

ARGONAUTA



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ARGONAUTA

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Editorial

by Isabel Campbell / Colleen McKee



Welcome readers to the spring issue of *Argonauta*. Please pour yourself a cup of tea or perhaps a glass of something stronger and sit down to savour this issue. We open with another humorous memoir from the pen of Willie Pullen, followed by an original research article about the Royal Canadian Navy and Narvik U-Boats by Derek Waller. Next, you'll find Alan Ruffman's piece about Canadian artist, Arthur Lismer, and Halifax. This latter piece contains a good mystery, especially aimed at naval members which may also challenge others who might be able to identify the ships depicted in a Lismer painting of Halifax harbour.

We also draw your attention to a new Francophone contributor to *Argonauta*, Clarence Lemay, a history student at the University of Ottawa, who worked as a cooperative student in the Directorate of History and Heritage. He offers us his analysis of comparative French and English Canadian newspaper coverage of the October 1962 Cuban Crisis. We are delighted to hear that Clarence intends to pursue graduate studies. We are confident that this is a first of many publications in his future, especially as his elegant French reads so very clearly.

Our own Richard Gimblett, organizer of this year's conference in Halifax from 9 to 12 August 2017, has sent along an impressive array of conference paper summaries along with more detailed programme information. This year's conference includes original, cutting-edge papers from international and Canadian scholars in French and English. For updates on conference arrangements, we encourage our readers to visit the Canadian Nautical Research Society website: http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/admin/conferences_e.html.

President Chris Madsen draws your attention to a fund-raising effort. See the President's Corner for more details on this effort. We also join Chris in applauding the outstanding work of Errolyn Humphries and Faye Kert.


We'd also like to draw your attention to our new author's guidelines for *Argonauta*. These guidelines should help save time in the preparation of submissions.

Finally, we'd like to remind all our readers that this is your quarterly publication. We welcome news about your on-going research, updates on book projects, announcements on publications, memoirs, descriptions of exhibits, and any other pieces you would like to share with our readers.

Fair winds,
Isabel and Colleen

President's Corner

by Chris Madsen



Starting in April 2017, the Canadian Nautical Research Society is launching a President's Appeal for the raising of funds from members, to ensure the charitable non-profit organization continues to be on a sound financial footing going into the future and to make possible a number of promising initiatives, focused specifically on enhancing our digital media offerings. These will keep the society relevant and attractive to a growing demographic of digital natives.

The last President's appeal was made over a decade ago when Bill Glover was president. In the intervening years, several close calls were averted by the generosity of our members. Currently, CNRS finances are in relatively good shape and membership numbers have held up, thanks mainly to a thrifty and frugal approach to activities, from production of the journal to the annual conferences, and a close watch on expenses. Other maritime and historical-focused organizations have not been so well-managed. We have benefited from the professional services of an outstanding secretary treasurer Errolyn Humphreys, with whom we remain indebted and owe a great deal of gratitude. She prepares financial statements, processes banking and credit card transactions for memberships and the conferences, reimburses Faye for mailing costs, and files regular returns with the Canada Revenue Agency. Errolyn and Faye are the unsung heroes of the CNRS. The President's Appeal, to reiterate, is not being made because the society is in dire financial straits, as it has been in the past. It is being made now, in order to allow the society greater room to grow and continue to encourage study, research, writing of maritime history in Canada, as a strong and vibrant organization.

Why does the CNRS need the money? Our non-profit organization is largely run by volunteers on a shoe-string budget. The margins between success and possible trouble are very tight from year to year. The society decided a few years ago to suspend cash payments for annual awards because the funds simply were unavailable. The decision was necessary at the time, though it would be nice to reinstate at least small bursaries to offset costs for student presentations and attendance at the annual conference. NASOH quite generously extends funds to students for its conference. Having more money in the bank would allow the CNRS to consider small financial subventions for awards and bursaries again, if that is what the membership wanted. During the past few years, the CNRS has not drawn on its reserve funds, which are a bit on the low-side for a society such as ours. These funds largely exist to guarantee publication of the print journal for the coming year, as a benefit of membership. Should Canada Post decide to raise significantly postage rates or printing costs increase, the society would be faced with devoting more resources and possibly raising the annual membership fee, to cover costs. A well-funded reserve provides a guard against

sudden unanticipated costs and smooths out hikes in the annual membership, which might turn off members or inhibit recruiting of new ones. The CNRS Council feels that the current membership fee levels are sustainable with existing costs and financial commitments, much of which is devoted to the production, publication, and distribution of the print journal.

The President's Appeal aims to bring in funds that will enable content from *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*, to be more fully accessible to a wider audience. Each member still receives four issues of the journal every year, as part of membership in the society. The CNRS is committed to a print journal as long as the funding and business model holds out and our arrangement with NASOH for co-publication stands. At the same time, more people are accessing articles and book reviews in digital and electronic formats by computer and mobile devices, and we cannot afford to miss out on opportunities to engage with a broader audience and draw in new members. EBSCO provides limited access to our offerings through libraries and universities, while the CNRS web-page archives back issues of the journal, thanks to the efforts and work of webmaster Paul Adamthwaite. This newsletter *Argonauta* has been digital for several years now. An exciting new initiative with York Digital Journals, hosted by York University in Toronto, will offer open access to digital copies of the journal articles and book reviews. *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* shall join a tier of nationally recognized academic journals in the arts and social sciences. While the costs once in operation are minimal, special project work is needed to prepare metadata and abstracts for the mounting of materials, and that work will require a budget and financial resources to come from somewhere. Better links and integration with content in social media are also beneficial. Having a secure financial base makes a print journal, on which a digital footprint can be enhanced, possible and sustainable.

I am near the end of a three year term as president, when I hand over to a new one in August in Halifax. I am recommending that the next president continue the President's Appeal until the end of the calendar year. To launch the President's Appeal, I am committing to a personal donation of \$500. It is up to individual members whether they want to participate in the President's Appeal and the extent of their generosity by way of a dollar amount. Whether large or small, all funds will be put directly into the activities of the society. As added incentive, donations above certain amounts are eligible for charitable receipts for income tax purposes if that enters into your calculations.

Please make the CNRS part of your giving and look favourably upon this appeal for funds. Donations can be made by cheque or credit card. The rigorous study and research of maritime history in Canada and North America is worth every dollar.

Chris Madsen
North Vancouver and Toronto

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Online donations may be made on the CNRS membership page at http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/membership/memb_signup_e.html



We encourage you to join us on facebook and twitter where we post links to interesting articles and announcements from around the internet. Our social media channels are where you will find time sensitive notices that are not suitable for publishing here in the *Argonauta*.

Public Speaking

by William Pullen



CCGS *Daring*, published courtesy of Mac MacKay

In the mid-1970s, I joined CCGS *Daring* as a newly-qualified Third Officer. *Daring's* job was Search and Rescue (SAR) patrol off southwestern Nova Scotia. As well as learning my profession, my service in her was an excellent opportunity to perfect my public speaking style.

Daring (ex-RCMP Wood MP17) was built by Davie Shipbuilding and Repair in Lauzon, Quebec and launched 22 October 1957. As an RCMP vessel, she was tasked with police patrol on the Atlantic coast in winter and in the Canadian Arctic in summer. She was transferred to the Coast Guard in 1970 and employed in SAR duties, based in Dartmouth and occasionally Sydney, N.S.

The *Daring* was long and narrow and quite lively. The officer's accommodation was aft, and meant the journey from one's cabin to the Bridge required good timing as she sometimes rolled and scooped up ice-cold salt water in the outside passageways along the waist of the ship. True, there was a heavy-weather route that began in the engine room and for some reason passed through the Officer's Shower, but after one encounter with a portly, pink and glistening occupant, all lathered up in suds and singing loudly, our delicate sensitivities caused us to think of it as an *in-extremis* option.

Close to the top of *Daring's* record of exemplary service is the tanker *Arhon* incident, when she stood by during salvage operations. In late January 1982, this fully loaded 45,000 GRT ship broke down some distance north of the east end of Sable Island and began to drift toward the sand bar that runs off the Island's east end.

At the time, there was a drill rig positioned off the eastern end of the Island, but south of the sand bar. The weather was atrocious and there was real concern that the tanker would move over the bar and collide with the rig. The ship had both anchors down while waiting for tugs to arrive, but was dragging her anchors toward the sand bar. Watching all this from the relative safety of the Marine Emergencies Group at headquarters in Ottawa, I recall feeling for my shipmates who were standing by the scene in *Daring*.

My service in *Daring* was well before the *Arhon* incident and much more hum-drum. *Daring* was mainly employed in SAR work off the south coast of Nova Scotia. For the most part, it was very routine work and so we were glad to receive orders to go into a historic seaport on the south coast of Nova Scotia, to act as Guard Ship for the annual fisherman's exposition. This exhibition is well known. Thousands of tourists gather for the festivities - scallop shucking, wire splicing, and an exhibition of enormous fish lined up on slabs of ice, like visiting day at the fisherman's mortuary.



CCGS *Daring* with the tanker *Arhon* in the background in Halifax Harbour, January 1982

I'm sure we all know the UNESCO World-Heritage Site where this exhibition takes place, but to fix it in the reader's mind's eye, the historic seaport in question is a largish bay running roughly east to west. The historic town lies on a steep hill along the northern side of the harbour and, at the water's edge, there are numerous wharfs. *Daring* was secured alongside one and we commenced acting as a Guard Ship, whatever that meant.

As I recall, there were mixed views about the assignment. Some saw it as a chance for even greater debauchery, others as a cross one had to bear. In any event, it was better than being sent to Shelburne, further along the coast. I'm sure it is now much improved, but back then we regarded Shelburne as a place where the town police and toughs tended to beat on you and ask questions later.

A main attraction of the exhibition was the International Dory Race, an event of some cultural significance. Tourists were encouraged, herded is more like it, out onto the wharfs that lined the northern edge of the harbour, to see and cheer as mighty men from Nova Scotia and Massachusetts rowed against each other in two dories along an elliptical course in front of the wharves.

The start and finish line ran from the schooner *Bluenose II*, lying to an anchor off one of the wharfs at the western end of the harbour. To keep everyone fully informed of what was happening a crude – but very powerful sound system – had been rigged up with the business end controlled from the *Bluenose II*. Blasting out sound through speakers at the ends of wharves, it was certainly an effective way of getting the word

out and I am sure they heard what followed in Halifax, some 100 miles to the east. To keep the assembled host calm and entertained until the race started, the powers-that-be had arranged for a demonstration of SAR equipment. The plan was that a SAR aircraft would overfly the harbour and para-drop some equipment and perhaps shoot off a flare or two. If it all worked as planned, people would know that if they too called for help in their little canoe, out of the sky would come hurtling a fibreglass canister containing a rubber raft, a solar still, and some inedible chocolate.

Now, all this paraphernalia could not be properly understood without a voice-over, so the call went out for someone with public speaking abilities and maritime qualifications. It was my bad luck to be correcting charts when the call came in, and the Big Tuna (*Daring's* Captain) looked at me and said, "Mr Pullen, go out onto that schooner and tell these people what we do".

Right.

This was obviously a largish mission and to consider the full scope of such a mandate I retired to my cabin to consult with Captain Morgan, with whom some readers may be familiar. If not, then I can tell you that the Captain is a true friend of mariners, comes in either light, amber, or dark varieties and can pack a punch when consumed neat. This task was clearly a moment that called for neat, and plenty of it.

I had several lengthy consultations with the Captain, preparing for what looked like arduous duty ahead. The long and the short of it was that when it came time to fulfill my mandate, I was influenced by things other than a natural and complete desire to do my duty. I'm sure you will understand when I say that I boarded the boat taking me out to the *Bluenose II* with a somewhat more than jaunty air.

Well, I got out to the *Bluenose II* and discovered the assembled elected and appointed officials of the town, plus various other lesser political lights, all engaged in loud and raucous conversation. And they were all much farther down the Road to Bliss than I was. In fact, here was a group of people who had been consuming Irish Coffee (with a lot more Irish than Coffee) since early morning and the beneficial medicinal effects were clear. Some had begun to jibber and rave.

I felt completely at home and when one of the crew thrust a mug of steaming lava into my hand, I knew I was among kindred souls. I drank deeply and admired the splendid pastoral vista before me: the shining sun, the blue sea, the crowds on the wharfs, the light summer breezes and the mellifluous hum of conversation amongst the Great and the Good. Could it get any better?

Under a bright blue sky, the senior elected official was haranguing the assembled crowd via a microphone powered by a massive electrical device with many lights and dials, emitting occasional puffs of blue smoke and that ghastly electric smell of burning shellac. From it ran a cable, over the side of the ship and under the waves to the speakers on the wharves. At well over safe industrial maximums, his voice boomed off the hills above the harbour and echoed down the Bay toward Spain.

As he droned on about the glories of the past, one could hear the low throb of aircraft engines in the distance as the SAR aircraft approached. I knew that my moment of glory was fast approaching. I had a final haul on my Irish coffee and felt a sympathetic little detonation of heat in my stomach, not knowing that it was to be the last semi-normal event. Somewhere, someone had their finger on the Fool Button.

As the aircraft circled, the senior elected official did a neat segue into a brief history of SAR. Turning to me, he announced to the crowd that he was now going to turn the microphone over to this fine young officer who would tell the crowd what was about to happen. Nodding and leering at me through rum-reddened eyes, he passed me the microphone and stood back expectantly.

