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At my home in Kingston, Ontario, autumn has arrived. The leaves have all changed and some have fallen, and there is absolutely no pleasure at the thought of even a quick dip in Lake Ontario for an afternoon lark. The last time I headed out in a kayak—around Cedar Island one blustery Sunday morning with a friend—I wasn’t completely confident that I could stop myself from being blown straight to New York state. As the waves sloshed into my little cockpit, I imagined the wrecks I might be paddling over and thought about how much I loved the beach. Our quiet exploration of the Prince Regent, a shallow nineteenth-century wreck whose timbers loom upwards at the head of Deadman Bay, was a sober end to the adventure.

The upheaval of the season seems, in some ways, to have visited our nautical community, too. Most obviously, this issue of the Argonauta contains the roster of the newly shuffled Council and the first official musings of our new President, Michael Moir; it also offers the call for papers for next year’s conference, in anticipation of the seasons to come. The articles likewise concern themselves with change, renewal, and loss: Fraser McKee’s memoir of the Hochelaga overlays happy reminiscences of childhood adventures on the rather sad tale of a royal pleasure yacht’s inevitable decline. Derek Waller’s next installment in the saga of the surrendered U-boats relates the Allies’ negotiations to divide the spoils. Ultimately, the sea itself was the greatest recipient. More somberly, this issue also includes two obituaries, the stories of Doug Maginley and Harold Langley, two prominent naval historians who enjoyed fabulous careers and friendships through their love of maritime life and history. I didn’t know them personally, but many of you may have, and I’m sorry for the loss of your friends and colleagues.

But even as the tide of summer recedes, I remind myself that autumn isn’t a shutting down; it is, rather, a protective closing in, a promise of seasons to come. Winter is the best time for telling stories, and when the best stories are told. And good stories beget more stories; the influence that Langley’s academic work had on the directions of maritime research is certainly proof of that, as are the decades of reading, writing, and friendship many in the CNRS community enjoyed in Doug Maginley’s company. In the tales they told and were a part of, ancient mariners return.
Change has become the dominant theme of recent times. Waves of infection batter our society, significantly altering the ways we connect with colleagues, friends, and family. Climate change brings intense debate, raising concerns about the fate of coastal communities and the impact of shipping on the Canadian Arctic. While George Bernard Shaw once remarked that “Progress is impossible without change,” it is difficult to avoid a feeling of trepidation in the face of so much uncertainty.

Fortunately recent developments with the CNRS give succor to Shaw’s optimism. Change is most obvious in our publishing program, beginning with Argonauta. The transition in editors from the team of Isabel Campbell and Colleen McKee to the virtual pen of Erika Behrisch has been smooth and has maintained the positive momentum of recent years. Change will soon come to The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord with the appointment of a new general editor to lead the journal into a fully digital workflow for authors’ submissions, peer review, and dissemination.

Technology has also changed the way that the Society carries out its business as members from Victoria to Belgium gathered using video conferencing software to hold our annual meeting last August. We will turn to this software once again for our next annual conference. I encourage members to mark 10 to 12 June 2021 in their calendars so that they are available for the virtual event being developed by Jan Drent and his program committee, and to give serious consideration to their call for papers so that you can share your research with fellow members and advance our understanding of maritime history.

Change has also come to the Society’s helm. As I begin my first term (and column) as president, I offer thanks to my immediate predecessors. Chris Madsen left a record of innovation and financial stability that set the Society on a good course, a focus on stewardship that was carried on by Richard Gimblett as he worked toward renewal of Council and our publishing program. As for my turn at the wheel, I will concentrate on bringing TNM into the stable of digital journals at York University Libraries and raising the Society’s profile through the strategic use of social media. With so much change in the air, we must seize the opportunity to make Canadians aware of the historical context that shapes contemporary issues of Arctic sovereignty, ship procurement, coastline management, and other maritime issues so that we can make informed decisions about our future.
A Second Pictou-to-Charlottetown Ferry Service: The *Hochelaga*

By Fraser McKee

The story of the “rather fraught” ferry service by the paddle steamer *Westmorland*, linking P.E.I. with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the mid-nineteenth century, was told in the Summer edition of *Argo* by H.T. Holman. This called to my mind a successor service over the same route, and I offer this brief supplementary tale of a vessel I once knew on the same service, with a much longer but equally wild and variable life: the ex-steam yacht *Hochelaga*.

The yacht, originally named *Waturus*, was built in 1900 by Hawthorn & Co., Lieth, Scotland\(^1\) for Archduke of Austria Karl Stephan, who was also the Flag Officer of the Austrian Royal Yacht Squadron. At 192.6' (210' o.a. due to its considerable bow), 17.6' breadth and the rather remarkable depth of 14.8', the luxurious pleasure craft was of 628 grt, and with a triple-expansion coal-fired engine by its builder, it could make 13 knots\(^2\). It was sold in 1902 to Randall W. Morgan of Philadelphia, who used his elegant yacht for family cruising along the Atlantic coast, including with his daughter who happened also to be the daughter-in-law of (later) Admiral Jackie Fisher, RN.

With the advent of the First World War—and Canada with but two warships—a requirement for at least some reasonable local patrol ships was soon appreciated. Five ex-motor yachts were acquired from U.S. sources,\(^3\) and one by Toronto stockbroker Æmelius Jarvis: the *Waturus*. Now renamed HMCS *Hochelaga* and newly fitted with a single 12-pounder QF gun, the yacht was handed over to the RCN on 31 July 1915, and commissioned on 15 August. With its compatriots and the new-built TR series of trawlers, the *Hochelaga* undertook local patrols out of Halifax as far as the Newfoundland coast.

The rather haphazard recruiting of crew in those early Naval Reserves days is revealed by the records of its crew: at one stage *Hochelaga*’s “navigator” was suspended when his calculated position was proven to be 100 miles off his real location. In another memorable episode, on 25 August 1918, C.O. Lt Robert D. Legate, RNCVR, was involved in one of the very rare U-boat encounters by these ex-yachts. Upon sighting the fray, Legate turned away from the U-boat (later identified as U-156) in the process of shelling a schooner, by then lying on its side with its dories pulling to safety.\(^4\) Legate reported he was hoping to find the larger HMCS *Cartier* (on patrol with the *Hochelaga*) to protect his own minimally armed craft. Legate’s conduct was questionable at best, as history records: “When in sight of a ship of the enemy which it was his duty to engage, [he] did not use his utmost exertion to bring his ship into action.”\(^5\) In those times, Legate was lucky not to face execution, and the Navy dispensed with his services. Under a different helmsman, *Hochelaga* continued its coastal patrols until after the war.

Turned over to the Coast Guard in October, 1920, the yacht was sold to John Simon of Halifax for $11,000 on 23 February, 1923,\(^6\) for conversion to his newly acquired and subsidized contract ferry service between Pictou, N.S. and Charlottetown, P.E.I. It was operated under his firm of Hochelaga Shipping & Towing Co. Simon operated more than the ferry from Pictou to Charlottetown, with tugs and service ferries along the Nova Scotia Eastern Shore as well. This P.E.I. route was rather shorter than that of *Westmorland* of 60 years earlier; it was in use as far as records show between those two ports only from 1924.
to 1940. With the dangers of the Second World War looming, Simon gave up the service and sold *Hochelaga*, and other competing ferries took on similar service to Borden.

It was in this role that I remember “the Hoch” on its daily departure for the Island and return, like clockwork. Between about 1927 and 1941 I spent my summers at Pictou Harbour at my Grandmother Fraser’s cottage, and even made one trip on the ship.

The ferry’s timetable and its rates will be illustrative today; the four-hour trip, Pictou to Charlottetown, looked like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lv. Pictou</td>
<td>9 a.m. daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar. Charlottetown</td>
<td>1 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lv. Charlottetown</td>
<td>4 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar. Pictou</td>
<td>8 p.m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rates:

- Passengers: $2.50
- Commercial: $2.00
- Regular Return: $4.00
- Weekend: $3.75
- Cars: $2.50
- Return: $3.75

With the start of the Second World War in 1939, the navy was in almost as sad shape as it had been in 1914, with only six destroyers and four minesweepers. Again, U.S. motor yachts were acquired—14 of them, plus one Canadian and one British on the West Coast. *Hochelaga* was considered for service that fall, but being now 40 years old and coal-fired, was rejected. In 1942 it was purchased by Thomas C. Wilwerth of New York City for potential use in the fruit trade between Puerto Rico and the U.S.; there was a scarcity of ships. However, after spending some $136,000 for the vessel, its repairs, and hopeful certification, Wilwerth abandoned the ship at New York when it was seized by U.S. Marshalls for unpaid debts.

The ship’s future steps are murky to say the least, and deliberately. It was purchased again as the war ended, apparently by the Israeli Hagganah organization, to be employed in transferring the few European Jewish survivors from thence to the hoped-for new land of Israel. Renamed once more as *Hakhayal Ha’irvi*, or Jewish Soldier, it departed Amsterdam with 550 Jewish refugees hoping to get to Israel. (Two of the 76 ships thus employed from all over Europe were even ex-RCN corvettes: *Beauharnois* and *Norsyd*.) There were difficulties, however, with authorities related to the *Hakhayal Ha’irvi’s* over-crowding and condition. Off Haifa, the elderly vessel was intercepted by the RN destroyer HMS *Saumurez*, boarded and towed into Haifa, then to Cyprus, where its passengers were held in camps pending the solution to the proposed “Jewish State” problem.

Here the *Hochelaga’s* story ends, with no further records. At about 47 years old, it was probably abandoned for scrap.

Endnotes

Fraser McKee was born and educated in Toronto. He joined the RCNVR in March 1943 as an Ordinary Seaman. Promoted to Sub-Lieutenant a year later, he served in various shore training and defence stations, an Armed Yacht, and an Algerine escort by the war’s end. He remained in the Naval Reserve until 1978, serving in every type of ship from submarines to aircraft carriers, and retired as a Commander. Postwar, he took a degree in Forestry, then worked in communications and advertising until his retirement in 1982. He is the author or co-author of six books on naval and merchant naval history, plus a paper on mine warfare. He was editor of two naval newsletters for over 14 years, as well as others, Past President of the Navy League of Canada, and of the Toronto Branch of the Naval Officers Association. His wife died in 2007 and he has four children and nine grandchildren.


6. ibid – The Armed Yachts + Lloyds Registers

7. Card personal property of author.

8. ibid. The Armed Yachts, and news articles of the day. Wikipedia article & table on their ships.
The U-Boats that Surrendered: The Retain, Scrap or Sink Debate
by Air Commodore Derek Waller RAF (Ret’d)

“I protest most strongly at the scuttling of German submarines from Loch Ryan. Am prepared to purchase same for scrapping”. (1)

Introduction

The above message written to Mr A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, by Mr William Nugent, a businessman from Largs in Scotland, on 26 November 1945 is an example of the serious contemporary concern about the disposal by sinking of the majority of the German Navy’s U-boats that had surrendered in May 1945.

At the end of the war in Europe 156 U-boats surrendered. Of these, 10 were allocated to each of the three Allies, the UK, the USA and the USSR, one was repaired and commissioned into the French Navy, one was returned to the Dutch Navy, four were repaired and commissioned into the Norwegian Navy, three were scrapped in the Norwegian ports in which they had surrendered, and two were sunk by the US Navy in February 1946. The remainder were sunk by the Royal Navy in “Operation Deadlight” to the north-west of Northern Ireland between November 1945 and February 1946.

A total of 116 U-boats were sunk in “Operation Deadlight,” comprising 115 of the U-boats that had surrendered plus one damaged U-boat (U-760) that had been interned in Spain since 1943. This action, however, as illustrated by Mr Nugent’s letter, continues even today to raise a question in the minds of naval historians and others interested in the Kriegsmarine’s WW2 history: why all these U-boats were sunk rather than scrapped—with the associated recovery of steel and other materials, all of which were in short supply in 1945 and 1946.

The bald answer to this question is that this was a decision taken by the Heads of Government of the ‘Big Three’ Allies (UK, USA and USSR) at their international Potsdam Conference (code named “Terminal”), held in Berlin in July and August 1945 as part of wider decisions concerning the future of all the German naval vessels that had surrendered.

The result of these political discussions was the production of the then-Top Secret Proceedings (Minutes) of the Conference—The Potsdam Agreement—which, in respect of the U-boats that had surrendered, said that the UK, the USA and the USSR had concluded that

The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. (2)

Thus the executive action to dispose by sinking of the majority of the surrendered U-boats was mandated by that political decision, and was not open to any variations driven by practical suggestions, including the possible recovery of steel or the use of the U-boats’ engines for power generation. Additionally, the Allies had decided that the sinkings would take place as soon as possible and that the matter would remain secret until the executive action had been completed.
Early Allied Proposals about the Future of the German Naval Fleet

Throughout 1944 and early 1945, the question of what should happen to the surviving vessels of the German fleet had exercised all three of the Allies as part of their respective post-war planning processes.

