BOOK REVIEWS


This book tries to cover a great deal of material and the prose occasionally labours under the load. It also suffers from maps that inadequately match its geographical pretensions, and its illustrations are of poorer quality than the rich source material seems to demand, the dust jacket excepted. The illustrations seem to have deserved better results from the Press' reproduction capacities.

These caveats aside, this book is a credit to Canadian scholarship. Freed by topic from the inhibiting tendrils of the nationalist miasma, Glynn Barratt has produced a beautifully crafted view into the Russian Navy's contribution to Melanesia in particular, and the South Pacific in general. As in all his work the marriage of fact and understanding is precise and always illuminating. The material is beautifully crafted by the editor, dealing as it does with a few voyages of the Imperial Russian Navy which, none the less, was forced to deal with a multiplicity of purposes and encounters - military posts, supply supports, ethnological and ethnographic developments, linguistics, cartography and climate. In dealing fairly with such a variety of interests Barratt has treated them in the best dispassionate method, of which Montesquieu was once the literary paradigm and Cook the acting example. The book is completely free of that "relevant" moralizing pedantry that turns so much modern attention to the past into mush. The Russians themselves contributed a good deal to this clear result, as the author recognizes. The voyages, especially those of Golovnin and Bellingshausen, while obviously dedicated to the purposes of providing staging posts or hideaways conveniently placed on the route from St. Petersburg to Kamchatka, took a low-key, pragmatic approach to their wider purpose, and, looking back, one is hard put to it to discover whether main purposes were political or ethnoscientific. Cook, who is constantly evoked by the editor and the discoverers themselves as role model, did set the stage. The Cook we see through the eyes of Beaglehole was a man with precise enough political-economic instincts and instructions, but a man who simply could not act as if naval power projections were always to be triumphant. He became a scientific-ethnological cartographer because he could not help himself. So, in turn, it appears to have been with Golovnin and Bellingshausen.

Of course, it is true, as the editor notes, that close ties between the Russian and English Navies were likely to produce
such results in the age of Nelson—but it is perhaps more to the point to realize that the quality of the Russian effort had indigenous roots as well and that the chief problem of the Russian sailors was the disgraceful way the home bureaucracy sat on the reports of these very able eighteenth century naval officers. The blinkered, insensitive response of the Russian autocracy and its bureaucracy to the intelligent work of dedicated sailors needs to be remembered—especially as the Russians are now attempting to free themselves from a worse bureaucratic tyranny.

Thus, out of a confused untidy setting emerged an humane, clear-eyed approach that paid its dues to both "Science" and the civilization of "Christian" Europe as well as to the purposes of the autocracy. Barratt's careful chronicling of this achievement is done with imagination and sympathy, and with understanding of what is due to the activities in retrospect. Furthermore he possessed the scholarly capacity to produce such an impressive result. I hope that the book is widely read, in naval history circles and beyond them.

Donald M. Schurman
Kingston, Ontario


The greatest maritime tragedy ever to occur on the Pacific coast was the sinking of the Canadian Pacific steamer Princess Sophia on October 25, 1918, when all 353 passengers and crew died in the icy waters of the Lynn Canal, Alaska. The shock to the people of the Pacific Northwest was devastating, particularly in the Yukon and Alaska. But the appalling shipwreck was overshadowed by two concurrent tragedies which took millions of lives, the Great War and the influenza epidemic, and few today remember the loss of the Princess Sophia. Time has healed most of the tragic wounds of that period, but the sad story of the shipwreck is recalled in a new book by two Canadian historians.

The Princess Sophia, built in Paisley, Scotland in 1911-1912, was a steel single-screw steamer of 2320 tons gross, 245 feet long, powered by a triple expansion engine with a maximum speed of 14.5 knots. She was the finest and newest ship operating on the run between Alaska and Vancouver, well found, well-manned, equipped with wireless, and meeting all safety requirements. On the fatal voyage she carried, in addition to seventy-five crew and "workaways," a maximum list of 278 passengers, although there may also have been some stowaways. They were miners, businessmen, civil servants, their wives and children, representing a significant cross section of the population of the Yukon and Alaska, travelling south in one of the last boats of the season to avoid the northern freeze-up. There was scarcely a family in the northland that was not therefore affected by the tragedy. In addition the ship carried many of the crews of the Yukon River steamboat fleet.

The liner left Skagway, at the head of the Lynn Canal, on the early evening of October 25, 1918. She soon ran into a raging storm, for Lynn Canal is notorious for the sudden furious gales that whip down its narrow waters from the north. A blinding snowstorm destroyed visibility, and somehow Capt. L.P. Locke lost his bearings. At 2 a.m., at a speed of twelve knots, she ran up on Vanderbilt Reef, a then poorly-marked rock in the centre of the channel. There she settled fair and
square on an even keel. The captain thought she was safe for the time-being, but she had actually suffered a mortal wound to her hull.

A distress call was sent out, and several small vessels arrived on the scene from the nearby port of Juneau the next morning. It was hoped that she would float off at high tide, but it was not to be. The storm became more violent with winds from fifty to one hundred miles per hour. Captain Locke refused to lower the lifeboats for fear they would be dashed against the reef. Apparently he thought that the storm would soon abate. Instead, the storm continued to increase in strength, forcing the small vessels standing by to take refuge. For forty hours the reef maintained its grip on the ship, while all aboard awaited rescue. The grinding of the ship's plates on the reef added to the apprehension of those aboard. At 4:30 on the afternoon of Friday, October 25, a fateful message was transmitted from the Sophia. "Ship foundering on reef. Come at once." At 5:20 the static broke with the horrifying message from wireless operator David Robinson: "For God's sake hurry. The water is coming in my room." It was the last human contact with the ship. She slipped off the reef into the icy seas and sank like a stone. Every human aboard perished, and within hours the adjacent waters were littered with bodies. Only a dog swam safely to shore.

The people of nearby Juneau rose to the crisis, as they searched for bodies, washed the oil-soaked and battered corpses, and prepared them for decent burial. The Canadian Pacific rescue ships Princess Alice and Tees arrived only in time to carry the makeshift coffins south. Their arrival in Vancouver coincided with the joyous celebration of the armistice on November 11. The Yukon Territory and Alaska went into mourning.

The subsequent marine enquiry absolved the C.P.R. from blame, for there were no witnesses alive to tell exactly what happened. Many relatives of the victims sued the railway company in the American courts for damages. The litigation went on for years, entailing huge legal fees, and did not end until October 1932, when the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favour of limited liability for the defendants. As a result, the relatives received nothing. Relatives of crew members of the ship and of the river steamers were more fortunate. The C.P.R. fought in the Canadian courts against payment by the Workmen's Compensation Board of British Columbia, on the grounds that the tragedy occurred in Alaska waters, and was thus outside British Columbia jurisdiction. Canadian courts concurred, and the litigation went to the final court of appeal, the Privy Council in London, which ruled in favour of the bereaved relatives. Widows received the modest sum of $20 a month life pension, with a bonus of $5 a month for each orphaned child.

The two authors of the book have approached the tragic story in scholarly fashion. The opening chapters trace the lives of many of the victims, emulating the technique used by Walter Lord in A Night to Remember, about the loss of the Titanic. Stress is made of the fact that the loss of the Princess Sophia was part of the inexorable decline of the gold rush communities of the north, which lost many of their most prominent citizens. Appendices include the names of all known victims of the disaster, awards made by the Workmen's Compensation Board, and two letters written aboard the ship that were washed ashore with the bodies. The book clearly demolishes many wild rumours which flourished at the time, such as the
canard that Captain Locke refused to launch the boats in order to save money for the C.P.R.

The authors are guilty of one geographical "howler." They have the Princess Sophia sailing north up Howe Sound en route to Skagway. That would have taken her to Squamish. And Johnstone Strait is misspelled Johnson Strait. There are excellent photographs and maps, but the book would have profited from an index.

Norman Hacking
North Vancouver, British Columbia


Hundreds of shipwrecks lie near forgotten along the historic West Coast Lifesaving Trail between Bamfield and Port Renfrew on Vancouver Island. Backpackers now pass along the rock trail and wind swept sand beaches where exhausted, near frozen shipwrecked mariners struggled years before to reach the nearest lighthouse. The Trail has been in the Pacific Rim National Park Reserve since 1970 but the shipwrecks remain unmarked. Often their dramatic tales are no more than a footnote on the park guides. Dick Wells is trying to change that. Most of his eight maritime history books or "booklets" are targeted at the Pacific Rim backpacker and diver. Sized to fit into a jacket pocket, brief in pages, and full of photos or Dick's pen drawings, they are a popular addition to modern west coast adventures.

*The Loss of the Janet Cowan* concerns one of the most tragic shipwrecks on the west coast. On December 31, 1895, the British barque *Janet Cowan* ran aground near Pachena Point. Three crew drowned while bringing supplies ashore. Four more, including Captain Magnus Thompson, died five to six days later from exposure. Thirteen crew were rescued on January 11, 1896 and the remaining nine had to wait two more days on the frozen cliff. The *Janet Cowan* disaster lead to recommendations for the creation of the shipwrecked mariner's trail and a lighthouse at Pachena Point. Sadly these recommendations were not carried out until after the wreck of the *Valencia* (1906) when 126 died.

Like many self published books, *The Loss of the Janet Cowan*, lacks clear illustrations and crisp editing. Dick Wells' drawings are normally one of the strengths of his books, but here they are fussy and the photos blurred. The ship wreckage diagram is unreadable. Discovering unknown manuscripts and ferreting out shipwreck facts are his stock and trade. These new facts are analyzed with a personal touch, i.e.: a visit to the wreck site with a survivor's son and the plotting of the *Janet Cowan*'s last track. However, his fine research and analysis would benefit from a publisher's editorial pen. Often, the facts hang heavy adding little to the story, i.e.: the last line on the wreck and rescue states on p. 22 that "the *Janet Cowan* had cost 26,000 pounds to build and was insured for 30,000 pounds." So.

*There's a Landing Today* is a narrative of stories and twenty pages of photos concerning the pioneer settlers along the West Coast Lifesaving Trail. The stories centre on the Logan Family of Clo-oose, midway on the trail between Bamfield and Port Renfrew, Vancouver Island. The Logan family were one of the first settlers
of Clo-oose (meaning "safe landing" in Nitinat). Logans built the first store, helped construct the lifesaving trail, worked as fallers, crewed on fish boats, rescued shipwrecked mariners, trapped furs, etc.

Life on the trail was one of isolation. Landings were difficult on the storm swept straight coast line. Like most "northern" towns a supply ship's infrequent visits were cause for community celebration. Those days are gone. Helicopters and satellites have replaced the ferries and telegraph lines. Communication is now instantaneous but the community may not be as close. That is There's a Landing Today's message. It is nostalgically told with scattered stories of every day life in a harsh but boldly beautiful land.

