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Hi everyone,

Years ago, a student of mine introduced me to the idea of “Farch,” the brutal double month after the detox cleansing ritual that is January and before the tentative optimism that is April that we all, in these northern latitudes, must hunker down and endure. I have secretly always quite liked this time, but rarely mention that fact in polite company. Who wants to hear it, when complaining about the weather is one of the fundamental connections that bind us as a species?

There is something magic about living in a world that freezes and thaws, bursts forth and retreats. Every day brings a new world—even from the same window. Three days ago the view from my desk was obscured by rain frozen to the glass; today it’s bright and clear, and as the ice drops from the trees and shatters on the roof, it sounds like the house is being attacked by raccoons. I scooted quickly along the sidewalk this morning with my dog, careful to skirt beyond the reach of the overhead branches molting their icy carapaces.

The shedding of layers—like the trees with their ice, like the sweaters we will put back in the closet before too long—is a theme for this issue of Argonauta: layers of history, meaning, memory, and misinterpretation get explored and explained. David Gray’s consideration of the private notes and possible hidden history of a former neighbour reminds us that quiet exteriors can shelter incredible memories; William Sayers’ piece on the etymology of the nautical chestnut “Wae hae, blow the man down” offers multiple narrative paths to explore through a discussion of individual words and their historical and cultural contexts. Brittany Dunn’s work on the history of the Maritime Command badge gives us a surprising glimpse of aesthetic considerations within Canada’s military bureaucracy.

And then, of course, the call for papers! The Society’s first in-person conference in three years will take place in St. John’s, Newfoundland. What a perfect venue to gather in this world made new again.

As always, please keep sending me your wonderful pieces for inclusion in Argo. Reading them together, it’s as if we shed the distance, wear our CNRS badge with pride, share adventures together, and sing loudly in unison.

WMP,

Erika
President’s corner
by Michael Moir
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We recently passed that time of year when the shout of “Weel done, Cutty-sark” brings to mind images of a scantily-clad witch dancing to the devil’s music instead of the sleek and graceful lines of the famous clipper ship. Distractions of haggis, whisky, and the poetry of Robert Burns are now swept away by thoughts of our 2023 annual conference in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. Dr. Meaghan Walker, a Councillor of the Society and organizer of this year’s conference, draws our minds back to our rich maritime past with a call for papers that will explore the theme, “Shaped by the Sea: The Maritime World as Transformative for Work, Culture, Ideas, Networks.” Just as the sea constantly changes our coastal landscape, the challenges and opportunities of the maritime environment led to continuous adaptation by society in diverse areas that include culture, commerce, civil engineering, and technology. These topics will provide rich fodder for members eager to share their research and ideas, and to engage in conversation and debate.

After almost three years of disruption and video conferencing, we return to an in-person venue at the Maritime History Archive of Memorial University of Newfoundland on 17-18 August 2023. Dr. Walker is developing a rich program of social events to go with historical presentations to make the visit to St. John’s interesting as well as informative. I encourage members to head east in August to celebrate the networking and connections that will arise from socializing with old and new friends in this historic city.

The Society’s return to St. John’s after more than 30 years will remind members of the many important contributions to maritime history made by scholars at Memorial University of Newfoundland using the British crew agreements and other documents in the Maritime History Archive, and the importance of universities to advancing the study of our discipline. Earlier today, I had a reference interview with an undergraduate student seeking advice on archival sources for the naval question of the early twentieth century and Canadian shipbuilding during the First World War. He expressed surprise at the richness of these interesting subjects that he had not yet encountered in his course readings. He chafed at the lack of opportunities to study naval history and mentioned that he was not alone among history majors. The student left my office with several suggestions for further reading (most written by members of our Society), and I was left with a sense of optimism that an interest in maritime history endures among university students many miles away from Canada’s coasts. What they need are scholars to teach them in universities that actively support the discipline. This challenge will be among the topics of our discussions at the annual conference in August, and for many years to come.
One of eight from HMCS *Spikenard*—or not?
David H. Gray

**Abstract**
HMCS *Spikenard*, a Flower class corvette, was torpedoed on the night of 10 February 1942 almost without notice by the other ships in the convoy. This paper investigates whether a former neighbour of mine was one of the eight who survived.

**The inspiration for this paper**
Have you ever found out that a deceased person had done or experienced something that you would have loved to have talked to them about if you had only known? This happened to me recently, and I think it worthy enough to pass along the story.

My wife and I have lived in the same house for over 40 years and when we arrived, the second house to our left was owned by Mr. & Mrs. Murray Harris. I knew that Murray worked for Bell Canada but learned little else about him. In January 1999, he died suddenly. His wife lived in the house for the rest of her life, which was until about five years ago. After she died, their son had the job of cleaning out the house, removing what keepsakes he wanted, and spiffing it up to be sold.

Amongst the chattels in the house, the son found various Second World War naval history books, particularly about the Battle of the Atlantic. He knew that his father had been a radio operator on various ships, and his dad’s collection also included photos from the deck of ships, his patches from his uniforms, and his medals. During COVID, the son undertook to read some of the books, and he noticed that any time HMCS *Spikenard* was mentioned, the associated passages were highlighted. Out of one of the books fell a slip of paper with a sketch of the relative positions of the ships in the convoy and the names of some of the eight who survived the sinking—his father’s name was not one of them. The son, and his mother (Murray’s wife) knew nothing about this sinking or any possible involvement on Murray’s part. Murray would have been 17 years old at the time.

**HMCS *Spikenard***
The Royal Navy ordered the construction of HMS *Spikenard* (K-198) on 22 January 1940 as part of the 1939-1940 Flower-class corvette construction program. Laid down at Davie Shipbuilding & Repairing Co. Ltd., Lauzon, Quebec on 24 February 1940 and launched on 10 August, the ship was commissioned into the Royal Navy on 6 December 1940 at Québec City, Québec. There was urgency to get it and several of its sister ships to Halifax before the St. Lawrence River froze for the winter.¹ On 21 January 1941 the *Spikenard* and two others of its class sailed with Canadian steaming crews² in convoy HX-104. While in transit across the Atlantic, the decision was made not to man the ships with Royal Navy personnel due to the shortage of British sailors.³ There was, however, a surplus of Canadian sailors because other Canadian constructed corvettes were ice-bound in the St. Lawrence until the spring thaw.⁴ This meant that *Spikenard* remained in Canadian hands, and the ship’s steaming crew became its operational crew—albeit with little operational training and without being a cohesive crew.⁵ The temporary arrangement became permanent with an April 1941
decision. On 15 May 1941, HMCS *Spikenard* officially became one of ten corvettes taken over by the Royal Canadian Navy, all of which kept their “flower” names. (Later Canadian corvettes were named after cities and towns.) *Spikenard* was sent to South Shields (down river from Newcastle-upon-Tyne) to get its final equipment, but because of the wartime strain on British shipyards, work progressed slowly. The ship worked up at Tobermory, Scotland, and left on 10 June with convoy OB-332 as a full escort.

![Figure 1: This is HMCS *Windflower* (K-155), but the image shows how HMCS *Spikenard* would have looked before leaving Canada in January 1941. Note no guns or radar. Source: HMCS WINDFLOWER K155 - For Posterity's Sake (forposterityssake.ca) Accessed 23 March 2022.]()  

HMCS *Spikenard* could be differentiated from later Canadian corvettes by its lack of minesweeping gear and the siting of the after-gun tub amidships. Corvettes were fitted with basic SW-1C (Surface Warning 1st Canadian) surface warning radar, notable for its fishbone-like antenna (visible in Figure 2) and reputation for failure in poor weather or in the dark. The set tended to shut down when jarred, as would occur when guns were fired or depth charges exploded. Sea trials had indicated that the SW-1C set could detect a fully surfaced submarine at 2.7 miles; however, German U-boats preferred attacking in a trimmed down mode. Practical experience indicated that the set had the propensity to generate false echoes (e.g., targets on reciprocal bearings), and the long signal pulse of the set, which operated at 200 MHz (1.5-metre wave length), meant that it could detect nothing within a half-mile of the ship. Nevertheless, Canadian authorities would not accept the critical reports from the users at sea about the poor performance, and due to poor liaison, the RCN never realized that the Royal Navy had already introduced a superior radar (271 type) in 1941. It took some circumvention—and insistence by the Royal Navy when the corvettes were to be under its command, as for Operation Torch (the invasion of North Africa)—to allow the much-superior 271-type radar sets to be used.
Convoy SC-67
In late January 1942, convoy SC-67 was the first of the end-to-end convoy escort system (Halifax or Sydney to Newfoundland, Newfoundland to mid-ocean, and mid-ocean to United Kingdom), a system that lasted through to the end of the war. “SC” identified slow convoys (ships capable of 8.5 knots or even less\textsuperscript{15}) typically mustered at Sydney, Nova Scotia, and this particular convoy consisted of 28 ships. *Spikenard* was the unlucky escort of the convoy: of the original convoy that began the crossing, one merchant ship was sunk, one was in a collision and was towed to St. John’s, one went to Iceland, four returned to port, and 21 made the full crossing. Of the escorting vessels, only the *Spikenard* sank.

