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Editorial

Welcome to the fast-paced world-wide-web and the electronic version of Argonauta. Here you will find familiar treats, including the President’s corner with words of wisdom from Maurice Smith, the literature review by Tavis Harris, and the welcome return of Charles Nadeau, a former Canadian naval officer, who has kindly provided us with another classic article in French. We’d like to thank Jean Martin of the Directorate of History and Heritage who has willingly given assistance in editing French articles over the past few years. Merci Jean, que serions-nous sans toi?

We have exciting news on the forthcoming Canadian Nautical Research Society 2013 Conference; this issue of Argonauta contains summaries of conference papers offer a tempting preview of the event. CNRS Secretary Robert Davison is co-ordinating with the Laurier Military History Colloquium on our behalf. Our Vice President, Chris Madsen, has produced a line-up of impressive speakers to present papers on Thursday 2 May. It includes an array of old and new CNRS stars, Carl Christie, Geoff Hayes, and Roger Sarty, Ambjörn Adomeit, Robert Dienesch, Russell Freure, Richard Goette, Christopher Greenlaw, Iain O'Shea, and Joseph Zeller. These names are familiar to readers of articles and books reviews in The Northern Mariner and now at the conference you can meet the people behind the work.

Laurier Colloquium co-ordinator Michael Bechthold tells us that
this year more than sixty papers will be presented over three days, including special sessions to promote military history in the curriculum, to assist educators, and to reach a wider public. This innovative approach ties into Joshua Smith’s call in our last issue for maritime historians to relate their findings to the real world and to demonstrate relevance. Perhaps we may seek common high ground here from the financial storms that erode our shores and threaten our existence. For those wishing to register for either or both conferences online, please see the website at: http://www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/conference2013/. We thank Rob, Michael, and the Laurier Institute for their kindness and cooperation in co-hosting the CNRS conference.

Members may be interested in attending the NASOH conference in Alpena from 15 to 18 May. Please see their website for more information and registration at: www.nasoh.org/conference.

We thank our readers for understanding the financial crisis which prohibited the printing of Argonauta in January and hope that you will continue to send us your articles, announcements, and ideas for future issues. Your contributions are vital to us. We look forward to hearing from you and wish you smooth sailing this summer season.

Fair Winds, Isabel and Colleen

**President’s Corner**

by Maurice Smith

The CNRS Council held a critical meeting March 16th. This was a follow up to the emergency meeting held in the fall of 2012. In between there was time to think about, what we call, the numbers. We have to make as best we can, fact based decisions. Our Certified General Accountant and Society Treasurer, Errloyn Humphreys reported little change over the intervening four months. The fall prediction remains the same. At our current rate of revenue and disbursements we will be broke by mid 2014. There are a number of choices – and yes we still have time to make effective decisions.

We can pack it up and just walk away. That is not my option. There is simply too much good maritime history being written by scholars and by independent historians to be ignored. The Northern
Mariner is a lifeline for them and for over five hundred subscribers in North America and other parts of the world. The Northern Mariner is an important part of our lives. We can go entirely digital. This has offered a partial solution in that Argonauta is now digital and can be accessed on our web site. We have done that to reduce our operating costs. A number of members have sent in positive responses.

The question now remains: do we publish The Northern Mariner as a digital publication or do we continue to send print copies to our Membership? Or is there a combination option, print and digital, that will give us an opportunity to satisfy university subscribers (who no longer want print copies in their libraries) while maintaining our five hundred print copy subscriber base (they are not the same). We have a model in the UK who appear to have done this quite successfully and that is The Mariners Mirror published by the Society for Nautical Research. The transition for them has not been easy, but there is nothing wrong with us benefiting from their experience.

To make rational decisions that will be effective in the long term we need time. In fact we need to buy time and that will require the support. It is expected the fees will go up by $5.00. But that will not be enough to get us through until the end of 2014, by which time we should be well positioned to survive.

So please – reach into your pockets to send our Society a donation. Small or large, everything will be appreciated.

Maurice D Smith

Post script – All questions answered. My email is barque2@cogeco.ca. And do not forget the conference in May. The details are in this issue of Argonauta.