As he handed me the microphone, I looked down and noted with more than passing academic interest that I was standing in a small pool of water. And as my hand closed around the handle of the open microphone I received something like 400 or so volts, amps or joules or whatever, direct from that massive device. My fist locked around the handle in a death grip, and I roared out at the top of my lungs, "*Holy S**t...!*"

Now, you must understand that every word spoken into that damned microphone was distributed nearly directly to the many people, families, mothers, sons and daughters, waiting on those wharves for the dory race to begin. And now who knows what sort of awful hellish nonsense had broken out on the *Bluenose II*. First, some fool rambling on about iron ships and wooden men, and now this terrible oath, like the voice of doom itself, roaring out of the ship, and sweeping across the harbour like a Pentecostal Wind.

Young mothers with their babies, waiting patiently on the wharves for a simple cultural rite were now standing blasted, like survivors of a terrible visitation. Old men looked up and crossed themselves, certain the fifth horseman was upon the harbour. The crews of the two dories waiting for the race to start swallowed their chewing tobacco, and in the sky, far above, a fibreglass canister descended slowly followed by a single red flare.

The senior elected official goggled at me. Members of his entourage backed away from me as if I had the plague. I had blown a fuse in the device, and there was now dead silence, broken only by the mocking cries of seagulls, wheeling like vultures overhead. I handed the microphone to a shocked bystander and went below in search of more Captain Morgan. It seemed the only reasonable thing to do.

Never talk to people when standing in a pool of water.

The Royal Canadian Navy and the Narvik U-Boats - May 1945

by Air Commodore Derek Waller RAF (Rtd)

“Ninth [Canadian] Escort Group consisting of Matane, Loch Elvie, St Pierre, Monnow and Nene slipped from Lisahally and proceeded to sea” (10 May, 2100).¹

“Ninth Escort Group ordered by D.17 to detach and proceed with all dispatch to intercept German Convoy reported proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim”. (16 May, 1415).¹

On 17 May 1945 the 9th (Canadian) Escort Group (9 EG), commanded by Commander A F C (Frank) Layard, RN, who was on loan to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), intercepted 15 U-Boats in Vestfiord off northern Norway nine days after the war had ended, and thus played a major part in a long-disputed story about exactly where and when these U-Boats surrendered to the Allies. Was it in Narvik on 9 May, was it at sea in Vestfiord to 9 EG on 17 May, or was it in Loch Eriboll in northern Scotland after they arrived there on 19 May escorted by 9 EG?

In early May 1945 there were about 85,000 German Naval personnel stationed in Norway, as well as many Kriegsmarine surface ships and 87 U-Boats, and Admiral Donitz instructed General Franz Bohme, the German Commander-in-Chief Norway, that he was to follow to the letter the Allied capitulation plans as set out in ‘The Act of Military Surrender’, viz:

We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea and in the air who are at this date under German control.

The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment.²

As a result General Bohme made a radio broadcast on 7 May from his Headquarters at Lillehammer, north of Oslo, saying that all the German forces in Norway were to obey Allied orders without dispute.

The Allies, particularly the British, had well established plans in place for the re-occupation of Norway in the event of a German capitulation. However, as there were no Allied forces on the ground in Norway on 7 May, one of the first British actions was to dispatch a small Disarmament Party from the UK to Norway, which arrived in Oslo on the afternoon of 8 May.

This joint-service party included a number of ‘Disarmament Unit Commanders’, as well as three Norwegian Army District Commanders, and they proceeded to pre-planned geographic zones in Norway on the morning of 9 May. Thereafter,

responsibility for the successful execution of the surrender orders in each zone was initiated by these Unit Commanders in co-operation with the Norwegian District Commanders. The detailed work was carried out by a number of 'Disarmament Heralds', whose job was to work with the German authorities throughout Norway in order to implement the first stages of the surrender process.

The Allied surrender instructions included the '*Special Orders by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force to the German High Command relating to Naval Forces*'. These reinforced the words in the '*Act of Military Surrender*' and, with some duplication, stated that:

The German High Command will forthwith issue categorical directions that no ship [or] vessel ... of any description is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment.

All warships ... in harbours are to remain in harbour pending further directions from the Allied Representatives.

All warships ... in port ... will immediately train all weapons fore and aft. All torpedo tubes will be unloaded and breech blocks will be removed from all guns. All warships ... in German or German-controlled harbours will immediately land and store in safety all ammunition, warheads and other explosives.²

Also, on the morning of 8 May the German Naval War Staff in Flensburg, Germany, made it clear to the Head of the Kriegsmarine in Norway, Admiral Theodor Krancke, that he was responsible for the notification of the conditions of surrender to all relevant naval organisations in Norway, including the Admiral Commanding U-Boats. Thus Admiral Krancke and his staff were very well aware of the need to cooperate fully with the Disarmament Heralds, as well as with the Allied Naval representatives when they arrived.

The naval surrender process itself began on 9 May but, in view of the large number of U-Boats and other German naval vessels in Norwegian waters and ports, the planned naval organisation was inadequate to deal with the task. As a result, the local German Navy authorities in Norway were ordered to follow the surrender and disarmament instructions issued by the Allies, which would be passed on by the Kriegsmarine HQ in Oslo. This facilitated the prompt and successful surrender of all the U-Boats in Norwegian ports on 9 May.

As part of the initial surrender arrangements, and before the full extent of German co-operation was generally known, Admiral Krancke sent a German Naval delegation to Rosyth in Scotland, arriving there on 11 May. The delegation was led by Captain Krueger, and whilst he was unable to provide details about all the U-Boats and their specific locations, he was able to confirm that:

The U-Boats have orders to surface and surrender.³

He was also able to confirm that the Kriegsmarine in Norway was willing to assist in carrying out the surrender terms that had been laid down by the Allies.

As well as the 87 U-Boats which surrendered in Norwegian ports on 9 May, a

further nine surrendered from sea - five on 9 May, one on 10 May, one on 12 May, one on 14 May and one on 15 May - making a total of 96:

In port:	Bergen	28
	Kristiansand (S)	17
	Trondheim	13
	Narvik	12
	Holmestrand (Horten)	10
	Stavanger	7
From sea:	Bergen	4
	Narvik	3
	Stavanger	2

There is little doubt that the surrender of the U-Boats in Norway was accomplished astonishingly smoothly. Germany had capitulated on 7 May, the German High Command had issued the appropriate surrender orders on 8 May and, although there were few Allied forces to whom to surrender, the U-Boat COs and their crews laid down their arms on 9 May with virtually no arguments whatsoever. No U-Boats were scuttled, no COs tried to escape, and there was no serious trouble. Of the nine U-Boats that surrendered from sea on or after 9 May, some were routinely returning to base after their last operational patrols, some were obeying Donitz' *'cease operations and return to Norway'* instruction of 4 May, whilst others arrived in ignorance of the capitulation, having failed to receive any of the surrender messages.

Whilst action was underway to establish the exact number of U-Boats in each of the Norwegian ports, there was considerable surprise and concern when the Royal Norwegian Navy destroyer HNoMS *Stord*, which was transporting the Norwegian Navy's Rear Admiral E C Danielsen to Tromso in north Norway, sighted a convoy of German naval vessels at sea in Vestfjord early in the morning on 16 May. The convoy included 15 U-Boats, which were being moved to Trondheim from Narvik where they had surrendered either in port or from sea on 9 May.

The 12 U-Boats already in port at Narvik on 9 May were *U-294, U-295, U-312, U-313, U-363, U-427, U-481, U-668, U-716, U-968, U-997* and *U-1165*, and the three that had arrived from sea during the morning were *U-278, U-318* and *U-992*. However, there were no Allied forces in Narvik at that time, and the surrender arrangements for all the German naval vessels there were therefore implemented by the German Navy commander in Narvik, Captain Reinhard (Teddy) Suhren, who was Captain (U/B) Northern Waters, acting under the orders of the Kriegsmarine's 'Naval Chief Command Norway' (NCCN), which was itself acting under Allied orders.

Some of the U-Boat COs in the Northern Waters area (including Zoller in *U-315*, Will in *U-318* and Falke in *U-992*) had initially been inclined to continue the war alone or to escape rather than to obey the surrender instructions. However Captain Suhren would tolerate no such thoughts or actions by anyone under his command, and his staff quickly made it very clear to all the U-Boat COs in Narvik that it was their duty to co-operate with the Allies without demure.⁴

Nevertheless, after completing the surrender instructions, Suhren became worried about the security situation in Narvik, with his description of the local situation being that:

The German fleet was widely scattered at the time, and as part of the surrender process the Allies gave orders for [the vessels] to meet at fixed collection points and to be handed over there. We in Narvik felt that we were situated a bit too close to Murmansk, and that the Soviets might decide to occupy Narvik and take us over too. As a precaution I appealed to [the] Allied Command and suggested that as regards getting all the submarines together, we could bring them and all their attendant ships to Trondheim.⁵

Thus, on 11 May, with Allied permission, the NCCN staff approved Suhren's proposal to transfer the U-Boats and their supporting vessels from Narvik southwards to Trondheim. In the meantime, the 15 U-boats were moved to an anchorage in Skjomenfjord (30 miles south of Narvik) on 12 May, partly to avoid conflicts with Norwegian and other forces, including ex-POWs.

This decision to allow the U-Boats in Narvik to move to Trondheim was not surprising, as the Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief Rosyth had already recommended to the Admiralty on 9 May that:

All the U-Boats [in Norway] should be ordered to concentrate in ports for which NOICs [Naval Officers in Charge] are planned, i.e. Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Tromsø⁶

Captain Suhren then signaled NCCN on 13 May saying:

In accordance with Naval Chief Command Norway's message of 11 May intend to transfer on 13 May eight U-Boats of the 13th U/B Flotilla and seven U-Boats of the 14th U/B Flotilla to Trondheim. Accommodation in Narvik has so far been almost exclusively afloat, which can no longer be reckoned with. Accommodation ashore in the Narvik area is impossible owing to the general lack of space, whereas in Trondheim the 13th Flotilla's Depot can accommodate Captain (U/B) Northern Waters' entire unit.⁷

As a result, all the U-Boats at Narvik/Skjomenfjord were directed to transfer to Trondheim, with Suhren advising at 1155 on 15 May:

With the consent of the Allied Commission in Oslo,[and] in accordance with Naval Chief Command Norway's [instructions], Captain (U/B) Northern Waters' unit will leave Narvik at 2000 hours on 15 May 1945 with the 14th Flotilla (15 U-Boats) [in an] open water passage at 10 knots to Trondheim. All vessels will fly a black flag at the starboard yard..⁷

And, at 2103 a further message was sent which advised NCCN:

Captain U/B's unit with 'Grille', 'Huascaran', 'Kamerun', 'Stella Polaris', 'Kaernten' [and the U-Boats] U-278, U-294, U-295, U-312, U-313, U-318, U-363,

U-427, U-481, U-668, U-716, U-968, U-992, U-997 and U-1165 left Narvik at 2000 hours for transfer passage to Trondheim by outer route.⁸

'Grille' was Hitler's former yacht, 'Huascarán' was a submarine depot ship, 'Kamerun' was a minelayer, 'Stella Polaris' was an accommodation vessel, and 'Kaernten' was a naval tanker. The group, under the overall command of Captain Suhren in 'Grille', sailed south, with the 15 U-Boats on the surface in accordance with the agreed surrender arrangements. But before doing so, and in accordance with the Allied surrender terms, all ammunition and mines had been landed, and all torpedoes had been rendered harmless.

However, on 16 May, the circumstances for the convoy changed dramatically when HNoMS *Stord* had been surprised to sight the German convoy in Vestfjord en route from Narvik to Trondheim. At that stage, the UK naval authorities in London knew nothing whatsoever about the surrender arrangements for these 15 U-Boats and, as recorded in the Admiralty War Diary for May 1945, a flurry of signal messages followed:

160819 - Stord to Flag Officer Norway: *Have met German convoy ... in Vestfjord ...they say they are sailing from Narvik to Trondheim. Is this in order?*

161130 - Assistant Chief of Naval Staff to Flag Officer Norway: *Admiralty is taking action on Stord's [message].*

161200 - Assistant Chief of Naval Staff to Stord: *U-Boats are to be escorted ... to Loch Eriboll.*

161340 - Flag Officer Norway to Stord: *[Your 160819] Yes, German submarines have been in touch with Trondheim.*

170211 - Assistant Chief of Naval Staff to Flag Officer Norway: *Request report whether convoy referred to in Stord's [message] was ordered by you to sail from Narvik to Trondheim or whether it sailed under German orders. This is not clear from your 161340.*

191306 - Flag Officer Norway to Admiralty: *Permission for German Naval Command to sail convoy from Narvik to Trondheim was granted by Disarmament Heralds who preceded Joint Force Commanders to Norway. Reason for request was shortage of stores and of accommodation for personnel landed after disarmament at Narvik.⁹*

At the same time, the last Arctic convoy, JW 67, which was on passage to Murmansk was in the area, and so Commander Frank Layard's 9th (Canadian) Escort Group, comprising HMCS *Matane*, HMCS *Loch Alvie*, HMCS *Nene*, HMCS *Monnow* and HMCS *St Pierre*, was detached from the convoy in order to intercept the U-Boats. Also, as discussions were underway with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington about a British proposal to transfer all the seaworthy U-Boats in Norway to the United Kingdom, the Admiralty took an immediate unilateral decision that the U-Boats should be moved to Loch Eriboll in north-west Scotland which was the main designated reception anchorage for U-Boats surrendering from sea in the vicinity of the UK.

