable range of research interests and topics. Unlike many historians of early maritime exploration, he fully values the discovery of Newfoundland and the exploitation of the fisheries in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries— as similar in significance for Europe as the much more romantic and exciting exploitation of the silver and gold mines of the Spanish empire. Several chapters examine lesser known maritime activities that in some cases did not produce longer term results. The study on the voyage of Triad, 1606-1607, illustrates the difficulties of marine affairs in an era of confused jurisdiction, piracy, warfare, and poor communications. Quinn's topics range from early maps and charts of North America; advice to potential investors in Virginia, Bermuda, and Newfoundland; books to be purchased for the Virginia Company, and the role of the Welsh in marine exploration. Despite the variety of subjects and themes, Quinn constantly assesses changing perceptions as Europeans learned to understand and to deal with the full significance of the New World. While most of these essays may be found elsewhere, this anthology makes easily accessible a valuable compilation for readers of maritime history.

Christon I. Archer
Calgary, Alberta


The exceptionally complete archives of Rouen, above all the massive Tabellionage or notarial records, form the basis of Brunelle's meticulous study of a group of wealthy commercial families in what was probably France's second city in the sixteenth century. After eighty years of sustained economic growth, Rouen's contacts with the New World peaked in the 1550s, but
the disturbances of the Wars of Religion, together with the bankruptcies of the crowns of France and Spain, the high incidence of piracy, and the outbreak in 1585 of European conflict, undermined Rouen's trade. Only a few major merchants survived the winnowing process, and the trading conditions of the early seventeenth century were very different, as the French monarchy became more inclined to restrict and control commerce by the use of chartered companies. After 1595, Rouen's merchant community was significantly smaller, and the percentage engaging in international trade, as distinct from retail and domestic trade, also shrank.

The first three chapters outline the growth of the Rouennais economy, the network of French commerce and colonization in the New World, and the investors who financed voyages. Rouen's transatlantic trade was divided into two distinct branches; commerce with Brazil was mostly in luxury goods, particularly brazilwood for dyeing, while ships went to Newfoundland solely for cod. Voyages were financed by a risk-limiting system of shares and loans, with a core group of around sixty merchants who invested both frequently and for commercial purposes, rather than for colonization or exploration. The rest of the book focuses on the investors' strategies for social mobility, their purchases of rentes, land and municipal office, their kinship links and finally, where it can be discerned, their religious affiliation amidst the confessional strife that caused such upheaval in Rouen in the second half of the century. Readers of this journal may find themselves wishing that the rather routine and sketchy chapters on New World commerce had been fuller and more detailed, since the subject is of such intrinsic interest, and the archival material obviously very informative. However, Brunelle's stated aim was not to write the history of a particular trade, but rather to bridge the gap between studies of commerce and studies of social mobility, using the New World investors as an access group, since she argues that only successful international trade could provide enough liquid capital for the purchase of office. She finds nothing that distinguishes the transatlantic merchants from their colleagues in other trades, except perhaps "some intangible entrepreneurial spirit that may have pushed [them] to risk their capital on the more hazardous New World voyages when less adventurous merchants would not." Her book adds much of value to current knowledge of the dynamics of French urban society, but rather less to our picture of the transatlantic trades in this vital period.

Pauline Croft
London, England


This booklet is the companion-volume to a revised permanent exhibition on the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in the Dutch maritime museum at Amsterdam. Most of the fine photographs are exhibits of the museum. It is an account of the shipping between the Netherlands and Asia for one who does not have time or chance to turn to the forbiddingly massive volumes in the grand series of Dutch national historic publications (*Rijksgeschiedkundige publicaties*) upon which the booklet is based. It contains a good description of the ship-building of the Company, and a fine portrayal of the life aboard the East-India men and its crews. Not enough is known about
the sailors, though, to warrant the cherished, but in my view wrong, inference that "all of them were born in the lower level of society or from orphanages." (p. 38) One should be wary of bestowing too much faith to the habitual complaints of the directors about the "scum." The description of the draconic punishments on board is probably somewhat overdrawn too. Take the punishment for drawing a knife: putting a knife through the culprit's hand. (p. 41) As far as I know, this was not a normal procedure. Such quibbles aside, however, the treatment of the ships, the routes between Europe and Asia, shipboard life, the organization of the Company in the Netherlands and the description of its buildings and wharves is brief, but illuminating.

Jacobs is far less successful when treating the trade of the Company in Asia and the trade between Europe and Asia. The extremely limited space devoted to large and often complex and unsettled issues, such as the decline of the VOC, or its impact upon the Javanese and Ambonese society, force Jacobs to one-sided, if not altogether faulty, statements. Again, in keeping with much Dutch literature, Jacobs considers the VOC as a trading venture, largely ignoring its role as an early colonial state. Thus, she does not treat the missionary activities of the VOC, its territorial administration, or its relations with the English, Portuguese and French settlements in Asia. Such questions ought to have merited attention in a "story" of the VOC, however brief. Jacobs ought rather to have titled the book: *In Pursuit of the Tropics: Ships, Sailors and Buildings of the Dutch East India Company*. With such a more restricted title the book might have been safely recommended.

R J. Barendse
Leiden, The Netherlands


The publication of the proceedings of the symposia at Annapolis is an essential service to the naval history community. These vast events, at which the attendees dash about to try to catch as much as possible at concurrent sessions, are a clear case where the stage production itself is not sufficient: you have to read the book. This volume, like its predecessors, rewards the effort.

The ninth symposium is notable for the breadth of subject matter, which runs the whole gamut from the Aegean in the fifth century BC to US operations in Vietnam. International participation is significant. Of the twenty-three authors, six came a considerable distance—from Germany, Finland, Peru, Greece, the Netherlands and Great Britain—most of them to discuss the distinctive experiences of their nations. The emphasis on subjects other than well-known campaigns and controversies is particularly satisfying. The thread linking many of the papers is an attempt to understand the practical difficulties of keeping warships at sea in peace and war: the design of ancient fighting vessels; training, discipline and leadership in the Greek navy during the Balkan War of 1912-13, the Peruvian navy in the 1920s, and the Dutch navy of the 1930s; the challenges to German U-boats in mounting clandestine operations during the Spanish Civil War, and to the US Navy in containing the Vichy French fleet at Martinique by means short of war in 1940-3; and inter-service friction
in the exquisitely tricky art of amphibious operations during the American Revolution and World War II

The book is a good read. The papers relate well one to another and follow in a logical sequence, a credit to the organizers of the sessions of the conference. Each is written in a clear style, a credit to the authors and editors. A uniform strength among all of the papers is the considerable amount of information presented, much of it fresh and all of it thoroughly documented. A few suffer somewhat from a lack of bibliographical or analytical discussion to provide context to narrative.

One of the most stimulating features of the Annapolis symposia is the forthrightness of some of the commentators. Fortunately the editors have printed the commentary for two of the outstanding sessions—on the ancient Aegean fleets, and on US Marine Corps counter-insurgency operations. A remark about one of the controversial papers deserves quotation: "I cannot help but say that for many years [the author] has marched to a différent drummer." (p. 53) The spirit is friendly, but the discussion pointed, and that is the hallmark of a truly successful conference.

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


Philippe Le Vallois, future marquis de Villette-Mursay was born in 1632. A stiff-necked Huguenot cavalry officer, unemployed since the end of the Franco-Spanish Wars (1635-1659), he was on half-pay and destined to remain mired on his lands in Poitou when in 1672 he joined the French navy. His cousin, the future Madame de Maintenon, obtained the appointment. While he was not a typical French naval officer during the expansion that occurred under Louis XIV, Villette-Mursay's career does allow historians greater comprehension of the navy's growth and development during the final third of the seventeenth century. An officer and a gentleman, he evinced no regard for *la guerre de course* or for commoners who entered the service through the merchant marine or from the commercial classes in the sea ports. A member of the military, landed nobility, his presence in the navy reflects the heterogeneity of recruitment in Louis XIV's young navy as well as the predominance of his class in the new officer corps. As the editor points out, Villette-Mursay was both a witness and an actor.

He entered the navy as a capitaine de vaisseau and made nineteen campaigns during the next thirty-two years. The opening of the Dutch War found Colbert short of suitable commanders for the ships of his rapidly expanding navy, and Villette-Mursay immediately assumed second-in-command of a third-rate in the Mediterranean. He obtained his own ship two years later and fought his first action in 1676. Later the same year he was wounded at Agosta fighting against the Dutch under Admiral de Ruyter. Following the Dutch War, Villette-Mursay made several campaigns including a very extended one to the West Indies between 1678 and 1681. But despite his growing experience and good record further promotion was denied him until, like many Protestant officers, he abjured his faith in 1685. This action earned him appointment to flag rank almost immediately and three years later he was promoted to lieutenant-général des armées navales.
During the War of the League of Augsburg Villette-Mursay commanded divisions in the major battles and naval actions: Béveziers or Beachy Head (1690), Barfleur or La Hogue (1692), Bantry Bay (1689), the Smyrna Convoy (1693) and Tortosa (1694). By the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession he had become one of the senior members of the officer corps and, through his cousin's influence, mentor to the Admiral of France, the young comte de Toulouse. In 1704, at age 72, he went to sea for the last time, commanding the van of Toulouse's fleet in the bloody but indecisive battle of Velez-Malaga. He died on Christmas Day three years later.

The memoirs which Villette-Mursay wrote at the behest of Toulouse are based on his sea-journals and are rather laconic. Their merit lies in his witness as companion in arms of Duquesne, a second to d'Estrées and Tourville, collaborator with Chateaurenault and Courbon-Blénac, and tutor of Toulouse. Published once before in 1844, this new, critical edition marks an immeasurable improvement for the editor, who has written extensively about the officer corps of the Old Regime navy, has contributed an excellent introductory essay tracing the author's career and placing it in a well-developed social-cultural as well as naval context. He has also carefully annotated all of the sea-terms employed in the memoirs and contributed a valuable dictionary of people and naval battles and engagements mentioned in the memoirs. Indeed, the editor's contribution, providing context, elaboration, and definition makes this a very useful reference that will appeal to many beyond students of Louis XIV's navy. Librarians take note.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


The Restoration Navy is finally being rescued from some of the unflattering judgements of its saviour, Samuel Pepys. This monograph also challenges Macaulay's too memorable charge: "There were gentlemen and there were seamen in the navy of Charles the Second. But the seamen were not gentlemen; and the gentlemen were not seamen." To explore the contest between gentlemen and tarpaulins, Davies undertakes a social and political analysis of the Restoration Navy.

It was only in peacetime, between 1674 and 1688, that most naval commissions went to gentlemen, who had to know something of seamanship in order to pass the rigorous examination for lieutenants instituted by Pepys in 1677. Collisions between the growing professional solidarity among the officers and the growing bureaucratic centralization of government were endemic. Government insistence upon regular musters and sea journals was effectively enforced by withholding pay, but unauthorized leaves, drunkenness, and fraud were never adequately controlled. Although an officer's commission was more profitable in the navy than in the army, especially for those awarded the lucrative Mediterranean voyages, naval officers seldom left substantial estates. The statistical side of this group biography is quite disappointing, and a related article would be welcome. Information gathered by Davies on the career paths of 784 officers deserves thorough analysis for age, origins, length of service, promotions, life expectancies, estates, etc., not merely sampled for a table on gentle-
men vs. tarpaulin commissions.

Although this work is overwhelmingly about naval officers, the more impressionistic discussion of the "men" of the subtitle offers some insights. During wartime, between a third and a half of the maritime community was in the navy. Although most seem to have been volunteers then, as were all crewmen of the peacetime fleet, there were numerous impressment riots. Davies notes that "the officers competed to get into the navy with the same zeal with which many seamen sought to get out of it." (p. 230) Despite barbaric punishments without recourse and unremitting delays in pay, the Restoration navy is represented as offering several attractions. Better food was available than for mates aboard merchant fleets or ashore. Improvements in awards, pensions, and bounties are noted. Claims that there was little desertion among sailors who were owed more than seven or eight months' wages is dubious evidence of contentment below decks. Davies argues that sailors in the navy were not part of an alienated maritime class, as Marcus Rediker has recently claimed. Links to officers went beyond their power to appoint petty officers. Commissioned officers were expected to recruit sailors through kin and clients, as well as general reputation.

The stronger half of this book is the detailed study of the politics of the naval officers. Several naval dynasties of kin and neighbours developed into factions in the Restoration navy. Davies consciously builds on Bernard Capp's Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648-1660 (Oxford, 1989), especially in discussing the Restoration itself. A sympathetic treatment of the transition for Vice Admiral John Lawson introduces discussion of an officer corps preoccupied with their pay and their careers. Charles II's honeymoon with his navy lasted until the second Dutch war, and the intensification of patronage rivalries became particularly acute during the long peace that followed. The best and final chapter is on the revolution of 1688. Rivalries between the factions led by Admirals Arthur Herbert and George Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, are explored in detail. Davies sees the naval conspiracy against James H as a failure without consequences for the fortunate revolutionaries. Faction and clientage were more significant in naval politics throughout the Restoration than were the distinctions between gentlemen and tarpaulin officers.

This revised doctoral thesis entirely demolishes the gentlemen vs. tarpaulin myth of the Restoration naval officer corps. While the theme may have constrained the potential for a more thorough social analysis, this is a sound guide to the problems and politics of the naval officers serving Charles II and his younger brother.

Ian K. Steele
London, Ontario


There seems little doubt that Rear Admiral Popham was indeed a most "cunning fellow." Originally used by one of the Admirals' detractors in a pejorative sense, the author succeeds in developing the character of his subject in a more positive way where his cunning is shown in a broader context to illustrate the ingenuity and dexterity of this singularly unique individual.

Orphaned at birth, Popham was fortunate to be befriended by Captain Thomson,
who took him to sea at the age of 16, and was to act as father, instructor and protector. From Thomson, he learned seamanship and was introduced to the intricacies of navigation, in which field of endeavour he was to excel. He eventually explored new coastlines and passages wherever his duties took him, including India and the Far East. A master surveyor and excellent hydrographer, he continually put forward ideas for improvements in the design of chronometers, compasses and binnacles and was to become a fellow of the Royal Society.

But Popham was an adventurer and opportunist and a restless one at that. After eight years at sea, and finding himself ashore on half pay, he sought and received reluctant permission from the Admiralty to go to the East Indies "to follow my private affairs." He spent the next few years in command of merchant ships carrying cargoes both for the East India Company and on his own account. He became a confidante of the Governor General and senior members of the Company Council, though these connections could not save him when his vessel was seized for illicit trading. Prolonged litigation followed and although finally found in his favour, he never recouped his losses.

Not one for self-recriminations, Popham became attached to the Army in Flanders under the Duke of York, where he served as Superintendent of Inland Navigation with great distinction and was much involved in combined operations. For his efforts, and on the personal recommendation of the Duke, he was promoted to Post Captain, though he had never commanded a naval vessel larger than a sloop. This hardly commended him to his naval peers.

His agile mind was now to conceive the idea for establishment and organization of the "Sea Fencibles," an anti-invasion force drawn from seamen and fishermen on the south coast and he personally commanded the district from Deal to Beachy Head. Back in Ostend he commanded the naval part of the expedition to destroy the sluices of the Bruges Canal and then to Russia to make arrangements for the embarkation of Russian troops for service in Holland. He made such an impression on the Czar that he was invested as a Knight of Malta, an honour to be recognized by his own sovereign George III for a "man full of zeal, talent and knowledge."