HMCS *Spikenard* (K-198) was the senior escort (Lt.Cdr. H.G. Shadforth) and one of six corvettes shepherding convoy SC-67 in the Newfoundland to mid-Atlantic portion of the route, commonly called the “Newfie-Derry” run. Once relieved at the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point, the escorts would proceed to Londonderry at a somewhat faster, more economical speed for repairs, fuel, maybe some leave, and then another convoy back.\textsuperscript{16} SC-67 had left Halifax on 30 January, 1942 and Sydney on 2 February 1942,\textsuperscript{17} and had a change of escorting ships southeast of Newfoundland. Though the convoy did not encounter a U-boat attack, it experienced fog and heavy weather until south of Iceland; heavy weather and fog were considered enemies equal to the U-boat threat because merchant ships lacked radar, and the escorts’ SW-1C radar sets were ineffective and of limited range—if they worked at all.\textsuperscript{18} With no lights showing, night navigation in close proximity to other ships (which were also zig-zagging) was a mariner’s nightmare. The merchant ships were in seven columns of
three or four ships spread over a lateral distance of about 1.5 nautical miles (NM),\textsuperscript{19} with three corvettes on the starboard side: \textit{Spikenard} (ahead of the starboard column), \textit{Louisburg} (2000 yards to starboard of the lead ship of the starboard column) and \textit{Dauphin} (about 1 NM astern of the starboard column and 3 NM astern of \textit{Spikenard}). On the port side of the convoy were \textit{Chilliwack}, \textit{Shediac}, and \textit{Lethbridge}, similarly arranged (see Figure 3):

![Figure 3: Sketch of convoy configuration at the time of the attack. [Source: Found in DND Directorate of History & Heritage Library, Ottawa]](image)

At approximately 21:30 on 10 February 1942, the Norwegian ship\textsuperscript{20} M/V \textit{Heina} 4028 GRT (Capt. A.H. Aardahl; see Figure 4) was torpedoed on its port side near #2 hatch.\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Spikenard} was the lead escort ahead of the starboard column\textsuperscript{22} and was struck by another torpedo at about the same time or possibly minutes earlier.\textsuperscript{23} The weather was reported as cloudy and clear horizontally.\textsuperscript{24} The moon was not a factor, since, being well past third-quarter, it rose just before dawn on 11 February.\textsuperscript{25}
Board of Inquiry Report
A Board of Inquiry was convened on 4 March 1942 to investigate what happened. With respect to what happened to the convoy, one must remember that it was still the early days of escorting convoys, before convoy defence doctrine had been worked out and passed down to escort groups through simulator training.27

The corvette HMCS *Chilliwack* (K-131) (Lt. L.F. Foxall, RCNR) was abeam of the leading ship of the port column.28 About the time that *Spikenard* was hit, *Chilliwack* had spotted a surfaced U-boat, lost it, obtained and then lost an ASDIC contact, and continued searching.29 Mountainous seas hid the truth from *Chilliwack*, who believed that only one vessel had been torpedoed.30 The Board of Inquiry report on the sinking of *Spikenard* references (but does not provide) the report of *Chilliwack's* activities with respect to this search.

HMCS *Louisburg* (K-143) (Lt. W.F. Campbell) had been nearest to *Spikenard*, about 1.25 NM away. At about 21:38 *Louisburg* heard the explosions of a pattern of depth charges apparently on the starboard bow.31 An unknown ship (now known to be *Spikenard*) burned furiously for two or three minutes and presumably sank.32 Immediately after the explosions, *Louisburg* gained a firm A/S contact and altered course on that bearing.33 At 21:40, the ship’s crew spotted the wake of a torpedo along its port side about 4 or 5 cables away, which struck a merchant ship approximately one NM on *Louisburg's* port quarter34 a few seconds later.35 It turned to follow the tracks36 and carried out an attack of nine depth charges at 21:46.37 Further sweeps were then carried out, with no visible results to its depth charging38 until 23:10, when course was set to rejoin the convoy.39 During that time, nothing was seen of the torpedoed ship, nor of any lifeboats or survivors.40

HMCS *Dauphin* (K-157) (Lt. R.A.S. McNeil) was astern of the convoy on the starboard side and three miles distant. The Officer of the Watch, Skipper K.L. Lyons, RCNR, saw a ship (the *Spikenard*) about 3 NM distant torpedoed at 21:30.41 Like the *Louisburg*, the *Dauphin* witnessed it sink in about three minutes.42 After arriving on the bridge, the commanding officer and some others on the bridge saw another ship torpedoed.43 All on board thought
that the first ship to be torpedoed was a tanker.\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Dauphin} immediately carried out an anti-submarine sweep along the bearing towards that ship, which was then burning furiously.\textsuperscript{45} In the course of this sweep, it encountered \textit{Heina} down by the head.\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Dauphin} immediately lowered nets and picked up survivors from two lifeboats and one raft,\textsuperscript{47} and stood by until it sank at 00:15, 11 February.\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Heina}'s officers and crew were landed on 13 February at Londonderry, where the captain was taken to hospital. The crews were then sent to Glasgow where the captain, third mate, and first engineer appeared at an inquest on 21 February.\textsuperscript{49}

HMCS \textit{Shediac} (K-110) (Lt. John E. Clayton, RCNR) was on the port side about 2000 yards (one NM) astern of the third column at the time of the explosion.\textsuperscript{50} It closed what it thought was a ship that had been blown up and sinking astern.\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Shediac} swung off at full speed across to the starboard side of the convoy and then astern on a reciprocal course and got a good contact and made an attack.\textsuperscript{52} It then searched in the vicinity but no further contact was made.\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Shediac} then closed on the torpedoed ship where \textit{Dauphin} was standing by, having taken on board the survivors.\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Dauphin} instructed \textit{Shediac} to search further eastward for a second ship that possibly had been torpedoed.\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Shediac} moved down the side of the convoy but didn’t see \textit{Spikenard} or its survivors.\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Shediac} rejoined \textit{Dauphin} and they rejoined the convoy in company.\textsuperscript{57}

HMCS \textit{Lethbridge} (K-160) (Lt. H. Freeland, RCNR) was several miles away, on the port quarter. At approximately 21:30, it heard heavy explosions across the convoy and about five minutes later saw a ship burst into flames.\textsuperscript{58} Not having orders to the contrary, \textit{Lethbridge} remained on station during the whole of the attack.\textsuperscript{59} During this attack, numerous radio transmissions were intercepted from \textit{Dauphin} and \textit{Shediac} to \textit{Spikenard}.\textsuperscript{60} As \textit{Lethbridge} could not raise \textit{Spikenard} by visual signalling, there was no need to pass these signals to \textit{Spikenard}.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{My Interpretation of the Board of Inquiry Information}

My opinion varies slightly from the interpretation offered by the synopsis given above:

- 21:30 \textit{Spikenard} is torpedoed and there is a fire on board. [\textit{Dauphin}] [\textit{Gentian} timed this at 00:34 GMT [sic, more probably “A” (see section on Time Zones)]]
- 21:30 \textit{Chilliwack} visually spots a surfaced U-boat, loses it, gains ASDIC contact and loses it. [\textit{Chilliwack}]
- 21:30 \textit{Lethbridge} hears explosions but stays on station. [\textit{Lethbridge}]
- 21:33 \textit{Spikenard} sinks. [\textit{Dauphin}] [Survivors’ statement to \textit{Gentian}]
- 21:35? \textit{Shediac} crosses stern of convoy then sweeps farther aft, gets an ASDIC contact and attacks. [\textit{Shediac}]
- 21:38 \textit{Louisburg} hears large explosion off starboard bow. [\textit{Louisburg}]
- 21:39 \textit{Louisburg} gains ASDIC contact to starboard and turns to search. [\textit{Louisburg}]
- 21:40 \textit{Louisburg} spots torpedo track 4 or 5 cables to port. Moments later, the torpedo strikes another ship (\textit{Heina}) about 1 mile on port quarter. [\textit{Louisburg}] \textit{Dauphin} sees second ship torpedoed. [\textit{Dauphin}]
- 21:41 \textit{Dauphin} commences sweep towards first torpedoed ship. [\textit{Dauphin}]
- 21:45 \textit{Dauphin} encounters \textit{Heina}, which is down by the head, and engages in rescuing the crew. [\textit{Dauphin}]
- 21:46  *Louisburg* attacks with nine depth charges. [*Louisburg*]
- 22:00?  *Shediac* meets *Dauphin* and *Heina*. *Shediac* told to search farther eastward for second torpedoed ship. Not finding anything, *Shediac* returns to *Heina* & *Dauphin*. [*Shediac*]
- 23:10  *Louisburg* stops searching and heads to rejoin convoy. [*Louisburg*]
- 00:15  *Dauphin* & *Shediac* depart *Heina*, which has just sunk, to rejoin convoy. [*Dauphin & Shediac*]

**The Aftermath**

At 01:30 on 11 February, while still unable to raise *Spikenard* by radio, *Dauphin* sent a signal to Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches and copied to *Spikenard* that it had all the survivors from *Heina* and had stood by for three hours until the ship finally sank. We now know that *Spikenard* could not have replied to any signals because its radio was probably destroyed in the explosion. Though it was hoped that *Spikenard* might be over the horizon on the lookout for the new escort group, dawn brought the grim truth. After daylight, *Dauphin* came alongside the convoy commodore’s ship (SS *Biafra*) to ask how many ships had been torpedoed—the reply was only one. But with two distinct explosions, *Dauphin* realized that the other one must have been *Spikenard*! After the British escorts arrived, *Dauphin* explained the problem to the senior officer on board HNoMS *St. Albans* (I-15), Lt.Cdr. S.V. Storheill, which had arrived at about 10:00 “A”.

**HMS Gentian’s Report**

The corvettes HMS *Honeysuckle* (K-27) and HMS *Gentian* (K-90) (Lt. F.V. Osborne) left Liverpool to join the convoy, and shortly after midnight 10/11 February *Gentian* was about five NM distant. At 00:34Z [sic, but more probably “A”] *Gentian* heard an explosion and saw a fire break out, and then another explosion. At 11:40 “A”, the senior officer on *St. Albans* ordered *Gentian* to conduct a search. At 17:50, after more than six hours of retracing and then searching, and 19 hours for the survivors on the raft, at 56° 07′N, 20° 44′W it came across a merchant-service-type raft with a Carley Float secured alongside with eight survivors—all that were ever found. Given that *Gentian* travelled 95 NM, it found the survivors almost immediately upon arrival in the search area. The survivors pointed out that there was little possibility of other survivors, since both boats had been destroyed by the explosions and they had seen nothing else afloat; nevertheless, *Gentian* searched for two more hours, until dusk. On the completion of crossing (14 February), *Gentian* landed the eight survivors at Gladstone Dock, Liverpool, and four were taken to hospital at Seaforth (just outside Liverpool).

**Survivors’ Statements**

The Commanding officer of HMS *Gentian* filed a report of interviews with the eight survivors. *Spikenard* had been zigzagging ahead of the convoy at 80 rev.s throttle, and for 10 to 15 minutes had been hearing what sounded like depth charges exploding. A few minutes before it was attacked, the ship increased speed to 120 rev.s and the “Action Stations” bell was rung just as the ship was hit. The survivors agreed that the torpedo hit near the wardroom, or the stokers’ flat, but they could not agree on which side of the ship. Most of the damage occurred on the port side, where part of the ship’s side and the deck at the break of the forecastle was blown away. Because the gasoline stored in a drum below the bridge (lashed to the mast) exploded, a fire immediately broke out from there to the funnel and engulfed the
Because depth charges had been dropped in the preceding ten minutes, men were expecting the call to Action Stations and were waiting in the space between the forecastle and bridge at the time that the torpedo hit directly underneath them. This accounts partly for the large loss of life. As well, Spikenard never transmitted any emergency signal of any type; there was no time. The ship sank in about three to five minutes at 56° 10′ N, 21° 07′ W, about 435 NM due south of Iceland. It went down headfirst and, just before sinking, another explosion occurred, attributed either to a boiler or a depth charge. (As one of the men reported that the depth charges were always kept set at “safe,” it was probably a boiler.) Spikenard disappeared entirely before Dauphin reached its location, and Dauphin’s attention was drawn by the flaming Heina. Survivors heard a number of other men shouting but could not find them. The men who had escaped from the mess deck had to run through flames after coming out of the door, and fell into the water where the deck had been blown away. Some clambered back onto the ship; others swam round to the after part of the ship to the Carley Float, which was then in the water. Originally, the raft held ten people, but two succumbed to the cold and their injuries. The survivors were not clothed properly for exposure to the February waters and air temperature of the North Atlantic, so the men removed the clothing of the dead men before they were buried at sea and retained the extra clothing for themselves. The survivors saw the dark shape of Shediac go past but, without flares or lights, they had no way of drawing attention to their location.

**Time Zone Identification**

The various documents in the files reveal that different time zones were being used and/or reported in the record, which can confuse the narrative. If Spikenard’s sinking occurred at or near the half-hour, the times reported are 21:30 (Board of Inquiry), 22:30 (Sketch, Figure 3 and press release,), 23:30 (1957 Report by the Office the Naval Historian), and 00:34 “A” (Report of Proceedings and Attack on Convoy SC-67 when MV Heina and HMS Spikenard were Torpedoed—dated 14 February 1942). From these various times, I conclude that 23:30 represents GMT, 00:34 “A” represents British Summer Time—which was in use in Britain at the time—and 21:30 represents the local time zone for 20°W—i.e., GMT-2 hours. A radio transmission stated that the sinking was at 23:30 GMT, confirming the recorded time zone as GMT-2 hours.

The reports provide the estimated positions of various ships as follows:

- **Chilliwack** 56° 06′ N, 21° 10′ W
- **Dauphin** 56° 09′ N, 21° 05′ W
- **Lethbridge** 56° 05′ N, 21° 13′ W
- **Louisburg** 56° 08′ N, 21° 08′ W
- **Shediac** 56° 06′ N, 21° 22′ W
- **Spikenard (sinking)** 56° 10′ N, 21° 07′ W as per Board of Inquiry Report
- **Spikenard (sinking)** 56° 06′ N, 20° 39′ W as per a R/T communication
- **Survivors picked up** 56° 16′ N, 20° 39′ W as per Report of Proceedings and Attack on Convoy SC-67 when MV Heina and HMS Spikenard were Torpedoed—dated 14 February 1942
- **Survivors picked up** 56° 07′ N, 20° 44′ W as per HMS Gentian’s report
- **Heina (sinking)** 56° 05′ N, 20° 54′ W

As can be seen in the plot of the corvettes’ eventual positions below (Figure 5), they do not
reflect their arrangement around the convoy as per the sketch in Figure 3. *Chilliwack*, *Shediac*, and *Lethbridge* were on the port (northerly) side of the convoy, in that order east to west, and *Spikenard*, *Louisburg*, and *Dauphin* were on the starboard side (southerly) of the convoy, again east to west. To me as a surveyor, it seems that each ship had been keeping its own Dead Reckoning over the previous 10 days or so, and the errors involved in the various DR positions are reasonable. *Heina*'s position might have been determined by *Dauphin* three hours after the former's torpedoing.