The 9th Escort Group sighted the German convoy off the Norwegian coast at 0445 on the morning on 17 May, and a 3-man boarding party from HMCS *Matane* was put aboard '*Grille*' an hour later. The first action of the Boarding Officer, Lt John J Coates, RCNVR, was to ask Captain Suhren if he had read and understood the terms of surrender and if his U-Boat commanders also understood these terms. In response Suhren confirmed that all ammunition had been landed, no mines were carried, the pistols had been removed from all torpedoes and that the COs of the U-Boats understood and would comply with the terms of the surrender.

At the same time, the other RCN escort vessels were ordered to approach the two lines of U-Boats to ascertain whether or not they had complied with the surrender terms. As a result, and as described by Commander Layard in his subsequent Report of Proceedings (RoP):

*Boats were lowered and several U-Boats were boarded and the reports which I received satisfied me that the surrender terms had been complied with and that we were unlikely to experience any trouble or hostilities.*¹

In the meantime on board '*Grille*', Captain Suhren who was already operating under Allied orders to move the 15 U-Boats from Narvik to Trondheim, was having some difficulty in accepting the new instruction that the U-Boats were to be diverted to Loch Eriboll instead of continuing to Trondheim. As recorded in 9 EG's RoP:

*He explained that his reluctance was due to the fact that he was proceeding to Trondheim under German High Command orders in co-operation with the Allied High Command. [However] he was informed that he was to comply with all orders given by my Boarding Officer [and that] his High Command would be informed, if necessary, by the Allied High Command. At that, he surrendered his command of the U-Boats and ordered [the CO of] U-278 to assume command under Senior Officer 9EG, forming up and proceeding in accordance with instructions.*¹

Thus, Commander Layard advised the Admiralty at 0720 on 17 May:

*Have ordered five merchant ships to proceed to Trondheim and have started for Loch Eriboll with the following German U-Boats: U-278, U-294, U-295, U-312, U-313, U-318, U-363, U-427, U-481, U-668, U-716, U-968, U-992, U-997 and U-1165.*¹

Similarly, Captain Suhren, who was allowed to continue to Trondheim in '*Grille*', sent a message to NCCN and BdU (Ops) saying:

*At 0700 hours on 17 May 15 U-Boats handed over to British corvette formation under the command of K.444 [HMCS *Matane*] for passage to Scotland.*⁸

Thereafter, the 15 U-Boats were ordered to form up and proceed in two columns towards the Shetlands, and thence to Loch Eriboll. U-278 had been nominated as the lead U-Boat, and one officer, Lt J Mallett, RCNVR, and two Canadian crewmen were transferred to it from HMCS *Loch Alvie* for the duration of the passage.

The passage to Loch Eriboll was relatively uneventful, though some bad weather was encountered. Also, two of the U-Boats (*U-295* and *U-312*) needed to refuel in Lerwick in the Shetland Islands. However, escorted by HMCS *St Pierre*, they then caught up with the convoy, and all 15 of the U-Boats ex-Narvik arrived off Loch Eriboll at 1915 in the evening of 19 May where they were met by ships of the 21st Escort Group (21 EG) before moving into the anchorage for initial processing.

At 1400 on the same day, the Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches ordered the 30th Escort Group (30 EG), comprising HMS *Pevensey Castle*, HMS *Caistor Castle*, HMS *Launceston Castle* and HMS *Kenilworth Castle*, to move from Lough Foyle in Northern Ireland to Loch Eriboll to assist 21 EG with the processing arrangements. 30 EG arrived in Loch Eriboll in the late morning of 20 May and immediately helped to provide armed guards on the U-Boats.

After that, all the ex-Narvik U-boats were quickly transferred to Loch Alsh, near Skye in western Scotland, sailing in three separate batches of five. The first batch comprised *U-294*, *U-481*, *U-716*, *U-968* and *U-997*, and they were escorted by from Loch Eriboll by four of the ships from 9 EG (HMCS *Matane*, HMCS *Loch Alvie*, HMCS *Nene* and HMCS *Monnow*) on 20 May. In the meantime, the fifth ship in 9 EG, HMCS *St Pierre*, had been sent to Greenock in order to disembark the Norwegian passengers that 9 EG had originally been transporting to Russia before it was diverted to Vestfiord.

The second batch comprising *U-278*, *U-427*, *U-668*, *U-992* and *U-1165* left Loch Eriboll on 21 May escorted by two ships from 21 EG (HMS *Conn* and HMS *Fitzroy*) and one from 30 EG (HMS *Caistor Castle*), and the third batch comprising *U-295*, *U-312*, *U-313*, *U-318* and *U-363* escorted by three ships from 21 EG (HMS *Rupert*, HMS *Deane* and HMS *Byron*) also left Loch Eriboll on 21 May.

The first batch of five U-Boats escorted by 9 EG arrived at Loch Alsh on 21 May, and the second and third batches arrived on 22 May, where they were all processed by ships of the 5th Escort Group (5 EG), with their remaining torpedoes being unloaded and most of the German crews being taken into captivity. Thereafter, all 15 of the ex-Narvik U-Boats were transferred to Lisahally in Northern Ireland during the next few days for laying-up prior to decisions being made about their final disposal.

Once their work at Loch Alsh was finished 9 EG departed for Londonderry on 21 May after what was its final (and successful) war-related operation prior to being disbanded, but not without some unfortunate criticism from the resident NOIC, Captain Brian Gourley, RN who sent a message to Commodore (D), Western Approaches, Commodore G W G (Shrimp) Simpson, RN, in Londonderry on 21 May saying:

*Search of German prisoners has revealed following evidence of fraternization between U-Boat crews and armed guards of 9 EG on passage from Loch Eriboll. Canadian personnel badges, English money, and packets of Eire butter, English and Canadian cigarettes*¹

There was no love lost between Commander Layard and Captain Gourley, as is reflected in a comment in the former's diary entry for 21 May, viz:

Who should come on board just before we sailed but Mr. Bloody Brian Gourlay now Captain NOIC Loch Alsh. He was my Captain at the end of the last war in the Sea Bear.¹⁰

They had both served in the destroyer HMS *Sea Bear* in late 1918 when, as a Lt Cdr, Brian Gourlay had been an extremely harsh and unpopular captain, and there were clearly still a few issues to settle between them. As it happened, Commander Layard could see both sides of the problem, as was reflected in the comments in his diary entry, also on 21 May, which recorded that:

*How the hell can you help fraternization if you berth U-Boats alongside ships for 24 hours. As a matter of fact it was very bad in this ship [HMCS *Matane*] and I had to get the Captain to do something about it.¹⁰*

Although, in the end he got no sympathy from Commodore Simpson, Commander Layard also highlighted the problem in his 9 EG RoP saying:

With reference to NOIC Loch Alsh's signal, the evidence of fraternization is much regretted and shows clearly a great lack of supervision on the part of certain ships. It is submitted, however, that if boats are berthed alongside ships and if it is quite apparent that, by their attitude the German crews are accepting the terms of surrender willingly and without question, it is indeed difficult to prevent English or Canadian personnel from displaying those small acts of kindness and goodwill which is our National characteristic.¹

Typically, his final comment was;

To the last we [the 9th (Canadian) EG] were true to form. Never out of trouble.¹⁰

At the very start of his naval career Commander Layard had witnessed the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1918 and, earlier in May 1945 when 9 EG had sighted one of the surrendering U-Boats on its way into Loch Eriboll, he had written in his diary that he could not help being sorry for the U-Boat crews, observing that defeat and surrender must be very bitter. So it was not surprising that he had some private sympathy with the actions of some of his Royal Canadian Navy crews, no matter that they were disobeying Royal Navy orders.

Arundel, West Sussex, UK

January 2017

Specific Sources:

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3. TNA Kew, ADM 1/18665 - Minutes of Meeting in Rosyth on 11 May 1945 with German Naval Officers
4. Cuxhaven U-Boat Museum and Archive, Germany - Note re U-318.
5. Teddy Suhren: "Ace of Aces - Memoirs of a U-Boat Rebel" (Chatham Publishing 2005) – page 223
6. TNA Kew, ADM 199/2317, Admiralty War Diary - 1 to 15 May 1945
7. TNA Kew, HW 18/222 – German Naval Messages, 8 to 15 May 1945
8. TNA Kew, HW 18/223 – German Naval Messages, 15 to 20 May 1945
9. TNA Kew, ADM 199/2318, Admiralty War Diary - 16 to 31 May 1945
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Halifax Harbour – Time of War c. 1917

by
Alan Ruffman
Honourary Research Associate
Department of Earth Sciences
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4R2



Arthur Lismer, *Halifax Harbour - Time of War c. 1917*
Oil on canvas, conserved on aluminum 102.5cm × 130cm
Collection of the Dalhousie Art Gallery, gift of the artist, 1956
Used by permission Dalhousie Art Museum

Arthur Lismer was Principal of the Victoria School of Art and Design from the late Summer of 1916 to the end of August 1919. Halifax offered him his first real teaching job, and allowed him to escape the employ of the Grip Ltd. and later Rous & Mann, Limited in Toronto. In return, Lismer built up the Victoria's stagnant low student population, added courses and part-time teachers, and sponsored and encouraged visiting exhibitions to use the modest facilities of the Nova Scotia Museum of Fine Arts in the upper floor of the VSAD at the southwest corner of George Street and Argyle Street in downtown Halifax. By the time Lismer left for his next teaching position at the Ontario College of Art (OCA) in August 1919, the Nova Scotia Museum of Fine Arts could hold its head higher as Lismer had persuaded its Board to add to its once-meager collection, and he had had a series of public exhibitions sponsored in part by the National Gallery of Canada.

Lismer and his School lived through the Thursday, December 6, 1917 explosion of the *Mont-Blanc*. The two visiting exhibitions that had opened on Thursday evening, November 29, 1917 were not so lucky, and were quite disrupted by broken frames and glass. Both were packed up and sent back to their Ottawa and Toronto sponsors. On June 8, 1918 Lismer was appointed as a War Artist on the home front, and the Canadian War Museum holds a number of these pieces including the iconic *Olympic With Returned Soldiers 1918-1919* that shows *Olympic* (“*Old Reliable*”) landing the first lot of almost 5,000 returned soldiers at Pier 2 in Halifax on December 14, 1918 (Canadian War Museum Object No. 19710261-0343).

Lismer’s interest in the Harbour’s wartime activities had been with him for some time, and his daily commute from Bedford, Nova Scotia, to the Victoria School took him by train each day along the shore of the Bedford Basin where he looked out on a whole variety of vessels anchored in all parts of the Basin. These vessels were waiting their turn to lift their anchor and to join the relative safety of a convoy for the trip across the isolated North Atlantic to keep the First World War effort supplied with new recruits, munitions, horses and military supplies.

In 1982-83 Ms. Gemey Kelly curated a reputation-making show “Arthur Lismer Nova Scotia, 1916-1919” that travelled from its home in Halifax to Fredericton, St. John’s, and ended in Charlottetown – all four Atlantic Provinces. Gemey Kelly’s 1982 catalogue has survived as a classic review of Lismer’s time in Halifax, and three portions transcribed below detail what we know of Lismer’s painting *Halifax Harbour – Time of War c. 1917*:

Lismer had discovered soon after his arrival in Halifax that it was impossible to draw or sketch anywhere near the waterfront area or at any land fortifications, and he confessed to Eric Brown of the National Gallery of Canada that on one occasion he had been arrested attempting to do so. (Lismer to Brown, 28 January [1917], file copy in the National Gallery of Canada). Feeling completely hamstrung at being unable to record the activity taking place all around him, he wrote Brown just after the explosion to ask if he might somehow obtain permission to sketch in the restricted areas. Without this, he wrote, “it is absolutely impossible to make sketches, it is forbidden strictly and almost useless.” (Lismer to Brown, 12 January 1918, National Gallery of Canada). Even later when he was officially commissioned by the War Records and armed with special permits for all military areas, Lismer continued to be harassed and reported by the public. He complained, though somewhat forgivingly, that ‘the public make it a little unpleasant occasionally, they don’t understand. One of the local papers is lashing up an argument against landscape painters having access to docks etc. & I have been frequently reported as a suitable subject for internment. People who were previously cordial to me have discovered that I’m a suspicious character.’ (Lismer to Brown, 25 August 1918, National Gallery of Canada). [p. 20, col. 1]

Regardless of these contingencies, Lismer did produce at least two large paintings of war subjects before he was formally commissioned as a War Artist. *Halifax Harbour – Time Of War* was perhaps the first large war subject that Lismer tackled, but it was not a documentary treatment of the theme. The work depicts one of the more glorious sights of war – a large troopship camouflaged in ‘dazzle’ paint, set in a

soft light diffused by clouds and smoke. Fully four-fifths of the painting is sky. This interest in sky and cloud formations derived from Lismer's study of Constable and from a 19th century romantic tradition of landscape painting. He continued over the next few years to draw a very low horizon line in many of his works, but gradually moved it higher as he became less interested in panorama and more involved with the details and forms of the scene.[p. 20, cols. 1-2]

Lismer exhibited *Halifax Harbour – Time Of War* at the spring joint RCA/OSA exhibition, just before he was commissioned by the War Records office in June 1918. *Winter Camouflage*, most likely done over the winter of 1917-18, was also submitted to the exhibition. ... In both these works, Lismer displays a fascination for the dazzle painting on the sides of the large troopships and employs it as an integral part of the design. Later, in the larger War Records painting *Convoy in Bedford Basin* he uses the variations of the colour and the markings of the dazzle to unify the entire canvas. [p. 20, col. 2]

Lismer did numerous sketches of vessels, often dressed in their dazzle camouflage, as they lay in Bedford Basin. Many of these have ended up in the Lismer collection at the Canadian War Museum – not as his formal submission to the War Records Office as his obligation as a formally-appointed War Artist, but rather several large donations made by his daughter, Marjorie Lismer Bridges, after his death in 1969.