That rugged beauty draws sailors, hikers, scuba divers and west coast maritime history buffs in increasing numbers. For them this book will provide a useful glimpse at pioneers of the region. Indeed, both books will leave their readers demanding more, for many stories still wait to be told along the West Coast Lifesaving Trail.

Thomas F. Beasley
Vancouver, British Columbia


The International Congress of Maritime Museums is an organization whose membership is comprised of maritime museums and their staffs, as well as other interested groups and individuals. Currently it has three hundred members in about twenty-five countries throughout the world. One of the primary aims of the ICMM is to foster knowledge of each other's institutions as well as beneficial working relationships among its members. This it does, most successfully, through its triennial conferences held at prestigious maritime centres.

In the early 1980s it was decided to hold informal gatherings around the annual executive meetings. Such an event was held in Liverpool, England in 1986; the proceedings of this conference have been assembled into this book. In his introduction, the editor, Mike Stammers (Keeper of the Merseyside Maritime Museum), indicates that although the papers were informal they contained "so much good matter...that it was decided to publish them." He is perfectly correct.

The thirteen papers included in the book are divided into three main sections based on three conference sessions: "Liverpool and North Wales"; "Ship Preservation - the Future?"; and "New Maritime Museum Developments in the United Kingdom."

The first session in fact supplemented tours of the Merseyside Maritime Museum in its new location in the renovated Albert Dock complex as well as one to the Caernarfon Maritime Museum and the Welsh Slate Museum. The papers were concerned with the rise of Liverpool as a port, Liverpool's North Wales connections, the archives of the Merseyside Maritime Museum and Samuel Walters, Liverpool marine artist. Being of necessity short, all papers left the reviewer wanting more. Aled Eames' talk on the North Wales connection included an extract from the film Trade Wind, which was made with assistance from the CB C and describes the schooner trade involving slate to the Elbe,
general goods to the Mediterranean, salt to Newfoundland, saltfish to South America or the Mediterranean and then home. (It is strange that a Canadian reviewer should learn about a CBC production through a four year-old conference!)

Anyone who reads the papers in the third section of the book will want to spend at least a month in the United Kingdom investigating the new maritime museum developments there. Among these are the subjects of talks: the Aberdeen Maritime Museum, developments at Bristol, proposals for Tyneside, the Scottish Maritime Museum at Irvine, the maritime heritage in Portsmouth and the Chatham Dockyard Project. In spite of the enthusiasm of the speakers and of the reviewer (a "museum man"), it is sad, on reflection, to think that the reason for such vigorous activity is the fact that the once great docklands, the shipbuilding industries of the Clyde and Tyneside and the Royal Navy have declined to the point where, unless museums step in to fill the void, dereliction will result.

The planning and work going on in all these places is incredible; the complexity of the plans and the involvement of various levels of government, private enterprise, societies and individuals is staggering. There is however a down side to this museum development - that the museums are replacing the once bustling dockyards of Bristol and Liverpool, the productive shipyards of Tyneside and the Clyde and the bases of the Royal Navy. Only the Aberdeen Maritime Museum, with its plans for North Sea Oil exhibits, deals with present day prosperity. This last statement is not a criticism, only reality.

But the museums will be great; it is unfortunate that the reader cannot see the slides which were shown at most of these presentations - they obviously add another dimension. It is unfortunate too, for the reader, that the tremendous work being done at the Merseyside Maritime Museum was not the subject of a paper. But then the delegates of the conference had no need of this—they were there.

To many readers the most interesting part of this book will be the middle section on ship preservation. The speakers here were Basil Greenhill, presently involved with the Great Britain project in Bristol; Bard Kolltveit, director of the Norwegian Maritime Museum; Michael McCaughan of the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum; and Cdr. Robert Wall of the Maritime Trust—all of whom have intimate knowledge and strong views pertaining to ship preservation.

Statements contained in this section run the gamut of the whole ship preservation question: "We have to be quite sure that the vessel to be preserved is thoroughly worth preserving" and "preservation of ships [is] an activity liable to absorb time, effort and money to a degree that is disproportionate to all other museum activities" (Basil Greenhill); "There are no simple expedients that will substitute for doing the proper job. Every compromise threatens the integrity of the vessel being restored and seriously diminishes its historical significance" (quote from Revell Carr); "A regular part for ship preservation has for several years been entered into the annual [Norwegian] State Budget, totalling about £100,000 per year" and the "greatest mission [of preserved ships] will be that of awareness-makers of maritime history and culture rather than historic monuments in themselves" (Bard Kolltveit); "...you will get a far better understanding of what life was like in a nineteenth century sailing vessel by reading Conrad, Masefield or Marryat than..."
you will by visiting a restored vessel crowded with tourists all heading for the souvenir shop" (Robert Wall).

Anyone contemplating preserving a vessel must consider the above and should read the amplification of these statements before proceeding. To others this section provides a thought provoking, philosophical look at an important aspect of maritime museum work.

This short book has something for everyone interested in the museum aspect of maritime history.

Eric Ruff
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia


These two volumes deal with what was, until 1982, a forgotten maritime world for the English-speaking world, namely the waters around southern "cone" of South America. *The History of the South Atlantic Conflict* focuses entirely on the Falklands/Malvinas War while *Strategy in the Southern Oceans* is made up of two case studies on maritime geopolitics—Bolivia's quest for an outlet to the sea and Argentine and Brazilian views of the sea.

*The History of the South Atlantic Conflict* was written by an Argentine Air Force Commodore who served with his country's C-130 Hercules squadron during the war. The book itself was originally published in Spanish as *La Guerra Inaudita* in 1986. There is one major flaw with the translation. The translator, Michael Valeur, has, with the author's permission, weaved "historical references and vignettes ... into the narrative" (p. xiv), the better to illuminate the Argentine perspective for American and British readers. This has led to a multiplicity of unfortunate references to Paul Revere and quotations of "the British are coming" type which do nothing to enhance the story. The author's main theme seems one of defending the honour of the Argentine armed forces and the Air Force in particular. While this may be necessary for internal political reasons, surely the accomplishments of the Argentine air forces (both regular and naval) requires few apologies. This is perhaps even more true when the difficulty of the task which faced them is considered: the distances involved, their limited aircraft inventory (only two tankers, five Exocet missiles, and approximately 50 obsolete Skyhawks), and their general unpreparedness for a hastily mounted campaign.

The main operational interest is in the author's descriptions of Argentine air attacks. When compared with the better British accounts (David Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falkland's War*, and Rodney A. Burton *et al.*, *Falklands: The Air War*) the biggest discrepancies are in the sinking of the *Sheffield* and in the Exocet attacks. Moro presents an interesting argument that the *Sheffield* was not hit by an Exocet on 4 May but rather had been bombed on 1 May. Thus the *General Belgrano* was sunk on 2 May as an act of revenge after the *Sheffield* was given up for lost. However, one of the Exocets fired on 4 May
hit the aircraft carrier Hermès. The Exocet attack on 30 May is presented as a complete success with the Invincible being hit not only by the missile but also by three five hundred pound bombs dropped by the accompanying Skyhawks. These claims fly in the face of the more sober British accounts noted above. It can scarcely be believed that Her Majesty's armed forces could have retaken the islands if both of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers had been severely damaged. For public consumption, at least, it appears the Argentine armed forces must still exaggerate their performance in defence of the Malvinas.

Strategy in the Southern Oceans is a work of political science and has a much less emotional tone than The History of the South Atlantic Conflict. The author's first case study is of an episode now almost forgotten outside Latin America, Bolivia's quest for a sea coast after her disastrous involvement in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1883. That Bolivia still pursues its claims to this irreducta, given the serious social, economic, and political problems that continue to dog it, is extraordinary. The author places these claims in then-South American geopolitical framework so that we have Argentina, Brazil, and Peru vying for influence in Bolivia in hope of isolating or supporting Chile as the case may be. Bismarck would feel at home in this contest. For non-participants the real significance of this issue lies in the importance that even poor land locked states give to the sea.

Gamba-Stonehouse's second maritime geopolitical study is of more relevance to Canadians. She outlines the political, strategic and economic developments in the western South Atlantic since the mid-1960s and shows how the outcome of the Falklands/Malvinas War dramatically changed official Argentine and Brazilian views of their "ocean." The outcome of this war helped change two erstwhile rivals into collaborators, if only to keep interlopers such as the British isolated. The author also discusses such wonderful logical constructions as Chile's claim that the Pacific Ocean extends in an arc from the Beagle Channel eastward to fifty-three degrees West and then swings back to Antarctica (thus most of the water south of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia are part of the Pacific Ocean). In Argentine eyes this Chilean definition has the effect of destroying Argentina's rightful title to her share of Antarctica. Why should Canadian policy makers read this examination of this "forgotten" southern sea? The answer lies in the prospect of an independent Quebec and the maritime jurisdictional problems that would follow. How does one draw a two hundred mile limit around the Iles de la Madeleine? Strategy in the Southern Oceans should have a Canadian audience because what appears half a world away today could have a bearing on issues much closer to home very soon.

M. Stephen Salmon
Ottawa, Ontario


This is a straightforward life of a straightforward sailor-aviator who, in wartime at least, did the necessary rather than the glamorous jobs. Rear Admiral Bellinger, the author frankly declares in the preface, was "Not a Halsey, King, Moffett, or Mitscher..." (p. in). Commitment and solid
competence rather than brilliance accounted for Bellinger's progress through a career that began during the pioneering days of naval aviation before the First World War—Bellinger was the fourth U.S. sailor to receive an air pilot's certificate—and ended only in 1946.

For all his qualities as a loyal team player, Bellinger possessed the reckless individualism needed during the early days of flight. He requested a transfer to aviation only three years after graduating from the Naval Academy partly because he could not abide the "militaristic" discipline aboard warships. He was not a naturally gifted flyer, but an avid one who fearlessly carried out test and endurance flights. He was also lucky, surviving three crashes, all the result of equipment failure.

After commanding Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia in 1917-19, he participated as a staff officer during the 1920s in the bureaucratic and congressional wrangles that firmly established naval aviation. Successful command appointments in the 1930s, including a tour as captain of the aircraft carrier USS Ranger, earned him flag rank and command of shore-based aviation in the Pacific in November 1940. His headquarters was at Pearl Harbour where, with his army counterpart, he produced the famous Martin-Bellinger report of March 1941 that predicted the Japanese attack in uncanny detail. Desperately short of resources and confounded by the Alice in Wonderland command arrangements at Hawaii, Bellinger was unable to mount the long-range reconnaissance patrols that might have located the Japanese task force. He assisted in the reinforcement of Midway Island that contributed to the American victory over the Japanese combined fleet in June 1942 and then, after a tour of staff duty in Washington, became Commander, Air Force Atlantic from early 1943 until shortly before his retirement. In this last appointment he was responsible for training and otherwise preparing for operations the air groups of the escort carriers that inflicted severe losses on the German U-boat fleet during the final two years of the war. Still, the fact he never obtained a sea-going command was a disappointment. Although he was exonerated of any blame for the Pearl Harbour fiasco, the author speculates that he may have been too vigorous in his defence of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief Pacific and U.S. Fleet at the time of the disaster.

