ARGONAUTA
Founded 1984 by Kenneth MacKenzie
ISSN No. 2291-5427

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ARGONAUTA is published four times a year—Winter, Spring, Summer and Autumn

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and four issues of THE NORTHERN MARINER/LE MARIN DU NORD:

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Like every good voyage, this issue of *Argonaute* is full of adventure. There are tragedies and triumphs, regrets, rebels, and reckonings; there’s courage, betrayal, subterfuge, and salvation—but rather than break into song, I will let the articles speak for themselves!

There are two research articles in this issue of *Argo*, and despite the differences in their time periods and circumstances, they tell similar tales: the lead up to and aftermath of shipwreck. Specifically, Andrew Jampoler deconstructs the last voyage and afterlife of the *Ann & Amelia*, an East Indiaman destroyed in the same catastrophic storm that wrecked the *Amphitrite* in 1833, and Derek Waller offers the latest installment of his U-boat saga—this time from the German perspective—chronicling the fate of individual U-boats that were scuttled or surrendered at the end of WW II. Each article explores an international maritime event that was politically charged and historically significant, but what makes them especially compelling is their respective attentions to the human side of these incidents. Jampoler recounts in riveting detail the agony experienced by shipwreck victims forced back into the French coast’s pounding surf; Waller parses the confusion of orders flying across the wires to U-boat captains to surrender or scuttle in the final days of the war; captains had to keep clear heads amid the fog of conflicting directives. We talk about ships, the sea, and maritime history writ large, but these stories remind us that real people are at the centre of each tale. This seems like a good theme for the spring issue, as we emerge from winter and begin facing outward again.

Like spring itself, this issue also hints at the exciting season to come: inside you’ll find the draft schedule and registration information for the CNRS virtual conference—Canada’s Pacific Gateway—taking place in June. The paper abstracts and the presenter biographies are a testament to the vibrancy and variety of current maritime research. I am looking forward to attending, and hope to see you there.

It also contains a friendly letter of introduction by Dr Peter Kikkert, the new editor of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*. I’m very much looking forward to working with Peter as a fellow CNRS editor, streamlining the society’s publications for common look and feel, and collaborating on delivering entertaining tales and great research on all things maritime to you, our readers.

What’s hidden from view at the moment, like the whale rising from the depths not quite ready to break the surface—and also promise of good things to come—are the articles I’ve received for future publication in *Argo*. They are all shapes and sizes, but they have two things in common: they are, each one of them, fascinating, and they all come from you. It is a privilege and a pleasure to receive your words and stories, and I’m excited to share them in *Argo*. Please keep them coming.

WMP,
Erika
It was a race against the change of seasons when Council held its mid-winter meeting on the first day of spring. The agenda was fulsome despite Zoom fatigue and attendance was good since lockdowns have greatly reduced demands upon our Saturdays. Roger Sarty’s comprehensive minutes of the meeting appear later in this issue. The discussion reflected the positive standing of the Society despite these challenging times, and identified areas that require further attention. These themes provide the basis for this installment of the “President’s Column,” or as some might call it, “Caterwauling from the Quarterdeck.”

The meeting began with presentations by editors Erika Behrisch and Peter Kikkert, who laid out ambitious plans for their respective publications. The design of Argonauta will be freshened up as we enter the season of renewal, but its content will continue the fine tradition of providing an outlet for members’ research and news, as well as serving as an important conduit for the Society’s minutes, financial statements, calls for papers, and other announcements. Change will also come this year to The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord. Volume 31 will mark the introduction of OJS software to manage submissions, peer review, and preparation of material for publication, which will allow authors to track their contributions through the workflow of publication. It will also enable the editor to issue individual articles when they are ready for release so that authors can draw attention to their work as soon as possible. At a time of heightened competition for grants and employment, this feature should be beneficial for early career researchers. Technology is also changing the annual conference, which will be entirely online this year. The use of video conferencing software has attracted presenters on three continents and will likely have a similar impact on registration. We hope to return to an in-person format in Halifax in 2022 to enjoy the camaraderie and network-building that comes with human contact, but it is clear that future conferences will require capacity for a virtual component to encourage members’ participation regardless of distance and without the cost of travel and accommodation.

While we have been looking to the future, we have also been mindful of the past. The Society’s website offers free access to issues of Argonauta since 2007 thanks to the support of Paul Adamthwaite, our webmaster and Executive Director of the Naval Marine Archive: The Canadian Collection in Picton. The coverage for 1984 to 2006, however, is sparse, and Paul has agreed to work with his student assistants to create a complete digital collection of Argonauta by the end of summer. This project will provide access to a significant amount of original research and will be an invaluable source to trace the study of maritime history during the last forty years. While our quarterly publication reveals an active membership sharing new insights into our nautical heritage, much work remains to be done and new student members need to be attracted and encouraged. Council has taken another step toward this objective by creating the James Pritchard Prize in honour of the award-winning historian and past-president of the Society who died in 2015. In keeping with Jim’s legacy as a teacher and mentor, the cash award will be given for the best paper written by a student and published in future volumes of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord. The allure of prize money once led mariners to sail the high seas. Let us hope that it will now attract students to the less dangerous and more enduring rewards of exploring maritime history.
THE WRECK OF THE EAST INDIAMAN
ANN & AMELIA
AUGUST 31, 1833
by Andrew C. A. Jampoler

London to Calcutta

In 1892 Robert Louis Stevenson finished The Wrecker, his seventh novel and the second of three written with his American-born stepson, Lloyd Osbourne. Nine chapters into this long adventure story, the authors set a scene in San Francisco’s Merchants’ Exchange Building. There, on California Street between Montgomery and Sansome Streets just a few blocks uphill from the bayfront, “the boys” are disposing at auction what is left of a British brig, Flying Scud. Under the command of Captain Jacob Trent and heavy with a cargo of rice, silks, teas, and “China notions” insured for £10,000, the two hundred-ton brig had left Hong Kong for San Francisco the previous December. The ship now lies holed on the sands at Midway Island, abandoned by Trent and the other survivors of his crew after their providential rescue by HMS Tempest, roughly 3,400 nautical miles west southwest of the city where Flying Scud’s fate is being settled.

There’s keen interest in the remains of the vessel at the Merchants’ Exchange, stimulated by the easy money to be made reselling its cargo and the “copper, lead, rigging, anchors, chain, even the crockery” known to be at the wreck site. Like all the others recently held at the exchange, this auction has been fixed, or so it is thought until the bidding accelerates, driven upward by a mysterious participant and by a growing suspicion that the distant wreck conceals a fortune in opium, then selling for $40 a pound landed in Honolulu. In the end, ownership of what’s left of Flying Scud goes entirely on a gambler’s hunch—not for the $100 “the boys” had quietly agreed upon among themselves at the outset, but for five hundred times that much.

Writing nearly ten years after his Treasure Island was published, Stevenson was a mature storyteller by 1892, but describing the auction need not have taxed the imagination of even his apprentice, Osbourne. Such was the frequency of shipwrecks during the nineteenth century that similar scenes—granted, most minus this one’s casino atmosphere and surprises—occurred in real life almost daily in some port or coastal city.

So it happened that nearly sixty years before the fictitious Flying Scud ended up on a mid-Pacific reef, at 10:00 the morning of 10 November 1833, the remains of the very real and once-handsome East Indiaman Ann & Amelia were auctioned at Berck-sur-Mer, France, near where it had run aground during a great storm in the English Channel the last weekend of August.

Built in 1816 of Burmese teak in Chittagong by James Macrae for Joseph Somes, the shipping magnate, Ann & Amelia had spent its first decade at sea in local and Far East trade. The shipwreck, very near the end of Ann & Amelia’s third charter since being taken up for East India Company service in 1826, happened five months out of Calcutta and just days from its destination, almost exactly a year after departing the Company’s London docks on what became its last outbound voyage.
The French coast between Calais and Berck—the fearsome “lee shore” of many mariners’ nightmares—was a popular place for an abrupt end to a voyage in the age of sail. A census conducted in September 1833, in connection with the loss of the British female convict transport Amphitrite not far to the north at Boulogne-sur-Mer, named eighteen British-registry vessels driven on shore there during the decade immediately before Ann & Amelia went aground.⁴ (Though most were shoved there by wind and waves, some were deliberately grounded, those masters trusting in their ships’ stout hulls and planning—hoping—to float off safely behind the weather.) Including the ships of other nations might have multiplied that count several times. According to an inventory done in 2010 by the Musée de la Marine d’Étaples, 1,610 vessels were wrecked, run aground, or capsized along this same stretch of shoreline from 1800 to 1900—more than one a month on average through the century.⁵

At the end of August 1833, as many as a hundred merchant ships and fishing vessels were lost in or badly damaged by a sudden, violent mid-summer storm that thrashed the North Sea and the English Channel. Described then as the worst in the memory of Lloyd’s oldest underwriter and the subject of stunned reporting in newspapers on both sides of the water, the storm might have approached or even equaled the terrific destruction of Daniel Defoe’s notorious tempest of November–December 1703.⁶ Among the many vessels then fighting for survival in the Channel was Georgiana, a 406-ton merchant ship sailing between Calcutta and London, and, like Ann & Amelia, also chartered by the Honorable East India Company.

On 27 June, Georgiana, under Captain Walter Young’s command and with a crew of 36, had left St. Helena in the South Atlantic in company with Ann & Amelia. The latter, bigger and faster than its consort, finished its voyage hard aground at Berck-sur-Mer about the time that Amphitrite broke up at Boulogne with terrible loss of life. The more fortunate, or perhaps better led, Georgiana found shelter in the Downs anchorage that weekend. Despite losing both anchors off Deal, Georgiana nevertheless survived days of “excessive hard gales” to reach Gravesend three days later. From this ship’s log book we learn that on Saturday, 31 August, Georgiana’s barometer showed 28.30” of mercury.⁷ Such low atmospheric pressure is typically associated with a Category 3 hurricane, one capable of generating winds of 96-113 knots (111-130 MPH), and of producing “devastating” damage on shore. A single data point does not a great storm make but, coupled with contemporary newspaper accounts, Georgiana’s barometer offers a reliable idea of the catastrophe that swept down on the coast that weekend and wreaked havoc on Channel shipping.

Three wrecks during that storm prompted extensive coverage in the British and Continental press: the Scottish smack Earl of Wemyss atop the mud and peat “scurves” off north Norfolk; HM Chartered Transport Amphitrite on the sands fronting Boulogne’s elegant, beach-front spa; and Ann & Amelia, near the fishing village of Berck.

The Earl of Wemyss was quickly exposed as a tragic instance of incompetent seamanship in extremis coupled with ghoulish greed on land.⁸ Amphitrite and Ann & Amelia, however, were examples of something else; their stories became, among other things, highly public case studies of the behaviour of French customs officers—douaniers—at shipwreck sites, studies fueled by suspicion that, countenanced by old, xenophobic laws, the douaniers’ heartless behaviour on the beaches at Boulogne and Berck had perversely multiplied the number of British lives lost. These latter wrecks raise a question, too, about French coastal life-saving and salvage practices during the early nineteenth century, and they offer at least a suggestion of its answer.

The wreck of Amphitrite saw all but three aboard—more than one hundred women, perhaps as many as a dozen of their children, and most of the crew—drowned in sight of horrified, impotent observers on the beach at Boulogne as the evening tide came in. The death toll was especially tragic because, at the time, Boulogne was home to the only life-saving
humane society in France, an institution deliberately modeled on its counterpart in England by members of the expatriate Anglican congregation, who in 1825 had been the Société Humaine’s founders.

Public outrage in the United Kingdom focused on the ship’s master and the surgeon superintendent and his wife (all three victims of the storm); on the British consul resident at the port, a Scot named William Hamilton; on government contracting procedures that had, it was charged, permitted an unfit ship to be chartered and dispatched to the other side of the world; and on the local douaniers who, in an effort to suppress “le traditionnel pillage,” had prevented at bayonet point an aggressive search after dark along the waterline for survivors.

The Berck auction announcement reported that salvaged items on offer included Ann & Amelia’s hull, masts, and spars and sails (the latter generally in “very good condition”), as well as chain in various sizes, cable, forty-five or fifty water casks, four compasses, nearly 6,000 pounds of red copper and around 10,000 pounds of scrap iron, blocks, guns, and anchors, and countless other miscellaneous objects. This was all that remained of what—until the last Saturday in August—had been a veteran merchant ship, representative of the high technology of the early nineteenth century and a model of purposeful human organization. The callous treatment of Ann & Amelia’s crew and passengers at Berck (where few died but many more might have) by local douaniers, and their obstruction of salvage attempts, were offered as evidence to substantiate the case against customs officials at the scene of the Amphitrite’s mass drowning up the coast at Boulogne.

Ann & Amelia’s outbound voyage to Calcutta with Captain William Compton in command had been an uneventful one. After several weeks of preparation for sea under the watchful eye of First Officer Benjamin Simpson, on 7 August 1832, Ann & Amelia was cast loose from the East India Company wharf and hauled into the dock. Once in the stream it finished loading, took on board mail and passengers (a fifty three-man-strong detachment of company troops under a Captain Thompson, accompanied by two unnamed women and their children), and on 10 August set off down the Thames on what became a five and one-half-month crossing to Calcutta.

The steady rhythm of the passage was soon set by near-daily pumping of the bilges and weekly divine services. (Almost every week; Captain Compton’s Sunday observations were not apparently conducted with religious regularity.) Day after day, First Officer Simpson’s and Second Officer Skelton’s signatures alternated in the log book below reports of weather observations, the winds, sails aloft, estimates and fixes of ship’s position, and special events. Only once, on 22 November, was barometric pressure recorded. Early that afternoon—a Thursday—in the empty waters some 850 nautical miles due south of Madagascar, Skelton noted the barometer had fallen to 29.405” and that the sky had taken on “a very wild appearance.” He then prudently made “every preparation for strong gales.” (At voyage’s end Skelton’s craven character and insubordination in a moment of crisis would cost him his life and three others theirs, but during the outbound voyage there was no indication of these flaws, and he apparently managed one of the ship’s two watch sections capably.)

On some days, Ann & Amelia failed to make good as many as 100 miles; on a few good days, Simpson or Skelton estimated that the ship’s progress down track approached 200 miles. 3 October, without ceremony, Ann & Amelia crossed the equator southbound near 23° west longitude. Two weeks later, heading for Cape Town, the ship crossed the prime meridian eastbound near 35° south. Much later, on 20 December after its port call, it re-crossed the equator northbound near 90° east, and went on to sail uneventfully through Christmas and New Year’s Days. All these events passed without observance or special mention in the log.
Excitement had first interrupted monotony on 15 September, near 12° 45’ North 26° 16’ West (some 250 miles southwest of the Cape Verde Islands), when William Fowler, one of thirty-one seamen on the crew, fell overboard from his perch on the mizzen chains while painting. Few sailors could swim in the nineteenth century, so a fall into the water while underway was almost always a death sentence. So it was with Fowler. He was unable to save himself by grasping the grating or any of the other floating objects immediately thrown over the side, and the ship’s boat that was quickly launched to attempt a rescue didn’t find him.⁹

A second noteworthy event followed Fowler’s death by a month. First Officer Simpson recorded in the ship’s log on 15 October that the embarked troops “behaved in a very disorderly manner, refusing to work for the non commissioned officers when ordered by them also being ordered by the officers of the ship and did not do any duty until being severely reprimanded by Captain Compton.” There’s no record of any punishment imposed in response to this flash of indiscipline bordering on mutiny, perhaps because the military detachment’s forty-seven privates were still too large a force for their officer in charge, his six NCOs, and the ship’s crew altogether to confront. (The only other disciplinary lapse noted in the log was an incident of stealing in mid-November, somehow resolved when Private Patrick Flarhty’s knapsack and kit—he was the suspected thief—were summarily tossed over the side.)

Three months out, on Monday, 6 November, Ann & Amelia stood in to Table Bay at Cape Town for “refreshment,” to take on drinking water. The necessity for this unplanned port call had emerged during a “consultation,” held the Friday before by the master with his two senior officers, to review water consumption to date and the adequacy of the remaining supply. Compton’s “consultation” suggests a collegial leadership style, unusual in an age when, at sea, a merchant ship’s master enjoyed the power and perquisites of the captain of warship, or of a tyrant ashore. This and other things hint that Compton took a light strain on the line, leaving it to his hard-working first officer to manage most of the ship’s business both in port and when underway.

Remarkably, only a gallon per person per day had been consumed or lost from leaking casks during the previous months underway. The three, Compton, Simpson, and Second Officer Skelton, concluded that, at current usage rates, the 4,670 gallons still on board would last only forty days—not long enough even with favourable winds. Hence, Tuesday, 7 November, found Ann & Amelia at anchor in seven fathoms at Table Bay, with forty fathoms of chain out. Wednesday and Thursday were spent taking in and stowing water casks. Caution proved to be a good thing; Ann & Amelia’s next opportunity to get more to drink wasn’t until late January.

Once out of Cape Town, Captain Compton took Ann & Amelia across the Indian Ocean in two legs: the first generally east along the 40° south parallel, to ride the powerful westerlies beyond the Cape; the second north, roughly up the 90° east meridian, into the Bay of Bengal. His route very generally followed the sea lane first opened by the Dutch early in the seventeenth century, which had been, by 1630 or so, worn into a groove by Dutch ships of the Vereinigde Oost-indische Compagnie.

Finally, in mid-January, Ann & Amelia entered the Hugli River, the westernmost of the mouths of the Ganges on the Bay of Bengal. After several short up-river legs and overnights at anchor, the steamer Irrewaddy took Ann & Amelia in tow on 24 January the rest of the way. Short days later, the ship reached Calcutta, recorded in the log book as the shift from underway to in port watches.
The turn-around in Calcutta (“Kolkata” today), the capital and chief commercial city of British India—disembarking the troops and unloading; cleaning, re-caulking and painting; tending to the ballast, spars and sails; stowing cargo, stores, mail and dispatches aboard; and finally embarking passengers—took two months exactly. All preparations for sea were again supervised by the indefatigable Simpson, while the captain evidently dallied ashore. His presence on board was noted in infrequent log entries.

These many preparations were a near-duplicate of the practiced process that had seen Ann & Amelia readied for the voyage out in 1832, done in Calcutta by the same officers and “people” who were to ride the ship back, less the late Seaman Fowler and Third Officer Davis, the latter no longer on the crew list. Davis’ unexplained absence opened promotion opportunities for Fourth Officer Rider and Fifth Officer Young, each of whom now moved up a space in the pecking order—and a chair at the wardroom table. In its hold Ann & Amelia now carried hundreds of bales of silk, boxes of indigo, and thousands of bags of saltpeter for London, and many sacks of rice consigned to the colony on tiny St. Helena Island in the South Atlantic, where victuals were always in short supply. On departure the ship drew 17’ 2” forward and 17’ 3” aft.

24 March 1833, Ann & Amelia dropped off the pilot at the mouth of the Ganges and finally got underway on blue water. In addition to some male passengers on board when the ship entered the Bay of Bengal, there were also nine women and seven children. The ship’s next landfall was almost three months off, at St. Helena, on 21 June.

The passage home began ominously enough. At two in the morning, 24 March, the day the pilot went ashore and Ann & Amelia headed into the bay, Midshipman Robert Percival, the senior of the six most junior officers on board, “departed this life.” From that, a superstitious sailor—and most were—might have feared that Ann & Amelia’s return voyage to London was not going to be as tranquil as the outbound one to India had been. Second Officer Skelton’s entry in Ann & Amelia’s log for the day explains only that Percival “died of… a formation of matter in the bowels,” and in the next sentence returns to business with an unemotional “All sails set.” A perfunctory notation later the same day records that at 5:00 PM Percival’s body was “committed to the deep with the usual ceremony.” There’s no indication how long the young officer had been ill or what role, if any, the ship’s new surgeon, Dr. Collicott, had played in the diagnosis and treatment of Percival’s deadly condition. Collicott had joined the crew in Calcutta; Doctor Shaw, the surgeon outbound, evidently stayed behind in India. A second death from disease, dysentery this time “after a long illness,” came 5 July in the South Atlantic. Here, too, the “usual ceremony” was enacted, this one starring an unnamed deceased. And those—one outbound, two inbound—were all the deaths en route, until the end of the voyage.