Lismer's large painting *Halifax Harbour – Time Of War c. 1917* travelled with him back to Toronto in August 1919 and then with him to Montreal. Arthur Lismer personally donated the 102.5 x 130.0 cm painting, conserved onto aluminum¹, to the collection of the Dalhousie Art Gallery by a letter dated February 20, 1955 (original copy, Dalhousie Art Gallery). The paperwork for the donation was not completed until 1956.

Lismer, in writing to a Mr. John F. Graham, Chair of the Dalhousie Art Committee, notes that, "I do not think it is a masterpiece by any means. — but it dates, in time & place." The current Director of the Dalhousie Art Gallery, Peter Dykhuis, counters Lismer of 60 years ago with "Lismer does not believe the painting to be a masterpiece but I love it ..." and his gallery will have it on display from October 12 to December 17, 2017 as part of a major multi-curator/artist effort to honour the 100th commemoration of the 1917 explosion in Halifax Harbour.

The author is to also be involved in the Fall exhibition, and the Dalhousie Art Gallery would like to follow up on Lismer's 1955 observation, "Any old naval officer may recognize the vessels. – and, Pier II – with Citadel Hill behind it & painted from the Dartmouth Shore." [looking about due WNW across the harbour at the two major naval piers used to dispatch and land large troop movements on major liners that had been converted to troopships]. The Citadel Hill can be seen in the background along the skyline.

Lismer suggested "any old naval officer may recognize the vessels" in 1955. It's now 60 years farther on. Can any even older naval officers recognise the vessels in Lismer's c. 1917 painting *Halifax Harbour – Time Of War c. 1917*? Please contact Alan Ruffman if you can identify the vessels by emailing him at aruffman@dal.ca.

1485 Fort St
 Montreal P.Q.
 Feb 20. 55

Answered
 Feb 28

Dear Mr Graham.

The painting, "Halifax Harbour
 Time of War" — (and that is the title)
 is leaving here per C.P.R. Express, - Collect
 today or tomorrow. - It is addressed to
 you. It is fairly clean as an old picture
 goes, and I have given it a coat of retouching
 varnish - which is a spirit varnish.
 The canvas may need re-stretching at some
 future date — and the frame is antiquated.
 Any old naval officer may recognize the
 vessels. — and, Pier II - with Citadel Hill behind it,
 painted from the Dartmouth shore.
 I do not think it is a masterpiece by any
 means. — but it dates, in time & place.
 Your programme sounds interesting & I
 wish you luck with it.

Please say to me a true word
 that it has arrived safely

Sincerely yours
 Arthur Lismer

Transcript

1485 Fort St
 Montreal, P.Q.
 Feb 20, 55
 [answered Feb 28]

Dear Mr. Graham.

The painting, "Halifax Harbour
 Time of War" — (and that is the title)
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Sincerely yours
 Arthur Lismer -

Letter from Arthur Lismer to Mr. John F. Graham, Chair of the Dalhousie Art Committee 1955
 Used by permission Dalhousie Art Gallery

Endnotes

1. Peter Dykhuis, Director/Curator of the Dalhousie Art Gallery, has explained that the gallery has apparently followed Arthur Lismer's suggestion; "The canvas may need re-stretching at some future date — and the frame is antiquated." however the gallery has not yet relocated the details of the conservation work done with a thin aluminum sheet probably serving as a secondary reinforcement. Peter Dykhuis went on to say:

"Aluminum sheet is often used by conservators as backing material for paintings where the canvas, or linen, is thin and fragile, or was damaged. Canvas also reacts to changes in humidity and temperature and can become loose and saggy on a stretcher. It can be restretched taut but there is always the chance that this literal 'action' will compromise the adhesion of the oil paint onto the canvas. Particularly if thicker, impasto layers and lower quality oil paints and binders were used.

The cases that I've seen involve the removal of the canvas from the stretcher and attaching it to aluminum panels (lightweight but rigid) with ph neutral adhesives that are reversible. Which gets tricky. The conservator at the AGO used pure beeswax that was in a liquid state on the new backing panel (or another layer of canvas) and the painting was laid down onto the warm wax and allowed to cool. The process could be reversed by gently reheating the wax."

2. Paige Connell of the Dalhousie Art Gallery has explained that "Retouching varnish is a temporary protective coating for paintings that can be easily removed by using a solvent/mineral spirit before applying a permanent varnish. Retouching varnish is generally quicker drying and can be applied to an oil painting that is dry to the touch, but still allows the oil paint to continue to cure over a six-month period without surface cracking as the paint off-gasses." This painting was 38 years old in 1955.

La crise des missiles à Cuba : les positions éditoriales du *Ottawa Citizen*, du *Globe and Mail*, du *Devoir* et de *La Presse*

Par : Clarence Lemay

INTRODUCTION

Cette étude vise à comparer les positions éditoriales de ces quatre journaux canadiens (deux journaux de langue anglaise et deux journaux de langue française) concernant la crise des missiles de 1962 à Cuba afin de déterminer si les opinions de ces quotidiens varient en fonction de la langue de publication du journal. Autrement dit, est-ce que les journaux francophones ont une lecture des événements dans leurs éditoriaux qui serait différente de l'analyse qu'en font les journaux anglophones? D'emblée, nous pouvons affirmer que les positions éditoriales des quotidiens étudiés dans ce travail varient, non pas selon la langue, mais bien d'après leur orientation idéologique. En effet, les journaux libéraux étudiés dans ce travail s'opposent au blocus américain à l'endroit de Cuba tandis que les autres journaux ont tendance à l'approuver.

Avant de débiter, il est essentiel de situer brièvement cet événement dans son contexte historique. Nous pouvons retracer les origines de cette crise des missiles en 1959, année où des guérillas cubaines menées par Fidel Castro et son bras droit Ernesto « Che » Guevara renversent le gouvernement de Fulgencio Batista et instaurent un régime communiste à Cuba¹. Avant l'ascension de Castro, les États-Unis avaient un très grand contrôle politique et économique sur l'île de Cuba. Mais dès son arrivée au pouvoir, Castro nationalise les entreprises américaines déjà implantées dans l'île, en plus de conclure une entente avec l'URSS pour obtenir un soutien militaire et technique, ce qui a pour effet de détériorer grandement les relations américano-cubaine.² En représailles, les Américains tentent d'envahir Cuba en 1961 (avec le débarquement de la Baie des Cochons), mais cette tentative est un échec total.³ Après cet incident, les gouvernements cubains et soviétiques croient fermement que les États-Unis tenteront prochainement d'envahir de nouveau l'île : c'est pourquoi Nikita Khrouchtchev, le premier secrétaire du Parti Communiste de l'URSS, installe à Cuba, au cours de l'année 1962, des missiles nucléaires de longue portée pouvant atteindre le territoire américain.⁴ Mais le 14 octobre 1962, des avions militaires américains découvrent l'arsenal nucléaire soviétique dissimulé sur le territoire cubain, ce qui incite le Président américain John F. Kennedy à imposer, le 22 octobre 1962, un blocus contre Cuba.⁵ Ce blocus consistait à entourer l'île de Cuba de navires américains qui fouillaient tous les bateaux étrangers tentant d'approcher afin de vérifier qu'ils ne contenaient pas de missiles nucléaires. Le 25 octobre de la même année, l'ambassadeur américain aux Nations Unies, Adlai E. Stevenson, divulgue des photographies prouvant hors de tout doute la présence de missiles nucléaires soviétiques à Cuba.⁶ La tension entre les deux superpuissances est alors à son paroxysme et plusieurs craignent qu'une guerre nucléaire n'éclate. Toutefois, d'intenses négociations ont lieu pendant ce temps entre les deux pays pour tenter de mettre fin à cette crise et le 28 octobre 1962, Kennedy et Khrouchtchev arrivent finalement à un accord : les Soviétiques retireront leurs missiles de Cuba, mais, en retour, les Américains promettent de ne pas envahir l'île en plus de retirer leurs propres missiles déjà installés en Italie et en Turquie.⁷

Pendant la crise, le Premier Ministre canadien de l'époque, John Diefenbaker (du Parti Progressiste-Conservateur) a laissé entendre à la Chambre des Communes que la meilleure solution pour résoudre le conflit américano-russe à Cuba serait de mettre sur pied une délégation d'inspecteurs sous l'égide des Nations Unies, dont la mission serait d'enquêter sur la situation cubaine. Selon le chef du gouvernement canadien, seule une instance indépendante, comme l'ONU, peut donner l'heure juste au monde entier concernant la présence de missiles soviétiques⁸. Il est important de souligner que le Premier Ministre canadien a choisi d'adopter cette position principalement pour éviter que le Canada ne devienne la marionnette des États-Unis sur la scène internationale. Par conséquent, cette proposition du gouvernement reflète son désir de préserver l'indépendance du Canada en matière de politique étrangère vis-à-vis des États-Unis⁹. En d'autres termes, Diefenbaker cherchait à ce que le Canada développe une politique étrangère distincte de celle des Américains ; il voulait ainsi que les décisions et les prises de position du gouvernement canadien soient prises en fonction des intérêts du Canada et qu'elles ne soient pas seulement un simple reflet des positions américaines. Néanmoins, cette proposition du Premier Ministre canadien a été perçue comme un refus de sa part d'appuyer publiquement les actions prises par les États-Unis contre Cuba¹⁰, ce qui a eu comme principale répercussion de détériorer les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis de même que celles entre Kennedy et Diefenbaker (même si les rapports entre les deux hommes étaient déjà tendus avant la crise¹¹). Elle a aussi mené à une baisse de popularité du gouvernement conservateur dans la population canadienne. En effet, de nombreux Canadiens ont trouvé que la réponse initiale de leur gouvernement a été hésitante, incertaine, confuse et faible¹². Comme le souligne Bothwell, les Canadiens s'attendaient à ce que leur Premier Ministre fasse preuve de loyauté et soutienne leur allié, comme ce fut le cas par le passé lors des deux Guerres Mondiales ainsi que lors de la Guerre de Corée¹³. La position de Diefenbaker lors des événements de 1962 à Cuba de même que le refus de ce dernier d'accepter des armes nucléaires américaines en sol canadien en 1963 a provoqué la chute du gouvernement conservateur aux mains des Libéraux de Lester B. Pearson¹⁴. L'attitude de Diefenbaker au cours de cette crise n'a même pas fait l'unanimité au sein de la famille conservatrice au Canada. Dans un message adressé au Premier Ministre canadien, Deane Finlayson, chef du Parti Progressiste-Conservateur en Colombie-Britannique, critique fortement la décision de Diefenbaker. Selon Finlayson, le gouvernement canadien aurait dû se montrer favorable à l'endroit du blocus américain contre Cuba¹⁵. Cette prise de position de Diefenbaker a donc créé des remous aux États-Unis, dans la population canadienne et même au sein de son propre parti.

LES JOURNAUX ANGLOPHONES

Tout d'abord, examinons les positions éditoriales des deux journaux de langue anglaise que nous avons choisi d'étudier dans le cadre de ce travail, soient le *Ottawa Citizen* ainsi que le *Globe and Mail*. Nous avons arrêté notre choix sur ces deux quotidiens puisqu'ils proviennent de deux grandes villes ontariennes (Ottawa et Toronto, respectivement).

The Ottawa Citizen : Opposition catégorique au blocus et autonomisme canadien

Nous débuterons par l'analyse de la position éditoriale du *Ottawa Citizen*. Ce journal voit le jour sous le nom de *The Packet*, un hebdomadaire fondé en 1845 par William Harris¹⁶. Un an plus tard, John Bell et Henry Friel acquièrent le journal ; puis, Bell en deviendra l'unique propriétaire en 1849 et le rebaptisera alors *The Ottawa Citizen*¹⁷. C'est véritablement au cours des années 1960 que ce journal (devenu un quotidien en 1865) adoptera une tendance libérale dans ses éditoriaux,¹⁸ se distinguant de son principal concurrent de l'époque, *le Ottawa Journal*, d'allégeance conservatrice¹⁹.

Selon *le Ottawa Citizen*, la décision du Président Kennedy d'imposer un blocus à Cuba est une erreur, et ce, même si l'URSS a provoqué les États-Unis et a menti à la communauté internationale en affirmant que les missiles installés sur le territoire cubain étaient purement défensifs²⁰. Une multitude de raisons expliquent cette position et nous tâcherons à présenter les arguments de ce journal.