Professor Coletta has drawn on Bellinger's unpublished memoirs, but produced an entirely new book, fully documented and reflecting the latest scholarship. It is pleasant to be able to report that he has used Jim Boutilier's RCN in Retrospect and Marc Milner's North Atlantic Run. The research and admirable academic apparatus does not, however, obscure the portrait of this square-jawed, tenacious, and unpretentious southerner. Other well-drawn personalities also brighten the text, particularly—perhaps inevitably—Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, under whom Bellinger served during two appointments. King usually did well by Bellinger, but with such a singular lack of common-place manners that Bellinger detested him; this account makes clear that the Fleet Admiral's lack of flair for human relations was truly dazzling.

I have a quibble with the balance of the book. Understandably, nearly a third of the text is devoted to Bellinger's Pacific command in 1940-42, when he was closest to great events. There is some helpful new detail, but most of the story is readily available in the vast literature on Pearl Harbour and Midway. By contrast there is
much less about Bellinger's important role in anti-submarine aviation, especially tactics and training, during both World Wars, and this is frustrating given the dearth of published works in the area.

Nevertheless, Professor Coletta has amply demonstrated the value of full-length studies of officers who gained neither fame nor infamy. A view from inside the service, rather than from the top or the battle front, can only add depth to our understanding. Bellinger's career provides a close-up view of the enormous technical and organizational hurdles that had to be overcome in projecting air power over the sea.

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


Herwig's long out-of-print classic has at last appeared in a most welcome paperback. Requiring only minor updating and a bibliography expanded by some thirty-three new titles, it has stood the test of serious scrutiny since going to press in 1978. So solid was Herwig's research on this particular book, and so convincing his argument, that his interpretations still hold virtually unchallenged. Some reviewers of the first edition, of course, had picked away at one perspective or another; it's a trick of the trade. One had insisted that despite Herwig's achievement the Imperial German Navy still needed its Arthur J. Marder. That meant devoting five volumes to the subject—a challenge that Herwig categorically declines. A re-reading now after ten years confirms the wisdom of his stance. 'Luxury' Fleet is all the Marder the subject requires. Only one bibliographic point escaped him in the revision: Britain has long-since returned the U-boat logs to Germany, where they may be consulted in the Federal and Military Archives in Freiburg.

Offering impeccable credentials as a naval historian, Herwig has produced standard works upon which researchers in the field continue to rely. They are models of urbanity and erudition. Herwig has always set high standards. Thus, when lauding Keith W. Bird's German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature (New York, 1985) in the light of the great outpouring of Battle of Atlantic publications, Herwig characterized the difference between histories written by "the old sweats" and those written by younger academics. The distinction lay not between age and youth, wartime experience and booklearning, but between those who had done spadework in archives, and those who had not. Many hobby historians still fail to grasp this point, and fail to understand the importance of fully documenting their sources—not only to acknowledge their debts, but in order to facilitate further study. These neglects frequently render their publications virtually useless for further research.

Against this background Charles S. Thomas' The German Navy in the Nazi
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*Era* offers a corrective to what has been written on both sides of the Atlantic: he cuts through the apologias and hagiographies on the German side in order to arrive at historical truth, and countervalances the half-truths about the German navy peddled by popular writers and memoirists from other countries (including Canada and the USA). His political history of the German officer corps provides a balanced assessment of the Kriegsmarine's relationship with National Socialism.

Thomas' impressive scholarship, lucid style, and persuasive argument is in the finest tradition of historical writing. With meticulous attention both to detail and breadth of context, his thoroughly researched work is a pleasure to read. Richly footnoted, it invites the serious reader to further enquiry, and gives him the tools to get on with it. Thomas had first essayed the topic in his 1983 dissertation "Bluejackets and Brown Shirts: The German Naval Officer Corps in the Era of National Socialism 1926-1939"—written, it comes as no surprise, under his mentor Herwig. Now spruced up with a snappier title, and market-oriented cover bearing swastika flag and picture of "the old lion" Admiral Dönitz, Thomas has expanded his focus significantly. It includes not only the legacies of the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras, but a close examination of the Tirpitz legacy. Having elucidated the navy's uncomfortable accommodation to the Nazi party, Thomas passes chronologically beyond the dissertation, and examines the war years and their immediate aftermath. The final chapters "Dying Gallantly" and "For Führer and Fatherland" clarify one of Thomas's major points: the achievement of Admirals Raeder and Dönitz at the interface between navy and Nazi Party was not so much leadership of men (German: Menschenführung) as the seduction of men (Menschenverführung). However, having marshalled such massive original sources in German archives he leaves us just a little disappointed when capping his judgement of Dönitz by relying on the less than dispassionate journalist Peter Padfield (*Dönitz: the last Führer*, New York, 1984). And his index—which seems not to have been compiled by Thomas himself—contains not a single reference to "submarines" or "U-boats" despite their treatment in the text. These quibbles aside, this is a very fine book.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia


*Lisbon as a Port Town, the British Seaman and Other Maritime Themes* is the second in the Exeter Maritime Studies series and consists of six papers given at the 1986 and 1987 Dartington maritime history conferences, sponsored by the Department of Economic History of Exeter University. The result is a variable smorgasbord of essays, though with rather more flavour than substance, and this fact is at once its strength and its greatest weakness.

The strength of this collection rests in the broad appeal of the variety of topics presented. The papers range in time from the seventeenth to the twentieth century and encompass social, economic, political and even geographical approaches. Thus, the casual reader may be enticed by and enjoy the pleasures of constantly changing fare. On the other hand, this variety is obtained at the cost of substance, coher-
ence and a complementary context. In this instance (alas) the sum is no greater than the whole of the parts and reading one paper does little to enlighten our understanding of the others, despite some obvious intersections.

In the title article, "Lisbon as a Port Town," editor Stephen Fisher presents eighteenth century Lisbon as a city of foreigner merchants and tradesmen, with an economy driven by foreign capital. While his observations are not without interest, the analysis amounts to a sort of economic-historian's travelogue, the importance and objective of which is unclear and must, evidently, be found in a further reading of Mr. Fisher's other works.

On the other hand, J.L. Anderson's "Prince William's Descent Upon Devon, 1688: The Environmental Constraints" is among the most interesting and satisfying submissions in this volume. Here one is shown how environmental factors (all too often left unexamined or taken as simple constants in historical hypotheses) can have a determining influence on historical events. The argument, though of limited scope, is complete and invites a reappraisal of other similar events and is both refreshing and enlightening.

Lewis Fischer's "Seamen in a Space Economy..." is another instalment in the comparative economics of the nineteenth century shipping which has become his trademark. In this instance the focus is on wage patterns and by now it can be said that Prof. Fischer has made serial history into an art form, with each piece offering some valuable suggestions as to cause and effect, and concluding with the familiar refrain of "stay tuned." This piece is no exception and so long as the work continues to entice, his following should remain loyal.

Tony Barrow's essay The Crewing of Arctic Whaling vessels in the 18th Century: The Evidence of the Shields Muster Rolls" uses extant muster rolls to draw a profile of the crews engaged in a trade which was then considered a nursery of seamen. While some of the observations he makes are rather interesting, the author unfortunately does little to convince the reader of the broader importance of this work.

This is not the case in "Henry Mayhew and the British Seamen," by David Williams. In this paper the author introduces an important, albeit limited, new source for studies in the social history of the merchant marine: Henry Mayhew's six letters on the living and working conditions of the nineteenth century British seamen. As an introduction and guide to this unique contemporary material, Mr. Williams' essay is as complete and concise as one could hope and, moreover, constitutes the most valuable contribution of this collection.

The volume concludes with Peter Hildich's analysis of "The Decline of British Shipbuilding since the Second World War." Mr. Hildich's thesis is very clear and quite convincing: the crucial failure of the British shipbuilding industry in the 1950s was one of management strategy regarding investment and product specialization. However, in light of the general decline in western shipbuilding in the last forty years (and the topic invites such projection), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these failures merely hastened what was otherwise inevitable.

Thus, these essays are quite distinct entities, of varying quality and value, which appear to have been published together simply to conform to a publications programme. Some of the papers, particularly J.L. Anderson's and David Williams', are certainly worthy of wider attention which,
one hopes, they will receive through word-of-mouth recommendations. However, notwithstanding the attractive variety of topics considered, the discrepant and generally cursory nature of the submissions precludes a full and hearty recommendation of this volume.

Garth Wilson
Ottawa, Ontario


The Boston Mills Press of Erin, Ontario, is a small and very special publisher of books on the Canadian scene: volumes on beaches, bridges, ducks and decoys, glass and furniture, theatres, aircraft— and the definitive history of Crokinole.

This collection of five essays tells of summertime as it was (and is) on the Rideau Canal, the languid waterway which had its (military) origins long before Confederation. The jacket notes nicely summarize:

A century ago new attitudes were transforming patterns of recreation. On a sleeping and nearly dormant military and commercial canal, pleasure boating took root and spread from Kingston to Ottawa. On river and lake, at lock and channel, a celebration of wooden boats breathes life into the Rideau Waterway. This book is a celebration of those heritage boats, the wonderful waterway on which they were used, and the survival of many specimens from the early days of recreational boating. It is about wind in the hair, polished mahogany, groaning lock gates, gleaming brass, billowing sails, and Rideau waters. Several contributors from different backgrounds comment on historical traditions in boating and boatbuilding. The rise of the Manotick Classic Boat Club to sustain and revive out boating heritage is assessed and there is an illustrative panorama of old craft and a walk through a living museum of surviving antique and classic boats.

Editors Douglas and Turner are old hands at historical writing, although this is their first collaboration. Keith Dewar writes from the perspective of the St. Lawrence Islands Parks Authority. To James Potter, native to the Rideau, preservation and restoration of the fine old watercraft have become a way of life. Mary Helwig and Frank Phelan tell by work and camera of the Manotick Club and their satisfaction with purposes accomplished.

*On a Sunday Afternoon* is an easy and nostalgic read.

George H. Cuthbertson
Keswick, Ontario


This lavishly illustrated account, the first in a projected series of *Studies in Naval History*, elaborates on material which has appeared earlier in the author's articles in
Mariner's Mirror and his book Historic Architecture of the Royal Navy: An Introduction (1982). It covers the period up to the introduction of metal hulls and steam propulsion. The remarkable selection of photographs demonstrates how little some things in the yards changed over centuries and how some activities (such as ropemaking) have continued up to the present time without interruption. The maps, specially drawn for this publication by Jenny Heath, deserve special recognition.