Next, Popham convoyed troops from the Cape of Good Hope and from India to the Red Sea and cooperated with the Army in Egypt, concluding a communal treaty with the Arabs at Jeddah with his usual skill and zeal. Returning to India his ship underwent extensive repair for which the expenditure was so enormous and extraordinary, an investigation was ordered. Once again he was vindicated, the accusations having been grossly exaggerated.

Undaunted by such reverses, Popham had continued his work on his "Telegraphic Signals" or "Marine Vocabulary." This was published in 1800 and became an important adjunct to the Royal Navy's signal book for ships of war; Nelson used it to convey his famous signal at Trafalgar and it formed the basis of naval signalling for many years.

He next hoisted his broad pennant as Commodore and Commander-in-Chief of an expedition against the Cape of Good Hope. Resistance was minimal and he achieved his objective without difficulty. He then heard that Buenos Aires would welcome liberation by a British force, and he saw this as a patriotic duty and opportunity. At first successful, but soon repulsed, he subsequently faced a court martial for leaving his station without orders and received a severe reprimand. None of this seems to have lessened the confidence the Admiralty held for this talented man. He became
engaged in an expedition against Copenhagen in conjunction with Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) and operated as well off the Spanish coast in the Peninsular War. Promoted to Rear Admiral and invested with a Knight Commander of the Bath, he finished his career as Commander-in-Chief Jamaica, an appointment he did not hold for long, as he was to retire due to ill health and to die shortly after.

The author has done a considerable service by bringing this extensive biography of a lesser-known admiral of the Royal Navy to our attention. Writing with clarity, he has obviously researched his subject well. One almost feels that perhaps he has some affinity with his distant relation and felt that the story of one man's contributions to naval history in Napoleonic times had been left untold, too long. I believe he is probably right and I can only say that I enjoyed it sufficiently that I shall be seeking out other works from the same author.

Robert St. G. Stephens
Madingley, Cambridgeshire


Books presenting detailed reconstructions of historic ships are becoming popular with ship modellers and the best of them can be valuable summaries of current knowledge for researchers. The acknowledged leader in this genre is Boudriot's Collection Arché-
The work is not without problems. For researchers, Boudriot is too erratic in providing references; archive file numbers are quoted in some places while in others, statements are made which lack any support. The plates necessarily involve much conjecture, which may not trouble modellers (the considered conclusions of the leading expert on these ships being as close to authenticity as can be) but the researcher needs to know which questionable details can be confirmed and which cannot. The text could have benefitted from tight editing; there is too much repetition, some unfortunate ordering of information and disconcerting shifts between present and past tenses.

In short, this book is highly recommended for anyone with a special interest in these vessels and for experienced modellers. Although it could be read alone, prior familiarity with The Seventy-Four Gun Ship would be preferable.

T.J. Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia


Peter Goodwin is well known as the author of The Construction and Fitting of the Sailing Man of War 1650-1850 (London, 1987); this, together with his background as a submariner, design engineer, and employee on Victory, establish his credentials and his credibility.

This latest book is another in Conway's "Anatomy of the Ship" series. Consistent with other books in the series, The Naval Cutter Alert provides the history of the vessel as well as dimensions, photographs of a model olHawke in the National Maritime Museum, lines drawings and plans.

Surprisingly, many people are not all that familiar with cutters and their versatility in the eighteenth century. Inexpensive and somewhat small, they were also quick with a large spread of sail and well-armed, and therefore served as dispatch boats, reconnaissance and patrol vessels, smugglers and revenue cutters. In 1777 and 1778, the Royal Navy at Dover had fifteen cutters built, one being Alert. In September 1777, she captured the American brig Lexington and captured the French lugger Coureur in June 1778. Alert was subsequently captured in July by the French frigate Junon.

Alert was clinker built, and Goodwin covers the whole range in his research regarding various dimensions, etc. However, there are various cross-references to other cutters for different figures, and this tends to be confusing. Thus, the mast and yard dimensions come from the cutter Pheasant of 1778, while the rigging is from Steel. As there is no known contemporary model extant of Alert, the photos, as previously mentioned, are of Hawke. While some of them are clear and crisp, others are not. The plans and lines drawings are well done, and cover every aspect of this little cutter, including deck furniture, interior details, cannon, and rigging.

On the whole this book is adequate with a few strong points. It would be best, before purchasing it, to try to look through the book unless you have a heavy interest in this period and vessel type. The price is somewhat high for value received, but nonetheless for many of us, it is and will be a worthwhile addition to our libraries.

Bob Cook
East Lake Ainslie, Nova Scotia

It is an odd phenomenon that the development of the Royal Navy just prior to the age of steam has been generally neglected and it is hard to understand why. Perhaps the charm of Nelson's ships and the perceived perfection at Trafalgar encouraged the conclusion that things simply did not get better, or perhaps the thinking is that steam came onto the scene so suddenly and conclusively that it eclipsed sail overnight, thus rendering the further study of sailing ships dry and inconsequential. Whatever the reasons for this unfair lack of interest, Lambert's latest issue will surely dispel these myths and create new interest in this somewhat overlooked period.

The book's title is a fair description of its subject, yet one must see the table of contents to find the extraordinary range of topics covered. All aspects of maintaining and building the Royal Navy during the years between 1815 and 1850 are dealt with here in considerable detail. Lambert begins by describing the taut political and depressed economic climate in Great Britain after the Napoleonic Wars. This virtually dictated strategic naval policy until the Crimean War. Of particular interest are the influences of party politics and the personal idiosyncrasies of the people in government, the Navy Board, the Admiralty and the Surveyor's Office. Also discussed are the progress of technology and subsequent advances in building methods, at a time when the Industrial Revolution and the development of steam power were creating a whole new atmosphere for labour.

Necessarily, new developments in ship construction and fittings are dealt with at length in the book. Few students of wooden warships have not heard of the innovative structural systems introduced and developed by Seppings and Symonds but very little has been written on the subject. Lambert describes these building techniques and discusses their successes and failures. He also describes other modernizing methods, notably that of "razeeing" multi-decked ships (this usually involved the removal of the Upper Deck) so that larger, standardized guns could be carried.

The building of increasingly large ships progressed simultaneously with the development of heavier ordnance. Lambert discusses this subject as well as the use of foreign species of timber with their accompanying advantages and drawbacks. The treatments employed to preserve oak against fungal decay (the bane of wooden ships) is also discussed and one wonders if, had not iron replaced wood as the principal building material for warships, an optimum wooden ship would have been built.

The last chapter discusses the development, maintenance, manning, etc. of the Royal dockyards, the abandonment of private yards for building navy ships and work in foreign yards, notably in India. This is a welcome follow-up to Morriss' *The Royal Dockyards During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars* (Leicester, 1983).

Quite apart from its technical merit, special mention must be made of the book's visual appeal. It is profusely illustrated with reproductions of draughts, maps, paintings, portraits and models as well as tables. But most remarkable are the contemporary photos of many of the ships, most of which have never before been published. Some of the ships lasted well into the twentieth century, but more importantly, the end of their era (1850) coincides roughly with the introduction of the cam-
era. For the photos alone, simply thumbing through this book piqued my interest.

This is a very thorough and well-conceived study; looking at his list of primary sources one can tell that Lambert is breaking considerable new ground. Some of his conclusions may prove to be controversial. However, as he rightly points out, Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1805* was seminal; I am sure that *The Last Sailing Battlefleet* will be as well.

John McKay
Langley, British Columbia


The US Naval Historical Center has embarked upon a second generation of its series of historical sketches of US Naval ships. The first volume of that effort is now off the presses. As with the old series, the chronological period covered is 1775 to the present day. The reader is cautioned that the use of the term "fighting ships" within the title may be somewhat misleading as the work deals both in combatant craft and in naval support vessels.

On this second generation go-round, one discovers that histories of vessels whose names begin with the letter "A" cover 580 pages of text as compared against eighty pages of text for the same alphabetical designation within the Naval Historical Center's original product of 1959. Of course a considerable number of ship commissionings have occurred in the interim. This accounts for some of the new material. Considerable information has also been added to the sketches of the vessels which were enumerated in 1959. Where there is fresh information, it has been gleaned in-house from Navy Historical Center staffing, from the private sector, and from the myriad of published and unpublished operational histories that were written over the past thirty-three years.

*The Dictionary* has always been a role model in the way it is designed and formulated. Now, as in the past, it is far more than just a dry statistical listing of lengths, tonnages, and armaments. Instead, the editors have tried—and with success—to blend the ships biographies with a narrative treatment of the operation(s) in which each ship participated. The risk one can run in doing a list in this manner—particularly a list dealing with so many vessels—is that duplication concerning specific operations can often result in a noticeable redundancy in the writing. This does not appear to have happened here. Instead, each historical sketch is approached as a fresh treatment.

*The Dictionary* carries many illustrations of ships of different types and periods. This debut volume of the new series is clearly an indication of the US Navy's commitment to keep its ship histories current. It is highly recommended, both to the researcher and to the casual reader of American naval history.

Charles Dana Gibson
Camden, Maine


With the exception of the ironclad CSS *Virginia*, which sank two anchored ships in
The Northern Mariner

Hampton Roads, the Confederate States Navy did not mount a credible threat against the US Navy. In one of the South's few successful strategies they did, however, nearly drive the commercial fleet from the high seas. In a very compelling history based on meticulous research, the author tells the story of the eight Confederate commerce raiders that captured 247 ships, burning or scuttling 172 of them. A major theme of this book is that the winner in the war against commercial ships was Great Britain. In 1860, 70% of world trade was carried in American ships. The fear and panic created by the raiders resulted in American ships laying idle in port or being sold or transferred to foreign registry. Great Britain picked up the spoils, winning undisputed dominance of maritime commerce that continued long after 1865.

With or without official complicity, the three most effective raiders, CSS Alabama, Florida and Shenandoah, powerful cruisers fast under sail or steam, were built in British shipyards. Their construction was surrounded by diplomatic furore as Northern representatives tried to prove that England's Neutrality Laws and Foreign Enlistment Act were being contravened. Their departure was clandestine under British command, and they were armed and commissioned as Confederate warships in remote harbours in the Azores or Bahamas. While the officers were the South, their crews were from England, other neutral ports and captured ships, lured by promises of prize money which never materialized as there was no way to dispose of prizes. Barred from Confederate ports by blockade, the frequency and duration of visits to neutral ports were legally restricted and neutrals wanted no part of their prizes. The raiders ranged the world in search of American ships, capturing them in European waters, off South Africa and Australia and in the Indian Ocean. Shenandoah sailed into the North Pacific and destroyed the US whaling fleet, twenty-five of them in May 1865 because the captain did not know the war was over. One of the most interesting passages in this book examines the sinking of Alabama by USS Kearsarge in a battle off Cherbourg. Kearsarge had been searching for Alabama for a year. Thousands on shore and in small boats witnessed the battle. The two captains had been mess-mates and close friends in the old navy.

A war of words and bitter relations between the United States and Great Britain continued for years after the war, with the US claiming British negligence in their neutral responsibilities. The so-called "Alabama Claims" were finally settled when a tribunal awarded the US $15.5 million indemnity, which the book suggests may have been a cheap price for Britain's rich inheritance of maritime commerce.

Gray Raiders illuminates one of the lesser known chapters of Civil War history, most of which had been previously covered by thumbnail sketches as part of a wider history. Chester Hearn has provided Civil War students with an important new title for their history shelves.

Peter G. Rogers
Halifax, Nova Scotia


The Mahan Centennial Conference, co-sponsored by the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island and the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C., met on 30 April and 1 May, 1990 to commemorate the 1890 publication of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's most famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. The conference brought together historians, naval thinkers and naval strategists. War College President, Rear Admiral R. J. Kurth, observed in his welcoming remarks that Mahan was the first in the US Navy to combine all three of those attributes and to reach the pinnacle of fame. The following are a sampling of fifteen presentations.

Wilfrid Laurier University historian and past CNRS president Barry M. Gough presented a paper, "The Influence of History on Mahan," although that title might easily have read, "The Influence of Mahan on History and the History Profession." Gough concluded that Mahan's *Influence* and the larger corpus of his writings is of enduring value, not because Mahan was right, but because he was sometimes wrong. Mahan constituted a touchstone, a prism through which today's generation may view a much larger spectrum than Mahan could ever have perceived in the late 1880s and later. Mahan enlarged our world. He also popularized naval history in an unprecedented fashion-one that today's historians might emulate.

In a paper titled "Mahan: Then and Now," retired Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie suggested that the connecting link between Mahan's notions of sea power in 1890 and sea power today is the inherent capability then and now, in peace or war, to extend some kind of control, influence, or leverage from the sea on to the land. Wylie affirmed that as long as the United States chooses to continue as the free world's leader, sea power is the absolutely vital basis for US policy globally. Without it, no US policy would be viable. Realistically one could not but agree with Wylie's conclusion that Mahan's sea power has grown immeasurably more important for the US and the free world in the 1990s than it was in the 1890s.

Historian Roger Dingman addressed the question of Mahan's impact on Japan and its navy. Did Mahan's ghost propel the U.S. and Imperial Japanese navies toward Pearl Harbor? Dingman argued convincingly that the Japanese used Mahan; he did not serve as their instructor. Imperial Japanese Navy leaders had outlined the kind of fleet they wanted before Mahan's *Influence* appeared. Japanese naval expansionists found Mahan as naval publicist useful to their cause. In Mahan as naval thinker, they discovered general arguments about the relationship between sea power and national power that suited their political needs in development of the fleet.

Professor Holger H. Herwig assessed the twentieth century shortcomings of German "navalism" in a presentation titled "The Influence of A.T. Mahan Upon German Sea Power." He concludes that both Alfred von Tirpitz and Erich Raeder either misread or ignored Mahan's naval philosophy. Mahan insisted upon ready access to the ocean as a vital precondition for sea power. England flanked Germany's English Channel and Scotland-Norway route to the Atlantic Mahan warned that no nation could be both a great land and sea power concurrently. Tirpitz and Raeder failed in confronting that alternative, both in 1914 and 1939, either to build a battle fleet one-third superior to England (as Mahan advocated) to challenge the adversary for control of the Atlantic or to acquiesce in British naval supremacy and concentrate on dominating the European continent.

Other papers dealt with such topics as Mahan's influence in Latin America, the link between Mahan's religion and his
ideas, Mahan's thoughts on the War of 1812, Mahan's influence on American naval thought since 1914, and "Manan, Russia, and the Next 100 Years."

In his opening remarks, Rear Admiral Kurth noted that Mahan is hardly a forgotten figure in the US Navy, the purpose in holding this conference was not to commemorate someone who might otherwise be forgotten. Rather, the conference dealt with a man whose name everyone in the Navy has heard, but few have fully understood. One could hardly have attended this conference without seeing Mahan, anew, in the context of his time, and better understanding his contribution to and role in naval thought. Publication of *The Influence of History on Mahan* will allow those who could not attend to share those insights.

David Beatty
Sackville, New Brunswick

Nicholas Tracy. *Attack on Maritime Trade.*

This scholarly volume will be most useful to students of maritime war. The terms "blockade," "guerre de course" and "privateering" are familiar to all with such an interest, yet one suspects the real implications of the terms are often taken for granted. One just assumes the Royal Navy will blockade its enemies rigorously, and that this will have a dramatic impact on the enemy's ability to wage war; one assumes the weaker opponents will be forced, *faut de mieux*, into a feeble privateering war on commerce. Ultimately, according to the Mahanian gospel of "command of the sea," the strongest naval power will prevail, in large part because of its ability to ravage the trade of the enemy. Tracy boldly analyzes such assumptions and often provides thoughtful challenges to accepted wisdom.