![Figure 5: A plot of the positions of the five corvettes at the time of the attack on HMCS *Spikenard*, its sinking (2 locations), where *Gentian* rescued the survivors, and the location where *Heina* was sunk.](image)

Information gleaned from various websites tell us a few vital facts:
- All officers and crew on *Heina* were rescued.\(^{85}\)
- There were two U-boats in the area of the convoy that night: *U-591* and *U-136*.\(^{86}\) One was spotted by *Chilliwack*; the other was detected by *Louisburg*.
- *Spikenard* and *Heina* were probably attacked by the submarine detected by *Louisburg*, as per the sketch in Figure 3.

Based on information in the Board of Inquiry Report, other titbits of information can be added to the picture:
- The sun set at 18:16 GMT on 10 February.\(^{87}\) The sinking would have been five hours, 15 minutes after sunset and 9½ hours before sunrise, based on 23:30 GMT as the time of the sinking. Thus, there was not even twilight conditions at the time of the attack.
- Given the position of the meet as 56° 26′N, 18° 30′W, the effective course and speed of the convoy since the attacks was 6.7 knots at 079°.\(^{88}\) The mean course is consistent with...
the Report, which stated that the course was 081°. The speed is consistent with the parameters of a slow convoy.

- Once the survivors were picked up, *Gentian* would have taken more than 17 hours to catch up with the convoy.
- *Gentian* complained that it did not know the radio call signs of the Canadian ships.90
- There is an indication that the German U-boats might have been using the call sign for *Spikenard* on 425 KHz as a homing target for other submarines.91

**Recommendations offered from the sinking**

There were five recommendations from “Comprehensive Notes on the Loss of *Spikenard*”92 that might have helped save lives later in the war:

- Spare white rockets should be carried in a position far removed from the bridge so that they can be fired if the bridge is knocked out.
- Lifesaving rafts and Carley Floats should be provided for the whole ship’s company at least, since boats can seldom be used.
- All securing pendants of rafts and floats should be secured by hemp lanyards with knives or axes available, and not by slips.
- Some improved methods should be adopted for drawing attention to rafts and floats, including flares.
- The hatch from the upper to the lower messdecks in corvettes should be made watertight.

Also, it was recommended that P/O H.J. Laabs RCNVR (the senior ranking survivor) should get special mention for his resourcefulness and fortitude. Whether this or any of the other recommendations were acted upon is unknown to me.

**The adversary?**

*U-136* (KL H. Zimmermann93) was a Type VIIC U-boat of Nazi Germany’s Kriegsmarine laid down at Vulkan-Vegesackerwerft in Bremen on 2 October 1940, launched on 5 July 1941, commissioned on 30 August, and operational on 1 January 1942 with the 6th flotilla. *U-136* is credited with sinking five ships, with a total of 23,649 gross register tons (GRT) and two warships totalling 1,850 tons. It sank *Spikenard* on its first patrol. On 11 July 1942, while on its third patrol, *U-136* was sunk with all hands (45 men) west of Madeira by depth charges from the Free French destroyer *Léopard*, frigate HMS *Spey*, and sloop HMS *Pelican*.94

**Casualties and survivors**

57 officers and sailors of *Spikenard*, including the commanding officer Lt.Cdr. Hubert G. Shadforth, the senior officer of the escort group, perished.95 The “Report of Proceedings and Attack on Convoy SC-67 when MV *Heina* and HMS *Spikenard* were Torpedoed—dated 14 February 1942”96 gives the names of the survivors:

Those landed at Hotel Liverpool on Saturday, 14 February:

- Alexander Albert Day (34), ERA (V/5825), of Verdun, Québec
- Harold James Laabs (32), P.O. Stoker (V/16182) born at Pembroke, Ontario
- Reginald (“Red”) MacMillan (22), Stoker (V/1328) of Mount Stewart, PEI
George Anderson Morrison (22), Stoker 1st Class, (V/25797), of Pictou, Nova Scotia; Morrison died 2 October, 1942 and is buried at Haliburton Cemetery, Pictou County, N.S. 

Those sent to the Royal Naval Auxiliary Hospital Seaforth suffering from burns, but not seriously injured:
- Wilfred Edward Mills (23), Telegraphist, (V/22962), born April 1918
- John (“Jack”) Lindley Whitworth (22), Signalman, (V/8411), born at Connah’s Quay, Wales and moved to Canada when he was six years old
- Denis Hugh Cowan, A.B. (V/6481), A.B., of Halifax, later of Laurentian View (Ottawa), Ontario
- Thomas Russell Deans, L/SMN, (3212), of Esquimalt, BC

Murray Vincent Harris

The question remained in my mind, and in Murray’s son’s mind: had Murray Harris been aboard Spikenard and was therefore a survivor? From his enlistment papers, Murray was born on 23 July 1922 at Saint John, New Brunswick. However, he had actually been born two years later, on 23 July 1924, to Frank Ernest Harris & Mary Helen McCarthy. So, indeed, he was underage when he enlisted on 4 June 1940. At the time of Spikenard’s sinking (February 1942), he had gained the rank of “Able Seaman” and was stationed at HMCS Avalon II (ex-passenger steamer Georgian), a floating barracks at St. John’s Newfoundland. In fact, Murray was stationed there from 18 November 1941 until 21 April 1943. Elsewhere in his Certificate of Service, it is stated that he served on HMCS Kenogami (Flower-class corvette), HMCS Winnipeg (minesweeper), HMCS Bowmanville (Castle-class corvette), and took trans-Atlantic passage on HMS Loring (frigate). He also served at various shore establishments as far afield as Greenock, Scotland, Derry, North Ireland, and Portland, England. He became a Leading Seaman and a telegraphist, earned a Good Conduct Service badge, and at the end of the war was awarded the following medals:

- 1939-45 Star: 180 days in an operational theatre
- Atlantic Star: six months’ service (3 Sept 1939–7 May 1945) in the Atlantic or home (UK) waters
- Defence Medal: six months’ service in a non-operational theatre, subject to air attack or threatened
- Canadian Volunteer Service Medal (CVSM) & Clasp: 19 months’ service in Canadian Armed Forces, clasp for 60 days’ voluntary service outside Canada
- War Medal: 28 days service during Second World War

Murray’s annual appraisals said that he was of “very good” character and he was “satisfactory” at his rank at those times.

After the war, Murray went to university, studied engineering, married, moved to Montreal to work in the Bell Canada planning division, and was eventually transferred to Ottawa. As a pastime, he took up dinghy sailing and teaching navigation for the Canadian Power Squadron.
Murray’s interest in *Spikenard* might have been because two crew members who perished in the sinking were from Saint John:

- John Walter Connor (V/2408) Stoker 1st Class, age 24
- William John Seaman (V/2412) Stoker 1st Class, age 22

The similarity of their respective enlistment numbers is worth noting, as well as their hometown: Murray’s number is V/2404. In all probability, the three of them would have been in basic training together at Saint John from 4 June 1940 to 21 August 1940, and possibly at HMCS *Stadacona* and training ship *Reindeer* from then until 5 April 1941, when Murray was posted to HMCS *Kenogami*, although it’s also possible that Connor and Seaman were part of *Spikenard’s* original steaming crew that left Halifax on 21 January 1941. It may be that, in reading and underlining passages, drawing maps, and collecting evidence, Murray was tracing the last few hours of his friends.

**Spikenard** remembered

*Spikenard* is remembered permanently at the Crow’s Nest Officers’ Club in St. John’s Newfoundland. The club was established as a “‘Seagoing Officers Club” on 27 January 1942 (mere days before *Spikenard* sailed to escort SC-67) as a hideaway for seagoing naval officers of the escort ships for the convoys. It was situated in a secure space in the old Butler Building near the waterfront as a place where naval officers could talk freely, discuss tactics, bond, and “let their hair down.” On its opening night, a competition sprang up of who could drive a spike into the floor with the fewest number of hammer strokes. LtCdr Shadforth of *Spikenard* won, and that spike is still honoured at the Club as the “Spikenard Spike.”