The first Royal Dry Dock was built in 1495. Edward Dummer, who built the dock at Plymouth in 1692, introduced the use of stone in a stepped formation, and inclined planes for sliding heavy timbers down from above. Initially the dock was filled at high tide and then drained by gravity, but as they were increased in size, horse-drawn chain pumps and, from 1797, steam-pumps were needed to keep them dry. Swinging lock gates or floating caissons were used to secure the entrance. Wet docks were established to allow keeping the ships in the same relation to the quay, independent of the state of the tide. Although ships could be built in a dry dock, it was cheaper if they were erected on slips, upon which they might rest for over twelve years. Following the practice in Venice, Karlskrona, and other European yards, covered slips came into use in the 1800s. The metal roof erected in Portsmouth in 1845 over such a slip antedated similar architectural innovations in railway stations.

The timbers forming the ships were shaped in sawpits and kilns. Steam was used for bending planks from 1830, "supplying boilers" being placed adjacent to the building site. The dock itself was only a small item in the general scheme of things. Besides the docks were found the storehouses, sawpits, roperies, smitheries, together with the facilities for mast-making, sailmaking, and everything else needed to outfit a ship of war. Two activities demanded a lot of space without putting too much strain on the flooring, namely the Mould Loft, where the frames were laid out, and the Sailmaker's Shop. Accordingly, both were found on the upper storeys of buildings. The danger of fire was particularly feared in the Smithery, the Pitch House, the Hoop House, where iron hoops were shrunk onto spars, and the Paint House, where linseed oil was handled. Disastrous fires did occur in the rope-walks, and in 1777, an arsonist was hanged at the dockyard gate as an example to other potential malefactors. High boundary walls were erected around the Yards to discourage pilfering. Earlier they had "lain naked to the ill-designs of every desperate villain, and the bolder attempts of a giddy rabble and unruly mob...or it may be the secret and sudden attempts of desperadoes hired by a foreign enemy." There were buildings for specialists: the Treenail House where the treenails were shaped to the desired diameter or "moot;" the Block Mill; the Rigging House; the Boat and Oarmaker's Shop. The Ropery was distinguished by its length, and hence ideally was sited to one side of the yard so it did not interfere with other activities. It comprised Spinning, Laying, and Hatchelling Houses, with separate storerooms for White Yarn and Black (tarred) Yarn.

Quite apart from their strategic significance, the Dockyards had enormous significance in the industrial history of England, employing over seventeen thousand men in the Dockyards and supporting a fleet of more than nine hundred ships at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The Portsmouth Block Mill represents a particularly early attempt at mass-production.
Marc Brunei designed block-making machines which allowed ten unskilled men to duplicate the output of a hundred skilled blockmakers. Brunei was paid on the basis of the money he had saved, collecting over £17,000 for his efforts. Some of the original machines are preserved in the Science Museum.

Despite the emphasis on the technological and architectural aspects of the topic, we also learn a great deal about the underlying naval administration. The Board of Admiralty was concerned with the strategy and tactics of the fleet. In support were the Navy Board, who built the ships and under whose direction were the Royal Dockyards. Equally necessary for the support of the Fleet were the junior Boards with their respective Commissioners: the Board of Ordnance, the Victualling Board, and the Sick and Hurt Board. The student of naval history is often left with the impression that battles were won despite the inefficiency and corruption of these Boards. In fact, as Jonathan Coad shows, not only were the dockyards the most significant industrial organizations in the country, their bureaucracy was no worse than in the country at large, a point also made by Nicholas Rodger in *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (1986). As the author puts it, the Boards manifested the "inability, not unknown today, of officials to estimate correctly the cost of any project," concluding that the Royal Navy was served by its Administration at least as well as navies of foreign nations were by theirs.

Until 1855 the Board of Ordnance were concerned with the supply of weapons, everything from cutlasses to cannon. Special care was demanded in caring for gunpowder, but surviving documents indicate that this was not always observed:

The method now used to lift up the powder barrels into the magazine is by running a rope through a pulley, one end of which is fastened to a powder barrel and a man taking hold of the other jumps out of a window, and his weight draws the barrel into the magazine, which is a dangerous and uncertain method, for if he is too light, the powder barrel will not ascend, and if he is too heavy, he is sure to bruise himself against the pavement, whereby it is very difficult to get men who will run such a risk upon a labourer's pay.

The Naval Hospitals at Haslar and Stonehouse were originally erected by the Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt. Deaths from disease far outstripped the number of men killed in action. The Naval Hospital at Haslar was the largest hospital in Britain when it was completed in 1761. The Board of Victualling was done away with in 1832. It supervised and ran the granaries, bakeries, breweries, salt houses and cooperages needed to supply the fleet. Meat had originally been preserved in salt but this was not the only method used. From 1812, meat was available in cans; it was also available as slabs of meat concentrate, "Mrs. Dubois' Portable Soup." Sauerkraut and, later, lemons or limes, were supplied as antiscorbutics.

Coad devotes most of his attention to the three major Home Bases (Portsmouth, Chatham, and Plymouth) but there is substantial mention of those at Sheerness and Pembroke. He even discusses the Foreign Bases, though no attempt has been made to cover them all. For a century, Gibraltar and Minorca were the important Mediterranean strongpoints.
The first lacked a good anchorage and the second needed a strong garrison and fell twice to the French. In 1800, Malta was captured and some of the buildings, originally erected by the Knights of Malta, were in use until the Navy abandoned the base.

This splendidly produced and illustrated book is not cheap, and the fact that it was published at all is in part due to the support of the Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England. It is bound to remain the definitive account of its subject for the foreseeable future.

John Harland
Kelowna, British Columbia


This small volume comprises five essays on various aspects of the shipping and trade of the U.K.'s second largest port during its rise to pre-eminence, and at a time of significant structural change in the British economy. It emerges from a period when Valerie Burton held a joint post at Liverpool University and the Merseyside Maritime Museum, and appropriately contains contributions from both academics and museum staff. Each in its own way deepens and extends our knowledge of Liverpool's maritime history in this period - although there is little which can be said to be truly path-breaking - and the volume therefore deserves recognition and a place on the bookshelf. The collection does not pretend to be comprehensive in its coverage - it would be easy, but perhaps unfair, for the reader to list important topics in Liverpool's maritime history which are not addressed - but what it does attempt is competently carried off.

Liverpool's principal claim to fame is, of course, as a great international seaport, and in his "Bulk Trades and the Development of the Port of Liverpool in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," David Williams of Leicester University continues his exploration of the inward cotton and timber trades from North America. He concludes that, although they generated an enormous volume of activity for the port, they were less significant in creating employment for Liverpool-based ships (because of the substantial U.S. and Canadian participation) or in stimulating manufacturing activity, including shipbuilding, within Liverpool itself. Here his essay touches on, but does not really come to grips with, the many interesting questions about port-hinterland, or city-region, development, and how to explain Liverpool's curiously lop-sided or "over-extended" reliance on shipping and port services which would cause it such enormous problems when the demand for such services dried up in the 1960s to 1980s. It is a pity, too, that Williams tends to exclude the international grain trade from his analysis (on the grounds that its growth largely comes after 1850). His essay, in short, identifies some, but only some, of the influences at work in the rise of Liverpool as a port-city.

More pioneering is Valerie Burton's own essay on "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," which reports on quantitative research into data contained in the Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry for the months of March, July and October 1853. From this she is able to present a fairly detailed snap-shot of shipping activities between Liverpool and other
ports in the British Isles - principally with those bordering the Irish Sea, in Ireland, Wales and the West of Scotland - and to comment on the flows of vessels and commodities between different regional centres of specialisation of production. While there are perhaps few major surprises in the patterns which emerge, this work has great potential value as a benchmark from which change can be measured—either by going back in time (as Burton herself has done with subsequent work on the year 1827) to trace the steps in the emergence of these trading relationships, or by going forward in time with an eye, among other things, to establishing how railway development affected Liverpool's coasting trades. Looking further afield, it should be possible to combine such analyses with international trade flows to create a picture of the market segments and hierarchies served by the port of Liverpool.

The remaining essays have a narrower focus. Aled Eames provides an account of the shipowners of the small ports of North Wales, who were principally engaged in transporting copper and slate to Liverpool, while Nancy Ritchie-Noakes and Mike Clarke compare the lives and work of Thomas Steers and Jesse Hartley, two of the five engineers who oversaw the construction of the Liverpool Docks. Finally, in what begins as an essay on a single vessel, the Jhelum, in the conservation of which the Merseyside Maritime Museum has been assisting the Government of the Falkland Islands, Michael Stammers, the Museum's Keeper, goes on to try to rescue from obscurity the Liverpool shipbuilders of the mid-century and to defend them from charges of conservatism and poor workmanship. Although the case for the defence is not convincing, the effort does at least begin to make contact with one of the broader themes raised by David Williams. Merseyside's failure to keep pace with the Clyde and the Tyne and Wear in shipbuilding development is once again highlighted, and the question is posed as to whether shipbuilding was simply "crowded out" by the much more successful shipping and port services industries.

This is a relatively modest publication, for which the editor does not make too many unfulfilled claims. However, one is compelled to record a degree of disappointment with the somewhat inward-looking nature of the enterprise. Comparisons with other major estuarial ports, in Britain or elsewhere in Europe, are avoided, and readers are left to themselves to provide an appropriate national and international context within which to understand and evaluate Liverpool's maritime history.

J. Forbes Munro
Stirling, Scotland


McKinney's Bligh is a well-written account of a mutiny which, within the confines of English literature, has become perhaps the most famous of mutinies. Indeed, it is a mutiny better known for the myths surrounding it than for the realities of the event. As a collective form of insubordination, mutiny has always been subject to very harsh punishment; it is not usually accompanied by violence and assumption of authority in a ship—though such was the case in Bounty. In most mutinies, the underlying causes he in intolerable condi-
tions, the cumulation of grievances and the incompetence of those in command. McKinney clearly shows the mutiny in *Bounty* to be no exception to this rule.

It may perhaps usually be impossible to justify mutiny; it nevertheless is not too difficult to explain it most of the time. The author analyses with skill and care the explosive and difficult character of *Bounty*’s captain and the consequent severe strain on his twenty-two year-old second-in-command, Fletcher Christian. Bligh appears to have had little education though he is depicted as an excellent cartographer and he appears full of compulsion to prove himself. Indeed, much of the asperity of his character seems due to his awareness of his own shortcomings—a situation so often productive of harshness and arrogance. McKinney also shows Christian's sensitivity and profound distress at the conflict between him and his captain.

With considerable skill and insight, the author sets out the prolonged discomforts to which the ship’s company was constantly subjected: bad and insufficient food, refusal to tolerate complaints, desperately uncomfortable living conditions, cold, wet, monotony, scorpions, centipedes, cockroaches and, in due course, patent dissension between Bligh and Christian.

