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Greetings readers. This autumn issue brings us another original research article about German U-boats by Derek Waller. This latest piece details how and why particular captured German U-boats ended up in Soviet hands at the end of the Second World War. We especially appreciate how carefully Waller has delineated the limited capabilities of most of these captured submarines and the various operational issues the Soviet navy encountered after they acquired them. Also in this issue you’ll find an intriguing description of an archival discovery by Jan Drent about the Royal Canadian Navy’s carrier pigeon service during the Second World War.

This issue contains the Executive and the Annual General Meeting minutes. President Rich Gimblett is to be congratulated on reviving the Executive with new scholars and keeping the Society relevant and fresh, while former President Chris Madsen, Secretary Michael Moir and Lakehead’s Michel Beaulieu have proven to be formidable conference organizers. We heard praise of the presentations from those attending the sessions and we encourage all presenters to consider submitting their pieces to The Northern Mariner and Argonauta so those who were unable to attend can enjoy the published versions of the conference papers in the coming issues.

The high quality of the CNRS prize winning publications and the reinstatement of the MA thesis prize point to a healthy, vigorous future for the Society. Congratulations to Ambjörn Adomeit, Nicholas Landry, Keith Bird, Jason Hinds, Rick James, Anthony B. Dickinson and Chesley W. Sanger. Readers can learn about their impressive and varied accomplishments in the announcements on prize winners.

As the minutes show, the Society is searching for a replacement editor for The Northern Mariner. Over the years, William Glover, Roger Sarty, and other distinguished historians have unstintingly dedicated time and effort to this exemplary peer reviewed quarterly. We hope that another scholarly member of our Society will step up to the plate and carry on with this work. We hope that Faye Kert, our formidable book editor, will stay on many more years, continuing her outstanding contribution to scholarship in this and other essential capacities.

Canada and our Society were well represented at the 2019 Annapolis naval symposium. Rich Gimblett presented with Lt (N) Jason Delaney, and Chris Perry (a new CNRS members, who has taken on the post of Naval Command Historian) on a panel of Canadian naval topics. John Orr, David H. Oliver, and Isabel Campbell also presented in three other panels on international and allied topics. The symposium
brought together distinguished international scholars from across the globe and addressed cutting edge naval historical topics.

Our readers will have to await the next issue to see the full biography of Erika Behrisch Elce who will take over the editorial helm of *Argonauta* next summer. In the meantime, we are sure our readers will enjoy reading the forthcoming pieces by Waller, by Willy Pullen, and by others which are being prepared for the winter and future issues.

We wish to remind you that the spring issue will revitalize the debate about the future of maritime history; articles by Lincoln Payne, Joshua Smith, and Kelly Chaves should help us better understand how the technological challenges, the fast pace of the internet world, social media, and other new venues have influenced methods of reaching and expanding our audiences. Your feedback and engagement is welcome so please feel free to take part in this debate and to offer your views.

Finally, we’d like to apologize to our readers, most especially to Alan Ruffman, for a typographical error in the postal code for the membership business. This address is now correct on the verso of the front cover and on the Society’s web pages. Our membership secretary, Sam McLean may also be easily reached at his e-mail address which appears at those locations.

Fair winds. Wishing safe travels to all our readers. Isabel and Colleen
In so many ways, we look to the change of calendar in January to mark a new year, for example within the Society as the signal that membership renewal is due. But for me, it is the coming of fall that marks the launch of my annual cycle, perhaps sparked by my several continuing academic associations. Indeed, this year, the “summer is over, back to work” marker was the late-August timing of our conference and the annual general meeting (AGM).

Personally, it was the kick-off to a busy couple of months travel — after our conference in Thunder Bay came the Naval History Symposium at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, interspersed with a 40th Reunion of my Graduating Class at RMC Kingston, a family wedding in Perth, and a variety of day trips around the local central Ontario area — all occasions, it turned out, to explore a surprising range of nautical history subjects (as the several of you who follow me on InstaGram are aware) and to meet with an equally wide number of Society members. A most pleasurable sequence of events all around!

Institutionally, other than for the matter of dues and the cover date on our publications, the AGM marks the change of year for the Society. This year’s conference was a most stimulating way to ease back into regulated intellectual pursuits, and organizers Michael Moir, Chris Madsen and Michel Beaulieu are deserving of our gratitude and praise for an absolutely stellar endeavour. As for the business meeting, you can review the Minutes elsewhere in this issue, but I want to use this space to shape your reading of them by stating the whole conduct has cemented my belief that the Society is in good stead.

Besides the formal adoption of the very favourable financial statements for 2018 (no surprise to anyone who has seen them set out previously in the Spring number of Argonauta), and good discussions on aspects of membership renewal, the main point for your attention is the new slate of officers and councillors. Continuing the fresh influx begun at the AGM last year, we now have a viable succession plan to ensure the smooth operations of the Society into the future. First, I must note the “retirement” of Faye Kert and David More to open up new slots, which I accepted with sincere thanks for their service — and noting also that both have assured me of their willingness to serve in other capacities for years to come. These opened the way for Michael Moir to step up as 1st Vice-President, with the expectation that he should succeed me as President next year, and Tom Malcomson at his side as 2nd Vice-President. Coming on as new Councillors are Isabel Campbell (as she transitions from her present role as editor of this fine publication) and Ambjörn...
Adomeit (a young scholar who, along with Sam McLean, will give voice to that key demographic). This is a wonderful team to oversee our renewal.

I look forward to working with all the members of the Society in this last year of service as your President. Please contact me if you have any concerns or suggestions for our Society.

Richard H. Gimblett, MSC, CD, PhD, RCN (ret’d)
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U-Boats in the Soviet Navy post-May 1945

by Air Commodore Derek Waller, RAF (Rtd)

Introduction

By the late 1930s the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, had an ambition to create a blue-water navy to enhance the Soviet Union’s world-wide influence. However, the Second World War prevented the achievement of that ambition. From 1941 to 1945, the Soviet Navy was limited to operations in coastal waters around the Soviet Union, especially in the Baltic and the Black Sea. When the war in Europe ended in May 1945, Stalin was keen to resurrect his naval plans, but he was thwarted by the lack of suitable Soviet surface ships and ocean-going submarines. No German U-boats had surrendered in the Soviet-controlled Baltic ports; all serviceable U-boats had been transferred to the western end of the Baltic in the face of the Red Army’s advance. As a result, Stalin was determined to obtain at least a one-third share of the surviving German naval fleet, including the U-boats.

During the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945, the Soviets argued strongly to obtain the maximum possible allocation of captured German U-boats. Eventually the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, settled for the allocation of 10 U-boats to each of the three Allies (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and it was then the job of the Allied Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC) to recommend which 10 U-boats should be allocated to each ally.

The TNC Allocation of U-Boats to the Soviet Union

The TNC allocated the following U-boats to the Soviets in early November 1945:

U-1057, U-1058, U-1064, U-1231, U-1305, U-2353, U-2529, U-3035, U-3041 and U-3514. (1)

These comprised four large, ocean-going, Type XXI U-boats, four smaller, ocean-going, Type VIIC U-boats, one large, ocean-going, Type IXC U-boat, and just one small, high-speed, coastal Type XXIII U-boat. All these U-boats were moored in the United Kingdom, either at Lisahally in Northern Ireland or in Loch Ryan in south-west Scotland. As their transfer to the Soviet Union had to be completed no later than 15 February 1946, urgent action was required, especially in view of the onset of winter, the prospects of stormy seas around the west and north coasts of Scotland, and the annual freeze-up of the Baltic.

Unfortunately, on 23 November, when U-3514 was being prepared to leave Lisahally, it collided with another U-boat, damaging its steering and aft hydroplanes. It was then discovered that the stern was distorted, and that it could not be transferred, even under tow. The Soviet Navy therefore agreed that U-3515 should be transferred instead.
U-Boats Captured by the Red Army in Danzig – March 1945

In the meantime, during the TNC Inspection Team’s visit to Danzig in August 1945 to assess the condition of the German Navy’s surface vessels that had surrendered there, it was discovered that the Soviets had failed to declare that they had captured 11 uncompleted U-boats in the Schichau Shipyard when the Red Army entered Danzig on 30 March 1945. The Inspection Team leader’s report dated 31 August showed that the Soviets were not averse to conducting some deception to gain access to and advantage from advanced German submarine technology. The report concluded that:

*During inspection of the vessels at Schichau AG, Danzig on 28 August it was obvious that most of the submarine production had been removed.*

*There were at that time somewhere between nine and twelve submarines either still on the ways or having been so recently launched as to be incapable of movement under their own power. After capture of the city by the Russians, those vessels still on the ways were completed sufficiently for launching and launched. [sic] The Russian Navy then removed these vessels to unknown destinations. Whether these vessels were towed or moved under their own power is not clear.*

*The implications of the above seem to contradict the statement of the Russian Delegation of the Tripartite Naval Commission to the effect that no German naval vessels are in Russian ports. It is to be assumed that these submarines went to Russian ports since there is no indication that they were delivered elsewhere. It is recommended that the matter be investigated at the next meeting of the Tripartite Naval Commission, since it appears possible from this evidence that there may after all be German naval vessels in Russian ports. (2)*

The Inspection Team had been accompanied by Admiral Geoffrey Miles, the Head of the British Delegation to the TNC. His personal commentary dated 1 September amplified the Team Leader’s Report, stating that:

*At Danzig it transpired that there was now a Polish Director of Works. I got him to send for some German workmen and as a result the cat was let out of the bag. They confirmed that at the time of the Soviet occupation there were eleven completed submarine hulls, some with and some without engines, and that they had all subsequently been towed away. My Soviet colleague became more and more confused and uncomfortable, and he eventually admitted that he thought there had been eleven submarines here originally.*

*He asked if I really wanted Admiral Levchenko to be told about this, to which I of course insisted that as the Senior Soviet Representative he would have to offer an explanation and give the details of these submarines to his British and American colleagues. (3)*
This information was not only contrary to the Soviet assurances to the TNC that there were no German U-boats in Soviet ports, it also contradicted the exaggerated information published in a Press Release by the Soviet News Agency (Sovinformburo) on 30 March 1945 which described the capture of Danzig by the Red Army and stated 45 submarines had been captured there. The matter was therefore raised at the 7th Meeting of the TNC held in Berlin on 12 September. In his response, Admiral Levchenko, the Head of the USSR’s Delegation admitted that:

> In March of 1945 the naval bases of Danzig and Gdynia were liberated by the Soviet troops and there on the docks unfinished submarine hulks were found. They were not equipped with any machinery.

> These submarine hulks were towed to bases in the Soviet Union.

> Since there are no plans for completing their construction nor any machinery they are going to be scrapped for the metal. (2)

Admiral Miles was not prepared to let the matter rest. He replied to Admiral Levchenko saying:

> The information given to the Tripartite Naval Commission at Danzig was that of the 11 submarines towed away from there some had their main engines on board.