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https://tridentnewspaper.com/battle-atlantic-hmcs-spikenard/
www.forposterityssake.ca/Navy/HMCS_SPIKENARD_K198.htm
https://www.warsailors.com/singleships/heina.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMCS_Algoma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-136_(1941)

Other books with information about HMCS Spikenard

Endnotes
7 The 10 Canadian “Flowers” were: HMCS Eyebright, Fennel, Hepatica, Arrowhead, Mayflower, Spikenard, Trillium, Snowberry, Windflower, and Bittersweet.
Some secondary references describe *Heina* as a tanker, possibly because of the fire on one of the torpedoeships. I say not so because of this photo, the description that she was torpedoed at #2 hatch and that she was carrying 7700 T of general cargo. Also, tankers were usually placed near the centre of the convoy rather than at the outside edge. The Board of Inquiry report makes no mention of a fire on MV *Heina*.


Personal calculation based on Internet applications.


Readers are encouraged to read *A Game of Birds and Wolves* by Simon Parkin (2020)

Board of Inquiry Report.
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Report of Proceedings and Attack on Convoy SC-67 when MV Heina and HMS Spikenard were Torpedoed – dated 14 February 1942. One died at 5 a.m. and the other at 11 a.m. (Regina newspaper of 27 Feb. 1942)


Permanent Reference File: *Spikenard*, HMCS.

R/T from CinC Western Approaches @ 2358 GMT 18 Feb., 1942. [In RG24-D-12. Volume 11930, File 1156-331-100]


Personal calculation using Internet application for 56° 10′N, 21° 07′W.

Board of Inquiry Report.

Personal calculation.

Comprehensive notes on the loss of *Spikenard*.

Naval Message of 10 March 1942 to Capt. D Nfld. et al from FONF.

Found in Permanent Reference File: *Spikenard*, HMCS.


A full listing of the casualties can be found in Fraser McKee & Robert Darlington, *The Canadian Naval Chronicle 1939-1945*, p. 48.

Found in Permanent Reference File: *Spikenard*, HMCS.


National Archives of Canada, Attestation Form of Murray Vincent Harris (V/2404).


"Wae, hae, blow the man down": Work songs and their response to changes in context
by William Sayers

It is unlikely that any of us has experienced a sea shanty in its original milieu. Whatever the contextual adaptability of work songs, technology rapidly made them irrelevant as steam and other power replaced the onerous physical labor of hauling on ships' lines and winding anchor cables. We recognize the once popular refrain "Way hey blow the man down ... Give me some time to blow the man down!" but would be hard put to say just what is going on. An affective mood is created but not a picture. The historical ins and outs of this bit of work song are in an even more distant past. The hey-day of shanty recording, collection, and research lay between about 1900 and the 1960s, although important advances in the study of origins date to more recent decades. (Of this, more later.) The generally received idea of shanties is that they were sung by a lead singer and a responding crew of working seamen to a flexible combination of traditional verses, floating refrains from within the general shanty repertoire, and verses improvised in the immediate circumstances or peculiar to individual shantymen. The resulting songs were of indefinite length, matched to the collective work at hand. It seems profitless to attempt to identify an "original" or a subsequent standard version.

Refrains were also customary and need not have immediate relevance to any storyline that emerges in the soloist's singing. The shanty "Blow the Man Down" is a case in point. "Blow the Man Down" has been categorized as a long-drag shanty with two pulls per chorus, as sung to the work of hauling on halyards to hoist topsail or topgallant yards. The best-known version deals with a British ship of the Bull Line. A popular understanding of its refrain is summarized in the Oxford English Dictionary thusly:

The lyric "Blow the man down" most likely refers to a common mishap at sea during the age of sail wherein a strong, sudden gale catches a ship with its topsails fully set – the force of the wind, depending upon the load and balance of the ship's cargo, can actually "blow the man down", or blow the Man o' war down into the water, partially capsizing it. When this occurs during a violent storm, the result is almost always a loss of the ship, however there are techniques for righting the vessel in relatively calm positions (cutting free the sails and rigging dragging in the water). This might be judged a literalist explanation—each word of the refrain charged with its basic, most common meaning—with, however, man a proxy for the fuller man o' war. This hypothesis exhibits several weaknesses. Firstly, the refrain, as sung by the sailor chorus, has little explicit relevance to the situation and events of the soloist's narrative, although it allows for the possibility of an unanchored phrase somehow colouring a general situation. Secondly, the authoritative Sailor's Word-Book of Admiral William Smyth, from the end of the Age of Sail, has no entry for blow in the context of capsizing from an excess of wind in the topsails. Thirdly, the injunction, imperative, or signal to the crew to "blow the man down" is to an action well beyond their power, although we must allow for some rhetorical license. Fourthly, chanties were not permitted in the British navy, ostensibly on the grounds of not muffling the officers' commands and boatswain's signals but more likely to deny the sailors anything like a collective voice, the possible source of mutinous thoughts. Concurrently, man and -man were used of ships generally (e.g., merchantman), not exclusively of fighting ships. Finally, most tellingly, toward the end of the best-known version, the shanty has the soloist Jimmie crying "We'll blow the man up and blow the man down" and the sailors subsequently responding:
Then we'll blow the man up.
And we'll blow the man down.
Go way, way, blow the man down.
We'll blow him right over to Liverpool town.
Oh give us some time to blow the man down.  

While "blowing up" might refer to artillery fire in the case of naval vessels, it cannot be plausibly ascribed to the crew in relation to their own merchant ship. Some other collective ship-board activity is clearly being referenced here, as noted above one most plausibly related to hoisting and lowering yards and sails.

This renewed inquiry into the source of the phrase "blow the man down" begins with "the man". The two most evident readings are man as a merchant ship and man as an individual member of the crew, as I explore in more detail below. Three distinct uses of the verb blow warrant attention. A now-obsolete meaning of blow was 'to blossom' and one could see the raising and unfurling of the sail as comparable to a blossoming flower "blowing up". But there is no equivalent botanical image, "blowing down", for its wilting and loss of petals. Mining operations offer a second use of blow with reference to bringing down coal or stone with gunpowder but there is no comparable use with up. The effects of cannon and an exploding powder magazine can be described in terms of blowing up and down, but again this is far from merchant sailors' collective work. A third specialized use of blow is met in smelting and foundry work, in which a furnace might be blown up with bellows and blown down to cool off. Note the OED entry for this technical use: "Blow, a single heat or operation of the Bessemer converter". Yet a transfer of terminology between metallurgy and sailing seems unlikely, nor can there by any true analogy with sail-handling, although the generation of power, be it in the form of heat or propulsion originating in human labor, is common to both operations.

Another lead in this inquiry is blows as a plural noun recorded in the English Dialect Dictionary with the meaning "affairs, things to be done, in phr. full of blows". The recorded evidence, however, is sparse and we should have to assume for blow a transfer from nominal to verbal status. Many collective ship-board activities might be put under this heading. These recurrent work passes can be imagined as coming in short bursts not unlike gusts of wind, thus giving the term overtones of the wind itself. The verb work offers an analogy of such multi-purpose use of common verbs, e.g., "to work something in, out, up". "Blowing the man down" could represent completion of task(s), resulting in an optimal degree of "shipshapedness".

In the foregoing discussion, the working hypothesis has been that man referred to the ship. But what if man here stands for seaman? English dialect records the use of the verb blow in the phrases "blow on" and "blow up" in reference to signals, e.g., a whistle or fife, for men to return to work. A comparable "blow down" can be interpreted as the signal, communicated by a whistle or fife, to cease work (cf. Admiral Smyth's naval "pipe down: The order to dismiss the men from the deck when a duty has been performed on board ship"). Yet the dominance of "blow down" in the shanty, understood as laying off shipboard labor, would seems at odds with effective ship-board activity, unless the sails had been set for rapid progress or the crew was looking forward to coming into port with its resulting shore leave. The subtext of the chantey would then be "Haul away and let's get this job done".