The ship’s track from the top of the Bay of Bengal to the Cape of Good Hope was half a great catenary arc, dropping past the subcontinent and through the Indian Ocean well west of the right angle that had defined the outbound route. At the end of the first week of May, Ann & Amelia passed fewer than two hundred miles south of Cap Sainte Marie on Madagascar, some six hundred miles closer to that tip of land than it had been at the end of November when heading the other way.

On 7 May, Simpson made a note in the log: “one of the Hon EI Company’s invalids confined on the poop on bread and water for drunkenness and mutinous conduct in using most abusive language to captain and officers.” After six uneventful weeks at sea, the diversion this nameless passenger’s outburst offered might have been welcome entertainment. On 16 May, Seaman John Brown received the same sentence for being insolent to Second Officer Skelton.
Brown’s punishment was the last report of anything noteworthy, other than occasional understated logbook entries describing *Ann & Amelia*, propelled by strong winds, pitching and rolling through heavy rain and high seas, until after the ship departed St. Helena late afternoon Thursday, 27 June. Squally weather punctuated long, dull days and nights at sea otherwise marked by little else than pumping the bilges (sometimes as often as three times a day; the goal seemed to be less than one foot of water in the hold) and trimming the sails and yards to the wind for best speed and sea-keeping.

For two centuries East India Company ships had been stopping regularly at St. Helena, a forty-plus-square-mile outcropping of volcanic basalt in the South Atlantic now known chiefly not as the Company’s isolated first colony and long-time watering hole for homeward-bound vessels (both true), but as the place of Emperor Napoleon’s exile in October 1815. Elba in the Western Mediterranean—twice St. Helena’s size and only 145 miles from Antibes, on the French coast—had been too porous to hold the great general for long after May 1814, but St. Helena was impermeable. After almost six years’ confinement, Napoleon died miserably and somewhat mysteriously (the cause of death at age fifty-two is still unknown) in chambers at “Longwood,” his rambling quarters-cum-prison on the island, in May 1821.

Friday, 21 June, *Ann & Amelia* dropped anchor in twelve fathoms off St. Helena’s James Valley, the narrow cleft in the rocks that was the cramped site of the island’s capital town. It sailed again the following Thursday, having passed the intervening days taking on fresh water, off-loading rice, doing ship’s work, and swinging impatiently at anchor. Departure was delayed by the Honourable East India Company’s resident agent, who ordered *Ann & Amelia* to sail together with another Company-chartered vessel, the ship-rigged *Georgiana*, in port on Sunday from Calcutta and also heading for London. (The two had met by chance at sea 7 June, near 35˚ South 15˚ East, not far off Cape Town, after which *Ann & Amelia* covered the 1,800 miles into St. Helena in fourteen days; it took the 400-ton *Georgiana* sixteen.) *Ann & Amelia* was ready for sea Wednesday morning, 26 June, but the two didn’t leave port until Thursday night, delayed in part by a trial on board *Georgiana* of a crewmember accused of assaulting his first officer.

Those thirty-six hours and the time lost until 18 July (the last time *Georgiana* was in sight, “far astern” of *Ann & Amelia*) to keep company with the slower, smaller ship may well have been fatal. Had *Ann & Amelia* not been so hobbled—two months later and many miles farther down track—the ship might have escaped the full fury of late August’s storm in the English Channel, and evaded grounding and destruction.

Finally shed of its dowdy consort, *Ann & Amelia* made good progress after mid-July; Friday, 9 August, the ship was near the Azores in sight of Pico, the towering black volcanic cone that is the islands’ (and metropolitan Portugal’s) tallest mountain peak. The next log entries describe “vivid lightning” and heavy weather, but once northeast of the archipelago, *Ann & Amelia* enjoyed smooth sailing again. According to the entry in the deck log, at noon Tuesday, 27 August, *Ann & Amelia* was at 49˚ 01’ North 9˚ 13’ West, sailing through fine weather. The navigational fix (logged as combining “observed latitude” and “longitude by chronometer”) put *Ann & Amelia* some 150 miles west southwest of Lands End in the Atlantic approaches to the English Channel, and roughly 400 miles west of *Amphitrite*, then out of Margate Roads for the Downs and a planned overnight pause in its progress toward Australia. At the end of the week, the two would abruptly end their voyages within twenty miles of one another.

That day and the next passed bright and clear with light airs; conditions were good enough to permit repairs on deck to a torn mainsail. Thursday (29 August) was pleasant also, with breezes blowing gently from the west through a summer sky. When a jolly boat came alongside *Ann & Amelia* that afternoon to put the pilot on board, everyone would have taken
his arrival as proof that the long voyage was practically over. By then, other preparations for arrival had been underway for several days: chains had been bent to both anchors and scrubbing the ship’s sides commenced. Since passing Saugor Island at the entrance to the Hugli River months ago, the ship had sailed some 12,000-plus nautical miles, the rough equivalent of four back-to-back crossings of the North Atlantic. After spending most of two seasons of the year at sea Ann & Amelia’s crew and passengers must have been eager to arrive at the company’s docks on the Isle of Dogs, and finally to stand on land. (Under steam and through the Suez Canal forty years later, Calcutta to London would take in weeks what the long way ’round under sail had taken in months.)

Friday’s skies remained clear through noon even while the morning’s moderate westerlies gained strength. At midday Friday, the logbook entry reported “out all reefs and made all sail,” suggesting a press for maximum speed. Not far to the east, however, the convict transport Amphitrite was already ensnared by the storm, and during the afternoon the weather around Ann & Amelia progressively deteriorated. As the hours passed under darkening, squally skies, the watch worked continuously to reduce sail and rig the ship for heavy weather. By 10:30 PM Ann & Amelia could no longer remain on course and hove to instead, “the weather being too thick to run with head to NE.”

Saturday, 31 August began with threatening conditions and ended in disaster. First Officer Simpson recorded that morning came with a “hard gale and thick weather,” and with winds out of the north-northwest. At 4:30 in the afternoon the Isle of Wight was visible off the port beam, meaning that the ship had averaged only three knots since the noon fix on Tuesday. During its final seven hours afloat, Ann & Amelia was pushed by the storm nearly due east across the Channel, to what the stranded survivors later would discover was Berck-sur-Mer.

Simpson’s account of Ann & Amelia’s last hours is a vivid description of what it meant to be “embayed on a lee shore”: to be cornered by the wind and inexorably driven toward land. “Set the foresail,” he wrote, “ordered the main topsail to be set. Found it split. Split the foretop sail in attempting to set it. At 5 [AM] the fore sail blew to pieces. Unbent it and bent another. 7 [AM] unbent the main topsail. . . Hard gales and heavy rain.” In the North Sea, the first mate in Earl of Wemyss, David Reid, was watching his own ship’s sails tear away, too. Later, he would tell a board of inquiry that, even if they’d been made of leather instead of canvas, the sails would not have held up against this tempest. Back aboard Ann & Amelia, in Simpson’s words,

At 1 [PM] the weather being so thick hauled the foresail up and brought the ship to the wind on the starboard tack. At 2:30 sounded in 16 faths. Came around to SW. At 5:30 sounded in 27 faths wore to NE. 6: 15 sounded in 17 faths. Gale increasing to a complete hurricane. Wore to SW. Soundings 17, 18, 17, and 14 faths. Wore to NE. Shoals on this tack. Wore around the other way. Shoals to 13 faths. At 8 found the ship 15 in broken water, wore up ENE and got out of it. Water shoaled to 9 faths, then I wore round on the starboard tack. Kept wearing. Water still shoaling both tacks. Blowing a complete hurricane. All our sails blown away excepting the foresail. The last sail that was set was the fore topmast stay sail, which was blown away immediately after it was set. Heavy surf all around the ship. Sea breaking on both sides.

And then—inevitably—“at 1 1:45 the ship struck the ground, surging dreadfully.” Ann & Amelia had been driven to destruction by the wind as efficiently as if it had been wild game chivvied by a beater into the field of fire.
Simpson’s next entry describes what followed the impact: “The topmasts went a few minutes after the ship struck. Sea breaking over her in every direction. Cut away the main and foremast. Mr. Skelton, 2nd officer, Lt. Frazier, 7th Bengal Cavalry (without orders) lowered the starboard quarter Boat at the same time calling for volunteers….The boat had scarcely left the ship when she was dashed to pieces and all perished excepting Lt. Frazier (who reached the shore by swimming).”

Midnight the gale blowing with great violence seas breaking over the ship fore and aft.

Minutes later, the crew began to collect the spars to assemble a raft from them, but, Simpson continued, “at 1:30 the ship began to lay more quiet. Found the tide was leaving the ship fast. Lashed the mainmast to the [?] rail and ring bolts to act as a shore to keep the ship from falling over. At 3 found the water leave the ship so fast that at daylight we could walk on shore. Sent the dispatches, passengers and a great quantity of luggage on shore also a quantity of the ship’s stores.”

Beginning Monday, 2 September and during the next two weeks when the tide permitted, Ann & Amelia’s cargo was hauled ashore by a gang of French labourers more than fifty strong. By the time the last of the company’s cargo was discharged from the wreck on 14 September, almost six hundred bales of silk, nearly seven hundred boxes of indigo, and thirty-seven hundred bags of saltpeter had crossed the beach, joining salvaged chains, cables, guns, and anchors.

The Douaniers on the Beach at Berck-sur-Mer

Still stranded in Berck on 22 September, Captain Compton described the great gale now three weeks past in an emotional letter to William Hamilton, His Majesty’s Consul at Boulogne. At the time, Hamilton, consul there for the past eleven years, was defending himself against a vindictive London newspaper reporter’s charges that he had failed to exercise sufficient vigour in connection with the wreck of the convict transport, and that he bore personal responsibility for Amphitrite’s many deaths. “At about 2 o’clock on the Sunday morning,” Compton wrote, “finding the water leaving the ship as the tide ran out I desired the 1st Officer and two men to see whether they could reach the shore, the water appearing shoal.” What followed after Compton attempted to land his passengers and crew suggests that the worst interpretations of the behavior of the douaniers at Boulogne may not have been wrong. Only four of Ann & Amelia’s crew drowned Saturday night, but many more on board might have died:

In a short time they returned informing me they had succeeded, but that we would not be allowed to land, for the Guard drove them into the sea again. I answered never mind them as we must, instantly giving orders for the ladies to prepare. In half an hour I had the happiness of seeing them safe over the ship’s side, the remainder of my crew & passengers following, remaining to the last myself. I had requested Mr. Robio a French gentleman passenger, to go and see what he could do with the Guard on shore for I must insist on landing. He returned twice to me, calling & begging to me to come on shore with the hope of my having more influence with the Guard, informing me at the same time, they were threatening to drive the ladies back into the water, many both passengers and crew calling to me to the same effect. On my getting to them I found the ladies sitting in greatest misery scarcely out of the water surrounded by about a dozen soldiers with their muskets presented threatening if we did not return to the ship to fire at us. I called for their Head, and told them I had no one sick (my surgeon being present), explained our situation, all to no effect. Go back, go back was the answer. This being impossible I took the ladies and marched off to a small hut or Guard House. They attempted to stop me, once
or twice on the way. On reaching it some little kindness was shown by those within by kindling a fire. Fortunately the hut had one separate apartment, about six feet square where the ladies took shelter. In this horrid place, we were kept until 12 of the day, when a health officer arrived from whose appearance I hoped something better. Alas I was again to be disappointed. I instantly on seeing him gave him my word, also my surgeon’s that no disease existed amongst us, begging of him at once to allow the ladies to be removed to the village…. It was two hours before I could get the permission. He first kept mustering my crew over & over again, then wished the passengers to be called out in the same way, ladies also. I told him it was impossible. He then went where they were, 4 or 5 individuals following & stood gazing at them for some time with such a want of sympathy and delicacy towards them that it really was disgusting. 13

The humanity shown to the crew and passengers wading ashore through the surf from Ann & Amelia’s beached hull had consisted, the master reported sarcastically, “in the Douane refraining from firing upon people escaping from a watery grave. I have given what I fear you will think a very long statement, but I wish to be as minute as I possibly could be,” Compton concluded to Hamilton, relating his experience to Amphitrite’s “so that you may be made acquainted with every particular, the better able to judge how far correct the reports at Boulogne are.”

Spared drowning, Captain Compton could now mourn the loss of his fortune, his share in the ship and its cargo, and all his personal possessions on board right down to the perishables in his private cuddy stores. “The wreck of my ship has been to me a very severe loss (not being insured,” he wrote from home on 7 December to the foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston. “How hard, my Lord, after getting a great part of my property safe on shore, to have it taken from me and destroyed. At least to the amount of £600 in nautical instruments and stores alone. The ship has become a total loss, entirely from the officer of the French Marine not allowing her to be secured in the first bed she made.”

On board Amphitrite, beached mid-afternoon in front of the port of Boulogne near where the River Liane meets the Channel, the loss of life albeit not of property on Saturday, 31 August, had been much greater. There, a large audience of citizens, vacationers, and resident expatriates had watched aghast at the failure of two brave efforts to warn the crew of their mortal danger, soon followed by the destruction of the ship under the incoming tide and the death by drowning of all but three aboard. In time, roughly half the bodies were recovered and buried in the city’s English Cemetery.

Prompted by extensive, horrified coverage in British newspapers and by letter-writing and petition campaigns directed at the foreign secretary, the Foreign Office quickly asked the Admiralty to launch an investigation into the “melancholy event.” The investigator selected was Henry Ducie Chads, the senior survivor of HMS Java’s fatal duel with USS Constitution in December 1812, now a captain on half-pay in his seventh year awaiting orders.

During the next three weeks, Chads inquired into every aspect of the wreck of the convict transport but one: the allegations that the douaniers had behaved with callous indifference to human life, the same charge leveled by Captain Compton. Chads had been warned off this line of inquiry by the foreign secretary when the two met privately in London just before the captain’s departure for France. In correspondence to Second Secretary of the Admiralty John Barrow after his investigation was complete (Chads exonerated everyone except, perhaps, the surgeon-superintendent’s wife), he explained that he had agreed with Palmerston that it would be “improper and indelicate” of him to pursue this line of inquiry.
Undercutting charges in the press that *douaniers* had “prevented with determination anything be it living or dead from passing the mean high water line without prior permission and the payment of duties,” Chads reported to Barrow that “the accusations against the French Employees are exaggerated, & made at a time of greatest excitement & horror at the events & the term of ‘inhuman’ to them is not applicable... The French Authorities I understood were personally on the spot. There can be no reason to doubt but that their motives & exertions were dictated by humanity, & I do not believe their actions in this instance were the cause of loss of life and if delay in saving anybody occurred it was from the cause I have before named, an endeavour to protect the bodies.”

A much more critical view of the role of the *douaniers* on the beach at Boulogne sur Mer (and by extension, substantiating Colton’s account of events at Berck-sur-Mer) came, surprisingly, from the editor of *L’Annotateur*, who—not yet a generation after the long Napoleonic wars—could have been expected to have reacted defensively to any British criticism of the conduct of French civil servants. He didn’t.

Under French regulations, officers from customs, the port authority (the Marine), and the police had distinct roles to perform on scene, *L’Annotateur* explained. The *Douane’s* scope was limited to preventing the smuggling of wreck cargo into France; the Marine was responsible for the rescue of crew and passengers; and the Gendarmerie was charged with the preservation of order and the protection of property at the scene. “But that’s not the way things happen,” *L’Annotateur* observed. “Customs intervenes in every aspect of the grounding, because this service is usually rather intrusive, and because above all, it has a strong, united, compact, flexible, and dedicated organization supporting its commander.” In contrast, the Marine organization is an “old, complicated machine wherein all the wheels are worm-eaten by old age. The result is that the Marine almost completely disappears behind Customs, which shows itself very jealous to extend its power as much as possible”:

> Very few marine superintendents will open themselves to Custom’s disfavor. The triumph of tax considerations over more commendable humanitarian ideals is, therefore, made certain from the beginning of every grounding....All errors, all mistakes, all wrong measures which are so often and so unnecessarily mourned flow from this. Customs is strict, dominated by iron rules; it has only one objective, which totally excludes any humanitarian ideas. Consequently, where these ideas should prevail, they come in second. Most often they are not visible through the concerns which occupy customs officers. This is not Customs’ mistake. . . it is the Marine’s mistake.

Drawing a lesson from the calamities just past, the paper’s editor concluded that a new civil organization was required, *une force publique spéciale* “able to protect efficiently the belongings, to save men’s lives, and to fight together with smartness and method against the obstacles presented by seawater.”

Beginning mid-morning 10 November and for a few days following, what remained of *Ann & Amelia* was on put up for sale at auction on the beach at Berck and at a salvage store in the small port and fishing village. The ubiquitous Adamses, bankers, businessmen, and politicians of Boulogne and other towns along the Pas de Calais, were the auctioneers. The distress sale of *Flying Scud*’s remains was the beginning of a popular fictional story, but the auction of *Ann & Amelia*’s marked the end of a tragic real one. Parted out and sold, *Ann & Amelia* disappeared from the record.
Endnotes

1. R. L. Stevenson and L. Osbourne. *The Wrecker* (London, 1892). Osbourne (1868-1947) was twelve when his divorced mother, Fanny, married the well-known novelist, and only twenty-four when *The Wrecker* was published. Osbourne, too, wrote fiction, but he never attained the distinction of his famous Scottish stepfather, who died in Samoa in 1894, soon after the publication of his tenth story, *The Ebb-tide* (also jointly credited to Osbourne).

2. Notice of the sale, to be conducted by M. Alexandre Adam, one of the prosperous Adams banking family of the region, was published in L'Annotateur, the daily newspaper of Boulogne-sur-Mer, the chief town of the arrondissement.

3. *Ann & Amelia*’s two previous voyages under Honorable East India Company (HEIC) charter were in 1825-26, China to Quebec, Captain Henry Ford, and 1829-30, China to Halifax and Quebec, Captain William Nichols. BL IOR/L/MAR/B8OB and C. British Library.

4. The census of wrecks along this segment of the French channel coast was prepared in conjunction with an Admiralty investigation by Captain Henry Ducie Chads, RN, of the loss of *Amphitrite*, wrecked on the sands at Boulogne-sur-Mer the same evening that *Ann & Amelia* went aground a few dozen miles down the coast at Berck. TNA ADM 1/1688, “Papers Connected with the enquiry into the loss of the Amphitrite convict ship held by Captain Chads to be lodged in the Record Office.”


6. Defoe described it in his book, *The Storm, or, a Collection of the Most Remarkable Casualties and Disasters which happen’d in the Late Dreadful Tempest, both by Sea and Land*, published the following year that drew on eyewitness accounts he’d solicited through newspaper advertisements.

7. IOR L/MAR B156l-J in the collection of the British Library.

8. Thursday, 29 August, the *Earl of Wemyss* left London on the 400-mile passage for Leith with Captain Henry Nesbit in command and more than twenty passengers aboard. The majority of them were women and children. By mid-day Saturday, a survivor reported later, the smack was adrift on seas “like mountains of snow.” After dark, *Earl of Wemyss* went aground four hundred yards off-shore near Brancaster. Soon after sunrise on Sunday, storm-driven seas broke over four unprotected skylights on deck, shattering their glass and drowning everyone in the ladies’ cabin below. A magistrate’s inquiry was convened to determine “whether there had been any loss of life by culpable negligence, or loss of property by dishonesty,” and the captain’s incompetence was made manifest. So, too, was evidence that the dead, “whilst their bodies were yet warm,” had been ghoulishly stripped of their valuables by the son-in-law of the aged lord of nearby Brancaster Manor, as soon as it became possible to move between the wreck and the shore—putting into practice the general belief that coastal residents were “the lawful heirs of all drowned persons” and so entitled to the property a generous Providence had cast at their feet. The *Spectator*, 12 October 1833, pp 1-6.