In general, it seldom appears to those in authority that the circumstances giving rise to mutiny exist in their commands. Such an attitude may be the result of self satisfaction, insufficient education to determine what causes mutiny or even possibly an unwillingness to admit that anything so damaging could happen to them. The book reveals threads of all three forms of intellectual blindness in the case of *Bounty*.

The ship's voyage began in December 1788, and the hitherto unplanned mutiny took place suddenly—and by exception violently—in April 1789, just one hundred years after England's second revolution and in the very year of the French revolution. Thus, the ship's company was subject to all its discomforts and hardships for four long months, quite long enough to hatch mutinous sentiments. However, as in all naval mutinies in all countries, the unpleasant tale of oppression, discomfort, incompetence and mutiny was kept from the public as much as possible until Captain Bligh's self-serving log became available in 1921 and the better-educated Morrison's journal of events became available in 1935. The reluctance of navies everywhere to have their mutinies known is quite natural: mutiny bespeaks incompetence somewhere and that somewhere is usually in the persons of those in authority.

Having dealt with the mutiny itself, McKinney then gives a superb account of Bligh's splendid leadership and of his remarkable accomplishments in navigating a mere twenty-three foot boat with its nineteen survivors for a month and a half over 3600 miles without the usual instruments for such navigation. The book also follows the sad and even tragic subsequent lives of the mutineers who sailed from Tahiti to Pitcairn Island; this account shows the effects of undue preference to Englishmen over natives with its fatal consequences and the murder of Christian himself. The brutality and death among them is reminiscent of the biblical injunction concerning death by the sword for those who take up the sword.

The entire story is well told; both Bligh and Christian appear as human beings. The author does not attempt to take the facile course of praising one side and condemning the other; he sees the inevitable mixture of good and bad in every man; he is singularly able in weaving
a story which allows the reader to form his own conclusions. The book is essential reading for the historian interested in mutiny.

L. C. Audette
Ottawa, Ontario


Here is a handsome little book that should be of interest to all *Northern Mariner* readers. The New Brunswick Museum intends to publish a series of documents from its holdings, and this volume is a welcome beginning to that series.

The journals of William and George Smith are among the many treasures in the archive of the New Brunswick Museum. The Smith brothers worked in their father's shipchandling and ship-owning business in Saint John. William's journal was written in 1850, during a voyage from Saint John to Liverpool in the barque *Susan*. George put his thoughts on paper in 1859 and 1860, during a voyage to Barbados in the brigantine *Brisk*.

The result is a trove of minutiae about seafaring in the mid-nineteenth century, and the details are of interest precisely because they reflect ordinary experience. There is no Bluenose bravado here, but the cool reflections of a merchant's sons attending to their business as agents of the family firm.

As we might expect, the journals contain regular notes on weather and the disposition of sails. But there is much more: the crew complain about the bread, the fresh water is used up too quickly, the vessel leaks and the crew must pump every hour, and the vessel is too slow. William wrestles with the tedium. What colour are the eyes of cockroaches? Why should two ships, meeting in the same place, find three degrees of difference in their longitude? Why should a brig, carrying less sail in proportion to its tonnage than our barque, run by us so quickly? The sea was a place for such musings.

It is sad that we hear little about Liverpool and why William became "heartily sick of the place," but George tells us more about the merchant-shipowner's business ashore. Profits were good, but the discount on bills and drafts was huge, and return cargoes were slow to appear. "Fair remuneration" depended on luck and weather, as well as on the occasionally reluctant labour of an ill-fed crew. George is also a keen observer of people and curiosities ashore, as he takes us from the consul's residence, to the customs house, to the theatre, and even to a sugar plantation.

Alan McNairn's introduction and notes are brief but helpful, and the result is a small but valuable addition to our collection of documents from the age of sail.

Eric W. Sager
Victoria, British Columbia


Vizcaino's 1603 discoveries on the California coast left the whole northern shore above Cape Mendocino unexplored to Europeans, and it was not until 1774 that...
Spain's next expedition sought to determine the details of the coastline stretching north and west as far as the sixtieth parallel for evidence of newly reported Russian settlements and trading activity. It fell to Juan Pérez, a mariner from Majorca and an officer in the Spanish Royal Navy, to undertake a reconnaissance in the frigate Santiago of 225 tons. Pérez was a seasoned navigator and empire builder, for he had crossed the Pacific and had played a key role in the establishment of presidios and Franciscan missions in San Diego and Monterey in 1770. His advice on northern objectives was earnestly solicited by his political superior, the Viceroy, and Pérez initially responded that he was in favour of undertaking a voyage to latitude 45° or 50° North. However, as is often the case in human affairs, the state of international relations impinged on national plans, in this case those of Spain. In the end Pérez was instructed to go as high as the sixtieth parallel. Possibly this was beyond his personal desires or the capabilities of his ships and supplies, and we will never know this for want of evidence. In the circumstances, however, he made an extensive voyage along the coast in a remarkably short time. He sailed from Monterey. He returned to port with little to show in the way of concrete discoveries and with no claim to his credit of having planted the flag of Spain or of having made any claim to the territory he discovered.

The voyage was well recorded; there were four distinct diaries kept. Herbert Beals' fine book brings into print six items: two letters from Perez to Viceroy Bucareli, Perez's "Diario," 11 June to 28 August 1774, an extract from Esteban José Martinez's "Diario," 20-21 July, Francisco Mourelle's narrative of the Pérez voyage, 25 January to 5 November, and, also by Mourelle, the "Tabla diaria," 24 January to 3 November. Beals has provided up-to-date notations and commentary that place these documents in context and add appreciably to our understanding of the circumstances facing Pérez. He also had provided excellent maps to show the track of the Santiago by date. Students of Canadian history will find particularly valuable the reference to the course of the Santiago on 20 to 28 July off the Queen Charlotte Islands and 7 to 8 August off the Hesquiat Peninsula near Nootka Sound.

Pérez did report an encounter with the Haida but rather typical of the man he reported the details with incredible sparseness. Indeed, the voyage resulted in little fruit. The voyage consumed only two and a half months at sea. The captain claimed a water shortage as the main reason for turning back, and he reported on the ravages of scurvy. Mourelle, a contemporary, was highly critical of these reasons. And why, he asked, had not the commander sought out the numerous havens and inlets that would have fulfilled all the purposes of the instructions; and where they found shore had they made inadequate observations? Few documents had been left for so long a coast, complained Mourelle, "after a voyage that cost the Royal Treasury plenty." He added, "...except for finding out that the coast continues to the northwest, we remained almost in the same ignorance after the voyage" (p. 117). These are harsh, perhaps ungenerous words, and historian H.H. Bancroft thought they showed no appreciation of the difficulties facing mariners in these circumstances. I am inclined to support Bancroft. Beals and Donald Cutter, who provides a lucid foreword, are correct in praising Perez's achievements despite the apparent paucity of results. Certain it is that Pérez had coasted the shoreline and indicated for future mariners the rough coastal outline.
Moreover, he had made the first encounter with the Haida. These are significant contributions in and of themselves, and precursors of successive developments. This book joins the shelf of the important documentary editions of Northwest Coast history and is a credit to editor and publisher alike.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario


Like all Hal Lawrence’s books, this is an entertaining read about colourful people. He spins good yarns from the flax of the past to weave his canvas.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin’s foreword outlines his warm and friendly associations with Canadians. I can attest to this: one of my great pleasures was to serve under him when he was NATO Commander in Chief Channel, and I was Commander of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. The close association of naval officers and what are now, God help us, called “non-commissioned members” of the great democracies is immeasurably valuable, for both big and small navies. During my career, the early close Commonwealth association was replaced by that stemming from NATO. I hope that in the world restructuring just starting, we remember who our friends are and whose values we share, and that the professional value of our international naval associations is not forgotten.

This book concerns comrades in arms: Canadians in the British Coastal Forces during the Second World War. In both the First and Second World Wars, Canadians flocked to the colours; most people in the country saw it as their duty. Those who actually joined did so for many reasons—adventure, everyone else doing it, three square meals and a bunk—but we should never forget that all from our country who fought, volunteered to do so. Those of that generation deserve honour for having done what had to be done to preserve what we have today.

In the time of *Victory at Sea*, most Canadian naval men, while feeling fiercely Canadian, still emphatically associated themselves with the British Empire. A British victory was a victory for “us.” Canadians had been fighting in many wars for many years, not as allies but as an integral part of the Royal Navy. Indeed, the Coastal Forces commanded by Canadians in the Mediterranean had mostly British crews although, late in the war, the ships’ companies of those in the Channel were Canadian, serving under British operational control.

The appendix on Honours and Awards and that on Canadian Flotillas and their Captains seem inconsistent. C.A. Law, for example, is listed in the former as DSC, but not in the latter; others are listed in the latter as DSC, but are not mentioned in the former. What the Honours and Awards section is listing is a puzzle. It is certainly not confined to honours won by Canadians serving in coastal forces, neither is it a list of all awards won by Canadians in naval actions.

The style of the book is unusual and interesting. It consists of anecdotes told against broad backdrops of some of the major naval campaigns of the war. The author brings it off to a considerable extent, although the anecdotes range far beyond the conventional interpretation of
"Coastal Forces:" from motor gunboats (MGB’s), motor torpedo boats (MT’s) and motor launches (ML’s) and their USN equivalents to the activities of everything from battleships and aircraft carriers to minesweepers. Destroyer and convoy escort men may be surprised to find themselves included under "coastal forces." Some of the backdrops are painted with a very broad brush indeed, and probably make naval historians shudder!

Where the book is best is in telling the stories of the small group of Canadians who so bravely served in this enthralling branch of naval warfare, the Coastal Forces themselves. It is, I repeat, a most entertaining read.

Dan Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario


The Panama Route is a detailed account of the development and importance of this major shipping link between the east and west coasts of North America. John Haskell Kemble’s classic, originally published in 1943, has been reprinted with minor amendments and will be welcomed by maritime historians. The author, who recently died, was Emeritus Professor at Pomona College and his work on the Panama Route was based largely on his doctoral dissertation which itself was the result of a long-standing interest in the operation of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.

Before the 1850s, communications between the Eastern Seaboard and the Pacific Coast of North America were long and inefficient. Overland travel was dangerous, demanding and took months, and had its own special perils. It is not surprising that a route across Panama was seen as a great advantage. Steam ships could operate on each coast and connect with a short overland route that together could save months of travel and great expense. The California Gold Rush of 1849 only made the need for this service more urgent.