A major advance in shanty research occurred in the early twentieth century, although the evidence then adduced had been known since the first decades of the nineteenth. African work songs, associated with such collective activity as paddling, and their derivatives among enslaved labourers in southern US ports and the Caribbean are now seen as determining the nineteenth-century British combination of collective labour and musical activity, what would emerge as the chanty tradition and repertoire. Surprising to many, perhaps, is evidence that points toward cotton plantations as a
Intermediaries are also a useful concept in tracing the origin and development of chanty lyrics and their refrains. As for "Blow the Man Down", James Carpenter has collected thirty versions or, rather, iterations, since the spread and period of popularity of any one iteration can often not be determined. The earliest dates to about 1854. The refrain also existed in a number of variant forms. To give a sequence in anticipation of the argument that is to follow, these include "We'll blow a man down and we'll knock a man down" and "To me, way, hey, blow the man down! and when he is down we will kick him around." Carpenter proposes that knock was the "original" operative verb in the refrain and would trace it to enslaved Black workers accustomed to violent interpersonal physical action, an action in which they were both victim and agent. But how or why would knock evolve into blow and, in such a development, to what would blow refer? Although this is largely speculation, I suggest that what became the trend-setting refrain was originally the work order to "block the man down", that is, to screw the bales of cotton into the hold of the ship for an optimal load size and distribution that would entirely "block" the cargo area. "Roll the man down" has also been recorded, albeit from 1908, and may originate in this stage of the lading process. Among Black workers engaged in this and other "upstream" activities such as the cultivation and initial baling of cotton at the plantations, the refrain substituted knock for block. In other marine environments with their diverse tasks, the verb took a different phonetic turn and block became blow. In a listing intended to follow the teleology of shipboard activity, blow was the object of recontextualization and resemanticization. With down, it recalled the rough discipline of marine labour. It echoed blows as "work to be done", while also referring to the activity of the complementary force, the wind. It conjured up the sharp exhalation of breath that accompanied the pulls on the halyard. In addition, as blow up and blow down, it referenced the whistle or fife signal to begin or break off work. Chanties are not necessarily internally consistent, nor consistent across the genre, and the refrain and blowing the man down share this flexibility and rich field of reference.

In all of this, man could be both the human crew member and the ship itself. In this general situation of vocabulary moving between humans and nautical gear, a longish version of the shanty recorded in 1879 replicates this equation on a lesser scale. There are instances of the body parts of the sailor on shore leave, and his female friend or male rival being equated with ship's parts (e.g., "She was round in the counter and bluff in the bow ... So I tailed her my flipper and took her in tow / And yardarm to yardarm away we did go"). And concerning the last details: the 'wae hae' of the refrain doubtless reflects a more conventionally spelled 'weigh, hey!', which is composed on a common template that first names the action to be performed—here weighing or hoisting—followed by the signal 'hey!' to initiate the joint action (cf. 'heave ho!). Blow then accompanied the pull itself.

This review of the available evidence for the chanty refrain "blow the man down" discredits the popular explanation that the verb blow implicated overfilled topsails that led to a vessel's capsizing, a nautical disaster in which the hard-working crew would somehow have been merrily involved. In preference to this literalist folk etymology, a plausible origin is identified in the work song traditions of enslaved Africans in America and the Caribbean, and in the ship-lading operation of cotton-screwing or packing bales. From this, other spheres of application were soon found, prime among which was hauling yards and topsails. Of the various contexts of blow and man, the dominant one for the crew seems to have been work orders, communicated by the mate's whistle, and for the ship, optimally set...
sails that ensured rapid passage to its destination. The investigation of this bit of the nautical cultural heritage (from an original on-shore matrix) illustrates the adaptability of larger language units than mere individual words as the surrounding social and economic context changes, although technological development can rapidly make both technique and its terminology irrelevant. Fortunately, historical research, the reconstruction of artisanal techniques, re-enactments, even popular entertainment (Pirates of the Caribbean) all contribute to revivifying the maritime past.

Endnotes

1 For a general introduction, see William Main Doerfinger, Songs of the Sailor and Lumberman (New York: Macmillan, 1990).


8 OED, s.v. man o’war, 2a.


10 OED, s.v. blow, n. 4; “Instead of blows of three or four tons, we have now to deal with twelve to fifteen tons,” Daily News, 20 September, 1883, 2/1.

11 EDD, vol. 1, 308, s.v. blow, 19. The dictionary also lists shanty as a local pronunciation of jaunty, thus shantyman, a man who was “jaunty, flashy, gay, stylish” (EDD), qualities associated with successful lead singers of chanties. But this is surely a fortuitous resemblance; EDD, vol. 5, 357, s.v. shanty.

12 EDD, vol. 1, p. 309, s.v. blow, 19.


15 "Roll the man down" - Percy Grainger, ethnographic wax cylinders - World and traditional music | British Library - Sounds, https://sounds.bl.uk/.


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Command Badge Policy
On 16 September 1965, a memorandum by Commodore F.B. Caldwell, Secretary Defence Staff, recommended that a badge for each Command should be designed “if we wish to emphasize the theme of integration in our command structures.” At the 157th Defence Council Meeting on 20 September 1965, the proposed Mobile Command badge was discussed and it was decided that for Command badges “some measure of uniformity and coordination was desirable and necessary.” The Minister of National Defence (MND), the Honourable Paul Hellyer requested a report from the Commanders of the other Commands regarding badges. This report was sent to the Minister on 27 September 1965 and stated the current practices and opinions regarding Command badges. Clarification was given that, in that report, the term “badge” described formal badges which needed Royal Approval and the term “insignia” meant less formal badges which could be approved by the Department of National Defence (DND). Regarding current practices, the Navy and Army did not have a Command badge while the Air Force, which was composed of Air Transport Command, Air Defence Command and 1 Air Division, did. However, the Army was using identifying insignia on items such as vehicle flags and vehicle markings. It was noted that Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, Rear Admiral W.M. Landymore and Flag Officer Pacific Coast, Rear Admiral M.G. Stirling each had a badge which they intended to continue using. The report concluded that “it would appear that at the present time the new integrated Commands are thinking of an ‘insignia’ rather than the more formal ‘badge’.”

CDS (Chief of the Defence Staff) Meeting 25/66 on 28 July 1966 stated that Field Commands were “authorized to adopt, if desired, distinctive command insignia for operational clothing and for the marking of vehicles.” As per this meeting, it was decided on 24 August 1966 that Command badges would be worn only on operational clothing which included combat clothing, bush clothing, flying suits, aircraft technicians’ coveralls and sailors’ working dress. The memorandum noted that “not all personnel in any Command will wear the Command badge and in some Commands, very few personnel will wear Command insignia.” However, five days later on the 29th, authorization was given to wear Command badges on non-operational clothing as well. He also noted that the “[w]earing of insignia on combat clothing is under consideration” although this had already been approved on 24 August 1966.

A memorandum on 12 October 1966 by Air Marshal E.M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel (CP), recommended a number of guidelines to be followed for designing Command insignia. He stated that, due to the multi-purpose nature of Command insignia, “a certain amount of versatility, and compatibility between designs is required.” At this time, both Mobile Command and Materiel Command had created badges using “symbolic/functional themes as opposed to heraldic” and this was considered to be the most appropriate action. Air Marshal Reyno suggested that “[n]o letters, names or mottoes should be included in the
design.” As well, the insignia’s background should be white unless another colour was particularly significant to the Command and the remaining colours of the badge should be restricted to red, green, purple, blue, black, gold/yellow and silver/white unless otherwise approved. The badge should also be simple, easily recognized even when miniaturized or in black and white, and a distinctive shape. These guidelines were approved by the CDS on 19 October 1966, and sent to the Commands on 27 October 1966. Before formal instructions regarding the use of Command badges were issued, Air Commodore R.C. Weston, Director General Administration (DGA) noted that the badges could be used “for purposes such as on invitations, greeting or visiting cards, menus, for displays, or on plaques and furnishings. It could also be used as a badge on blazers or coats and on shirts or sweaters of competitive or representative Command team members.” By 7 March 1967, each Command had a badge approved; suggested wear was to be on the right breast pocket of the new uniform.

With the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces on 1 February 1968, it was decided that a badge requiring Royal Approval was needed for each Command. As noted in a letter from General (Gen) J.V. Allard, CDS to Lieutenant-General (Lt-Gen) W.A.B. Anderson, Commander Mobile Command on 31 July 1968, sent on 6 August, the Command badge frame was approved by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in June of that year. The frame was heraldically described as:

In front of two sprigs of stylized maples leaves, slipped and tied at base, resting on a motto ribbon, a round gold edged panel featuring a rope design. The whole surmounted by the St. Edward’s Crown (Image A).