9. Log Book for the Ship *Ann & Amelia* BL shelfmark L/MARB8OD. 15 September 1832. The entry was signed by 2nd Officer Skelton.
10. The ship gave better than it got, riding nearly a foot higher on departure, 16’ 6” forward, 16’ 2” aft, than it did on arrival.

11. Inexplicably, the routine that for months had Simpson and Skelton signing alternate half-days in the log book was interrupted on 20 June, after which date First Officer Simpson alone signed it until 20 July, when no one did. Beginning suddenly on 13 August, occasional entries appear over the signature of Captain Compton himself, with the remainder unsigned. Simpson emerges and resumes signing the log once the ship is in extremis, and his is the only signature that appears in Ann & Amelia’s logbook during the crisis until the last entry on Saturday, 14 September.

12. The four who drowned when the boat broke up included Second Officer Skelton, Midshipman Shunkburgh, and Seamen Gardner and Teesdale. In a 4 September letter, forwarding to the Foreign Office dispatches recovered from both wrecks and the mail from India, Consul Hamilton also reported that Skelton and Frazier had, “unknown to the master,” taken “possession of the only boat on board” in their failed attempt to reach shore, so clarifying what Simpson had meant by his phrase “without orders.”

13. The practice across the Channel was not appreciably different, so L’Annotateur told its readers. If survivors of a foreign registry shipwreck were discovered ashore in Great Britain, the practice was also to isolate them in a suitable empty building. Should one be unavailable, these unfortunates were to be isolated on the beach in a kind of corral made from salvaged spars and line from the wreck, tented over by sailcloth, and kept there until disposition instructions arrived from London.

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The Kriegsmarine’s ‘Operation Regenbogen’: The Scuttling of U-boats in and around North Germany in early May 1945

by Derek Waller

It is intended to sink the nucleus of the fleet upon dissemination of codeword Regenbogen (30 April 1945)

For U-boats the orders issued will continue to apply, namely the destruction of U-boats by order of Admiral (U/B) (1 May 1945)

No boat is to fall into enemy hands. Every man must scuttle on his own responsibility in case of danger (4 May 1945)

If possible U-boats which at 0800/5/5 are in German or Danish ports, roads or bays or are south of latitude 55.10 north will carry out Regenbogen (5 May 1945)

Do not carry out any further ‘Regenbogen’ after 0800/5/5 (5 May 1945)

Introduction

After the USSR’s Red Army captured Danzig on 30 March 1945 and began to advance westwards along the southern Baltic coast, the Kriegsmarine was progressively forced to abandon ports such as Pillau and the various Polish and north German harbours in the eastern Baltic, and to move its remaining U-boats towards Kiel and the ports and anchorages in the western end of the Baltic. At the same time, British and Canadian forces were advancing from the west towards Schleswig-Holstein, thus putting pressure on the U-boat bases to the south-west of the Danish peninsula, such as Wilhelmshaven, Wesermunde and Hamburg.

In late April 1945, the Kriegsmarine was therefore forced to consider how best to continue the war and to decide what should be done with all the remaining warships (surface and submarine) if—as seemed inevitable—Germany would be forced to surrender. Thus, whilst he was still C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine, and before he became the German Head of State, Admiral Karl Dönitz turned his mind to the consideration of the fate of the remaining warships. It was, as he later wrote, a significant problem:

The officers of Supreme Headquarters were of the opinion that to hand over weapons, and particularly warships, the most strikingly outward and visible manifestation of armed strength, would be a violation of the tenets of military honour.

I fully realised that if I handed over our warships I would be acting contrary to the traditions of our Navy and of the navies of every other nation. It was in an effort to conform to this code of honour which is accepted by all nations that the German Navy sank the fleet in Scapa Flow at the end of the First World War. (1)

Almost all the publications that describe the end of the U-boat war refer at least briefly to the Kriegsmarine’s Operation Regenbogen, and their authors invariably imply that the scuttling of the many U-boats in early May 1945 was contrary to the conditions of the formal “Instrument of Surrender” agreed with Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in
North Germany. The latter was signed at 1830 on the evening of 4 May and became effective from 0800 on 5 May 1945.

This review attempts to uncover the facts, stories, and rumours surrounding the Regenbogen-related scuttlings, many of which were related to the confusion and fog-of-war that had settled over North Germany in the first week of May 1945, especially on the night of 4 / 5 May and before the total German capitulation came into effect at 0001 on 9 May.

**The Kriegsmarine’s Regenbogen Scuttling Policy**

Throughout the war, the German Navy had a standing instruction that the Commanding Officers (COs) of all warships were expected to scuttle their vessels rather than surrender or allow them to be captured. It was thus not surprising when, as the end of the war in Europe approached, the Kriegsmarine’s Naval War Staff (Seekriegsleitung (SkI)) reinforced this requirement by sending a message on 30 April 1945 to all German naval headquarters, including the Office of the Commander-in-Chief U-boats (BdU), concerning what it called the “self-destruction” (scuttling) of the remaining German naval ships and submarines:

_In case of a non-predictable development of the situation it is intended to sink the nucleus of the fleet upon dissemination of codeword Regenbogen [Rainbow], and to retire units from the service still useful for civilian purposes._

_Codeword Regenbogen signifies:_

_a. The following war ships are to be sunk immediately respectively to destroy themselves: battleships, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, S-boats, U-boats._

_b. All ships still with the potential for later civilian use such as fishing or transportation are to be retired. Their armament has to be destroyed._

_c. Ships still usable for any kind of minesweeping operations are to be retired. Their armament is to be destroyed. (2)_

**The Initial Implementation of Regenbogen**

During the final week of the war, the BdU directed that all the remaining operational and potentially-operational U-boats—especially those in the Baltic—were to transfer to Norway, from where the U-boat war would continue. However, this left a large number in the Baltic and north-west German ports and anchorages, particularly the many new Type XXI and Type XXIII high-tech U-boats still undergoing their various stages of work-up prior to becoming operational.

At the same time, the Allied armies to the east and west of Hamburg and Kiel were closing in on the German forces in northern Germany; by 2 May, British forces had reached the Baltic coast near Lubeck. Almost all the U-boat ports and anchorages to the west and east of the Danish peninsula, but south of the Danish border, were also under immediate threat of capture. Thus, with effect from 1 May, the planned scuttling of the U-boats in lieu of surrender began. Such action was contrary neither to Allied nor to Kriegsmarine policy; indeed, it was exactly what the Kriegsmarine had ordered.

It was therefore no surprise when, for instance, Admiral (U/B)—who by then was Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg—sent the following message to the U-boat bases at Wesermünde and Wilhelmshaven on 1 May, with copies to the CO of No. 31 U-Boat Flotilla, as well as Captain (U/B) Baltic:
For U-boats the orders issued will continue to apply, namely the destruction of U-boats by order of Admiral (U/B), unless the local O.I/C Base is compelled by the situation to act independently. (3)

The CO of No.31 U-Boat Flotilla in Wesermunde confirmed the order:

In agreement with Admiral, Navy Office Hamburg, the following boats… will be towed at once to Markwaerderhafen, ready for blowing up. (3)

On the same day (2 May), the CO of No.25 U-Boat Flotilla in Travemunde advised Admiral U/B:

Arrival of enemy tanks in Travemunde reported at 1515. Am giving order to scuttle. (4)

On 3 May, BdU (Ops) similarly instructed the CO of No.5 U-Boat Flotilla in Kiel:

Boats ready for Norway are to leave Geltinger Bay for Norway immediately. If at all possible make provision for Regenbogen in Geltinger Bay. (5)

Regenbogen was therefore underway from the very start of May 1945, and all those in charge of the remaining U-boats in North Germany—from Dönitz and the Admirals in the various Headquarters right down to the individual U-boat COs—were well aware of the Kriegsmarine’s scuttling policy and were implementing it as circumstances demanded. Thus, three U-boats were scuttled in Warnemunde on the Baltic coast on 1 May, 32 were scuttled off the Baltic coast on 2 May (mostly in Travemunde), and a further 46 were scuttled in a variety of north-west German and Baltic locations on 3 May.

The specific Regenbogen warning order of 30 April was reinforced late on 3 May (or early on 4 May) when the Naval War Staff (Skl) advised the whole fleet, including Admiral (U/B):

[The] basic order remains in force that old battleships, cruisers, destroyers, new torpedo boats, S-boats, U-boats and small battle units may not fall into enemy hands, but in the existing situation are to be sunk or destroyed. (4)

Shortly thereafter, early on 4 May, BdU (Ops) sent a further message to Admiral U-Boats and all U-boat COs and U-boat bases on the north German coast advising them that

The U-boat war goes on.

Boats coming from Kiel are to go not to Flensburg, but to Geltinger Bay. Cdr. Liebe of BdU (Ops) will settle which boats can be made ready for front line operations and be despatched to Norway.

On keyword ‘Regenbogen’ which may also be given for single areas, U-boats are to be scuttled or destroyed outside the fairways.

Over and above this, the order is: No boat is to fall into enemy hands. Every man must scuttle on his own responsibility in case of danger. (5)

This order was reinforced yet again, also on 4 May, by the Naval War Staff (Skl):

Local C’s-in-C are authorised, taking account of [the] situation, to issue code word ‘Regenbogen’ on their own responsibility. (4)
All the U-boat COs had thus been very clearly reminded of their duty; they could be in no
doubt about it. If they were not in a position to sail their U-boats to Norway, they were to
scuttle their boats rather than surrender them to the forces of either the Russians or the
Western Allies. The plethora of messages despatched by the OKM (the Kriegsmarine HQ),
the Skl and the BdU in the first few days of May 1945 made it quite clear that this was a
Kriegsmarine policy requirement. As a result, a further five U-boats were scuttled on 4 May
in accordance with the extant Regenbogen order.

The Surrender in North Germany to 21st Army Group

Whilst these initial scuttling actions were underway, many of them overlapped with the
negotiations in North Germany leading to the surrender to Field Marshal Sir Bernard
Montgomery’s 21st Army Group of all German armed forces in Holland, Denmark and north-
west Germany, including the Friesian Islands, Heligoland, and all the islands in Schleswig-
Holstein. The negotiations took place on 3 and 4 May; the formal surrender agreement was
signed at 1830 on the evening of 4 May, and it came into effect at 0800 on 5 May. It required
all German armed forces in these areas to lay down their arms and surrender
unconditionally and—in a last-minute addition to the first paragraph of the typed “Instrument
of Surrender” document, written in the Field Marshal’s own hand-writing—it included the
condition that the surrender also applied to all naval ships, thus obviously including U-boats.

There is nevertheless confusion relating to the date and time when Admiral Dönitz, who was
now Head of State, became aware of Montgomery’s late condition concerning the surrender
of all warships. Dönitz wrote in his Memoirs,

   At our morning conference on May 4 I … directed Supreme Headquarters to issue orders
   that no arms were to be destroyed. At the same time I instructed the Chief of Naval Staff
   to ensure that the signal ‘Regenbogen’—the code word for the sinking of warships—
   should not be issued and explained to him the reason for my instructions. (1)

While there is no doubt that the main topic of this meeting on 4 May, which was attended by
(amongst others) Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Admiral von Friedeburg, as well as by
Johann Ludwig “Lutz” Count Schwerin von Krosigk (Dönitz’s Minister for Foreign Affairs) and
Commander Walter Ludde-Neurath (Dönitz’s adjutant), was the implications of the proposed
local ceasefire, it is not clear if there were any specific discussions about Regenbogen per-
se. This is especially as it appears that no specific Regenbogen-related orders or
instructions were originated as a result. Perhaps by 1959, Dönitz’s memory had let him
down a little.

Equally, there is no evidence to confirm that the standing Regenbogen warning order of 30
April was ever formally rescinded during the morning, afternoon or evening of 4 May 1945,
either by Dönitz himself, the Supreme Command Staff (OKW), the Skl staff at the OKM or by
Admiral (U/B) at the BdU. No such instructions are recorded in either the OKW or the OKM
War Diaries, and unfortunately no copy of the May 1945 BdU War Diary survived the war.

The Continuation of Regenbogen

On the other hand, on 4 and 5 May, Admiral Dönitz initiated two specific actions relating to
the impending end of the war. First, on the afternoon of 4 May he ordered all the U-boats at
sea to cease operations and return to Norwegian ports. As a result, in a message to Field
Marshal Montgomery on 5 May, Head of the German Armed Forces Field Marshal Keitel
advised:
The Grossadmiral [ Dönitz ] has issued orders already on 4 May at 1614 to all U-boats to cease combat operations and to sail homeward. (6)

Second, on Dönitz’s behalf, BdU (Ops) advised all U-boat COs on 5 May that the OKM had ordered that they were to

Cease hostilities against the English and Americans forthwith. (5)

It is therefore possible that neither Dönitz nor the OKW staff realized the specific need to order the formal cancellation of the standing Regenbogen instruction until late on 4 May, probably after the surrender document had been signed. Specifically, they may have realized it only after Admiral von Friedeburg ( Dönitz’s senior representative at the Luneburg Heath negotiations ) had reported back to him in Flensberg at 1940 on the evening of 4 May that the “Instrument of Surrender” now included Montgomery’s late additional hand-written statement indicating that all warships were required to surrender.

As recorded by Dönitz’s Adjutant, Commander Walter Ludde-Neurath, in the 1999 version of his book Regierung Donitz: Die Letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches (first drafted in 1948):

On the same evening at 19:40 hrs we received a radio message concerning the signing of the instrument of surrender in the HQ of Montgomery which had taken place in the meantime. In the Northern Area, weapons were to be silent from the 5th of May at 08:00 hrs. As desired by the Grossadmiral, the OKW issued orders forbidding the destruction of weapons and—with a short explanation of the reasons—the order to pass all weapons to the enemy. (7)

As a result of this, at some time after 1940 on 4 May, and most probably in the very early morning of 5 May, Field Marshal Keitel caused the OKW, in a short (but unfortunately untimed) message, to notify all the German armed forces—including the Kriegsmarine—of the 21st Army Group’s surrender conditions, including the requirement, to use his own words, that there should be “no scuttling,” viz:

As of 05 May 1945 0800 hrs of German summertime ceasefire with respect to the troops of Field Marshal Montgomery. It comprises all formations of the Army, the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe and the Waffen-SS within the area of the Netherlands, Friesland including West and East Friesland Island and Heligoland, Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. To be made known to all subordinate troops immediately. Check reception of orders, troops remain in their positions with their weapons. Transport operations by the Kriegsmarine at sea to be continued. Strictly no destructions, scuttling and demonstrations. Securing of all stocks, obedience and discipline to be maintained with iron strength. Further orders to follow. (8)

In respect to the timing of this instruction from the OKW, which made no specific mention of Regenbogen, there are a number of clues that it was despatched either very late on 4 May or very early on 5 May, most probably the latter. For example—as revealed in a message found in the war diary of the damaged light cruiser Leipzig, which was being used as an accommodation ship in the S E Danish port of Aabenraa, from Vice Admiral Hans-Heinrich Wurmbach, who was Admiral (Skagerrak) and was responsible for the coastal defence of Denmark—its contents were not forwarded to the Kriegsmarine units in Wurmbach’s area of responsibility until 0145 on 5 May. (9)

There is also an entry in the OKM War Diary on 5 May 1945 which shows that, despite the Keitel message bearing the very highest transmission priority of “Blitz,” it was apparently only passed on to the OKM / Skl staffs at 0425 on 5 May. (10)
Additionally, there was another “Blitz” message at 0517 on 5 May sent to the Admirals commanding the Kriegsmarine’s Naval Command West and Naval Command North reinforcing the Keitel message:

The cessation of hostilities viz-a-viz Field Marshal Montgomery’s troops, which comes into force at 0800/5/5, applies to the area of the Netherlands, Friesland (including the Western and Eastern Friesland Islands and Heligoland), Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. (3)

Even this did not entirely clarify the situation, and Admiral (Netherlands) responded to the Skl at 0815 on 5 May:

Query. Is freedom of independent action for Admiral Netherlands with regard to key-word Regenbogen cancelled by the order concerning the truce? (3)

All this suggests that there were major communication difficulties, that the instruction about “no scuttling” only slowly made its way down through the various levels of the chain of command, and more especially that even the Kriegsmarine’s senior officers were unclear as to whether or not the Keitel message formally over-rod the Regenbogen order.

In fact, the wording of Keitel’s message concerning the timing of the “ceasefire” seemed to create the opportunity for recipients to make their own choices as to when the “no scuttling” order was to take effect. Thus, during the night of 4 / 5 May the news that no U-boats were to be destroyed or scuttled in lieu of surrender was followed by much concern and misunderstanding within the OKM and the Skl, as well as in U-Boat Headquarters (BdU), about the exact meaning and implications of the message. In particular, for instance, did it apply immediately or only after 0800 on 5 May?

 Dönitz was no longer the C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine and Admiral U-Boats, and during the evening of 4 May his successor in both appointments, Admiral von Friedeburg, was on his way to Reims to meet General Eisenhower in order to negotiate the complete capitulation of the German State on Dönitz’s behalf. Additionally, Admiral Godt, the BdU’s Chief of Staff, was on his way to Norway. There may therefore have been a temporary lack of effective leadership amongst the Kriegsmarine’s senior OKM, Skl and BdU staff, which conspired to create a decision vacuum.

Neither the OKM, the Skl staff, the BdU staff, nor a number of U-boat COs who had assembled at the new HQ location in Flensburg could believe that Dönitz would have rescinded the Regenbogen order voluntarily; if he had done so, the decision must have been made under duress and against his better judgement. There were attempts to speak directly to the Admiral late in the evening of 4 May, but by then he was sleeping and not available to clarify the situation.

In the absence of clarity, the BdU staff therefore took matters into their own hands and, in what could be interpreted as a direct contravention of the OKW’s Keitel order, despatched a message early on 5 May (probably, according to an ULTRA intercept, at 0134 German Summertime):

New situation.

If possible U-boats which at 0800/5/5 are in German or Danish ports, roads or bays or are south of latitude 55.10 north will carry out ‘Regenbogen’, i.e. scuttle in as deep water as possible. (5)

It was not until around midday on 5 May that this order was belatedly rescinded by the
BdU, in a message sent to all U-boat COs in German and Danish waters:

_Do not carry out any further ‘Regenbogen’ after 0800/5/5._ (5)

There is, however, no clear evidence that establishes the precise time of release of this latter message; nevertheless, the use of the words “at” and “after” in both messages seems to imply that, as far as the BdU was concerned, it was acceptable for the commissioned but non-operational U-boats located in German and Danish ports or at sea south of latitude 55.10 degrees N to be scuttled prior to 0800 on 5 May, but not later.

It was also by then too late to reverse the many local actions that had been initiated in the early hours of 5 May. As a result, a further 95 U-boats were scuttled out of sight of any Allied forces during the course of 5 May, mostly from Kiel, Flensburg, Wilhelmshaven, and Wesermunde and mostly, it must be assumed, in the early hours of the morning prior to the 0800 deadline imposed by the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender.”

Several examples of the reaction to the activation and the subsequent cancellation of Regenbogen were intercepted by ULTRA on 5 and 6 May:

- On the morning of 5 May, the 26th U-Boat Flotilla at Warnemunde reported, “Measure ‘Regenbogen’ completed.” (3)

- On the evening of 5 May, the 4th U-Boat Flotilla reported that 2 U-boats had been “Sunk in Flensburg.” (4)

- On the evening of 5 May, the 8th Defence Division wrote, “The Commanding Officer of U-2544 reports ‘Regenbogen’ carried out.” (5)

- On the evening of 5 May, Captain (U/B) Baltic reported that 2 U-boats were “Blown up as the last U-boats in the [Kiel] canal.” (4)

- Late on 5 May, the U-Boat Base at Wesermunde reported, “Cancellation of ‘Regenbogen’ received too late. ‘Regenbogen’ carried out.” (4)

- Early on 6 May, the U-Boat Base at Wilhelmshaven reported, “Wilhelmshaven is being occupied. Secret matter destroyed. ‘Regenbogen’ carried out.” (3)

(There were undoubtedly major communication difficulties in North Germany on 4 and 5 May 1945, and so the dates and times of these ULTRA intercepts do not necessarily indicate exactly when the various messages were first originated and / or transmitted.)