He divides the "denial of trade" approach into "mercantilist" and true "blockade" aspects. In the former, trade with the enemy was allowed if he paid the price; after all, mercantilist goals were to amass bullion. Even during the Napoleonic period, England allowed measured trade with France. It is often noted that the French armies frequently wore British-made overcoats and boots. London reasoned that it was better to keep British factories humming, even with French orders, than to slam the door on the French and force them to spend their money elsewhere. And this, it should be noted, occurred in the classic age of blockade, thus demonstrating that trade issues in war were more complex than often assumed.

Readers will notice a slight imbalance in the space allotted to various eras. The practices of trade war from the late 1500s to the defeat of Napoleon are covered in seventy pages. The nineteenth century receives forty-six, the world wars ninety-seven, and the era since 1945 has twenty-eight. The Kuwait crisis of 1990 (but not the actual Desert Storm war) gets a nod on the last page. Tracy explains the short shrift allotted the sailing ship era by the fact that he is just summarizing the work of others. The 1918-45 period is one he researched in depth himself; thus it receives far more ink.

Serious students of the subject will be impressed by the extensive bibliography, and by the thorough notes which appear at the end of each chapter. Tracy has earned a reputation for earnest and painstaking scholarship, and readers can be assured of thoughtful judgements. One aspect of the book—one dare not say drawback—is that it deals of necessity with frequent and complicated questions of maritime law, and the shifting interpretations of that law. This
condemns the author to grapple with explanations of theory, the arguments and resolutions of numerous international conferences, the often murky views of harried statesmen, learned jurists and sundry commentators. This is done frequently in a turgid prose style, and renders some sections heavy going indeed. There will be much sighing and re-reading of pages to extract full understanding and, in view of the rather high price tag, potential purchasers should be aware they will be getting an authoritative work but not a rattling good story.

It will not give anything away to readers of this journal to reveal that despite all the time spent defining laws and customs, the power which had predominant control of the sea lanes pretty much did what it wanted in time of necessity. The classic case, not a new revelation, is the United States: as a weak naval power she supported the "free ships, free goods" approach, yet when her naval strength grew to dominance in the twentieth century the attraction of that doctrine subsided dramatically.

The twentieth century sections, Tracy's "own," are the most lively. The allies, particularly Britain, learned a hard lesson in the 1914-18 war: economic warfare must be as much concerned with your own enrichment as with the enemy's impoverishment. In fact, the Allies sometimes settled for an acceptable (no war materials) regulation of trade with Germany via neutrals like the Dutch and Swiss rather than attempting to strangle all trade contacts. The interwar years are covered in interesting fashion, particularly from the point of view of relating allowable ship types to the supposed needs of trade war and protection in future conflicts. There is concurrently a sound analysis of the growing body of opinion (Sir Herbert Richmond among others) which questioned the effectiveness of sea power against a truly determined and well-organized enemy. In fact British policy under Churchill is described as a reversion to the mercantilist outlook of the Napoleonic Wars: look after your own economy first, since blockade is not a war-winner. The case of the Japanese war is painted somewhat differently: unlike Nazi Germany, Japan could be isolated effectively, and so blockade could apply serious pressure. Of course if the authorities could ignore civilian sufferings, even that pressure might not bring victory much closer.

In conclusion, Tracy has provided a solid combination of synopsis and original research on the subject of maritime trade war. None but the professional specialist will need to dig deeper to attain a grasp of this intricate subject.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario


One of the great tenets of seapower as a strategic concept is its apparent ability to defeat enemies through a blockade. In fact, maritime blockades alone have seldom, if ever, proven successful. Nonetheless, when coupled with a land blockade or a major military campaign against the enemy state, a maritime blockade has been a vital element of a war-winning strategy. And so it was with the blockade of Germany from 1914 to 1918. In part the success of that blockade stemmed from German reliance on both imported food (all the more so once hostilities began) and the chemical
fertilizers needed to maintain production. We have always known that Germany suffered grave shortages of food by 1917, but the hows and whys, as well as the consequences of poor diets, have not undergone a thorough examination by a modern scholar until now. Offer helps fill that gap.

As the subtitle indicates, this is an agrarian interpretation of World War I. Though its focus is the blockade of Germany, the book is largely about the nature of global agricultural production and marketing before and during the war. Indeed, Offer wrestles with the two sides of the food question, the Allied surfeit and the starvation inside the blockade. Despite his modest claim that this "is primarily a work of new synthesis which depends on the labour of predecessors," (p. vii) he combines a comprehensive reassessment of existing works with extensive archival research in Britain, Australia, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. The result is a fascinating study of the success of what was largely an Anglo-American, maritime-based, global food system, and the collapse of a continental system under the stress of war and blockade.

The book is long and complex, really several quite distinct studies all pointed towards the importance of food as an element of strategy. Part One on how Germany was defeated, is a short summary of his main points. His conclusion on the decisiveness of the blockade will surprise no one who has examined earlier blockades. The Home Front, with its weakened work force and widespread shortages, provided the "anvil" against which the "hammer" of Allied offensive moulded Germany's defeat in 1918. (p. 72) Once all hope of military victory faded in mid-1918, the weakness of the Home Front precipitated the final collapse. That defeat was hastened by the collapse of Germany's allies, especially Austria where the blockade brought genuine starvation. Thus, bullets and butter were the root of German defeat; the two were complimentary.

Offer then presents a thorough assessment of how the battle for sustenance was planned, fought, and won—or lost. Part Two is a fascinating study of the global food economy in the two decades before 1914. Part Three looks at the role of food and international commerce in war planning, straying into international law, law of the sea, and the morality of blockades. It provides an exceptionally succinct and insightful discussion of the debate over economic warfare before 1914.

Part Four analyses German economic planning for war, the management of their domestic economy, the impact of German attempts (through the use of submarines) to blockade Britain and the fall-out of the blockade. The conclusions here are reasoned and conventional. Germany did not grossly mis-manage her food resources: the blockade—in conjunction with the wastage at the front—had an impact. Britain was less susceptible to the U-boat campaign than Germany supposed, and her real problems were often ones of internal handling and distribution. Offer's final conclusion, that Germany could not win a protracted war against the "overwhelming material and demographic preponderance" of the Anglo-American economies (p. 404
reflects conventional wisdom. He is on less firm ground when blaming German generals for not making "sufficient allowance for the economic potential of the English-speaking economies" in their pre-war plans. Schlieffen, Moltke and others knew that they could not win a prolonged two-front war: that's why they sought victory in 1914 by a *coup de main*. The error lay with those who ran the war after 1914.

The failure to integrate a sophisticated military assessment of the short-war imperative of 1914 does not detract from Offer's accomplishment. He has drawn together an enormous volume of work from many disparate fields. In the process, he has produced a seminal work on the role of food in the rise and fall of great powers. Offer's book is highly recommended to those who teach, research or write almost any aspect of modern history.

Marc Milner
Fredericton, New Brunswick


The rise and demise of Germany's first powerful navy between Tirpitz and Versailles has attracted some very fine historians whose names are synonymous with standard works on the subject. Thus, for example, Walter Hubatsch (1958) analyzed naval command; Eckhart Kehr (1970) revealed the interweavings of internal politics and economics; Volker Berg-hahn (1971) explored the aggressive motives and strategic thinking behind the Tirpitz naval plan; Wilhelm Deist (1976) examined fleet politics and propaganda; Paul Kennedy (1980) explained how German unification and Germany's rise to the status of a world economic power helped trigger World War I; and Holger Herwig studied the officer corps (1973) and laid bare the intriguing development of Germany's "Luxury Fleet" (1980). These and other major studies provide such daunting variety and detail that one might incline to the view that the "Kaiser's Navy" has been done. Such is not the case.

Gary Weir's excellent study reveals a perceptive mind at work on a complex and substantive issue that has never been treated in so comprehensive a manner. Like others before him, his lucidly-written monograph focuses on the creation of the new German fleet. But it does so from an entirely new and vital perspective: that of the relationship between the Imperial Naval Office and the various shipyards and industrial concerns responsible for ship construction between 1897 and 1919. What makes the work so appealing is Weir's obvious mastery of the naval-industrial complex, his broad grasp of both international and domestic issues, and his ability to spike the heady punch with some revealing, if arcane, lore. We learn of the difficulties of research and development; of Germany's initial dependency on foreign technology; of problems in contracting, sub-contracting and quality control; of Krupp expansionism and the armour monopoly. Always ready with a telling example, his account is memorable. Thus early problems with R&D meant that the two Konig-class German "dreadnoughts" had to be powered by Parsons' steam-turbines manufactured by a British subsidiary in Germany; and late delivery of a wireless system by sub-contractors delayed the
construction of the cruisers Prinz Adalbert and Hamburg. Even where we are all aware that the submarine came to replace the capital ship in naval combat, Weir opens up the inner workings of the naval-industrial complex to reveal what this meant. Again, he highlights his arguments with a succinct and graphic example: in 1918 even General Ludendorff "gave the transport of U-boat parts to the yards a higher priority than aircraft, motorized vehicles, and rolling stock containing powder and munitions." (p. 186)

Gary E. Weir has written a standard work that will serve as a model for studies of this kind.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia


The dreadnought was the most spectacular fetish of the dynamic age of early twentieth century burgeoning naval technology. So argues Robert L. O'Connell, a senior US Army intelligence analyst but a graduate student two decades ago when this project was originally his doctoral dissertation. Because the battleship never fought decisive battles, it was a failure, he claims in the two-thirds of the book devoted to the years before 1918; after 1941 it was a weapons vampire which sucked up tax monies. This thesis is attractive but seriously flawed by the author's ignorance of the nature of all navies and military academies, the uses of power, and the fact that naval officers of that era were no more fraternalistic or insensitive to minorities than generals, diplomats, business leaders, or even athletes. Typical of Vietnam-era iconoclasts, he bases many of his misconceptions on the untenable theories of sociologist Peter Karsten over a so-called US Naval aristocracy. The fact is that the battleship was the simple index of naval power at the centre of arms races, maritime warfare before 1941, and treaties that made it the deterrent which insured great power stalemate—peace—during the 1920s and 1930s, like nuclear weapons after 1945.

O'Connell's lack of confidence is apparent in his overdependence on and citing of common secondary sources and their authors, like John Keegan (whose name is misspelled, p. 35). Such overabundant footnoting results in unnecessary laddering of titles, against a relative paucity of primary materials—odd for a revised dissertation, as is the omission of a bibliography. Thus the cornerstone of this study, the World War I navies, is based on the usual monographs, with the exception of the papers of one Homer G. Poundstone, "the first American all-big-gun advocate." (p. 120) This claim is new and deserves a fuller treatment. Hyperbole abounds, as when O'Connell equates Admiral George Dewey's strategic talents with those of Washington, Andrew Jackson, and Eisenhower! He is plain wrong in saying that "Annapolites" worshipped the theories of Mahan; this theorist was virtually outside the seagoing fraternity, as Robert Seager's biography shows. Several ghastly metaphors are only the worst examples of peacenik flippancy, for example, the Panama Canal becomes "a sort of strategic hymen" of "stolid imperviousness to the swelling dreadnought." (p. 135) The author's treatment of his own era, Korea to the Persian Gulf, is downright glib, sarcastic, and full of slang. Errors include the fact that Coral
Sea, not Midway, was the first naval battle in which opposing warships did not sight each other, and sixty-four rather than sixty-two was the US Navy's retirement age until 1946. Several captions lack important details.

The most useful aspects of Sacred Vessels are the many excellent quotations of American naval officers and the treatment of the way in which gunnery instructors William S. Sims, Bradley A. Fiske, and William F. Fullam shifted their loyalty from dreadnoughts to aircraft by 1921. Ironically, this shift is proof positive that, contrary to the author's thesis, better minds can and did overcome technological loyalties to discern the future.

Clark C. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


From the time of their conception in the late 1930s until their destruction in the waning days of the Pacific War, the mammoth sister battleships Musashi and Yamato were intended to form the nucleus of the Imperial Japanese Navy's battlefleet in the expected deciding confrontation with the United States Navy. Yoshimura's book, however, is about the building of Musashi, not its role in fleet operations. Unfortunately, the two cannot reasonably be separated and Yoshimura's work accordingly lacks key elements and begs important questions. Dividing his work into twenty-seven very short, choppy chapters, and often resorting to crudely reconstructed dialogue, the author outlines the massive effort expended for Musashi's construction at the Nagasaki Shipyard. The last few chapters detail the sinking of Musashi in the Sibuyan Sea by US carrier-borne aircraft in October 1944.

As early as 1934, the Japanese Naval General Staff requested proposals from the Bureau of Naval Construction for the mightiest warship ever built. A design was adopted in March 1937. The first ship, Yamato, was laid down at Kure Naval Arsenal at the end of that year while Musashi was begun in March 1938. As Musashi was slightly more complex than Yamato in that it was designed as the flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy, it was considered "the most difficult assignment in shipbuilding history." (p. 80) The specifications called for a ship 263 metres in length with a beam of 38.9 metres, boasting a full-load displacement of 71,100 tons. Maximum speed was twenty-seven knots and the main armament a staggering nine 18.1" guns. The enormous width was needed to accommodate the huge main armament and to absorb the recoil of a full broadside. In order to meet the building challenge, Nagasaki Shipyard expanded its facilities by building new gantry cranes and extending and widening the slipway at which Musashi would be constructed. Extraordinary security precautions were implemented to conceal the ship from sight as both Great Britain and the United States had consulates in Nagasaki. Enormous hemp screens were built which shielded the ship from view. Musashi was launched in November 1940, commissioned in August 1942 and ready for action in January 1943.

Regrettably the author's description of the building process is generally superficial and presented in a vacuum. The work is not technical in the least; it is episodic and
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Crammed with meaningless detail such as the names of even minor personages or the number of rivets used within given periods. Virtually nothing is mentioned of crew training, any new docking or repair infrastructure required, the making of the guns or sea trials or other testing. The outfitting of the ship is very sketchily dealt with. There are never any comparisons with other battleships such as the American Iowa class. Despite dustjacket claims that Yoshimura is Japan's leading naval writer, he does not seem a trained historian and his work—lacking notes, bibliography and even a reasonable conclusion—is hardly academic. Build the Musashi is a "history" without context and a presentation without style.

Serge Durflinger
Verdun, Québec


With this book, Dr. Gary Weir, a historian with the US Naval Historical Center, shows in some detail how the efforts of private industry, combined with those of the USN, finally produced fleet submarines capable of prolonged and effective anti-shipping operations in distant waters; after 1941, they would be of enormous importance in the war against Japan.

In 1914, US submarine production was entirely in the hands of private industry. US submarines which participated in World War I, relatively primitive submersibles, were used only for harbour defences. In contrast, British and German submarine practices were well ahead of the U.S. with standardized types and specialized features together with tenders and bases. Their officers were experienced and submarine development was logical and well-planned.

At the war's end, the USN acquired six U-boats for trials and study and were deeply impressed. However, the strategic role of US submarines had not been decided, and this impaired progress on future designs. The Naval War College proposed that submarines should support the fleet, which required a capability of twenty knots; this was difficult to achieve without diminishing other desired characteristics.