Announcements

Obituary – Janet Piers

On behalf of the CNRS, we would like to express our sympathy to the family of Janet Piers. Janet Piers died at her home in Chester, Nova Scotia on 15 March 2013. Born in 1914, she married “Debby” Piers of the Royal Canadian Navy after the death of her first husband, Captain Hon. Peter Rudyard Aiken. Janet Piers exemplified the best of
her generation of women, contributing to the well-being of others, the community, the navy, and Canada. She received the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal in recognition of her many years of devoted service. After a life well-lived, she will be remembered with warmth and gratitude by the many people who knew her.

**Obituary – Edward Reed**

On March 27, 2013, The Canadian Nautical Research Society lost a former Treasurer, Past-President and longtime friend, Ed Reed, of Ottawa. Only 61, Ed was one of the early members of the society. He worked for the Bank of Canada at the time and contributed his accounting skills to the CNRS as Treasurer by balancing the books and ensuring that we had a solid financial basis on which to launch *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* when the responsibility for publishing the journal moved from Memorial University of Newfoundland to CNRS in 2001. Annual general meetings were always fun as Ed could not resist opening his Treasurer's Report with a terrible accounting joke that only he got. We all laughed dutifully and then begged him to tell it again at the next meeting. It became a CNRS tradition.

For a number of years, Ed and I worked on keeping CNRS membership up to date and pushing debits and credits into the right columns. He had the neatest printing of anyone I ever met. Occasionally, we spent a Saturday afternoon at his office reconciling names and dues. When one of his colleagues mentioned to Mary Ann, Ed's wife, that he had seen her with Ed at the bank over the weekend, she never missed a beat. She just said that she was not with Ed and it must have been some "bold hussy". His co-workers never raised the issue again!

Like many of us, Ed also took his turn as President of CNRS from 1996 to 1999 and helped increase our investment portfolio as membership rose. Even after he stepped down as Treasurer and President, Ed remained a member and book reviewer for many years. When he moved to the Conference Board of Canada we lost touch for a while, but continued to touch base on likely books for review. Ed was a man of wide-ranging interests from maritime history to the Civil War. He and Mary Ann eventually had to build an addition on their house so Mary Ann could have a kitchen and Ed, a library.
Although he had been ill throughout the fall, Ed was actually doing better which made his loss so unexpected. The obituary appeared in the Ottawa Citizen on April 2, 2013 and there will be a celebration of his life later in the spring. Condolences, tributes and donations to The Heart and Stroke Foundation, The Canadian Diabetes Association or the Community Foundation of Ottawa can be made at www.tubmanfuneralhomes.com. Faye Kert, Ottawa, April 2013

Musée naval Québec

Our museum wants to find sailors, or relatives, of HMCS Charlottetown torpedoed on 11-09-42. Any help will be appreciated. Thank you. Notre musée recherche des marins ou leurs familles, de la corvette Charlottetown torpillée le 11-09-42. Toute aide sera appréciée. Merci Contact: info@museenavaldequebec.com

Battle of the Atlantic Sunday – An event to remember.

The first Sunday in May is set aside as an opportunity to thank and remember those who served courageously in the Second World War and also for those who served with equal pride and determination in other conflicts, including our forward deployed sailors today. It serves to remind us that almost 70 years later, our sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen are following the example of service to this great nation established during the Battle of the Atlantic and are willing and ready to serve whenever they are called upon to do so. Service to one’s country is noble work and the Battle of the Atlantic fought by the RCN, RCAF and the Merchant Navy truly was noble. The price of victory, when paid in full, would cost the RCN 24 warships and over 2000 dead, the RCAF 350 aircraft and over 900 dead, the Merchant Navy of Canada 73 ships and over 1700 dead.

Services commemorating the Battle of the Atlantic will be held in naval establishments across Canada and by fellow Canadians around the world. The national commemoration ceremony will take place at the National War Memorial in Ottawa on Sunday the fifth of May commencing at 1030. You are encouraged to bring your families, relatives and friends.

70th anniversary of The Battle of the Atlantic 1943 – 2013

In May 2013 the 70th anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic will
be commemorated by the Maritime Foundation with a series of events in London and Liverpool.