Tout d'abord, le geste des Américains d'entourer Cuba est une erreur d'après ce quotidien puisqu'il viole le principe de liberté des mers, principe que les États-Unis ont eux-mêmes longtemps défendu²¹. De ce fait, en imposant un blocus à Cuba, les États-Unis ont commis un geste qu'ils avaient eux-mêmes condamné par le passé²².

Ensuite, ce journal considère que les États-Unis n'auraient pas dû mettre en place ce blocus contre Cuba en raison des dangereuses répercussions qu'il pourrait amener. En effet, cette action pourrait déclencher un conflit armé entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, qui se transformera rapidement en une guerre nucléaire mondiale²³. Ce journal reproche particulièrement à Kennedy de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce danger de guerre nucléaire lorsqu'il a imposé le blocus contre Cuba²⁴.

De plus, le blocus contre Cuba n'était pas nécessaire selon le *Ottawa Citizen* puisque des solutions moins risquées et moins belliqueuses s'offraient à Kennedy. Par exemple, le Président américain aurait pu se fier à l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) pour régler cette crise²⁵. Le Président américain devrait se tourner vers l'ONU pour l'aider puisque cette organisation possède de l'expérience en résolution de conflits internationaux, comme en fait foi son implication dans la crise du Canal de Suez ainsi que dans la guerre civile congolaise²⁶. Il est important de signaler que ce point de vue du *Ottawa Citizen* était également partagé par Diefenbaker. Ainsi, le *Ottawa Citizen* croit aussi que le Canada doit conserver une certaine autonomie envers les États-Unis : ce journal affirme que les Américains « cannot expect an instant “ready, aye ready” response. [...] We [the Canada] must be given time to make a considered decision in the light of our convictions and interest²⁷ ». Diefenbaker et le *Ottawa Citizen* souhaitent donc tous les deux que le Canada conserve une certaine indépendance à l'endroit des États-Unis au niveau international, ce qui explique pourquoi ils préfèrent soutenir une intervention de l'ONU plutôt que d'appuyer une action unilatérale américaine.

Ce journal considère en outre que les Américains ont commis une maladresse puisqu'ils n'ont pas consulté leurs alliés occidentaux avant de prendre cette décision. Selon le *Ottawa Citizen*, le Président Kennedy aurait mieux fait de sonder ses alliés

avant d'imposer ce blocus puisque ce geste pourrait non seulement créer des tensions importantes au sein même des alliés des États-Unis, mais aussi aliéner les pays non-alignés en raison du manque de fondement moral des actions américaines contre Cuba²⁸. Ainsi, les États-Unis devraient écouter davantage leurs alliés occidentaux avant de prendre des décisions pour conserver l'harmonie au sein des pays capitalistes²⁹.

Dans le même ordre d'idée, le *Ottawa Citizen* souhaiterait que les États-Unis donnent au Canada un plus grand rôle dans le processus décisionnel et stratégique de la Guerre froide. Même si le Canada est l'allié indéfectible des États-Unis dans cette Guerre froide, « the Americans are leading an alliance, not an empire. We are their comrades in the struggle, not their servants. [...] We expect to play a part in the decision-making process at the top level of Cold War strategy ³⁰ ». Les États-Unis doivent accorder une plus grande place au Canada dans ce conflit puisque leurs décisions auront aussi un impact sur la population canadienne : si une guerre nucléaire devait éclater en raison d'une décision prise par les Américains, elle aura également un impact sur les Canadiens³¹.

En résumé, le *Ottawa Citizen* stipule que le blocus imposé par les États-Unis contre Cuba est une erreur et le désapprouve totalement. Il est important de souligner que la position éditoriale de ce journal n'était pas partagée par la majorité de la population canadienne de l'époque puisqu'un sondage mené durant la crise a démontré que 79,3% des Canadiens approuvaient les actions unilatérales des Américains lors de ce conflit³². Par ailleurs, il est intéressant de noter que Diefenbaker, d'allégeance conservatrice, a, tout comme ce journal d'idéologie libérale, proposé que l'ONU intervienne dans la situation cubaine en raison du fait qu'ils veulent tous les deux que le Canada préserve une certaine autonomie vis-à-vis des États-Unis sur la scène internationale.

***The Globe and Mail* : Approbation des actions de Kennedy sous certaines réserves**

Passons maintenant à l'étude de la position éditoriale du *Globe and Mail*. Ce quotidien tire ses origines du journal *The Globe*, fondé en 1844 par George Brown (un politicien réformiste libéral) comme organe officiel du Parti Réformiste, mais devient rapidement un journal d'information³³. En 1936, George McCullagh fusionne *The Globe* avec le *Mail and Empire* pour former le *Globe and Mail* et est aujourd'hui le journal le plus populaire au Canada³⁴. Il se situe au centre-droit du spectre politique³⁵.

Bien qu'il affiche certaines réserves à l'endroit du blocus des États-Unis contre Cuba, le *Globe and Mail* suggère quand même aux Canadiens de l'appuyer. D'abord, ce journal émet des réserves à l'endroit du blocus car il pourrait être interprété par l'URSS comme un acte de guerre, ce qui pourrait dès lors déclencher un conflit nucléaire entre ces deux superpuissances qui affecterait l'ensemble de la planète³⁶. Le *Globe and Mail* critique également la décision de Washington d'agir unilatéralement contre Cuba, sans consulter au préalable ses alliés occidentaux membres de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord (OTAN)³⁷. Selon le *Globe and Mail*, cette action va à l'encontre des procédures de l'OTAN, en plus de démontrer de l'arrogance et du mépris pour ses alliés³⁸. De ce fait, « the NATO nations [...] have every right to object to unilateral U.S. actions in the Caribbean which might bring nuclear destruction

upon all³⁹». En d'autres termes, les nations alliées des États-Unis avaient le droit d'être consultées car ces dernières seront elles-aussi affectées par les décisions prises par les Américains. Il semblerait que les Américains n'ont pas consulté leurs alliés en raison d'un manque de temps⁴⁰. Malgré tout, les États-Unis aurait dû, minimalement, consulter le Canada avant d'imposer leur blocus contre Cuba. En effet, en raison du fait que ces deux pays font partie du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (mieux connu sous le nom de NORAD, le North American Aerospace Defence Command), qui prévoit « the fullest possible coordination in North American defence⁴¹ », le gouvernement canadien était en droit de s'attendre à être consulté par Washington⁴².

Dans un monde idéal, le *Globe and Mail* aurait préféré, tout comme le *Ottawa Citizen* et le Premier Ministre Diefenbaker, que l'ONU se penche sur la question cubaine. D'après ce quotidien, plusieurs guerres ont été provoquées par un manque de communication entre les belligérants et une intervention de l'ONU inciterait, au moins, les nations américaines et soviétiques à collaborer et à communiquer⁴³.

Malgré les critiques qu'il a adressées au blocus, le *Globe and Mail* conseille tout de même aux Canadiens d'appuyer le blocus des États-Unis à Cuba. Selon les éditoriaux du journal torontois, les Canadiens doivent appuyer les actions américaines en raison de la proximité géographique et politique qui unit le Canada et les États-Unis : « The inescapable facts of geography, our shared political traditions and close defensive alliance dictate that we support the United States.⁴⁴ » Ainsi, la proximité entre le Canada et les États-Unis fait en sorte que ces deux pays sont de proches alliés dans ce conflit idéologique opposant le capitalisme au communisme. Dans cette optique, les Canadiens doivent se montrer solidaires avec leur allié et appuyer ce blocus car le contraire pourrait être perçu, à travers le monde, comme un signe de division au sein de l'alliance des pays occidentaux capitalistes, ce qui pourrait profiter au Bloc Communiste⁴⁵. Par ailleurs, le *Globe and Mail* est d'avis que les Canadiens doivent approuver les actions du Président Kennedy en raison du fait que les missiles nucléaires soviétiques présents sur l'île constituent une véritable menace, non seulement pour les États-Unis, mais bien pour toute l'Amérique⁴⁶. De ce fait, pour mettre fin à cette menace qui pèse également sur le Canada, le Président Kennedy devait s'assurer qu'aucune autre arme nucléaire ne pénètre sur le territoire cubain, et mettre en place un blocus sur l'île était donc le meilleur moyen pour y parvenir.

En somme, nous remarquons que, contrairement au *Ottawa Citizen*, le *Globe and Mail* recommande aux Canadiens d'appuyer les actions américaines à l'endroit de Cuba, même si, à l'instar du journal d'Ottawa, le quotidien torontois se permet de critiquer le blocus de Kennedy. D'ailleurs, les préoccupations que le *Globe and Mail* a soulevées concernant l'offensive américaine à Cuba (que cette dernière pourrait provoquer une guerre nucléaire entre les États-Unis et l'URSS et que les Américains auraient dû consulter leurs alliés avant de prendre cette décision) avaient également été soulignées par le *Ottawa Citizen*. Alors, même si les deux journaux anglophones étudiés dans le cadre de ce travail soulèvent les mêmes inquiétudes à l'endroit des gestes de Kennedy, ils ne s'entendent pas sur la nécessité de soutenir ou non le blocus. Nous pouvons donc en conclure que la ligne éditoriale de ces deux journaux de langue anglaise diffère ; même s'ils adoptent des positions semblables quant aux critiques adressés au blocus américain et quant à la position du Canada comme allié

des États-Unis dans la Guerre froide, ces deux quotidiens arrivent à des conclusions diamétralement opposées sur la question du soutien des actions américaines contre Cuba.

LES JOURNAUX FRANCOPHONES

Analysons maintenant les opinions des deux journaux de langue française choisis dans le cadre du présent travail, soient *Le Devoir* et *La Presse*, afin de déterminer si, à la différence des deux quotidiens anglophones étudiés préalablement, ces publications ont adopté des positions éditoriales semblables par rapport à cette crise des missiles. Ces deux journaux francophones ont été sélectionnés parce qu'ils comptent parmi les quotidiens les plus connus au Québec.

***Le Devoir* : Soutien indéfectible des actions américaines à l'endroit de Cuba**

Fondé en 1910 par Henri Bourassa (un ancien député libéral du gouvernement de Wilfrid Laurier), *Le Devoir* se veut un journal nationaliste indépendant⁴⁷. De 1947 à 1963, le rédacteur-en-chef du journal se nomme Gérard Filion et son passage marque un tournant idéologique important dans l'histoire de ce quotidien. Alors que *Le Devoir* se vouait traditionnellement à la défense de l'Église et appuyait l'Union Nationale de Maurice Duplessis, il rompt avec ces idéaux dans les années 1950 en se portant plutôt à la défense des syndicats et en critiquant sévèrement le gouvernement Duplessis, très proche du clergé⁴⁸. Ainsi, le passage de Filion au *Devoir* marque une rupture nette avec le conservatisme et propose une évolution vers une pensée beaucoup plus progressiste. C'est également lors du passage de Filion que ce journal se prononce en faveur de l'autonomie politique du Québec⁴⁹.

À prime abord, nous pouvons affirmer que *Le Devoir* approuve totalement les actions prises par le Président des États-Unis pour tenter de régler cette crise. Tout d'abord, le blocus à l'endroit de Cuba serait justifié selon ce quotidien puisque la sécurité du continent américain en dépend. En effet, le blocus américain serait en fait une intervention pour assurer la sécurité continentale selon *Le Devoir*, comme le démontre l'appui massif des pays de l'Amérique Centrale aux actions prises par Washington⁵⁰. Par conséquent, même si la souveraineté territoriale de Cuba permettait à son gouvernement de se procurer des armes de l'URSS, le fait que ces armes pouvaient compromettre la sécurité de l'Amérique entière autorise le gouvernement américain à prendre toutes les actions nécessaires pour mettre fin à cette menace, y compris imposer un blocus sur l'île⁵¹.

En outre, en installant ces missiles, les Soviétiques ont agi à l'encontre du « principe directeur [...] auquel le monde est soumis : chacun chez soi, un peu autour, mais jamais chez l'autre⁵² ». Selon la vision du journal *Le Devoir*, l'URSS a le droit de faire comme bon lui semble sur les territoires qu'elle contrôle, mais il lui est interdit de s'immiscer dans les affaires cubaines puisque cette île se situe dans la zone d'influence des Américains⁵³. Cette ingérence soviétique représente donc une véritable menace pour les États-Unis⁵⁴, et c'est pour cette raison que le Président américain se devait d'agir avec fermeté.

Ensuite, *Le Devoir* appuie entièrement les actions de Kennedy contre Cuba puisqu'elles lui ont non seulement permis de régler cette crise, mais aussi de remporter

une victoire morale contre le régime soviétique (puisque l'ensemble de la communauté internationale est d'avis que Kennedy a très bien géré cette crise tandis que les Soviétiques ont très mal paru)⁵⁵. D'ailleurs, le peuple américain semble avoir approuvé les décisions de son Président lors de cette crise puisque le Parti Démocrate a été en mesure de conserver sa majorité au Sénat et à la Chambre des Représentants lors des élections de mi-mandat américaines de novembre 1962⁵⁶.