Discussion of design continued until, around 1930, several ideas came together. First there was an evaluation of US responsibilities in the Pacific. Next there was an analysis of German U-boat strategy and design and how this might be applied to USN policy. This led to the conclusion that the submarine qualities which would best serve the navy would be reliability, improved habitability and long range. Working with the fleet would be the least important role of submarines, a conclusion supported by the War College. By 1937 the debate was over and a design established.

When the USN acquired its first submarines from the builders in 1900, the relationship had been that of customer to vendor. As time went on the USN suspected that the object of the builders was to make money with vessels that would pass inspection but were not efficient fighting machines. The builders believed that the USN did not appreciate their problems with manpower, materials and finance. Submarine construction by the USN itself began in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, New Hampshire. From then on cooperation gradually developed between the USN and the Electric Boat and other companies, resolving most problems of design and construction.
There were major technical problems. For example, a reliable, sturdy, diesel engine suitable for submarines and made in the USA was not available until after 1937. Other problems were equally daunting; torpedoes, deck guns, communications, passive and active sonar, periscopes, habitability, all had to be manufactured or arranged to near perfection. The eventual partnership between industry and the navy came about as a developing network arising out of the complexity of construction of a particular type of vessel and the associated technology. Two thirds of all US submarines constructed between 1900 and 1940 were by the Electric Boat Company.

This is an extremely complicated subject which Weir has brought together in a comprehensible form. He is now continuing the history of US submarine construction from 1940 to 1960. At the time of writing this review, the fate of 10,000 workers at the Electric Boat Division in Groton, Connecticut hinges on whether a single one billion dollar submarine will be built. What the odds are, is anybody's guess.

L. B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


This beautifully produced biography of Admiral John H. Towers (1885-1955) is the story of the first thirty-five years of aviation in the United States Navy and the evolution of that service from a big gun into an aviation force. Although now little known in comparison with his wartime contemporaries King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance, Towers can be considered as the critical player who ensured the supply of naval aircraft and aviators and the development of the logistical systems for their management in the great oceanic war waged by the USN against Japan from 1941 to 1945.

The career of John Towers receives a sympathetic but balanced treatment in this comprehensive and exhaustively researched work. Towers' career is followed chronologically from his entry into the Naval Academy in the class of '06 until his retirement in late 1947 and briefly in his subsequent role at Pan American World Airlines from 1948 to 1953.

His accomplishments and lasting impacts are numerous. In 1911 he became Naval Aviator Number 3 and soon after was recognized as the Service's senior aviator and head of its training. From 1914 to 1916 he was assistant naval attaché in London during which time he obtained his only combat experience on a surreptitious sortie as observer in an RNAS Sopwith "Y" Strutter over Belgium. After the US entry into the war he was intimately involved with the expansion of USN aviation, going on to command the Navy's project to complete the first trans-Atlantic flight in May 1919 via Halifax, Newfoundland, the Azores and Lisbon.

After interwar periods in command of the first USN carrier USS Langley and as an opponent of Billy Mitchell's attempts to create a unified air force along British lines, he served in many senior naval aviation staff roles. In 1939 he was elevated to command the Bureau of Aeronautics. From that point until his promotion to command the US Pacific Fleet in 1946, he was at the centre of the process by which the USN transformed itself into an aviation navy.

Clearly the author subscribes to the
view that Towers was thwarted in his ambition for senior combat command by his rivals, primarily King, and that he should have been promoted to Chief of Naval Operations at the end of his career. The evidence presented in the book suggests, however, that Towers was employed in the role which made best use of his talents: that of general manager of the wartime campaign in the Pacific as Nimitz' deputy.

The writing is seamless and criticisms minor. There are occasional instances of technical inaccuracy such as misnaming the Boeing 377 "Stratocruiser" as "Strato Clipper" and the Kiwi as an Australian bird plus a lack of understanding that in 1919 Newfoundland was not part of Canada. More maps might also have been welcome to supplement the two provided.

These minor quibbles apart, this book is highly recommended for its perspective on early US Navy aviation, its insights into the process by which a new technology became institutionalized in a conservative service and the interplay of the personalities who acted as the catalysts. It is interesting to speculate how Towers himself might have responded to the advent of the nuclear submarine.

Christopher Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


While the air war over northern Europe during 1939-1945 has been thoroughly studied by air historians, the war above the oceans during that same period has received less attention. Nathan Miller's The Naval Air War 1939-1945, first published in 1980 and reissued in 1991 with minor changes, helps redress that imbalance. Well illustrated with good photographs on nearly every page, the book offers a brief but comprehensive account of all three naval air wars during World War II: the efforts of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm in the North Atlantic, the Fleet Air Arm's struggle in the Mediterranean, and the conflict between the USA and Japan in the Pacific.

Miller opens with an account of the Pearl Harbor attack, then moves back to describe the beginnings of the Fleet Air Arm and the 1940 Norwegian campaign. He then describes the air war in the Mediterranean, the Bismarck hunt, and the victory over the U-boats. Most of the book, however, is devoted to the Pacific air war. Miller relates the initial Japanese successes, the agonizing struggle for parity between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy, culminating in the overwhelming superiority of the US Navy in 1944-45.

Interpretive as well as recitative, The Naval Air War 1939-1945 presents the three stages in the development of air warfare at sea: from 1939 to 1942, carriers and their aircraft were secondary to battleships; in the second stage, from 1942 to 1944, the carrier was developed into the primary operational weapon; from 1944 to 1945, carrier forces became the instruments of naval warfare. Miller also gives the people involved in naval air warfare appropriate credit. The uses that Cunningham of the Royal Navy, Yamamoto of Japan, and American admirals such as Halsey, Spruance, Sprague, Mitscher and Kinkaid made of the carriers under their respective commands are fully discussed. In this way Miller shows the evolution of carrier warfare during 1939-1945, and thus, the foundations for contemporary carrier strategy.
The Navy Air War 1939-1945 sets out to provide a one-volume guide to naval air warfare in World War II, and accomplishes just that. The maritime enthusiast unfamiliar with this segment of World War II history will find this a useful introduction to this topic; the aviation buff will find this book to be an excellent overview of a topic often ignored by air and naval historians.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


The USS Chenango, or "Lucky Lady," as she was affectionately called by her crew, was one of the first escort carriers completed for the US Navy. She served in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, from the "Torch" landings in Morocco in November 1942, followed by extensive service in the Pacific, where she participated in most of the major island battles culminating with her arrival in Japan a few days after the Japanese surrender. She then served as a transport for Allied prisoners of war back to Okinawa and the USA, followed by service as a troop transport ferrying army and navy personnel back to the USA. The author joined the ship as a young ensign just prior to her recommissioning in September 1942 and served on her for most of the war. The book is his intimate and personal account of the ship and the men who served on her during her short career.

The Chenango was completed in April, 1939 as the commercial tanker Esso New Orleans and served in this capacity until May 1941, when she was requisitioned by the US Navy as a fleet oiler. The need for escort carriers led to her conversion to this role in April 1942. She was one of four near-sister ships so converted and which comprised the first American Carrier Division ever formed. They were an extremely successful class of ship, being used operationally with regular fleet units during the shortage of proper carriers in the Pacific until 1943. Due to their very large fuel capacity, they were extensively used as replenishment oilers for smaller escorts while operating with the US Pacific Fleet, concurrent with their normal carrier duties. All four ships saw extensive war service. The Chenango, for example, earned a Navy Unit Commendation, and received eleven battle stars for her World War II service.

Hindle has thoroughly researched this book. It covers a subject on which too little has been written from an American perspective. It is an interesting and informative read, and is highly recommended.

John K Burgess
Calgary, Alberta


In an author's note, Edwyn Gray immediately makes clear the purpose behind his analysis of the Royal Navy's war against Japan during World War II. He declares that with few exceptions, most studies have tended to dwell on British defeats or very specific episodes if they mention the conflict in the Pacific at all. Lost in this shuffle, Gray contends, is the story of campaigns in the Indian Ocean, the Dutch East Indies, and the efforts of the Commonwealth navies. His avowed purpose is to correct these omissions and "to provide
the reader with a comprehensive account of the Royal Navy's battle with Japan from the first assault on the Shanghai Concession and landings in Malaya in December 1941, to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo Bay in September, 1945." (p. xi)

Gray succeeds to a point. He lavishes attention upon British ships, large and small, in the bitter and doomed struggles for Southeast Asia in 1941-42, followed by the slow and relentless drive that culminated in Japan's collapse in 1945. Noting that "for many death was their only reward for duty bravely done," (p. 106) Gray lauds the valour of individual ship's crews. His assessment of the senior levels of command is more damming. Commenting that senior officers are a band that rarely admits mistakes, the author passes judgement on various British naval commanders including Admiral Tom Phillips who died in December 1941 when HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse met their unhappy fate. Phillips is castigated for his limited understanding of the power of aircraft and a too rigid adherence to prior planning. However it is Winston Churchill who becomes the target for much of the abuse; "It was Churchill's persistent and personal under-estimation of Japan over a long period of years which proved to be the culprit when disaster engulfed the Royal Navy in the months that lay ahead." (p. 20)

Gray does attempt to outline the activities of Commonwealth vessels in the Pacific war, most notably those of Australia and New Zealand. He mentions as well the participation of HMCS Uganda in the Okinawa campaign (without discussing the withdrawal of that ship from combat after the crew voted to return to Canada) and describes the operation that earned Canadian flyer Robert Gray a posthumous Victoria Cross in August 1945. Still, the author says little about the poor relations between Australia and Britain that existed after Singapore's loss, a topic much discussed in Australian historiography. Canadians will note as well that the author fails to identify the crew of the Catalina aircraft that spotted the Japanese fleet off Ceylon in 1942 as primarily Canadian and that he mistakenly claims that Hong Kong fell to three Japanese divisions rather than one reinforced division.

Short on references and long on battle descriptions, Operation Pacific is meant for a general audience rather than interested scholars. As such, it is a good and interesting introduction. However, those desiring a more complex explanation of Britain's experience in the war with Japan would be better served by a careful reading of the relevant works by Stephen W. Roskill, Arthur Marder, Christopher Thome, D.M. Horner, David Day and John McCarthy.

Galen Roger Perras
Kingston, Ontario


This book tells the story of the Malta submarines in World War II based on British and Italian documentary sources and recollections of surviving officers and men. The author earned a Distinguished Service Cross as First Lieutenant in one of the flotilla boats and has written many books on naval subjects.

The Tenth was more than a flotilla in the usual sense of a tactical unit of about eight vessels. Rather it was a specialized command within the Mediterranean com-
m and, with its own shore base and terms of reference—to halt Axis traffic to North Africa—which defined its area of operations. Its boats usually worked singly, thus each had its own history and each is represented here. Some eighty submarines came under the command in the four years of its existence; almost half of them were lost. The flotilla *per se* consisted of boats of the small and handy *U* class which were supplemented by boats of other classes, boats on passage through the Mediterranean, and large ones on a "magic carpet" service carrying cargo, mail and passengers to help keep Malta going.

Previous writings on this campaign include the autobiography of the Senior Officer, Captain, later Rear Admiral Simpson, and books by commanding officers of several of the boats. Simpson was selective in his choice of the operations he described, while the COs wrote of their own boats. As a result, many have not had public recognition. Wingate has brought them all into the story, supported by excellent maps and an extensive glossary. While descriptions of so many operations—often much alike—tend to lose their impact, Wingate does hold the reader's interest despite a few obscure passages and a somewhat schoolboyish style. One episode repeated here will raise the hackles of many who were there. An officer who, to my personal knowledge was not on Malta at the time and was later a figure of contention, is credited by Wingate, echoing Simpson, with having commanded the crucial reopening of the swept channel through the enemy minefield into Malta. (p. 197)

This book will not modify our understanding of the sea war in the Mediterranean but, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Tenth Flotilla, it will constitute a worthy tribute to all who served in the Malta submarines. It will appeal to naval people, history buffs and anyone who likes to read of valour.

Gordon W. Stead
Vancouver, British Columbia


*Submariner*, Captain John Coote's memoirs of his life in the Royal Navy from 1939-1960, is really two books. The early chapters were written in 1946 and describe the wartime operations of HMS *Untiring* in the Mediterranean Sea. The closing chapters cover Coote's postwar career, and are spiced with humorous anecdotes and portraits of controversial naval figures such as Rickover and Mountbatten.

Coote transferred to the submarine branch in 1942 to avoid conscription into the Fleet Air Arm. As a Sublieutenant he was assigned to *Untiring*, under the command of Robert Boyd. *Untiring* operated with the Tenth Flotilla in Malta against Axis shipping off the coast of France and Italy. Vivid accounts of torpedo attacks on German warships and their depth charge counter-attacks bring home the intensity of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. The climax, in April 1944, was the high speed pursuit, based on late-breaking intelligence, of the blockade runner *Jerez*. *Untiring* ultimately caught and torpedoed the vessel just as she slowed to enter the safety of Port Vendres. Routine patrols and shore life at La Maddalena—the barren submarine outpost off Sardinia—are also depicted; sailors depended upon their sense of humour to survive in a hostile environment. In one of the few references to the RCN, Coote recalls that the Canadian MTB crews at La Maddalena were re-
nowned for their high-stakes crap games.

After the war he served in HMS *Amphion* for three years. Following a stint ashore he received his first command, HMS *Totem*, with John Fieldhouse, later First Sea Lord, as First Lieutenant. During a surveillance mission against the Combined Fleets in the Mediterranean, Coote demonstrated that submarines could move undetected amongst the Strike Carriers, even in excellent sonar conditions. Shortly after USS *Nautilus* was launched, Coote was appointed Assistant Attaché to the British Joint Services Mission in Washington. Later, he sailed in *Nautilus* as an observer during exercises with the Home Fleet. Declining British resources and Soviet backwardness in ASW convinced Coote that nuclear submarines were the future of the Royal Navy. But the commitment to costly Strike Carriers doomed this vision and contributed to Coote's resignation in 1960, when he took up a successful career in journalism.

There are some lapses in chronology and inconsistencies of style in the opening chapters. For example, a signalman introduced as a key figure in the first chapter is never mentioned again. But these are minor flaws and do not seriously detract from this entertaining story of a British submariner's life.

Robert C. Fisher
Ottawa, Ontario

Off Wonsan, Korea in 1950, US Rear Admiral H.E. Smith reported that "We have lost control in the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ." (Melia, p. 76) His force of some 250 modern ships was immobilized for six days while 1904-vintage Russian mines, laid from North Korean sampans, were swept. Mines are the very devil of a weapon; their threat of use is as incapacitating as their actual detonation, and they never become obsolete, as Admiral Smith made clear. They can be laid defensively, to protect one's own harbours or shipping routes, or offensively off an enemy's port, or along his routes, or those known to be used by his submarines, even at great depths. Mines cause a maximum distribution, both of one's own forces and the enemy's, at minimum cost, danger, and effort. These two books, largely reflecting the American experience, provide a comprehensive view of the theory and practice of mine warfare, and especially of mine countermeasures.