The Panama Route is the story of the development of this transportation route between 1848 and 1869 when the first transcontinental railway was completed across the United States and the Panama route was overshadowed until the completion of the Panama Canal. The completion of the Panama Railroad in 1855 provided an efficient link across Panama by replacing a makeshift system of river boat and overland trails. The dominant steamship companies serving the route during this period were the Pacific Mail Steamship Company (operating the Pacific end of the service) and the United States Mail Steamship Company (running the Atlantic coast route). These two companies held the mail contracts and dominated the route until 1859. Then the United States Mail Steamship Company went out of business with much of the operation becoming part of the empire of Cornelius Vanderbilt. Vanderbilt had been involved in steamship operations in competition for the traffic on the route through the 1850s. The corporate dealings over the route are complex, highly competitive and fascinating. Eventually Pacific Mail and Vanderbilt reached an accommodation which lasted until 1865 when the Pacific Mail arranged to take over the entire service.

Substantial and fully-referenced, this volume provides a thorough description and evaluation of the route before the
completion of the Central Pacific and Union Pacific railroads in 1869. It also provides other interesting insights into steam navigation and the reliability of steam vessels during the mid-1800s. This was the transition period when sidewheel steamers were slowing giving way to screw-driven vessels. Marine steam engines were still not very reliable and most of the vessels carried sail for emergencies. There is also valuable material on travel during the period and what conditions were like on board the vessels in the trade.

An extensive list of the vessels including specifications, many details of their accommodations and history is appended. Steamships often wandered far from their original routes and many of the vessels included in this history are of interest because of their later services. A number of these vessels eventually operated in Canadian waters: Dakota, Goliath, Oregon, Orizaba, and Pacific are a few west coast examples. Additional appendices include statistics on passenger volumes, treasure shipments, and shipbuilders. This book is both a valuable, thorough reference and good reading.

Robert D. Turner
Victoria, British Columbia


The introduction to this book contains a brief summary of the contents of its ten chapters. It also indicates that the book is the result of the author's thinking over a quarter century about the sea and grand strategy throughout recorded history. A number of the chapters have appeared in other publications. The final chapter on Soviet Russia was written especially for this book.

Nations have always become dominant sea powers through favourable geographic conditions. Maritime nations must have good bays and inlets large enough to accommodate naval and merchant fleets. These nations seek to enforce a state of domination and international order on the high seas. The growth and maturing of a navy requires many years which involve developments in naval architecture, propulsion, weapon systems, communications and the means for the control of ships and fleets. A strong navy has functions which are aimed at achieving command of the sea. These include the deterrence of aggression, defence against invasion, the protection of maritime commerce, blockade of an enemy coast, engagement in combined operations and the provision of strategic bombardment.

The author introduces the term "thalassocracy" at an early stage in the book, and it is generally defined as having "maritime supremacy." He indicates that thalassocracies have existed only six times in history: the Minoans, ancient Athens, Venice and Florence, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. He contrasts the thalassocratic state with the continental power; the former were catalysts of change and stimulated a high level of technology and industry. They were centres of higher learning and cultural activity. The chapter on thalassocracy is a thorough study by itself, having 173 footnotes. In the next chapter Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan is described as a thalassocratic determinist because of his many works as a proponent of sea power. Mahan is also described as the first major synthesizer of naval history; others
describe him as a leading naval analyst and historical strategist.

The thalassocratic concept is carried on in a chapter on America as a Thalassocracy. Since 1945 American sea power emerged as the leading naval force on the world scene. It has taken many of its characteristics from those of the Royal Navy, and the U.S. Navy has been a vital ingredient in American economic expansion and in its becoming the leading economic power in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Navy has been a major catalyst in science and technology since the days of sail but particularly since the time of iron ships and steam propulsion. In more recent times came the development of nuclear propulsion and satellite navigation. The author makes the observation that the nation's sailors tend to stay out of the political arena.

American strategic history and doctrines are outlined in a separate chapter where discussions about the influence of the British Navy are prominent. Much of the last half of the book is devoted to the Pacific theatre where the origin and development of the Imperial Japanese Navy are traced, the role of Admiral Ernest J. King as a global maritime strategist and naval leader is described, and a chapter on aspects of maritime strategy as viewed by General Douglas MacArthur is provided.

The final chapter covers eight centuries of continental strategy in Imperial and Soviet Russia. It is emphasized, however, that the Soviet Union has taken to the oceans as a naval power only since the 1960s. Four major factors are discussed in historical perspective: geopolitical, economic, cultural and military. A question which contemporary Western alliances must ponder is whether the present day Soviet Union has emerged from its past history and patterns of past strategic behaviour. Of such scope is this final chapter that it is by itself a very worthwhile reason for including this book in one's reading inventory.

Donald A. Grant
Nepean, Ontario


This second volume in the series from the UBC Press on "Canada and International Relations" is a review by political scientists, economists, lawyers, scientists and diplomats of what Canada has done, is doing, and proposes to do to obtain for Canadians the benefits available to coastal states under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

Seven years after the Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960 failed to reach an agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, Malta's ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, proposed to the General Assembly that the deep seabeds of the world's oceans should be declared "the common heritage of mankind." This concept was instantly accepted by the large group of non-industrialized states that had little hope of ever being able to exploit for themselves the mineral resources of the seabeds. To protect their own interests, the USA and the USSR, in an unusual collaboration, countered with their own agenda: the territorial sea breadth issue, free navigation through international straits, and freedom to conduct marine scientific research. Many other states including Canada then proposed and succeeded in having the Gen-
era! Assembly initiate an international conference that would consider all international law of the sea issues together and produce a single, comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention. No reservations would be allowed, precluding the practice of approving some provisions and rejecting others. The Convention was to be "all or nothing."

The UN Seabed Committee, struck by the General Assembly in 1969, negotiated an agenda and, as a preparatory conference, drafted articles for a comprehensive convention. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III, then was convened in December 1973 to start the work on producing a comprehensive constitution of the oceans. Some 159 nations laboured until April 1982 to produce a draft convention of more than 320 articles, negotiating every detail by consensus. They voted on the final draft in April 1982. Finally, representatives of 119 states met at Montego Bay in Jamaica, chosen as the site for the International Seabed Authority, on 10 December 1982 to sign the Law of the Sea Convention. It then remained open for signature for another two years. The negotiation of the Convention is aptly described in the book as "a three-way struggle between those states which desired to extend national jurisdiction seaward beyond the narrow band of ocean around their coasts, states which feared that expanded jurisdiction would interfere with navigational freedoms, and states which believed that a large area of ocean should be reserved as the 'common heritage of mankind' in which no one state could exercise jurisdiction. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is the attempt to balance these conflicting interests" (p. 45).

Canada, as a western, industrialized coastal state with a very broad continental shelf (at least on the Atlantic) has obtained enormous potential benefits under the terms of the Convention, particularly from the continental shelf and fisheries issues in which Canada's objective has always been to protect the living and non-living resources of the oceans adjacent to Canada's coasts to the fullest possible extent and to reserve their benefits as far as possible to Canadians. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans announced at Halifax on 29 September 1987 an oceans strategy to provide coordination and planning for enhancing ocean industries, promoting ocean science, managing ocean resources, and protecting Canada's rights over those resources within its jurisdiction and control. A workshop on Canadian Oceans Policy was held 18-19 March 1988 at the University of British Columbia to examine, with a multidisciplinary perspective, how the rules of the new Law of the Sea regime are actually being applied by states, Canada in particular. The papers in this volume are revisions of those originally presented at the 1988 UBC workshop. The volume's five parts correspond with Canada's priorities in the UN Seabed Committee (the preparatory conference for UNCLOS III) and at UNCLOS III: fisheries management, seabed mineral resources, the marine environment, and sovereignty, including the Arctic and maritime boundary delimitations with the USA, France and Denmark. The fifth part looks at the future of international oceans management as well as the international and domestic dimensions of Canada's oceans policy.

The Convention will come into force and be legally binding one year after the sixtieth ratification has been deposited. By January 1987 it had received only thirty-five ratifications. The USA, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany have
refused to sign the Convention on the ground that its provisions for the international seabed regime will discriminate against private enterprise and give too much discretionary power to the International Seabed Authority. However, these states object only to Part XI of the Convention; they have each stated that, apart from Part XI on deep seabed mining, the Convention reflects existing international law.

No industrialized state from East or West has so far accepted the deep seabed mining provisions as set out in the Convention by ratifying the treaty. Of the Western states, only one—Iceland—has ratified. Amendments will be required to make the mining provisions acceptable to those states with the technology and financial resources to mine metallic minerals on the seabeds. These states—Canada among them—are awaiting the outcome to the negotiations in the Preparatory Commission (where Canada is a very active participant) to see whether the final provisions are acceptable and the extent of the financial obligations for states that subsequently ratify the Convention.

The editors' summary of their volume reads: "For over ten years participants at UNCLOS sought to fashion a comprehensive regime for the oceans within which states could make decisions about the allocation, use and preservation of ocean resources. In this respect, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is a remarkable achievement. But now the focus has shifted, from multilateral action to action by states individually, bilaterally, or within regional frameworks. In Canada's case this offers an enormous challenge. The papers in this volume reveal that this challenge is being met with mixed success. Canada has acted to ensure that it can obtain some of the benefits of the new oceans regime and to fulfil its international responsibilities; but much remains to be done. The rational management of Canada's and the world's oceanic spaces must be kept to the forefront of political agendas" (p. iii).

The book, in my opinion, provides all that its editors have promised and more. Inevitably there has been some repetition between writers, but that merely shows that law of the sea issues are interrelated. The result of the 1988 workshop is a thorough coverage of a complex subject. The volume is well worth reading for the clarification it provides on these complex issues.

Allen D. Taylor
Cantley, Québec


The first of these recent additions to the excellent Anatomy of the Ship series describes an English merchantman, the largest of three that carried colonists to Virginia in 1607. Since Jamestown became the first successful English settlement on the continent, this otherwise-unremarkable little vessel was, in a sense, the "flagship"
of the Great Migration. The second book examines a very different ship: the yacht Royal Caroline that both George II and George III used for their frequent journeys between England and Hanover. Besides her Royal connections, she was notable as perhaps the most elaborately decorated ship ever and as an "experimental" vessel that had a key place in the English development of fast frigates.

The Anatomy series began with detailed studies of twentieth century warships, for which copious contemporary information is available. The books served to distil this mass into a form digestible by ship modellers and anyone fascinated by what lay behind the often-photographed steel plates of such vessels. Each volume provided a brief text, some photographs and extensive, annotated drawings of every extent. When the series was extended to sailing vessels, its character had to change. Each volume became, in effect, a summary of the conclusions from extensive research, conveniently expressed in the form of a description of a single ship. This gave the books considerable research value, if only as codified received wisdom to be challenged in future debate or as a test of where our present knowledge is inadequate. At the same time, however, this change in emphasis posed a trap for the non-specialist: the detailed drawings of the Susan Constant or the Royal Caroline may instil more confidence than the available information can support.