The Soviet Union had indicated in early 1944 that it expected to be allocated a share of any surviving German warships. In contrast, the total elimination of the German fleet and the associated destruction of any remaining U-boats was a long-held objective of many senior Royal Navy officers, many with memories of the events following the WW1 armistice and the scuttling of German warships in Scapa Flow.

The initial focus of the debate in the UK in respect of the surrender of the German Navy was on the arrangements for a German surrender as a whole. As part of these, early proposals were set out by the First Sea Lord (Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunnigham) in a submission to the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee on 25 February 1944. This was in response to a request by the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, who had asked for guidance concerning the general policy to be followed concerning the surviving vessels of the German fleet in the event of an early German surrender, before, during or just after the planned invasion of continental Europe in mid-1944.

As far as the disposal of the German fleet was concerned, the COS paper concluded that

*Surrender in UK ports would, of course, be without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of the ships, which would be a matter for settlement between Governments. The question of the future disposal of the German Fleet and the Soviet share will therefore be examined.* (3)

At that stage, it was unclear as to the procedure to be adopted in order to obtain Allied agreement to the UK proposals, particularly from the USSR, and the UK Chiefs of Staff were therefore asked to approve discussions with the Soviet Government at an opportune date. It was suggested that

*The procedure might be either to table the directive at the European Advisory Commission [EAC] or to raise the question at the highest level.* (3)

The EAC, which then comprised British, American and Russian representatives, had been established after the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in November 1943 to study and make recommendations to their governments on European questions connected with the termination of hostilities. One of its earliest projects was to produce an agreed-upon draft paper setting out the terms of an unconditional German surrender.

At the same time, however, the question of what should happen to the German fleet at the end of the war was exercising the US Navy; early evidence of this was a letter from the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the Commander of US Naval Forces in Europe (ComNavEu) on 24 May 1944. The CNO’s letter was titled “German Submarines for the United States,” and it outlined what the US Navy required and why:

*The following views of the Commander-in-Chief regarding the disposition of German submarines, upon the unconditional surrender of Germany, are furnished [to] you in connection with your position as the US Naval Advisor to the European Advisory Commission.*
It is assumed that, upon the unconditional surrender of Germany, the United States will become entitled to the possession of one-third of all German submarines.

Because of their value in research and development and in order to provide for operational test employment in the Western Pacific, it is desired to obtain actual physical possession of certain submarines of the United States’ share with minimum delay. (4)

This statement, with its advice to ComNavEu in his role as the US Naval Advisor to the EAC (based in London), was by no means premature. A related Admiralty letter dated 1 July 1944 mentioned American involvement:

The arrangements for the surrender of German naval forces when an armistice with Germany is concluded or hostilities cease, have been engaging the attention of Their Lordships, and the policy in regard to this will shortly be considered with the American and Soviet Delegates to the European Advisory Commission. (5)

The anticipated consideration by the EAC—the result of a long debate, during which the Soviet delegation played a full and robust part in relation to German surface warships and submarines—took place at its 7th (44) Meeting on 25 July 1944, at which the three national representatives of the UK, the USA and the USSR agreed:

In virtue of the Terms of Reference of the European Advisory Commission, agreed upon at the Moscow Conference, the Commission has given attention to the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany and submits herewith, for the consideration of the three Governments, a draft Instrument entitled “Unconditional Surrender of Germany”. (6)

As far as the German Navy was concerned, the EAC’s draft surrender document contained this important statement:

The German authorities will hold intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:—all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarines whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building. (6)

Thereafter, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the US Secretary of State on 4 September 1944:

It is understood that the immediate disposition of units of the German fleet in connection with the imposition of surrender terms upon the defeat of Germany is presently under advisement in the European Advisory Commission, and that it has been tentatively agreed that the ultimate disposition of the units of the German fleet will be a matter for decision by the governments of the United Nations concerned.

It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, except for the retention of a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes, the German fleet should be completely destroyed. In the event that agreement cannot be reached with the Russians and the British on this basis, the United States should press for either:

A one-third share of each category of ships in the German fleet, or
Agreement that all capital ships, such as battleships, pocket-battleships and heavy cruisers, and submarines should be destroyed, while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Russia and Great Britain. (6)

As a result of consultations between the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Secretary of State and the President himself, US policy was further refined. This was articulated on 23 November 1944 by the submission to the EAC of a “US Draft Directive on Disposition of German and German Controlled Naval Craft, Equipment and Facilities,” which included two significant proposals concerning the future of the German Navy:

Para 6:—Except as provided in para 8 [below] you [the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective occupation zones] will immediately render unfit for combat and as quickly as possible thereafter destroy or scrap all naval craft designed primarily for combat.

Para 8:—You will safeguard for ultimate disposition by the Control Council all such German naval craft mentioned in para 6 [above] as you determine to be of new or experimental design, or which you consider merit special examination, or which the accredited representatives of either of the other two Allied Commanders-in-Chief may designate for retention as experimental or new types. (7)

In essence, the US proposal to the EAC was that, except for a small number of naval vessels to be retained for experimental and other purposes, the entire German fleet—both surface ships and submarines—should be destroyed or scrapped. There was no mention of a one-third split between each of the USA, UK and USSR, there was no differentiation between surface ships and submarines, and there was no mention of the fallback positions set out in the Joint Chiefs of Staffs’ letter to the US Secretary of State on 4 September. Nor was there any mention of an “aside” that had been made by President Roosevelt on 13 October when, after confirming that he agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the complete destruction of the German fleet, he said,

I have one amendment to make. Destruction in the past has meant taking the ships to sea and sinking them. I do not like the idea of the complete destruction by sinking of thousands of tons of steel. We have used sunken ships as breakwaters for the formation of new harbours. It is a relatively cheap way to build a breakwater [and] it is rather a nice thought to use [these ships] for such peaceful purposes.

In any such cases, the ships should be sunk at a designated place as quickly as possible and under the eyes of a United Nations’ Committee. Once sunk it would be practically impossible to raise them and restore them to war purposes. (8)

The US President’s views fell on stony ground on this occasion, however, and his suggestion was not pursued.

Unsurprisingly, the Draft Directive provoked a great deal of interest in London, where it was apparent that, in principle, the US Navy and the Royal Navy had similar objectives concerning the disposal of the German Navy. However, whilst agreeing that it would lead to the total elimination of German naval power, the UK took an equivocal view about the fate of the surface fleet in the expectation that the Russians would demand to be allocated at least its fair share of the remaining warships. Nevertheless, it was hoped that, as part of the negotiations, it would be possible to achieve the specific UK objective of destroying all the remaining U-boats.
The need for Allied discussions on the topic was overtaken by the approach of the war’s end; in any case, it had already been accepted by the three Allies that the ultimate disposition of the surviving units of the German fleet would be a matter for decision by the UK, US, and Soviet governments. Also, it was clear that the USSR would definitely demand to be allocated at least one third of the German fleet.

One of the important aspects of the consideration of the American Draft EAC Directive was that it helped to formalise UK and Royal Navy views about the future of any U-boats that were likely to surrender at the end of the war. These are highlighted by a number of statements in the Admiralty File, which was opened in London on 23 November 1944. For example, the Admiralty’s senior staff officer responsible for assembling comments on the US proposal, Mr Claud Waldock, stated on 22 January 1945, that

*The policy of destruction proposed by the US is, in my view, in the best interests of the Royal Navy and of the United Nations as a whole and will, I believe, commend itself to the Board. Unfortunately, however, some of our allies may take a different view.* (7)

On 15 February, the Royal Navy’s Admiral (Submarines) opined:

*The question of manpower required to maintain surrendered vessels is of vital interest to Admiral (Submarines). Every German U-boat which we have to maintain means a direct reduction in our effort against the Japanese, for the maintenance personnel can only be skilled submarine ratings. Apart from U-boats required for experimental purposes it is therefore very desirable for them to be scrapped at the earliest opportunity.* (7)

This was followed on 21 March by a statement from the Admiralty’s Director of Plans:

*If the U-boat fleet was destroyed and German war making industry obliterated, I do not think there would be any harm in letting the Russians have what remains afloat of the German surface fleet. I would therefore say that we can enter upon a policy of supporting the American attitude wholeheartedly.* (7)

Mr Waldock responded on 29 March:

*I agree with the Director of Plans. If a policy of total scrapping [of the whole fleet] cannot be agreed then [we should] go for a policy of scrapping the whole U-boat fleet.* (7)

The UK’s attitude towards the future of any U-boats that might surrender at the end of the war was therefore clear. It was also clear that the final decision would need to be taken jointly by the three Allies, and that detailed negotiations would be required. However, further debate was overtaken by events as the war in Europe ended, as arrangements began for the high-level Allied meeting at Potsdam, and as the Russians increased their pressure for an early decision about the future of the surviving German warships.

**Initial Post-War Proposals**

On 23 May 1945, just two weeks after the end of the war in Europe, and whilst the war against Japan was still underway, Marshal Stalin sent a message to Mr Churchill and President Truman making it clear that—despite no German naval vessels having surrendered to Soviet forces—he expected at least one third of Germany’s surviving warships to be allocated to the Soviet Union. The full text of his message follows:
According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Military and Naval Commands, Germany, in keeping with the instrument of surrender, has delivered her navy and merchant marine to the British and Americans. I must inform you that the Germans have refused to surrender a single warship or merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces, and have sent the whole of their navy and merchant marine to be handed over to the Anglo-American armed forces. In these circumstances the question naturally arises of assigning the Soviet Union its share of German warships and merchant vessels, as was done with regard to Italy. The Soviet Government holds that it can with good reason and in all fairness count on a minimum of one-third of Germany’s navy and merchant marine. In addition I think it necessary for the naval representatives of the USSR to be enabled to acquaint themselves with all the materials pertaining to the surrender of Germany’s navy and merchant marine, and with their actual condition. The Soviet Naval Command has appointed Admiral Levchenko and a group of assistants to take care of the matter. (9)

Whilst Stalin’s message rightly asserted that no German naval vessels had surrendered to the Soviet armed forces, he neglected to acknowledge that, after the capture of Danzig by the Red Army on 30 March 1945, a Sovinformburo (the Soviet News Agency) Press Release had included a statement that “45 submarines” had been captured. (10) This piece of information had already been the subject of a written question-and-answer in the UK House of Commons, on 17 April 1945. The question, under the heading “U-Boats (Russian Captures)” by Colonel William Carver, Member of Parliament for Howdendshire, asked the First Lord of the Admiralty

Whether he had any information as to the capture of 41 [sic] U-boats by the Russians when they captured Danzig; whether these boats were fit for use or whether they were in an incomplete stage; and what is going to be done with them? (11)

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr A V Alexander, had little to offer:

Marshal Stalin’s Order of the Day [sic] dated 30 March announced the capture of 45 U-boats at Danzig and a subsequent Soviet announcement stated that eight of the captured U-boats were large [presumably Type XXIs]. A request has been addressed to the Soviet authorities for further details. I have no details as yet about the last part of the question. (11)

Mr Churchill’s reply on 27 May to Stalin’s message of 23 May thanked the latter for his telegram and continued:

It seems to me that these matters should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date, and I thank you for giving this outline of your views beforehand. (9)

President Truman, after first assuring Mr Churchill that he was in general agreement with his reply to Stalin, replied in similar vein on 29 May:

Thank you for your suggestion regarding surrendered German ships contained in your message dated 23 May 1945. It appears to me that this is an appropriate subject for discussion by the three of us at the forthcoming meeting at which time I am sure a solution can be reached which will be fully acceptable to all of us. (9)
In the meantime, Stalin had also raised the matter on 27 May with President Truman’s personal representative, the US diplomat Mr Harry Hopkins during the latter’s informal mission to Moscow on the President’s behalf. Hopkins recorded Stalin’s position in his notes of the meeting:

As regards to the German fleet which had caused so much damage to Leningrad and other Soviet ports not one [vessel] had been turned over to the Russians despite the fact the fleet had surrendered. He added that he had sent a message to the President and Prime Minister [Churchill] suggesting that at least one-third of the German Navy and merchant marine thus surrendered be turned over to the Soviet Union. The rest could be disposed of by Great Britain and the United States as they saw fit. He added that if the Soviet Union had been entitled to a part of the Italian fleet they certainly had more right to their fair share of the German fleet, since they had suffered five million casualties in this war. He said that the Soviet Government had certain information leading it to believe that both the United States and England intended to reject the Soviet request and he must say that if this turned out to be true, it would be very unpleasant. (9)

The meeting notes also record that, in response, Mr Hopkins reassured Stalin:

From conversations he had had with Admiral King [the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations] he was able to state that the United States had no desire to retain any portion of the German fleet and merely wished to examine the vessels for possible new inventions or technical improvements. After that we were prepared to sink the share turned over to us. He also said that he had always understood that the fleet was to be divided between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that insofar as the United States was concerned there was no objection to whatever disposition the Soviet Government wished to make with its share. He added that he thought that this matter could be definitely settled at the forthcoming meeting of the three Heads of Government. (9)

The matter was raised yet again during Mr Hopkins’ visit when, at their meeting on 30 May, Stalin said that he had received a suggestion from General Eisenhower stating

That a naval commission composed of the four countries [USA, USSR, UK and France] should be set up to consider the disposal and division of the German fleet; that the American representative on this commission would be Admiral Ghormley and that he would name Admiral Levchenko as the Soviet representative. (9)

It is clear that Stalin was taking the lead concerning the division of the German fleet, and also that such an approach was not unexpected by the UK and the USA. It was therefore agreed that the topic should be discussed at the forthcoming Potsdam Conference, with a mutually acceptable decision the desired outcome. Whilst the British were hoping to use their agreement to the division of the surviving German naval vessels between the Allies as a bargaining chip, their position had been somewhat undermined by the unilateral assurances given to Stalin by Mr Hopkins and General Eisenhower.