**London**
- Visit by RN and NATO warships
- Evensong Service, Reception in the Guildhall
- Battle of the Atlantic Dinner
- Lectures at King’s College London and the National Maritime Museum (including Marc Milner of the University of New Brunswick)

**Liverpool**
- Visit by RN and NATO warships and RN Historic flight
- Fundraising concert with the Band of Her Majesty’s Royal Marines
- Civic Dinner hosted by Liverpool City Council
- Service in Liverpool Cathedral
- March past of Battle of the Atlantic Veterans and Merchant Navy and Naval Association

For more information see: [http://www.bmcf.org.uk/events/boa70/](http://www.bmcf.org.uk/events/boa70/)

Canadian sailors, ships, and sea cadets will take part. For more information see, *HMCS Sackville, Canada’s Naval Memorial* website: [http://canadasnavalmemorial.ca/news/](http://canadasnavalmemorial.ca/news/)

**Ship building experts are preparing to reconstruct a 16th century wreck discovered off the coast of Red Bay, Labrador.**

The Basque whaling ship *San Juan* sank in the area around 1565. Archaeologist Robert Grenier, who discovered the wreckage in 1978, said the reconstruction will be one of the world’s first.

"Transforming these 3,000 pieces of wood we found in Red Bay, Labrador, into a very faithful, precise scientific replica of the original – this is more than a dream come true for me," he said."This will be the first time that the Spanish or Basque galleon is reconstructed that way in the world."

Grenier said discovering the ship was not as easy as some people may believe. "It’s not the way people think it is – it’s not like finding the Titanic with the name in print on the bow and [Leonardo] DiCaprio and his girlfriend on the bow. It's a pile of wood with no name on it," he said. "Suddenly, I could see that I was touching – I was
Xabi Agote, a Basque ship expert, will be undertaking the reconstruction. He said it’s an ambitious project, with special significance for an event taking place in the Basque region in the year 2016. "It will sail all over Europe as a floating ambassador of the [Basque] culture," Agote said. "Then, in 2017, we would like to contribute to the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Canada as a country. We are now establishing the first contact with Canadians in order to make that possible.

Grenier said the Basque have named him the godfather of the ship.

From CBC website – 24 February 2013

**New Online Version of Museum of Underwater Archaeology**

I'm proud to announce the new version of the online Museum of Underwater Archaeology (MUA) [www.themua.org](http://www.themua.org). The new site offers easier access to the hundreds of pages of content written by underwater archaeologists from around the world. Explore "In The Field" posts, full museum exhibits, cross disciplinary projects, digital posters, project journals, educational resources, and over 100 conference papers, site reports, and bibliographies. 2013 promises to be a busy year for the MUA with a new in depth exhibit coming soon and several collaborative projects in the works.

The Cleveland Underwater Explorers help us kick off the new site with their latest post on their discoveries in the Great Lakes. You can view their post by clicking the link on the new home page.

You can join your colleagues on the MUA! Apply for a MUA web publishing grant and share your research with our readers in over 90 countries. Contact us at research@themua.org

I hope you'll take a moment to visit the new pages and check back again soon as we continue to update and revise the new MUA.

T. Kurt Knoerl Ph.D. Director The Museum of Underwater Archaeology
Board of Longitude

I’m delighted to announce that the Cambridge Digital Library has just launched some samples of material from the Board of Longitude archive, which is being digitized under a JISC-funded project, 'Navigating Eighteenth Century Science and Technology: the Board of Longitude'. You can view the material at:
http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/collections/longitude

We’ve put up three volumes from the Board’s archive: the first volume of confirmed minutes (1737-1779), which includes a full transcription and covers all the meetings involving John Harrison; William Wales’s log from Cook’s second voyage; and a group of letters and reports by astronomers and captains about work on late 18th and early 19th century voyages of discovery. For all three, we’ve also begun to make links with the collections at Greenwich.

The rest of the archive (including other material from Cambridge and Greenwich) will go online this summer, but we’d like to get feedback on how it works and things we can do to improve it. There’s lots of interesting stuff in the three volumes, so please have a look and email any comments to Huw Jones at Cambridge University Library (hej23@cam.ac.uk).

Richard Dunn  Royal Museums Greenwich

Literature Review
by Tavis Harris

As Spring slowly but surely raises its head, there is plenty of material for maritime history enthusiasts. First off is a series of letters written by Marine Private Charley Morrison while serving on a United States Naval vessel during the Battle of New Orleans. These are found in “New Orleans is Ours!” Naval History Magazine (Vol. 27, No. 2 April 2013) edited by Craig L. Symonds, retired USN officer and current professor of history at the United States Naval Institute. Morrison’s letters provide a unique and fascinating look into shipboard life and military operations during the conflict.