> In accordance with paragraph 5 of Part A of the Potsdam Protocol I consider that all these submarines should be inspected by the Tripartite Naval Commission. (2)

On 19 September the Soviets responded that:

> As to the series of the hulls of the eleven submarines, they are as follows: three of series 7 [Type VIIIC], eight of series 21 [Type XXI]. These hulls are located in Libau and several of them are being fitted with machinery (equipment). If your curiosity is sufficient to warrant looking them over, such opportunity will be presented. (2)

Not impressed by this answer, on 24 September Admiral Miles responded to his Soviet colleague that:

> The Tripartite Naval Commission have [sic] not yet been told of the number, types and location of the German submarines removed from Gydania in addition to the eleven which were taken from Danzig and are now in Libau. On receipt of this further information, it will be necessary to arrange a Tripartite inspection team to see all of these submarines. (2)

**TNC Inspection of U-Boats in Latvia**
The TNC inspection team’s visit to Libau, in Soviet-occupied Latvia, took place on 8 October 1945. The team’s report gave comprehensive information about the 11 partially-completed U-boats that had been launched and removed from Danzig. 

There were three Type VIIC U-boats at Libau, U-1174, U-1176 and U-1177. Each was fitted with most of its main propulsion machinery, and it was estimated that each could be completed within 4 months if moved to a first class shipyard. There were also six Type XXI U-boats at Libau, U-3535, U-3536, U-3537, U-3538, U-3540 and U-3542, each of which was fitted with most of its main propulsion machinery. It was estimated that U-3535 and U-3536 could be completed within two months, U-3537 and U-3540 within three months, U-3542 within five months and U-3538 within six months. The other two Type XXI U-boats, U-3539 and U-3541 had already been towed from Libau to a shipyard in Tallinn in Estonia, and were not inspected by the TNC team. The Soviets had also taken initial steps to incorporate these eight Type XXI U-boats into their Navy, and had allocated them alpha-numeric designations - first TS-5 to TS-12, and then R-1 to R-8.

It was clear that, despite their earlier statements that these 11 U-boats were not fitted with any machinery and that they were simply going to be scrapped, the Soviet Navy intended to make the best possible use of these potentially valuable trophies. Nevertheless, the American and British Representatives on the TNC decided that there was no point in continuing the debate about the future use of these 11 or any other U-boats captured by the Red Army, preferring instead to assume that they would be treated as unallocated U-boats which would be destroyed in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. The 11 uncompleted U-boats were therefore, with Soviet agreement, specifically listed in the TNC’s Final Report as being ‘unallocated submarines afloat’, and were earmarked to be sunk no later than 15 February 1946.

Additional Type XXI U-Boat Sections from Danzig

Although the British and Americans did not become aware of the full details until early 1946, after the removal of the 11 partially complete U-boats from Danzig the Soviets had completely dismantled the Schichau shipyard and had moved everything to the Soviet Union as war reparations. During this process, they gained access to a large number of pre-fabricated Type XXI U-boat sections which, though earmarked for specific U-boats, had not yet reached the keel-laying/assembly stage. As a result, it was estimated that the Soviet Navy had sufficient pre-fabricated sections and other parts, as well as the assembly jigs and facilities, to complete at least another 12 Type XXI U-boats, plans for the final keel-laying and building of which had been underway before Danzig was captured in March 1945.

These U-boat sections would, if assembled, have comprised the 12 Type XXI U-boats, U-3543 to U-3554. However, although they were all formally allocated Soviet Navy ‘TS’ (War Prize) alpha-numeric designations, and although they were moved to
the shipyard at Kronstadt, near Leningrad, it is highly unlikely that any of them were ever either assembled, launched, completed or commissioned into the Soviet Navy. Nevertheless, in the late 1940s, the United States Navy (USN) considered that their presence posed a potential threat, despite the TNC’s Final Report that these U-boat sections should have been treated as Category “C” vessels, which were defined as:

**Naval ships or craft which were inoperable or those ships of craft where construction or repair could not be completed within six months.** (1)

According to the TNC Report, they were:

**Submarines under construction on slips [which should] be destroyed or scrapped for metal. This destruction or scrapping shall be completed by 15 May 1946.** (1)

**The Type XVII ‘Walter’ U-Boats**

One of the enigmas of the TNC allocation process was how little fuss the Soviets made about the British and American attitudes to the acquisition of the Type XVII hydrogen peroxide (HTP)-powered ‘Walter’ U-boats, their turbine engines, the specialist staffs, the drawings and the associated papers. The American and British forces had captured the ‘Walterwerke’ at Kiel on 5 May 1945, as well as the shipyards in Hamburg and Kiel, they had raised, salvaged and inspected all the Type XVII and XVIIB U-boats that had been built, they had denied the Soviets access to the HPT technology, and they had insisted that the two best surviving examples, *U-1406* and *U-1407*, should be allocated by the TNC to the USA and UK respectively. Yet, during the latter half of 1945, and totally out of character, the Soviets raised no difficulties concerning this situation, either within or outside the TNC forum.

*U-1407* was even transferred to the UK from Germany prior to its inspection by the TNC without Soviet permission. When it was later inspected in Barrow on 6 September 1945 by the joint British, American and Soviet team of naval experts charged with determining the condition of all the surrendered U-boats prior to the formal allocation process, the Soviet members of the team took a surprisingly relaxed attitude. The comments of the TNC Inspection Team’s leader, Admiral Archer in his “*Report of Inspection of German Naval Units in UK*” dated 25 September 1945, reveal that:

*The time spent inside this craft *U-1407* was surprisingly short. The general impression gained was that the Russians knew about the Walter unit, also that they felt cheated insomuch as they expected us to hide her away, instead of which there she was prominently displayed in our shop window, albeit with a pretty hefty shock for all those who braved her interior. [Captain] Orel [of the Soviet Navy] gave us his opinion that as a boat she could be considered scrap, though she might be of some technical interest.** (4)
The explanation for this relaxed attitude was that, in their advance westwards across Germany, the Red Army had captured the Glückauf Submarine Construction Bureau offices at Blankenburg in the Harz mountains to the west of Dresden, and that their prizes had included a full-sized mock-up of the Type XXVI ocean-going ‘Walter’ U-boat which was being designed there. They had also captured a substantial amount of submarine-related material and documents including an Mk 17B (2,500 hp) and an Mk 18X (7,500 hp) ‘Walter’ turbine. Thus, the Soviets themselves had acquired access to the secrets of the ‘Walter’ U-boats. Perhaps they did not wish to advertise this fact to the British and Americans for fear of more inspection rights demands and possibly they considered the maintenance of mutual secrecy the best way forward.

The TNC’s Admiral Miles concluded as much in his final report to the Admiralty on 8 November 1945, stating that:

*It is interesting to note that the possible difficulties over the Russians and the Walterwerke submarines, expressed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of my Directive, did not in fact materialise.*

_The Russian Inspection Parties evinced no interest and neither did Levchenko put in for any when it came to bidding for the ten submarines he was allowed._

_The small U-792 type was seen by the Inspection Party with no remarks, and this studied silence, I think, can only mean that they had got a selection of blue prints (which they clearly love) from the Walterwerke offices in their sector of Berlin and are frightened of us asking for them._

(5)

**The Transfer of U-Boats from the UK to the USSR – ‘Operation Cabal’**

In late 1945 and early 1946, under the code name ‘Operation Cabal,’ the 10 U-boats allocated to the Soviets by the TNC were transferred from Lisahally to the Latvian port of Libau. Prior to the transfer, seven of the U-boats were already moored at Lisahally, but three others (U-1057, U-1064, and U-2353) which had been moored in Loch Ryan were moved to Lisahally on 31 October 1945. The Soviet Navy’s original intention was that the 10 U-boats should be fully serviceable, should have Soviet crews and should be transferred to Soviet-controlled ports under their own power. However, the Royal Navy’s Flag Officer (Submarines) (FOS/M), made his opposition to this clear on 17 October when he advised the Admiralty that:

_All except the Type XXIs, although having minor defects, are capable of proceeding under their own power. The Type XXIs are however most unreliable and would undoubtedly have to be towed. The Americans had to tow their Type XXIs to the USA, and we have been unable to get any running satisfactorily._

(6)

The Soviet Navy also proposed that four of the U-boats go to Murmansk in North Russia and six to the Baltic, but this too fell on stony ground. On 26 October, Admiralty insisted:
Our offer is to sail all - repeat - all U-Boats to a Russian-controlled German port. It is out of the question that British crews should take any U-Boats to North Russia. (6)

Eventually a compromise was reached. It was agreed that all 10 U-boats should be transferred to Libau with RN crews and one Soviet naval officer on each as an observer. In the event, only five of the U-boats were deemed to be capable of proceeding the whole way under their own power. The remaining five would be towed. As each U-boat had a Royal Navy Commanding Officer and crew, each was allocated an RN Pennant Number:

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<th>U-Boat No</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>U-1057</td>
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<tr>
<td>U-3515</td>
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‘Operation Cabal’ began with problems. Captain P Q Roberts, Captain (Submarines) Lisahally, responsible for the transfer arrangements, sent a cryptic message to the Admiralty on 23 November, saying:

At conference this evening Russians raised a catalogue of defects and deficiencies which they require making good. Major items of these were pointed out to previous mission [the TNC Inspection Board who had visited Lisahally and Loch Ryan in September] who nevertheless were not deterred in their selection [of the U-boats to be transferred to the Soviet Union].

Remaining defects are in my opinion minor.

Russians asked me to delay sailing and on my refusal have telephoned their London Mission to apply to Admiralty.

Have informed Russians that my instructions are that they are observers for the passage and not an Inspection Commission and in any case I do not consider things complained about justify delay. It was never pretended that they were taking delivery of 10 new submarines. (7)
The transfer to Latvia began on 24 November when nine of the U-boats, less U-3515, sailed from Moville at the mouth of Lough Foyle downstream from Lisahally. The planned route was around the north of Scotland, then through the Pentland Firth between Scotland and the Orkney Islands. After that, it was across the North Sea to south Norway, then through the Skagerrak and Kattegat to Copenhagen, and finally across the Baltic to Libau. The five under power were U-1057, U-1058, U-1064, U-1231 and U-1305, and they were escorted by HMS Garth, HMS Eglinton and HMS Zetland. The four being towed were U-2353 (HMS Riou), U-2529 (HMS Zephyr), U-3035 (HMS Tremadoc Bay) and U-3041 (HMS Narborough).

The five U-boats which sailed under their own power had a relatively trouble-free journey to Libau. But it was a different matter for those that were under tow. All four experienced considerable bad weather en route, including Force 10 gales, and all had problems with their towing gear. As a result only seven of the U-boats (U-1057, U-1058, U-1064, U-1231, U-1305, U-2353 and U-2529) arrived at Libau on 4 December. The remaining three suffered extended delays due to a combination of poor weather, technical defects and towing problems.

U-3041 which was being towed by HMS Narborough encountered problems with its towing gear which necessitated a diversion to Rosyth on 26 November. It then developed steering and other defects in the North Sea off Norway and was diverted to Kristiansand (S) on 29 November for repairs which took 5 days. After repairs, the transfer resumed on 5 December, and it arrived in Libau on 10 December.

Similarly, U-3035 which was being towed by HMS Tremadoc Bay developed steering defects off the north of Scotland. This resulted in a jammed rudder and a diversion to Rosyth on 28 November. After repairs, the transfer resumed on 7 December, and it arrived in Libau on 14 December.