**The British and American Pre-Potsdam Conference Proposals**

With the future of the German naval fleet as an Agenda item at the Potsdam Conference (due to start on 17 July), both the UK and the US staffs produced “Briefing Notes” for their respective delegations. In the UK’s case, the final papers were produced by the Foreign Office but, in the case of the USA, theirs were produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it was considered to be a military matter.
The advice the US Joint Chiefs of Staff gave to President Truman (dated 10 July) stated that the preferred solution remained that—except for a small number of ships to be retained for experimental purposes—the entire German naval fleet should be destroyed by sinking or scrapping. An alternative was to destroy all the larger naval ships and the submarines, and to share the remaining smaller vessels. Failing that, the US Chiefs of Staff were content to agree that all the surface vessels should be shared equally between the three Allies and France. However, in respect of the U-boats, the US Briefing Note was clear:

*In any event, the United States should press for the sinking of German submarines.*

There were also two important UK papers relating to the future of the German naval vessels. The first of these was the Foreign Office’s “Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference at Potsdam” dated 6 July, which stated that it would be in the UK’s interest to scrap the entire German fleet—a situation with which the Soviets were not expected to agree. It thus recommended that the UK should support the US proposal for total scrapping as a bargaining counter to obtain USSR’s agreement on other issues.

The second paper was the Admiralty’s “Disposal of the German Fleet,” submitted to the Cabinet by the First Lord, Mr Brendon Bracken, on 7 July. This document included the suggestion that, whereas the Russians should be allocated only 10 U-boats, the British and Americans should be allocated 65 each, and that six should be allocated to France. The British requirement was for a large number of U-boats for experimental purposes, most of which would be used in extended explosive trials, an action which it was hoped would be seen as tantamount to sinking them. It was assumed that the United States would require the same number for the same purposes. The Admiralty’s aim was to keep U-boats out of undesirable—particularly Russian—hands, and it was believed that this suggestion would attract American support.

The Admiralty’s Cabinet Paper stressed that the lowest possible number of U-boats should be given to the Russians that would secure a settlement. If the Russians contested the allocation of 65 U-boats to each of Britain and America, it was suggested that they should be reminded that the Red Army had announced the capture of 45 U-boats in Danzig in March. This was known to be untrue—or at least exaggerated—but it was expected that the Russians would find it embarrassing to retract the Red Army’s announcement.

A UK Cabinet Meeting on 12 July, at which Mr Churchill was not present, considered the Admiralty proposal. Although no red line was formally put through them at the meeting, the Cabinet Paper’s suggested U-boat allocation figures did not survive once the paper had been considered at the political level. Indeed, other than the determination to ensure that the Russians were allocated no more than 10 U-boats, and although Mr Churchill subsequently reminded Stalin of the statement about 45 submarines being captured at Danzig, the figures never re-appeared. The important point agreed by the Cabinet was that the UK position at Potsdam should be to support the US proposal for the wholesale scrapping of most of the German fleet; if the Russians rejected that approach, the fall-back position would be to give the Russians the minimum number of U-boats.

**The Potsdam Conference**

The Potsdam Conference between Marshal Stalin, President Truman and Prime Ministers Churchill and (later) Attlee was about much more than the future of the Kriegsmarine and the remaining U-boats. Indeed, this decision was just one element of a whole series of momentous political and military subjects to be considered at what was essentially a peace conference.
The decisions about the U-boats were just a small part of the major German military issues, which, as set out in the Potsdam Agreement, included the statement:

*The purposes of the occupation of Germany are:*

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces shall be completely and finally abolished.

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. (12)

There was, therefore, no question of the retention of the majority of the German naval vessels, including the U-boats. The only question was how this was to be achieved. Were they to be scrapped or sunk?

The 1st Plenary [Leaders] Meeting was held at Potsdam on 17 July, and almost immediately Stalin raised the question of the division of the German naval fleet which, he said, the UK and the USA had agreed would be discussed at the Conference. There are three slightly different records of the debate at this Meeting, particularly in relation to the question of how the German fleet was to be destroyed.

In the US “Thompson Minutes”:

*S...[Thompson Minutes]*

Stalin asked why does Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet?

Churchill exclaimed “Why?” and went on to say that he thought that the fleet should be destroyed or shared.

Stalin said, let’s divide it. If Mr Churchill wishes, he can sink his share. (2)

In the US “Cohen Notes”:

*S...[Cohen Notes]*

Stalin: If you are in such an obedient mood today, Mr Prime Minister, I should like to know whether you will share with us the German fleet.

Churchill: We will share it with you or sink it. (2)

In the UK Minutes:

*Premier Stalin asked why Mr Churchill did not agree that Russia should have a third of the German Fleet.*

Mr Churchill said that this was not the position. It was, however, for consideration whether the German Fleet should be divided up, or whether it would be sunk.

Premier Stalin said that in his view the German Fleet should be divided up. If other countries wished to sink the ships which made up the share allotted to them they could do so, but he did not intend that the ships allotted to Russia should be sunk. (12)
A day later (18 July), Mr Churchill had lunch with President Truman, and the former noted their conversation:

_The President asked how I thought we should handle the Russian request for the division of the German Fleet. I said I found it hard to deny the Russians the right to keep their third of the Fleet afloat if they needed it. We British should not have any use for our third of the warships. The President said that the Americans would take their share, but it would be of no use to them. I made it clear that the case of the U-boats must be considered separately, as they were nasty things to have knocking about in large numbers. He seemed to agree._ (12)

The 2nd Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries was held on 19 July, one of the purposes of which was to agree the Agenda for the 3rd Plenary to be held later that day. Russia’s Mr Molotov was keen for an early discussion about a paper he had produced about the future of the German Navy; the USA’s Mr Byrnes and UK’s Mr Eden both agreed that it should be included in the Agenda for the Plenary. The Soviet proposal was short and to the point, with just five paragraphs on a single sheet. In respect of the German Navy, its position was simple:

_One third of the total German Navy shall be handed over to the Soviet Union._ (2)

The 3rd Plenary Meeting was held on the evening of 19 July, and included a lengthy debate about the future of the German fleet. Stalin once again took the lead, but Mr Churchill assured him that he had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet be divided, though he linked this to the need for a satisfactory and amicable outcome to the Conference as a whole. President Truman said that he, too, was agreeable to a three-way division of the German naval fleet.

Within this conversation, however, Mr Churchill insisted very strongly that the U-boats be dealt with differently. With the exception of a small number that should be kept for technical purposes,

_He thought that the bulk of the U-boats should be sunk and the remainder shared equally._ (2)

Stalin agreed:

_He was also in favour of sinking a large proportion of the U-boats._ (2)

President Truman did the same:

_He also was in agreement._ (12)

Once the principle of the three-way split of the surface fleet had been recognized by President Truman and Mr Churchill, Stalin agreed that this matter should be settled at the end of the Conference.

The topic was next raised at the 9th Plenary Meeting, held on 25 July. Mr Churchill and President Truman stated that their staffs were still working on the detailed proposals, and Stalin agreed that

_Further consideration of this matter should be deferred until detailed proposals were available._ (12)
As the Potsdam Conference approached its close, action concerning the disposal of the German naval fleet accelerated. Each of the three Allies produced their final position papers on the topic:

The US Delegation’s Working Paper (29 July): *It is agreed that the German fleet shall at once be divided equally among the USSR, the UK, and the US. A large proportion of the German submarines shall be destroyed, a small number being retained for experimental and training purposes.* (2)

The paper by the Soviet Delegation (30 July): *One third of the German surface navy shall be transferred to the Soviet Union [and] a larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk.* (2)

The paper by the British Delegation (30 July): *It was agreed in principle that the German U-boats should be dealt with separately, the greater part being destroyed. Importantly, though the British Delegation agreed that German surface ships should be shared equally between the Allies, it included the statement about how to move forward: There is a possibility that any public announcement that German warships are to be divided amongst the Allies may result in German crews scuttling ships. It is therefore desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy be made.* (2)

At the 10th Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (30 July), it was agreed that a Technical Sub-Committee should be established to examine the questions raised in the UK and Soviet papers concerning the future disposition of the surviving German naval fleet—both the surface vessels and the submarines—and to report to an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. This Technical Sub-Committee was led by three senior Allied naval officers: British Rear Admiral Edward D B McCarthy, American Vice Admiral Charles M Cooke and Russian Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov, who out-ranked his colleagues, was Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy; his presence showed just how seriously the Soviet Union was approaching the question of the final disposal of the surviving German naval vessels.

At the 11th Plenary Meeting (31 July), Stalin urged that a final decision be made about the question of the German fleet. Though the report of the Technical Sub-Committee was not yet available to the leaders, Stalin again stated his view that it had already been agreed that Russia would get one-third of the German naval fleet, except submarines—which would be “submerged.” (12)

The meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee also took place on 31 July, and the minutes record a lively discussion about the division of the German submarine fleet. It was agreed that Admiral Kuznetsov should be the Chairman of the Meeting. As far as the U-boats were concerned, the debate focussed on the number to be retained. The Royal Navy’s Admiral McCarthy, supported by the US Navy’s Admiral Cooke, suggested that each of the Three Powers should retain just six, with a possible allocation of two to France: a total of 20. In contrast—and ignoring the question of any U-boats being allocated to France, with which he disagreed—the Soviet Navy’s Admiral Kuznetsov said that there were “three interesting types” (presumably Types XVII, XXI and XXIII), and that the Soviet Union would like to have 10 of each, giving a total of 30. He gave these reasons for this proposal:

*That it would be necessary for experimenting with these submarines that some of these types should be delivered to industrial enterprises to be taken to pieces and examined.*
Others would be required for operating tests, sending some to the north and some to the south to see how they react to conditions.

One type would not guarantee results as any accident would destroy the value of the test. (13)

Not surprisingly the Soviet proposal did not attract support from the US and UK Admirals, especially the latter. Counter arguments were that this would involve 60% (90) of the surviving seaworthy U-boats, which was contrary to the agreements already made during the Conference, that there were insufficient numbers of the “three interesting types,” and that there would be major problems concerning the supply of spare parts. In particular, the Foreign Office representative stressed the following:

We should base ourselves on what was said on 19 July when Mr Churchill made a very forceful appeal for the destruction of the greater part of the U-boats. He explained the extreme sensitiveness of the British people towards this weapon which had twice brought Britain to the brink of disaster. Generalissimo Stalin said at the same time that he agreed and favoured sinking a large proportion of the German submarines. The British Government had never contemplated that the Sub-Committee had authority to propose the retention of anything like half of the German U-boat fleet, and that in following the basis of Mr Churchill’s remarks we should only maintain a number of something in the nature of 10%. (13)

In order to break the deadlock, Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that the question be remitted to the Allied leaders for a final decision on the basis that

The British Delegation suggested that the number of submarines left should not exceed 20%, while the Soviet representative did not consider this enough, the final decision being left to the Big Three. (13)

The recommendations of the Sub-Committee Meeting were therefore that

The total strength of the German surface navy shall be divided equally among the USSR, UK and US.

The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. (13)

In respect of the second recommendation, it elaborated:

The Committee are not able to make a recommendation as regards the number submarines to be preserved for experimental and technical purposes.

It is the opinion of the British and American members that not more than 30 submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, UK and US for experimental and technical purposes.

(2) It is the view of the Russian members that this number is too small for their requirements and that USSR should receive about 30 submarines for its own experimental and technical purposes. (13)

The 11th Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (1 August) considered the Technical Sub-Committee’s report, which also recommended that there should be no announcements about the division of the German Navy because of the danger that the German crews might scuttle any ships ordered to sail to Allied ports. In discussion, the Foreign Secretaries
agreed that the surface ships should be divided as recommended and, after a very strong statement by Mr Ernest Bevin, the new British Foreign Secretary who spoke on behalf of both the UK and the USA, Mr Molotov agreed that the Allies should be allocated just 10 U-boats each, with the remainder being destroyed.