The significance of its components was explained as follows:

a. The Crown is emblematic of the relationship of the Canadian Armed Forces to the Sovereign as Queen of Canada.
b. The sprigs of maples leaves in stylized design approved for the National Flag of Canada provides distinctive Canadian identity.

Gen Allard also stated that “[t]he devices from the centre of the previously approved badges are being incorporated in the new frame.”
The Maritime Command Badge

The Maritime Command (MARCOM) badge evolved from the badge of Atlantic and Pacific Commands, the development of which began in 1959. In June 1959, Rear Admiral (RAdm) Hugh F. Pullen, Flag Officer Atlantic Coast (FOAC) requested a distinct badge for the Atlantic Command to differentiate between Maritime Command as a whole and Atlantic Command. RAdm Pullen wanted the badge design to be simple and representative of the co-operation between sea and air power. E.C. Russell, the Naval Historian, recommended either “a winged anchor on a blue field or perhaps a winged monster from mythology on a bary [sic] wavy field.” He noted that the naval crown would not be accepted by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), so possibly the maple leaf crown, devised by Alan Beddoe, could be used instead. Russell also suggested that the Pacific Command could use the same badge.

On 22 September 1959, the Acting Naval Secretary, Captain (Capt) Steven A. Clemens wrote to RAdm Pullen informing him that the Commands Atlantic and Pacific were to each receive a badge and asking for his remarks on the suggested badge. A sample of the proposed badge was attached and consisted of three elements: an anchor, wings and the maple leaf crown. These devices were to symbolize the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the RCAF as a component of the RCN, and service to Canada. The Naval Secretary explained the design as follows:

The Navy anchor is separate from the Air Force wings, suggesting that these are two distinct Services. Being interlaced indicates that they are functioning as one Unit or are co-operating together in a common purpose. The coronet suggests that it is an official body. The maple leaves in the coronet symbolize Canada. The blue background refers to the sea.

The anchor and coronet were gold while the wings were argent (silver) or white; Capt Clemens noted that the wings could also be in gold (Image B).
RAdm Pullen responded to Capt Clemens on 14 October 1959. He approved the design except for a few minor revisions. RAdm Pullen suggested that the border, instead of reading “Maritime Commander Atlantic/Pacific,” should be “Maritime Command Atlantic/Pacific” and the lettering should be blue or gold on a white background. As well, the shape of the anchor was considered unsuitable and the badge should be surmounted by the St. Edward’s Crown to represent MARCOM as part of Her Majesty’s Canadian Forces.21 Flag Officer Pacific Coast (FOPC), RAdm Herbert S. Rayner22 sent his concurrence of the proposed design and RAdm Pullen’s suggestions to Capt Clemens on 6 November 1959.23

On 11 December 1959, however, Capt Clemens informed both Flag Officers that another badge design had been suggested. This new design consisted of an eagle over a fouled anchor, cable knotted on the left of the ring, looping once around the shank and ending behind the left arm, both in gold. The annulus read “Maritime Command Atlantic/Pacific,” the words separated by a maple leaf, and the whole surmounted by the St. Edward’s Crown. The background of the badge was to be either white or light blue, whichever the Commanders preferred; the sketch, however, was in black and white (Image C).24

RAdm Pullen approved of this design except for the anchor, recommending that “[t]he stock should be illustrated separate to the shank (not as a single casting) and when in position lies at right angles to the arms; in perspective, therefore, if the left end of the stock is to the front, the right arm should be pointed to the rear.” He also stated his preference for the light blue background.25 RAdm Rayner concurred with RAdm Pullen’s comments.26 This proposed
badge was heraldically described as:

Azure, a wooden-stocked anchor, foul of its cable, dexter fluke and sinister stock-arm foremost, debruised by an eagle volant affrontée, the head turned to sinister, all Or; the whole within a bordure of Navy Blue fimbriated within and without Gold and inscribed in the same with the words MARITIME COMMAND (above the device) and ATLANTIC [or PACIFIC] (below), the last word set off by a maple leaf, of the last, before and after; all ensigned with St. Edward's Crown.

The blue of the badge was to represent the sea while the anchor and eagle represented cooperation between the RCN and the RCAF. The maple leaves and crown symbolized service to Her Majesty's Canadian Forces (Image D).27 E.C. Russell explained that the anchor was described in detail because heraldry is normally two dimensional.28

On 17 March 1960, the proposed Commands Atlantic and Pacific badge, already approved by the RCN, was recommended for approval by the RCAF;29 this approval was given on 22 March 1960.30 On 27 July 1960, the proposed Atlantic Command and Pacific Command badges were sent to the Governor General, General the Right Honourable Georges P. Vanier for his approval; if he approved the badge, it was requested he then send it to Her Majesty the Queen for her consent. The letter noted that the badges had already been approved by Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral H.G. DeWolf; Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell; and Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Douglas S. Harkness.31 The approval process for these badges did not go through the Clarenceux King of Arms, Sir John Heaton-Armstrong, as it normally would due to the “rather unique dual service status” of Commands Atlantic and Pacific.32 On 8 August
1960, a letter from Government House expressed Her Majesty the Queen’s approval of the Atlantic Command and Pacific Command badges, referred to as Joint Service Badges. A letter on 1 December 1966 outlined that, although fuller instructions would be issued later, the badges could be used “on visiting or greeting cards, invitations, menus, for displays, or on plaques and furnishings. It could also be used as a badge on blazers or coats and on the shirts or sweaters of competitive or representative Command team members.”

With the approval of the Command badge frame in June 1968, a MARCOM badge needed to be approved within the new frame; prior to this, MARCOM did not have its own badge. In a letter on 31 July 1968, sent on 9 August, Gen Allard, CDS, requested Maritime Commander, RAdm J.C. O’Brien’s approval or remarks regarding the proposed badge before it was to be submitted to Her Majesty the Queen. The MARCOM badge was heraldically described as:

Azure, a wooden-stocked anchor, foul of its cable, dexter fluke and sinister stock-arm foremost, debruised by an eagle volant affronté, the head turned to sinister, all Or.

The badge’s significance was also explained:

The blue field refers to the sea, and the combination of the anchor and eagle to the co-operation between the sea and air elements in the pursuit of the enemy in that element.

“Ready, Aye, Ready” was confirmed as MARCOM’s motto; this motto had been suggested on 14 June 1968 when it was noted that MARCOM did not yet have one. RAdm O’Brien responded on 28 August 1968, indicating his concurrence with the proposed badge. It is important to note that the MARCOM badge adopted its central device from the badges of Atlantic Command and Pacific Command.

Maritime Command was officially formed on 1 December 1971 by Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) 9.0; however, the Command was first formally created on 17 January 1966. With the unofficial creation of MARCOM, Commands Atlantic and Pacific became subordinate commands. Pacific Command became Maritime Forces Pacific (MAR-PAC) on 1 December 1971 as per CFOO 9.6 while the powers of Atlantic Command were transferred to MARCOM by CFOO 9.0. As Atlantic Command and Pacific Command ceased to exist, MARCOM adopted the central device of their badge as its own. A letter from RAdm O’Brien on 18 July 1967 informed HMC Dockyard Halifax Commander, Commodore W.B. Christie that the design of the previous “Maritime Command” badge, meaning the one used by Commands Atlantic and Pacific, was to be adopted as a badge for “Commander Maritime Command,” meaning a badge for MARCOM as a whole. Presumably a similar message was sent to FOPC, RAdm J.A. Charles. As Commands Pacific and Atlantic changed designations, they were no longer entitled to their former badges.