The United States Naval institute has also provided a compelling think piece in their Proceedings magazine for April 2013. The institute
asked senior commanders from various navies the following: “economies across the globe continue to contract, navies, armies, and air forces are being told, if not, “do more with less” to at least “do the same with less…” What innovative efficiencies and economies are you implementing, or considering implementing, to improve force readiness?” Responses from twenty-one global naval forces were registered, including Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) who observed several of the changes and challenges the fleet faces in the upcoming years, including procurement of new support vessels and the implementation of a single training system.

Robert M. Peck, curator of art and artifacts at Drexel University’s Academy of Natural Sciences provides a thorough analysis of the meaning and interpretation of visual art concerning Arctic exploration in “The art of the Arctic: British painting in the Far North.” *Journal of Maritime Research* (Vol. 14, Iss. 2 June 2012). Peck argues that our understanding of Arctic exploration is primarily shaped by contemporary narratives and written accounts of such events. Visual representations are less understood, and roughly divided into two categories: sombre, more realistic works by serving naval officers and the romantic, fanciful creations of professional artists. Peck seeks to unpack the meanings of each and offer the first comprehensive inquiry into these important distinctions.

One final article examined this month was Calvin Mangyani’s “Resurrection of the Marine Capability in the South African Navy: The Maritime Reaction Squadron” from *South African Journal of Military Studies* (Vol. 40, No. 3). Mangyani, an officer in the South African Navy (SAN) documents the elimination and restoration of organic marine capabilities in the SAN with an emphasis on the important roles the newly-formed marines play in South African defence policies.

**Hamilton Naval Historical Trust**

Readers will be familiar with Tavis Harris’ Literature Review in their quarterly *Argo* and with her recent work at the Hamilton Naval Historical Trust. For this issue, we invited her to share some images of artefacts that the Trust has on display. Tavis has provided us with images and an obituary of an interesting Second World War officer. We encourage other members to send their photos and commentary of
memorials, services and special projects so we may share these events with other readers.

Dress uniform of Kenneth H. Salaman.
Images courtesy of Hamilton Naval Historical Trust

Kenneth Herman Salaman (1900-1984), intelligence officer, was born on 15 March 1900 at 1 Lower Terrace Branch Hill, Hampstead, London, the son of Jewish parents, Herman Cohen (d. in or after 1932), a barrister and his wife, Bessie Salaman (d. in or after 1932).

He was educated at Elstree School and then at Eastbourne College before joining the Royal Navy as a 'special entry' cadet in 1918. He subsequently served on HMS Iron Duke, and later became an expert on torpedoes. In 1935, as an interpreter in French and Russian, he transferred to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Soon after joining SIS Cohen was placed in charge of the London headquarters of a European network known simply as Z, which operated under commercial cover in parallel to the more overt SIS organization that depended upon a string of passport control offices attached to diplomatic premises abroad. Masquerading as Kenneth Crane and designated Z-3, Cohen worked through a front organization, Menoline Ltd in Maple Street and an office in Bush House, to recruit sources, including several distinguished foreign correspondents of British newspapers in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Upon the outbreak of war Z's assets were amalgamated into SIS's main organization and Cohen was attached to the French country section known as A5, becoming head of the Vichy section in May 1940.
His task was to recruit sources from within the unoccupied zone of France, and one of his successes was Jacques Bridou, who was parachuted into France in March 1941 to establish the Alliance network based in Pau and Marseilles, and later to be headed by the formidable Marie-Madeleine Meric (Sister of Jacques Bridou and well known as Fourcade). In the summer 1943, in anticipation of an invasion of Europe, Cohen was selected to take charge of Brissex, the British component of a large scheme, codenamed Sussex Plan, to parachute fifty-four two-man allied intelligence teams behind enemy lines. This huge paramilitary enterprise was intended to disrupt Nazi communications and logistics immediately after D-day and then liaise with local resistance organizations. The role played by Cohen required considerable tact and diplomacy. In the aftermath of the war he held senior posts in SIS (chief controller of Europe and director of production) and in 1946 was appointed a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. He retired in 1953 and was created Companion of the Order of the Bath.