At the 12th (and penultimate) Plenary Meeting, also held on 1 August, the Allied leaders endorsed the conclusions that had been reached by their respective Foreign Secretaries earlier that day concerning the disposal of the German naval fleet. In respect of the U-boats that had surrendered, the UK, the USA, and the USSR had concluded together that

*The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, UK and USA for experimental and technical purposes.* (12)

Immediately after this, Mr Clement Attlee, the new British Prime Minister, wrote to Mr Churchill:

*The Conference is ending tonight in a good atmosphere. I would like you to know the broad results before the communiqué is issued. We have, of course, been building on the foundation laid by you, and there has been no change of policy.* (12)

The letter ended with a postscript:

*We have reached a satisfactory agreement on the German Fleet, especially on U-boats. Of these all are to be sunk except 30 which are to be divided equally between the Three Powers for experimental and technical purposes.* (12)

Thus, by the end of the Potsdam Conference, each of the Allies had achieved what it wanted. The German Navy had been eliminated. As expected, Stalin had raised the issue, and he had achieved his requirement for the Soviet Union to be allocated one third of the surface ships, as well as 10 of the U-boats that had surrendered. The other two Allies had been allocated similar shares (though they had no aspirations to be allocated any surface vessels), and the US proposal to sink almost all the U-boats had been achieved, as had the UK’s similar proposal.

It would therefore be wrong to believe that the destruction of the German Navy was a one-sided view espoused by any one of the Allies. Their stated objectives were similar, even if their motivations differed, and even if the means by which they were to be achieved varied in detail. Nevertheless, the agreement that the military arrangements should be kept secret—mainly because of the fear that the surface ships, particularly those allocated to the Soviet Union, would be scuttled by their German crews—was to cause considerable difficulties for the UK Government later in the year.

**Post-Potsdam Actions: The Tripartite Naval Commission**

The final agreement at Potsdam stated that

*The Three Governments agree to constitute a Tripartite Naval Commission to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships*

*The Three Governments agreed that transfers shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15 February 1946.* (2)
The Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC), the senior members of which were Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, RN, Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN, and the Soviet Navy’s Admiral Gordei Levchenko, began its work on 15 August 1945 with the objective of deciding which surface ships and submarines would be retained, their allocation between the three Allies, and the disposal arrangements for the remainder.

During the TNC review there was an internal debate within the US delegation concerning the possibility of salvaging material from the U-boats that had surrendered. A specific suggestion concerning diesel engines was made on 19 August by Captain Graubart, a member of the USA’s TNC delegation:

_In order that no criticism can ever be leveled at the Naval Division by economical or political experts in the future, I submit the following recommendation. There are 148 serviceable submarines of the German Navy now in Allied ports. Of these 148, only 30 are to be allocated. In view of the known lack of generating power in the European continent, it is suggested that the main engines with their main motors be taken from the 118 serviceable submarines which will be destroyed. Each submarine has at least two main engines generating 350 horsepower for the smallest school-boat type to 2200 horsepower per engine for the largest type. I offer this suggestion only from the point of view of destroying material which can be used not only for the minimum economy of Germany but for the other countries in Europe which have suffered a loss in generating power capacity._ (14)

There were other suggestions concerning the salvaging of electric motors and batteries, but none came to fruition, particularly after a response from the USA’s TNC delegation’s 2i/c, Commodore Ray, to Admiral Ghormley on 27 September:

_With reference to stripping captured German submarines of small electric motor units I forsee a number of objections which will be raised by the Russians, if not by others. On the part of the Russians we can expect a demand for one-third of all the equipment stripped from German submarines. Besides the small motors we have already had the suggestion of Graubart that diesel engines be used in various parts of Germany to supply electric power._

_In connection with electric power, submarine batteries would undoubtedly be useful as sources of auxiliary power. To the batteries, electrical switchboards could be added, possibly other items which can be salvaged would swell the growing list. Then, in connection with such a list of salvageable material the question of spare parts would probably be raised._

_The [Potsdam] protocol states that “the larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk”. Unless an exception is made by the governments concerned in the case of material which can be salvaged, I believe that this requirement of the protocol prohibits the removal of any material on the submarines which are to be sunk. As a general proposition, if one item is salvageable, the whole of the submarine is salvageable, including the breaking up of the hull for scrap._ (14)

The matter was therefore taken no further.

A similar suggestion had been considered briefly by the Admiralty in June and July 1945, but this was limited just to the possible use of the engines of the remaining non-operational U-boats in the north German ports as sources of electrical power. It was not intended to apply to the seaworthy U-boats in the UK and elsewhere, the future of which was being discussed at Potsdam. The idea was dropped after the possible difficulties of linking with the German electrical distribution system were emphasised.
The initial allocations of the U-boats were agreed at the 13th Meeting of the TNC (10 October 1945). Specifically, of the 135 U-boats in the UK, eight were allocated to the UK, one to the USA and 10 to the USSR. This left 116 U-boats in Loch Ryan and at Lisahally awaiting final disposal by the Royal Navy.

The Minutes of the TNC Meeting on 10 October were classified as Top Secret, but there was a blatant breach of security when, on 9 October, a “Special Correspondent” of the London Times filed a story from Hamburg, published on 10 October:

Provisional agreement, subject to ratification of the Powers concerned, has been reached on the disposal of the former German U-boat fleet, it is understood here. Under the terms of the decisions taken by the naval representatives of Great Britain, Russia and the United States, each one of these three Powers will receive six [sic] boats for experimental purposes. The remainder of the fleet, totalling approximately 150 submarines, will be scrapped. (15)

The Manchester Guardian also published the story on the same day under the headline “Disposal of U-Boats,” and a similar story appeared in the Daily Express a week later.

The TNC made one of its most important decisions relating to the surviving U-boats at its 18th Meeting on 29 October. The proposal came from the Soviet Navy’s Admiral Gordei Levchenko:

All unallocated submarines which are afloat shall be sunk in the open sea by 15 February 1946. (16)

When taken together with the decision of the Potsdam Conference—that the various transfers were also to be completed no later than 15 February 1946—it was clear that urgent action was required in order to implement both decisions, especially in view of the onset of winter, the prospects of stormy seas in the North Atlantic, and the annual freezing of the Baltic.

A number of prompt executive actions were therefore necessary to implement these decisions, including the transfer of the 10 U-boats in the UK to the Soviet Union, which started on 24 November. Respecting the sinking of the 116 unallocated U-boats located in the UK, the Admiralty ordered the Royal Navy’s Commander-in-Chief Rosyth to initiate the necessary disposal arrangements; the “Deadlight” Operation Order was issued on 14 November, with a start date of 25 November.

The recommendation in the British Delegation’s Potsdam position paper of 30 July—that it was desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy should be made because of the possibility that any public announcement that German warships were to be divided amongst the Allies might result in German crews scuttling their ships—now began to cause considerable difficulties for the British Government, especially in relation to the sinking of the unallocated U-boats.

**UK Press and Public Involvement**

Whilst the decisions to allocate 10 of the surrendered U-boats to the USSR, to sink most of the remainder, and to keep these details secret until after the remaining German Navy’s surface ships had been moved to either the USA, the UK or the USSR had been made at Potsdam on 1 August, most of the U-boats were already held in the UK at Loch Ryan and Lisahally. Also, though the decisions about those U-boats to be moved to the USSR and
those to be sunk were not made by the TNC until October, UK press and public interest in the U-boats and their fate had been building since the very first two had surrendered at sea and arrived at Loch Eriboll in the north of Scotland and Weymouth on the south coast of England, respectively, on 10 May.

In particular, the newspapers in Scotland and Northern Ireland had carried details of the surrenders throughout May 1945, and interest had heightened in June and July as more and more of the surviving U-boats had been transferred to the UK from Norway and Germany. Wartime press censorship no longer applied, and coverage increased during November, including a detailed piece in both the Daily Telegraph and the Scotsman on the 15th—the day after the security classified “Deadlight” Operation Order was published:

*Plans are almost complete, I understand, for the greatest wholesale scuttling of war vessels since the Grand Fleet went down in Scapa Flow after the 1914-18 war - sunk by the German crews who had been left aboard. These plans, which are likely to be fulfilled within the next two or three weeks, concern the final disposal of the remains of Germany’s U-boat fleet. There remain more than 100 U-boats which have been collected at Loch Ryan, on the west coast of Scotland, and at Lisahally, in Northern Ireland. These are to be towed into the Atlantic and sunk outside the 300 fathom line.*

This report was written by Commander Kenneth Edwards, Naval Correspondent for both the Daily Telegraph and the Scotsman, a retired pre-war RN submarine commander, and a life member of the Wardroom Mess at Fort Blockhouse (HMS Dolphin) in Gosport—the home of the UK submarine fleet. It was followed by a similar report in the Daily Express on 17 November under the headline “Destruction of 120 Surrendered German U-Boats.”

Fuel was added to the fire on 19 November when the London Times published a letter under the headline “A Use for U-Boats” by a Mr C L’Estrange Ewan of Paignton, Devon:

*The reported proposal to sink a large fleet of German U-Boats in deep water seems to be a most wasteful project. Could not these unwanted vessels be sunk near our own eroding beaches in positions where they would serve the purpose of much-needed groynes and breakwaters? Incidentally, the preservation of our own coasts by enemy warships would provide a most piquant contrast to their late employment.*

At the same time, the TNC in Berlin was aware of the British plans and, on behalf of the Admiralty, Admiral Miles asked his colleagues on 16 November to agree that, as the destruction of the unallocated U-boats in “Operation Deadlight” could not possibly be kept secret, the TNC should issue a joint communiqué on 20 November which would include the words:

*It has now been agreed between the Three Powers that U-boats not required for Allied purposes should now be sunk or destroyed.*

However, in his reply the same day, Admiral Ghormley did not support such action; the original decision had been taken by the Allied leaders at Potsdam, and he believed that any announcement should be made jointly by the three Governments in their respective national capitals. This US line was also supported by Admiral Levchenko, who stated,

*In connection with the release of the announcement, the TNC is not authorised to do so. The sinking of submarines should be considered independently and has no relation to the transfer of submarines to the USSR.*
The Admiralty therefore had a problem. Ten U-boats were to be transferred to the USSR in “Operation Cabal” on 24 November, and 116 U-boats were to be sunk off Northern Ireland in “Operation Deadlight” starting on 25 November and ending by the following mid-February. However, there was no Allied authorization to announce either of these classified activities. At the same time, the Press already knew all about “Operation Deadlight,” and the expected arrival of Russian naval officers at Lisahally in connection with “Operation Cabal” would be difficult to keep secret. Thus, the ongoing reports in the papers were not well received in Whitehall by a UK Government precluded by international agreement from making any affirmative comments.

Of the two Operations, the one that really concerned the Admiralty was “Cabal”—the move of the U-boats to the USSR—and they therefore proposed on 16 November that the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Press Committee jointly issue a “D Notice,” which would prevent any mention in the papers of the proposed transfer. However, despite the Admiralty saying that any disclosure would render the UK liable to a charge of bad faith, the Press members of the Committee refused the request on the basis that defence security was not involved. This was despite the fact that there were genuine fears that disclosure could initiate sabotage by the German naval crews, especially those manning the remaining surface vessels in Wilhelmshaven.

As a result, the Admiralty sought a compromise with the Press, while still pursuing the official line that they were unable to make any detailed comments because of the restrictions of the Potsdam Agreement. The First Lord himself held a meeting with a large number of newspaper editors, news agencies, and representatives of the BBC on 19 November under the heading “Transfer of U-Boats to Russia.” At this meeting, the Admiralty put its cards on the table, discussing both “Cabal” and “Deadlight,” and emphasizing the very real danger of any publicity whatsoever concerning “Operation Cabal.”

The Admiralty’s briefing note for the meeting records that

_The Admiralty are nevertheless anxious that the Press should have full opportunities of witnessing and publishing the operations for sinking surplus U-boats. Invitations are therefore being issued to the Press to witness the operations, though the agreement of our Allies to publicity has not yet been obtained._ (1)

The meeting ended with two requests from the Admiralty. The first was unequivocal:

_To meet our request for the preservation of complete secrecy concerning the allocation of U-boats to any of the Three Powers._ (1)

The second, slightly more equivocal:

_To refrain from publicity concerning the sinking of surplus U-boats until the permission of our two Allies has been obtained to publication._ (1)

Whilst the unwritten agreement concerning “Operation Cabal” held firm, the requested restraint about “Operation Deadlight” did not last for long. On 25 November, the _Daily Express_ and the _Evening Standard_ published full details, followed shortly after by many other stories from the reporters who, by invitation, had been aboard the RN naval vessels involved. However, even then, because of the lack of Allied agreement, the Admiralty was forced to hide behind a cloak of sham secrecy, issuing a message on 29 November to the naval forces involved:
In spite of breach of faith by Daily Express and Evening Standard, Operation Deadlight is still to be treated as secret. (19)

There was one final and important consequence of the publicity concerning “Operation Deadlight”; this related once again to the question of the sinking of the U-boats rather than their scrapping, and the recovery of the metal and other useful materials. Specifically, several Members of Parliament (including the MP for the Loch Ryan area in southwest Scotland), businessmen, ship-breakers and others raised questions—some of them directly with the First Lord of the Admiralty, and some of them in Parliament itself. For example, the proprietor of the ship-breaker John Cashmore, Ltd., wrote to one of his fellow ship-breaker colleagues at T W Ward, Ltd., on 17 November 1945:

I noticed in the paper yesterday a report that 100 U-boats are to be sunk. What the political reason, if any, is I do not know, but it does seem to me a very great shame that all this work and wealth should be destroyed.