For Susan Constant, Lavery has taken these developments still further by tackling a ship of which he knows nothing for certain except its name, size and date of building. All else is based on the limited contemporary information on ships of her type and date, with the lines plan being developed from Harriot's contemporary manuscript rules. The author began the work as a design study for a full-scale replica and his text is an explanation of the reasoning employed there (essentially the "footnotes" for the replica). The publication of such details is to be applauded though, being expressed concisely, they will not be easily readable without some prior familiarity with the subject. Sadly, the plans derived from this exercise contain many highly questionable features and some simple errors: sternposts must extend to the wing transom, for example, and not end at the tuck; rudders must be able both to turn and to be lifted off their gudgeons (neither being possible with the one presented); double capstans are very improbable in a ship of this age; contemporary bilge pumps were of the lift rather than suction variety, the knightheads, and with them the bowsprit, are shown too far aft, and so on. Some of these features may be of little concern to ship modellers (though they are to replica builders) but they serve to define the reliability of the plans. Indeed, what Lavery has really shown is that, despite the various tantalizing pieces of contemporary information available, we still know far too little about small seventeenth century English ships.

The volume on the Caroline is also a departure for the Anatomy series in that it is an (excellent) translation of an earlier Italian work. The text is much more wide-ranging and easier for the non-specialist than is Laveras but it leaves many features of the ship undescribed. Indeed, the whole work follows Bellabarba's ship modelling interests by concentrating on external features, particularly the deck fittings and rigging (which follow the well-documented norms of the contemporary navy) and the incomparable carvings. The latter are shown in exquisite (and apparently accurate) detail in Osculati's drawings, which also cover the spars, rigging
and other features of interest to modellers. The Caroline's internal "anatomy" is presented much more briefly, speculatively and unconvincingly: the suggested arrangements leave little space for ballast or water casks while the only access to the captain's servant's berths passes through the Royal sleeping apartments, for example. Thus, we are denied believable details of how a miniature warship was fitted to carry the king and his family.

Both books are highly recommended within their limitations, but they should not be used incautiously.

Trevor J. Kenchington
Musquodoboit Harbour, Nova Scotia


While Germany at sea in World War II mustered a considerable force of heavy ships, disguised ocean raiders, and a multitude of small craft in the Channel, it is significant that the war opened with KL Fritz-Julius Lemp's torpedoing of SS Athenia from the U-Boat U-30 and ended on May 7, 1945 with a Coastal Command Catalina aircraft kill of U-320 off the coast of Norway, and the sinking by U-1025 of the Norwegian minesweeper NYMS 382 off the English south coast that same evening. Thus it is not surprising that van der Vat's book has the U-Boat war as its main theme. He does bring in the escapades of the raiders when they were involved in the Atlantic area, and those of the Bismarck, Gneisenau, Schamhorst and attendant cruisers when they too tried to intercept convoys or cause the Allies, primarily Britain, additional problems. But it was the U-Boats that are all pervasive in the story. Their Admiral Karl Dönitz grew to be the Navy's driving force, eventually its leader, and even Germany's "Last Führer."

Van der Vat, a Dutch-born and English-educated journalist, recently with the Manchester Guardian, leads into this Atlantic Campaign with three chapters on World War I and the inter-war years to set the scene. He discusses Germany's preparations and well-absorbed experiences, including those of Dönitz, the so-called "peace and disarmament conferences" in Washington and London, and the belated realization by Britain that the U-Boats once again might be a major threat to their vital import requirements if it was to survive, let alone counter, the resurgent Germany. Almost seventy percent of the book covers the period between September 1939 and May 1943, when the battle in the Atlantic suddenly changed from a desperate struggle of tactics, technologies, and mounting losses on both sides, to eventual victory for the Allies. By then the merchant raiders had been cleared from even the most distant oceans; the Kriegsmarine's capital ships were largely immobilised (except for the continuing nagging presence of Tirpitz in northern Norway). The mid-ocean air gap was almost closed as well, both by a few grudgingly allowed VLR (Very Long Range) Coastal Command aircraft and by the new MAC ships (merchantmen converted with a one-level flight deck and carrying a handful of anti-submarine Swordfish aircraft) and US-built Escort Carriers. The latter were slow to be widely used; the Royal Navy thought them unstable, dangerously poor in watertight integrity (their first was lost to a single torpedo), and
having a very dangerous aircraft fuel supply system (they lost one in dock when being refitted). This aggravated their American builders who cared little for such niceties in a ship built in only a few months! The last two years of the war is given only forty-three pages. During this period, the battle developed into one of technology rather than tactics. It was a battle which the Germans were about to win with true submersibles using schnorkels and the new high underwater speed Type XXI and XXIII boats. Success eluded them by probably six months, the author estimates. The two or three cruises by these new generation submarines were disturbingly successful, although fortunately some were sunk before they could report back.

Though this is a very carefully and fully researched book, its author (unlike many academic historians) reveals his biases in pungent criticisms of such persons as Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris and the anglophobic US Fleet Admiral Ernie King. Harris gave his support for area bombing, which never significantly hindered the U-Boat operations from Lorient (what van der Vat calls "entrenched obduracy at the Air Ministry," p. 68). King refused to accept that a weak convoy was better than none, thus costing the Allies hundreds of merchant vessels, particularly essential tankers, along his coast in 1942. Van der Vat is more gentle and understanding, although still critical, of the Admiralty’s part as a direct operations centre (the only one of the three Services to so operate) in trying to second guess and direct the Senior Officer on the spot in such debacles as the "Channel Dash" of the three German capital ships in February 1942 and the infamous PQ 17 Russian convoy massacre. To offset this, van der Vat emphasises the vital role played by British successes at Bletchley Park in decrypting the Kriegsmarine's "Enigma" machine traffic. He discusses the part played there by Alan Turing with his first generation computers searching for the key to unlock the over-vocal German U-Boat radio instructions, Captain Godfrey Winn and his amazingly accurate STR (Submarine Tracking Room) which was able to divert convoys with much success, and Professor P.M.S. Blackett’s rather ignored forecasts that big convoys were better and involved fewer escorts. His story flows cleanly despite so many major players on stage, especially in the early days, and he keeps all his threads well in hand. He gives examples of many of the actions of ships and U-Boats in detail, none lasting more than a page or so, and periodically pauses to give a summary of losses and gains, especially in the violent swings of the U-Boat war, citing ship and U-Boat losses, building rates, and the tonnage war Dönitz was waging from Day One. In the final analysis the whole problem was one of tonnage, replacement, building, and sinking. The fate of the Allies depended on the solutions. It might be noted that the author makes almost no particular mention of the astounding accomplishment of the merchant ship captains in adhering to highly unusual convoy discipline, even when under attack and at night, and handling their ships, often old and with foreign-speaking crews different from the officers, with only an engine room telegraph and often magnetic compasses. The pre-convoy Conferences seemed to work, and "rompers" (those ships pulling ahead of their mates in convoy) and "stragglers" (those who dropped astern) suffered far greater losses in both pure numbers and proportionately than did those who travelled under naval protection, however scanty and ill-equipped that
might be and however young the C.O.s might be (two of the RCNVR, Messrs Pickford and Quinn, are known to have been twenty-two years old!). But the tally of statistics is not intrusive and helps us to see the war from the headquarters in Lorient, London, Washington, and even Ottawa.

One of the most interesting aspects of this history is the clear view van der Vat has of the RCN's position throughout the war. He is, in fact, a strong supporter of our efforts, unlike many other British writers. He appreciates that we grew too fast, volunteered too much, and were unable to refuse demands on our apparent forces by the Admiralty who, in turn, left Canada at the back of the queue for equipment, leadership, training and support. When we caught up in mid-1943 and were lead, sometimes, by long experienced RN destroyer Senior Officers, we were as good as the best. He quotes Admiral Sir Percy Noble, the original Commander, Western Approaches, that "The Canadian Navy solved the problem of the Atlantic convoys" (p. 318). Van der Vat points out that when the British Groups had the same problems as the RCN, they too fared poorly. For example, in February 1943 B2 RN Group lost thirteen vessels, including a troopship, to twenty attacking U-Boats from three Wolf Packs, despite having been augmented to twelve warships with some USN ships, for a cost of three U-Boats sunk. He adds that due to poor performance and under-equipped ships, the RCN was too frequently and quite questionably assigned to the slower ONS and SC convoys which, in turn, attracted more German attention and were easier to find and attack than the faster ON and HX convoys. In September 1942, ONS 127 had five RCN corvettes, not one with a working radar. Later the same group (C4), now with St. Laurent, escorted SC 107, again with minimal radar; St. Laurent and a rescue ship had only H/F D/F to locate the seventeen U-Boats sent against them by Dönitz after a good xb-dienst decrypt. No wonder the RCN fared poorly. He does make the point, unnoted by this reviewer, that the Government deliberately resolved to concentrate on the technically intensive Services of the RCN and RCAF rather than the Army as in the First War, in order to gain a permanent development advantage. Even so, many technical developments, certainly for the Navy, lagged behind those of our Allies, and we often could not, or would not, follow their leads. Canadian radar in RXC and SW1C was almost always of poor operating quality, and years behind their RN counterparts. This is a first-class history, with only a very few unimportant errors (Col. Sir Maurice Hankey was Royal Marine Artillery, not Army for instance), and some possibly questionable assessments by the author which tend to disappear as the story progresses. The book is well worth having in any library, and a very good read.

Fraser M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


In this thoroughly researched, well-written, and generally fascinating study, the historian John Byrn explores the theory and practice of criminal justice in the British navy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century prior to the subsequent
reform of the so-called "Bloody Code." Here is an exhaustive analysis originally based on a doctoral thesis of the introduction, nature, and application of thirty-six naval ordinances known as the Articles of War of 1749. Through them Byrn shows how contemporary principles of common law were carried into military life at sea.

The author has limited this study to the experiences of the Leeward Islands' command between 1784-1812 for a number of reasons: it was militarily and strategically vital to the British government in the aftermath of the American and French Revolutions and during the Napoleonic conflict, it was distant enough from the mother country to escape interference by the Admiralty and thus gives one a good look at unimpeded naval discipline, and it had a reputation for lawlessness. Moreover, documentary evidence from this command is abundant. Byrn has made careful use of extant and, more importantly, complete captain's and master's logs of a sample of seventy-three ships stationed at these islands—a substantial evidentiary base.

The book consists of six chapters and four appendices. Beginning with an overview of the Articles of War, the author examines the basic types of crime-contraventions against religion and morality, crimes against king and government, infringements of the rights of individuals, and naval infractions—and their enforcement. He then looks at the nature and contours of naval jurisprudence as compared to the common law and makes the argument that the practice of naval law, especially pertaining to court martial, though ideological in its content and in its disciplinary function, was anything but arbitrary, excessive, or extraordinary in its execution. Rather, naval law reflected the prevailing characteristics and discourse of common law, and the Articles of War were implemented "moderately—even humanely" (p. 63). In a third likewise illuminating chapter, Byrn analyzes naval punishment more specifically. He has discovered that, though corporal penalties were deliberately brutal and humiliating, this result was by no means unique nor exclusive to the navy and, again, mirrored the forms of punishment deeply rooted in the civilian code of the day.