The transfer of U-3515, which had started late because of the last-minute exchange with U-3514, was also beset with problems. After leaving Lough Foyle on 6 December under tow by HMS Icarus, and after poor weather caused it to take shelter in the Orkney Islands, ongoing towing problems together with a number of defects caused a diversion to Rosyth where it arrived on 11 December. The pair sailed again on 12 December, but returned again on 14 December after the tow parted in more poor weather. After that, and as described by the CO of HMS Icarus in his voyage report:

Icarus and U-3515 then remained in Rosyth Dockyard waiting for a serious defect in the submarine to be made good, and subsequently for the weather to moderate until Saturday the 26th January. (8)

The exact nature and cause of U-3515’s defect remains a mystery. On 20 December the starboard main electric motor was found to be damaged. The Soviet Embassy in London believed that this was probably caused by sabotage and they argued with Admiralty about the problem, starting with a message on 24 December
from the Soviet Naval Attaché saying:

The damage was caused by strange objects in the form of spanner and metal filings being found after damage in the working part of the motor. It is not known by whom and when they were inserted. (7)

The Admiralty had no intention of confirming this allegation. After a final trial of the repaired motor on 23 January 1946, the departure of U-3515 from Rosyth, again under tow by HMS Icarus, began again on 26 January. The remainder of the journey was uneventful, and U-3515 arrived in Libau on 2 February, thereby completing ‘Operation Cabal’.

Perhaps the last words on ‘Operation Cabal’ should be those used by Captain Roberts in his formal report dated 10 January 1946:

On the whole the turnover of these submarines to the Russians went more easily than I had expected.

The 10 observers arrived in Lisahally five days before we sailed and made a fairly comprehensive examination of each boat. Some of their complaints were of a ridiculously minor nature and others were defects and deficiencies which had already been pointed out to the visiting Tripartite Mission [in early September].

As usual we started right at the beginning again and had to go over much of the ground which had been covered by the Mission. They expressed surprise, for instance, that the allocated boats had any defects at all and said that they had been given to understand that all defects would have been made good including defects requiring docking. This, of course, was absolutely false.

As reported by signal the Russians at Lisahally twice applied to me for the sailing to be delayed. Both these applications were refused. Spare gear, drawings and instruction books were, as expected, rather a bugbear, and deficiencies in them were continually being complained about. The whole argument was re-opened when we arrived at Libau and it was proposed that the boats should not be taken over until all spare gear, etc, had been checked and all defects examined. As I estimated that this would take anything up to three months I said that this was quite unacceptable to me.

The whole attitude of the observers [sic] inspection at Lisahally would have been perfectly correct for a final acceptance committee taking over 10 brand new boats from Vickers, but was quite impossibly meticulous under the circumstances. They were eventually persuaded to see my point of view. (7)

The U-Boats in the Soviet Navy

By the end of February 1946, the Soviet Navy had acquired access to 21 German U-boats (11 from Danzig and 10 from the UK), seven of which were good quality Type VIICs, and 12 of which were 1,600 ton ocean-going, high-speed diesel-electric Type
XXIs. The others were a single Type IXC and a single Type XXIII.

Perhaps this is the reason why, at Potsdam on 1 August, Foreign Minister Molotov had so readily agreed to the proposed compromise about the limited number of U-boats to be allocated to each of the three Allies. He knew full well that, in addition to the three incomplete Type VIICs, the Red Army had taken possession of the additional eight new, but as yet incomplete, Type XXIs ex-Danzig, as well as sufficient sections to enable the Soviet Navy to assemble another 12 Type XXI U-boats, thus giving a potential fleet of 33 U-boats, of which 24 were Type XXIs.

The 10 U-boats delivered to the Soviet Union in ‘Operation Cabal’ were commissioned into the Soviet Navy’s South Baltic Fleet, and were used for training (rather than operational) purposes until 1955, when they were placed in reserve and employed in a variety of support roles before eventually being scrapped (See Annex A). For instance, two of them, U-1057 and U-1305, were used as targets in atomic bomb tests in the Arctic in 1955 and 1957.

There is some controversy relating to the Type XXI U-boats (U-2529, U-3035, U-3041, and U-3515). Initially, as with all 10 of the ex-Lisahally U-boats, they were allocated alpha-numeric designations relating directly to their ‘N’ series RN Pennant Numbers. They were subsequently allocated the Soviet Navy designations B-27, B-28, B-29, and B-30 in June 1949, and the details of their use are generally agreed.

There is however uncertainty about exactly which of the ‘N’ series and the subsequent ‘B’ series designations was allocated to the four Type XXI U-boats in February 1946 and June 1949 respectively. Some secondary sources say that U-2529 became N.28/B-28, U-3035 became N.29/B-29, U-3041 became N.30/B-30 and U-3515 became N.27/B-27.

In contrast, I (and others, including the pre-eminent German U-boat historian Dr Axel Niestle) believe that U-2529 was N.27/B-27, U-3035 was N.28/B-28, U-3041 was N.29/B-29 and U-3515 was N.30/B-30, but without access to prime source Soviet Navy documents some uncertainty remains.

The 11 U-boats captured in Danzig and transferred to Libau in mid-1945 comprised the three Type VIICs, U-1174, U-1176, and U-1177, and the eight Type XXIs, U-3535 to U-3542. They were all defined in the TNC’s Final Report as “unallocated submarines afloat” which meant that they should have been sunk in the open sea in a depth of not less than one hundred meters by 15 February 1946. Nothing is known about the fate of the three Type VIIC/41 U-boats after they were inspected by the TNC team at Libau on 8 October 1945, but it seems probable that they were not completed, and thus neither commissioned nor used by the Soviet Navy before being scrapped.

However, the same did not apply to the eight Type XXI U-boats, at least three of which were completed and commissioned into the Soviet Navy. All eight were
allocated Soviet Navy alpha-numeric designations (first TS-5 to TS-12, and then R-1 to R-8), but there is no evidence that any of them was ever used operationally. Eventually U-3535, U-3536, and U-3537 were scuttled in the Baltic off Cape Ristna in Estonia in August 1947, and U-3538 to U-3542 were scraped in 1948.

With respect to the 12 unassembled Type XXI U-boats (U-3543 to U-3554), the pre-fabricated sections of which were removed from Danzig to the Soviet Union sometime after 30 March 1945, there is a very remote possibility that they too were completed and formally commissioned into the Soviet Navy, but based upon the available evidence, this seems most unlikely.

Other U-Boats in Soviet Seas (The Baltic Sea and The Black Sea)

The TNC’s Final Report of 6 December 1945 highlighted a number of other U-boats that had been scuttled in Soviet-controlled waters before the end of the war, and directed that they be destroyed. These included U-18 and U-24, both of which had been scuttled by the Germans off Constanza in the Black Sea. Both U-boats were raised and later both were sunk off Sevastopol by the Soviet submarine M-120 on 26 May 1947.

At the end of the war the Soviet Navy found a number of sunk, scuttled and damaged U-boats in and around various eastern Baltic ports (including U-4, U-6, U-10, U-21, U-108, U-902, U-929, and U-1308) and U-9 in the Black Sea. The Soviets put none of these into training or operational use before they were broken-up, mostly in-situ.

The Kriegsmarine had decommissioned the three Type II U-boats, U-4, U-6, and U-10 in July and August 1944: U-4 in Gotenhafen on 31 July, U-6 in Gotenhafen on 7 August and U-10 in Danzig on 30 July. They were then cannibalised for spares in support of other U-boats in the area. The TNC originally assumed that they were captured there by the Russians at the end of March 1945 and scrapped in situ. However, later evidence showed that these three unserviceable U-boats were towed west to the Polish port of Stolpmunde by the Kriegsmarine in early 1945, where their de-commissioned hulks were captured by the Red Army.

In early August 1945, the Soviet Delegation to the TNC advised their US and UK colleagues that there were “three small U-Boats under repair at Stolpmunde”. The TNC Baltic Inspection Team therefore visited the port on 28 August 1945, where it viewed the three U-boats, or what was left of them. Subsequently the TNC’s Final Report listed them as "U-Boats that have been dismantled". They were probably afloat at the time of their capture by the Red Army, and some parts of them were visible above the water at the time of the TNC inspection. Whilst the TNC Report sought no formal follow-up from the Soviet naval authorities, the final disposal of these three Type II U-boats simply involved scuttling them in Stolpmunde harbour in late 1945, albeit that they were subsequently raised and scrapped by the Polish authorities.
The Soviet Navy salvaged the heavily damaged Type VIIIC U-boat, U-250, which had been sunk in the Gulf of Finland in July 1944. On 25 September 1944 it was taken to Kronstadt near Leningrad [now St Petersburg]. Though it was provisionally allocated to the Baltic Fleet and given the designation TS-14 on 12 April 1945, it was un-repairable and struck from the Soviet Navy list on 20 August 1945 and eventually broken-up for scrap.

The Impact of the U-Boats in the Soviet Navy

Whilst the Soviet Navy clearly wished to obtain as many surrendered and captured U-boats as possible, particularly examples of the Type XXI, precise details of their subsequent use in the Soviet Navy have been difficult to discern.

Like the Royal Navy to a very limited extent, and the US Navy to a much greater extent, particularly in respect of their two Type XXIs, U-2513 and U-3008, the 10 ex-Lisahally U-boats were used by the Soviet Navy to gain experience of operating such submarines, as well as to obtain knowledge of their advanced technical features as the basis for the planned expansion of the Soviet Navy’s submarine fleet. On the other hand, in respect of the U-boats that were captured at Danzig, as well as the U-boat sections that were removed from there as part of the war reparations, there is no evidence that any more than a very few of the former were completed.

The first opportunity for the exploitation of German naval technology arose in September 1944, when U-250 was salvaged in the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Navy was keen to take advantage of any of the Type VIIIC’s design features for incorporation into their own Project 608 submarines and, using U-250 as an example, Admiral Kuznetsov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, formed a special commission in November 1944 charged with exploring the most advanced features of German experience in submarine construction. The capture of the three partially-complete Type VIIIC U-boats in Danzig in April 1945, as well as by the TNC’s allocation of the four Type VIIIC’s from Lisahally in late 1945 assisted this process. The Soviet Navy learned from eight Type VIIIC U-boats, but interest in the Project 608 submarine waned when detailed information about the more modern Type XXI U-boats became available.

The Type XXI ocean-going U-boats were of much greater interest to the Soviet Navy than the earlier Type VIIICs. They made a major contribution to the Project 614 submarine design concept, which became the basis for the development of the Whiskey Class, the early backbone of the Soviet Navy’s non-nuclear ocean-going Cold War submarine fleet. As was the case with the Type VIIICs, it is probable that the Soviet Navy was far more interested in the design features of the Type XXIs and their production techniques than in using them operationally.

As far as the Walter HTP technology was concerned, the Soviet Navy was very keen to gain the maximum advantage from the German developments. This involved two specific lines of research. First, the Project 616 submarine was intended to be a Soviet copy of the Type XXVI U-boat, but this line of research was soon abandoned,
probably after the captured German documentation and material had been fully analysed. Second, the Project 617 submarine was a more independent development implementing both the ‘Walter’ turbine and numerous innovations gleaned from the other U-boat types. Project 617 resulted in the building of a single submarine, S-99, which was intended to be the prototype for an entire class, but the plan was discarded after S-99 suffered damage from an explosion in May 1959. Overall, despite considerable interest and investment, Project 617 did not lead to the further development of any such submarines in the Soviet Navy. Instead, like the situation in both the US Navy and the Royal Navy, the prospect of the advent of nuclear power was far more attractive to the Soviet Navy than the German-based HTP-related propulsion technology.

Thus, at least in part, the Soviet Union adhered to the principles (if not the timing) behind the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference and the specific recommendations of the TNC, where it had been agreed by the three Allies, including the USSR, that the allocated U-boats were to be used for technical assessment and experimental (rather than operational) purposes.