Oxford DNB, Nigel West

http://www.plan-sussex-1944.net/anglais/biography/cohen.htm Viewed April 10 2013

Paper Proposals and Abstracts for CNRS 2013 Waterloo, 2 May 2013

Ian O’Shea (University of Victoria) “The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations: A Case Study of the 1893 Naval Scare in Britain”

In 1893 Britain experienced its third major naval scare in less than ten years. Doubts about British naval supremacy were fueled by an increasingly competitive international climate, and, more directly, by rapid technological change which rendered warships obsolete and threatened new innovations in the methods of naval warfare. This paper will use a case study of the 1893 naval scare to examine the complexity and nuance of civil-military relations in the modern world. Mass panics continue to affect society, although those relating to armed forces are neglected in the scholarship, but understanding them becomes more difficult as the key mobilizing factor, the media, becomes complicated by radio, television and the internet.

The press is the focal point of this study, being a semi-independent actor between the three primary groups, the service, the
government and the public. This study aims to provide a more complex analysis of this relationship, as well as the variations and conflicts within each grouping. Through the press, dissident thinkers could voice divergent opinions, recombine ideas and introduce subtle changes of emphasis that are easily lost in generalizations about panic.

These kind of public events are often easy for historians to gloss over, cherry-picking a couple of key episodes and then stating that panic ensued among the public. This tends to isolate panics as separate events; I would suggest that a panic is better imagined as the crest of a wave rising from a more or less consistent level of concern. In the case of 1893, the roots of the scare extended back to the 1889 Naval Defence Act, the policy response to the 1888 naval scare, which provided £21,000,000 over five years for warship construction and yet failed to satisfy all of the Admiralty’s critics. The 1888 scare had resulted in the official declaration of the Two-Power Standard as the basis of British naval policy, but the exact definition of this standard was heavily debated. This discussion, coupled with a renewed burst of anxiety over French naval preparations in the Mediterranean provided the basis for a renewed panic. Having learnt from the experience of previous panics, since both the 1884 and 1888 scares had resulted in major construction programs, the central demand was for a new multi-year construction program to come into effect when the Naval Defence Act ended. Ultimately, enough public pressure was mobilized to push the government into producing the Spencer program of over £3,000,000 and seven battleships.

By appreciating the deep roots of these public events, their legitimacy as a point of historical inquiry increases. These were not ephemeral moments on the sidelines of the naval history narrative, but key moments where political and naval interests, within and without Parliament and the service, engaged on questions of national significance in full public view. The support of public opinion, real or imagined, was a powerful ally for politicians and naval officers interested in promoting the navy, but once awakened public opinion was hard to control. A naval scare made it very difficult for a government to simply refuse to act, although delay was a universal tactic. Most importantly, the public discourse cannot be discounted as a creative force. At a time when no naval war staff existed to plan comprehensively for the future, the open discussion conducted through the press was critical to the development of naval thought.
Joseph Zeller (University of New Brunswick) “Jutland: A Grand Indecisiveness”

Soon one hundred years will have passed since the start of First World War. Britain’s initial disappointment with its performance in The Battle of Jutland (1916), the only large-scale naval fleet action of the War, has been allowed to colour the historical narrative for far too long. In fact, Jutland may well have been the most successful British battle in naval history.

A fleet sunk to the bottom consumes no further resources, requires no repair, men or metal. The German fleet, however, returned home shy only two of its twenty-seven large capital ships and nine of its seventy-two small craft. The rest of the fleet was so battle-damaged that it would be almost half a year of intense repair before much of it would be seaworthy once more. In the decade leading up to war, Germany spent more on outfitting its navy than on its army. The subsequent additional financial and material burden for wide-scale resupply and repair cannot be underestimated.

This presentation will summarize some of the findings of my doctoral level studies on the Battle of Jutland and will delve into the historiographical legacy which resulted. I will speak briefly on the Battle and the factors contributing to Britain’s disproportional losses. I will then set the Battle within the context of the First World War as a whole while emphasizing its place within international commerce, the British blockade and the u-boat campaign.

At the time, historians considered The Battle of Jutland indecisive, but the future it shaped was anything but indecisive. It was not the victory for which the British had hoped and strove towards, nor was it one that satisfied any of the participants, but that does not change the nature of the victory won by the British. The German fleet returned home in tatters and, therefore, had to be both mended and supplied for the remainder of the War. Although none of those who fought knew, as we now do with the benefit of hindsight, that the German fleet was to accomplish nothing of consequence for the remainder of the War, today the historical narrative should acknowledge
the Battle of Jutland as a resounding victory for Britain.