Par ailleurs, d'après *Le Devoir*, Kennedy a tellement bien géré cette crise que le prestige de Khrouchtchev aurait fortement diminué dans le monde communiste. Pour illustrer ce point, Sauriol mentionne que le gouvernement chinois a critiqué les décisions du gouvernement soviétique⁵⁷, qui a traité l'URSS « d'aventuristes » et de « capitulationnistes ». Par conséquent, le fait qu'un allié important de l'URSS conteste publiquement les opérations soviétiques pourrait démontrer que le Président américain a eu le meilleur sur Khrouchtchev dans cet affrontement. En fait, il semblerait que la promesse de Khrouchtchev de retirer les missiles soviétiques à Cuba à la fin de cette crise a été un facteur qui a contribué à son renversement du pouvoir en 1964 : en effet, de nombreux membres du Parti Communiste ont jugé que cette décision a fait mal paraître l'URSS sur la scène internationale en raison du fait que leur pays se serait fait humilier par les États-Unis⁵⁸.

En bref, *Le Devoir* appuie entièrement le blocus imposé par les États-Unis contre Cuba. Nous constatons donc que même si ce journal a entrepris un virage progressiste au cours des années 1950, il se prononce quand même en faveur de la cause américaine, et donc du capitalisme. Ainsi, l'affirmation de Maurice Duplessis selon laquelle *Le Devoir* serait une publication communiste⁵⁹ est donc une accusation sans fondement.

La Presse : Critique du blocus américain

Abordons maintenant l'analyse de la position éditoriale de *La Presse*. Ce quotidien est fondé à Montréal en 1884 par William-Edmond Blumhart et un groupe de Conservateurs insatisfaits du gouvernement de John A. Macdonald⁶⁰. Après avoir été la propriété de la famille Berthiaume, Paul Desmarais prend possession du journal en 1955. C'est véritablement sous la direction de Desmarais que *La Presse* adoptera de façon définitive une position libérale et fédéraliste dans ses éditoriaux, en appuyant systématiquement le Parti Libéral du Québec à chaque élection provinciale⁶¹ et en soutenant le camp fédéraliste lors des deux référendums portant sur la souveraineté du Québec⁶².

Même si ce journal montréalais dénonce l'hypocrisie de l'URSS, qui niait la présence de missiles nucléaires soviétiques à Cuba en septembre 1962⁶³, *La Presse* s'oppose tout de même au blocus des États-Unis. D'abord, ce journal se montre critique à l'égard des actions américaines en raison de la souveraineté territoriale de Cuba : ce pays a le droit d'agir comme bon lui semble dans les limites de son territoire. Alors, ce quotidien stipule qu'« [i]l est indiscutable, en théorie⁶⁴, qu'un pays souverain comme Cuba a le droit de choisir lui-même ses alliances et de prendre les moyens qu'il croit bons pour défendre son territoire⁶⁵ ». Imposer unilatéralement un blocus contre un pays souverain comme Cuba constitue donc un véritable acte de guerre d'après les éditoriaux de ce journal⁶⁶.

En plus, cet acte de guerre pourrait rapidement provoquer un conflit nucléaire mondial. En effet, une fois le blocus imposé, les navires américains qui encerclent Cuba ont l'ordre d'intercepter les navires soviétiques se dirigeant vers l'île ; si les Russes n'obtempèrent pas, les Américain couleront le navire⁶⁷. Or, personne ne sait réellement comment le Kremlin réagira à ce blocus : va-t-il tout simplement céder à la pression et ordonner à ses navires de ne pas mettre cap sur Cuba ou va-t-il plutôt relever le défi lancé par les Américains⁶⁸? Ainsi, il est possible qu'une guerre nucléaire mondiale éclate si les Soviétiques décident d'ignorer le blocus des États-Unis, ce qui explique pourquoi *La Presse* s'oppose aux opérations maritimes des États-Unis à Cuba.

À l'instar de Diefenbaker, *La Presse* croit que la solution idéale pour mettre fin à cette crise serait de mandater l'ONU d'enquêter sur la situation cubaine⁶⁹ puisque l'« on ne saurait accepter les yeux fermés ni les affirmations américaines, ni les dénégations cubaines⁷⁰ ». De ce fait, ce journal stipule qu'avant de commettre des actes irréflechis, il serait primordial de s'assurer en premier lieu que les armes nucléaires soviétiques décrites par le Président Kennedy dans son discours télévisé se trouvent véritablement en territoire cubain, et le meilleur moyen de s'en assurer est de mettre sur pied une commission d'enquête neutre et impartiale⁷¹.

En outre, *La Presse* s'oppose au blocus imposé par les Américains contre Cuba en raison de la souveraineté territoriale dont jouissent les Cubains et en raison du fait qu'il pourrait dégénérer en conflit nucléaire mondial. Ce journal considère que la proposition du Premier Ministre Diefenbaker (de laisser le soin à l'ONU d'enquêter sur la situation cubaine) est plus raisonnable et beaucoup moins risquée que le blocus des États-Unis. Nous constatons donc que, tout comme pour les journaux anglophones analysés préalablement, il n'existe pas de consensus dans les positions éditoriales des deux quotidiens francophones étudiés dans ce travail : *La Presse* est plutôt défavorable au blocus, tandis que *Le Devoir*, comme nous l'avons démontré plus haut, appuie entièrement les actions des Américains contre Cuba.

CONCLUSION

Nous avons démontré que les positions éditoriales des quatre quotidiens étudiés dans le cadre de ce travail ne variaient pas en fonction de leur langue de publication puisque nous notons d'importantes divergences lorsque nous comparons la position éditoriale du *Ottawa Citizen* avec celle du *Globe and Mail*, ainsi que celle du *Devoir* avec celle de *La Presse*. Par contre, il est possible de remarquer que les opinions de ces quotidiens par rapport à cette crise variaient plutôt en fonction de leur orientation idéologique : les deux journaux libéraux, soient le *Ottawa Citizen* ainsi que *La Presse*, ont tendance à s'opposer au blocus tandis que les deux journaux non libéraux, le *Globe and Mail* et *Le Devoir*, l'appuient. Nous pouvons supposer que la raison pour laquelle les deux journaux libéraux étudiés s'objectent à ce blocus et appuient plutôt la proposition de Diefenbaker d'une intervention onusienne dans la situation cubaine est que cette dernière est en accord avec l'idéologie libérale. En effet, les libéraux sont d'avis que les organisations internationales, comme l'ONU, ont un rôle essentiel à jouer dans le maintien de la paix mondiale⁷². Alors, Diefenbaker, un politicien conservateur, a proposé une solution très libérale pour tenter de mettre fin à cette crise et le fait que le conservateur Deane Finlayson conteste la position de son Premier Ministre (voir plus

haut) pourrait attester cette hypothèse. D'ailleurs, le chef du Parti Libéral du Canada de l'époque, Lester B. Pearson, appuyait le Premier Ministre sur cette question⁷³. Ainsi, Pearson a affirmé à la Chambre des Communes que « it is important, as the Prime Minister has indicated, that these international organizations should be used for the purpose of verifying what is going on⁷⁴ ». Par conséquent, nous pensons que le désir de Diefenbaker que le Canada soit indépendant des États-Unis sur la scène internationale l'a forcé à adopter une position libérale dans ce conflit, ce qui explique pourquoi le *Ottawa Citizen* et *La Presse* supporte le Premier Ministre canadien sur cet enjeu. Nous pouvons également émettre l'hypothèse que les deux journaux non libéraux sélectionnés pour ce travail appuient les actions américaines contre Cuba en raison de leur opposition idéologique face au communisme. Dans cette optique, il serait primordial d'enrayer (ou à tout le moins contenir) le communisme et il faut donc appuyer toute action qui cherche à arrêter l'expansion du communisme à travers le monde. À la lumière de cette recherche, nous constatons que l'étude des journaux d'époque s'avère essentielle, selon nous, pour élargir notre compréhension d'un événement historique puisque les arguments avancés par les quotidiens dans leurs éditoriaux reflètent sans aucun doute les opinions de leur lectorat-cible et peut certainement influencer les points de vue de citoyens indécis.

Footnotes

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. United States Information Service, *The USSR & Cuba*, Ottawa/ Toronto, 1962, p. 26.
7. Peter Haydon, *Op. cit.*, p. 26.
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9. Peter Gladman et Peter Archambault, « Advice and Indecision Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis », *Canadian Military History*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2015), p. 15.
10. Peter Haydon, *Op. cit.*, p. 122.
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14. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
15. Message from Deane Finlayson to John Diefenbaker, October 25, 1962, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa (hereafter DHH), Fonds 2004/9, The Diefenbaker fonds, Box 1, File 39.
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20. « The blockade of Cuba », *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 octobre 1962, p. 6.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. « Britons shocked. “Kennedy has gone too far – an act of war” Daily Mail », *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 octobre 1962, p. 7 ; « The blockade of Cuba », *Op. cit.*
26. « The blockade of Cuba », *Op. cit.*
27. « A lesson from the crisis », *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 novembre 1962, p. 6.
28. « The blockade of Cuba », *Op. cit.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. « A lesson from the crisis », *Op. cit.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. Nicholas Tracy, *A Two-Edged Sword. The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Montréal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012, p. 140.
33. Jessica Potter, Richard J. Doyle et Sasha Yusufali, « *Globe and Mail* », dans *L’Encyclopédie canadienne*, 2009 [<http://encyclopediecanadienne.ca/fr/article/globe-and-mail/>] (page consultée le 11 octobre 2016).
34. *Ibid.*
35. Sylvie Lacombe, « “Les enfants gâtés d’une province parasite.” Perceptions du Printemps québécois dans trois quotidiens anglo-canadiens à grand tirage », *Recherches sociographiques*, vol. 54, no. 3 (2013), p. 555.
36. « Canada and the Crisis », *The Globe and Mail*, 24 octobre 1962, p. 6.
37. « The Crisis Continues », *The Globe and Mail*, 25 octobre 1962, p. 6.
38. *Ibid.*
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49. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
50. Paul Sauriol, « La crise cubaine », *Le Devoir*, 22 novembre 1962 ; Paul Sauriol, « Quelques leçons du blocus », *Le Devoir*, 26 octobre 1962.
51. Paul Sauriol, « Quelques leçons du blocus », *Op. cit.*
52. André Laurendeau, « Mais pourquoi cette affaire cubaine? », *Le Devoir*, 30 octobre 1962.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. Paul Sauriol, « La crise cubaine », *Op. cit.*
56. *Ibid.*
57. Paul Sauriol, « La crise cubaine », *Op. cit.*
58. Alden Whitman, « Krushchev’s Human Dimensions Brought Him to Power and to His Downfall », *The New York Times*, 12 septembre 1971.
59. Duplessis a déjà affirmé que *Le Devoir* était un journal « bolchévique ». Voir Hélène Buzzetti, « Quand les politiciens s’en prennent au *Devoir* », *Le Devoir*, 3 avril 2010.
60. Jessica Potter, André Donneur et Onnig Beylerian, « *La Presse* », dans *L’Encyclopédie canadienne*, 2009 [<http://www.encyclopediecanadienne.ca/fr/article/la-presse/>] (page consultée le 21 octobre 2016).

61. En plus de donner son appui à plusieurs occasions au Parti Libéral du Canada lors des élections fédérales canadiennes. Voir André Pratte, « Élections > pourquoi *La Presse* prend-elle position? », *La Presse*, 9 octobre 2008, p. A 32.
62. Jessica Potter, André Donneur et Onnig Beylerian, « *La Presse* », *Op. cit.*
63. Gérard Pelletier, « Ce n'est pas la guerre, mais... », *La Presse*, 23 octobre 1962.
64. En caractère gras dans le texte d'origine.
65. Gérard Pelletier, « En revenant de notre peur », *La Presse*, 30 octobre 1962.
66. *Ibid.*
67. Gérard Pelletier, « Ce n'est pas la guerre, mais... », *Op. cit.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. Gérard Pelletier, « En revenant de notre peur », *Op. cit.*
70. Gérard Pelletier, « Ce n'est pas la guerre, mais... », *Op. cit.*
71. *Ibid.*
72. Parti Libéral du Canada, « Affaires étrangères et défense » [<https://www.liberal.ca/fr/affaires-etrangees-defense/>] (page consultée le 5 décembre 2016).
73. Asa McKercher, *Camelot and Canada: Canadian-American relations in the Kennedy era*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 165.
74. Canada, *Op. cit.*, p. 805-806.

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Clarence Lemay est un étudiant de quatrième année en histoire à l'Université d'Ottawa. Il s'intéresse particulièrement à l'histoire du Québec au XXe et XXIe siècles et à la question nationale. Il compte poursuivre à la maîtrise et, possiblement, au doctorat.

CNRS Conference 2017 / Canada and Canadians in the Great War at Sea, 1914-1918

The 2017 Conference and Annual General Meeting will be held in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 10-12 August 2017. The conference will be held in affiliation with the Royal Canadian Navy, in historic Admiralty House, the home of the Naval Museum of Halifax (NMH). The timing and location are chosen with regard to 2017 being the centenary of the Halifax Explosion, a defining moment in that port's long history, but as always, subject matter will not be restricted to military operations and related issues.

Registration form and administrative details will be posted to the Society webpage, with the conference fee expected to be \$25 (\$10 per day).