However, as a result of their captures in Danzig, the Soviet Union contravened that part of the Potsdam Agreement which fixed the number of U-boats at just 10 to each of the Allies, and which specifically stated that all other unallocated U-boats were to be sunk no later than 15 February 1946.

US Navy Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Intentions

Initially, none of this was clear, and there was a great deal of concern, particularly in the USA, about the number of Type XXI U-boats that had fallen into Soviet hands. The US Navy itself was investing a great deal of time, effort and interest in its two Type XXIs (U-2513 and U-3008), and was even replicating many of their design characteristics into the Guppy and Tang classes of submarines. The US was therefore fearful that, not only was the Soviet Navy likely to commission 20 or more Type XXI U-boats into operational service, but that the Type XXIs would also provide a design baseline for the new large ocean-going submarines that the Soviet Navy was known to be developing. Indeed, such was the concern that in July 1946 the US Navy’s CNO advised the Secretary of the Navy that by 1950 the Soviet Navy could have at least 300 submarines of advanced design based on the German Type XXI U-boat.

In the mid-1940s the Soviet Navy’s intentions with regard to the exploitation and use of the U-boats in its inventory, particularly the ones ex-Danzig, were obviously difficult to discern, but on 9 May 1947 the CNO nevertheless followed up his earlier advice with a comprehensive paper, based on the latest intelligence information, giving an “Estimate of Russian Exploitation of German Submarine Types”. Most of the US Navy’s attention was focussed on the Type XXI U-boats, but the paper also included assessments concerning the Type VIIC, the Type IXC, the Type XXIII and the ‘Walter’ U-boats. The paper’s conclusions about the latter Types were:
Type VIIC and Type IXC U-boats: It is believed that the Russian interest is more in material and design features rather than operational use.

Type XXIII U-boat: It is believed that their interest in the Type XXIII is merely examination of design and construction for future use.

Type XVII and XXVI ‘Walter’ U-boats: It seems probable that the Russians will construct some type of Walter propelled submarine for test purposes. There is no indication as yet that they will adopt a Type XXVI construction programme, and it seems unlikely that they will do so. All of their activity to date points to investigation and evaluation with a view to use in their own design. (9)

In contrast, the paper was equivocal about the Type XXI U-boat. Firstly, it said that:

No large Russian Type XXI program is apparent at this time. The Russians are interested in the Type XXI submarine. They have secured all the material, equipment and personnel concerned with its construction that became available to them, and are now engaged in tests and studies with a view to improving their submarine knowledge and design [and that] the Russians are not embarking on a Type XXI building program, but are conducting tests and investigations for future construction. (9)

But, secondly, it said that:

The Type XXI constitutes a potential threat in Russian hands because:

(a) 7 vessels are operational [these were the four ex-Lisahally, but wrongly included 3 other U-boats (U-3531, U-3533 and U-3534) which had been moved to Kiel by the Germans before Danzig was captured]

(b) 8 vessels are probably operational [these were the U-boats captured in Danzig and inspected by the TNC in October 1945]

(c) 6 vessels can be made operational in 2 months [presumably from the captured sections]

(d) 39 vessels can be assembled from sections within 18 months [a clear exaggeration]

Within the very near future the Russians will have a flotilla of about 15 Type XXI submarines. There are an additional six vessels which could be made operational within two months. Present intelligence of Russian policy indicates intention to employ all captured or allocated German submarines. A school has
been organised to implement this program. (9)

Despite its obvious errors, together with some dubious calculations about the prospects of the Soviet Union assembling a large number of additional Type XXI U-boats from the sections that had been captured in the Danzig area, this paper was accepted as the baseline for future US Navy briefings. As a result, in January 1948 the US Joint Intelligence Committee reminded the US Joint Chiefs of Staff once more of their estimate that the Soviet Navy had 15 Type XXI submarines operational and could complete another six within two months, and that 39 more could be assembled from prefabricated parts within 18 months.

Furthermore, in November 1948 the US Office of Naval Intelligence stated that it had confirmed information that there were 229 submarines in the Soviet Fleet, plus another 52 probably in service. Of those, between 130 and 160 were considered to be modern ocean-going patrol submarines, a category which included the ex-German Type VIIC, Type IXC and Type XXI U-boats. In particular, the report stated that there were certainly four Type XXIs, and probably an additional 20, in service with the Soviet Navy, and that these were the only truly modern submarines being operated by the USSR.

The impact of all this intelligence information, which in retrospect seems to have been exaggerated in terms of immediate operational capability, was that the US Navy became convinced that the Soviet Navy had sufficient examples of the Type XXI U-boats to provide a sound basis for the design of the ocean-going submarine fleet that the Soviet Union was determined to build. The other result was that it convinced the US Government that the Type XXI U-boats in the Soviet Navy represented a serious threat to the US Navy’s domination of the world’s oceans, and it was therefore probably one of the catalysts for the huge submarine building programme on which the US Navy itself then embarked.

The four Type XXI U-boats which had been allocated to the USSR by the TNC (U-2529, U-3035, U-3041 and U-3515), together with the other 20 which had been removed from Danzig, some incomplete and some simply as sets of unassembled prefabricated sections, therefore created a threat many times greater than their own inherent power.

Soviet Follow-Up Actions to the TNC Report

Whilst the British and Americans were meticulous in informing each other and the Soviets that they had, as recommended by the TNC, sunk their unallocated U-boats on time, the Soviet authorities were particularly tardy in providing the response to which they too were committed, viz:

**Former German submarines not allocated to [the] Three Powers shall be sunk by 15 Feb 1946. Similarly former German submarines on ways or building shall be destroyed by that date. On 15 Feb 1946 [the] Three Powers will exchange**
As the capture of the Type XXI U-boat sections in Danzig did not become clear until after the publication of the TNC’s Final Report in December 1945, it therefore made no specific mention of them. Nevertheless, by definition, their disposal was covered by the general TNC recommendation that surface ships and submarines under construction on slips should be destroyed or scrapped for metal no later than 15 May 1946.

The TNC’s recommendations in relation to the U-boats which had surrendered were formally approved by the three Allies in January 1946, and this was followed by a statement from the Admiralty on 5 March 1946 saying:

Moscow and Washington have been informed through diplomatic channels that all unallocated U-Boats afloat in British controlled ports were sunk by 15 February. No report of sinkings by [the] Russians [in respect of the 11 U-boats captured in Danzig and which were listed in the TNC Report] has yet been received. (10)

In similar vein, the Americans advised the Senior Soviet Naval Representative on the TNC in February and March 1946 that they too had sunk the remaining unallocated U-boats in US custody. The British and Americans were therefore not prepared to allow the lack of a Soviet response to continue, and diplomatic pressure continued throughout 1946. The result of this was the receipt of separate notes from the USSR to the American and British Embassies in Moscow on 6 and 9 December 1946 respectively, with the one to the British Government saying:

As regards the vessels [including the unallocated U-boats] referred to under Category ‘C’, in view of the large scale of the work involved in lifting and destroying these vessels, the Soviet military authorities have been unable to fulfil the recommendations of the Commission completely in the period laid down. At the present time the Soviet Naval authorities are taking steps to fulfil those recommendations. (11)

In the meantime, action continued within the British element of the TNC in Berlin, as well as in the Hamburg headquarters of the Admiral Commanding British Naval Forces Germany, Vice Admiral Sir Harold Walker, in order to highlight the Soviet intransigence and in an attempt to break the deadlock. Indeed, the question had by then turned into something of a vendetta, with the Royal Navy being determined to force the Soviets to react to the TNC recommendations. Thus, despite the Soviet note of 9 December, the Senior British Naval Representative on the TNC wrote to Admiral Walker on 11 December, saying:

It has become apparent that the Soviet Authorities are deliberately avoiding their responsibilities under the TNC agreement with regard to the destruction of Category ‘C’ vessels. For five months now the Soviet representatives of the Naval
Directorate and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Allied Control Authority have been pressed to make a report on the progress of the destruction of Category ‘C’ ships in accordance with their obligations, but no report and no information has been forthcoming and no reason has been given for their absence.

It seems to me that in their refusal to answer questions on this subject the Soviets are playing with us, and at the same time deliberately dishonouring their obligations on a matter of considerable importance. I consider that the time has come when we should make a definite accusation of breach of faith as, even if they intend eventually to destroy the vessels concerned, our delay in raising the question openly allows them to carry on quite happily with prohibited cannibalisation, etc. (12)

This was followed a week later by a letter from Admiral Walker to one of his British colleagues on 18 December, saying:

I consider the failure of the Soviets to render the [required] reports to be a most serious matter only explicable by the fact, which is borne out to a considerable degree from Intelligence sources, that instead of destroying the vessels concerned they are preparing to remove them to Russia with a view to refitting them for further use. I therefore consider that this matter should be pursued with the utmost vigour, if necessary at the highest level. (12)

At this stage, British determination to keep up the pressure on the Soviets knew almost no bounds and, without waiting for a response to Admiral Walker’s letter, a formal British Memorandum was presented to the Allied Control Authority’s Co-ordinating Committee on 3 January 1947, pointing out that:

The British and American Governments have duly completed the destruction and rendered the reports called for at the appropriate dates - the earliest report being due as long ago as February 1946. The Soviet Authorities, on the other hand, have rendered no report on the destruction of Category ‘C’ ships in accordance with their obligations. If the Soviet Delegation is unable to accede to the request, I shall have to report to my Government that a very serious breach of the TNC Agreement has occurred. (12)

Thus, despite the assurances in early December 1946, the British and Americans remained unconvinced about the Soviet commitment to fulfilling their part of the TNC recommendations relating to the Category ‘C’ vessels. So the matter was soon raised yet again. This time the concern was expressed in the Report of the Allied Control Council dated 25 February 1947 which, under the heading of ‘Statements not agreed on a Quadripartite basis’, said that:

The US and British authorities have, with the exception of one vessel remaining in the British zone, disposed of all their Category ‘C’ ships and submarines and note with concern the continued failure to report on Category ‘C’ ships and unallocated submarines by the Soviet Delegation. It would appear that these craft have not been destroyed as agreed by the Tripartite Naval
In amplification, the Allied Control Council Report also included an Appendix, which had been drafted by the Royal Navy representative on the TNC, and which set out in blunt undiplomatic language the details of the problem as seen by the British and Americans, saying:

It is possible that both inefficiency and lack of facilities have made it difficult for the Soviet to fulfil their obligations, but this in no way excuses them from their failure to report the situation. Moreover there is a considerable amount of intelligence information available to suggest that instead of trying to destroy the Category ‘C’ vessels, they have spent the time cannibalising some and repairing others for removal to the USSR. Even if they intend to destroy them eventually their failure to adhere to the specified dates has given them additional time for cannibalisation far beyond that to which they were entitled.

There were a number of submarines on the stocks in the Russian and Polish zones of Germany at the time of the capitulation. Owing to difficulty of identification it is impossible to state specifically what has occurred, but there is strong evidence to show that between 9 and 12 complete or nearly complete submarines have been taken to the USSR and up to 40 prefabricated sections similarly removed. All these should have been reported and destroyed.

The Soviets should be asked to state:

Why they did not destroy the vessels by the date specified?

Why, if they were unable to fulfil their obligations, they did not report on the specified date that destruction had not been carried out?

What progress in destruction has already been achieved, giving the names of all the ships disposed of and the dates of destruction?

By what date the balance of the work will be completed?