Russell Freure (University of Waterloo) “When Memory and Reality Clash: The First World War and the Myth of American Neutrality”

This paper looks at the “myth” of American neutrality during the First World War. Most studies of the Wilson administration’s policy seek to determine how and why the country found itself at war in April 1917, after two and a half years of non-belligerence. The common factor in these discussions is the tacit acceptance by historians of American neutrality from August 1914 through April 1917. The present paper challenges the assumption that the United States’ non-belligerence was in fact neutral, indeed American intervention in favour of the Entente powers effectively began in the first months of the war. The argument is twofold. First, that Britain carried out a systematic violation of international law. Second, that an overwhelmingly pro-Entente administration in Washington acquiesced in British policy in order to maintain relations with London, and prevent an Entente defeat.

Ambjörn Adomeit (Western University) “Roosevelt’s Private War: Theodore Roosevelt and his Role in Shaping the United States Navy”

Fuelled by one man's highly focussed ambition, the modern United States Navy took form under the political and theoretical pressures exerted upon it by Theodore Roosevelt in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Roosevelt's great interest in the naval side of the War of 1812 translated into a professional preoccupation later in life, culminating in a short stint in President McKinley's government as Assistant Secretary of the Navy before becoming one of the most renowned Heads of State of the United States of America. This paper will examine Roosevelt's policy priorities: What policies did he advocate that were sunk prematurely? Which of these was he able to implement as President? And, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, what policies did he view as important – or problematic – and discuss with his closest confidants? What lessons did he derive directly from his friend Alfred Thayer Mahan? With what concepts did he disagree? This paper will delve into Theodore Roosevelt's personal correspondence to find the answers to these questions.
Christopher Greenlaw (Wilfrid Laurier University)  
“Railways at Sea”

In each of the two World Wars, military and civilian maritime forces of the Commonwealth were ill prepared for the logistical demands of global warfare at sea. In the years preceding both conflicts, governmental complacency concerning littoral sovereignty and a lack of desire to upkeep their collective naval assets resulted in an inability to provide sufficient maritime transportation and defence once hostilities commenced. In Canada, the Dominion Government was forced to call upon its railways, which owned and operated a substantial fleet of steamships for their trans-oceanic passenger and freight services, to fill this gap. The British Admiralty was equally in need of shipping and also sought to press Canadian railway ships into military service by taking advantage of the fact that many of these railway-owned vessels were registered in Britain. The marine and steamship services provided by the railways of Canada had a significant impact on the outcome of both conflicts and the railways tailored their war efforts as best as possible to fill gaps in the deep-sea capabilities of the Dominion and the Commonwealth. These significant contributions to the wars included much more than just serviceable hulls: thousands of employees within the railway steamship services went to war with their vessels and, all too frequently, were lost along with their charge.

Robert Dienesch (University of Windsor) “1943 Through Official Reports: American Submarine Operations in the Year of Change

The history of the Second World War in the Pacific really revolves around three main themes. The first two, carrier operations and amphibious landings, draw the attention of both scholars and the general public who share a love of military history. The dramatic aerial dogfights and bombing missions, the courageous images of Marines storming the beaches on windswept islands, and the high casualty figures highlight both the courage of the individuals involved and the importance of their achievements. Yet there is a third theme that has not received nearly the attention of scholars as it should have. This is the war waged by small submarines alone in far distant seas against the heart of the Japanese empire, its merchant shipping. This war did not
produce the dramatic moments as the Battle of Midway or the landings on Okinawa. Rather, it was a slow war of attrition waged largely outside the public view with dangers unique to the submarine war.

Unfortunately this war has not received a great deal of scholarly attention. Popular accounts and memoirs remain the core of our understanding of the submarine war. While providing a great deal of anecdotal evidence and great stories to catch the imagination, they lack a clear scholarly methodology. The few scholarly studies of the submarine war in its entirety that do exist tend to be dated. Theodore Roscoe’s *United States Submarine Operations in World War II* (1949), a reworked version of the classified official history by Richard Voge, Chief of Staff ComSubPac, Samuel Elliot Morrison’s official history specifically the fourth volume published in 1949 and partially in volumes six through eight the last of which was published in 1953 and Clay Blair Jr.’s 1975 book *Silent Victory* are really the core of the orthodox understanding of the submarine war. This interpretation argued that the submarine performance in 1942 and early 1943 left a lot to be desired because of ineffective torpedo design, a defective attack doctrine combined with unaggressive skippers, and an insufficient number of submarines. While recent scholarship like Joel Ira Holwitt’s *Execute Against Japan* (2009) and Anthony Newpower’s *Iron Men and Tin Fish* (2010) indicate some of the potential of subject area, more work needs to be done.