The latter three chapters deal first with the "nautical gentry," or the officers responsible for enforcing the law, their social context on board ship, and then—possible motivation in dispensing the law in the manner that they did. The popular image of Captain Bligh to the contrary, this class of officer-gentleman often evinced "the leavening principles of gentility, paternalism and detached justice" (p. 108). Byrne goes on to provide a convincing portrait of the naval ship as "a floating society" in which moral, social and legal offences, principally drunkenness, theft, assault, and occasionally buggery and homicide had to be contended with, and he has discovered that while there were similarities, justice at sea as compared with on land relied more heavily on summary conviction and corporal punishment. In his final chapter, he discusses service-related infractions such as desertion, disobedience, and neglect of duty together with the legal decisions which surrounded them. These decisions too were founded on the common law tradition.

In concluding, the author argues that to an extent British naval law strengthened and legitimized the authority of the nautical gentry, yet that this law served less to perpetuate the self-interest of the elite overseers against the rank and file than to maintain the stability and discipline necessary to secure the efficient and proper
The Northern Mariner

operation of the navy and individual vessels. An extensive bibliography or primary and secondary sources rounds out the book. Also appended are the Articles of War of 1749, a reference list of ships surveyed and punishments meted out, a list of captains and their respective roles, and a series of graphs showing representative punishment patterns.

Detailed, rigorous, yet quite readable for the scholar and lay reader alike, Byrn's significant study effectively dispels common myths about crime and punishment in the navy and offers the reader hard evidence to support his main thesis that naval and common law were rooted in similar cultural traditions and attitudes. Moreover, his use of naval trial transcripts gives life to a compelling qualitative and quantitative analysis. In sum, this book is highly recommended for any serious student of naval history or criminal justice history.

Rainer Baehre
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


David Syrett is well-known for his research on the Royal Navy during the era of the American Revolution. His study Shipping and the American War, 1775-83 (London, 1970) and numerous contributions to journals like Mariner's Mirror have helped to establish him as a leading authority on the naval side of the War of the American Revolution. He is therefore a logical candidate to write a definitive treatment of the Royal Navy's role in the North American theatre of that war. So why is this particular book such a disappointment?

The answer rests with several complaints, beginning with the reason why the book was published in the first place. Usually, a book is published because it has something new to say, either by way of challenging established interpretations or because it offers the fruits of new research. A book might also be published because it synthesizes, in one convenient monograph, the research of many historians who, collectively, have forced us to re-think how an event as momentous as the American Revolution can be explained. The Royal Navy in American Waters does none of these things. In its interpretation, in the research on which it is based, and in its conclusions, the book is severely dated. A quick glance at the bibliography reveals that only one of its secondary sources was published after 1980—and that being an article written by Syrett himself. Recent works on the logistical or diplomatic side of the American Revolutionary War are conspicuous by their absence. The most recent volume of the continuing series of Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Washington, 1964-) to be used by Syrett is Volume IV, published in 1969! Yet there have been five more volumes published to date. The conclusion is inescapable: though published in 1989, this book is based on a manuscript which is more than a decade old, and hardly revised since then.

Quite apart from saying little that is new, Syrett fails to provide sufficient background material to place his description and analysis of the Royal Navy's activities in a firm historical context. On page 1, we are immediately plunged into the navy's situation in America in 1775; nothing is said on the state of the navy, its disposition, administration, personnel, manning, etc. What experience did its officers carry with them into the war? When and where,
for instance, did Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves develop his ability to keep his ships on patrol off the Massachusetts coast during the winter of 1775-76? We do not know, because we are not told. Elsewhere, we are left equally in the dark about developments beyond the American theatre which had profound consequences on the navy's performance in American waters. For instance, it is generally accepted that the Keppel-Palhser affair (1778-79) seriously damaged the navy's ability to prosecute the war, yet Syrett never once mentions it. When Syrett suggests that Lords George Germain and Sandwich "viewed the British position in America with varying degrees of complacency" (p. 181) after 1781, he obscures the seriousness of the situation in the North Sea or the Western Approaches which influenced their response to American events. What is missing, in short, is a larger context within which the navy's activities in North America could make sense.

The publisher surely shares some of the blame for the way in which this book disappoints. The index is a travesty, it shows all the signs of having been assembled mechanically with word-processing software and no sense of judgement. This, combined with Syrett's fondness for historical analogy, results in the appearance in the index of the Boer Republics; Generals Rommel, Eisenhower, and Stonewall Jackson; Bataan; and other equally irrelevant references, yet nowhere will one find privateering, logistics, blockade, and other concepts more germane to the book's subject. A series of sketch maps helps the reader with some campaigns, yet none exists for the Philadelphia campaign of 1777, though we are told that "The decision to move on Philadelphia by sea ... was the greatest single mistake made by [General] Howe..." (p. 74) The proofreading for this volume is very poor; the worst example occurs when the first two lines on p. 175 are reprinted again at the top of p. 176.

In conclusion, I suspect that scholars who wish a convenient one-volume treatment of the Royal Navy in North America during the 1775-83 war will undoubtedly find it difficult to resist this book, simply on the strength of its author's reputation. If so, I fear they too will find it a disappointment. Its treatment of the topic is far from thorough, and even as an introductory study its weaknesses make it less than adequate. A definitive modern treatment of the Royal Navy in North America during the American Revolution has yet to be written.

Olaf Janzen
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


This interesting little book is the latest in what is beginning to look like a series of personal histories of Nova Scotian master mariners. In common with its predecessors, the book describes the career of a ship's captain, born of seafaring stock in a small coastal community, and follows the highs and lows of his career from sail to steam, during which he commanded a variety of vessels, ranging from his family's cargo schooner Estonia to the elegant S.S. Surf and, finally, Bluenose II.

The easy narrative style of Jo Kranz presents Captain Hartling's story in autobiographic form from his boyhood in iso-
lated Spanish Ship Bay on Nova Scotia's Eastern Shore to his controversial captaincy of *Bluenose II* in 1975. Among the many highlights, are his eyewitness account of the Halifax Explosion, his description of the Norwegian whaling station at Rose au Rue and his wartime experiences as a pilot in Halifax Harbour. He comes across as a man with a great love of ships and the sea, a social man who enjoyed company, a good laugh and a glass of rum, but who had little interest in his family or life ashore.

The book is not without problems which, for the most part, arise from Jo Kranz’s rather odd use of nautical vocabulary and her apparent lack of interest in researching Hartling’s notes to ensure accuracy and fill in any blanks. This, given the fact that the subject was eighty-three years of age, should have been mandatory. To note a few examples, *Estonia*, the aforementioned schooner, is mentioned a number of times in the text as *Esthonia*, Sambro becomes "Samboro" and there are a number of vessels which remain unidentified. Similarly, Sherbrooke, the main commercial centre of the upper part of the Eastern Shore, with a healthy population of seven hundred in 1910, is described as "the small village near Spanish Ship Bay."

Of the twelve chapter title pages, illustrated with ink drawings by book designer Gerard Williams, only six are appropriate, and two of these are duplicated with photographs. Of those deemed inappropriate, two are, of all places, Peggy's Cove, and two are of steel-hulled excursion schooners in tropical settings. They do little to enhance the otherwise adequate design of the book. The photographs, on the other hand, apart from a completely unrelated view of the *Maid of England* under full sail, are interesting, although some have been published before, while a little sketch map showing the location of Mulgrave and Guysborough would have been unnecessary had the cartographer not forgotten the Strait of Canso in the area map preceding page one.

Apart from these relatively minor concerns, the memoirs of Captain Hartling are a delight to students of Maritime provinces' shipping in the twentieth century. They provide a wealth of information on many areas of interest, from people and ships to general economic conditions and government patronage. Much of the content dovetails neatly into the growing resource base on the subject, tying up a number of loose ends and providing yet another perspective on a fascinating subject.

*Bluenose Master* is a book which should be enjoyed by anyone, even those with only a recreational interest in sea stories. They may be a little surprised, as was the reviewer, by the almost defensive tone of the last two chapters, but Captain Hartling’s actions while in command of *Bluenose II* were controversial and what better place to tell his side of the story than in his own memoirs.

Robin H. Wyllie
East LaHave, Nova Scotia


*Ships and Shipwrecks of the Americas* is a fascinating book highlighting the contribution of the excavation of shipwrecks to our
understanding of the history of the Americas. Each chapter is written by the ranking expert in the field.

The text describes nautical history from the primitive craft of indigenous peoples to the end of the era of sail. Several of the chapters contain Canadian content but only chapter one deals with the Americas as a geographic whole. The remainder have strong regional emphases, with the United States predominating.

Chapter one includes a discussion of the Norse site in Newfoundland and even speculates on the possibility of Japanese contact with coastal Ecuador about 3000 BC. The early chapters deal with Columbian and other exploration between 1492 and 1554, with the emphasis upon the dearth of finds to date. From a Canadian viewpoint the absence of any treatment of Arctic exploration is disappointing. However, this feeling vanishes rapidly, since chapter four is devoted entirely to the excavation of the Basque whaler and auxiliary vessels at Red Bay, Labrador. The chapter details the methods and findings of the extensive work done by Parks Canada personnel under the direction of Robert Grenier. The chapter on treasure fleets is worth mentioning, as it does a remarkable job of cataloguing the impressive wealth of finds while at the same time decrying the incredible loss of knowledge about ship construction and design. The chapter on French and Indian naval battles provides a unique insight into the character of warfare in North America and the vessels used. The discovery of several bateaux in the lower town of Québec provides the rationale for the discussion of a vessel extensively used for military transport. Also in this chapter is reference to the battles at Louisbourg which resulted in the entrapment and sinking of the French fleet there in 1758. The scuttling of the Machault in the Restigouche River in 1760 is also described.

The chapter on the Great Lakes includes a lengthy section on the Hamilton and Scourge, the two gunboats located at great depths off Hamilton, which have been preserved in pristine condition by the low oxygen content of the frigid water. Later chapters deal with steamboats, ironclads and some of the last vessels of the sailing-ship era. The epilogue documents the advances in deepwater technology demonstrated by the work on the Andrea Doria and the Titanic, plus Dr. Joe MacInnis' pioneering work on the Breadalbane in the Canadian Arctic.

In summary, the book's strength lies in its compendium of data from disparate sources under one title. It clearly demonstrates the advances since Bass' earlier book in 1972, while at the same time drawing attention to how few of the known sites have actually been excavated for their archaeological data. From a strictly Canadian perspective, however, the weakness of the text lies in its omissions. In particular, there is a need for a chapter on whaling and Arctic exploration. Despite these oversights, the book is an essential addition to any serious student's library of nautical texts.

Andy Lockery
Winnipeg, Manitoba