On 6 September 1968, MND, the Honourable Leo Cadieux sent a letter to the Governor General, the Right Honourable Roland Michener, requesting he approve of the MARCOM badge and motto and, if so, send it to Her Majesty the Queen. A letter stating Royal Approval for the MARCOM badge was received on 23 September 1968; however, the official painting was dated for June of that year (Image E). Although an official badge was
sanctioned for MARCOM in 1968, the Command was not formed until 1 December 1971 by CFOO 9.0. 46


The MARCOM badge continued to be used until 2016. Ministerial Organization Order (MOO) 2011072, issued on 12 August 2011, altered the name of Maritime Command to “Royal Canadian Navy” and it was requested that its badge be amended to reflect this change. 47

Endnotes

1 Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 1060-9963 vol. 1, S1810-2 (DSecDS), memorandum, from F.B. Caldwell Commodore, Secretary Defence Staff, Badge – Mobile Command, 16 September 1965.


3 DHH, 1060-9963 vol. 1, P1150-4110/C35 (CP), memorandum, from K.L. Dyer Vice Admiral signed for F.R. Miller Air Chief Marshal, Chief of the Defence Staff, Command Badges and Insignia, 27 September 1965. The terms “Navy,” “Army,” and “Air Force” were used in the document, which was heavily based upon a memorandum written by Air Commodore G.F. Jacobsen on 21 September 1965: DHH, 1060-30, P12300-34 (DGA), memorandum, from G.F. Jacobsen Air Commodore, DGA [Director General Administration] to CP [Chief of Personnel], Command Badges, 21 September 1965.


7 LAC, RG24-G-1, box 19, 5250-28-13 vol. 1, FMC1060-4700/00 SVCS, correspondence, from W.A.B. Anderson Lieutenant-General, Commander, Mobile Command Uniform Insignia, 6 September 1966.

8 DHH, 1060-30, P1810-11 (DGA) TD6284, memorandum, from E.M. Reyno Air Marshal, Chief of Personnel to CDS [Chief of Defence Staff], Command Insignia, 12 October 1966.

9 DHH, 1060-30, S1060-1 DSECDS2, Department of National Defence Minute Sheet, from F.B. Caldwell Commodore, Secretary Defence Staff to SEC CP [Secretary Chief of Personnel], Command Insignia, 19 October 1966.

10 LAC, RG24-G-1, box 19, 5250-28-13 vol.1, P1060-4500/00 (DGA), correspondence, from R.C. Weston Air Commodore, Director General Administration, Command Insignia, 27 October 1966.

11 DHH, 1060-30, P1060-4400/00 (DGA), correspondence, from R.C Weston Air Commodore, DGA [Director General Administration] to Commander Air Defence Command, Command Badge, 19 December 1966.

12 LAC, 1996-97/957, box 9, FMC 1060-0057-1 vol.2 FMC 1060-4700-00 TD7123, P1060-4500/00 (DGA), correspondence, from R.C. Weston Air Commodore, Director General Administration, Command Insignia – Badges, 7 March 1967. At this time the following nine Canadian Forces Commands had a badge approved: Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Materiel Command, Training Command, Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, 1 Air Division, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group and the Canadian Forces Communication System.

13 DHH, 1060-9963 vol. 1, draft correspondence from Leo Cadieux to His Excellency The Right Honourable Roland Michener, Governor General of Canada, April 1968.

14 DHH, 1060-9963 vol. 1, P1060-280/C3-5 (DC), correspondence, from J.V. Allard General, Chief of the Defence Staff to Commander Mobile Command [Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson], Approved Command Badge Frame, 31 July 1968.

15 Although the exact date Atlantic and Pacific Commands were established is unknown, reference to “Atlantic Coast Command” and “Pacific Coast Command” was present in a Naval General Order from 1954. DHH, [Naval] General Orders Part I: Administration Personnel and Financial, Binder 3, 2.08/9 – Duties of Commodore Superintendent Atlantic Coast and of Commodore Superintendent Pacific Coast, 13 May 1954. Regarding the titles “Maritime Commander Atlantic” and “Maritime Commander Pacific,” the first reference to them appears to be in 1956: DHH, [Naval] General Orders Part I: Administration Personnel and Financial, Binder 2, 57.00/2 – Naval Short Titles, 18 August 1956.

16 Rear Admiral Hugh F. Pullen’s titles were Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, Senior Officer in Chief Command, Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area and Maritime Commander Atlantic. RAdm Pullen was succeeded by RAdm K.L Dyer on 1 August 1960.

17 The commander of Atlantic Command was also referred to as Flag Officer Atlantic Coast; likewise, the commander of Pacific Command was also referred to as Flag Officer Pacific Coast.
Please note that at this time, the Canadian Armed Forces were neither integrated nor unified; therefore, there was no central commander for Maritime Command, only commanders for Commands Atlantic and Pacific. The badge would be the same for both Commands; only the title would change.

Rear Admiral Herbert S. Rayner’s titles were Flag Officer Pacific Coast, Senior Officer in Chief Command and Maritime Commander Pacific. RAdm Rayner was succeeded by RAdm E.W. Finch-Noyes on 30 June 1960.

Normally, to receive Royal Approval of an official badge, it would be sent to the Clarenceux King of Arms who, if (s)he approved, would then send it to the monarch. In this case, the badge was sent to the Governor General instead of the Clarenceux King of Arms.

The term “Joint Service Badge” refers to the badge of an establishment which contains two or more services functioning together.
However, a letter from 10 July 1967 appeared to indicate that a Maritime Command badge had been approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Although this did not make the badge official, it implied that a Maritime Command badge, separate from the ones used by Commands Atlantic and Pacific, had been designed. No other documentation can be found to support this assertion however.

References to “the former Maritime Command Pacific badge” reiterated the assertion that the old Atlantic and Pacific Commands badge was no longer used by those commands; LAC, RG24-G-8-1, vol. 23425, MARC 1060-1 vol.1, MARC:1060-1 (COMD SEC), correspondence, from J.C. O’Brien Rear-Admiral, Commander, Maritime Command to Maritime Commander Pacific, Command Badge, 10 July 1967.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, P1060-280/C3-3 (DC), correspondence, from J.V. Allard General, Chief of the Defence Staff to Commander Maritime Command, Approved Command Badge Frame, 31 July 1968.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, message, from CANMARCOM [Maritime Command] to RCCWC/CANFORCEHED [Canadian Forces Headquarters], Command Badge and Motto, 14 June 1968.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, MARC:1060-1 (COMD), correspondence, from J.C. O’Brien Rear Admiral to Chief of the Defence Staff, Approved Command Badge Frame, 28 August 1968.


LAC, RG24-G-1, box 19, 5250-28-13 vol.1, P1060-4200/00 (DC), correspondence, from R.C Weston Air Commodore, Director General Administration to Commander Maritime Command, Command Badge, 1 December 1966.


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DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, P1060-280/C3-3 (DC), correspondence, from J.V. Allard General, Chief of the Defence Staff to Commander Maritime Command, Approved Command Badge Frame, 31 July 1968.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, message, from CANMARCOM [Maritime Command] to RCCWC/CANFORCEHED [Canadian Forces Headquarters], Command Badge and Motto, 14 June 1968.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, MARC:1060-1 (COMD), correspondence, from J.C. O’Brien Rear Admiral to Chief of the Defence Staff, Approved Command Badge Frame, 28 August 1968.


LAC, RG24-G-8-1, vol. 23425, MARC 1060-1 vol.1, MARC:1060-1 (TS Ships 2.4), correspondence, from J.C. O’Brien Rear Admiral to Commander, HMC [Her Majesty’s Canadian] Dockyard Halifax, Badge – Commander Maritime Command, 18 July 1967. References to “the former Maritime Command Pacific badge” reiterated the assertion that the old Atlantic and Pacific Commands badge was no longer used by those commands; LAC, RG24-G-8-1, vol. 23425, MARC 1060-1 vol.1, MARC:1060-1 (COMD SEC), correspondence, from J.C. O’Brien Rear-Admiral, Commander, Maritime Command to Maritime Commander Pacific, Command Badge, 10 July 1967.

DHH 1060-9970 vol. 1, P1060-280/C3-3 TD8243, correspondence, from Leo Cadieux [Minister of National Defence] to His Excellency the Right Honourable Roland Michener, CC, CD, Governor General of Canada, 6 September 1968.

DHH, 1060-9970 vol. 1, correspondence, from Louis-Frémont Trudeau BGen, Assistant Secretary to the Governor General to The Honourable The Minister of National Defence, 23 September 1968.


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