This paper is a first step in that direction. In honour of the seventieth anniversary of the year 1943, this paper focuses our attention on creating a better understanding of submarine operations for that twelve month period. This was a pivotal year in the submarine war. It saw the correction of two separate torpedoes problems, the introduction of more new fleet class boats to the Pacific and a reversal in submarine performance with the tonnage sunk per month exceeding 100,000 tons in each of the last three months of that year. That level of performance remained the norm until 1945. The central source of this study, supported by secondary literature, is a detailed examination of the submarine patrol reports for 1943. Patrol reports are unique sources to do this. More complete than a ships log, each is a cumulative report for a submarines patrol and as such it represents the only complete record available of a submarine’s activities at sea. Each boat patrolled alone and in radio silence and there was no other record of events. Thus they are central to any understanding of the submarine war and how it evolved over time. As such these reports provide an opportunity to examine several aspects of the submarine war which are
critical to our understanding of performance. Obviously torpedo performance stands out as an issue but also Japanese anti-submarine operations, the tempo of patrols, frequency of contacts, the influence of radar on ship performance, enemy aircraft threats, and even mechanical performance or deficiencies are evident in the reports.

Overall, this paper is part of a larger research project on US submarine operations. Thus, the feedback from this presentation will help refine further research on the submarine war in the Pacific. In the long run, it also helps to reshape our understanding of the submarine war and re-balance our understanding of the Pacific War.

Roger Sarty (Wilfrid Laurier University)
“The RCAF’s First Catalinas and Cansos, 1939-1942”

The RCAF first identified the U.S. Navy’s Consolidated PBY flying boat as an essential type for coastal and trade defence operations in 1939. High costs, competing Allied orders with the U.S. manufacturer, and the need for modifications for cold-weather operations on Canada’s east coast, however, delayed procurement until 1941. Initially the RCAF received British variants known as ‘Catalinas’ and then, late in the year, the first ‘Cansos,’ the version built to Canadian specifications. In the end, the RCAF received just barely adequate numbers just in time to meet the U-boat thrust into North American waters that began in January 1942. The Catalinas and Cansos, with their remarkable 24-hour endurance, soon became the workhorses of Eastern Air Command.

Dr. Richard Goette (CFC, RMC, Trent University) and Dr. Geoff Hayes (University of Waterloo)
“Closing the Mid-Atlantic Air Gap: Strategic, Operational and Personal Reflections”

In 1942-1943, Germany’s U-boat fleet ravaged convoys that traversed through the Mid-Atlantic “Air Gap,” a massive 300 x 600 mile hole in the air coverage along the North Atlantic Run between Greenland and the Azores Islands. Although the British recognized this problem by late 1941, the Air Gap was not in fact closed until the spring of 1943 due to a conflict over strategy and the allocation of aircraft resources. The four-engine long-range aircraft required to provide coverage for shipping in what sailors called the “Black Pit” became a
bone of contention between the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command, supported by the Royal Navy, which advocated the use of these airplanes for a defensive maritime strategy, and RAF Bomber Command, supported by the Air Staff and the Prime Minister, which favoured their utilization strategic bombing offensive.

Based on the article that he published in *The Northern Mariner* in 2005, Richard’s part of the joint presentation outlines the strategic, operational, and doctrinal debates that surrounded the Air Gap crisis during the Battle of the Atlantic. Geoff’s part of the presentation takes a more personal approach through an examination of his uncle Allan Hayes, who flew with RAF Coastal Command’s premier maritime air power unit, 120 Squadron. The motto of this squadron was “endurance,” and Geoff demonstrates the difficulties faced by airmen fly long distances in treacherous conditions from Iceland. He also shows, however, that this “constant endeavour” (Coastal Command’s motto) was worthwhile in the end by outlining the effectiveness of 120 Squadron’s Very Long Range (VLR) Liberator aircraft in driving away and sinking U-boats in the Air Gap.

The presentation will be accompanied by slides.