Respecting the message from Wilhelmshaven on 6 May, its veracity was confirmed by the CO of the Royal Navy’s local Submarine Party, which had arrived at Wilhelmshaven in early May, and whose Report of Proceedings stated, without any seeming concern,

_All U-boats in Wilhelmshaven, some 26 in number, were found to have been sunk, three by recent air attacks and the remainder by order of the German Admiral von Friedeburg some days previous to our arrival._ (11)

**The Montgomery-Related Surrenders**

Despite the considerable confusion about the scuttling of the U-boats that had arisen because of the series of orders and counter-orders, and which had led to the scuttling of the 95 U-boats on 5 May, there were nevertheless a small number of U-boat COs who complied
with Keitel’s “No scuttling” interpretation of the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender” and so chose—or were instructed—not to scuttle their boats in accordance with the extant Regenbogen order.

By the end of the day on 5 May, 19 U-boats had surrendered in port as instructed: 16 in the German ports of Heligoland, Cuxhaven and Flensburg, and three near Fredericia in Denmark. Subsequently, two more U-boats arrived from sea to surrender in ports that either had already been or were about to be taken over by the Allies, for a total of 21:

- Seven in Heligoland on 5 May (U-143, U-145, U-149, U-150, U-368, U-720, and U-1230)
- One in Flensburg on 5 May (U-2351)
- Three in Baring Bay, near Fredericia (Denmark) on 5 May (U-155, U-680, and U-1233)
- One from sea in Aarhus (Denmark) on 6 May (U-806)
- One from sea in Cuxhaven on 8 May (U-1198)

Of the 14 U-boats that surrendered in port on 5 May, two were the Type XVIIB “Walter” U-boats U-1406 and U-1407 in Cuxhaven, both of which were subsequently scuttled on 6 / 7 May, and all but one of the remainder were also located in Cuxhaven and Heligoland. In these two locations, in contrast to the actions that took place in almost all the other ports and anchorages—and although neither had at that stage been captured by the Allies—all the U-boats surrendered rather than being scuttled by their COs.

Rather than being scuttled in accordance with the Regenbogen order, the surrender of the U-boats in Cuxhaven was due to the personal intervention of Vice Admiral Gustav Kleikamp, the Coast Commander German Bight (based in Cuxhaven), and his staff, which included Captain Kurt Thoma, the CO of the Kriegsmarine’s 5th Security Division, and Commander Gottfried Stollte. The Admiral and his staff were not directly responsible for the operational control of the U-boats in the harbour at Cuxhaven, but early in the morning of 5 May they had become aware of the requirement in the “Instrument of Surrender”—as set out in Keitel’s message—that no warships were to be scuttled.

The Admiral and his staff had also been alerted to the situation by a message in the early morning of 5 May from the COs of the two “Walter” U-boats, U-1406 (Lt Klug) and U-1407 (Lt Heitz), which had only recently arrived from Kiel, which stated,

> We request order to scuttle for ‘Walter’ front-line boats in event of seizure by the enemy being imminent. (3)

Rather than allowing any scuttling being allowed to proceed, it was made clear to the COs of all the U-boats in Cuxhaven harbour that, despite the Regenbogen order, they were to surrender their charges. The chain of events during 5 / 6 May, including the precise reasons why the surrenders took place, is set out in the Royal Navy’s Interrogation Report of Lts Klug and Heitz, viz:

> At 0400 on 5 May the order ‘Regenbogen für U-Boote’ which meant ‘All U-boats within certain latitudes should be scuttled’ [was received]. This order included Cuxhaven. We
thereupon called Korv. Kapt. Stollte aboard the ‘Heligoland’ informing him that we were going to put out to sea to carry out the order.

Stollte told us that Admiral Kleikamp had phoned him instructing him that the order was cancelled. We told Stollte that we had not ‘heard’ the [latter] order and would go out just the same. Stollte said to us ‘what I am telling you now is an order from me, and you are not to sail’. We thereupon returned to our ships to await further orders which never came.

During the morning at about 1100 we met Lt. Grumpelt in the harbour and made an appointment with him to sail, in the company of other U-boats, to scuttle our craft. Kapt. Thoma probably got to hear of this scheme, because he came to contact us and again gave us an order that we were not to sail. Grumpelt evidently got to hear that Thoma had forbidden us to sail, and new arrangements were made to run out at 2200 that evening.

At about 2000 we received a signal that we were to report aboard the ‘Heligoland’ where we met all the other U-boat commanders based at Cuxhaven. When we were all there, we were driven out to Kubelbake to Admiral Kleikamp’s headquarters. We assembled there, the Admiral came in, made a speech, and we each of us, individually, had to give our word of honour to the Admiral and seal it with a handshake, that we would not scuttle our craft. (12)

The U-boats that surrendered in Heligoland on 5 May, like those in Cuxhaven, were under the operational control of No. 34 U-Boat Flotilla based in Wilhelmshaven. However, they were also under the administrative control of Vice Admiral Gustav Kleikamp, as well as his subordinate Rear Admiral Rolf Johannesson, the Commander of the Elbe-Weser Naval Defence Region (which included both Cuxhaven and Heligoland).

Though still a U-boat training base in early May, Heligoland was in the process of being converted into an operational base. Captain Alfred Roegglen, who was both the fortress’s commander and the senior German Naval Officer, was well aware of the general requirement for the destruction of the Island’s facilities and weapons prior to any possible capture by the Allies. However, despite this, a message—originating at 0135 on 5 May—was received from Admiral Johannesson, which passed on the contents of the OKW order from Field Marshal Keitel containing the “no scuttling” instruction. (13)

As a result, and despite the fact that Heligoland had not yet been captured by Allied forces, the seven U-boats based there were not scuttled in accordance with the Regenbogen order. Instead, they surrendered, and their COs patiently awaited their fate until a party of Royal Marines arrived from Cuxhaven on 8 May.

Of the remaining six U-boats that surrendered to the Allies on or after 5 May as required by the “Instrument of Surrender” (rather than being scuttled by their COs in accordance with their Regenbogen-related orders),

- **U-2351** had departed Flensburg on 4 May en-route to Norway, but had been attacked by aircraft and re-entered Flensburg the same day. Unable to sail again, it surrendered on 5 May.

- **U-155, U-680, and U-1233** had departed Flensburg on 4 May en-route to Norway, but had been attacked by aircraft and taken shelter in Baring Bay on the same day. They surrendered on 5 May after receiving advice about the cessation of hostilities from the local Danish harbourmaster.
• *U-806* had departed Kiel on 3 May en-route to Norway, but had been damaged after grounding on 5 May. This caused it to enter Aarhus in Denmark on 6 May, which by then had been occupied by British troops, to whom it surrendered.

• *U-1198* had departed Cuxhaven on 4 May en-route to Norway, and was about 100 miles north of Cuxhaven on 6 May when it received news of the need to surrender. As a result, it returned to Cuxhaven, arriving on 8 May, where it surrendered.

**The Scuttlings that occurred between 6 and 9 May**

Despite the number of U-boats that surrendered to the 21st Army Group in the geographical area of North Germany and southern Denmark, the war was by no means over on 5 May, and the remaining U-boats were still considered to be part of the Kriegsmarine’s operational force. This was so even though Dönitz had ordered that attacks against British and American targets were to cease and that all the U-boats at sea were to return clandestinely to Norwegian bases.

The BdU message on 4 May stating that “The U-boat war goes on” was still valid, and a whole series of Admiralty and RAF Coastal Command messages originated between 4 and 7 May made it very clear that the surrender to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group did not signal the end of the U-boat war:

• 4 May—from RAF Coastal Command: *All attacks to cease immediately except within 20 miles of Norwegian coast. This does not repeat not apply to U-boats at sea against which operations are to continue.* (14)

• 4 May—from the Admiralty: *Attacks on U-boats and escorting vessels at sea should be continued.* (14)

• 5 May—from RAF Coastal Command: *Personal from AOC-in-C. In spite of surrender of German forces on the continent there is as yet no indication that they contemplate surrender in Norway. We may therefore expect the continuance of intensive U-boat operations from Norwegian bases. All ranks must realise that for Coastal Command the war goes on as before. We started first, we finish last. I call upon all Squadrons for a great final effort against our old enemy. It falls to Coastal Command to strike the final blow against the enemy’s one remaining weapon.* (14)

• 5 May—from the Admiralty: *Enemy shipping in the Skagerrak north of 58 degrees (N) and proceeding towards Norway may be attacked pending further instructions.* (14)

• 7 May—from RAF Coastal Command: *Normal operations against U-boats to be continued until 0001 9 May.* (14)

• 7 May—from the Admiralty: *Attacks on U-boats should continue as heretofore.* (14)

There is, therefore, no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the U-boat war ceased after the Montgomery surrender in North Germany came into force at 0800 on 5 May. Rather, it was not formally brought to an end until just after midnight on 8 / 9 May, when the British Vice-Chief of Naval Staff at the Admiralty in London issued the instruction “Carry out Operation Adieu,” signifying the formal end of the war at sea. (15)

In the meantime, however, U-boats continued to attempt the transit passage from North Germany to Norway, and the Allies continued their air attacks on these U-boats, many of
which were forced to make the voyage on the surface in order to find their way through the British and German minefields on their route north. It is thus not surprising that additional scuttlings took place between 6 and 9 May, two of which were directly related to damage from air attack whilst in transit to Norway, but others of which were actually contrary to both the Kriegsmarine’s “Cancel Regenbogen” message and to the British orders as set out in the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender”—albeit that it is possible that the on-going communication difficulties might have contributed to the confused situation. The following U-boats were scuttled:

- **U-1008**—scuttled in the Kattegat on 6 May after suffering severe damage during an air attack whilst on passage to Norway.
- **U-2365**—scuttled in the Kattegat north-west of the Danish island of Anholt on 8 May.
- **U-2512**—scuttled in Eckernförde on 8 May.
- **U-2538**—scuttled in the south-west Baltic off the Danish island of Aero on 8 May.
- **U-3030**—scuttled in Eckernförde Bay on 8 May.
- **U-3503**—scuttled in the Kattegat west of Goteburg (Sweden) on 8 May after damage caused by an air attack whilst on passage to Norway.
- **U-2367**—scuttled in the Baltic (south-east of Schleimunde) on 9 May.

Though Regenbogen-related, the scuttling of **U-1406** and **U-1407** on the night of 6 / 7 May 1945 after they had surrendered on 5 May was a one-off special case. “The Case for the Prosecution” against Lt Grumpelt at his Court Martial in February 1946, included the following details of the event:

After a day of discussion as to whether the U-boats were to be scuttled on the next night, Grumpelt went aboard these two U-boats with a rating, and scuttled them. He did it, according to his statement, of his own volition, quite openly and in a sane mind, because he wished to deprive the Allies of the use of those two submarines, which were of the very latest type and capable of giving a great deal of information to the Allies. (16)

It is apparent from the evidence presented at the Grumpelt trial that, despite all the very many German messages, instructions, and counter-instructions that were originated on 4 May and in the early hours of 5 May, the British authorities’ understanding of the conditions set out in the “Instrument of Surrender” was that no Regenbogen-related scuttlings were permitted after 0800 on 5 May. Thus all the scuttlings which took place on that day, mostly probably before or around 0800, were accepted as legal within the terms of the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender.”

The scuttling of **U-1008** and **U-3503** after they were attacked from the air and damaged whilst in transit from the Baltic to Norway could more properly be regarded as “war losses” rather than Regenbogen-related scuttlings. In contrast, however, there are good cases for believing that the scuttling of **U-2365** (Christiansen), **U-2367** (Schroder), **U-2512** (Nordheimer), **U-2538** (Klapdor) and **U-3030** (Luttmann) were contrary to the extant Kriegsmarine and Allied orders, and were—strictly speaking—examples of deliberate disobedience. Each of their COs was undoubtedly aware of the orders pertaining after 0800 on 5 May but, in spite of this, they each decided to deny their U-boat to the Allies.

On the other hand, the U-boat war was actually still underway, and any submarine at sea in
the Baltic was at very serious risk of being attacked from the air and sunk—with the total loss of the crew—irrespective of its CO’s intentions, and especially in the absence of any formal surrender procedure (as happened as part of the main capitulation several days later). The circumstances which led to the perhaps not-so-unreasonable late scuttling of these five U-boats were the following:

- **U-2365** was scuttled in the Kattegat, off the Danish island of Anholt, on 8 May. After an air attack on 5 May whilst on passage to Norway, the CO continued north towards the Norwegian U-boat base at Kristiansand-South, but then learned that the German forces had capitulated. **U-2365** immediately turned south and headed for Germany until 1700 on 8 May, when it encountered a Kriegsmarine guardship in the vicinity of Anholt. Although the CO knew by then that scuttling was forbidden, he went ahead with it, and he and the crew transferred to the guardship.

- **U-2367** was in Kiel on 3 May when the British forces arrived, but rather than scuttling his U-boat, the CO moved it to Flensburg, where he should have surrendered. Instead, he left the harbour in company with a coastal patrol boat and headed for Schleimunde, which had not yet been taken over by British forces. After lying submerged off Schleimunde for the next two days, **U-2367** entered the port and disembarked most of the crew before being scuttled in the Baltic, four miles south-east of Schleimunde lighthouse, on 9 May.

- **U-2512** arrived at Kiel on 3 May en-route to Norway, and at midnight the CO received orders to leave the harbour and scuttle his U-boat. In spite of this, he headed for Flensburg in order to pick up some of his crew whom he had allowed ashore. **U-2512** was then moved to Eckernförde, where the Engineer Officer and two members of the crew were put ashore to check the military situation whilst the rest of the crew prepared the U-boat for scuttling. During the next two days, **U-2512** was twice ordered to surrender—first by the CO of the local No. 33 U-Boat Flotilla, and then by the CO of the Torpedo Trials School—but the U-boat’s CO disagreed. Instead he proposed to decommission his U-boat and hand it over to the CO of the Torpedo Trials School. The local informal decommissioning ceremony took place on the evening of 7 May, but shortly after midnight eight members of the crew re-boarded **U-2512** and scuttled it in Eckernförde Bay in the early hours of 8 May.

- **U-2538** escaped from Swinemünde at the beginning of May and arrived off Travemünde on 3 May to find that all other U-boats there had been scuttled on 2 May. It was ordered by the CO of No. 25 U-Boat Flotilla to scuttle in the open Baltic, but before it was able to do so, a group of four U-boats, which included **U-2538**, were attacked by aircraft on 3 May. Of these, one was sunk, but the other three escaped towards the western Baltic. Soon afterwards the CO learned of the capitulation from an Allied radio message, but he was not prepared to surrender his U-boat. Although he knew that it was contrary to his orders, he decided to sail north-west until he arrived off the Danish coast near the small island of Aero, where **U-2538** remained, mostly submerged, until the U-boat was scuttled at 0445 on 8 May after the weather conditions allowed the crew to go safely ashore.

- **U-3030**, in company with **U-2538**, also escaped from Swinemünde at the beginning of May and arrived off Travemünde on 3 May to find that all other U-boats there had been scuttled on 2 May. Like **U-2538**, it was ordered by the CO of No. 25 U-Boat Flotilla to scuttle in the open Baltic, but before it was able to do so, a group of four U-boats, which included **U-3030**, were attacked by aircraft on 3 May. **U-3030** arrived in Eckernförde on 4 May, and the CO went ashore to reconnoitre the situation. After he returned, he moved **U-3030** near to the small fishing village of Noer, where one of the
crew knew a local farmer, and the U-boat remained submerged there for three nights until, after unloading all their provisions with the help of local fishermen, the crew went ashore and the CO scuttled it on the morning of 8 May.

The only scuttling that might have been of concern to the British authorities were those which took place on 6 May and thereafter but, other than in the case of U-1406 and U-1407, any evidence that might have been available about any U-boats that were scuttled later than the deadline were ignored—even if the British had known about them. It seems that the COs of only five U-boats contravened the agreed surrender conditions, and the confusion and fog-of-war existing at the time enabled them to avoid any sort of censure or other disciplinary action.

**Secondary-Source Commentaries Relating to Regenbogen**

There are a number of good secondary sources of information relating to Regenbogen, four of which were written shortly after the war by officers directly associated with the 21st Army Group’s surrender negotiations. With the advantage of hindsight, these shed extra light on what were obviously the confused conditions in Flensburg on 4 and 5 May 1945. The first was written by Admiral Dönitz himself, and the others by three Kriegsmarine officers: Korvettenkapitan (Commander) Walter Ludde-Neurath, Fregattenkapitan (Captain) Gunter Hessler and Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Dr Wolfgang Frank.

Admiral Dönitz’s book, *Memoirs*, first published in Germany in 1958 under the title *Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage* (*Ten Years and Twenty Days*), was published in England in 1959, and in it he records—perhaps somewhat naively and maybe with a slight lapse of memory—

> Except for a few U-boats which were blown up by their captains in the night of May 4-5 before the armistice came into force, no warships of the German Navy were sunk. The U-boats in question had already been prepared for scuttling before the Naval Staff’s orders to the contrary had arrived. Their captains were sure that in sinking their boats they would be acting in accordance with my wishes, since they could not believe that I would have issued orders to surrender except under compelling pressure. (1)

Commander Walter Ludde-Neurath was Dönitz’s Flag Lieutenant (Adjutant) from September 1944 until the end of the war, and he was very closely associated with the events that occurred in the first week of May 1945. The first German-language edition of his own book, *Unconditional Surrender*, was published in 1950; it had been written in 1948 when the memory of events in 1945 was still relatively fresh in his mind. The latest English-language edition was published in 2010, and includes the following detail:

> At 1940 hrs the same evening [4 May] we received a signal confirming the signing at Montgomery’s HQ and at 0800 hrs on 5 May the guns fell silent. Following Dönitz’s order, OKW ordered that no weapons were to be destroyed and with a brief explanation ordered them to be surrendered to the enemy.

> It was obeyed almost without exception. Only the U-boat arm, loyal to Dönitz in a special way, declined the order in the Homeland. Dönitz had already left when [Heinrick] Liebe [ex U-38] and [Martin] Duppet [ex-U-959], both veteran U-boat commanders, stormed into my office. Both were attached to the BdU staff [and] had now received the incomprehensible order not to scuttle the U-boat fleet. They would only obey this order if they heard it from Dönitz’s own mouth.

> I was certain that Dönitz would not go back on his decision. Therefore I refused them an interview with Dönitz with the observation that I knew what I would do as a commander. Both understood.
U-boats that received the order were scuttled on the night of 4 May. Dönitz himself was at first very surprised by the mass scuttling. None of the feared reprisals followed. On the contrary, we later gained the impression that this destruction was approved by the Western Allies. (17)

Captain Gunter Hessler, who was also Dönitz’s son-in-law, was a staff officer in the Operations Branch of the BdU from 1942 until the end of the war. At the request of the Admiralty, he was given free access to the surviving war diaries and primary sources of the German Navy, and in 1950 wrote what was initially a classified Admiralty document before it was published by HMSO in 1989 on behalf of the Navy Department under the title The U-Boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945. In it, Hessler records the actions that took place in relation to Regenbogen during the first week of May 1945 and the surrender to Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group:

Details of the surrender terms were transmitted to all German forces late on 4 May. However, the commanders of U-boats in the Western Baltic, who had already prepared their boats for scuttling in accordance with the orders for Regenbogen and were of the opinion that the order forbidding the sinking of their ships was contrary to Dönitz’s intention and given under duress, scuttled their U-boats that night, just before the armistice. (18)

Lieutenant Dr Wolfgang Frank was a Public Relations Officer on the BdU staff in 1945; he described his memories of the activities in early May 1945 in relation to the 21st Army Group surrender in his 1953 book Die Wölfe und der Admiral, an English version of which was published in 1955 under the title The Sea Wolves: The Story of the German U-Boats at War. In it, he confirms Ludde-Neurath’s version of events, albeit using somewhat more flamboyant and exaggerated language:

The order to cancel ‘Rainbow’ loosed a flood of questions and protests. Had the Grand Admiral really given the order? If he had it could only have been given under duress. Ludde-Neurath’s telephone never stopped ringing; he could only repeat the same answer over and over again. That is the truth, ‘Rainbow’ has been cancelled.