The object of this letter is to ask you if you think that anything can be done, either by approaching the Admiralty on the one hand, or Members of Parliament on the other, or any other way. (20)

T W Ward replied on 19 November:

The question of the sinking of the U-boats has already been raised in higher quarters, and I see that according to last evening’s paper, one of the MPs, a Mr Lipson, is to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty on Wednesday next why these are to be sunk, and why they cannot be broken up in view of the shortage of metals. (20)

The written question from Mr Daniel Lipson, MP for Cheltenham, was asked of the First Lord of the Admiralty:

Why, in view of the shortage of metals, it is proposed to sink a large fleet of U-boats; and will he consider some less wasteful method of disposing of them? (21)

Obfuscation was clearly necessary, and the answer on 21 November, given on behalf of the First Lord by Mr John Dugdale, MP, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, was somewhat unsatisfactory:

I would refer the hon. Member to the passage in the Potsdam Communiqué dealing with the disposal of the German Fleet, which ran as follows: The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the three Governments in due course.

My right hon. Friend is not, therefore in a position to make a statement upon this matter in advance of that to be issued simultaneously by the three Governments. (22)

Similarly, there were reports in the Scotsman in late November drawing attention to the alleged waste of valuable materials which would be brought about by the proposed sinkings. For example, on 24 November, under the headline “Proposal to Scuttle 100 U-Boats: Galloway MP’s Protest,” it was reported that
Mr John McKie, MP for Galloway, has had several conversations with Admiralty officials in London this week in an attempt to secure the abandonment of the proposal to scuttle 100 U-boats at present in Loch Ryan.

Mr McKie has sent a telegram to Mr A V Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, protesting strongly against the proposal. Local feeling, he says, is unanimously against it in view of the terrible loss of material involved, and the fact that plenty of local labour is available to assist in scrapping the vessels. (23)

On 27 November, under the headline “A Scotsman’s Log: Fate of the U-boats,” an editorial ran:

One can easily sympathise with the people who object to the 100-odd German U-boats at Loch Ryan being taken out to sea and sent to the bottom. It may be that to reduce a U-boat to scrap is a difficult and uneconomic business; nevertheless, to scuttle these repulsive vessels seems uncommonly like wasteful conduct, even though it may avoid squabbling among the United Nations. (24)

Despite considerable diplomatic pressure throughout November and December 1945, the Soviet Government declined to accede to the UK appeals for any sort of early announcement, and “due course” eventually turned out to be 22 January 1946—by which time almost all of the unallocated U-boats had already been sunk.

As a result of the joint Allied Press Release on 22 January, yet another written question was directed to the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons, this one on 23 January by Mr Gordon Touche, MP for Dorking:

Whether he is now in a position to make a statement regarding the destruction of captured German submarines, and the value of the equipment destroyed in such submarines? (25)

The answer was delivered by Mr A V Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, himself:

As indicated to the House by my Hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary on 21 November 1945, no statement could be made on this subject until the three Governments had made the joint announcement which has just been issued.

I am now able to say that it was decided at Potsdam that the larger part of the German submarine fleet should be sunk and that 10 submarines should be retained by each of the three Governments for technical and experimental purposes.

The commercial value of the stores destroyed with the submarines was very small and in any case consisted of equipment built into the hulls, which would have required considerable expense to remove and could not have been dealt with inside the agreed time limit for sinking. Any consumable or perishable stores were removed and stored before the sinkings. (26)

It is clear from the foregoing that the answer to the question of sinking versus scrapping was never formally either debated or answered. However, in anticipation that it might become an issue that would continue to attract the interest of the British Press, the Admiralty prepared an internal defensive paper on 30 November. This set out the answers to what, in the end, had become essentially a hypothetical question:
1. The reason why surplus German U-boats are being sunk rather than scrapped is primarily because it was expressly agreed at Potsdam between the three Governments that they should be sunk. It is not possible to say what considerations influenced our Allies in making this agreement because the decision was reached without discussion of the merits of the two alternative courses of sinking or scrapping.

2. The reason which led the United Kingdom Government to join in this decision was that the sinking of surplus boats would plainly be the simplest and most convenient course. If the U-boats were not to be sunk, they would have to be divided equally between the three Powers for scrapping. This would have involved complicated and expensive operations for the removal of the U-boats from the United Kingdom. Moreover, it would have increased the manpower commitment for the maintenance of the boats, a burden which would have fallen almost entirely upon the United Kingdom.

3. Although U-boats have some scrap value, this is extremely small compared with the large tonnage in United Kingdom ports already laid up awaiting scrapping. At a rough estimate, there is upwards of a million tons of British warships and auxiliary war vessels, including 27 submarines, available for scrapping, whereas the British third share of surplus U-boats would equal slightly less than 20,000 tons. There is already several years of work for the ship-breakers.

4. Submarines contain a higher proportion of non-ferrous metals than surface vessels. The Admiralty is, however, advised that non-ferrous scrap is not at present wanted so badly as other types, so that with ship-breaking capacity at a premium, submarines would in this country almost certainly have to take a second place in ship-breaking programmes.

5. Accordingly there can be little question that, taken by and large, the sinking of the German U-boats is not only the simplest but most economical course for their disposal. (1)

The topic was raised yet again—over a year later—when, during oral questions in the House of Commons on 19 March 1947, Mr Robert Grimston, MP for Westbury, asked two questions:

First: If diesel engine generating plant and batteries were removed from captured German U-boats before these vessels were sunk?

Second: How many diesel engines and generating sets have been salvaged from German U-boats; and how many have been disposed of? (27)

The answer was given by Mr John Dugdale, MP, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty:

Diesel engine generating plant and batteries were not removed from captured German U-boats before they were sunk. As stated on 23 January 1946, these U-boats were sunk in accordance with our international obligations. This equipment formed an integral part of the U-boats and it would not have been possible to remove it within the time set for carrying out these obligations. Salvage operations would not be possible. (28)
As a follow-up, Mr Grimston then asked:

*Were no efforts made to change the arrangements when it was becoming apparent that this generating plant would be extremely valuable? (27)*

To which Mr Dugdale replied:

*The U-boats had to be sunk within two months of the time of the settlement of the agreement, and the two months included the time necessary for them to be taken to a place where they were to be sunk, and that was over 15 months ago. (28)*

**Conclusion**

At the end of the war in Europe, considerable numbers of serviceable German naval warships, including 156 U-boats, surrendered to the Allies—the majority to the UK, and none to the USSR. Prior to that, each of the three Allies had formulated their own views on the disposal of the surface warships and the submarines, guided by a common determination to see the total elimination of the German Navy and all its related facilities. The USA wanted to see the majority destroyed, as did the UK (which was especially keen to see all the U-boats sunk), but the USSR’s prime wish was to be allocated at least one-third of any warships that surrendered.

Whilst the topic had been discussed by the Allies earlier, the future of the German naval fleet was specifically raised by Stalin within two weeks of VE Day, and Mr Churchill and President Truman agreed that the topic should be considered at the Potsdam Conference. Neither the UK nor the USA had any particular desire to be allocated any of the surrendered surface vessels. They therefore used this as a bargaining chip in their discussions with the USSR, eventually agreeing that each would be allocated one-third of the remaining surface vessels, but that—with the exception of just 30 U-boats for experimental and technical purposes—the remainder of the U-boats would be sunk.

Despite an earlier, informal comment by President Roosevelt that he hoped that captured warships could be used in the building of breakwaters, the disposal method perceived by each of the Allied leaders throughout the Potsdam Conference for the destruction of the unallocated U-boats was that they should be sunk. There were no suggestions whatsoever by the three leaders that they should, instead, be scrapped in order to recover metal and other useful materials.

The Potsdam Agreement thus stated clearly that all unallocated U-boats were to be sunk, a decision that was accepted and reinforced by the TNC, which set a target date of not later than 15 February 1946 for such action. At an early stage in the TNC’s deliberations there was an internal US staff suggestion that items such as diesel engines and electric motors might be usefully salvaged, but this was ruled out on the grounds that the Potsdam decisions had already been taken, and that the TNC’s role was to implement rather than change them.

The urgent implementation of the Potsdam and TNC decisions, all of which were classified secret, led to the writing and implementation of the Royal Navy’s plan (“Operation Deadlight”), the purpose of which was to sink the 116 unallocated U-boats held in Loch Ryan and at Lisahally beginning on 25 November 1945. Despite the official secrecy because of the fear that the German crews might scuttle the surviving surface ships, details of the process leaked to the UK Press, and this led to suggestions from MPs and others that the U-boats should be scrapped rather than being sunk. Nevertheless, the Admiralty had to
maintain the cloak of secrecy which had been agreed at Potsdam, and declined to comment on any of these suggestions. Instead, it offered the UK Press full access to the “Operation Deadlight” sinkings; this took the heat out of the criticism that the U-boats were being sunk rather than scrapped.

Regardless, the Admiralty was prepared to justify the decision to sink the U-boats if necessary. First, it was part of the Potsdam Agreement between the leaders of the USA, UK and USSR, and it was therefore not open to review. Second, it was estimated that there was more than a million tons of British warships and auxiliary war vessels, including 27 surplus Royal Navy submarines, already available for scrapping; this would already provide several years of work for the UK ship-breakers. Finally, whilst there was perhaps an emotional case for scrapping rather than sinking the unallocated U-boats, this did not become a serious political, economic or industrial issue in the UK. In any case, by the time that the Allies issued their joint communiqué in late January 1946 giving details of the Potsdam decisions, almost all the U-boats had already been sunk.

*Arundel, W Sussex July 2020*

**Specific Sources**

1. TNA Kew, ADM 1/18689: Disposal of German Fleet. Telegram, 26 November 1945, to the First Lord of the Admiralty by Mr William Nugent


3. TNA Kew, ADM 116/5123: Surrender of the German Fleet


5. TNA Kew, ADM 116/5202. German U-Boat Fleet, Preparations for Surrender

6. NARA Washington, RG 260, EAC Papers, Minutes of EAC (44) 7th Meeting (RG 260, 390/40/17-/-7-,-, Entry A1-8, Box 1, OMGUS)

7. TNA Kew, ADM 1/16180: Disarmament of Enemy Naval Services

8. FRUS, General, 1944, Vol 1, Pages 1-483 (European Advisory Commission)

9. FRUS, The Potsdam Conference, 1945, Vol 1

10. The Soviet Bureau of Information, Moscow: Press Release, 30 March 1945

11. UK House of Commons, Hansard, Written Answers, 7 April 1945


13. The Admiral Cooke Papers, Hoover Library, Stanford University, California

14. NARA Washington, RG 333.4: Records of the US Navy Element of the TNC 1945 -1947 (NARA Entry No: E 15, 190/31/19/01-02, Boxes 1 and 5)

15. The London Times: 10 October 1945

16. TNA Kew, ADM 228/35: Minutes of TNC Meetings

17. The Scotsman: 15 November 1945
Derek Waller is a retired Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Commodore who joined the RAF College Cranwell in 1955 and was commissioned in 1958. During his 35 years service he graduated from the RAF Staff College and the Royal College of Defence Studies and, amongst his many appointments, he was the Commanding Officer of the RAF’s largest Supply Depot, the Command Supply Officer in HQ RAF Germany, and Head of Supply and Movements at HQ RAF Strike Command. In the latter role, he also filled the NATO appointment of Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics in HQ UK Air.

He retired from the RAF in 1990, and then spent 6 years working for British Aerospace as a senior Customer Support Manager.

Derek Waller’s interest in the history of the German U-boats which surrendered in May 1945 goes back to the 1960s, and his first published article appeared in the American International Naval Research Organisation’s quarterly magazine *Warship International* in June 1970.

He resumed his hobby in 2010, and since then has conducted extensive world-wide research aimed at revealing the stories surrounding all the U-boats which were still afloat at the end of WW2. This has included collaboration with Dr Axel Niestle, the premier German U-boat historian, which resulted in their joint production and publication of “The U-Boats that Surrendered: The Definitive List”. Some of his work can be found on the internet website “Uboat.net”, and a great deal more in the World Ship Society’s quarterly magazine, *Warships*, Nos. 168 to190.
The Archives Association of Ontario announced that PortsToronto has won the Corporate Award during the AAO’s virtual annual meeting on 25 June 2020. The Corporate Award is given by the AAO to organizations, corporations, or agencies of any kind that have been particularly supportive of archives and/or the archival community.