What truth is there in the rumour both completed submarines and sections of submarines in excess of the USSR allocation, have been and are being removed to the USSR? (11)

Significantly, this Allied Control Council Report contained the first formal mention of the requirement for the Soviet Navy to dispose of the many Type XXI U-boat sections which they had removed from Danzig in 1945. Although the information had become available too late to be included in the TNC’s Final Report, the details were widely known in Washington and London, and were of course included in the US Navy Intelligence Report published in Washington in May 1947. It was not therefore surprising that a short summary was included in the Control Council’s Report, thereby
alerting the Soviet Government to the fact that their ex-Western Allies were well aware of the situation.

At the 3rd Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Moscow on 12 March 1947, the British concern about this matter was raised yet again, when Mr Bevin in his opening statement said:

*There is one particular point which I can only describe as extremely unsatisfactory. We have been asking in Berlin for many months for information from the Soviet Delegation [to the TNC] as to what progress has been made in regard to the destruction of those ships which were placed in Category C and designated for destruction by the Tripartite Naval Commission. What assurance will Mr Molotov offer us on this subject? (13)*

Predictably, this drew a sharp response from an obviously forewarned Mr Molotov who, according to the British Minutes of the Meeting:

*Went on to deal with the question of warships in Category ‘C’. He referred again to the statement by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the Report of the Control Council. This statement said that as no Report had been made by the Soviet Authorities on the condition of vessels of Category ‘C’ and of submarines, it must be assumed that they had not been destroyed. It also stated that the Soviet Authorities had reported that in view of the magnitude of their task it has been impossible to fulfill their obligations. The Report ignored the fact that the Soviet Government was in fact taking the necessary measures to carry out the recommendations of the Naval Commission, and he hoped to inform the members of the Council when the ships in Category ‘C’ [and the submarines] had been finally destroyed. (13)*

Subsequently, as promised by Mr Molotov, the Soviet Delegation to the CFM at last produced a short formal statement on 27 March 1947 saying:

*The Soviet Government communicates herewith that the complete destruction of the ships of Category ‘C’ of the German Navy will be fully accomplished in August 1947. (13)*

Whilst the CFM meetings were underway in Moscow, the subject was also raised in the British House of Commons on 19 March 1947 when, during an obviously orchestrated question and answer exchange about the Royal Navy’s disposal of the unallocated U-boats under British control in late 1945 and early 1946, Lt Col Sir Ronald Ross, the MP for Londonderry in Northern Ireland, asked:

*Have all the submarines been sunk within the two months, including those allotted to other Powers? (14)*
To which the answer from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty was that:

*That is quite another question.* (14)

The British Foreign Office nevertheless remained determined to pursue the matter to the bitter end. Eventually the Soviets succumbed to the British pressure and closed the matter, with a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Moscow on 1 October 1947, saying:

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to the Embassy of Great Britain and has the honour to inform them that the Naval authorities of the Soviet Union have carried out by the date fixed their obligations resulting from the declaration of the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, concerning the destruction of German Naval ships in Category ‘C’, which were in waters controlled by Soviet Naval forces.* (12)

To complete the story, this was followed-up again in the British House of Commons towards the end of the year when, in answer to two more obviously ‘planted’ written questions on 5 November 1947 about ‘German Submarines (Destruction)’, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty reported that:

*An intimation has been received from the Soviet Government that they have fulfilled their obligations to destroy units of the German Fleet.* (15)

So the desired result had been achieved. Of the U-boats and U-boat sections captured in Danzig, the three Type VIIICs had been scrapped, as had all the Type XXI U-boat sections. The final action by the Soviet Navy had been to destroy the remaining eight Type XXIs. Of these three, *U-3535 (R-1)*, *U-3536 (R-2)* and *U-3537 (R-3)* had been sunk off Cape Ristna in Estonia on 7/8 August 1947 and struck from the Soviet Navy list in September 1947. The remainder, *U-3538* to *U-3542 (R-4 to R-8)*, had been broken up for scrap, being formally struck from the Soviet Navy list in February 1948.

Thus, some 21 months after the Soviet Union should have destroyed the 11 unfinished U-boats and the additional Type XXI U-boat sections which they had captured in Danzig in March 1945, it was finally confirmed that all the necessary action had taken place. The British and Americans had completed their U-boat-related actions by the TNC’s February 1946 target date, but the Soviets had clearly wished to milk every last advantage, especially from the eight Type XXI U-boats, as well as from the Type XXI U-boat sections, which they had captured, and they were not prepared to discard them until they had gained the maximum possible knowledge about their construction and technical features.

**Conclusion**
The Soviet Navy was allocated 10 U-boats by the TNC, and these were transferred to Libau from Lisahally in late 1945 and early 1946. They were all commissioned into the Baltic Fleet and, as permitted by the Potsdam Agreement, were used by the Soviet Navy in a variety of operational and non-operational roles. There was no requirement for the Soviet Navy to account to the TNC for their use, and no end-date to any such use had ever been specified.

As far as the 11 U-boats captured in Danzig and then transferred to Libau are concerned, nothing is known about the fate of the three Type VIIC/41 U-boats (U-1174, U-1176, and U-1177) after they were inspected by the TNC team at Libau on 8 October 1945. It is probable that they were not completed, and thus neither commissioned nor used by the Soviet Navy before being scrapped in 1947.

However, the same did not apply to the eight Type XXI U-boats, at least three of which were completed and commissioned. There is however no evidence that they were ever used operationally. U-3535, U-3536, and U-3537 were scuttled in the Baltic off Cape Ristna in Estonia in August 1947, and U-3538 to U-3542 were broken-up for scrap in early 1948. There is no evidence that the 12 unassembled Type XXI U-boats (U-3543 to U-3554) were ever launched, completed or commissioned, and they were most probably scrapped sometime in 1947.

The TNC’s Final Report of 6 December 1945 had also highlighted a number of other U-boats that had been scuttled in Soviet-controlled waters before the end of the war, and directed that they too should be destroyed. They included U-18 and U-24, both of which had been scuttled by the Germans off Constanza in the Black Sea and then raised by the Soviet Navy. Despite this, they were not put into service, and they were both sunk off Sevastopol on 26 May 1947. Finally, the Soviets found a number of sunk, scuttled and damaged U-boats in and around various eastern Baltic ports (including U-4, U-6, U-10, U-21, U-108, U-902, U-929, and U-1308), but none of these (as well as U-9 in the Black Sea) were taken into use before they were broken-up, mostly in-situ. Lastly, the Soviet Navy salvaged the heavily damaged Type VIIc U-boat, U-250, which had been sunk in the Gulf of Finland in July 1944, but it was found to be non-repairable and was eventually broken-up for scrap.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Navy made maximum use of German naval submarine technology, and that the Soviet Union’s possession of all these ex-German U-boats made a very considerable contribution to the later build-up of its navy’s huge ocean-going (blue-water) submarine fleet during the Cold War.

Arundel, W Sussex, UK
March 2019
Specific Sources:


4. TNA Kew, ADM 116/5571. TNC; Disposal of German Vessels in British Hands, 1945-1946.


8. TNA Kew, ADM 1/19405. Passage of HMS Icarus to Libau, 1946.

9. NARA Washington, RG 38.4.3. ONI Files, Naval Attaché Reports. (RG 38, A1 98C, 370/14/13/5, Box 15).


Annex A
The Uses and Disposal Details of the 10 U-boats Allocated to the USSR by the TNC

The specific uses and disposal details of the 10 U-boats allocated to the USSR by the TNC were as follows:

**U-1057**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as \textit{N.22}
Renamed \textit{S-81} on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 30 Dec 55
Allocated as a test hulk to the Northern Fleet
Transferred to the White Sea in 1956
Heavily damaged in the Barents Sea off Novaja Zemlja on 24 Sep 57 in atomic bomb test
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 16 Oct 57
Broken-up for scrap

**U-1058**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as \textit{N.23}
Renamed \textit{S-82} on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 29 Dec 55
Designated as floating submarine battery recharging station \textit{PZS-32} on 18 Jan 56
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 25 Mar 58
Broken-up for scrap

**U-1064**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as \textit{N.24}
Renamed \textit{B-26} on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 29 Dec 55
Designated as floating submarine battery recharging station \textit{PZS-33} on 18 Jan 56
Re-designated as training hulk \textit{UTS-49} on 1 Jun 57
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 12 Mar 74
Broken-up for scrap

**U-1231**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as \textit{N.26}
Renamed \textit{B-26} on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 17 Aug 53
Designated as combat training hulk \textit{KBP-33} on 15 Sep 52
Re-designated as training hulk \textit{UTS-23} on 27 Dec 56
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 13 Jan 68
Broken-up for scrap in Riga (Estonia)

**U-1305**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.25*
Renamed *S*-84 on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 30 Dec 55
Allocated as a test hulk to the Northern Fleet
Sunk off Novaja Zemlja in atomic bomb test on 10 Oct 57
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 1 Mar 58

**U-2353**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.31*
Renamed *M*-31 (or *M*-51) on 9 Jun 49
To reserve as a training hulk on 22 Dec 50
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 17 Mar 52
Broken-up for scrap in 1963

**U-2529**
Arrived at Libau on 4 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.27*
Renamed *B*-27 on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 10 Jun 55
Designated as block ship *BSh*-28 on 19 Sep 55
Re-designated as training hulk *UTS*-3 on 9 Jan 57
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 1 Sep 72
Broken-up for scrap

**U-3035**
Arrived at Libau on 14 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.28*
Renamed *B*-28 on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 29 Dec 55
Designated as floating submarine battery recharging station *PZS*-34 on 18 Jan 56.
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 25 Mar 58
Broken-up for scrap

**U-3041**
Arrived at Libau on 10 Dec 45
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.29*
Renamed *B*-29 on 9 Jun 49
To reserve on 29 Dec 55
Designated as floating submarine battery recharging station *PZS-31* on 18 Jan 56  
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 25 Sep 58  
Broken-up for scrap

*U-3515*  
Arrived at Libau on 2 Feb 46  
Allocated to the Baltic Fleet on 13 Feb 46 as *N.30*  
Renamed *B-30* on 9 Jun 49  
To reserve on 29 Dec 55  
Designated as floating submarine battery recharging station *PZS-35* on 18 Jan 56  
Re-designated as test hulk *B-100* on 2 Jul 58  
Struck from Soviet Navy list on 25 Sep 59  
Sold for scrap on 30 Nov 59 and broken-up
The RCN Carrier Pigeon Service 1942-43
by Jan Drent

Many Argonauta readers know the pleasant experience of coming across a totally unexpected item when hunting through a Library and Archives Box. That’s how I was startled to learn that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) actually had a Pigeon Service on the West Coast in 1942-43. The file is part of Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group 24 (RG 24).\(^1\) As often also happens this Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) file contains only a portion of the relevant correspondence, but it’s sufficient to lift the curtain. A 15 December 1943 Maclean’s article entitled “Birds of War” shows that the use of carrier pigeons for emergency communication by the RCAF and more recently the RCN was being publicized during the War.\(^2\)

Background

Homing pigeons had been used for communications during the Great War. The newly created Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) started a homing pigeon service back in 1920. At its peak during the Second World War the “Pigeon Division” had one officer and over 300 men operating 30 pigeon lofts in Canada. RCAF birds were also used in Bomber and Coastal Command aircraft flying from Britain. It appears that enthusiastic RCN members on the west coast with experience in handling homing pigeons (the literature terms them “fanciers”) convinced their superiors in 1942 that the Navy should follow the Air Force example and use pigeons for “last ditch” communications in an emergency or if radio gear failed.