*Weapons That Wait* is a modest revision of a book first published in 1979 by Dr. Hartmann alone. It is almost a textbook, even written in that style in many cases. It opens with a review of the US experience with sea mines—"torpedoes" as they were called originally by David Bushnell when used in the War of Independence. Hartmann, a wartime Director of the USN's Ordnance Laboratory, acknowledges the contribution of other countries to
mine warfare, notably by the Russians, both Imperial and Soviet, the Germans and the British. He analyzes in detail the actual, the monetary, and the psychological effect of many dozens of offensive (the intensive mining of Japanese waters in 1945) and defensive (North Sea and English Channel, 1914-18 and 1939-45) sea mine operations. This edition updates mine warfare by examining their use in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf and the latest countermeasures being developed in the USN and in Europe, where they are very sensitive to the threat. This is a book on the detail of mining operations and countermeasures; it is not for the casual reader. But it would be of immense value to anyone concerned with what once was called "minesweeping." Hartmann gives useful tables of costs of mining efforts against their results, of mine volume usage and "noteworthy mining efforts" from 1777 to 1988, and even formulae for magnetic and pressure detonating devices. It is a book that should be read by all naval officers, for mine warfare is, despite its real and continuing threat, the poor sister of naval weaponry, a backwater which those concentrating on advancement still avoid if possible.

As its subtitle suggests, Dr. Melia's book is a history of mine countermeasures, with particular attention to the wild swings of financing, attention and abilities suffered by mine warfare forces in the US Navy and in others. When the shooting wars end, the mine countermeasure force is one of the first to be abandoned. After all, it is always the Naval Reservist who does that dangerous and unpleasant task, not the real Navy, and they return to civilian pursuits, and are no longer present to defend their cause! It is a cautionary tale that should be closely absorbed by those who decide budgets and research attention, by those that send merchantmen out of harbours, and especially by the Canadian Naval Reserves, who may be about to become the Navy's only mining interest group. It seems that when shooting wars develop, as the U.S. found in the Arabian Gulf, mine countermeasures must be invented all over again in panic time, while lives are lost. The USN's mine force motto is an appropriate but oft ignored law: "Where you go, we have been." This is a technical but very readable book.

F. M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


This book examines the work of Admiral Richard Colbert, USN in support of naval cooperation between the United States and its allies during the Cold War period. Colbert, an ardent foe of communism and the USSR, believed that cooperation with allies was essential and that this could be achieved amongst navies themselves and thereby contribute to more effective strategic defence. The author has used source material in the Naval Historical Collection of the United States Naval War College to examine his activities.

Colbert's naval career included several assignments which brought him close to the free world's alliance activities and he used his connections with other naval officers to increase maritime influence in NATO. His interest in naval cooperation led him to establish and direct the Naval Command Course (NCC) at the Naval War College for officers of friendly nations. As President of the Naval War College he founded the Seapower Symposium—a flag officer
The seminar to discuss global issues. He was also actively involved in the formation of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic whilst serving in SACLANT. Colbert's activities showed what could be accomplished in the area of naval cooperation. It also highlighted the limits of this cooperation.

He believed that the threat to the free world was so evident that strategic common sense should overcome political differences and therefore pressed for levels of collaboration that were really unknown in interstate relations to that time. He promoted a partnership approach to US-allied relations believing that the "fraternity of the blue uniform" could overcome political differences. The real issue, however, was the extent to which coordination with allied navies would serve the interests of the United States.

Colbert demonstrated the importance of maintaining personal contact amongst allied naval leaders but this could not overcome national differences. He attempted to give allied naval cooperation a more formal structure and to extend it beyond NATO. Colbert's efforts reveal much about the possibilities and limits for cooperation in present day international security arrangements within the UN.

The contribution Colbert made to allied naval cooperation was significant and his legacy in cooperation may be more long lasting than even he might have imagined in the light of current world affairs. The author has written a fascinating account of the contribution of Admiral Colbert during a critical period in allied naval relations using pertinent source material. It will be particularly interesting reading for those who have had experience in the various committees and operations of NATO.

Andrew McMillin
Fredericton, New Brunswick


This is the story of Exercise Teamwork 1988, picked by the author as the best example to date of NATO's forward maritime strategy in action. In his foreword, Vice-Admiral Hugo White, who was the Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Striking Force in the exercise and subsequently became NATO's Commander, Northern Atlantic, praises the author's "deep understanding of maritime strategic issues." The book bears this out.

Teamwork 1988 was the last big exercise before the end of the Cold War in the series of major NATO naval exercises mounted at regular intervals starting with Exercise Main Brace in 1952. The book gives considerable detail on the exercise, and is thus particularly valuable to students. Yet it also addresses the general subject of the place of maritime forces in Western deterrence and defence, and is thus a good source of information for the general reader. Thinking of the reams of NATO exercise reports I have read in my time, I only wish someone had had the wit to make them as interesting and as entertaining as Eric Grove has produced in Battle for the Fiords.

The unusually large number of groundings and collisions reported for Teamwork 88 reminded me of being briefed in Norway, with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, in 1968, by the Commander of Naval Forces North Norway, Rear-Admiral Tamber. He said: "Welcome to Norway, Land of the Midnight Sun. And welcome to Norway, the land of the snow and the gales, and remember, if you bit Mother Norway, Mother Norway won't move an
inch!" That area is a tough place to go sailoring! Considerable space is devoted to the NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) which has guided NATO maritime activity since the early '80s. I was fortunate enough to lead the international team that produced it. Admiral Harry Train whom I served at the time, secured its approval in 1981. It predated the US Maritime Strategy, which was largely based on it, by some two years. Eric Grove stresses the importance of war games in testing the validity of strategic concepts against operational reality. I had the duty of running the SACLANT war games conducted at Newport Rhode Island, and can attest that Grove is quite correct. NATO exercises continue. Teamwork 1990 was unique; for the first time no US forces took part, owing to the Gulf War. Teamwork 1992 is in progress as this review is being written, but the context has changed profoundly from that of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR has immeasurably reduced the threat of a concerted land attack on Western Europe, but the power of the former Soviet Navy, at the moment jointly controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States, is very great, and the fleet continues to be modernized. The Western nations, of which Canada is part, are mostly linked by sea, not by land, and remain vulnerable to interference with their use of the sea. The authors say that in this new unstable and perhaps more dangerous world, the main focus of Western defence has shifted from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. This is unfashionable talk, in these days of "peace dividends." It is in these times that Canadians must constantly be reminded of their geographical situation. Our front is the great sweep of Eurasia; our right flank is northern Europe, and our left, the Asiatic shore of the Pacific Ocean; none of this is likely to change. The risk to Canada's interests may fluctuate, depending on international politics, but the vulnerability remains. We have a major stake in the free use of the seas, not just locally around our coasts. It follows that we should stick with the alliance of like-minded nations which has served us so well, and pay our share of the costs. Navies are expensive, but not nearly as expensive as wars.

Dan Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario


Timing is everything in politics and publishing. It is a pity therefore that this encyclopaedic account was not published a year later. As it is, it is a Cold War snapshot of a navy that no longer exists. Polmar, a world authority on the Soviet navy, set the tone at the outset with the selection of an old Russian proverb that "eternal peace lasts only until the next war." How astonishing it is to realize, for example, that the Soviet aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, the culmination of a quarter of a century of concerted endeavour, is now being advertised for sale in the International Herald Tribune and her two sister ships (the fourth carrier is never likely to be built) seem destined for the scrapper's yard.

What Polmar captured was a naval sitzkrieg, a phoney period in which bureaucratic momentum continued to propel the Soviet navy on its parabolic course while the political will and economic vitality...
needed to sustain it lapsed into a state of catastrophic decline.

A disturbing divergence began to appear between official naval pronouncements and naval force structure in the mid-1980s. What the Soviet navy said it was doing and what fleet compositions and dispositions argued were two different things. Soviet watchers in the American naval fraternity appeared unfashionably antediluvian in their threat analyses, arguing that quantitative declines masked qualitative improvements in the Soviet navy. While they were roundly criticized by peace activists for being out of step with the prevailing climate of Soviet "reasonableness," they were, in fact, quite right. By the end of the decade, however, the Soviets could no longer exploit naval arms control as a way of disguising the inability of the Soviet military-industrial complex to sustain naval programmes. Just as Polmar's book was being put to bed the first real signs of powerful decay were undermining his "quality versus quantity" thesis. That is not to suggest that the Russian navy is not an impressive collection of ships, but the technical problems that beset Soviet submarines in the 1980s were a metaphor for the economic sclerosis to which Russia and its maritime forces have succumbed.

Throughout the one time Soviet Union, building yards are falling silent or turning to the production of merchant ships or floating hotels. Nuclear cruisers, SSNs, and a host of other vessels, painstakingly described (and complemented with crisp line drawings and photographs) in this account, are being terminated or scrapped. Ships are lying alongside bereft of enough fuel to go to sea. The divergence between rhetoric and force structure has been replaced now by a divergence in official pronouncements as the contest between hardliners and reformers (to use simplistic terms) is being worked out.

The Admiral Kuznetsov was and is a sign of the times. Renamed three times (ex-Leonid Brezhnev, ex-Tbilisi) to remain politically correct in a highly fluid political environment, it was a measure of how difficult it was and remains for an expert like Polmar to produce a timely analysis. Having said that, however, the Guide... is an excellent reference work. The text is tightly organized, provides very useful historical background material on such issues as bases, fleet deployments, ship classes, etc., and includes valuable details on naval aircraft, weapon systems and electronics. In addition there are four convenient appendices, thorough indices (including a Ship Name and Ship Class index), and a six-page Addenda that summarizes developments within the Soviet navy until the autumn of 1991.

James A. Boutilier
Victoria, British Columbia


John Dunmore is Emeritus Professor of French at New Zealand's Massey University, but like many scholars has developed a secondary interest: in this case, the history of the discovery and exploration of the Pacific. In a useful volume with particular value to those studying the last two hundred years of Pacific history, Professor Dunmore provides capsule encyclopedia-style entries on several hundred individuals who took part in European-era navigation of the Pacific to a sufficient degree to merit notice. What is fascinating about the engrossing work are the obscure, lesser-known individuals Dunmore has unearthed,
whose brief entries of glory or doom—or prosaic transience—on the face of this vast ocean are almost more interesting than the expected major entries on Cook, Bougainville, Vancouver and Tasman. Here one thinks of Roelof Roscndaal, the sickly Dutch captain of the Afrikaansche Galey, who sailed from the Texel in 1721 in a small squadron under Rogeveen and left his mark on the Pacific by discovering Easter Island in 1723 and running aground in the Tuamotus before dying at Batavia; or of a certain Captain Butler, commanding a supply vessel to New South Wales, who in 1794 made the major discovery of his life, an island laden with guano which he immediately named after his ship, the Walpole, leaving the reader to wonder if this reflected Butler's opinion of his ship or its contents.

The reader makes the recurrent discovery that the navigation of the Pacific and its fascinating archipelagoes did not begin with Cook and his Endeavour, or Wallis in the Dolphin; well before the high mountains of "Otaheite" were first seen by Europeans there were clutches of vessels blundering into the Pacific to obscure fates-Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, English and French—for hundreds of years. Given that so much of this was done in vessels sized well under a hundred tons, the courage and determination of the people involved is evident, as is their vast ignorance of the enormous ocean upon which they sailed. Awareness of just how many vessels got into the Pacific after Magellan's first pioneering traverse—a bare twenty-seven years after Columbus' first voyage—leads to the thought that more contact with island groups by shipwrecked crews may have gone on than scholars normally suggest. One is led to wonder if the Hawaiian chain actually managed to escape detection of any kind while Manila galleons trekked eastward to the north for over two hundred years.

An unfortunate flaw in the book is the presence of typographical errors, as in one instance when the date changes from the 1700s to the 1500s, depending on what paragraph one is reading. In addition, some of Dunmore's facts are incorrect: the schooner Resolution, which accompanied Captain Edward Edwards and the Pandora when it left Tahiti with imprisoned Bounty mutineers, was not built by Edwards' men, but by Bounty mutineers who had remained at Tahiti rather than follow Fletcher Christian to his fate on Pitcairn.

Notwithstanding these problems, the book is a fascinating collection of snapshots of known and unknown names in Pacific navigation, and deserves to be on the bookshelf of anyone interested in the history of that wide and fabled sea.

Victor Suthren
Ottawa, Ontario


This book is about the surveys in Australian waters undertaken by HMS Beagle in the years 1837 to 1843. During this period the ship circumnavigated Australia twice; Stokes discovered the Fitzroy, Albert and Flinders Rivers and Port Darwin and charted in great detail Bass Strait, Torres Strait and many other areas which earlier navigators such as Flinders and Philip
Parker King had not adequately covered. The book is based on a wide range of printed and manuscript sources, including the diary "full of idle chatter" of Benjamin Francis Helpman, one of the Masters of the Beagle. This has provided the author with personal anecdotes that give a far more complete idea than could be gained from official sources of what life was like on so small a vessel in such uncomfortable climates and situations.

Marsden Hordern is very well qualified to evaluate the material which he has studied, for he has sailed in many of the waters which Stokes surveyed. In particular, during World War II the author was in command of the Royal Australian Navy's ML 1347 in the hazardous waters to the north of Australia, and found that many of the charts he used were based on surveys by Stokes. In fact, twelve of Stokes' charts were still in use more than one hundred years after they had first appeared in print. After the war the author had considerable experience navigating ocean yachts, and has been able to use the practical knowledge gained in this activity to evaluate the technical points found in his sources. In addition, he has had the opportunity to return to many of the waters surveyed by Stokes, and to see for himself what was involved.

Hordern's narrative is absorbing not only in evaluating and describing the actual work of the Beagle and her surveyors, but also in providing a context of contemporary events in England and Australia. His dramatic descriptions of battles against gales and the surging tides of Australia's north-west coast could only have been written by someone who has sailed those waters and is familiar with their many hazards.

The reader is reminded of the link between Cook, Bligh, Flinders, Philip Parker King and Stokes, and of the valuable advice King gave to Stokes when he was in Sydney. There are many other small items of interest, such as the fact that Stokes was one of the first to advocate the use of the name Tasmania, officially adopted only in 1856, for what was still known as Van Diemen's Land in 1838.

Appendices include Admiralty Instructions for the expedition, a history of the Beagle and a detailed description of the ship, and notes on Helpman and his diary. The book is generously illustrated with over forty plates (four in full colour), many line drawings, and maps. Five of the six fold-out facsimiles of charts first appeared in Stokes* Discoveries in Australia. An impressive bibliography and a good index are provided. The text is in excellent style, and is a joy to read. The book has already won two major literary prizes in Australia.

Vaughan Evans
Sydney, Australia


When we reflect on our history, we realize how much the world owed its enlightenment to whalers and whalemen. In the case of Japan, we could name, among others, Ranald MacDonald, who served aboard the whaleship Plymouth. In his autobiography, Japan Story of Adventure, MacDonald explained how he penetrated into "that double-bolted land, Japan" with the intention of becoming an interpreter when Japan opened its door to foreigners. He even suggested to Japanese high officials that they should open port for American whalers to recruit, wood and water.
This Don Quixote of a man was born in Oregon in 1824. His father was Scottish and his mother was the daughter of Com-Comly, a chief of the Chinook Indians. After proper schooling at academies he became a bank clerk, but it was "not to his taste." Besides, he was obliged to face the racial discrimination--"the Rock on which split all the hopes and fortunes" of Indian youth. Disillusionment beyond expression took hold of him. Unable to control "the wild strain for wandering freedom in his blood," he resolved to "solve the mystery of Japan"--"the land of his ancestors," of which he had heard from early childhood.

At age twenty-four, MacDonald joined the Plymouth (Captain Edwards) at Sag Harbor, New York. According to a contract made with the captain, in June 1848 he was furnished with a boat and left the ship "For the mysterious dread Japan." He intentionally capsized the boat and landed at a small island in the north, pretending to be a castaway. There he was treated with Samaritan kindness. After three days, he was taken to Soya and put in prison, then sent through Matsumai to Nagasaki where he was kept in captivity. After a ten-month captive life MacDonald, together with other American whalmen, was delivered over to the Preble (Captain Glynn) and left Japan.