PortsToronto, formerly known as the Toronto Ports Authority and, prior to that, the Toronto Harbour Commission, is the agency responsible for the management of the city’s harbour and waterfront, including Terminals 51 and 52 of the Port of Toronto, the Outer Harbour Marina, and the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport. The archives of PortsToronto was founded in 1975 and contains records dating back to the creation of the Toronto’s Harbour Trust in 1850; the archives documents the evolution and management of the city’s waterfront from that time to the present. With the passing of the 1999 Canada Marine Act, the Toronto Harbour Commission became the Toronto Port Authority and the records fell under federal jurisdiction. While the records could have been transferred to Library and Archives Canada, it was determined they should remain in Toronto, where they continue to provide administrative, legal, and historical value for the Authority and for researchers in the city. The archives are used to determine rights and responsibilities with developers, to assist with contaminated soil remediation and for other environmental purposes, and for promotional purposes, historical research, and use in exhibitions.

In 2017, following the rebranding of the agency to become PortsToronto in 2015, the agency’s landmark building—and the archives’ home—at 60 Harbour Street was sold. PortsToronto moved into the Queen’s Quay Terminal building, but a new location was needed for the archives. PortsToronto undertook a major renovation of storage rooms at
Terminal 52, creating a modern archival storage space complete with HVAC system, fire-suppression and security systems, and additional shelving. Archival reference is now provided out of the Queen’s Quay Terminal offices. In PortsToronto’s winning nomination, the archives’ nominator articulated the importance of its continued support for the archives, noting its longevity, dedicated care, and public access: “Over the course of 45 years, the Toronto Harbour Commission and PortsToronto have been keepers of a documentary legacy that began in the mid-19th century. It has used its archives in innovative ways that offer corporate and public benefits. The costs of preservation and access could have been avoided by transferring these holdings to Ottawa. Instead, PortsToronto has ensured that these significant records remain in the region in which they were created and are accessible to promote an understanding of the historical context that shapes contemporary challenges facing Toronto’s waterfront.”

The AAO presented PortsToronto with its Corporate Award for 2020 in recognition of its long track record of stewardship and its recent investment in the storage of its archives.

For further information about PortsToronto’s archives, contact:

Mark Rumas
Records and Corporate Services Coordinator, PortsToronto
207 Queens Quay West, Suite 500
Toronto ON M5J 1A7
T: 416-863-2048
E: mrumas@portstoronto.com

This notice is based on the AAO’s online posting: https://aao-archivists.ca/resources/Documents/Membership/Awards/AAO%20Awards%202020.pdf
This isn’t an article; it’s a gem. Actually, it’s a question, but its invitation to participate as a community in the expansion of our collective knowledge of maritime history represents, I think, the best spirit of *Argonauta*.

A few weeks ago I received an email from Anthony Jupp, a naval and military history enthusiast in the UK, which I include below:

I don’t know if you can help but if you like a mystery, you may wish to. I volunteer at the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Museum in the UK, helping to restore a Fairey Barracuda aircraft. Some of our visitors’ relatives flew the aircraft in WW2 and some underwent training at RCAF Goderich, RCAF Aylmer and RCAF Kingston. The attached image was taken by one of the trainee pilots, I believe in August or September 1944; it shows a steam yacht. I believe this was taken at the Redfern shipbuilders in Toronto, or possibly down the coast at Hamilton, where Algerine class minesweepers destined for the Royal Navy were fitted out.

The photographs belonged to the current owner’s father, Lieutenant Eric John Hurley, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, who trained as a pilot in Canada between 6 February and 11 October 1944, being stationed at RCAF Moncton, RCAF Goderich, RCAF Aylmer and then back to RCAF Moncton before returning to the UK. I believe the photos could only have been taken whilst he was based at RCAF Aylmer.

Once back in the UK, he was allocated to train on Fairey Barracuda dive bombers but was still in training when the war finished. Eric’s daughter and her nephew visited the Fleet Air Arm Museum to have a look at our ongoing restoration of the Fairey Barracuda and graciously allowed me to copy his pilot’s Flying Log and all his photographs.
Any help you could provide as to the location, story, or even a name for the steam yacht would be greatly appreciated.

So I open the invitation to Argo readers: does anyone have information relative to the yacht in the photograph? If so, please send them my way, with the subject line “mystery yacht”: CNRS-ARGO@cnrs-scrn.org. I will publish the responses in the Winter 2021 issue and pass them along to my new acquaintance at the Fleet Air Arm museum, an amazing museum I have myself been to more than once. I look forward to your stories!
CNRS 2021 CONFERENCE AND CALL FOR PAPERS: Canada’s Pacific Gateway

The Canadian Nautical Research Society/Société canadienne pour la recherche nautique will hold its annual conference **10-11 June 2021**. In commemoration of the 150th anniversary of British Columbia joining Canada, 25 July 1871, the conference theme will be Canada’s Pacific Gateway: past, present, and future. Proposals are invited for papers or presentations related to the general theme of Canada’s wider Pacific Ocean dimensions, as well as other maritime topics both contemporary and historical.

Presentations will be a maximum of twenty minutes, followed by time for discussion. This will be a virtual conference. The Annual General Meeting of the society will be held virtually on Saturday 12 June 2021.

Proposals should be sent by email no later than **15 March 2021** to:

- **Michael Hadley** pilgrim33@telus.net
- **David Collins** birchinall@gmail.com

Please include your name, affiliation (if any) and title, and a brief description of 250 words or less. Abstracts for accepted papers will be published in the CNRS newsletter *Argonauta* prior to the conference.
The Keith Matthews award for the best article published in *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*

The competition of articles published in 2019 was “a near run thing.” Not much more than a hair’s breadth separated the decisions. Collectively, the articles considered received some of the strongest referee reports of the recent years.

**Honourable Mention:** Thomas Malcomson, “Commodore Sir Edward W.C.R. Owen: Shaping the British Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes in the Wake of the War of 1812” Comments about this piece included, “Tom Malcomson’s piece on Sir Edward Owen and the Great Lakes in 1814-15 is ... such a superb piece of research,” and “very much enjoyed and was impressed by Malcolmson’s piece on RAdm Owen and the Great Lakes in the post 1815 period.”

**Keith Matthews Best Article Award:** Jan Drent, “Esquimalt: An Outpost of Empire in the Great War”

In the words of one committee member, “Drent’s piece on Esquimalt’s role in Pacific naval operations in the First World War is most worthy because it presents considerable new research on a little known area of great significance to Canadian maritime history.”

The Keith Matthews Award for a Book Deserving of Special Recognition

This prize was not awarded in 2020 for a book published in 2019.

**The Keith Matthews Best Book Award**

Of the submissions in general, one committee member wrote, the “maritime dimension … is not a universal attribute this year.” Regardless, amongst those that did emphasize a maritime dimension, we found several of very high standard.

**Honourable Mention:** Antony Adler, *Neptune’s Laboratory: Fantasy, Fear, and Science at Sea* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)

The committee’s assessment is neatly summed up in the words of one member: “In terms of important scholarship, I think Adler’s *Neptune’s Laboratory* is a leader: great scope in time and in international coverage (with important research in French, British and US sources), and methodologically significant for the marrying of history of science with the relatively new field of environmental history.”


The best book award goes to an account of an almost forgotten small boat voyage. In the words of committee members, *Around the World in a Dugout Canoe* “skilfully presents a forgotten story of interest and significance with good detective work to reconcile and correct two conflicting published accounts, both of which featured distortions and errors. That aside, [it is] a gripping tale of the sea.” From another reviewer: “The account demonstrates a high
regard for the academic touchstones of accuracy and reliable analysis” and “it illustrates for any practitioner of history’s dark arts, the role and importance of perspective. As well, it is a solidly Canadian tale.”

It remains for me to congratulate all our winners, and to thank all those whose work was submitted for consideration. I would also like to thank the committee members for their work in what was a challenging year.

Bill Glover, Matthews Awards Chair
15 August 2020
Harold D. Langley (1925-2020)

“Harry’s contributions to the naval history field were and are original and important. We are all in his debt.”

Former Director of Naval History, Dr. William S. Dudley

Harold D. Langley, diplomatic and naval historian who was Associate Curator of naval history at the Smithsonian Institution from 1969 to 1996, died on Wednesday, July 29, 2020 after an extended illness. He was 95. In 2014, he received the Naval Historical Foundation’s Commodore Dudley W. Knox Medal recognizing his lifetime accomplishments as a naval historian. “We are very saddened to hear of the loss of this wonderful member of our naval history community. Our prayers and thoughts go out to his family,” stated Naval Historical Foundation President Frank Pandolfe.

After growing up in Amsterdam, New York, Langley served in the Army during World War II. He went on to attend Catholic University, where he earned his B.A. in 1950. He then earned his M.A. in 1951, and his Ph.D. in 1960, from the University of Pennsylvania. His dissertation became his first published book: the path-breaking Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862.

Langley’s scholarship coincided with a broad reconsideration of how history was written, as contemporaries turned away from writing “top-down” biographical studies of political, military, business, scientific and “other great white men of history” to take a broader “bottom-up” approach that enhanced our understanding of the past.

Recognizing Langley’s pioneering use of this new approach in exploring American naval social and medical history, the 2013 McMullen Naval History Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy dedicated a session to honor the impact his dissertation had on our understanding of naval history and on the number of future historians he inspired. One of those he influenced, Christopher McKee, reflected:

That classic work [Social Reform in the United States Navy], together with Eugene Ferguson's Truxtun of the Constellation and Robert Johnson's Thence Round Cape Horn, marked the beginning of a renaissance of historical interest in the nineteenth-century U. S. Navy that has flourished ever since in an abundance of new and important scholarship. God only knows how many times Harry’s work has been cited by others.

One of those well familiar with Langley’s pioneer work is the current Director of Naval History, Rear Adm. Samuel Cox:
I read his book *Social Reform in the U.S. Navy* when I was a midshipman and the influence was profound. I still have it in my home library and refer to it on occasion. His body of work continues to influence historians at the Naval History and Heritage Command to this day and will likely do so far into the future as well.

Langley began his professional career at the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, in Washington, DC in 1951. After working as a manuscript specialist in Washington and Pennsylvania, in 1955, Marywood College in Scranton, Pennsylvania, appointed him Assistant Professor of History. He was next appointed as a Diplomatic Historian in the U.S. Department of State in 1957. Former Director of Naval History, Dr. William S. Dudley, noted Langley’s stint at the State Department proved beneficial: “Owing to his earlier position as a diplomatic historian at the State Department he was a co-editor of a volume on the secret wartime correspondence of Roosevelt and Churchill.” In 1964, Catholic University appointed him Associate Professor, and in 1968 promoted him to Professor, which he held until 1971.

Upon landing his Catholic University appointment, in 1965, he married Patricia Ann Piccola. The couple settled in Arlington, VA and had two children. In 1969, the Smithsonian appointed him Associate Curator of Naval History. While holding that position, he was also an Adjunct Professor at Catholic University beginning in 1971. Reflecting on his academic contributions at Catholic University and the Smithsonian, Dr. Dudley observed:

As a naval historian teaching at Catholic University of America, his works brought to our attention topics that had been largely overlooked, such as U.S. naval administrative history in articles by Charles Oscar Paullin, the vital topic of illnesses on board the navy’s ships and the backgrounds of the surgeons and assistant surgeons who cared for sailors with the meager medical supplies available to the early navy. He described the impact of civilian reform movements that became powerful in the nineteenth century, such as criticism of brutal punishments of sailors for mild offenses, the growing disapproval of the use of alcohol on board ship leading to alcoholism among ships’ crews, and religious reform movements that culminated in the establishment of sailors’ bethels in many U.S. ports and homes for aging seamen such as Sailors’ Snug Harbor on Staten Island, New York. By these means, Langley became an effective voice for naval social and medical history: as a public historian for the Smithsonian Institution and as a frequent speaker in naval and maritime historical society gatherings.

In addition to his research and writing, Langley became a mentor not only for a number of graduate students but also to the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine historian Jan Herman, who reminisced:

His scholarship on the early days of Navy medicine was just one aspect of my association with him. We spent many delightful hours together discussing his wide range of historical interests. He was truly a class act.
In 1996, Harold Langley retired from the Smithsonian, and continued teaching at Catholic University until 2001. After he retired from teaching, he remained active in the history field, writing articles for historical journals, reviewing books, and working on his own book. One article published in *Sea History* 153 (Winter 2015-16): 24-31, the then-90-year-old Langley provided historical context to the continuing debate over government-sponsored health care. Reflecting on Dr. Harold Langley’s lifetime accomplishments and body of work, former Senior Historian of the Navy Dr. Edward Marolda observed:

> What an illustrious and productive career he had! A longtime curator at the Smithsonian, professor at Catholic University, and the author of numerous award-winning naval histories. I remember him most from personal interactions at military history conferences, professional meetings, and social functions. He and his wife Pat enlivened many of our gatherings. I will miss this good friend and highly respected colleague.