The RCN Pigeon Service

The LAC documents show that NSHQ had formally approved “the organization of a Pigeon Service on the West Coast” on 1 June 1942. The Maclean’s article notes that Frederick H. Woodfield, a wartime sailor, had written to his commanding officer in 1942 advocating the use of pigeons by the Navy. As this observation suggests, NSHQ was probably reacting to his west coast proposal when it approved creating a pigeon service. The LAC correspondence also cites Frederick Woodfield as a driving force behind the Pigeon Service. Like most wartime sailors of the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR), he had originally been serving in the trade of Officers’ Steward. Once the Pigeon Service got off the ground he was promoted to Petty Officer in the Telegraphy (i.e. radio communications) trade. By early 1943 he had five other men who had been pigeon fanciers in civilian life working under him. Four were also members of the RCNVR; the fifth was from the Fishermen’s Reserve, a branch of the RCNCR which recruited men from the fishing industry who served aboard a fleet of former fishing vessels and specially built patrol vessels based on fishing boat designs.
Captain (RCN) Massey Goolden, the Naval Officer in Charge in the Dockyard, forwarded a seven-page report compiled by Woodfield to the Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, then located at Jericho Beach in Vancouver on 9 March 1943. Captain Goolden’s covering letter commented on how well Petty Officer Woodfield had written the report. Woodfield must have had an interesting background. The report explains that 198 pigeons, donated by civilian fanciers in western Canada, were being accommodated in a new loft completed in the Dockyard in September 1942. Experimental flights, reported as having been 100% successful, were being carried out from distances between 30 and 60 nautical miles using a Fairmile patrolling in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The next stage planned for trials utilizing Fishermen’s Reserve patrol vessels once enough birds had been bred. The truly comprehensive report covered everything from urging an early start on recruiting civilian fanciers before they became taken by the RCAF, to plans for creating lofts at Prince Rupert and “intermediate bases”, the need to enlist basket weavers to manufacture carrying baskets, formally establishing a Pigeon Communications Branch and how it could be organized, the numbers of “Pigeoneers” required depending on how many lofts would be created, reporting procedures and records, etc.

**Memorandum by the Naval Services HQ Deputy Director Signal Division 9 April 1943**

By 9 April Lieutenant Commander Michael (“Micky”) Stirling, the Deputy Director of the Signals (i.e. Naval Communications) Division at NSHQ was reacting to the lengthy report about the west coast Pigeon Service dated four weeks earlier. Stirling’s memo is reproduced below. It is an admirable single-page summary of the background and issues requiring decision. His memo stated that NSHQ would have to decide “whether this project be followed up or whether it should be shelved”. (paragraph 6). It notes that the suggestions from the west coast about expanding the Pigeon Service are “somewhat ambitious, and…. if followed through will attain some proportions” (paragraph 5). It reminds his superiors that “From the political point of view, it may be noted that questions are being asked in the House as to what use the Services are making of Carrier pigeons.” (paragraph 7). While observing that pigeons “might be of use for carrying of messages from Fishermen’s Reserve vessels…. under conditions of W/T (radio) failure …there are a number of disadvantages.” (paragraph 8). These drawbacks are not enumerated because they were apparently in a separate memorandum from the Chief of Naval Personnel. Finally, Stirling wrote that if the Pigeon Service was to be retained a new rate (or trade designation) would be needed, (“the name Pigeoneer has been suggested”), pigeon feed would have to be added to naval procurement lists and “unless ratings are selected very carefully and trade decided by expert fanciers, it may prove an ideal backwater for skrimshankers”. (paragraph 9).
MEMORANDUM TO: NAVAL STAFF

Pigeon Service.

It is requested that the situation with regard to the Pigeon Service of the R.C.N. may be reviewed.

2. On the 25th of May, 1942, D.S.D. requested a decision from C.N.P. and V.C.N.S. as to whether ratings could be provided for a Pigeon Service. This was approved by C.N.P. on the 25th May and by V.C.N.S. on the 1st June. Accordingly the organization of a Pigeon Service on the West Coast was commenced.

3. Since this time, the project has grown considerably. Officer's Steward Woodfield, who was the rating put in charge of this venture from the first, has been made P.O.Tel (S.O.) and as far as can be determined has done a very good job. He has working under him now, one Ldg. Smn., one Able Smn., one Stoker I, one Stoker 2, and one Sig. T.C. He has a loft planned to accommodate 235 birds and situated in Esquimalt Dockyard.

4. Financial approval was obtained on 10th July for $7,000 for building this loft.

5. On the 19th March, the first report was received from C.O.P.O. giving the progress of the Pigeon Branch with suggestions for its improvement. These suggestions are all somewhat ambitious and it would appear that this project, if followed through, will attain some proportions.

6. It is requested that Staff may decide whether it is desired that this project be followed up or whether it should be shelved.

7. From the political point of view, it may be noted that questions are being asked in the House as to what use the Services are making of carrier pigeons.

8. They might be of use for carrying of messages from FR vessels on the West Coast under conditions of W/T failure. On the other hand there are a number of disadvantages, three of which were enumerated by C.N.P. in a Memorandum to D.S.D. on the 26th March.

9. If this Branch is retained and developed sufficiently to make it worth while, it will necessitate the institution of a new rate (the name Pigeoneer has been suggested). It will also necessitate Stores going into the feed business, since it is essential for these birds to be fed only on recommended products (see list contained in monthly report of Stores, flagged) and unless ratings are selected very carefully and trade decided by expert fanciers, it may prove an ideal backwater for skrimshankers.

April 9, 1943.

M.G. Stirling
A/Lieut, Commander, R.C.N.
D.S.D.
The Final Act

A directive signed by Captain Goolden in Esquimalt on 27 December 1943 announced that the Pigeon Service had been disbanded on 10 December 1943. The pigeons, loft equipment, Petty Officer Woodfield and two other ratings were all being transferred to the RCAF. Ironically, the Maclean’s article which was based on interviewing Petty Officer Woodfield was published on 15 December 1943, just five days later. One wonders whether Woodfield continued to be a pigeon fancier after the war.

Post script:

“Micky” Stirling, the son of British Columbia Conservative politician Grote Stirling who was Minister of National Defence in the Bennett government 1934-35, was twenty-seven years old when he produced his memo. Michael Stirling had joined the RCN at the age of seventeen and had immediately been sent to Britain for training with the RN. He had had done the Royal Navy’s Signals Officers course in 1940 followed by service in his new speciality in an RN destroyer and had come to NSHQ in 1942. “Micky” Stirling would have a distinguished career in the post-war RCN, with promotions to the rank of Commodore at the age of forty-four and to Rear-Admiral three years later. His final appointment was as the Flag Officer Pacific Coast. As a senior officer “Micky” Stirling was known in the Navy for his professional competence and invariably immaculate appearance. An officer who served under him when Commander (second in command) of the Training Cruiser Ontario recalled how he would change into a freshly pressed shirt at midday. He chose to resign in 1966 six years before the retirement age of fifty-five because of the Unification of the three armed services then being pushed through by the Pearson government. In retirement Admiral Stirling served as British Columbia’s Agent General in London from 1968 to 1975.
Endnotes

1. The specific file number is LAC, RG 24 Series D-1-a Vol 5587, NSS 1-85-1.


5. Anecdote from Commander David Avery, 1980.

Biography of the author:

A graduate of UBC, Jan Drent, CD, BA, was a career officer in the RCN. He commanded three warships on both coasts and served ashore in Canada and overseas. He was a member of the Directing Staff at the Royal Navy Staff College during an exchange posting. Russian language training and subsequent service as the Canadian naval attaché in Moscow during the Cold War prompted ongoing interest in the Russian language and culture. Since retiring to Victoria with his wife, Jan has been active as a volunteer. His nautical writings have included articles and book reviews in The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord and other periodicals in Canada and the UK. His hobbies include sailing, walking and reading.
Some Images from the 2019 CNRS Conference
Images courtesy: Michael Moir

Councillor Peng You welcomes the conference to the City of Thunder Bay at the Lakehead Transportation Museum, 22 August 2019. In the background from left to right: Fraser McKee, Thorold Tronrud (Director of the Thunder Bay Museum), Thomas Malcomson, and Richard Gimblett.

Chris Madsen, Muriel Gimblett, and Richard Gimblett on the CCGS Alexander Henry, 22 August 2019
Charlie Brown, President of the Lakehead Transportation Museum Society, and Chris Madsen on the CCGS *Alexander Henry*, 22 August 2019

Richard Gimblett and Chris Madsen on the CCGS *Alexander Henry*  
22 August 2019
CCGS *Alexander Henry* with the Sleeping Giant in the background, 22 August 2019

Ambjörn Adomeit (foreground) on the tour of the CCGS *Alexander Henry*, 22 August 2019
Charlie Brown, President of the Lakehead Transportation Museum Society, takes a question on the bridge of the CCGS *Alexander Henry*, 22 August 2019

View of Thunder Bay from the Prince Arthur Waterfront Hotel, 23 August 2019
Professor Erika Behrisch Elce reads from her novel, *Lady Franklin of Russell Square*, during the reception hosted by HMCS Griffon, 23 August 2019
The Canadian Nautical Research Society Awards committee is pleased to award the Jacques Cartier MA Prize to Mr. Ambjörn L. Adomeit for his MA thesis. The thesis, "A Fleet of its Compromises: The Canadian Navy’s Cold War Submarine Posture" ("Une flotte de ses compromis: La position sous-marine de la guerre froide de la Marine canadienne"), was submitted in 2018 to the Royal Military College.

In his thesis, Mr. Adomeit historicizes the development of the Canadian submarine fleet from 1949 through the 1990s. His analysis of the factors that affected submarine procurement in the Canadian navy has ongoing relevance to today. Mr. Adomeit elegantly weaves a comprehensive literature review throughout, and offers an honest appraisal of the leading work on Canadian submarines. The committee was especially impressed by his use of interviews alongside documentary evidence to support his argument. Mr. Adomeit is to be commended for applying historical methodologies with deftness and potential.
2019 Keith Matthews Awards Announcement for 2018 Publications

Articles

Honourable Mention

Honourable Mention is given to Nicolas Landry for «Tensions, diplomatic et accommodements dans un espace partagé: La France et l’Angleterre sur la côte ouest de Terre Neuve, 1842 - 1870 ».

The committee noted the article offered both new research and a strong literature review. The only thing separating this article from the prize itself was that the topic was a bit narrower.

Keith Matthews Award for the best article published in The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, 2018

The 2018 Keith Matthews award for the best article published in The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord in 2018 is given to Keith Bird and Jason Hines for “In the Shadow of Ultra: A Reappraisal of German Naval Intelligence in 1914 - 1918.” The Awards Committee comments included the following remarks:

“A great analysis of the literature and important new research.”

“Sheds significant new light on German signals intelligence in the First World War.”

“The scope of the topic is larger than for most other pieces examining technical material.”

“Insightful, generally ploughing a new field with respect to German electronic warfare.”

Books

Keith Matthews Award for a Book Deserving Special Recognition

The Keith Matthews Award for a Book Deserving Special Recognition is given to Rick James for Don’t Never Tell Nobody Nothin’ No How: The Real Story of West Coast Rum Running, published by Harbour Publishing.