Late that night a group of officers stormed in. Where is the Grand Admiral? We must speak to him at once. The capitulation doesn’t come into effect until tomorrow. Suddenly one of them now realised what was needed. There was unanimity of feeling, [and] within a very short time the U-boat wireless transmitters began to buzz throughout North Germany: Rainbow, Rainbow, Rainbow.

All along the coast, at Flensburg, Eckernforde and Kiel, in Lubeck-Travemunde, at Neustadt, Hamburg and at Wilhelmshaven, [the U-boats] slid away from the jetties for the very last time. (19)

Another useful commentary on the confusing situation in early May 1945 was recorded by Korvettenkapitan (Commander) Peter (Ali) Cremer, who at that time was in charge of Dönitz’s bodyguard and therefore in close personal contact with the Admiral, in the 1987 English language version of his book, U-Boat Commander. Although his own U-boat (U-2519) had been scuttled in Kiel on 3 May, and despite a number of memory lapses regarding the timing of various Regenbogen-related scuttlings, he offered the following details:

When these incidents were reported to him, I was personally present. The Grand Admiral looked very surprised and at first disapproving, then a slight smile crossed his face. And we commanders also got away with it, for the Allied reprisals which we had expected did
It had been hoped that the recollections of Count Schwerin von Krosigk, who had been present at Dönitz’s meeting at 0900 on 4 May, would shed additional helpful light on the discussions that took place about the implication of the proposed terms and conditions of the surrender to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, but his version of the story is equivocal to say the least. He says that the meeting took place on 3 May (which is incorrect), and the words used in his 1977 Memoirs follow very closely those of Dönitz’s Flag Lieutenant, Walter Ludde-Neurath. Indeed, they seem to have been based directly on the latter’s version of events; they add nothing to the information that is already available from other sources; and they have therefore added nothing to the debate.

The Timing of the Regenbogen Executive Order and its Cancellation

Because of the “fog-of-war” surrounding events in North Germany in early May 1945, it is difficult to establish the precise dates and times at which the various orders relating to Regenbogen were initiated and received. This is exacerbated by the fact that no version of the May 1945 BdU War Diary exists. There are, however, other secondary sources which purport to specify the exact dates and times of the Regenbogen executive instruction and its withdrawal.

First, in the late British naval historian Dan van der Vat’s book The Atlantic Campaign, published in 1988:

Confusion now reigned in the residual submarine command. The code word ‘Regenbogen’ was transmitted at 1.34 a.m. on May 5. The German word for rainbow was the predetermined message indicating that submarines should scuttle themselves rather than surrender. At 1.42 a.m. however there came another message from Headquarters, now in Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein, which ordered that “no scuttle or destruction should be undertaken”. (21)

Second, the American naval historian Clay Blair in his book Hitler’s U-Boat War, published in 1998, somewhat cautiously records, in what seems to be an echo of Dan van der Vat’s commentary, that

According to some sources, the codeword ‘Regenbogen’ (Rainbow), the directive to initiate scuttling, was transmitted from Flensburg at 1.34 a.m. on May 5, German time, but rescinded by Dönitz or an aide eight minutes later. Whether this is true or not, it is certain that ambiguous orders of some kind regarding scuttling reached the U-boats. As a result, some skippers or surrogates commenced scuttling on May 5, but others did not. (22)

Third, in an email message to the author of this review in December 2013, the late Herr Horst Bredow—the authoritative German creator and mastermind of the Cuxhaven U-Boat Museum and Archive—stated,

The official ‘Regenbogen’ message was transmitted at 01.34 hrs (German Summer Time) on 5 May 1945, to be followed by a second message at 01.42 hrs on 5 May 1945 signed by Field Marshal Keitel himself informing all stations about the partial surrender to Montgomery and the strict order not to scuttle. (23)

However, none of these three secondary sources gives a clear and precise indication of the primary sources from which the authors apparently “discovered” the specific date / times that they quoted. Instead, there is the distinct impression that the two latter versions might well
be based on Dan van der Vat’s 1988 version. There is, therefore, a need to seek proof concerning the two quoted messages: the first apparently sent at 0134 on 5 May, and the second apparently sent at 0142 on 5 May.

There is no question that the BdU’s Regenbogen implementation message was the one intercepted by ULTRA at 0150 on 5 May, and which suggests that its time of origin was 0134 on 5 May. However, there is no evidence whatsoever concerning any closely-following specific Regenbogen cancellation message from the BdU. The message saying “Do not carry out any further ‘Regenbogen’ after 0800/5/5” was not intercepted by ULTRA until 1336 on 5 May—although that does not necessarily prove its time of origin by the BdU.

Dan van der Vat claims that the cancellation message was timed at 0142 on 5 May and contained the words “no scuttle or destruction should be undertaken,” and Horst Bredow states that it was “signed by Field Marshal Keitel himself informing all stations about the partial surrender to Montgomery and the strict order not to scuttle.”

The OKW’s Keitel message, for which there is no evidence as to its exact date / time of origin except that both Walter Ludde-Neurath and Gunter Hessler say it was sent late in the evening of 4 May, contained the words “strictly no scuttling.” It would seem likely, then, that a version of this, which was transmitted to the lower formations, may be the alleged cancellation message quoted by both Dan van der Vat and Bredow. However, this is not substantive evidence that it was the formal cancellation of the BdU’s Regenbogen implementation message sent at 0134 on 5 May; nor does it answer the question as to exactly when the BdU’s “Do not carry out any further ‘Regenbogen’ after 0800/5/5” message may have been originated.

This lack of sound evidence concerning the precise details and timing of the cancellation of the Regenbogen order is also confirmed (by omission) in the Canadian naval historian Dr Chris Madsen’s comprehensive and exceptionally well-researched 1998 book, *The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942-1947*. Madsen had little to say on the matter:

> Some German captains and crews decided to scuttle their warships and submarines before formal implementation of the surrender to 21st Army Group. Whether Dönitz and the German naval staff sanctioned these actions is unclear.

> The German naval staff originally intended to leave as few submarines as possible to the British. Early on 5 May British intelligence staffs intercepted a wireless message from the German naval high command [saying carry out ‘Regenbogen’].

> There is some suggestion that Dönitz later countermanded the order. (24)

Dr Madsen had obviously not been able to locate any specific Regenbogen cancellation message that had been originated in the early hours of 5 May, but at least he did not attempt to conflate it with the Keitel message—as others have done. Thus, the exact timing of any formal cancellation messages from the BdU in the early hours of 5 May—if indeed there ever were any—remains a mystery. All that is known is that they might have originated sometime after 0001 and before 0800 on 5 May.

A more likely explanation of this Regenbogen-related order / counter-order conundrum is that it stems from the coincidental overlap between the BdU’s orders, which followed the operational chain of command, and the OKW’s Keitel message relating to the Montgomery surrender, which generally followed the Kriegsmarine’s administrative chain of command. Thus, the Regenbogen implementation message sent out by the BdU in the early morning of 5 May never was specifically rescinded several minutes later—as some authors allege.
Rather, several versions of Field Marshal Keitel’s message were received at around the same time and shortly afterwards, but they did not specifically mention the cancellation / withdrawal of Regenbogen, even though they certainly forbade scuttling after 0800 on 5 May.

The operational U-boat authorities and COs were therefore faced with two separate but related messages: one from the BdU timed at 0134 on 5 May saying “scuttle,” and the other from their administrative commanders in the early hours of 5 May (of which those from Admiral [Skagerrak] at 0145 on 5 May and Sea Commander Elbe-Weser at 0135 on 5 May are but two examples) saying “do not scuttle.” No wonder there was confusion!

This confusion was well illustrated by the testimony CO of U-999, Lt Wolfgang Heibges, who scuttled his U-boat in Flensburg Fjord (Geltinger Bay) in the early morning of 5 May:

*The hours passed without the password Regenbogen being initiated. Instead, we received a counterorder from the Naval Staff, which forbade scuttling. I was clueless and now totally uncertain.*

*Was this counter order really in line with Dönitz’s mind? What were the reasons for it?*

The uncertain situation did not relax when the partial surrender in the west was communicated during the night of 4/5 May, which was to come into effect on 5 May at 0800 hours.

*We still dealt with the question: should we, may we, or must we scuttle our boat or not?*

*Just one thing was totally clear: scuttling after the time of partial surrender would have been a violation of the surrender conditions, no longer allowed within a few hours time.*

*I was relieved from this fateful decision, when the upper deck lookout reported that the first boats were being scuttled. (25)*

A further piece of the puzzle is provided by the German naval historian Michael Salewski, who, in Volume II of his 1975 book, *Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945 (The German Naval War Command 1935-1945)*, suggested that the confusion surrounding Regenbogen might have resulted from Admiral Dönitz deliberately turning a blind eye to the final tranche of the scuttling of the U-boats in the early hours of 5 May:

*In the night from 4 to 5 May 1945 all German U-boats which could be reached somehow sank themselves without the keyword Regenbogen ever having been transmitted [which is clearly incorrect]. Dönitz—allegedly surprised—could congratulate himself: Without proof of violating the ceasefire agreements, a matter of heart for the BdU had been fulfilled. As had been hoped there occurred no Allied reprisals, no doubt that the Western Allies were not discontent with this course of events. (26)*

In the interests of rescuing troops and refugees from the eastern Baltic it was essential that no surface warships were scuttled, but this was not so important in the case of the U-boats. Salewski implies that while Dönitz ensured that Field Marshal Montgomery was made aware of the order on 4 May that all U-boats were to cease combat operations and return to their bases, he deliberately chose to stay silent about the implementation of Regenbogen as far as the U-boats were concerned. Instead, he left the matter in the hands of the BdU and thus (by omission) allowed the Regenbogen order to be transmitted in the knowledge that its subsequent cancellation would be received too late to stop the related scuttling actions.
Finally, in what may well be the most accurate version of the events and their timing, there is Major Joachim Schultz-Naumann’s 1991 book, *The Last Thirty Days: The War Diary of the German Armed Forces High Command from April to May 1945*, the German edition of which (*Die Letzten Dreissig Tage*) was first published in 1951. This is an informal version of the OKW War Diary that had formally ceased being recorded on 19 April 1945, and the diary entry at 0045 on 5 May records the following:

*The order concerning the beginning of the armistice at 0800 hours German Summer Time, May 5, is sent to Commander in Chief North, Wehrmacht Commander Denmark, Naval High Command and the Luftwaffe High Command. (27)*

It would seem, therefore, that this was most probably the first version of the Keitel message to be despatched, albeit that the diary entry at 0445 then states, presumably in reinforcement of the earlier (0045) message,

*Telexes are sent to Commander in Chief North, Wehrmacht Commander Denmark, Commander in Chief Netherlands, Naval High Command, Luftwaffe High Command and various departments of the Reich, explaining why there was an armistice in the Northern Zone while fighting continues in the east. (27)*

The OKW diary also sheds some light on the timing of any possible separate specific instruction concerning the scuttling of the Kriegsmarine’s warships. On the one hand, and despite the fact that Dönitz was asleep in bed at the time, Schultz-Naumann records in the diary entry made at 0028 on 5 May:

*The Grand Admiral wishes that no demolitions or scuttling of ships be undertaken. (27)*

However, Schultz-Naumann records in the diary entry made at 1910 on 5 May, well after the formal cancellation of Regenbogen by the BdU,

*In the evening, the Grand Admiral cancels all orders concerning the scuttling of ships. There is evident desire to ensure a smooth transition as demonstrated by the sequence of events and the manner in which they have been handled by both Germans and Allies. (27)*

There is no mention whatsoever of Regenbogen in this sole remaining version of the OKW War Diary. It is therefore possible to conclude that, while Dönitz was obviously keen to ensure that no warships were scuttled in the light of the terms of the ceasefire / surrender to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, there was a failure in the follow-up staff action designed to transmit that message to the Kriegsmarine with sufficient clarity to ensure that all recipients fully understood that, by definition, it withdrew the extant Regenbogen order.

**The British Reaction to the Regenbogen Scuttlings on 5 May 1945**

There is no evidence of any British or Royal Navy criticism or adverse reaction to the many U-boat scuttlings that took place on 5 May 1945 or shortly thereafter; nor is there any evidence that these scuttlings were thought to have been made in contravention of the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender.” The surrender took effect at 0800 on 5 May, and it seems to have been accepted by the British authorities that all the scuttlings that took place before or around that time were, by definition, legal—or at least understandable and acceptable.

There was, nevertheless, well justified concern about the case of two Type XVIIB “Walter”
U-boats (*U-1406* and *U-1407*), which had been scuttled in Cuxhaven early on 7 May by an unconnected third party (Lt Gerhard Grumpelt) after their own COs had already surrendered their boats on 5 May. There was also some much later legal concern about four other U-boats that had been ordered to surrender from sea as a condition of the main German capitulation on 8 May but which were instead scuttled by their COs later in the month and in early June. Regardless, these latter four scuttlings were completely unconnected with the earlier Regenbogen-related actions.

Some months later, in September 1945, the staff of the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany, which by that time was titled the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), sought a legal opinion concerning the scuttling of *U-1406* and *U-1407* in Cuxhaven. This attracted two responses that implied considerable British sympathy with and understanding of the Kriegsmarine’s U-boat scuttling activities in early May.

First, the Director of the German Courts Martial Control Branch advised on 10 October:

> Whatever decision may be taken as to preferring a charge in this case, I do not think that the circumstances are those that should be placed before a German Court Martial for their decision. It is difficult not to anticipate that officers of the German Navy would regard this as a patriotic action. (28)

Second, the Acting Director of the Legal Advice and Drafting Branch in his response to the BAOR Executive Section stated on 12 October:

> To prosecute for a war crime may be considered undesirable in that it would perhaps appear to be reducing a patriotically-minded German officer to the level of a Concentration Camp guard. (28)

Although in due course Lt Grumpelt was court martialled (and found to be guilty) for his illegal action in respect of *U-1406* and *U-1407*, it is clear that there were no general ongoing Allied concerns about the U-boat scuttlings that had taken place in early May 1945 in and around the Baltic and the north-west German ports and anchorages. Even though the specific Regenbogen order had been issued and then possibly withdrawn just prior to the implementation of the “Instrument of Surrender,” and even though some of the scuttlings must undoubtedly have been effected after 0800 on 5 May, the British military authorities seem to have been content to accept that such actions were neither unreasonable nor illegal. As a consequence, no fingers were ever pointed at the U-boat COs who undertook such actions or even at the Headquarters’ staff who issued the orders to scuttle.

Whilst the British public and politicians, particularly Winston Churchill, hated the U-boats and all that they stood for, there is no doubt that the Admiralty and many of the senior officers in the Royal Navy took an understanding and conciliatory view. This difference was exemplified in October 1945 when, in a different context, the very influential Mr Claud Waldock (the Principal Assistant Secretary [Legal] who was the Head of Military Branch I in the Admiralty Secretaria), submitted a paper relating to Dönitz’s alleged war crimes that suggested that there could be legal difficulties in making a strong case against the German Navy at the forthcoming International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg. His argument was dismissed out-of-hand by the Foreign Office as a “Typical Admiralty whitewashing of the German Navy.” (29) While not in any way connected to the Regenbogen-related events in North Germany in May 1945, this comment perhaps helps to put into context the somewhat relaxed attitudes adopted by the British military authorities to the scuttling of so many U-boats in and around the Baltic as the end of the war approached.

Similarly, in relation to the scuttlings in early May, though Dr Madsen supported the action
taken against Lt Grumpelt, and later against the U-boat CO who scuttled U-1277 off the coast of Portugal in June 1945, it is noteworthy that he also supported the British Commander-in-Chief’s decision to reduce their sentences:

This willingness to excuse large parts of sentences at later dates reflected how British authorities regarded such offences. Although war crimes required punishment, the Royal Navy was understanding of particular circumstances. (24)

As it happened, the Regenbogen-related U-boat scuttlings that took place in early May 1945 before the final German capitulation were a blessing in disguise. This was because, although Field Marshal Montgomery required all the German warships (including U-boats) in North Germany to surrender, in contrast, the Admiralty actually wished to see the complete destruction of the latter.

To illustrate this, British naval policy had been set out on 11 August 1944 as part of the end-of-war planning process, and included the unequivocal statement:

Unlike the terms of the armistice in 1918 which permitted Germany a reduced navy and left intact the German naval system of administration and command, we this time intend that no vestige of the German Navy, either in respect of its personnel, its material, its dockyards, its manufacturing, establishments, its schools, its depots, its barracks, or anything which might assist in keeping alive any sorts of German Naval esprit de corps (such as it is) or permit of a revival of naval building shall remain. (30)

The draft outline plan also included the following proposal:

All U-boats will be ordered to proceed to Allied ports. The armaments of all warships, including U-boats, to be surrendered will be rendered ineffective before proceeding to Allied ports. Plans for this surrender are being drawn up separately by the Naval staff for agreement with the US and USSR Governments. (30)

This policy was reinforced on 22 January 1945, after the Admiralty received a paper from the US Navy which recommended that, after the expected German capitulation, all surviving German naval craft (including U-boats) should be destroyed or scrapped. In Mr Claud Waldock’s words,

The policy of destruction proposed by the US Navy is, in my view, in the best interests of the Royal Navy and of the United Nations as a whole and will, I believe, commend itself to the Board. (31)

It was re-emphasized even more strongly by the Royal Navy’s Admiral (Submarines) on 12 February 1945 when he responded to Claud Waldock’s comments:

The question of manpower required to maintain surrendered vessels is of vital interest to Admiral (Submarines). Every German U-boat which we have to maintain means a direct reduction in our effort against the Japanese, for the maintenance personnel can only be skilled submarine ratings. Apart from U-boats required for experimental purposes it is therefore very desirable for them to be scrapped at the earliest opportunity. (31)

Despite all these plans and hopes, it was inevitable that a number of U-boats would surrender at the end of the war. The British plan was that they would all be promptly transferred to the United Kingdom before they were scrapped, primarily to keep them out of the hands of the Russians. However, the number that would surrender was an unknown. Nevertheless, a good guess was obviously necessary so that suitable reception and storage
arrangements could be made; in August 1944 the Admiralty had advised the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches,

_It is impossible to give anything more than a rough estimate of the number of U-boats in the proposed British Zone, in Atlantic Ports or at sea to the west of Lubeck, at the time of surrender, but for planning purposes, the number may be taken as 160. In the event this number will probably be smaller._ (32)

Without the Regenbogen-related scuttlings, more than 350 U-boats would have been available to surrender, so—in the end—it was fortuitous that these scuttlings took place. It is perhaps no wonder that the Royal Navy raised no objection to them, even in the light of the conditions set out in the 21st Army Group’s “Instrument of Surrender.”

**The Total Number of the Regenbogen-Related Scuttlings**

There are many different versions of the total number of U-boats scuttled in accordance with the Kriegsmarine’s Regenbogen policy in the short period in early May 1945 prior to the main German capitulation, during the course of which Allied forces closed in on the ports and anchorages in the Baltic and on the North Sea coast of north-west Germany. Some versions are restricted to just those U-boats that were still operational, whereas others include U-boats that were either non-operational, awaiting commissioning, or which had already been de-commissioned due to war damage. For instance, Roskill’s official _History of the War at Sea_, published in 1961, quotes a figure of 221, although it does not list the U-boats concerned (33).