Conference Program Overview

Wednesday 09 August

Evening: informal reception [TBC]

Thursday 10 August

Forenoon: Great War (general) sessions (NMH)

Afternoon: Tour Maritime Museum of the Atlantic (MMA)

Evening: o/c tour remain downtown for Dinner

Friday 11 August

Forenoon: Halifax Explosion Plenary Session (NMH)

Afternoon: Tour Explosion sites [TBC, additional]

Early evening Reception: NMH / Opening of Halifax Explosion Exhibit / Society Awards Presentations

Saturday 12 August

Forenoon: Miscellaneous papers (NMH)

Afternoon: CNRS AGM (NMH)

Presenters & Abstracts (alphabetical by author.. Joel Zemel is listed with Alan Ruffman as joint presenter)

Myriam Alamkan est une historienne autodidacte. Elle a écrit plusieurs ouvrages dont « Vous irez porter le fer et la flamme » en 2015. Elle a consacré plusieurs conférences et articles à propos de la morue et de son commerce avec la Guadeloupe dont « Tropicalisation de la consommation de la morue », l'approvisionnement en morue de la Guadeloupe pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale» et « Une brise tropicale des îles : Le French Colonial Supply Mission, la Mission des Colonies et la réorganisation de de Guadeloupe sur le commerce de la morue avec Terre Neuve et Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 1635-1946. »

Précis: « Les approvisionnement morutiers de la Guadeloupe durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. » Le 13 juillet 1943, les Antilles françaises rallient la France Libre après avoir été administré par des gouverneurs pro-vichystes. L'économie de la colonie de la Guadeloupe reposait jusqu'à la déclaration de guerre de 1939 sur des approvisionnements réguliers entre la France et l'archipel guadeloupéen pour de nombreuses marchandises manufacturées mais également pour ses approvisionnements en morue dite localement morue salée. La morue salée est considérée par l'administration coloniale comme un produit de première nécessité dès le début du 20^{ème} siècle, or contrairement aux conflits des 18^{ème} et 19^{ème} siècles, la colonie ne peut pas faire appel aux corsaires pour pallier les inévitables manquements de bateaux entre l'Europe et les Antilles françaises. La colonie doit alors innover afin de se procurer de la morue depuis Terre-Neuve et le Labrador ou Saint-Pierre et Miquelon pour en vendre localement. Ce sont ces dispositifs que nous nous proposons de découvrir à travers cette étude.

John Armstrong joined the Royal Canadian Air Force Reserve as a bandsman less than a week after his sixteenth birthday. Commissioned as a regular force administration officer, he later completed an MA and taught at RMC Kingston. In 1985 he joined the Directorate of History to work on various aspects of the RCAF in Bomber Command. Since retirement, he spent more than four years researching his grandfather's experience in the RCN during the Great War, which led to publication of his award winning book *The Halifax Explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy*.

Abstract: "Danger on the Water and a Funeral in Quebec; James Anderson Murray and the Halifax Explosion". Lieutenant James Anderson Murray RNR died a hero, the first to realize the danger inherent in the *Imo – Mont Blanc* collision and to attempt to raise the alarm. Readers of Halifax explosion literature will not know much of Murray's sacrifice, other than looking to the long-ago published *The Town That Died* (1982) from Michael J. Bird. One of the real strengths of this work is that Bird realized, better than most, the importance of the military – particular the navy – in the overall story of the disaster. Haligonians understandably did not have much time to think of Murray, but his body and his funeral in Quebec City was that of a hero.

George Bolotenko was born in 1946 in Klagenfurt in post-war Austria, and immigrated to Canada with his family in 1951, settling in Oshawa. He graduated from the University of Western Ontario (Hons BA 1970, MA 1972) and from the University of Toronto with a PhD in European Intellectual and Russian Imperial history in 1979. After several years of sessional appointments at U of T and Ryerson, in 1981 he came to the Public Archives of Canada (as it was then known) and worked as an archivist, largely in Political Archives, until 2012. While with archives, and in collaboration with other entities, he made many trips to Russia and Ukraine on archival matters, and has written and published occasional papers on history and archives.

Abstract: “Of Icebreakers and Railways – Canadians in the Russian North during the First World War”. The Eastern Front was critical to the defeat of Wilhelmine Germany. Given the Russian Empire’s lag in industrial development, war supply to that front was critical in a war that turned, eventually, into a trial fully testing every combatant society’s capacity to survive extreme tribulation. Canadian sailors in icebreakers and railwaymen as builders played no small part in assuring Allied supply to Russia, to help sustain the Eastern Front. This presentation will tell this story, and provide some “unusual” commentary on the significance of the Eastern Front.

Sean Campbell is a former reservist with the Canadian Forces, and originally comes from Prince Edward Island. Some of his prior written work on the Canadian naval history has appeared in the *Canadian Naval Review* and his first book, *Tin-Can Canucks: A Century of Canadian Destroyers* was published in 2017 by Kay Cee Publications. A software engineer turned digital marketing consultant, Sean currently resides in Calgary, Alberta with his daughter and several of her guinea pigs.

Abstract: “HMCS *Grilse* – A Maritime Muse”. Conflict has always been a source of artistic inspiration. The Great War produced poets, artists, songwriters and other artists both official and unofficial. In the Royal Canadian Navy, however, there was an interesting creative nexus which inspired an unofficial poet and an official war artist—and continues to inspire art to this day. This paper looks at the torpedo boat HMCS *Grilse*, and explores why she would have inspired poet Bertrand L. Twinn (an RCN clerk) and painter Arthur Lismer (later a member of the Group of Seven) during the war—and how her story has inspired a more modern piece of artwork.

Michael Dupuis is a Canadian history researcher, writer and author whose work focuses on the role of journalists in historical events. In 2011 he was a consultant to CBC Television for *Titanic: The Canadian Story*, and in 2012 contributed “Canadian Journalists in New York” in Paul Heyer’s *TITANIC Century: Myth, Media and the Making of a Cultural Icon*. In 2014 he published *Winnipeg’s General Strike: Reports From the Front Lines*. His new book, *Bearing Witness: Journalists, Record Keepers and the 1917 Halifax Explosion* (Fernwood Publishing), will be released in April 2017.

Abstract: “Journalists as First Responders in the Halifax Explosion.” It is well documented that military personnel, firemen, policemen and citizens were first responders in the aftermath of the Halifax Explosion. However, there is one other group of first responders who have remained unheralded: local journalists. They include James Hickey, Superintendent of the Halifax Canadian Press bureau, *Halifax Herald* editor Peter Lawson and *Morning Chronicle* editor Hervey Jones and reporter James L. Gowen. Each performed heroic actions in the disaster’s aftermath providing vital information for Halifax-Dartmouth survivors and stimulating the remarkable response of sympathy and practical assistance from Canadian and American sources.

Carl Gagnon joined the Canadian Forces in December 1983 after graduating from University of Québec in Chicoutimi in History. He has held staff positions in the Naval Reserve Divisions HMC Ships *Champlain*, *Queen Charlotte* and *Carleton*, and Naval Reserve Headquarters, Maritime Operations Group Five, Canadian Forces Fleet School (Quebec) and the Canadian Naval Centennial. He served as Watch Officer (Expeditionary) at Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and Canadian Joint Operations Command from 2010 to 2014. He is serving since 2015 at the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command in Ottawa.

Abstract: "Colours on the High Sea". The year 1917 saw ships in bright colours and strange abstract patterns appearing on the high sea: in order to keep warships free for the forthcoming naval battle involving battleships and to counteract the third year of submarine threat, the British Admiralty was forced to experiment with new solutions to protect the vital shipping. The "dazzle" camouflage was an attempt to protect ships from the underwater threat. This paper will cover a brief history of the development of the disruptive camouflage pattern, will attempt to evaluate its effectiveness, and will look at Canadian cases and illustrations.

Marie de Lavigne-Aubery is a lecturer in the history of law and French institutions at the University of Antilles-Guyane (Guadeloupe-French Antilles) and a Lay judge at the Labour Court of Pointe-à-Pitre (Guadeloupe-French Antilles).

Abstract: "Halifax 1940: Transit for European Gold." At the time of declaration of war, France was in a weak military position. However, it was very wealthy with its 2430 tons of gold and metallic reserves that could not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. A part of the French and British gold was to be transported on warships to North America, but since the United States was neutral, no ship of any state at war could stay more than 24 hours in American harbors. The strategic harbor of Halifax was chosen as a transit harbor to secretly offload the precious metal and ship it by land rail to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Central Bank of Canada in Ottawa. This presentation answers the question of the saga of the European gold on the wharves of Halifax.

Chris Madsen is a Professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario. He teaches in the areas of military planning, operations, and national security. He has served the Canadian Nautical Research Society in various capacities on Council and most recently President.

Abstract: "Counting the Dead and Injured: Longshore Workers and Crown Liability after the 6 March 1945 Greenhill Park Explosion in Vancouver Harbour". While loading a mixed cargo destined for Australia that included volatile ammonia nitrates-related fertilizer, the Canadian Park Steamships freighter *Greenhill Park* caught fire and exploded dockside at the Canadian Pacific Railway pier on the south shore of Vancouver's Burrard Inlet, killing six longshoremen and two seamen, and injuring another twenty-five. A federal public inquiry to examine the likely causes and culpability was quick to blame the dead for the explosion. The government largely claimed no liability and directed queries to the provincial workmen's compensation board, that required application, proof of physical impairment affecting return to work, and limited monetary amounts payable.

Longshore workers and their union, confronting a sometimes uncaring bureaucracy and pedantic legal equivocation, stubbornly fought for indemnification suited to the losses suffered.

Charles (“Doug”) Maginley Doug Maginley was born in Antigua, West Indies in 1929. At the age of 15 he went to England to join the nautical school ship HMS *Conway* and at 17 he went to sea and travelled worldwide in British merchant ships. He served in the RCN 1955-76, joined the Coast Guard as a Ship Safety Inspector, transferring in 1979 to the Coast Guard College at Sydney, Nova Scotia. Since retiring in 1990, Doug has been the principal or sole author of three books about the Coast Guard, the latest being *The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet, 1962-2012* (Long Hill, 2014). Doug was one of the earliest members of the Canadian Nautical Research Society and is a frequent book reviewer for *The Northern Mariner*.

Abstract: “Before the Maple Leaf: The Flags of Canada, 1868-1965.” For most of our history, from 1868 to 1965, the flag that identified Canada was the Canadian red ensign. Through those years, the changes to its design mark the evolution of the country from the original four provinces to the nation it is today. Doug’s talk will be illustrated not only with slides but with actual ensigns from his own collection dating back to Confederation, including white and blue ensigns and enlivened by titbits of heraldic lore and about nautical flags: what exactly is an ensign, a jack, a standard? How should they be displayed? Conclusion: the special virtues of the maple leaf flag.

Janet Maybee holds English degrees from UNB and Dalhousie; she is a retired teacher and un-retired granny. A Research Associate at Maritime Museum of the Atlantic, she discovered John Griffith Armstrong’s book (*The Halifax Explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy: Inquiry and Intrigue*) and then learned of Pilot Mackey’s connection with her Halifax house, leading to friendship with his family. Her research was first published in the April 2010 issue of *The Northern Mariner*. With the encouragement of the Atlantic Pilotage Authority and veteran historians such as Janet Kitz and Alan Ruffman, she created an illustrated book aimed at a wide audience. *Aftershock: The Halifax Explosion and the Persecution of Pilot Mackey* won the 2016 Atlantic Book Award for Nonfiction, and she maintains a related web-site (www.pilotmackey.ca).

Abstract: “The 1917 Explosion: a harbour pilot’s perspective”. For the past hundred years, Pilot Francis Mackey and his descendants have borne unfair blame and shaming for a tragedy that was certainly not his fault. Interviews and family files have provided a much different picture, supported by previously unseen documents from LAC. Evidence exists to indicate the persecution he suffered, though initially the product of local anger and panic, was extended by federal politicians to cover their own mistakes. Amid the mourning in this anniversary year of so much destruction and loss, this is one situation in which we can finally make a positive difference: we can change the narrative, redeeming the reputation of a competent mariner who became the convenient local villain.

Fraser McKee joined the RCNVR as an Ordinary Seaman in March 1943, commissioned a year later, and remained in the Naval Reserves until 1978, retiring as a Commander. He served in an Armed Yacht, an Algerine ocean escort (that brought the last westbound convoy of the war into New York) and shore bases. A Past President of the Navy League of Canada, he edited two successive naval newsletters for 16 years for the Naval Officers Association, he has written or co-written six books on the Canadian Navy, the Merchant Navy and a naval novel about the Arctic.

Abstract: “The RCN’s ‘Other Ships’ of the Great War – the Armed Yachts and Marine Services Vessels”. When war broke out in the summer of 1914, the Royal Canadian Navy needed significantly more than was in hand. What was available proved to be the auxiliary Canadian Government Ships (CGS) of the Marine and Fisheries and other departments, and an ad hoc variety of yachts hastily converted with armament for local patrol duties. This photo presentation examines what was taken up from whom, and provides an overview of these ships.

Sam McLean is working towards a PhD in War Studies at King's College London, where his research identified and discussed the Royal Navy's development in the Westminster Model constitutional process from 1660 to 1749. His primary research interests are in the process of the development of military and state institutions. Sam previously studied at the University of Guelph and Wilfrid Laurier University. He is the Social Media Editor for www.BritishNavalHistory.com, and he can be found on Twitter @Canadian_Errant.

Abstract: “Performer & Audience: Defining the Royal Navy 1660-1749”. Following the Restoration of King Charles II, the Royal Navy became a contested legislative space. More than that, it was a public space where the creation of definitions was meant to be observed. This paper considers the process of the Royal Navy's development after 1660 as 'Performance', and discusses the overlap between, and the changes to, the Performers and the Audiences.