The committee members congratulate the author for an entertaining account of the folly of prohibition. They note the work is well researched, making extensive use of primary sources. They particularly noted the difficulty frequently associated with using newspaper sources.
The Keith Matthews Award for the Best Book

The Keith Matthews Award for the Best Book is presented to Anthony B. Dickinson and Chesley W. Sanger for *After the Basques: The Whaling Stations of Newfoundland and Labrador*, published by DRC Publishing.²

The committee believes this book makes a substantial and scholarly contribution to the history of whaling. It also provides important insights to the maritime economy of Atlantic Canada.

The committee found this regional study to be substantial. It makes a scholarly contribution, especially concerning the maritime economy.

Endnotes


McWatters Visiting Fellowship

The Geraldine Grace and Maurice Alvin McWatters Visiting Fellowship is designed to foster, promote, and support original archival research by scholars, authors, or artists in the collections located at

Queen’s University Archives
(http://db-archives.library.queensu.ca/)

This Visiting Fellowship has a stipend of $5,000 which is intended to help defray living, travel or research expenses of successful applicants to come to Kingston, Ontario, Canada to conduct their research.

Conditions of the Visiting Fellowship

a. Visiting Fellowship recipients must commence their research at Queen’s University Archives within one year of being notified of the award.

b. Fellows are expected to be in residence for the duration of the Fellowship and are expected to devote full time to their research projects.

c. Successful applicants will not be associated with Queen’s University, nor reside in the City of Kingston.

d. Recipients will be asked to participate in campus and community activities where appropriate, and may be asked to give a public face to the fellowship and their research during their time here.

e. The Visiting Fellowship must be acknowledged in works emanating from research accomplished through the Geraldine Grace and Maurice Alvin McWatters Visiting Fellowship.

f. Recipients will be asked to provide the University Archivist with two copies of any work resulting from research conducted as a result of the Visiting Fellowship, one for the Fund donor, and one for Queen’s University Archives.

g. Successful applicants will not be eligible for a second Fellowship for a period of at least one year following their first Fellowship.

h. Visiting Fellowship recipients are requested to submit a short report on their research to the University Archivist, within two months of completion. Edited versions of, or excerpts from, these reports may be used in Queen’s University Archives publications.
Application Form

To make an application for The Geraldine Grace and Maurice Alvin McWatters Visiting Fellowship, please complete and submit the application form. Deadline for submission of applications is 2019 September 9. Submissions may be made electronically to ken.hernden@queensu.ca or in hard copy to:

Ken Hernden, University Archivist
Queen’s University Archives Kathleen Ryan Hall
Queen’s University
Kingston, ON K7L 3N6
Draft Minutes of the Council meeting held at the Prince Arthur Waterfront Hotel, Thunder Bay, Ontario  
Wednesday, 21 August 2019

Present:
Richard Gimblett, President; Walter Lewis, First Vice President; Michael Moir, Secretary; Tom Malcomson and Ian Yeates, Councillors; Chris Madsen, Past President; William “Bill” Glover, Chair of the Awards Committee; and Roger Sarty, Chair of the Editorial Board.

Regrets: Faye Kert, Second Vice President; Errolyn Humphreys, Treasurer; Sam McLean, Membership Secretary; Richard Goette, David More, Jeff Noakes, Margaret Schotte, and Winston “Kip” Scoville, Councillors.

Calling to Order and President’s Introduction
Richard called the meeting to order at 1950hrs. He opened the meeting by commenting on the Society’s strong position at present. A succession plan for the Society’s officers is now in place, and there has been movement in the search for a new general editor for The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord (TNM).

Minutes of Council’s Previous Meeting
Walter moved, Ian seconded acceptance of the minutes of 9 March 2019. Carried.

Treasurer’s Report
Richard reviewed the statement updating the Society’s finances to 31 July 2019 that was prepared by Errolyn Humphreys (see Attachment A). The Society is on a solid footing with increased membership revenues. The option to receive only the digital version of the journal has brought back several former members, and others have kindly paid fees that were in arrears. The Investment Committee will review options to determine if additional funds should be added to a portfolio that consists of bonds, guaranteed investment certificates, and some stocks.

The financial statement was received for information.

Membership Report
Richard reviewed Sam McLean’s report that will be going to the annual general meeting on 24 August 2019. There was discussion about the need to reconcile online and mailed registrations with the spreadsheet maintained by Sam to ensure that membership records are up to date, and the motion to create an early career researcher membership category that will be going to the annual general meeting.
Succession Planning
Richard reviewed the slate of candidates for Council in 2019-2020 that will be presented to the members at the upcoming annual general meeting.

Publications
The final issue of *TNM* for 2018 has been mailed to members. Roger observed that the issue was up to the journal’s top standards. He is exploring options for a new editorial team, and Bill will remain in place on an issue-by-issue basis until a new team is recruited. Council discussed potential material for forthcoming numbers, including a 35th anniversary issue based on the mimeographed proceedings of the inaugural conference in 1984 so long as it is found that the scholarship of these articles has stood the test of time.

Upcoming Conferences
Chris provided an update on preparations for next year’s conference, which will be held in North Vancouver on 13 to 15 August 2020. Various venues were discussed, as well as the potential for financial support from the Society to keep the cost of registration at affordable levels. Tom moved, Roger seconded that the Society makes available up to $1,500.00 to cover a conference deficit in 2020. Carried.

Jan Drent and Barry Gough have volunteered to organize the 2021 conference in Victoria. The date is tentatively set for June.

News of the return of the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston to its former site at the historic dry dock property led to discussions that the 2022 conference should be held in Kingston. David More has volunteered to be part of the organizing committee along with other local members.

Awards
Those responsible for the Society’s awards confirmed that they were prepared to announce the winners at the reception to be held at HMCS *Griffon* on Friday, 23 August 2019.

Adjournment
There being no further business to conduct, Richard asked for a motion to adjourn the Council meeting at 2153hrs. Walter so moved, Tom seconded.

Respectfully submitted
Michael Moir
Secretary

Attachment A: CNRS – Financial Situation as at July 31, 2019
Bank Balances - June 28, 2019

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<td>Investment account</td>
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<td><strong>Total Cash on hand</strong></td>
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Deposits in Transit - July/August

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<tr>
<td>NASOH recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dues and Other Revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cash in transit</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,957.72</strong></td>
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**SUB-TOTAL CASH AVAILABLE** $43,473.25

**LIABILITIES**

Payments in transit

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<td>Marquis Book Printing</td>
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<td>Gemma B. Publishing (copy editing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prizes and Awards</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cash Owing</strong></td>
<td><strong>($4,506.37)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL CASH AVAILABLE TO MEET EXPENSES** $38,966.88

Attachment A: CNRS – Financial Situation as at July 31, 2019
## Estimated Expenses to Year-End

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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
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<td>NASOH recovery</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing and Editing</td>
<td>($300.00)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total estimated expenses to year-end**  ($2,970.00)
Draft Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held in the Bertrand Room, 
Prince Arthur Waterfront Hotel, Thunder Bay, Ontario 
Saturday, 24 August 2019

Present
Richard Gimblett, President, and eleven members of the Society.

Calling to Order
The President called the meeting to order at 1050hrs.

Approval of the Agenda
Fraser McKee moved, Ian Yeates seconded approval of agenda. Carried.

Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of 12 August 2017

President’s Report
Richard is very satisfied with the present state of the Society after a few turbulent years. Membership levels have stabilized and Sam McLean, Membership Secretary, has enjoyed success in encouraging individual members to renew and submit lapsed fees. The transition to an open-access digital journal has not yet had a discernable effect on membership levels. In fact, the paperless option has attracted a few former members back to the fold. The search continues to find a successor to William Glover as general editor of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord (TNM) with various options being explored. Richard was also pleased to report that a succession plan is in place for Council, which will be discussed in the report of the Nominating Committee.

Treasurer’s Report
Richard Gimblett presented the financial reports for the period ending 31 December 2018 and an update to 31 July 2019 on behalf of the Treasurer, Errolyn Humphreys. The Society’s financial position improved despite reinstituting the Panting and Cartier cash prizes and taking into account the projected costs of producing forthcoming issues of TNM.

Discussion turned to initiatives that would increase expenditures in support of the Society’s mission while ensuring the availability of funds to meet unforeseen pressures. It was suggested that the Society revive cash prizes for the Keith Matthews Awards. Richard noted that there was not strong support for this proposal at the Council meeting in March. Authors and publishers are more interested in the
distinction of winning the book prize, but Walter Lewis pointed out that a cash prize for the article award may increase submissions to *TNM*. Michael Moir suggested a new Matthews Award with a cash prize for the best student essay published in *TNM*.

Ian Yeates expressed the need for cautious optimism. One home run does not make a successful season (as any Jays fan will attest), and the Society needs to enjoy successive annual surpluses before being confident in our financial position.

Thomas Malcomson moved, Walter Lewis seconded acceptance of the financial statements for the period ending 31 December 2018. Carried.

(Secretary’s note: the financial statements for the period ending 31 December 2018 were published in *Argonauta* 36:2 (Spring 2019), 36-37; [https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/argonauta/pdf/argo_36_2.pdf](https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/argonauta/pdf/argo_36_2.pdf). The Treasurer’s update regarding the Society’s financial situation as at 31 July 2019 is attached to the minutes of the Council meeting of 21 August 2019.)

**Membership Secretary’s Report**

Richard Gimblett presented Sam McLean’s report (see Attachment A). Membership levels remain steady with a higher number of paid renewals than at this time last year. The only significant change was the decline in renewals by members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH), which was not a surprise as NASOH members receive *TNM* without having to join the CNRS due to a publication subvention agreement between the societies.

Fraser McKee moved, Thomas Malcomson seconded acceptance of the Membership Secretary’s report. Carried.

**New Membership Category**

In February 2019, Sam McLean asked members to submit their views on the current state of the Society. Their feedback provided the basis for a report submitted to Council that highlighted the need to attract new and young members to ensure the Society’s sustainability. This group often faces financial challenges that make it difficult to participate in the Society until they are established in their occupations. While students are offered a reduced rate for membership, it was recommended that a new membership level be established for early career researchers and those dealing with precarious employment, such as sessional and part-time appointments at universities. Chris Madsen suggested that this category include recent graduates of masters’ programs, which would be more reflective of the Society’s membership.

It is moved by Thomas Malcomson, seconded by Ian Yeates that effective 1 January 2020 the Society establish a new membership category to be known as Early Career Researcher, which is defined as an individual within five years of graduation with a doctorate or master’s degree, or a sessional or part-time instructor who is seeking but has not yet found full-time employment in the field, and that the annual subscription rate for this category be $45 for members receiving a printed version of *The Northern Marine/Le marin du nord* and $25 for members receiving the digital version. Carried.
Publications
Roger Sarty presented his report as Chair of the Editorial Board regarding the Society’s publications, *Argonauta* and *TNM* (see Attachment B).

Roger Sarty moved, Ambjörn Adomeit seconded that the report be received. Carried.

Nominating Committee
Richard Gimblett moved, William Glover seconded that the following individuals be elected as officers and councillors at large of the Society for 2019-2020:
- President – Richard Gimblett, serving the third year of a three-year term
- First Vice-President – Michael Moir, serving the first year of a three-year term
- Second Vice-President – Thomas Malcomson, serving the first year of a three-year term
- Treasurer – Errolyn Humphreys
- Secretary – Michael Moir *pro tem*
- Membership Secretary – Sam McLean
- Communications – Winston “Kip” Scoville
- Councillors – Isabel Campbell, Richard Goette, Walter Lewis, David More, Jeff Noakes, Margaret Schotte, and Ian Yeates

Chris Madsen moved, Richard Goette seconded that Ambjörn Adomeit be elected as a Councillor.
Both motions carried.