As a general guide for the purpose of this review, and especially to avoid becoming involved in endless discussions as to which total figures are or are not correct, and which U-boats were or were not involved in Regenbogen-related scuttlings, it is proposed to accept the figures published in Dr Axel Niestle’s 2014 book, _German U-Boat Losses during World War II_, which indicates that three U-boats were involved in Regenbogen-related scuttlings on 1 May, 32 on 2 May, 46 on 3 May, five on 4 May, 95 on 5 May and nine thereafter—a total of 190. (34)

**Conclusion**

Though a large number of U-boats were scuttled in and around the ports and anchorages in North Germany in the first week of May 1945, the majority of those actions took place before the implementation of the local surrender to Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group that came into effect at 0800 on 5 May.

The justification for those scuttlings had been spelt out by the Kriegsmarine in a warning order on 30 April, when it became apparent that the war was coming to an early end. The code name for the implementation of such action was Regenbogen, and all U-boat COs were given personal responsibility for ensuring the avoidance of surrender when circumstances demanded, even if the order to activate Regenbogen had not been formally promulgated.

It is not therefore surprising that, as the Allied forces closed-in, U-boats began to be scuttled by their COs between 1 and 4 May. However, the situation was complicated on 4 May, when the local German forces agreed to surrender to Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group with effect from 0800 on 5 May, and one of the conditions prohibited the scuttling of any U-boats.

This led to considerable confusion and involved a series of orders and counter orders late on
4 May and early on 5 May, the result of which was that, when the figures were eventually added-up, some 190 U-boats had been scuttled in accordance with the Kriegsmarine’s Regenbogen order. Most of these scuttlings had taken place before 0800 on 5 May, with only seven being definitely effected later. Of those, five were clearly totally contrary to both the Allied and Kriegsmarine’s instructions. However, though all of these five can be described as “late,” the COs’ actions were not perhaps surprising: the war was still underway, there were major local communications problems, and Allied aircraft were still at liberty to attack and sink any U-boat that was discovered either on or below the surface.

The situation was undoubtedly complicated by an overlap between orders from the BdU, which emphasized the need to scuttle rather than surrender, and orders from the OKW, which emphasized the need to surrender rather than scuttle. As a matter of pride (if nothing else), the BdU may—perhaps inadvertently—have disregarded the instructions from the OKW and therefore facilitated a considerable number of the scuttlings which took place in the early hours of 5 May and thereafter. Nevertheless, and to everyone’s relief, the generally sympathetic British authorities took a very lenient attitude to all the Regenbogen-related scuttlings either before or after 0800 on 5 May. Other than in the case of the illegal scuttling of U-1406 and U-1407 in Cuxhaven on 6 / 7 May after they had formally surrendered on 5 May, all such scuttlings were accepted as being reasonable and understandable actions in the prevailing circumstances.

Operation Regenbogen was then overtaken by the complete German capitulation, which was signed on 7 May and came into effect at 0001 on 9 May, and it was accepted with some relief by the British that there were far fewer U-boats that needed to be dealt with as part of the post-surrender process.

Special Acknowledgement and Thanks

I must refer to the invaluable assistance that I have received from Dr Axel Niestle and General Manfred Rode in Germany, from Ken Deshaies in the USA, and from the many other friends and colleagues who have helped with my research. In particular, without Axel’s encouragement, Manfred’s support and expert translation skills, and access to Ken’s comprehensive archive of U-boat publications, the production of this review of Operation Regenbogen would not have been possible. I am therefore most grateful to them for their hard work and personal interest, for sharing with me their knowledge of the Kriegsmarine’s final days in early May 1945, and especially for their patience in searching for the answers to the many questions which I kept asking.

Specific Sources

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15. TNA Kew, ADM 199/2317. Admiralty War Diary 1 to 15 May 1945.
30. TNA Kew, ADM 1/16076. Plan for Naval Control of Germany.
31. TNA Kew, ADM 1/16180. Disarmament of Enemy Naval Services on Capitulation of Germany.
Conference Registration

Participation in “Canada’s Pacific Gateway: Past, Present, and Future” is free for Members of the CNRS. To receive a link for the virtual conference, please send an email to CNRSCnf2021@cnrs-scrn.org with “Conference registration” in the subject line. To join the CNRS, please visit https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/membership/index_e.html. Reduced rates are available for students and early career researchers.

Conference Schedule (Tentative)
All times noted are Pacific Standard Time

Thursday June 10
0830-0840  Intro/welcome  CNRS President Michael Moir, Virtual Conference Manager
0840-0855  Pacific Gateway Theme Setter  Barry Gough
0900-1030  “Development of the Pacific Gateway 1871-1940 in the era of Steam Globalization”  Jan Drent
            “All But Forgotten: Early Measures for Maritime Safety on Canada’s West Coast”  Clay Evans
1040-1210  “A dry dock to link land and water: the case of Prince Rupert, 1912-1951”  Michael Moir
            “Foot of Carrall: The Pacific Maritime Gateway of Gastown”  Trevor Williams
1220-1310  “The Role of Canadian Pacific Coastal and Ocean Steamship Services in Developing the Gateway”  Robert Turner

lunch break

1320-1455  “Canada’s Pacific Gateway—to the Arctic!”  Nigel Greenwood
            “The American Periodical Press, the Waterways of the Chilkoot Pass, the Dyea Inlet, and Canada’s Transnational Pacific Gateway”  Caroline C. Evans Abbott
1505-1550  “Reluctant Allies, Distant Enemies, Willing Partners: A Naval History of Canada-Japan Relations”  Hugues Canuel

Friday June 11
0830-1000  “Pacific Perspective: why Canada had a special place in the maritime defence of the British Empire”  Tim Döbler
            “The Royal Canadian Navy and the Asia-Pacific Region in the Early Cold War, 1945 to 1965”  David Zimmermann
1010-1140  “The Pacific Impulse in Canadian Naval History”  Richard Gimblett
            “The Invisible Strength and Heart Behind the Uniform: Experiences of Canadian Navy Officer’s Wives since World War II Through Oral Histories”  Jordan Kerr
1150-1235
“Virtual Tour of Coal Island Naval Ordnance Yard in Esquimalt Harbour” Richard Linzey

lunch break

1245-1415
“Discovering Nothing: Captain Cook and the Evolution of the Pacific Portal to the Northwest Passage” David Nicandri
“Tactics and Experiential Learning on the Pacific Station: Captain Henry John May, C.B., R.N. in Esquimalt 1892-96” Chris Madsen

1425-1555
“Work, Life and Settlement on the Fraser: Kanaka Maoli Mobilities to British Columbia in the Nineteenth Century” Naomi Calinitsky
“The Battle of Valparaiso, 1812” Nicholas Kaizer

1605-1650
“Canada and its Asia Pacific Gateway” Hugh Stephens
“Why Canada Must Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Dr Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Stephen Nagy
“The American Periodical Press: the Waterways of the Chilkoot Pass, the Dyea Inlet, and Canada’s Transnational Pacific Gateway”
Caroline C. Evans Abbott

The discovery of gold in the Yukon in the final decade of the nineteenth century profoundly reshaped human relationships with the waterways of the North. Experiential, journalistic accounts of these waterways featured heavily in the American periodical presses of the late nineteenth century, but a satisfactory exploration of the way those representations shaped environmental history does not exist. Despite its value to current scholarship, the transnational periodical press is all but ignored for its role in commodifying an experience of nautical frontiersmanship. Similarly, the role of periodicals in shaping middle class relationships with environment is critically slight. The experiential accounts of northern gold prospecting featured in American periodicals at the turn of the century depend implicitly on sensationalized accounts of Canadian waterways. Thereby, those depictions offer a mode by which the role of international media in shaping Canadian environmental histories can be more thoroughly accounted for. This study will consider the periodical press itself as a shaper of nautical gateways to the Canadian Pacific and of its cultural landscape. With specific attention to portrayals of the waters of the Chilkoot Pass and Dyea Inlet, the transnational nature of this territory’s comanagement today by the American National Park Service and Parks Canada offers culturally relevant geological placement for the subject of this study. It will analyse selections from popular American periodicals from the final decade of the nineteenth century with special attention to an account by divisive American Major General Frederick Funston published by Scribner’s Magazine in 1896.

“Work, Life and Settlement on the Fraser: Kanaka Maoli Mobilities to British Columbia in the Nineteenth Century”
Naomi Calinitsky

This paper considers how Pacific Islanders came to establish themselves as labourers and, ultimately, settlers on the North American continent, establishing new and lasting connections to the land in the 19th century. My focus here is upon the emergence of one key site for Hawaiian labour, Fort Langley on the Fraser River, to examine the ways in which this locus of labour and export-driven commerce enabled Hawaiians to not only engage in the broader trans-Pacific economy that was becoming increasingly established in the mid-nineteenth century, but also to briefly explore the ways in which Hawaiians at Fort Langley would become enmeshed and embedded within broader British Columbian settler-colonial culture, taking up new colonial opportunities to own land and forming families with Native American women that would effectively help rewrite and transform the trajectory of the Pacific Islander labouring diaspora on the North American continent as the 19th century progressed.
“Reluctant Allies, Distant Enemies, Willing Partners: Evolving Naval Relations between Canada and Japan through Peace, War, and Uncertainty across the Pacific.”
Hugues Canuel

A review of the limited literature concerned with the history of Canada-Japan relations through the last century can lead to a simplistic characterisation: strained over the immigration issue before 1941 and dominated by trade after 1945, with virtually no military dimension to the framework. This paper adopts a naval lens to illustrate a relationship that is much more nuanced than it appears, evolving as it did through several stages that remain ignored in academic works today. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance made Canada and Japan reluctant allies during the First World War but growing interwar tensions turned them into distant enemies, while common interests eventually united them as willing partners, as illustrated today by their collaboration in the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against North Korea, another example of an interaction largely ignored by the public and in academic circles. Ultimately, this paper seeks to make an original contribution to an historiography that neglected a relevant dimension of Canada-Japan relations through decades of war, peace and uncertainty across the Pacific.

“Pacific Perspective: why Canada had a special place in the maritime defence of the British Empire.”
Tim Döbler

With British Columbia joining the Canadian Confederation on 25 July 1871, Canada obtained a coast in the far west of the North American continent. From that day onwards, Canada not just commanded an Atlantic coast, but a Pacific coast as well. This provided the Dominion with access to important sea-lines of communication and opened a part of the world with special importance for all the great powers of the time.

This paper examines why Canada had a special place in the maritime defence of the British Empire. With two coastlines separated from each other geo-strategic questions that arise are, firstly, what was the Canadian opinion towards imperial maritime defence? Secondly, did Canada contribute to the maritime defence of the British Empire and how? Thirdly, how was Canada’s maritime defence arranged in general?

Canada was not the only dominion with coastlines on two different oceans, as for example Australia was surrounded by the Indian and Pacific Ocean, and South Africa had an Atlantic and Indic coastline. Unlike these colonies with their equally easily accessible coastlines, however, the Canadian coastlines were separated from each other, as the Northwest Passage yet had to be found.

Another difference between Canada and Australia was that the Canadian colonies were not just overwhelmingly inhabited by British settlers, but by a significant proportion of French settlers, too. These characteristics underline the special requirements British politicians had to consider when arranging Imperial maritime defence and negotiating Canadian contributions.

“Development of the Pacific Gateway 1871-1940 in the era of Steam Globalization”
Jan Drent

It was the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1886 that truly made the BC coast Canada’s Pacific gateway. Because steamships could provide more timely and rapid connections than sailing vessels, they came to predominate in the last quarter of the 19th century. Global trade boomed because of steam power and the rapid exchange of information through telegraph cables. Shipping companies now offered regular passenger
and cargo service from BC. The systematic charting of the intricately indented British
Columbia coastline by the Royal Navy—particularly between 1846 and 1910 (continued by
Canadian hydrographers starting in the 1890s)—and pilotage services enabled safe
navigation by larger and faster vessels. Growing marine traffic was supported by improved
port infrastructure, and the creation of ship repair facilities. The opening of the Panama
Canal in 1914 was a major boost to the Pacific Gateway, resulting in significantly increased
traffic in the two decades between the World Wars. Vancouver had become the dominant
BC port and was now competing with eastern Canada in the export of grain and other bulk
cargoes. This paper will examine the main traffic flows through the Pacific Gateway and the
development of its ports between 1871 and the start of the Second World War.

“All but Forgotten: Early Measures for Maritime Safety on Canada’s West Coast”
Clay Evans

The colonial development of Canada, like its neighbour to the south, began in the east and
spread westward over time. The distance between Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts
remains vast even in today’s era of jet travel, let alone during a time when it took several
months to make a passage from east to west around Cape Horn. That said, there
remained—and arguably still remains—a sense among British Columbians that, even though
they were part of this new Canada, they were still being seen by those in the east as a far-
flung fringe of the Dominion.

The exponential population and expansion of shipping from 1867 to 1914 in both British
Columbia and the American Pacific Northwest led to marine disasters along the area known
as “The Graveyard of the Pacific.” This paper will examine local life-saving measures on
Canada’s Pacific Gateway and how Ottawa responded to such calls.

“The Pacific Impulse in Canadian Naval History”
Richard Gimblett

Canadian naval history generally has been portrayed as Atlantic-centric, what with that being
the principle theatre of both World Wars and the Cold War. This presentation posits that,
rather than being a backwater, the Pacific in fact has been the impetus for many of the major
developments in the history of the Royal Canadian Navy. To illustrate this, I shall present a
dozen vignettes, ranging from the Navy’s origins in Jacky Fisher’s Fleet Unit concept (which
was intended to be based in Esquimalt), through “The First to Die” (our four midshipmen
killed in action at Coronel) and the loss of Galiano (the only HMC Ship lost in the Great
War), the epic voyage of Thiepval to Russia and Japan in 1924, the biasing of the interwar
destroyer fleet on the BC coast, the “incidents” of 1949 as a West Coast phenomenon (the
main lock-ins were aboard Esquimalt-based destroyers), the Korean War as the only “hot
spot” of the Cold War, the re-balancing of the Canadian fleets in the 1980s to effect the USN
Maritime Strategy, that experience as the groundwork for post-Cold War “interoperability”
with the USN, to the 2014 constructive loss by fire of HMCS Protecteur as the final spur for
an AOR replacement project.

“Canada’s Pacific Gateway … to the Arctic”
Nigel Greenwood

“Pacific Gateway”—this term evokes the “All Red Route” of fashionable and elegant travel by
CPR steamers or, less historically, global shipping patterns that have enabled Prince Rupert
to post record growth as Canada’s third largest port. But the Pacific Northwest is also
notably associated with “White Routes”—forays into the polar wastes in search of knowledge
or glory. While Arctic exploration often originated from the east many western approaches,
from Vitus Bering’s American explorations and the Third Voyage of Captain Cook to the
present day, reflect accessibility and opportunity that contradict common notions of Arctic approaches. The western Arctic has also been the scene of technological exploitation and innovation. Most evident in the heyday of Beaufort Sea drilling of the 1980s, much development of purpose-built polar technology has emanated from the west coast. Recent concerns over global climate change have refocused attention on Arctic issues. While the morphing of the National Shipbuilding Strategy to include more east-coast yards suggests that icebreakers may not be built in BC, the west coast will nonetheless continue to be a key stepping-off point for Canada’s Arctic strategy, supported by basing of CCG and RCN ice-capable ships and the seasonal variation of Arctic ice coverage that provides early access to most of Canada’s Arctic estate from the west. More significantly, the geographic intersection of “Great Power” interests—of Arctic coastal nations and non-Arctic states—in the western Arctic will ensure that Canada’s Pacific Gateway is significantly northern as well as westward-focused.

“Strategy over Honour: The Pacific Naval Theatre and the Battle of Valparaiso in the War of 1812”
Nicholas James Kaizer

The naval war of 1812 featured a unique number of single-ship actions that had little strategic importance on the wider conflict. Captains engaged in these actions as matters of personal and collective honour, rather than out of any strategic considerations: in fact, in a few cases these actions were undertaken despite risks posed to the strategic interests of the British Royal Navy or the United States Navy. The public, too, were interested in these affairs as matters of honour. Losses were rationalized as contests where their naval heroes had been outgunned and outmanned. Victories were touted as triumphs of their naval heroes in evenly-matched actions, the most celebrated being the victory of HMS Shannon over USS Chesapeake, two closely-matched frigates.

One notable exception, on both counts, was the Battle of Valparaiso, fought between British and American frigates and a sloop of war consort on each side, after USS Essex sailed into the Pacific to prey on the British whaling fleet. The British, in this case, outgunned and outmanned their American opponents, and had a clear advantage over the enemy in the battle. Arguably, the battle also had important strategic implications, as evidenced by the impacts on the British whaling trade and a rushed response by the British Royal Navy. This paper examines these strategic implications and impact of the Essex’s cruise, as well as how the patriotic British and Haligonian press sought to rationalize this British victory against an inferior enemy as an honourable victory.

“The Invisible Strength and Heart Behind the Uniform: Experiences of Canadian Navy Officers Wives since World War II Through Oral Histories”
Jordan Kerr

Oral histories are a quickly emerging field of historical inquiry aimed at capturing the unique experiences of people. While oral histories are not a new research method, their treatment as a significant source of information rather than supplemental anecdote is a new and beneficial practice for capturing the experiences of individuals and groups absent from past scholarship. One such population that would benefit from this practice are Canadian Navy officers’ wives. Broadly defined as civilian or military personnel who are or were married, engaged, or in common-law relationships with any active-duty or retired member of the Canadian Navy, Canadian Navy wives are the heart behind the uniform. Using ten author-completed oral histories and cross-sectional secondary source literature, this paper explores the following questions: what are the experiences of Canadian Navy officer’s wives since 1960, and how is their life course impacted by their husbands’ positions in the Canadian Navy. Ultimately, the oral history-based findings show that, regardless what previous
literature suggests, Canadian Navy officers’ wives have overwhelmingly positive experiences, despite facing significant challenges in the areas of parenting, relocation and separation. The participants frequently stated “the good outweighed the bad,” citing their independence, financial security, large network of friends, and travel abilities as positive aspects of their Navy wife lifestyle. Additionally, while these wives were differentially impacted by their husbands’ positions in the Canadian Navy, changing professional goals, social networks, homes, and parenting styles for their spouse’s job, they nevertheless lived the life they desired.

“Royal Navy's Cole Island Ordnance Yard in Esquimalt Harbour from 1860-1910: a virtual tour”
Richard Linzey

The presence of the Royal Navy on the northwest coast underlined British (and by extension Canadian) sovereignty over the Pacific Gateway until 1910. Infrastructure to support warships stationed in local waters was developed in Esquimalt starting in the 1860s. This included an ordnance yard with ammunition magazines and workshops on a small, isolated island in the upper harbour that was finally abandoned for a more spacious location on the West Shore after the Second World War. Cole Island has since remained unoccupied and is now a Provincial and National Historic Site under the care of the Heritage Branch of the BC government. Evocative brick storehouses and a guard house remain as examples of typical infrastructure of the Victorian era. Heritage expert and branch director Richard Linzey, who has studied the early dockyard and outlying facilities in depth, will provide a virtual tour and interpretation of the site and the program of conservation works currently underway.

“Tactics and Experiential Learning on the Pacific Station: Captain Henry John May, C.B., R.N. in Esquimalt 1892-96”
Chris Madsen

In 1897, Captain Henry J. May presented a paper at the Royal United Service Institute titled Notes on Tactics for Ships and Weapons of the Present Day, which established his standing as one of the leading authorities on naval tactics in the Royal Navy. He went on to refine and impart his ideas on the subject while in command of a battleship in the Channel squadron and as first director of the war course at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich. The genesis for May’s new approach to naval tactics came from four years spent on the Pacific station, in command of the third-class cruiser HMS Hyacinth, when he had time to ponder, test, and practice his evolving thinking. This paper delves into the content of May’s sole known published work, situates the state of thinking about naval tactics in the late Victorian navy, compares the contemporary writings of American captains William Bainbridge-Hoff and Alfred Thayer Mahan, and provides context in the Pacific where May observed and interacted with the United States, imperial Russia, and imperial Japan navies, specifically naval operations during the 1894 Sino-Japanese war. Captain Henry May, sometimes referred to as the Royal Navy’s Mahan, demonstrated that innovation in naval tactics could emerge even from a distant backwater station like Esquimalt, far away from the main British fleets.