During his stay in Nagasaki, MacDonald had taught English and democracy to government interpreters of the Dutch language. Years later, when Perry came to Japan, Moriyama Einosuke, one of MacDonald's pupils, was the chief interpreter. Had Moriyama not learned English under MacDonald, the negotiations between Perry and Japan might not have proceeded so smoothly. Thus part of Mac's dreams was realized through one of his pupils.

Throughout his captivity, MacDonald managed to find the opportunity to make careful observations of Japanese manners and customs, religion, morals, women, dress, food, sense of honour, law, government, language and so forth. He acquired a smattering of Japanese, sufficient for some conversation. Throughout his entire sojourn in the strange land, MacDonald recalled, he was treated with great kindness and delicate consideration and never received a harsh word or unfriendly look. This is one of the best books available on Japanese culture besides Golovnin's Narrative of my Captivity in Japan.

In conclusion I should say that we are apt to forget to review our history from an everyday perspective. For this reason Ranald MacDonald's Narrative, despite its somewhat pseudo-classic style, provides excellent and enlightening reading.

Tetsuo Kawasumi
Toyohashi City, Japan


Benajah Ticknor served as surgeon aboard USS Peacock on its long cruise from March 1832 until May 1834 from Boston to Bencoolen, Manila, Canton, Vietnam, Bangkok, Mocha, Muscat and Mozambique. The purpose of the voyage was the diplomatic mission of Edmund Roberts to the courts of Cochin-China, Thailand and Oman; Roberts' own posthumous account of that voyage, published in 1837, is well known. Ticknor's journal offers much to complement Roberts' book and will interest a variety of readers. He keenly observed the many foreign places he visited and vividly described their appearance and what
he could ascertain about their social life and customs. He wrote freely on controversial issues and never failed to inject his own strong "pious" views into his judgements.

It would carry too far here to discuss in detail the various original passages in Ticknor's journal, but his interest in tropical diseases and particularly cholera should be highlighted. He was equally concerned with the state of health of his fellow officers and the crew of the Peacock. While on the whole they remain an anonymous group, Ticknor did not hesitate to criticize Captain Geisinger and many of the members of his wardroom for their appalling habits. He claimed that alcoholism was rife and severely affected the ship's management. A reference to "those practices of vice and dissipation, to which sailors are almost universally addicted" (p. 193) is highly suggestive, but remains obscure.

Despite his fundamentalist Protestant convictions, Ticknor was more open-minded about the societies he visited than many other travellers of his time. He strongly condemned the evils of slavery he encountered abroad and, by implication, those in the United States itself. He was also highly critical of the two most recent examples of American gunboat diplomacy, at the Falkland Islands (1831) and Kuala Batu on Sumatra (1832). Taken in combination with his criticism of the US Navy in general and the Peacock's commander and officers in particular, and his frequent complaints about the tediousness of the long voyage (he felt he was "doomed to wander," p. 79) and the absence from his wife, one wonders why he persevered with his naval career.

Hodges has edited the text with a meticulous hand, providing extensive and informative annotation. The introduction is succinct but effective on Ticknor. It might have placed his voyage in the broader context of American maritime diplomacy. Similarly, his journal could have been judged more fully against the vast array of contemporary naval travelogues and reminiscences. But overall this is an attractive publication of a highly informative, if not unbiased, travel account.

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Western Australia


Richard Ellis, author of *The Book of Whales* and other books, is a well known marine painter specialising in magnificent representations of whales from an underwater viewpoint. Copiously illustrated and handsomely produced, this lucid and entertaining account covers whalehunting from the most primitive to the most sophisticated aspects. As a delegate to the meetings of the International Whaling Commission, Ellis follows the twists and turns of the industry as it wound down, in the late postwar period; modern whaling is especially well handled, with chapters covering the whaling nations, country by country. There is also comprehensive coverage of peripheral topics such as the use of whalebone in corsets and hoopskirts, and the whale as a carnival attraction.

The definitive book on modern whaling is Tønnesen and Johnsen's *Den moderne hvalfangsts historie*. However, the fourth and final volume of this work was published in 1970. Hence the authors had little to say about the efforts of the various anti-whaling factions. This is something that Ellis is able to contribute, for it is well
covered here. As Ellis puts it: "The environmental ethic that has pervaded our consciousness is a recent development...It is only through the lens of hindsight that the whaleman's job becomes malicious or cruel. Until the beginning of this century it was considered an admirable and romantic profession." (pp. 1-2) The impact of television in this connection was crucial, starting about 1968 with Jacques Cousteau's incredible underwater shots of whales, later reinforced by worldwide coverage of other events, notably the adventures of Humphrey the Whale in San Francisco Bay in 1985, and the rescue by two Russian icebreakers of three whales trapped in the ice off Point Barrow in 1986.

Ellis notes a couple of ironies associated with this change of heart. The first is that some of the countries with the bloodiest whaling histories are now in the forefront of the effort to control commercial whaling; the second is that this occurred only when further large scale hunting had ceased to be economically rewarding. As he puts it: "The whaling nations fought among themselves for the right to eliminate the whale species and in some cases came close to achieving this dubious goal." (p. 392) Oddly enough, one of the first to warn of the extinction of the whales was none other than Herman Melville, who asked "whether Leviathan can longer endure so wide a chase, and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must not at last be exterminated from the waters..."

This is quite the most comprehensive account of the troubled relations between man and the whale now available (the English version of Tennesen and Johnsen, mentioned above, is less useful than the Norwegian original, and not an easy read). *Men and Whales* is not just another cut and paste job, but presents distinctive insights on many aspects of "modern" whaling, together with a perceptive review of the industry's earlier history. This is done in a fair and balanced manner, avoiding the temptation to look at the early 1900s through 1990 spectacles. It is unreservedly recommended as a reference work to anyone with a serious interest in any aspect of whaling history.

John H. Harland
Kelowna, British Columbia


These three books, all reprints of nineteenth century Pacific whaling voyages, come from publisher Glen Adams of Ye Galleon Press. John Wilson's journal has been expertly edited by Honore Forster of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. His additional research and notes add considerably to its further enjoyment.
Born in 1810 in Yorkshire, John Wilson indentured to a medical doctor at age fifteen. By 1839 he had qualified as a licentiate of the Society of Apothecaries, whereupon he joined the London whaling barque *Gypsy* (404 tons, John Gibson, Master). *Gypsy* proceeded for the Pacific whaling grounds via Cape of Good Hope, and cruised the waters of the Bonin, Mariana, Caroline, Gilbert, Marshall and Sandwich Isles. Her homeward voyage took her by Fanning, Cocos Keeling Isles, Madagascar, and the Cape, terminating in London on 20 March, 1843. During her voyage *Gypsy* travelled about 32,100 nautical miles, not allowing for extensive additional cruising across the whaling grounds. Seventy-one whales were taken, yielding 177 tons of sperm oil. Apart from treating the crew for injuries sustained in the performance of their duties, Wilson also treated tropical fevers, diseases, signs of scurvy, the effects of excessive consumption of ardent spirits, as well as syphilis and gonorrhoea contracted by some of the crew ashore. When not needed professionally he read avidly, exercised his skills in both sketching and painting and, on almost a daily basis, maintained his journal in a well-written, descriptive and often illuminating manner. He recorded the ship’s position, weather sightings, comments on the master and crew with an insight quite unusual for a man who was not himself a seaman. His long voyage as *Gypsy*'s surgeon gave him a rare perception of life at sea in a whaling sailship and the often appalling conditions their crews endured in the South Sea fisheries ISO years ago.

Following his time at sea, Wilson qualified as M.R.C.S. and established a practice in London in 1844. To all intents and purposes his journal lay forgotten until his son donated the manuscript in 1923 to the Royal Geographical Society. It was through the cooperation of the RGS that the publication of the journal became possible.

Honore Forster also supplied the research on Henry Cheever for the fine facsimile reprint of the original volume. During his lifetime, Cheever's account of *The Whale and His Captors* ran into several editions in both the United States and Great Britain. The last American printing was in 1886. In its day, it was considered something of a classic in the whaling literature. Herman Melville is thought to have found it a source for his great novel *Moby Dick*. Cheever was born in 1814 in Maine. He attended Bowdoin College at Brunswick, Maine, where one of his teachers was Longfellow. He then attended theological colleges at Andover and Bangor, Maine. Because his health was causing some concern, a sea voyage was prescribed in 1834, spending a year in the Hawaiian Isles visiting all the missionary stations. He returned to the United States as a passenger in the whaling sailship *Commodore Preble* of Lyn, Massachusetts (323 tons, Captain Lafayette Ludlow). She had been on a Pacific whaling cruise of two years, and was on the homeward leg of the voyage when Cheever embarked at Honolulu in June 1844. The ship made first for Rimatara, in the Tubai Islands of French Polynesia. She then went via Cape Horn to cruise the Atlantic whaling banks and the Bermudas before terminating her voyage at Lyn in May 1845. Cheever took advantage of his time in *Commodore Preble* to study carefully at first hand and to record all aspects of whaling operations in a sailing whaleship. That experience resulted in a book which is as fascinating and enthralling today as when it was first written. All good things however have, in greater or lesser degree, their shortcomings. In this case Cheever's abundance of pious platitudes on Christian life become something of a trial...
Book Reviews

on one's patience. Cheever subsequently became a minister in the Congregational Church and a staunch Republican, espousing such causes as anti-slavery, women's rights, and home rule for Ireland before his death in 1897. The re-appearance of this volume will be welcomed by those interested in the whaling literature, and, in particular to those, who, until now, have had difficulty in obtaining this rare volume.

The third of these facsimile reprints was written by J.C. Mullett, born in Weymouth, England in 1848. At age eighteen, he left there to join an elder brother in the United States. That intention fell by the wayside when, on arriving at New York, he was tricked into joining George and Susan of New Bedford as a first voyager on a whaling cruise via Cape Horn to the Pacific whaling grounds. He was so disillusioned with the life in that whaler that on arrival at Honolulu he deserted and hid ashore. Discovered by the native police two days after the ship sailed, he was jailed, then promptly put aboard the barque Rhone, from Australia bound for China. His time in her proved equally disastrous. Complaining to the master about the scale of provisioning, they came to blows and he was mast-headed. Upon entering the China Sea, the Rhone was challenged by a pirate sloop. Rhone carried two cannon and fire was exchanged; though some of her gear carried away, she managed to get away. As he had been abused by the master who had never bothered to have him sign the ship's articles Mullett made his mind up he would go no further than Hong Kong. There with the assistance of the American Consul, the Rhone's master was made to give Mullett a written and unblemished discharge. He tried to get employment in Hong Kong at his old trade of blacksmith, but the conditions were so miserable that he joined the whaleship Challenge under Captain Waterman, notwithstanding his repugnance so far for life at sea. They cruised the northern seas and the Arctic and suffered many hardships, privations and dangers, including entrapment in the ice, but bis life in this ship proved to be a happy one. He therefore became reconciled to the seaman's life. Following a seven month cruise they returned to Mohee with 650 barrels of oil; there he got his discharge. Until 1853 Mullett cruised the Pacific grounds from the Marquesas to the Sandwich Isles and off the west coast of South America. He confronted many dangerous situations including two serious mutinies. His last whaling voyage was in the small brig Water Witch from Hong Kong to the port of Tombas, from which she proceeded to the Galapagos, Honolulu, and China. In Whampoa, he received his discharge and saw the largest ship he had ever seen, the famous American clipper Flying Cloud. She was seeking a crew, so Mullett joined for the voyage to New York. The voyage proved miserable in the extreme; three of the crew were lost and the rest were ill-treated by the master and officers. Flying Cloud took ninety-seven days back. Mullett finished with the sea on arrival at New York. In 1855 he resumed his trade as a blacksmith at Charlotte, near Rochester, New York. Shortly thereafter a piece of steel flew into his left eye and he lost its sight. The right eye also deteriorated after which he became completely blind, a sad fate indeed for this memorable seaman.

Collectively, these volumes provide welcome additions to the existing whaling literature. Publisher Glen Adams of Ye Galleon Press deserves high praise for producing these unusually handsome books.

Harry C. Murdoch
Toronto, Ontario

This study draws from two manuscript items held by the Kendall Whaling Museum. The first part consists of two brief essays from the "commonplace book" of boatsteerer Dean C. Wright who served on the Rhode Island whaler *Benjamin Rush* from 1841 to 1845. One is a general discussion of Pacific whaling—the types of whales hunted and equipment used—while the other is a wry commentary on the duties of a boatsteerer/harpooner during a whaling voyage. The essays are well written, perceptive and are accompanied by a number of illustrations, including some from Wright's own journal. The second and main component of this work is a journal kept by Steward John Jones on the New Bedford whaler *Eliza Adams*, over the first four months of 1852. Jones records the daily on-board activities and adds his own, sometimes candid, comments on people and events. One thing that soon becomes clear upon reading the journal is that when whales were not being taken or processed there was a good deal of tedium involved in a whaling voyage. An important diversion were the daily meals, but sometimes for the wrong reason. Whaling-cooks had a poor reputation and at one point Jones records his belief that The Lord sends the grub but the Devil sends the Cooks." (p. 14) Yet although sometimes tedious, the cruise of the *Eliza Adams* was certainly not without incident. There were crew troubles aboard that began after the Captain refused the men shore-leave during a brief call at Valparaiso. In their determination to get ashore, some of the men deliberately lit a fire in the hold while the vessel was still in port. The fire was brought under control and five crewmen were put in irons, two of them later being landed at Hawaii. Jones' personality emerges clearly from the pages of his journal and many of the daily entries have a vigour of expression that bring life to the events described. The journal transcript is fully footnoted and the editor has found additional information about the voyage from other sources.

*Meditations* is a useful addition to the Kendall Whaling Museum monograph series and will be welcomed by those with an interest in Pacific whaling history.

Mark Howard
Melbourne, Australia


This is a handsome coffee table book with text by Struzik and spectacular photography by Beedell. No doubt many of the photographs are the result of the latter's two-year catamaran voyage through the North West Passage with Jeff McGinnis some years ago.

The text is the latest of many attempts to describe the search over the centuries for a route to Asia, and records many of the disasters that befell exploration by land and sea. However, despite being an old story, this is a timely account because, once again, there is some serious interest in developing the North West Passage route for commercial shipping from Europe to Asia and vice versa. This interest was sparked by Mr. Gorbachev's decision
(briefly mentioned in the book) to call for an Arctic zone of peace and cooperation at all levels between the countries with polar interests. This important decision is mentioned briefly in the book. The consequences of such cooperation could be enormous and should have been given expanded treatment, but we must also bear in mind the current difficulties in the ex-Soviet Union which are also affecting their polar operations.

The Royal Navy's efforts to find a route are well documented, including, inevitably, the debacle involving Sir John Franklin and loss of his entire crew in 1848. But, what else was there to do with the Royal Navy after the Napoleonic war? The Arctic was attractive for exploration and captured the public's imagination. The naval ships and crews were ill-equipped for Arctic service, and their privations are adequately described in Struzik's text.

In the opening chapter, Struzik notes the voyage of an Arctic cruise ship, M/V Linblad Explorer through the Passage. Such cruises have become almost an annual event. In 1991 the ice strengthened cruise ship, M/V Frontier Spirit attempted the Passage from west to east, but was stopped by heavy ice off the north coast of Alaska and had to turn back as no icebreaker support was available. It was the worst ice year since 1971. However, this type of commercial enterprise will continue.