Annual Conferences
In their closing remarks for the 2019 conference, Michael Moir and Chris Madsen expressed appreciation for the invaluable support of Michel Beaulieu and Lakehead University, Michael deJong of the Thunder Bay Museum Society, and the Prince Arthur Waterfront Hotel. Richard Gimblett moved, Walter Lewis seconded that the members thank Michael and Chris for organizing an intimate and rewarding gathering. Carried

2020 – North Vancouver, 13 to 15 August. Chris provided an overview of conference planning. The theme will feature working on the waterfront.

2021 – Victoria, 9 to 12 or 16 to 19 June. Barry Gough and Jan Drent head a growing organizing committee.

2022 – Kingston.

The members discussed potential sites for future conference, including Burlington, St. Catharines, and places along the Welland Canal.

Other Business
William Glover moved, Roger Sarty seconded that members of the Editorial Board whose terms expire in 2019 be reappointed for a further term. Carried.

Adjournment
There being no further business to conduct, the President asked for a motion to adjourn the Council meeting at 1150hrs. Walter Lewis so moved, Ian Yeates seconded.

Respectfully submitted
Michael Moir
Secretary

Attachment A:  2019 Membership Report
Attachment B:  Report for AGM, Editorial Board Chair
Attachment A

2019 Membership Report- Summer Council Meeting & Annual General Meeting

Part I: Membership Statistics and Discussion

As of 10 August 2019, the membership is as follows:

1) Domestic Memberships: 101 Members (103 in 2018)
   Renewed in 2019: 77  (At the previous AGM, 54 had renewed in June 2019)
   Last Renewed in 2018: 17
   Last Renewed in 2017: 7
   Last Renewed 2016 (and removed):10.

2) International Memberships: 15 (12 in 2018)
   Renewed 2019: 7
   Last Renewed 2018: 5
   Last Renewed 2017: 3
   Last Renewed 2016 (and removed): 2

3) NASOH Memberships: 13 (20 in 2018)
   Renewed 2019: 6
   Last Renewed 2018: 3
   Last Renewed 2017: 4
   Last Renewed 2016 (and removed): 7

Institutional Memberships: 40 (36 in 2018)
   Last Renewed 2019: 29
   Last Renewed 2018: 10
   Last Renewed 2017: 1
   Last Renewed 2016 (and removed): 1

Comp Memberships: 14 (15 in 2018)

Digital Memberships: 17 (16 Domestic & 1 International)

Student Memberships: 4 (4 Domestic, 2 in 2018)

   Generally speaking, there are reassuring trends here, although certain areas remain concerning. Although the “total” of individual domestic memberships is “down”, the number of members who have actually renewed in the current year is much higher, even given that we’re compiling this report several months later in the year. This number will be higher still as there are several members who are active but have not yet renewed for 2019. We believe that this increase is due to the increased effort (particularly through emails from the Society) to get members to renew. In a few cases, members who had not renewed for several years did so, and some even paid
the membership fees for past years they had missed. Several new individual domestic members also joined.

Last year’s big initiative was the creation of ‘Digital’ memberships. If we consider only the members who renewed in 2019, ‘Digital’ memberships are approximately 20% of the total. In some cases, those members have made an additional donation to the Society. It is likely that the number and percentage of these members will increase over time, especially as the Society’s involvement with York Digital Journals moves forward. However, the results so far are an indication that *The Northern Mariner*, as a package, is still attractive to members.

With institutional members, in one case an institutional member became an international individual member, and in another case a museum joined as an individual rather than as an institution for financial reasons. However, one lapsed institutional member has rejoined, and there is another additional new member. I believe that the Institutional members who have not yet renewed are waiting for 2019 issues to arrive before they do so. In some cases however, particularly those of Ontario and Canadian Government departments, it is unclear if they will be renewing their memberships.

International and NASOH members remain two areas which continue to decrease, and in each case the number of members renewing in 2019 represents less than half of the “total”. However, we do have a new international member and I believe that if the Society continues to support maritime studies through avenues such as awarding prizes, having an open-access journal, then we will continue to have both NASOH and International members for the near future.

The one aspect that is the most concerning is the continued inability to attract and maintain substantial numbers of ‘Student’ memberships – it seems that with a few exceptions, student members lapse after a year. This requires further attention is addressed in Part II.

**Part II: Discussion of Member Benefits and Other Developments**

Last year at the AGM, there was a robust discussion about communication between the Society and the membership. Over the past year, we have been using email more actively to communicate with the members, and so far the results include a higher number of members renewing in the current year. However, this is something that actively needs to be worked on, as response to communication other than prompts to renew membership remain low. For example, in February/March, only two members responded to the email survey asking about potential membership benefits. Further, although Rich has frequently used his ‘President’s Corner’ in *Argonauta* to raise issues for discussion, there are seldom responses. The CNRS will continue to use email and social media communications, including sending announcements and asking for feedback, and hope that more members will provide feedback.
We intend to continue our pattern of emails to the membership, and indeed increase it. We would ask that if members have announcements they would like to circulate to the membership (for example about events, lectures, talks, museum tours etc.), that they send an email with details, images (if possible) and links to a yet-to-be-designated email address so that they can be collected and included. Also, if possible, we would like to post those announcements on our social media accounts as well (Facebook https://www.facebook.com/cnrs.scrn and Twitter https://twitter.com/cannautressoc). On that note, we encourage our members to follow us on Facebook and Twitter, as that is where we often place announcements. For example, that is where we post the link to the “Article of the Week” from The Northern Mariner’s archives. Further, we have recently begun working with NASOH so that a list of books available to be reviewed for The Northern Mariner is posted on the NASOH website (https://nasoh.org/books-for-review).

In February/March, in addition to reaching out to CNRS members, we also surveyed online academic communities using Social Media to find out what students and other community members look for, and expect to get from Academic Societies when they are a member. This survey was mostly aimed at MA and PhD students, as well as recent graduates (who often leave their memberships after graduation).

One distinct answer was that societies should recognize that often choices about membership come down to cost. Accordingly, we are proposing a new category, Early Career Researchers be created for the 2020 membership year. More details will be discussed at another point during this meeting. We believe that creating this new membership category (and also, having this reflected in the registration options for our conferences) will make them more accessible and affordable.

The second major response was that people look for ‘mentoring’ opportunities. We hope in the future to be able to create paid internships. In the short term, we ask that any members who are interested in being mentors contact Sam McLean (sam.mclean@cnrs.scrn.org). Examples of mentoring could include sharing expertise about areas of history or archival sources. The intention would be to create a list of available expertise, which can then be shared, and to create connections between mentors and those looking for help.

The third major response was around member benefits. Due to the relatively low number of Digital memberships for 2019, there is still a significant demand for a printed edition of The Northern Mariner. Beyond that, the discussion around additional members’ benefits has focused on a) members-only events such as museum tours and b) social/Society events. Although often discussed, those who have been part of those discussions have not been able to personally organize events. Discussions have begun around an event for next year (a tour of an archaeological site in southern Ontario). However, it is time to fully engage the membership on this subject. Those who are interested in organizing events and opportunities should also get in contact with Sam McLean by email.

Submitted by Sam McLean
Attachment B

Report for AGM, Editorial Board Chair

Since the 2018 AGM, four quarterly issues of Argonauta have appeared on time, each with research notes and other special features, in addition to full accounts of the Society’s business, and notices about the conferences and activities of sister societies. The online format continues a success, with colour photographs, and the ability readily to expand the page count – to 64 pages in one case this past year – to accommodate all contributions. The most recent number brings the exciting news that Professor Erika Behrisch Elce, acting head of the Department of English, Culture, and Communication at Royal Military College, will be assuming the editor’s position in the summer of 2020. I can only repeat yet again our gratitude to the editorial team, Isabel Campbell, Colleen McKee, and Kip Scoville.

Other good news is that the final number of The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord for 2018 has appeared, thanks to exceptional efforts by the editorial team, Bill Glover and Walter Lewis. They have grappled with special challenges of diminishing submissions and difficulties in timely peer review, as has been regularly reported in the President’s Corner, and minutes of Executive Council in Argonauta. On a personal note (and as a former editor) I must add that despite these challenges the eight articles in the 2018 volume are all substantial and well up to the best standards of the journal. Book reviews, thanks to the indefatigable efforts of Faye Kert, Yves Tremblay, and Claire Phelan, continue to be an enormous strength of the journal, and assisted by enabling the production of a full number (Summer 2018) of reviews. Bill Glover, who agreed to serve a second term as editor in 2015, has now completed his commitment. Bill of course has been a mainstay of the Society and the driving force of the journal for too long, and in too many roles to offer proper thanks. Suffice to say we are all deeply in his debt. The search for a new editor continues, together with arrangements to produce the journal in an online and print-on-demand format through York University’s digital journals, again as has been reported in Argonauta.

Submitted by Roger Sarty
Guidelines for Authors

Argonauta follows The Chicago Manual of Style available at this link: http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html.

However, we utilize Canadian spelling rules, in lieu of American rules, unless referring to proper American names. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense are both correct.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Queenston
Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Châteauguay

Class of ship/submarine: Victoria-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)

Former HMCS Fraser rather than Ex-Fraser

Foreign ships and submarines:
USS Enterprise
HMS Victory
HMAS Canberra 3

Because Argonauta aims to publish articles that may be easily understood by senior high school students and other non-experts, we encourage authors to include general introductory context, suggestions for additional reading, and links to relevant websites. We publish memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone.

Although Argonauta is not formally peer-reviewed, we have two editors who carefully review and edit each and every article. For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to The Northern Mariner which is peer-reviewed and appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works.

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers, in the usual North American Academic manner described in the Chicago Manual which also provides guidance on using the Word insert function at this link: https://www.ivcc.edu/stylebooks/stylebook5.aspx?id=14646. For technical reasons, we prefer that authors use endnotes rather than footnotes. Typically an article in Argonauta will be 4 to 6 pages long, though we do accommodate longer,
informal pieces. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of emerging scholars. The Chicago Manual provides detailed instructions on the styles used.

All photos should be sent separately and accompanied by captions, describing the image, crediting the source, and letting us know where the original image is held. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, art work, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. The images should be named to reflect the order in which they are to appear in the text (Authornameimage1, Authornameimage2, Authornameimage3) and the text should be marked to show where the images are to be added (add Authornameimage 1 here, add Authornameimage2 here, etc.)

All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. Argonauta recommends that authors consult Royal Military College’s website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link: https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help were provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

All authors are asked to supply a short biography unless the text already contains these biographical details or the author is already well known to our readers.
CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord, a quarterly refereed open access journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the northern hemisphere. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, marine archaeology, maritime societies and the like.

- Argonauta, a quarterly on-line newsletter, which publishes articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.

- An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime-minded locations, where possible with our U.S. colleagues in the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH).

- Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at $70 for individuals, $25 for students, $45 for Early Career R or $95 for institutions. Please add $10 for international postage and handling. Members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) may join the Canadian Nautical Research Society for the reduced rate of $35 per year. Digital Membership does not include a printed copy of The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to take one of several other categories of patronage, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and all donations to the Society are automatically acknowledged with a tax receipt. Should you wish to renew on-line, go to: www.cnrs-scrn.org

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