“Why Canada Must Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
Dr Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Stephen Nagy

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP) is a template for Canadian Indo-Pacific engagement and a potential framework upon which to build a strategy. Critics advocate for a diverse and inclusive Canadian Indo-Pacific approach, but this overlooks the challenges associated with a revisionist power in the Indo-Pacific and the importance of creating an Indo-Pacific strategy that reflects the shared values that Canada and other partners in the region share and the trajectory of the Indo-Pacific.
“A dry dock to link land and water: the case of Prince Rupert, 1912-1951”
Michael Moir

The government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier was responsible for two initiatives that had significant impact on Canadian maritime affairs during the early 20th century. The first was the Naval Service Act of 1910, legislation that is very familiar to members of the Canadian Nautical Research Society. The second was a series of statutes intended to encourage the construction of dry docks passed between 1899 and 1908 that, while lesser known, nevertheless played a crucial role in creating the infrastructure needed to maintain naval and merchant vessels. This presentation will examine the impact of the dry dock acts upon Canada’s Pacific coast and in particular Prince Rupert, where a massive floating dry dock supported the connection between rail and steamships in the regional transportation network, as well as shipbuilding for peace and war.

“Discovering Nothing: Captain Cook and the Evolution of the Pacific Portal to the Northwest Passage”
David L. Nicandri

The British Admiralty, after two centuries’ worth of futility attempting to discover the Northwest Passage via the Atlantic, in 1776 dispatched Cook to the Pacific in the hopes that a productive corridor might be accessed from the west. For several generations, historians of the Pacific Northwest/Northwest Coast have faulted Cook for “missing” openings to the Great River of the West and Fuca’s Strait, without full appreciation for the fact that Cook’s instructions directed him to 65° N before he began his search in earnest. This parameter was established by the late-arriving cognizance from the Hudson Bay Company’s Samuel Hearne, who had reached the Arctic (it was thought at 71° 54’ N) via the Coppermine River, northwest of Hudson Bay.

The interpretive corollary to this “fatigued explorer” hypothesis stipulates that Vancouver was ordered to the Northwest to compensate for some perceived shortcoming of Cook’s. In fact, Vancouver was directed to find a second-generation Northwest Passage, one popularized by maritime and terrestrial fur traders (notably John Meares and Peter Pond) and speculative geographer Alexander Dalrymple. This successor image was not the direct saltwater passage Cook sought but rather, through an imagined western analogue to Hudson Bay that conveniently lessened the extent of terrain between Atlantic and Pacific waters, a membranous “communication.”

The notion of the Northwest Passage was such an idée fixe that the successors to Pond and Dalrymple (Alexander Mackenzie and Thomas Jefferson) propagated the notion that a third-generation Northwest Passage (a network of rivers) was a suitable substitute.

“Canada and its Asia Pacific Trade Gateway”
Hugh Stephens

Canada’s trade has traditionally gone south to the US or across the Atlantic to European trade partners, although in recent years, trade with Asia has grown significantly. China is our second-largest trade partner even though it takes only 4 percent of Canadian exports. Japan has also long been an important market for western Canada’s resource-based and agri-food products. South Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN trade bloc also offer significant potential in certain sectors, along with India.

While Canada has had a free trade agreement with the United States since the late 1980s, and an agreement in place with the EU (and now separately the UK) for the past several years, its trade structure in Asia is limited. However, Canada concluded a bilateral trade agreement with Korea in 2014 and is a founding member of the eleven-country
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These two agreements provide the framework for a pan-Pacific trade architecture, of which Canada is a part by virtue of its CPTPP membership. The CPTPP, which came into force in December 2018, will likely undergo expansion beginning in 2021, offering Canada potentially broader opportunities. If Canada could reach a trade agreement with ASEAN (long in the works) this would potentially open the way to RCEP membership, firmly embedding Canada into important Asian supply chains. The challenge for Canada at the present time is to secure its place as an Asia Pacific trading country, through its BC gateway, by actively pursuing opportunities to expand our trade linkages across the Pacific.

“The Role of Canadian Pacific Coastal and Ocean Steamship Services in Developing the Gateway”: An illustrated talk
Robert Turner

After the completion of the transcontinental railway in 1886, the Canadian Pacific Company established transpacific mail, passenger, and cargo service with the celebrated Empress liners. In addition, it created steamship services linking BC coastal ports as well as Seattle and Alaskan ports. These services had seminal roles in linking the west coast with Pacific markets and in transporting people and freight along the long BC coasts at a time when land links were largely absent. Although outside the scope of this talk, CP paddlewheel steamers on BC interior lakes extended the reach of railway lines. The CP coastal steamer service continued until 1958. Transpacific passenger service was not resumed after the Second World War, but CP cargo ships continued trading in the Pacific until the mid-1950s.

“Foot of Carrall: The Pacific Maritime Gateway of Gastown”
Trevor Williams

Many communities throughout Canada enjoy public water access through a municipal wharf. Vancouver, British Columbia, however, does not. The arrival of the Canadian Pacific Railway in Coal Harbour in 1887 challenged the traditional public water access to the Burrard Inlet, as the central, street-end location at the foot of Carrall Street. This was the long-standing water access to the grubby community of Gastown. Vancouver City Wharf, the would-be public dock built in the Carrall Street carriageway in 1886, shared this favoured location with the float and boathouse belonging to pioneer boat-builder Andrew Linton. The culture of land squatting throughout Vancouver in the mid 1880s was mimicked on the water and foreshore, as both City Wharf and Linton Boatworks steadfastly refused to sign any form of lease with the CPR to legalize their occupation. After City Wharf was abruptly sold to Union Steamships in 1889, there was a mourning period for the loss of this valuable downtown location, and the idea of a public right to access the Burrard Inlet expired with the last legal appeal of the “Street-Ends Cases” in 1906. Union Steamships was always awake to the meaning of being at this critical historical node, because this pioneering company was originally composed of long-standing and established mariners of the Burrard Inlet, such as Captain Donald McPhaiden. The company heritage of Union Steamships is conjoined with that of Gastown through locating at the foot of Carrall.

“The Royal Canadian Navy and the Asia-Pacific Region in the Early Cold War, 1945 to 1965”
David Zimmerman

The 1994 White Paper on Defence contained a remarkably inaccurate assessment of the Canadian navy’s role in the Asia-Pacific Region since the end of the Second World War. It stated, “Canada's participation in Asia-Pacific security affairs since the end of the Second World War has been largely limited to the commitment of forces to various peacekeeping and observer missions,…along with participation in the ‘RIMPAC’ air and naval exercises
with the United States, Japan, Australia, and, on occasion, other Asia-Pacific countries.” The reality is that the Royal Canadian Navy’s involvement in the region during the Early Cold War was far more extensive than was claimed in the White Paper. Remarkably, no mention was made of the ALCANUS defence agreements, which integrated Canadian Pacific maritime security planning with the United States. The RCN’s involvement in Pacific naval exercises was more extensive than the White Paper suggests. During these exercises, as well as annual training cruises of the region, Canadian sailors were exposed to what in the 1950s and 1960s must have seemed like strange and exotic cultures. RCN’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific did diminish after 1965, caused by the USN’s heavy commitment to the Vietnam War and the large reductions in the size of RCN. This paper will assess the RCN’s role in the wider Asia-Pacific world during the Early Cold War.
Pacific Gateway Presenters’ Biographies

Caroline C. Evans Abbot is a recent graduate of Glasgow University (M.Res. English Literature, 2019) with interests in the intersections of literature, gender, and environment in the long nineteenth century. She has particular interest in the periodical presses of the fin de siècle and their transnational relationships with environmental history. She is managed by a small gray rescue manx.

Naomi Calinitsky recently completed her PhD in History at Carleton University, Ottawa, and holds a Master of Arts from the University of Otago and a Bachelor of Arts in History from the University of Manitoba. Her academic interests include transnational migration, Mexican History, Early Modern Canada, the Colonial and Contemporary Pacific, and the Hawaiian Nineteenth Century.

Hugues Canuel Captain Canuel, RCN, is Canadian Defence Attaché to Japan and holds a PhD in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, where he also serves as Adjunct Assistant Professor for the Department of History. His book The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power: France’s Quest for an Independent Naval Policy within a Strategy of Alliance, 1940–1963 was published this year by Naval Institute Press. Previous works have appeared in the Naval War College Review, Canadian Naval Review, Canadian Military History, Defence Studies, Journal of Intelligence History, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and The Northern Mariner.

Tim Döbler, M.A., joined the German Navy as an officer cadet in 2012. As part of his training, he studied History at Helmut-Schmidt-University, University of the German Armed Forces Hamburg (HSU), from 2013 to 2017. During this time, he served as an intern at the Seapower Centre, Australia, researching maritime warfare in the Indo-Pacific region during the First and Second World Wars. In 2017, he graduated with a thesis on the foundation of the Royal Australian Navy. An officer in the German Navy, he is a PhD candidate at HSU focusing on Royal Navy officer cadets and officers born in the British settler colonies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Jan Drent CD, BA. A graduate of UBC, Jan Drent was a career officer in the RCN. He commanded three warships on both coasts and served ashore in Canada and overseas. Since retiring to Victoria with his wife Jan has been active as a volunteer. He has pursued interests in languages by doing freelance translations from Russian and German. His nautical writings have included articles and book reviews in periodicals in Canada and the UK. His hobbies include sailing, walking, and reading.

Clay Evans is a Past Chair of the Maritime Museum of B.C. who served with the Canadian Coast Guard for over 35 years, primarily in search and rescue along the British Columbia coast—during which time he was the Commanding Officer of the historic Bamfield Lifeboat.
Station for 17 years. Clay is also a maritime historian specializing in the international history of lifesaving at sea and has several publications to his credit including *Rescue at Sea; An International History of Coastal Life-saving, Rescue Craft & Organizations* (U.S. Naval Institute Press: 2003) and numerous articles in Canadian and international journals and magazines. He holds a history degree from the University of Victoria and a Master’s degree in Maritime Law from the University of Wales, Cardiff. Clay is currently a Victoria pilot boat coxswain.

**Dr Richard Gimblett**, MSC, CD, RCN (ret’d) has degrees in history from RMC (BA 1979), Trent (MA 1981) and Laval (PhD 2000). As a surface warfare officer in the Canadian Navy (1975-2001) he served in ships of various classes on both coasts, including for operations during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. He is recently retired as the Navy Command Historian (2006-17), has authored numerous books and articles on the history of the RCN, and is a Past President of the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

**Nigel Greenwood** RAdm Nigel S. Greenwood, CMM, CD, RCN (Ret’d) grew up in Powell River BC and joined the RCN through Royal Roads Military College, obtaining a BSc in Physics and Oceanography. His naval career included command of HMCS *Ottawa* (FFH 341), CFB Halifax, and the Canadian Pacific Fleet, and appointments as Deputy Commander of the RCN, and Commander Maritime Forces Pacific. Upon leaving the RCN in 2012, he established Greenwood Maritime Solutions Ltd and has since consulted on a wide range of risk assessment, operations research, and maritime operational studies. Holding a current certificate as Master Mariner, he spends summers as an ice-navigator in the Canadian North.

**Nicholas James Kaizer**, B.Ed, MA, Teacher, Halifax Regional Centre for Education. Author of *Revenge in the Name of Honour: the Royal Navy’s Quest for Vengeance in the Single Ship Actions of The War of 1812*.

**Jordan Kerr** is a recent graduate from the University of Victoria, completing her Bachelor of Arts with honours in history and major in sociology in 2021. Her undergraduate thesis work focused on oral histories and the experience of Canadian Navy Officer’s wives since World War II. Jordan’s research interests include the family, gender, and Canadian naval history. Jordan will be attending the University of British Columbia in September 2021 to complete a dual Master of Archive Studies and Master of Library and Information Studies.

**Richard Linzey**, director of the Provincial Heritage Branch of the Ministry of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resource Operations and Rural Development. With a Masters in Architecture from Plymouth and a Masters in Building Conservation at the Architectural Association in London, he became a chartered architect in 1992. Prior to immigrating to Canada in 2002, he led English Heritage’s Architecture Team in historic environment policy development, and repair of national historic buildings and monuments. He is an authority and published author on the conservation of post-mediaeval military engineering. In Canada, he worked for Commonwealth Historic Resources Management in Vancouver, and the City of Victoria Planning department, and has run his own consulting practice, Past Perfect. He joined the Heritage Branch in 2007 and is committed to connecting British Columbians with their history and historic environment. He and his wife Kim live in Victoria, BC.
**Chris Madsen** is a professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada, where he teaches senior military officers and public servants on the National Security Programme and Joint Command and Staff Programme. He is a past president of the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

**Jonathan Berkshire Miller** is a senior fellow with the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the MacDonald Laurier Institute. He is an international affairs professional with expertise on security, defence, intelligence and geo-economic issues in the Indo-Pacific who has held a variety of positions in the public and private sectors. Jonathan Miller is also a senior fellow on East Asia on the Tokyo-based Asian Forum Japan, and Director and co-founder of the Council on International Policy.

**Michael Moir**, University Archivist, and Head Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, York University.

**Stephen R. Nagy** is professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo and a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Prior to returning to Tokyo in 2014, he was an Assistant Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from Dec. 2009 - Jan. 2014. Originally from Calgary, Stephen Nagy obtained his PhD in International Relations from Waseda University, Japan in Dec. 2008 and then worked as a Research Associate at the university’s Institute of Asia Pacific Studies from Oct. 2007 - Nov. 2009.

**David Nicandri**, director of the Washington State Historical Society from 1987 to 2011. In retirement, Dave has been concentrating his research and writing on the history of exploration in the Pacific Northwest. This culminated in two books being published in 2020: UBC Press’s *Captain Cook Rediscovered: Voyaging to the Icy Latitudes*; and WSU Press’s *Lewis & Clark Reframed: Examining Ties to Cook, Vancouver and Mackenzie*. His CNRS 2021 presentation bridges the intellectual terrain covered in these publications and extends it deeper into the 19th century, indeed to modern times.

**Hugh Stephens** is currently Vice Chair of the Canadian Committee on Pacific Economic Cooperation (CANCPEC), Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and Executive Fellow at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary. After a 30-year career in the Canadian foreign service, during which time he served at Canadian missions in Beirut, Hong Kong, Beijing, Islamabad, Seoul, and Taipei, he became Senior Vice President (Public Policy) for Asia-Pacific for Time Warner, based in Hong Kong. He has written extensively on Canada’s engagement with the Asia Pacific region in *The Globe and Mail, National Post, Ottawa Citizen, iPolitics, The Diplomat, Open Canada,* and others.


**Trevor Williams** is a maritime history writer based in Gibsons BC. He is an avid archives user, which feed his hobbies of reading, travelling, and camping. Trevor’s essays have appeared in *BC History, Canadian Journal of Native Studies, BC Studies and Alberta History.*
David Zimmerman is Professor of History at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. He is the author of Britain’s Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe; Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War; The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa; Coastal Fort: A History of Fort Sullivan, Maine, and Maritime Command Pacific: The Royal Canadian Navy in the Pacific during the Early Cold War. He has published over twenty articles, on various aspect of naval and military history, and on academic refugees. His book Ensnared Between Hitler and Stalin will appear later in 2021.
Hello all! My name is Peter Kikkert and I am set to take over from Bill Glover as the editor of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* for volume 31 (2021). Erika was kind enough to suggest I provide a proper introduction to the CNRS on these pages and I greatly appreciate the opportunity.

I was born and raised on a small beef farm near Grand Bend, Ontario. Growing up along the shores of Lake Huron, I spent countless hours in and on the water. Geographical proximity also generated an early interest in the human history of Canada’s Great Lakes and its inland waterways.

Far outmatched by my brother in agricultural prowess, I decided to pursue my love of history as a career. I completed my BA and MA in history at the University of Waterloo. An undergraduate course on the Canadian Arctic with Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer inspired a lasting interest in the ice and water of Canada’s third ocean. I translated this interest into a PhD in history at Western University, completed in December 2015, exploring the international history of polar sovereignty (Arctic and Antarctic). During my doctorate, I held a two-year appointment (2012-2014) in the Bachelor of Education program at Aurora College in the Northwest Territories, where I taught Circumpolar, Canadian, and Indigenous Studies. It was an incredible experience, and I was fortunate enough to meet there my partner, Maria (we welcomed our first child last spring). In September 2016, I accepted a position as Professor of Public History at Sheridan College, where I stayed until coming to St. Francis Xavier University in July 2018. I am currently the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Policy and Assistant Professor in the Public Policy and Governance program in the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government at StFX.

My research focuses on safety, security, sovereignty, and governance issues in the polar regions. I have published on the evolution of international law in the Arctic and Antarctic, the Canadian-American defence relationship in the North, the possibilities and challenges of Arctic transportation, and histories of rural and isolated communities. I have also written extensively on the historic and contemporary role of the Canadian Armed Forces in the North and on the activities of the Canadian Rangers. With an academic position focused on public policy, over the last couple of years my research focus has shifted to explore methods for strengthening search and rescue, emergency management, and disaster response capabilities and bolstering community resilience in remote, isolated, northern, and coastal communities. My research into the maritime history of the Arctic continues, however, with ongoing projects that examine Canadian and American icebreaker operations, icebreaker procurement, and marine search and rescue.

Through my research and teaching, I have been privileged to live and teach in the North, sail the Northwest Passage, observe military exercises, participate in training patrols with the Canadian Rangers, and travel on the land, ice, and waters of Nunavut and the Northwest Territories with community members and Elders. These formative experiences continue to shape my scholarship and policy work.
Enough about me. I’m sure you are more curious about what I intend to do with your journal. Well, my plan is to maintain the high standards established by the previous editors and to continue publishing articles that expand our knowledge of the northern hemisphere’s maritime, coastal community, inland waterway, and naval affairs. My primary focus is on securing new submissions and increasing the journal’s diversity, both in terms of authors and content. Regarding the latter, I hope to publish more articles covering contemporary history and current public policy issues with historical roots. If you have any article ideas that you want to pitch, please do not hesitate to send me an email.

Here are a few other new developments I am working on:

- I have updated the author and submission guidelines (which are published in this issue of Argonauta).

- Thanks to Sam McLean, a Northern Mariner Twitter account has been created, and I will soon have it active and offering regular updates.

- I plan to launch a Northern Mariner Digital Roundtable with my first issue. Initially, this roundtable (conducted via Zoom) will coincide with the release of each issue and will offer a platform to discuss the journal’s content and have conversations with contributing authors. If the roundtable generates enough interest, I will expand the number held throughout the year.

- The journal will continue to publish research articles, research notes, and research essays, but I also intend to launch a new section called Commentaries. These pieces will generally be between 1000 and 5000 words and will introduce and assess historical documents, letters, maps, works of art, artefacts, technology, and other aspects of material culture. I recognize that the journal has long published content such as this—my hope is that the Commentaries section will simply formalize the space and encourage more submissions.

- I am in the process of transitioning The Northern Mariner to York’s online journal system, which will facilitate the submission process and allow us to engage with new audiences. For those who prefer the traditional website, no worries, we will continue to upload content there as well.

My first issue of the journal will focus on a special topic: America in the Arctic. If you have any suggestions for future special topics editions, please let me know.

Finally, I want to thank everyone who has assisted me in learning the ropes, particularly Bill Glover, Walter Lewis, Faye Kert, Michael Moir, and Roger Sarty. I appreciate your time and patience.
Guidelines for Authors

Aim, Scope, and Article Types

*The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* is a fully refereed, quarterly journal published by the Canadian Nautical Research Society and the North American Society for Oceanic History. It is devoted to the study of maritime affairs and the inland waterways of the nations that touch the seas of the northern hemisphere. Topics of interest include—but are not limited to—ships, shipbuilding, ship owning, technology, merchant shipping, trade, labour, maritime communities, ports and harbours, naval history, fishing, whaling, sealing, underwater archaeology, and maritime biography.