The chronological section at the back of the book contains some errors. It was surprising that these were not recognized by the editorial board of the Canadian Geographic Society, sponsors of the book. The reference to lack of consultation with the Canadian Government (p. 141) with regard to the voyage of the super-tanker S/S Manhattan in 1969 (not 1970 as stated) is incorrect. Canada fully encouraged U.S. advocates and provided much assistance, including Canadian icebreaker support, to ensure its success.

The icebreaker Labrador (pp. 146-147) on her maiden voyage in 1954 under the command of OCS Robertson was a ship in the Royal Canadian Navy (HMCS not CCGS). Captain T.C. Pullen (p. 147) did not navigate the Northwest Passage from east to west in 1956. He was certainly heavily involved in opening up a route between Bellot Strait in the central Arctic in that year after Henry Larsen commanding RCMP ship St. Roch, had navigated the passage in 1942. These errors are important to recognize by future Arctic historians. However, Struzik tells an interesting story and it should appeal to the layman with an interest in Arctic exploration.

Tom Irvine
Ottawa, Ontario


Even if you have read a shelf-full of books about the last Franklin expedition, you should read this one. If you have never read any at all, this is an excellent book to start with—comprehensive, fair-minded and so gripping that you will stay up late to finish it. Yet to say that this is a marvellous book about the Erebus and Terror expedition and the fate of the officers and crew is only to begin to praise it. For it is not just a book about the Franklin expedition; it is also a book about knowing about that expedition.

David Woodman is an officer on the Océanographie Research Wessel Endeavour. What spurred him to his fifteen-year work
of research and writing (apparently a self-financed labour of love) was not so much an interest in Franklin, although clearly he possesses that in abundance, as a conviction "that the natives probably knew what had occurred in their land more accurately than the historians who tried to reconstruct the events from a meagre 138-word record and a broken trail of remains." (p. 312)

What Woodman does is to take what Inuit saw and understood and remembered (as we know these things through the writings of white men) and construct on that basis a version of "what really happened" which will be as satisfying to whites as their version presumably was to Inuit. This makes his task sound an easy one but it must have been far from that. Indeed, one is sometimes puzzled as to which to admire more-Woodman's mental agility or his capacity for work.

Unlike the publishers, who give the game away on the dust-jacket, I shall say only that Woodman's reconstruction presents the officers and crew as surviving with more intelligence and resource and, in some cases, for longer, than is usually allowed. Whether you find his reconstruction acceptable or not will depend on your own knowledge and sympathies. But whether one accepts all or some or none of his finely-drawn arguments should have no bearing on one's judgement of the book.

What makes this book so special is that, by using the Inuit testimony so fully and sympathetically, Woodman forces us to think about how culture affects our knowing of the past. Why do we choose which evidence to seek out and interpret and why do we interpret it in the way we do? It must be admitted that Woodman himself is no proponent of radical historiography. At the end he suggests that if more physical and written evidence is found (and he offers some tantalizing ideas as to where it might profitably be looked for), "it will instantly render all speculative books, this one included, obsolete." (p. 322) Modesty in historians is always welcome, but here Woodman is denying the magnitude of what he has accomplished. He is also denying the Inuit testimony its own validity, which exists apart from non-natives' preferred ways of knowing. And he is overlooking what he has so vividly brought home to the reader. All history is speculation; it is just that some historians, like Woodman himself, research more diligently and think much harder and more imaginatively than others.

A final note—it is a pity that this book is not likely to be widely read. The popular view of the last Franklin expedition as a tragicomic shambles has such powerful support (Peter Newman's history of the HBC; John Torrington's dead face on the cover of Macleans; even Margaret Atwood's 1991 Clarendon lecture at Oxford) and seems to meet with so many a responsive bosom in post-imperial Canada that one wishes what Inuit saw could be better known. What did they see? Men in a hard land of whom more was asked than mortal men can do. Requiescat in pace.

Anne Morton
Winnipeg, Manitoba


One generally greets the arrival of another published diary by a northern explorer,
adventurer, scientist, or traveller with scepticism. This field is, after all, rather full, and it takes a special kind of book to jolt the jaundiced northern sceptic from his or her complacency. However, when a volume arrives, particularly a weighty tome such as this one, dealing with Diamond Jenness, one is compelled to sit up and take notice, if only because of the importance of this noted northern scientist, ethnographer, and public figure.

Diamond Jenness was born in New Zealand and educated at Oxford; he was to become the foremost Canadian anthropologist of his day. He served as member of the Canadian Arctic Expedition, 1913-1916 and then went on to a distinguished academic and professional career. His writings on indigenous peoples, particularly those in the Canadian North, have been acclaimed as seminal studies, and are still widely used by scholars in many disciplines. This volume is derived from Jenness’ work with the Canadian Arctic Expedition, which explored the physical and human landscape of the western Arctic between 1913 and 1918. Viljhalmur Stefansson has attracted the lion’s share of the attention for this important undertaking, although the less-publicized work of his colleagues made a vital contribution to contemporary understanding of the Arctic. Diamond Jenness, then living in New Zealand, was recruited to study the Eskimo of the western Arctic. He accepted enthusiastically, and joined the expedition in Victoria in April 1913. The diaries pick up the story on 20 September, 1913, when Jenness, Stefansson and several companions left the ill-fated Karluk, and continue through to 14 August, 1916, as Jenness and a group of other scientists stopped at Nome, Alaska en route to Ottawa.

His son, Stuart Jenness, turned to the massive task of preparing the diaries for publication for two reasons: to provide general access to a valuable historical document on life in the Arctic in the early twentieth century, and to "provide a revealing glimpse of my father's personality and character." The challenge facing Stuart Jenness was indeed formidable. The diaries are long, and the complications of Arctic geography and ethnography numerous. As well, the Canadian Arctic Expedition has long been extremely controversial, marked by tensions between Stefansson and other members of the party.

Arctic Odyssey is, in almost every respect, a remarkable and important book. Stuart Jenness has let his father speak for himself, keeping editorial intrusions to a minimum. The editor has clarified occasional confusions (as to places, names, spellings, dates and the like), annotated the volume very professionally (although, unfortunately, the notes are separated from the text and placed toward the back of the book) and provided a series of extremely valuable appendices, including lists of participants, Eskimo words, and details of Jenness' many ethnographic collections. There are, as well, detailed maps of the Canadian Arctic Expedition, permitting the reader to follow with ease the scientist's progress across the Arctic. The editor has also provided brief biographical sketches of the post-1918 lives of several of the individuals who figure prominently in the book.

The strength of the book, not surprisingly, rests in the observations of Diamond Jenness. Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in his careful commentaries on Arctic travel. His attention to detail—nuances of climate, snow conditions and technology (indigenous and European)—provides an extremely useful portrait of the practicalities of moving about in the Arctic. Most important, the descriptions of Arctic travel are not filled with the post-
hoc glorifications of the Northern experience that so often creep into published recollections; instead, the diaries offer a day-by-day account of adaptation to a difficult region, and of very personal struggles with terrain, different cultures, and climate.

Students of the Arctic will mine this book in countless ways in the years to come. Those interested in Arctic exploration and science will find the details of the inner workings of the Canadian Arctic Expedition quite fascinating. (Given earlier work by Richard Diubaldo, most of what is found here is not particularly new, but it does provide a personal and engaging accounting of this controversial undertaking.) Those interested in Eskimo life in the Arctic in this period—after the demise of the whaling industry and during the period of fox trading—will find a veritable treasure trove of information. Diamond Jenness was an astute and careful observer of the human setting in which he operated; his diaries, consequently, are replete with detailed descriptions of musical activities, health conditions, settlement patterns, seasonal rounds, harvesting, and many other aspects of Eskimo (Inuit) life.

Stuart Jenness has opted to let his father's diary stand on its own merits. We are not offered, consequently, much in the way of an introduction or conclusion, and what Stuart Jenness does provide is simply descriptive. There is, not surprisingly, room for more. Someone more detached from the subject might have provided a detailed study of the ideological assumptions that Jenness carried with him into the Arctic and an assessment of how his scientific and ethnographic approach conditioned his understanding of the region. One would have liked, as well, some comparisons between Jenness' descriptions of places, people and process and accounts by the observers. Enough time has passed for the scholarly community to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the career and ideas of Diamond Jenness; it is unfortunate that such a study is not included as part of this otherwise definitive work. Stuart Jenness has, instead, provided us with a detailed and accurate version of his father's diary, leaving the editorial comment and analysis for others. There is so much to be found here, so many gems of value to so many people, that this book will make an important contribution to Arctic studies for many years to come.

Ken Coates
Victoria, British Columbia


This publication presents the proceedings of a one-day seminar on maritime defence strategy and resource development in Canada's Arctic, held in March 1990 in Calgary, Alberta. Five presentations are concerned with maritime defence strategy and the sixth is on resource development. There are also two discussion forums.

The first paper is by Harriet Critchley, who outlines the meaning of sovereignty and security in the Arctic with reference to the influence of geography, the superpower relationships and changing east-west relations. She concludes that development in the Arctic will be influenced by global supply and demand for the types of resources found in the Arctic.

In a paper on Arctic arms control,
Ronald Purver outlines various proposals that have been put forward in recent years. These include Gorbachev’s Murmansk proposal calling for an Arctic Zone of Peace, the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern Europe, anti-submarine warfare free zones, aerial stand-off zones and variations of these measures. Purver expresses some optimism about the prospect for naval and Arctic arms control in the future.

George Lindsey’s paper on strategic stability pertaining to the Arctic begins with an outline of the geographic influences on the various types of strategic weapon systems. He also describes the influences and threats posed by each type of strategic weapon system. He indicates that none of the disarmament measures being proposed and discussed today are likely to alter the situation in the Arctic.

The sole paper on resource development in the Arctic is by Gray Alexander. He reviews past explorations and developments, then draws attention to such challenges as climate, terrain and ice cover. The search for oil and gas was the most significant activity in the Arctic until the 1980s when lower oil prices brought an end to most of these operations. Alexander concludes that the resource industry can bring a measure of self-sufficiency to the people in our Arctic communities.

Rear-Admiral F.W. Crickard outlines Canadian and particularly American maritime interests in the Arctic. He discusses the importance of the Arctic with respect to US and Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The defence aspect of northern policy-making is likely to become a more integral part of the social, economic and political policies of the Canadian north. He concludes that the contribution of the Canadian Forces in the north will be greater in the future as international attention to the Arctic continues to grow.

The final paper of the session by Commodore L.E. Murray on building a maritime defence strategy is focused on the general topic of maritime strategy with specific reference to the Arctic. He emphasizes that Canada is a three-ocean maritime country and must have a maritime force which will maintain our sovereignty and security.

Donald A. Grant
Nepean, Ontario


With constitutional issues permanently clouding the Canadian political horizon, a favourite activity of social scientists has been to dissect almost all imaginable consequences of possible Quebec separation from Canada, and then, depending on their hues and persuasions, to issue either reassurances or warnings. *Divided We Fall* presents the proceedings of a seminar on national security aspects of the constitutional question, organized by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in November 1991.

The CISS seminar provoked a bit of a stir at the time because the media gave it a sensationalist slant by highlighting the musings of some of the participants on the possibility of civil disorders should Quebec declare independence ("Experts weigh civil war scenarios—Risks seen if Canada splits" was, for instance, the headline of the *Globe and Mail*). The seminar laudably avoided
any partisan or propagandists stance. However, it had interventions by unofficial, but nevertheless publicly recognizable, spokesmen for various positions. Then it presented various potential constitutional outcomes and their security implications from the national as well as the international point of view.

All of the participants agreed that even the total fragmentation of Canada would have no serious, negative security repercussions on the international scene except that the world would lose its most eager peacekeeper. Even the United States, whose security requires a close collaboration with Canada, would not feel threatened since all it would have to do in the new situation would be to demand access to the Canadian land mass, air space, and waters, whenever it deemed it necessary. Thus, far from producing a security crisis for the United States, the break-up of Canada would simply constitute an even more serious loss of sovereignty for the entities which replaced it.

The discussion concerning the implications for national security mirrored the ambiguities and misunderstandings present in the constitutional debate itself. The participants who took the term "national" as a synonym for "Canadian" saw almost any type of constitutional change as a potential threat to security, which they understood as protection from external attack and internal disorder. Thus, an additional transfer of powers from the centre to the provinces would create conditions for the progressive erosion of defence budgets and lead to a sapping of security. The declaration of independence by Quebec, on the other hand, would reduce the ability of the military to deal with threats to civil strife, especially in a post-referendum crisis, given the legal intricacies of civil-military relations in Canada. Those who took the term "national" as having to do with people as opposed to states and boundaries (e.g., Gordon Peters, Vice-Chief of the Assembly of First Nations), saw constitutional change as a necessary presupposition of security, which they understood primarily in terms of cultural survival.

Divided We Fall represents a very useful and original addition to the vast literature on the constitutional question. Its worth resides primarily in its ability to invite the reader to reflect about a whole range of important questions which the constitutional debate had so far failed to raise.

Osvaldo Croci
St. John's, Newfoundland


The most recent volume of the *Canadian Yearbook of International Law* contains the usual eclectic collection of articles and notes from Canada's most respected international law academics and government practitioners. The following is a sampling of these contributions.

Professor R. St. J. Macdonald, from the University of Toronto and the only non-European on the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, contributed a commentary about the designation by the United Nations of the 1990s as the Decade of International Law. The goal of the designation is to better establish and fortify the rule of law in international relations. Some have viewed the actions of the United Nations in the Gulf War as having done much to accomplish these goals.
Professor Katia Boustany discusses the role of the United Nations in the Gulf War in her commentary, entitled: "La Guerre du Golfe et le système d'intervention armée de l'ONU."

Of particular interest to Canadians during the current negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement is the note by Robert Hage of the Department of External Affairs on the operation of the dispute settlement procedures of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. He reviews the establishment of the process and, more specifically, how it has operated in the West Coast salmon and herring dispute and the East Coast lobster dispute. It is perhaps not surprising that the author remains enthusiastic about the merits of the dispute settlement procedures in the FTA, even though Canada "lost" both of these cases.

Environment is very much at the forefront of international consciousness, particularly since 1992 is the year in which the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro. In the past, Canada has been a leading environmental nation, particularly with respect to marine pollution. In a detailed and insightful article, Professor R. Michael M'Gonigle deals with the existing international legal regime respecting land-based marine pollution. He also provides direction for future improvement of the capability of the international regime to deal with the most difficult and serious of all sources of marine pollution. This paper is a significant contribution to the academic literature on land-based marine pollution. More importantly, the paper provides a useful blueprint for the international community in attacking land-based marine pollution.

In addition to articles, notes and book reviews, the Canadian Yearbook of International Law includes a section entitled "Canadian Practice in International Law." In this section is collected government statements relating to various topics on international law that were made in the House of Commons as well as excerpts of letters, speeches and memoranda that were prepared by officers of the Department of External Affairs. These sources provide useful insight into the important issues that face the Canadian government and reveals what the official government position is on these issues.