Michael Moir is University Archivist and Head of the Clara Thomas Archives and Special Collections with York University Libraries in Toronto, and is working on the history of Canadian shipbuilding during the Great War. He is a past contributor to *The Northern Mariner* and currently serves as Secretary of the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Abstract: “The Great War and the Re-emergence of Shipbuilding in Nova Scotia.” After the “golden age” of wooden shipbuilding in Canada – especially in Nova Scotia – during the mid-19th century, the introduction of steel and steam left Canadian shipbuilders largely unable to compete with British shipyards by the beginning of the 20th century. This situation changed dramatically after the outbreak of the First World War. The desperate need for merchant vessels to maintain supply lines led to significant orders for Canadian shipyards. Nova Scotia's response to the urgent need for tonnage was significant and quite distinct from the rest of Canada, but has largely been overlooked. This paper examines the reawakening

of the province's shipyards to produce wooden schooners for regional and international clients who pursued highly profitable wartime shipping rates, as well as ventures into steel shipbuilding at Trenton and Halifax.

David More is an award-winning historical novelist with three books published to date, recently retired from a 40-year professional career working in and managing medical laboratories, and is now working towards a history doctorate at Queen's University. He is a Councilor for the CNRS and has previously served as a volunteer director for the Canadian Olympic-training Regatta, Kingston (CORK), Literacy Kingston, the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston and, most recently, for Brigantine, Inc., a charity which owns and operates the brigantine *St. Lawrence II* out of Kingston as the platform for its traditional youth sail-training program.

Abstract: "Other (Canadian) Stuff we never learned about: French-Canadian Mariners in the early post-Conquest Era, 1775-1815" explores the history of a significant group of individuals who have remained relatively obscure: the thousands of French-Canadian mariners who worked for the British Crown during the early post-Conquest era. They provided and defended the only supply line between Montreal and what became Upper Canada for over 40 years of conflict and near-war. Without their support and participation, both the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 may have had quite different outcomes north of Canada's fourth or "Fresh" Coast. In all the historical debate around who did what during these two invasions from the south, the actions of such ordinary Quebeckers have largely escaped notice, much less celebration.

John Orr joined the Royal Canadian Navy in September 1963 and graduated in 1967 from the Royal Military College of Canada. Selected for aircrew training, he completed five operational tours on the Sea King helicopter culminating in the command of 423 Squadron. Promoted to Colonel, he was appointed as Canadian Forces Attaché in Cairo (1990–93) and subsequently served in Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (1993–96) before returning to Canada as the Deputy Commander, Maritime Air Group (MAG) and then Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) (1997–99). In July 1999, he returned to Egypt as the Chief of Liaison with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. He retired from the Canadian Forces in September 2000 and has since contributed greatly to the recording of Canada's naval aviation history.

Abstract: "Yanks over Halifax: How indifference and indecision led to the deployment of US Naval Air Forces to Canada in 1918." On 25 August 1918, two Curtiss HS-2L flying boats of the United States Navy took off from their new base, United States Naval Air Station Halifax, and proceeded seaward to conduct anti-submarine patrols. Within the broader context of the development of aviation in Canada and 'Trade Protection' in Canadian waters, this paper seeks to explain why the fledgling Royal Canadian Navy had to be augmented by American air forces when German U-Boats re-appeared off Canada's east coast in 1918. While somewhat of an historical anomaly, in retrospect, the deployment of these aircraft had a significant impact on the development of both civil and military aviation in Canada.

Alan Ruffman has been active in marine research for half a century, writing on early hurricanes, the 1929 earthquake and tsunami off south Newfoundland, attempts at iceberg towing, and the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. His considerable work on the 1917 Halifax Harbour Explosion includes having co-edited *Ground Zero* (1994) and searching out Arthur Lismer's drawings of the event.

Joel Zemel enjoyed an earlier career in music and film. He came to the 1917 Explosion by trying to determine the positioning of each camera shot of the Explosion cloud. His non-fiction book, *Scapegoat, the extraordinary legal proceedings following the 1917 Halifax Explosion* was published in 2014. He is presently writing a biography of Acting Commander F. Evan Wyatt.

Abstract: (Ruffman and Zemel – joint paper) “The 1917 Explosion Cloud as seen in Halifax Harbour: An Ephemeral Signal for Help”. Captain W.M.A. Campbell, inbound on the SS *Acadien*, off Chebucto Head noted in his own hand: “... suddenly I saw an immense colum [sic] of smoke shoot up to a very great height [sic] with two red(?) angry looking flames of fire projecting some distance above its summit.” Campbell's sextant measured the peak of the cloud at 11,800ft (3,600m, or 2.25mi). In 1992, at the time of the conference that led to publication of *Ground Zero*, fifteen different photographs of the Explosion cloud were known. Since then, the discovery of the Lieutenant V.M. Magnus photos and other sources have added about ten more. This paper will present and position all known Explosion cloud images.

Roger Sarty, a native of Halifax, grew up hearing stories about the city's experiences during the two world wars. He was a senior author and team leader at the Directorate of History in 1981-1998, and at the Canadian War Museum in 1998-2003, where he became deputy director and was responsible for exhibition development for the new Canadian War Museum building that opened in 2005. In 2004 he became a professor of history at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2006 to 2015 he was articles editor of *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord*, and editor-in-chief of *Canadian Military History*. He has authored, co-authored, or edited thirteen books.

Abstract: “Halifax and Convoy, 1917-1918: The First Anglo-US-Canadian Naval Alliance”. The Royal Navy implemented transatlantic merchant ship convoy in May 1917, with substantial assistance from the US Navy, to counter Germany's renewed unrestricted submarine war on commerce. Halifax and its summer sub port of Sydney became central to both Royal Navy and US Navy convoy operations. Canadian staff played a prominent role in organizing the convoys, and the RCN's flotilla of emergency-built anti-submarine trawlers and drifters protected the convoys in Nova Scotian waters. The paper argues that the RCN was an important if junior partner in these first alliance operations by the USN and the RN, and that these operations anticipated in some detail the larger scale cooperation in convoy organization during the Second World War.

Tom Tulloch served 37 years in the Royal Canadian Navy, retiring as a Captain. He commanded HMC Ships at sea and held leadership roles at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and on NATO operations. He deployed for UN embargo enforcement, for counter-terrorism and for counter-piracy operations throughout the Middle East and for NATO deterrence operations in the North Atlantic. His final appointment in the RCN was as the Canadian Naval Adviser to the United Kingdom and Defence Attaché to the Kingdom of Denmark. He holds a Master's Degree in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College and is currently Special Adviser to the President of Irving Shipbuilding Inc.

Abstract: "The Halifax Graving Dock – Before and After the 1917 Explosion." The Halifax Graving Dock was opened in Halifax in 1889, to provide the Royal Navy with a facility to repair the ships of its North American and West Indies Station. Over its first three decades of operation it saw extensive use, including supporting the fledgling Royal Canadian Navy from its inception in 1910. The epicenter of the Halifax Explosion in 1917 was just 300 yards from the graving dock itself. The blast killed over 40 shipyard workers and levelled all of the buildings in the vicinity – however the graving dock survived and was back in operation within 2 months. The event nevertheless altered the future of the graving dock, which changed hands shortly after the explosion and ushered in an era of building steel hulled ships that endures a century afterwards. The presentation will cover the pre-explosion role of the Halifax Graving Dock, its role in the 1917 explosion, and the explosion's consequences.

Jay White is a native Haligonian specializing in the history of Atlantic Canada. His 1994 doctoral dissertation examined the impact of the Second World War on the civilian population of Halifax. He taught Canadian military history at CFB Halifax, and Global, US and Canadian history at universities in Canada and the United States. He has also conducted commissioned research for Canada Post Corporation, Parks Canada and the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic. Presently he divides his time between working as a field interviewer for Statistics Canada and giving private tours of Halifax and environs during the cruise ship season.

Abstract: "Garrison to the Rescue: Unsung Heroes of the Great Disaster". It was Canada's worst disaster: 2,000 civilians killed, thousands more injured and homeless, and 1,600 homes destroyed. This presentation, based on research commissioned by Parks Canada in 2014, examines the role of the Halifax Garrison during rescue, recovery and reconstruction phases of the Halifax Explosion. Although the Navy became the focus of investigation and public censure, it was the army that provided the manpower and expertise required by civil authorities in the days and weeks immediately following the disaster. Had those troops not been ready and able, the community response would undoubtedly have been much more difficult and chaotic.

CNRS Nominations

We have a terrific group of council members now serving on our Executive (see the inside front cover of *Argonauta* for a list of those serving over the past year). This year, we expect openings for 1-2 Councillors, and as well are always looking for your help in suggesting names to develop a group of people willing to step up and replace any of our Executive in case we face retirements or need members to take on extra duties from time to time. If you are interested in Executive service in the long term, let us know.

The by-law information pertaining to nominating Officers and Councillors at large is as follows:

37. There will be a nominating committee. Normally the past president will chair this committee with such other members as may be appointed by council. No officer or councillor or member standing for election or re-election may be a member of this committee. The nominating committee will nominate one candidate for each position to be filled at the next annual general meeting.

38. Members may also propose the names of candidates in writing and with the signatures of three members. All proposals must include a written undertaking by the nominee to accept the position if elected. If such suggestions are not accepted by the nominating committee for incorporation within their report, the nominations not so included must be forwarded by the nominating committee to the annual general meeting in addition to their report, for the purpose of conducting an election for the contested positions. The chair of the nominating committee will close the nominating list, which will include the proposals of the nominating committee and other proposals by members not later than 30 days prior to the annual general meeting.

39. A call for nominations shall be included in the January issue of *Argonauta* each year. Such notice must include the date on which nominations will close, to whom the nominations must be forwarded, and the date of the annual general meeting at which the nominating committee report will be received, or, if necessary, and election will be held.

40. Nominations from the floor are permitted at the annual general meeting only if there would otherwise be a vacancy for a position.

41. The council may fill any vacancy not filled by election at the annual general meeting in accordance with section 68, (Vacancy in Office).

Also feel free to contact Executive members just to chat about issues or to find out what sort of duties are involved or possible vacancies.

Please send your nominations to CNRS AGM Coordinator Rich Gimblett who is filling in for Maurice Smith as Nominating Chair as of March 2017 at richard.gimblett@me.com.

Buffalo Maritime Center

The people at the Buffalo Maritime Center are building a replica of a Durham Boat. These boats were used to transport cargo on rivers from the mid-eighteenth century onwards in both American and Canadian waters. We hope to provide an article on the history of these boats, and on the building of the replica, in a future issue. In the meantime, readers will find a pictorial timeline of the building of this replica by following the links on the Buffalo Maritime Center Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10154526818309780.1073741831.205286709779&type=3>

Readers will also find information about the Museum, its plans for the future, and the boat building center at <http://buffalomaritimecenter.org/home/boat-building-center>

Guidelines for Authors

Argonauta follows *The Chicago Manual of Style* available at this link: <http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html>.

However, we utilize Canadian spelling rules, in lieu of American rules, unless referring to proper American names. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense are both correct.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Queenston*
Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Châteauguay*

Class of ship/submarine: *Victoria*-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)

Former HMCS *Fraser* rather than *Ex-Fraser*

Foreign ships and submarines:

USS *Enterprise*
HMS *Victory*
HMAS *Canberra* 3

Because *Argonauta* aims to publish articles that may be easily understood by senior high school students and other non-experts, we encourage authors to include general introductory context, suggestions for additional reading, and links to relevant websites. We publish memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone.

Although *Argonauta* is not formally peer-reviewed, we have two editors who carefully review and edit each and every article. For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to *The Northern Mariner* which is peer-reviewed and appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works.

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers, in the usual North American Academic manner described in the *Chicago Manual* which also provides guidance on using the Word insert function at this link: <https://www.ivcc.edu/stylebooks/stylebook5.aspx?id=14646>. For technical reasons, we prefer that authors use endnotes rather than footnotes. Typically an article in *Argonauta* will be 4 to 6 pages long, though we do accommodate longer, informal pieces. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of emerging scholars. The *Chicago Manual* provides detailed instructions on the styles used.

All photos should be sent separately and accompanied by captions, describing the image, crediting the source, and letting us know where the original image is held. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, art work, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. The images should be named to reflect the order in which they are to appear in the text (Authurnameimage1, Authurnameimage2, Authurnameimage3) and the text should be marked to show where the images are to be added (add Authurnameimage 1 here, add Authurnameimage2 here, etc.)

All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. *Argonauta* recommends that authors consult Royal Military College's website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link:

<https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai>

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help was provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

All authors are asked to supply a short biography unless the text already contains these biographical details or the author is already well known to our readers.



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Membership/Renewal Form

CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada.

Members receive:

- **The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord**, a quarterly refereed journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the North Atlantic, Arctic and North Pacific Oceans. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, nautical archaeology and maritime societies.
- **Argonauta**, a quarterly newsletter publishing articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.
- An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime minded locations across Canada such as Halifax, Vancouver, Hamilton, Churchill and Quebec City.
- Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at \$70 for individuals, \$25 for students, or \$95 for institutions. Please add \$10 for international postage and handling. Members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) may join the CNRS for a reduced rate of \$35 per year. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to subscribe to one of several other levels of membership, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and any donation above the cost of basic membership to the Society is automatically acknowledged with a tax-receipt.

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