Dr. Harold D. Langley is survived by his sister, Dorothy Sweeney, of Albany, NY; his brother, Roger Langley, of Rockville, MD; his son, David Langley, of Alexandria, VA; his daughter, Erika Langley, of Bremerton, WA; and many nieces, nephews and cousins, along with their families. His wife, Patricia, predeceased him in 2013.
Charles Douglas Maginley (CD, RCN, CGC) (1929-2020)  
(republished and excerpted from The Chronicle Herald (Metro): 19 September, 2020)

It is with deep gratitude for the life of Charles Douglas Maginley, born June 26, 1929 in Antigua, West Indies, that we announce his passing on September 12, 2020, surrounded by love and family at his home in Mahone Bay. He was predeceased by his brother, Robert Maginley; second wife, June Maginley; and his stepdaughter, Pamela Holm. He is survived by his children, Rachel, Robin (Valerie), David (Erika), Christopher and Amanda; grandchildren, Suzanne, Ryan, Derek and Megan, Malcolm and Emma; stepchildren, Heather (Steve), Mike (Dory) and Carol (Blake) Holm; and first wife, Marilyn Hill.

Our father lived a spectacular life! A seafaring man, Dad worked in the Merchant Marine, was an officer in the Canadian Navy, a Master Mariner, a teacher at the Canadian Coast Guard College and at the Nova Scotia Community College. Retiring in 1990, he opened a bed and breakfast, wrote three books on the history of the Coast Guard, and lectured frequently as a Nautical Historian. Dad loved being involved in his community of Mahone Bay; he acted in theatre productions, helped with the Wooden Boat Festival and the annual book sale, played Father Christmas for the town, attended Tai Chi, and went dancing every opportunity he could. Coffee at the Biscuit Eater was also a daily opportunity to connect with friends.

He was a dedicated father, an adventurous spirit, a man who lived in the moment and loved life to the fullest. Dad so enjoyed a good conversation, and always said, “You must accept people for who they are.” As his family, we are still discovering who he was, as his character and career are deeper than we imagined. He was always a gentleman, a scholar, had a warm wit and charm, was an outstanding teacher, maintained lifelong friendships, was always willing to give his time, and knew he was unconditionally loved. He was ready to cross the bar knowing he had lived a good life to its fullest.

As if the Sea should part  
And show a further Sea —  
And that — a further — and the Three  
But a presumption be —  
Of Periods of Seas —  
Unvisited of Shores —  
Themselves the Verge of Seas to be —  
Eternity — is Those —

—Emily Dickinson
Draft Minutes of the Council decision made using electronic mail
Monday, 10 August-Wednesday, 12 August 2020

The following motion was sent by Richard Gimblett, President, to the voting members of Council: Michael Moir, First Vice President and Secretary; Tom Malcomson, Second Vice President; Errollyn Humphreys, Treasurer; Sam McLean, Membership Secretary; Ambjörn Adomeit, Isabel Campbell, Richard Goette, Walter Lewis, Jeff Noakes, Margaret Schotte, Winston “Kip” Scoville, and Ian Yeates, Councillors.

Faye Kert – Honorary Membership

Roger Sarty moved, Michael Moir seconded:

Whereas section 21 of the Society’s by-law reads in part, “On recommendation of the council, members at a general meeting may, as a special mark of recognition for an extraordinary contribution to the society and/or to the field of nautical research, grant Honorary Membership in the Society to an individual”; and

Whereas Faye Kert has made extraordinary contributions, generally to the field of nautical research and specifically of long and distinguished service to the Society, as outlined in Appendix A to this motion,

Therefore be it resolved that Council recommends to the next Annual General Meeting that Faye Kert be recognized with Honorary Membership in the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Carried.

Respectfully submitted
Michael Moir
Secretary

Appendix A

Dr Faye Kert holds degrees from Queen’s University, Kingston (BA 1970), Carleton University (MA 1986) and the University of Leiden (PhD 1997). She was a career public servant, working as a communications specialist in various departments including Parks Canada, the Canadian Museum of Civilization (now the Canadian Museum of History) and the Canadian War Museum. While working with the historical community at large, she was able to spend the early part of her career as an underwater archaeologist, participating in three significant expeditions:

- excavating Hollandia, an 18th-century Dutch East India Company ship off the Scilly Islands (1977); and

- uncovering a previously unknown 16th-century Basque whaling ship in Red Bay, Labrador (1978-79-80); and,
• recovering the Mary Rose, a 16th-century warship owned by Henry VIII, sunk off Portsmouth in the UK (1981).

Her academic research has brought new understanding to the subject of privateering in the era of the War of 1812. She has published a number of articles and book chapters as well as several monographs including: *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Research in Maritime History, No. 11); *Trimming Yankee Sails; Pirates and Privateers of New Brunswick* (University of New Brunswick, Military History Series); and *Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812* (John Hopkins University Press). The latter is an analysis of the little-known world of Canadian and American privateering and looks at the war from the privateers’ perspective. It was awarded the Society’s Keith Matthews Award for the best book published on a maritime history subject in 2015; the committee’s citation noted that it was “an impressive achievement… for an independent historian without institutional or funding support.” The book also won the John Lyman Book Award for U.S. Maritime History from the North American Society for Oceanic History.

Of most direct relevance to the Society, Faye is one of our original members, having assisted in drafting the constitution of what was then (1984) known as the Canadian Society for the Promotion of Nautical Research, and has been active with us in one capacity or another ever since. Her most prominent positions include:

• President (1993-96)

• Past President (1996-99)

• Membership Secretary (1999-2018)

• Book Review Editor (2003-present)
Draft Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held using videoconferencing software
Saturday, 15 August 2020

Present
Richard Gimblett, President, and eighteen members of the Society.

Calling to Order
The President called the meeting to order at 1300hrs.

Use of Video Conferencing Software
Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that in consideration of the circumstances of the present medical emergency, Sections 49 and 50 of By-Law 1 are suspended in order to allow the annual general meeting for 2020 to be held online using video conferencing software. Carried.

Approval of the Agenda
Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded approval of agenda as amended. Carried.

Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of 12 August 2017
Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that the minutes of the Annual General Meeting of 24 August 2019 as published in Argonauta 36:4 (Autumn 2019), 50-57 be approved.

Michael Moir noted an error in the second line on page 53, and requested that the reference to “Council” be removed.

Carried as amended.

President’s Report
Richard Gimblett reported that most of what he has to say about the state of the Society was captured in his last “President’s Corner” in Argonauta 37:3 (Summer 2020), 2. He thanked Chris Madsen, his predecessor, for leaving the Society on such a solid footing and for launching several initiatives that helped to set the course for the last three years. One initiative – the transition of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord to an open journal software for production and distribution – will be passed along to Richard’s successor for completion. He thanked William “Bill” Glover for his work as General Editor, leaving large shoes to fill as he prepares to step away from this role. Richard praised the smooth transition of Argonauta from the editorial team of Isabel Campbell and Colleen McKee to Erika Behrisch Elce with the support of Winston “Kip” Scoville. He also noted that there has been good turnover on Council with the election of several new people.
Richard concluded his report by thanking members for participating in the Society’s first online annual general meeting.

Treasurer’s Report
Errolyn Humphreys expressed her appreciation for Richard Gimblett’s support and assistance during his term as President.
Errolyn reported that the Society currently has a bank balance of approximately $35,000. She is working with Sam McLean and Paul Adamthwaite to investigate various electronic payment solutions to help people to renew their memberships and pay for conference registration through the Society’s website, but noted that there are still some members who prefer paper and wish to pay by cheque.

Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that the financial statements for the period ending 31 December 2019 be accepted. Carried.

(Secretary’s note: the financial statements for the period ending 31 December 2019 were published in Argonauta 37:3 (Summer 2020), 40-42; https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/argonauta/pdf/argo_37_3.pdf.)

Richard concluded the Treasurer’s report by thanking Errolyn for her hard work on behalf of the Society and for waving her “magic wand” over the accounts.

**Membership Secretary’s Report**

Richard Gimblett presented Sam McLean’s report (see Attachment A). Membership levels remain steady compared with figures from the previous year. Sam has maintained Faye Kert’s fine tradition of pursuing unpaid members to keep them in good standing with the Society.

Ian Yeates suggested that mailings for membership renewal and receipts should indicate the year being invoiced to assist in members’ recordkeeping. Errolyn Humphreys reported that online payments will result in a receipt that includes the membership year.

It was noted that there was no uptake on the new Early Career Researcher membership category.

The report was received.

**Publications**

Richard Gimblett spoke to the report for Argonauta that was submitted by Isabel Campbell (see Attachment B) and the turnover to the new editor, Erika Behrisch Elce. Kip Scoville, Production/Distribution Manager for Argonauta, commented on the smooth transition that was complicated only by a cyberattack on the Royal Military College.

Roger Sarty presented his report on The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord (see Attachment C). An advertisement has been distributed to recruit a paid General Editor, which has attracted an application and other expressions of interest. The new editor will be given latitude so that the journal can evolve to meet the demands of the coming years in terms of the numbers of issues per year and the number of articles per issue. The method of compensation may also change during negotiations with the successful applicant.

Bill Glover gave an overview of the progress of volume 30. The second number is well underway, with the contents of the remaining two numbers still to be finalized. Bill thanked Walter Lewis for relieving him of great burdens in the areas of page layout and solving computer problems. Bill particularly acknowledged the hard work of Faye Kert as Book Review Editor. Bill recruited Faye for this role in 2003 during his first term as editor and she has been a pleasure to work with for 17 years, making Faye the Society’s longest serving volunteer. Bill will be pleased to work with the new General Editor to ensure an orderly transition in 2021.
Chris Madsen asked about plans for working with the North American Society for Oceanic History going forward. Roger responded that he will be following up with NASOH’s editorial board members regarding potential submissions for the journal. Bill received a considerable number of submissions from American authors early in his second tenure as editor, which reinforced Roger’s commitment to pursue young scholars in the United States since little work is being done by Canadian graduate students.

Bill raised the need to have a lawyer with expertise in intellectual property law review the Society’s permission to publish form that is sent to authors, especially as the federal government is reconsidering its cultural policies.

Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that members of the Editorial Board whose terms expire in 2020 be reappointed for a further term. Carried.

Paul Adamthwaite, the Society’s webmaster, summarized his analysis of downloads of TNM articles from the CNRS website that he was asked to prepare by Roger. The most popular download was an article on wooden shipbuilding published in 2003. Articles on combat during World War II are regularly downloaded, but not pieces on naval policy or earlier periods of naval history. Overall, Paul’s analysis reinforces that demand is greater for general marine topics than naval history. Articles published between 2000 and 2015 are downloaded most often, and a third of downloads are requested by users in Europe. Paul filters advertising-based sites; most downloads are initiated from academic Internet addresses. Paul is willing to do further analysis of these downloads to identify areas of reader interest for the new editor and to provide data on international interest and interdisciplinary appeal that could be useful when preparing an application to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for aid to our scholarly journal. Paul also noted that the index for the journal’s first ten years gets a considerable number of downloads, and suggested that the Society prepare a 25-year index for the website.

The discussion turned to issues relating to the transition to a new editor and a new publishing format. In response to the suggestion that the editor could be compensated by covering expenses to attend maritime-related conferences, Chris Madsen remarked that paying a stipend would be preferable to avoid misunderstandings over reimbursement of receipts and disposition of unspent funds and that perhaps the amount of the stipend should be increased to offset the impact of income tax. It was also suggested that the home for the electronic journal should be decided in consultation with the new editor, to which Chris responded that the Society had previously decided to go with York University Libraries and it should be left there to avoid the problems that arose when Memorial University withdrew its support for TNM. York Digital Journals have an especially good reputation and is used by editors working at many other institutions. Walter Lewis also supported making York Digital Journals the permanent home for our journal.

Maurice Smith drew attention to the changing nature of maritime history and suggested that recent articles in Mariner’s Mirror and The International Journal of Maritime History could provide useful insights for the new editor. Conversations with the editors of these journals could also be helpful in establishing a future course for TNM. Eileen Marcil remarked that we need to consider younger readers and that publishers like material that relates to school curricula. She had a wonderful time teaching maritime social history to a class of 12-year-old students in Quebec.

Richard Gimblett raised the possibility that the search for a new editor may not be successful, an outcome that could have significant consequences for the Society.
Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that the membership authorize Council to cease publication of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* at the end of volume 30 if by 31 December 2020 the Editorial Board has not been able to identify a new General Editor.