Regarding ocean matters, there is some commentary about two issues, one on the East Coast, the other on the West Coast, both of which are continuing problems for Canadian diplomacy. On the East Coast, the difficulty is foreign fishing in waters beyond Canada's 200-mile zone. Canada claims that fishers from the European Economic Community are over-harvesting their quota and that this alleged over-fishing is affecting stocks in Canadian waters. This is a position that is not necessarily supported by the European Economic Community or scientists. A speech made in February 1990 by an unidentified official of the Department of External Affairs (pp. 487-9) explains that Canada is seeking to address this problem diplomatically by building on Canada's rights and duties to manage and conserve fishery resources in the 200 nautical mile zone. Canada argues that it should have management authority beyond 200 nautical miles in order to perform properly its conservation functions within 200 nautical miles. Statements in the House of Commons by Ministers Clark and Valcourt (pp. 550-553) follow a similar pattern. Clark provides more detail on the actual situation beyond 200 nautical miles and the workings of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the international organization designed to deal with...
fishing outside Canada's 200 nautical mile zone. In early 1992, foreign fishing outside Canada's 200 nautical mile zone again was prominent in the newspapers as the foreign fishing (along with seals) were blamed for the reduction in the northern cod quota available for Canadian fishermen.

On the West Coast the ocean issue of interest is the location of the international maritime boundary between Alaska and British Columbia in the Dixon Entrance. Every year, Canadian fishermen are arrested near the disputed boundary, with the result that questions are raised annually in the House of Commons. In response to a question about one such arrest, Ross Belcher, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, (pp. 548-550) affirmed the position that the A-B Line (a line drawn by a 1903 Anglo-American tribunal) is Canada's claimed ocean boundary in the Dixon Entrance. The United States argues that the boundary should be based on a principle of equidistance which would favour the United States. Belcher notes that in the disputed waters the two countries have agreed to mutual tolerance of each other's fishing activity. The annual difficulty is a difference of opinion whether or not Canadian fishing vessels stray into undisputed US waters (north of the A-B Line). The United States reacts strongly to such perceived incursions and quickly and forcibly arrest Canadian vessels.

For the Canadian international law specialist, the Canadian Yearbook is the principal academic publication. Volume XXVIII, under the capable editorship of C.B. Bourne, continues its well-deserved reputation for professionalism and scholarship.

Ted L. McDorman
Victoria, British Columbia


Pacific salmon are among the most well-known fishes. Not only are they of significant commercial and sport fishing value but their behaviour results in the magnificent annual spectacle of hundreds of thousands of fish migrating into rivers of the Pacific Rim, and in the mystery of how, after spending months or years in the open ocean, they find their way back to their natal rivers. The editors' objective was to assemble current knowledge of the life histories of these fascinating fishes into a single volume. The result is a comprehensive and authoritative book. The life histories of the seven recognized Pacific salmon are individually described by distinguished fishery scientists, three from the United States, one from Japan and two from Canada. The authors have spent all or most of their professional careers studying their subject. One, Dr. R.L. Burgner, introduced this reviewer, thirty years ago, to the study of the biology of sockeye salmon. The editors, themselves renowned fishery scientists, mandated a standardized coverage of topics. Hence, the following information is reviewed for all species: distribution, relative abundance, transplants, ascent to spawn, incubation, emergence, fry migration, freshwater residence, early life history, offshore migration, high-sea residence, maturation and return migration, upstream migration, homing and straying, and dominance cycles. While this resulted in uniformity in coverage, it constrained the writing style and few will be stimulated by it. But then, this is not a book for the
general reader, even one interested in fishes. Most will find the wealth of detail and range of variation in life history data overwhelming. While this variation fascinates, excites and frustrates salmon biologists, the non-biologist will have difficulty placing it in a coherent framework. There are numerous graphs, maps, and tables, and several excellent colour plates of each species. With the exception that some maps and graphs are too crowded to be easily deciphered, and it is hard to distinguish between land and water on some maps, graphical material is well presented. There is a single index, but each chapter (species) includes its own bibliography. Almost all references predate 1988. While this is a book for the specialist rather than the reader with a general interest in Pacific salmon, it will be an excellent reference for anyone writing a non-technical book on these widely known fishes.

John M. Green
Middle Cove, Newfoundland


Meggs has written a definitive history of a complex and important British Columbia fishing industry's first 125 years. A skilled journalist and long time editor of a respected union paper, *The Fisherman*, Meggs is well qualified for his task. He champions the interests of the fish stock, the environment and above all, the workers in the industry. He presents the intricate story of the vicious on-going struggle for control of a vital natural resource, the several species of Pacific salmon that annually spawn by the millions in the 1,100-km-long Fraser River and its many tributaries.

Meggs inspires his readers to help rectify the grave abuses heaped upon the resource by a small group (initially eight in number and today not much larger) of ultra-greedy capitalists. From about 1865, they imparted six basic characteristics that still define the industry, notwithstanding expansion, diversification and new technologies. The first is the "rapacious frenzy" inherited from the 1858 gold rush with its hoards of bigoted and arrogant Californians. To this day the same frenzy remains a hallmark of the business ethic in British Columbia. J.H. Todd, a leading employer for many years, typified this ethic. According to one contemporary, Todd "seized every opportunity to advance himself at the expense of others." (Salmon, p. 21) The second characteristic is a studied contempt for the aboriginal peoples who, for thousands of years depended on salmon but never abused it or its environment. They have much to teach those not blinded by racial hatred. Third is the strong alliance with the most powerful British Columbia and, more recently, U.S. capitalists who will support the owners, particularly in disputes with workers. The fourth characteristic is a total disrespect for the resource itself. Large-scale waste is endemic. Thus in 1877 when only one species of salmon was desired by the canning industry, all other species netted were killed and tossed into the river. One canner in one day produced 3,000 corpses. Over many days, canners produced several square kilometres of rotting fish that choked the great river
from shore to shore. Every fish killed could have provided excellent food for humans. Even in recent years the owners have viewed with equanimity the destruction of salmon streams by clear-cut logging. Fifth, there is an almost total co-option of government personnel assigned to the fishery. Thus the very first inspection warned the public not to believe criticism of the canners for the 1877 disaster. With honourable exceptions, the mandarins have always been apologists for the employers. Finally, there is a contradictory policy-seeking ever-larger harvests while denying protection to their source. This may seem insane, but the employers have an answer: breed salmon artificially. The process, begun in 1884, has led today to large fish farms. They pollute adjacent waters and yield products inferior to wild salmon, whose stocks are threatened by the artificial variety.

What power can control and, ultimately, defeat the employers? According to Meggs, they have created their own nemesis in the workers who operate the industry and who have developed great skill and maturity in their struggles over many years. They have learned the art of building alliances with such important groups as environmentalists and aboriginals, to say nothing of the trade-union movement. Their own experiences are telling them ever more insistently that the employers' system, capitalism, is incompatible with a viable fishery in the twenty-first century.

The second book, Gladys Young Blyth's *Salmon Canneries*, is for history buffs who will like the photos of some thirty-nine cannery buildings in the Prince Rupert area, who wish to know the legal descriptions of the lands on which the canneries are built, the names of men employed in certain canneries from 1892 to 1905, and who will enjoy the illustrations of labels used on cans of salmon in years gone by. There are also townsite plans, diagrams of the way certain fishing gear is used, and pictures of boats and men. As for finding out what makes the industry go—nary a word.

John Stanton
Calabogie, Ontario


As its subtitle title suggests, *Ragged Islands* deals with the author's three-month solo canoe voyage along the coast between Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland. As an avid ocean kayaker and canoeist I initially thought that this might be just another account of someone's harrowing experiences—in the "man against nature" genre-played out against the rugged BC coastline. After all, one does not normally set out on a 600-mile ocean trip in a canoe. But I was pleasantly surprised by the way in which Michael Poole writes about his explorations, blending vivid descriptions of the natural environment with his encounters with the people who live along this coast today.

This is a region that is sparsely populated; its inhabitants are people who have chosen to live an existence more akin to the pioneers of yesterday rather than that of urban Canada in the 1990s. They are an independent and self-reliant breed of fish farmers, gyppo loggers, homesteaders and prawn fishermen who have chosen to live amongst some of Canada's finest scenery. But this has a price, as Poole explains. Living a difficult and somewhat isolated existence can be hard on relationships and
after years of hard work many settlers of this coast barely continue to eke out a living.

Poole is at his best with his descriptions of the natural environment and his accounts of the first inhabitants of this coastline—the Kwakiutl and Haida Indians. He obviously did considerable research into the areas used by the Indians and he makes the abandoned villages and midden beaches he comes across "come to life."

Although geographically the area explored by Michael Poole is fairly small, his total trip was over 600 miles. This is in large part due to the intricate maze-like arrangement of fjords, inlets, islands and peninsulas which is characteristic of this coastline. This confused terrain gives it scenic diversity from broad sand beaches to deep fjords, backed by ice capped mountains. It also presents numerous natural hazards from topographically induced winds to tidal rips. Although Ragged Islands is not a guide book to canoeing the inland passage, it does provide information that paddlers need to know before paddling this coast. Most dangerous are probably the tidally produced rapids caused by massive amounts of ocean water that funnel down fjords and between islands on a twice daily basis. A knowledge of tide charts and how to use them is certainly one of the first skills needed to navigate this section of coastline safely in almost any size craft.

The author includes an appendix in which he briefly describes bis canoe, its spray cover and other fittings and the equipment he used (a selected bibliography is also appended).

Anyone interested in the geography or history of British Columbia's coastline would enjoy this book and it would also appeal to ocean paddlers as well. My only complaint is that he never includes a scale or north arrow for any of his seven maps. Also photographs would have added to the book's overall impact.

Keith Nicol
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


With the acknowledged assistance of his daughter, Doina, Jimmy Cornell has put together a mammoth volume of cruising information to accompany his popular earlier publication, *World Cruising Routes*. The sheer task of compiling such an astonishing amount of information for a total of 166 separate countries and islands is enough to shiver the timbers of even the most assiduous researcher. Hardbound, replete with alluring Seychelles scene on jacket cover, glossy, high-quality paper, endpapers emblazoned with the courtesy flags of some 146 countries, this is an encyclopedic work meant "to serve as a planner for anyone intending to cruise anywhere in the world." (p. xiii)

The book is divided into three sections: Section I contains three subsections—*Formalities* (Documents, Visas...), *Health Precautions Worldwide* (AIDS, Hepatitis, The Sun...), *Communications* (Radio Communications, Satellite Communication, COSPAS-SARSAT, EPIRB...). Section II divides the World into 12 regions, beginning with the *Mediterranean Region and Black Sea* and ending with the *South Indian Ocean*. Within each region are listed in alphabetical order the assigned countries (islands, possessions) for that region. Canada is included in the regional designation, *Central and North America*. Section III
is choc-a-bloc with a potpourri of information commencing with a World map (#17 p. 429) illustrating the IALA Maritime Buoyage System, a list of International Direct Dialing Codes, Addresses of Chart Agents and National Hydrographic Offices, a glossary of useful terms in French, Spanish, Portuguese and finally, an extensive bibliography and short index.

Entries include a highlighted section titled, Practical Information, which includes buoyage, currency, business hours, public holidays and addresses of diplomatic missions. Following this are Ports of Entry (e.g., Belize City 17° 30'N 88° 11'W, p. 224), customs regulations, immigration information, fees and details pertaining to regulations regarding firearms, restricted areas, and health risks. You are warned that in El Salvador, for example, suspected subversive literature will be confiscated and also military style clothing. In the Solomon Islands, social custom prohibits the wearing of shorts or scanty clothing by women. In French Polynesia, each person aboard a yacht must post a bond in a French Polynesian bank sufficient to cover their return airfare. And for those who wish to visit the Galapagos Islands, be prepared for a long and lengthy process of government red tape (at least a year). But Cornell makes the process easier by providing a sample letter in Spanish containing all the necessary stipulations as required by the authorities.

For each region and country, historical and geographical profiles are provided which are succinct, informative, readable and tidily written. Each region opens with a map encasing the countries to be covered. Cartographically, these would be improved if they included scale and direction, and marginal notation of latitude and longitude. In a number of examples no borders are delineated (e.g., the Caribbean pp. 162-3).

The task of sustaining the integrity of such an encyclopedic publication requires constant revision of assembled data. And this may be where the book could run into difficulty. After all, the stroke of an official pen can alter the validity of information overnight. To his credit, Cornell appeals to readers to provide such new details for a revised new edition which eventually will be published. Certainly the sections on the Soviet Union (p. 73) and Yugoslavia (p. 76) will no doubt require re-editing, but this should come as no surprise.

Examination of the sections on Canada and Newfoundland do reveal several errors, mainly typographical. Thus, "Ottawa" becomes "Ottowa" (Map 8, p. 225), while under Port of Entry, "Argentia" appears as "Argentina" and "Burgeo" as "Burgo." A call to Revenue Canada indicates that several listed ports of entry are now closed: Catalina, Botwood, Harbour Breton, Burin and Grand Bank, leaving only St. John's, Corner Brook, Fortune, and Harbour Grace as designated entry ports. While these are not critical omissions, the integrity of information will be the making or breaking of this nautical tourist guide.

Of course the question remains, is this a book the cruising sailor should buy? As one cruising friend exclaimed: Where do you get ice? Where are the Penta Volvo parts? Where can I buy the best charts? And this may be the rub. For specifics you'll need local guides. Chris Doyle's excellent, Cruising Guide to the Leeward is an example. For the overall picture, Cornell's, World Cruising Handbook is a mine of information, simply enjoyable in itself. For your reviewer this will be a handsome, useful and hefty (1.4 kg.) addition to the nautical bookshelf.

Geoffrey H. Farmer
St. John's, Newfoundland

To all kinds of oceanographers, Henry Stommel has been a hero and role model: a kind and simple man, obsessed with the secrets of the sea, and endowed with a gift for teasing simple rules from bewildering observations. No one has contributed as much as he to our current understanding of ocean circulation. It was Stommel who first explained how the Earth's rotation and sphericity conspired to place the strongest ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream and the Kuroshio, on the western side of ocean basins; it was he who extended these ideas to show how sinking of cold salty waters in polar regions would again concentrate deep currents on the eastern edges of continental shelves and deep ocean ridges.

*A View of the Sea* is Stommel's scientific testament, an effort to communicate to a broad audience of naturalists insights distilled from a lifetime of observations and mathematical analysis. The book is particularly devoted to an explanation of the "beta-spiral," a term coined by Stommel to explain the veering of broad ocean currents with depth. With diagrams, but without mathematics, starting from simple physical rules explained in the text, Stommel constructs a step-by-step explanation of ocean circulation as it is understood today. The story follows a Socratic model, presented in the form of a dialogue extending over many tears between Stommel and the Chief Engineer of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution research vessel *Atlantis II*. By selecting as his protagonist a practical man, with technical rather than scientific training, a man whom he has obviously greatly admired for his good sense, Stommel has set himself the challenge of explaining the workings of the ocean on a level similar to that of a marine engine: no mysteries, all parts visualized and connected to each other, a clear cause and effect relationship between each event.

The story spans many years; Stommel takes us to sea, introduces some of his collaborators, and eventually brings us to the Chief's death bed. It is a story full of compassion, concluding simply, with a glimpse of the author's deep pleasures at discovering the ocean's secrets. It is however not a story to be devoured quickly. While there are not mathematics, some of the concepts are unfamiliar and require careful attention and repeated reading. Patience will bring the reader to the end with a qualitative appreciation of ocean circulation comparable to that enjoyed by the professionals. I will strongly recommend this book to my students in oceanography, even those with a good mathematical background will benefit from the alternate, qualitative but correct, appreciation of the subject. For those who would deepen their understanding by watching the ocean move, Stommel provided some computer programmes which allow simple simulations on a personal computer.

Paul Henri LeBlond
Vancouver, British Columbia