*The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* publishes research articles, research notes, commentaries, review essays, and book reviews.

- Articles present original research and should normally not exceed 9000 words, inclusive of footnotes and table/figure captions, but excluding the reference list.
- Research notes, which may be a maximum of 5000 words, discuss research in progress, methodological approaches, historiographical debates, and other aspects of the research process.
- Commentaries, generally between 1000 and 5000 words, introduce and assess historical documents, maps, works of art, artefacts, technology, and other aspects of material culture.
- Review essays up to 9000 words in length review the state of research on a particular topic or subject area.
- On average, *TNM/Lmn* reviews more than 300 new books each year, making it the most convenient and comprehensive way to keep abreast of new works.

Submissions for consideration in *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* may be written in either English or French. If you have an idea for an article, note, commentary, or review essay, please contact the editor at pkikkert@sfx.ca.

Submission Guidelines

All *TNM/Lmn* submissions, the peer review process, and editorial work are done through our online journal system at York Digital Journals. If you are a new contributor to the journal, please visit our site and select “register” to create a new account. You will be asked to fill in a brief contributor form. You will then be able to log in, using the username and password you created, and carry out the submission process.

To facilitate the submission process, please have the following pieces of information available:

- The title of your article
- Your 100-word abstract (which will be translated into the language in which the article is not written)
Online Submission Checklist

- The submission has not been previously published, nor is it before another journal for consideration.
- Cover sheet included with name, affiliation (if applicable), and article title.
- Your name does not appear on the submission’s pages or file’s properties, to facilitate the peer review process.
- Submission files are in Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx file).
- Where available, DOIs/URLs for the references have been provided.
- The text is 1.5 line-spaced; Times New Roman, 12-point font.
- Tables, images, and other digital materials are supplied as separate documents, TIFFs or JPEGs; and placeholders have been included in the text (e.g.) [Insert Image 1 here].
- The text adheres to the stylistic and bibliographic requirements outlined in the Author Guidelines.

Style Guidelines

To assist authors in preparing articles, research notes, and commentaries for *TNM/Lmn*, we provide the following guidelines:

1. In editing English language articles for publication, the primary references used are *The Chicago Manual of Style*, *The Oxford Concise Dictionary*, and *Fowler's Modern English Usage*.

2. *TNM/Lmn* uses footnotes in the Chicago style. We also request that authors submit a separate reference/works cited list (in Word) to facilitate the journal’s efforts to improve citation tracking.

Monograph:

- Footnote: Author First Name Surname, *Title of Book* (Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication), Page Number


- Reference/Works Cited List: Surname, First Name. *Title of Book*. Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication.

• Book with multiple authors:

- Footnote: Author First Name Surname and Author First Name Surname, Title of Book (Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication), Page Number.
  

- Reference/Works Cited List: Author Surname, First Name and Author First Name Surname. Title of Book. Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication.
  

• Journal Article:

- Footnote: Author First Name Surname, “Title of Article,” Title of Journal volume, no. (Publication Date): Page Number, DOI/URL (if available).
  

  

• Book Chapter:

- Footnote: Author First Name Surname, “Title of Chapter,” in Title of Book, edited by Editor First Name Surname (Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication), Page Number.
  

- Reference/Works Cited List: Author Surname, First Name. “Title of Chapter.” In Title of Book, editor(s) First Name Surname (Place of Publication: Publisher, Date of Publication), Page Range.
  
• Thesis or Dissertation:
  • Footnote: Author First Name Surname, “Title of Thesis or Dissertation” (Degree, University Granting Degree, Date of Publication), Page Number.

  • Reference/Works Cited List: Author Surname, First Name. Title of Thesis or Dissertation. Degree, University Granting Degree, Date of Publication.

• Documents:
  • Footnote: Author First Name Surname (if known), Type of Document or Title, Date, Archival Reference, Archive/Repository.
  • Example: Leopold Amery, Memorandum to the Governor-Generals of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, 6 February 1920, RG 25, volume 1263, file 1920-311, Library and Archives Canada.

  • Reference/Works Cited List: Author Surname, First Name (if known). Type of Document or Title. Date. Archival Reference. Archive/Repository.

  • Reference/Works Cited List Note: If you reference multiple items from a collection, cite the collection as a whole: Collection name, reference code. Repository.
  • Example: Records of the Department of External Affairs (RG 25). Library and Archives Canada.

• Newspaper or Magazine:
  • Footnote: Author First Name Surname, “Title of Article,” Title of Newspaper/Magazine, Date of Publication, Page Number (if applicable).
  • Example: Lucien Wolf, “Canada’s Claim to the Pole,” The Times (London), 20 September 1909, 5.

  • Reference/Works Cited List: Author Surname, First Name. “Title of Article.” Title of Newspaper/Magazine, Date of Publication. Page Range.
  • Example: Wolf, Lucien. “Canada’s Claim to the Pole.” The Times (London), 20 September 1909. 5.

• Where possible, please provide URLs/DOIs for all references.
3. After a work has been cited in the footnotes, repeated references should use the short note form of that citation (rather than ibid). Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, 144. McDonald and Shlomowitz. “The Cost of Shipping Convicts to Australia,” 5.

4. Tables, images, figures, and other graphic materials must be supplied as separate Word documents, TIFFS or JPEGs, and placeholders should be included in the text along with a caption (e.g.) [Insert Image 1 here. Caption…]. Tables should be numbered sequentially throughout the article (e.g. Table 1). Provenance for all content must be indicated. Permission to reproduce materials which are copyrighted or under similar restrictions must be obtained by the author, who is also responsible for any associated fees.

5. Express numbers in words if less than one hundred (e.g., seven, eighty-one), otherwise use arabic numerals (e.g., 100, 789). Percent is written as one word. If percentages are in whole numbers, write out the number and percent; if decimals are used, use arabic numbers and a percentage sign (e.g., 98.1%).

6. Dates should always be in the standard Canadian style, viz. 29 August 1774.

7. Abbreviations and contractions should be avoided where possible. If an abbreviation is used, it must be cited in full at its first use, e.g. Canadian Nautical Research Society (C.N.R.S.) and subsequent use should include the periods/full stops. The sole exception is geographic locations, which should be abbreviated in CAPS without a period, e.g., MA for Massachusetts.

8. If a ship name is used, it should be italicized. Following current industry standard, ships are considered gender-neutral.

9. Submission files must be in Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx file). The text should be 1.5 line-spaced; Times New Roman,12-point font.

Copyright Notice

Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.

Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
Peer Review

Initial selection of research articles, research notes, review essays, and commentaries is completed by the Editor, who then assigns reviewers. All research articles are reviewed by at least two anonymous reviewers, while research notes, commentaries, and review essays are reviewed by one anonymous reviewer. To ensure a fair and objective review, *TNM/Lmn* uses a double-blind peer review process, in which both the reviewers and the authors remain anonymous.

There are four possible outcomes of the peer review process: Acceptance, Acceptance with Minor Revisions, Major Revisions Required for Acceptance, and Rejection. The Editor's decision on publication is final.

Reviewers are assigned articles based on their expertise. *TNM/Lmn* welcomes recommendations for reviewers from authors, though these suggestions may not always be used. If you are interested in reviewing for the *TNM/Lmn*, please contact the Editor at pkikkert@stfx.ca.
Present: Michael Moir, President (joined and took chair at 1109 hrs.); Tom Malcomson, First Vice-President (acting chair); Ian Yeates, Second Vice-President; Richard Gimblett, Past President; Errolyn Humphreys, Treasurer; Sam McLean, Membership Secretary; Ambjörn Adomeit, Isabel Campbell, Richard Goette, Walter Lewis, Jeff Noakes, Margaret Schotte and Winston “Kip” Scoville, Councillors; and Roger Sarty, Chair of the Editorial Board and Secretary.

In attendance: Erika Behrisch, Editor, Argonauta; and Peter Kikkert, General Editor, The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord.

Calling to Order

Tom Malcomson called the meeting to order at 1005 hrs.

Introduction of Editors

Erika reported that she is well settled in with Argonauta. Has material for the summer and fall issues thanks to good support from the membership including both regular and new contributors. She is having new graphic artwork done for some redesign.

Peter reported progress since he accepted the editorship of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord last fall. He has revised the author guidelines in accordance with the latest edition of The Chicago Manual of Style and the new version will be promulgated in Argonauta. He has also updated the submission categories, adding the new category of ‘Commentary,’ which will be broader than the existing ‘Research Notes,’ encouraging commentary for example on artifacts.

His goal is to make authorship more gender balanced and otherwise diverse, including Indigenous contributors. He will also be seeking more material that is relevant to current maritime issues. These initiatives will be important for the SSHRC application later this year.

He has started putting up older issues of the journal on the York Digital Journals site in preparation for the switch to OJS with the first issue for 2021 calendar year, following Bill Glover’s completion of the last 2020 issue.

Material is in hand for the first 2021 issue, which will feature a theme: the US in the Arctic. He hopes to be able to offer authors three-month turnaround from submission to publication. An idea to stimulate submissions is to invite authors of books to extract a chapter for publication (would require publisher’s permission, but usually willingly given for this kind of promotion).

He is working with Sam on social media, including the ‘Article of the Week’ feature, and the Twitter account. He would also like to organize Zoom meetings with authors, with perhaps participation of former editors of Argo and TNM/Lmn.

Richard Goette – We need to emphasize for TNM/Lmn our openness to shorter contributions, 4000-6000 words. Discussion noted that the journal has in fact always been open to shorter pieces, but the group agreed that this should be made better known.
Discussion also noted the appearance of a multi-part longer work in recent issues, and Peter noted he is planning to submit a multi-part piece on US icebreaker procurement. Faye Kert noted the need to keep NASOH, our co-publishers, in the loop. Roger noted that several of the regular NASOH contributors have retired, and not passed on new contacts. He had kept the NASOH Editorial Board members informed of the new editor competition, and advised them that we will require their support to help broaden our community of contributors as part of the move to OJS publication.

**Approval of Agenda**

Walter moved, Faye seconded. Carried.

**Minutes of Council’s Previous Meetings**

Isabel moved acceptance of 18 June 2021 minutes; Ambjörn seconded. Carried.

Margaret moved acceptance of 12 August 2021 minutes; Walter seconded. Carried.

**Financial Report (Michael joined during this discussion)**

Errolyn, Ian, and Michael have been discussing procurement of SAGE accounting software for the cloud, which carries a subscription fee of $15/month for the basic version. This is for the secure storage of information that has been, until now, only on the Treasurer’s personal machine, and so that Ian (who is assisting Errolyn) and other authorized officers with a need can access the information. Also under consideration is the creation of a common drive in Google Docs or MSN One Drive for storage of financial documents. A common drive could also be useful for the Secretary files. A discussion of Google Drive versus MSN One Drive followed, in which Walter noted that he and Sam already share members’ contact information on a Google Drive spreadsheet. The group agreed that the key issue is financial documents; Errolyn, Ian and Michael will report on choice of Google Docs or MSN One Drive.

Walter asked that if Peter is able to produce all four 2021 issues of *TNM/Lmn* in 2021, can we afford this in addition to the two issues of 2020 that have been or will be produced. Errolyn responded that funds are available.

Isabel moved acceptance of the financial report; Margaret seconded. Carried.

Faye moved ‘Treasurer has authority to establish a cloud based SAGE account for financial accounting.’ Walter seconded. Carried.

**Membership Report**

Sam reported that our membership is stable, but we need to grow, especially by attracting students. Suggested reaching out to fields beyond history, such as environmental and policy studies. Peter will work with Sam in drafting a note that can be circulated to students, teachers and program administrators. Richard Gimblett will provide them with information on the Cartier and Panting prizes.

[At 1127 hrs. Errolyn and Peter left the meeting]

Isabel raised the question of the Cartier prize for an MA paper or thesis requiring Canadian citizenship. Margaret said she and Tom are working on revisions of the Cartier prize criteria so that they match the Matthews prizes, i.e., a non-Canadian working on a Canadian topic will qualify.

Margaret noted that with the single-year MA it is impractical to induce people to change their topics mid-stream, hence the wisdom of making contact with more diverse programs such
as policy studies and environmental studies where people may have maritime topics in progress.

Isabel noted that other societies require membership to give a paper at the annual conference, and, as TNM/Lmn production catches up, we can also give the inducement of possible early publication. Richard Goette noted the example of the Canadian Naval Review’s student essay competition. We could offer the winner the chance to present at the annual conference.

Sam suggested a rotating position for a graduate student on Council, and Richard Gimblett observed it would be easy to arrange now that we have an expanded number of Councillor positions.

Jeff noted the opportunity to promote CNRS and the journals at the graduate student conferences now held by many universities.

Ambjörn suggested a promotional video, and is a member of a film group that could assist. He also noted that he and Sam have assembled list of email contacts for every history graduate chair in Canada.

Lunch break, 1200-1230 hrs.

Publications

Scanning of Argonauta

Michael noted that while we have a complete run of Argonauta starting from 2007 on the CNRS thanks to the work of Paul Adamthwaite, coverage for 1984 to 2006 is sparse. Richard Gimblett had suggested last year that this gap be filled, and Michael has initiated discussion with Paul to undertake this work using student assistants in the summer of 2021.

Isabel noted that the indexing of the issues scanned so far should be improved for better accessibility. Michael noted that OCR is not foolproof and requires proofreading. There is also a need to assemble a “keywords” guide. Richard Gimblett noted that the implementation of a keyword guide will greatly increase time and cost, unless there is a considerable number of capable volunteers. Tom noted that he supports scanning of full issues of Argonauta, not just articles, which is Paul’s recommendation.

Motion: “The Society will work with the Naval Marine Archive to digitize back issues of Argonauta to a cost of $1000. If that cost rises with the digitization of full issues rather than just articles, the matter should come back to Council.” Ambjörn moved; Walter seconded. Carried.

Printing and Distribution of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

York University printing and distribution services can print and mail the journal for a total of about $1650 more per volume of four issues than present arrangements, which impose a large burden on Walter.

Motion: President has authority to negotiate contract with York University for printing and distribution of TNM/Lmn starting with the first issue in the 2021 volume. Isabel moved; Margaret seconded. Carried.

Conferences

2021, Victoria, BC: Richard Gimblett noted that the 2021 conference will be free to members, and that non-members can participate by taking a digital membership for $30. The conference dates are 10-11 June 2021 for papers and 12 June 2021 for the AGM.
2022: proposed for Admiralty House in Halifax. Discussion on need for good wifi service for digital participation. Related point was possibility of pre-recording paper presentations both to ease bandwidth issues and time zone challenges. Richard Goette observed that the Canadian Forces College pre-records presentations, and then has live plenary sessions on groups of papers.

2023: favourable response to proposal for St. Catharines Museum, ON and the Welland Canal Centre, and possible joint meeting with NASOH. Kimberly Monk’s work on the excavation of the Shickluna Shipyard could be an important feature. Richard Gimblett observed that if NASOH already has a location for 2023, we could work with them another year. Richard Goette suggested Buffalo might be good for a joint meeting, as it would give access to the Welland Canal Centre, together with the warship museum on the Buffalo shore. Walter noted that there are ground shuttle services from Pearson and Hamilton airports to St. Catharines.

Awards

Cartier award: Tom and Margaret reported one strong submission.

Discussion supported Tom and Margaret’s proposal to bring the Cartier submission criteria in line with those for the Matthews and Panting, that is anyone, Canadian or not, working on a Canadian topic, and any Canadian working on any maritime topic.

Proposed new Pritchard award. Faye moved, and Sam seconded: ‘The Society create the James Pritchard prize to be awarded to the student in a post-secondary program who authors the best article published in *The Northern Marine/Le marin du nord* in a particular volume.’

Discussion: Michael noted that Peter will be soliciting student papers, such as literature reviews for *TNM/Lmn*, and this prize is intended to encourage student submissions. Suggestion that the prize be linked to a student prize competition, but agreement that the prize should go to a piece that has already been peer reviewed for the journal. Consensus that winning of the Cartier award would not exclude the Pritchard prize for an article developed from the thesis or research paper that won the Cartier. Consensus that the author of an article under consideration need not still be a student at the time of the article’s publication; the key criterion is that the article is the product of work undertaken while a student; committee should exercise latitude on this question. Agreed that terms for the Pritchard prize should be drafted by a committee of Michael and Richard Gimblett.

Motion carried.

Awards text on website: Richard Gimblett has volunteered to simplify and make consistent the wording for the various awards on the website. Jeff and Sam observed that the awards feature on the website must make it clear that we encourage submissions, and that the only initial step required is an email to the awards chair.

Agreed that the awards chair should be the first point of contact for all awards, and the awards chair will coordinate with the awards committees. Michael will coordinate a review and, if necessary, revision of the bylaws regarding the awards chair position for the AGM on 12 June 2021.

Nominations

Richard Gimblett reports that if Ian continues as Associate Treasurer, that will open a position for Second Vice-President, and that in turn will open a position for a Councillor. We also need a nomination for Secretary. Richard will put out a call for nominations in the next *Argonauta* (summer 2021).
Michael notes that use of electronic conferencing for Council meetings will open up the possibility for more nominations from regions outside of central Canada. He will be exploring if Corporations Canada will continue its 2020 allowance to use telecommunications software for the annual general meeting.

Note: Michael will review the by-law to see if changes are needed to the new Associate Treasurer position in preparation for AGM on 12 June 2021.

**Website**

Agreed to have special meeting on website issues in May to prepare for AGM on 12 June.

Adjourned 1422 hrs.
Respectfully submitted,
Roger Sarty
Secretary
**Argonauta Guidelines for Prospective Authors**

*Argonauta* aims to publish articles of interest to the wider community of maritime research enthusiasts. We are open to considering articles of any length and style, including research articles that fall outside the boundaries of conventional academic publishing (in terms of length or subject-matter), memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone. Articles accepted for publication should be easily understood by interested non-experts.

For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to *The Northern Mariner*, a peer-reviewed journal appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works also managed by the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Except with proper names or in quotations, we follow standard Canadian spelling. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense may both be correct in context.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

- Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Protecteur*
- Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Preserver*
- Class of ship/submarine: *Victoria*-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)
- Former HMCS *Fraser* rather than Ex-*Fraser*
- Foreign ships and submarines:
  - USS *Enterprise*
  - HMS *Victory*
  - HMAS *Canberra 3*

Following current industry standard, ships are considered gender-neutral.

Although *Argonauta* is not formally peer-reviewed, the editors carefully review and edit each and every article. Authors must be receptive to working with the editors on any revisions they deem necessary before publication; the editors reserve the right to make small formatting, stylistic, and grammatical changes as they see fit once articles are accepted for publication.

Articles should conform to the following structural guidelines:

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. Please use endnotes rather than footnotes. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of emerging scholars.

Each image must be accompanied by a caption describing it and crediting the source, and indicating where the original is held. Images will not be reproduced without this information. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, artwork, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. Please indicate clearly where in the text each image should go.
All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. *Argonauta* recommends that authors consult Royal Military College’s website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link: https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help were provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

With each submission, please include a brief (5-7 sentence maximum) biography.
CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord*, a quarterly refereed open access journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the northern hemisphere. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, marine archaeology, maritime societies and the like.

- *Argonauta*, a quarterly on-line newsletter, which publishes articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.

- An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime-minded locations, where possible with our U.S. colleagues in the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH).

- Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at $70 for individuals, $25 for students, $45 for Early Career R or $95 for institutions. Please add $10 for international postage and handling. Members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) may join the Canadian Nautical Research Society for the reduced rate of $35 per year. Digital Membership does not include a printed copy of *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord*. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to take one of several other categories of patronage, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and all donations to the Society are automatically acknowledged with a tax receipt. Should you wish to renew on-line, go to: www.cnrs-scrn.org

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