The motion sparked much discussion. Chris Madsen felt that it was premature; even if a new editor is not found, the Society can pursue other options. He did not support the motion because he feared that members would interpret Council’s intent as seeking to get rid of the journal. Roger responded by outlining the long struggle to find a new permanent editor that has gone on for 15 years, and that Council felt that the time had come to set a limit on this search. Richard Gimblett explained that since the journal began with a motion at an annual general meeting, its end should follow the same path. Chris remarked that if the journal dies, so does the Society, a point supported by Paul Adamthwaite since we could not sell memberships without having the journal to offer members. Bill Glover disagreed with Chris and Paul, and stressed that the issue at the heart of the motion is process. Council needs authority to deal with the consequences of a failed search for an editor, and it cannot pursue all possibilities without this motion. Bill agreed that this course of action is undesirable, but using guest editors or a committee would undermine the quality of TNM and lead to its failure with very negative consequences for the Society. Bill has been trying to step aside for two years with no replacement in sight. Council needs authority to act if a new editor cannot be found. While comparisons were drawn with the demise of *American Neptune*, Richard assured members that all options will be explored to keep TNM in operation.

Richard Gimblett called for a vote on the motion, which ended in a tie vote. The question was put to the members a second time, and the motion was defeated.

The related motion regarding revised membership rates should TNM cease publication was withdrawn.

**Nominating Committee**

Thomas Malcomson moved, Richard Goette seconded that the slate of candidates recommended by the Nominating Committee be elected as officers and councillors at large of the Society for 2020-2021:

- President – Michael Moir
- First Vice-President – Thomas Malcomson
- Second Vice-President – Ian Yeates
- Treasurer – Errolyn Humphreys
- Secretary – Roger Sarty
- Membership Secretary – Sam McLean
- Councillor/Communications – Winston “Kip” Scoville
- Councillors – Ambjörn Adomeit, Isabel Campbell, Richard Goette, Walter Lewis, Jeff Noakes, Christopher Perry, Margaret Schotte
- Past President – Richard Gimblett

The motion carried.

**Annual Conferences**

Jan Drent reported on behalf of the organizing committee for Victoria in 2021. Although there is hope for an in-person conference, we need to consider using video conferencing software which offers the added benefit of being able to record sessions for subsequent online viewing. It was suggested that planning should continue for a conference in Victoria without making financial commitments that cannot be cancelled without penalty. Walter Lewis noted that successful virtual conferences feature sessions of one to two hours per day held over
several days at a time that would attract participants from Europe and the west coast of North America. Chris Madsen suggested that a virtual conference might attract 20 to 30 people, roughly the same number that attended recent Society conferences. A call for papers will be drafted for the Autumn issue of Argonauta indicating that the conference may be held online if required by the pandemic.

The Society is still looking at Kingston as the site for the conference in 2022, possibly held at the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes. Richard Gimblett has been in touch with the president of NASOH to discuss a joint conference in 2023, assuming that the world is not locked down. Michael Moir suggested St. Catharines as a possible site, which features the heritage of the Welland Canal and the Shickluna shipyard and is close to the United States’ border.

**Awards**

Bill Glover reported on the deliberations of the Matthews Awards Committee for 2019 and announced the winners of the best book on a Canadian nautical subject or by a Canadian on any nautical subject, and the best article published in *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*. Bill’s remarks will be published in the next issue of Argonauta.

Richard Gimblett reported that cancelation of the annual conference meant that the Gerry Panting Award for New Scholars was not presented in 2020, and that there were no submissions for the Jacques Cartier MA Prize.

**Member Recognition**

By a vote held electronically on 10-11 August 2020, the Council passed the following motion: Whereas section 21 of the Society’s by-law reads in part, “On recommendation of the council, members at a general meeting may, as a special mark of recognition for an extraordinary contribution to the society and/or to the field of nautical research, grant Honorary Membership in the Society to an individual”; and whereas Faye Kert has made extraordinary contributions, generally to the field of nautical research and specifically of long and distinguished service to the Society, as outlined in Appendix A to this motion, therefore be it resolved that Council recommends to the next Annual General Meeting that Faye Kert be recognized with Honorary Membership in the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Moved by Roger Sarty, seconded by Michael Moir, that the Society adopt the recommendation of Council, and award Faye Kert an Honorary Membership in the Society. Carried unanimously.

Richard Gimblett announced that the CNRS Merit Award is presented jointly to Isabel Campbell and Colleen McKee for their efforts as co-editors of *Argonauta* for more than a decade, from issue 27:2-4 (Spring-Autumn 2010) through to 27:2 (Spring 2020), during which time they ushered the publication through a progression of format and delivery changes (from solo hard copy paper surface posted, to combined mailing with the journal, culminating in full-colour e-copy only, downloadable from the website and distributed by email), all the while increasing the variety and quality of an already impressive “members only” product to a truly “open access” publication of great benefit to the entire maritime historical community. Richard also acknowledged Winston “Kip” Scoville’s important contribution to the transition of the printed Argonauta to an online PDF format.

**Other Business**

Paul Adamthwaite, the Society’s webmaster, invited Members to submit new content for our website at [https://www.cnrs-scnr.org/index.html](https://www.cnrs-scnr.org/index.html).
Karl Gagnon suggested that the Society use social media to develop the public’s interest in maritime history by leveraging the subject expertise of its members. He referenced Drachinifel’s channel on YouTube devoted to naval history, including the series *The Drydock: A Warship based Q&A* (https://www.youtube.com/c/Drachinifel/featured). Michael Moir reported that Sam McLean had raised with Council the potential of using video conferencing software to offer seminars on the Internet, and that several libraries and museums have used this technology during the pandemic to connect with their communities through virtual local history presentations. Karl’s suggestion will be kept in mind as such initiatives are discussed in the coming year.

Adjournment
Richard Gimblett passed the chair to the incoming President. There being no further business to conduct, Michael Moir asked for a motion to adjourn the meeting at 1600hrs. Walter Lewis so moved, Thomas Malcomson seconded. Carried.

Respectfully submitted
Michael Moir
Secretary

Attachment A: 2019 Membership Report
Attachment B: *Argonauta* Report February 2020
Attachment C: Editorial Chair Report for AGM, August 2020

Attachment A

2019 Membership Report

1. Membership Renewal Numbers for 2019 (Numbers for 2018 in Brackets):
   Domestic: 80 (up from approximately 70)
   International: 6 (up from 5)
   Institutional: 35 (down from 36)
   NASOH/CNRS: 6 (up from 5)

The Society currently has 23 Domestic members who are digital-only (this is very similar to last year) at least one member has gone from digital to receiving the journal on paper. There is also one digital international member.

2. Issues Addressed/Lessons Learned
   a) Coordination with Errolyn Humphreys, Treasurer, to make sure the spreadsheet reflects the mailed-in memberships that she has received.
   b) Coordination with Kip Scoville, Production/Distribution Manager for *Argonauta*, to make sure new members receive *Argonauta*.
   c) Monthly notices to members have generated a growing number of responses, and we hope that members will continue to submit notices to include.

3. Standing Concerns
   a) Attracting new student members: it has been suggested that we could partner with universities/history student societies to do events – talks, seminars, library days, etc. I have reached out to universities via our mass email list.
   b) Other local events: How can we organize these events? How can we partner with organizations/museums/archives? One strong possibility: the Shickluna Shipyard
archaeological dig (with Kimberly Monk). COVID-19 has put a wrench in a number of plans for local member events, but hopefully we can proceed with those plans in 2021 or 2022.

   c) Getting more input/responses from members: How do encourage members to respond to communications? Responses are increasing (for example, things to add to monthly emails/notices – but slowly)

   d) Attracting members from other disciplines, and encouraging them to contribute. Which comes first – recruiting their contributions or recruiting them as members?

Sam McLean
Membership Secretary

Attachment B

Argonauta Report February 2020

Colleen McKee and Isabel Campbell will be editing their last issue of Argonauta with the spring issue 2020. Erika Behrisch Elce, a professor at Royal Military College, will take over the helm for the summer issue 2020. A brief biography of Erika is available in the winter 2020 issue.

Colleen and Isabel began their editorial duties in the autumn of 2010, merging the spring, summer, and autumn issues of 2010 into their first single publication. The publication was reformatted into a smaller size to allowing mailing with The Northern Mariner. The next year, Council approved a move to pdf online publishing. Then, Kip Scoville joined the Argonauta team and took over all the formatting and distribution duties associated with this method of communication. Happily for all, Kip will remain in place as the production and distribution manager as Erika takes over the editorship. We thank him for many years of outstanding and enjoyable voluntary support.

We anticipate a very full issue for the spring, including a revisit of the debate on the future of maritime history (which first appeared in the winter of 2012). It will touch upon the importance of social media in creating new and wider audiences, the question of relevance, and how online publishing has transformed academic publishing. It will also include several other articles of interest along with the usual conference announcements, the President’s Corner, and other news items.

Argonauta remains a key communication tool for the executive, but we note the increasing importance of social media – twitter, Facebook, and e-mailed messages for information requiring immediate communication and when the quarterly publication schedule is insufficient. We also note the continuing vital role of The Northern Mariner and its peer review process for original academic articles of the highest standards. We work cooperatively with TNM editors, referring authors among us. Argonauta represents a meeting ground – a place where interested members of the public, students, and others may exchange their research, ideas, and communications with academics, professionals, and other specialists. It performs a different function from TNM, enabling the Society to create an inclusive and encouraging spot for publishing work. That said, all articles are subject to months of editing and fact-checking and all authors are required to provide precise references and to follow the normative rules about plagiarism and copyright. Instructions to authors are in the back of every issue of Argonauta. Thus the editors retain authority to reject pieces or to require revisions.
We are grateful that Professor Elce, a respected literary professional, has taken over the editorial role to ensure that *Argonauta* thrives and to ensure that normative editorial standards continue to be met. We hope that the Executive will support the new editor in her duties and we look forward to reading *Argonauta* for many years to come.

**Attachment C**

**Editorial Chair Report for AGM, August 2020**

It has been a notably productive year with the publication of five issues of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*. These include numbers 2 through 4 for cover year 2018 and issues 1 and 1 and 2 for cover year 2019.

Efforts to recruit a new editor for *TNM/LMN* continue, but have not yet produced results. We are managing with the current editor, Bill Glover, kindly agreeing to remain in harness on an interim basis, with the usual splendid efforts from Walter Lewis (production and distribution), and Faye Kert (book reviews editor). The society is deeply indebted to this excellent team.

Delays in production have been largely the result of slowness of submissions of article manuscripts. One difficulty is that fewer members have been present at major conferences, a function of the hard fact of our times that fewer members have institutional employment that provides travel funding. I would encourage all members who attend a conference or workshop – physically or virtually – to remind paper-givers of the possibility for publication in the journal. Another issue may be the increasing expectation of writers for online submission and peer review through open-access journal software; this will be addressed as we transition to that software when a new editor comes on board.

Roger Sarty
Guidelines for Prospective Authors

Argonauta aims to publish articles of interest to the wider community of maritime research enthusiasts. We are open to considering articles of any length and style, including research articles that fall outside the boundaries of conventional academic publishing (in terms of length or subject-matter), memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone. Articles accepted for publication should be easily understood by interested non-experts.

For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to The Northern Mariner, a peer-reviewed journal appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works also managed by the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Except with proper names or in quotations, we follow standard Canadian spelling. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense may both be correct in context.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

- Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Protecteur
- Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Preserver
- Class of ship/submarine: Victoria-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)
- Former HMCS Fraser rather than Ex-Fraser
- Foreign ships and submarines:
  - USS Enterprise
  - HMS Victory
  - HMAS Canberra 3

Following current industry standard, ships are considered gender-neutral.

Although Argonauta is not formally peer-reviewed, the editors carefully review and edit each and every article. Authors must be receptive to working with the editors on any revisions they deem necessary before publication; the editors reserve the right to make small formatting, stylistic, and grammatical changes as they see fit once articles are accepted for publication.

Articles should conform to the following structural guidelines:

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. Please use endnotes rather than footnotes. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of emerging scholars.

Each image must be accompanied by a caption describing it and crediting the source, and indicating where the original is held. Images will not be reproduced without this information. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, artwork, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. Please indicate clearly where in the text each image should go.
All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. *Argonauta* recommends that authors consult Royal Military College’s website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link: [https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai](https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai)

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help were provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

With each submission, please include a brief (5-7 sentence maximum) biography.
The Canadian Nautical Research Society
P.O. Box 34029
Ottawa, Ontario, K2J 5B1 Canada
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org

CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord, a quarterly refereed open access journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the northern hemisphere. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, marine archaeology, maritime societies and the like.

- Argonauta, a quarterly on-line newsletter, which publishes articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.

- An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime-minded locations, where possible with our U.S. colleagues in the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH).

- Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at $70 for individuals, $25 for students, $45 for Early Career R or $95 for institutions. Please add $10 for international postage and handling. Members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) may join the Canadian Nautical Research Society for the reduced rate of $35 per year. Digital Membership does not include a printed copy of The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to take one of several other categories of patronage, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and all donations to the Society are automatically acknowledged with a tax receipt. Should you wish to renew on-line, go to: www.cnrs-scrn.org

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Please print clearly and return with payment (all rates in Canadian $).

NB: CNRS does not sell or exchange membership information with other organizations or commercial enterprises. The information provided on this form will only be used for sending you our publications or to correspond with you concerning your membership and the Society's business.

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