**Carl Christie “’Hitler’s Little Pet was Blown to Pieces’: A Day with 5 (BR) Squadron of the RCAF’s Eastern Air Command”**

On 24 February 1943, while flying a No. 5 (Bomber Reconnaissance) Squadron Canso A on a convoy protection patrol, Flight Lieutenant F.C. Colborne and his crew spotted a German U-boat on the surface. They flung their amphibian to the attack, lumbering back to base afterwards in a state of euphoria. As the news spread, the reaction within the RCAF’s much-maligned Eastern Air Command to a successful engagement with the enemy in the Western Atlantic greatly improved morale after several frustrating months. It was a shot in the arm just when needed.

This attack differed little from other such incidents in the Battle of the Atlantic, the long campaign to secure Britain’s lifeline against an innovative and highly successful enemy submarine offensive. Perhaps the biggest difference from most attacks by anti-submarine aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force came with the attack report submitted by the crew. Colborne and other members of his team took more than the
usual time to record in their own hands, and often in a colourful vernacular, details of their showdown with the U-boat. Decades later the report provides us an opportunity to experience vicariously what it must have been like to attack a surfaced U-boat from the air. Equally as important, perhaps more, it gives us early evidence of the progress EAC was making in adopting new anti-submarine doctrine recommended by Royal Air Force Coastal Command.

Québec et la Marine française en 1759
by Charles Nadeau

Carte du fleuve Saint-Laurent à Québec en juillet 1759.
L'anse des Mères est située immédiatement à l'est de Wolfe's Cove.

À l'automne de 1758, Louis Antoine de Bougainville fut dépêché par le marquis de Montcalm à la cour de Versailles pour obtenir des renforts en Nouvelle-France. Il rencontra Nicolas Berryer, ministre de la Marine, qui lui déclara: «Monsieur, quand le feu est à la maison, on ne s'occupe pas des écuries.» Malgré cette déclaration cavalière, le
gouvernement français fournit une aide navale à sa colonie. Quelle fut l'ampleur de cette assistance et qu’en firent les autorités militaires à Québec?

La remarque de Berryer révélait la position précaire de la France à la fin de 1758. La guerre continentale avait atteint une impasse, l’aide financière à l’Autriche ruinait le gouvernement, les Anglais frappaient à volonté le long des côtes et les ports étaient l’objet de blocus qui paralysaient le commerce. Paris voulait une paix honorable, mais n’était pas en mesure de négocier. Pour remédier à cette situation, les autorités modifièrent la stratégie. L’armée envahirait la Grande-Bretagne et menacerait Londres pour créer une panique financière. Le plan imaginé en conséquence incluait la réunion des escadres de l’Atlantique, basée à Brest, et de la Méditerranée, située à Toulon. La flotte combinée escorterait une armée de 20,000 hommes assemblée à Vannes en Bretagne, passant à l’ouest de l’Irlande et débarquant dans l’estuaire de la Clyde, près de Glasgow. La présence de sympathisants écossais devait faciliter les opérations de ce contingent. Après le débarquement, la majorité de la flotte continuerait sa route, contournerait l’Écosse et traverserait la mer du Nord. Elle rejoindrait une seconde armée, établie à Ostende en Belgique actuelle, et la conduirait à la baie de Maldon dans le comté d’Essex, à 50 kilomètres de Londres. Le mérite de ce plan provenait de l’absence de troupes régulières en Angleterre.

En 1758, le gouvernement français avait approvisionné le Canada. En 1759, il laissa cette tâche à l’entreprise privée, c’est-à-dire à des corsaires. Le lieutenant de frégate Jacques Kanon fut engagé par le munitionnaire Cadet, un aide de l’intendant Bigot, pour entreprendre cette mission. Il prit la tête d’un convoi de 17 navires, dont trois frégates, qui partit de Bordeaux le 22 mars et jeta l’ancre devant Québec le 17 mai. Trois vaisseaux manquaient cependant à l’appel. Le Rameau et le Bonnes Amies furent capturés et la Charmante Rachel le fut probablement aussi. Dix autres bâtiments voyagèrent indépendamment vers Québec. Deux furent saisis, un fit demi-tour et deux transports, le Soleil Royal et le Colibri arrivèrent à bon port. Les cinq autres, partis de Bayonne, de Bordeaux et de Barcelone n’ont pas laissé d’indications sur le résultat de leur voyage. L’effort logistique pour Québec totalisa donc 36 navires dont seulement 20 arrivèrent à destination.

L’aide navale française, malgré son manque d’ampleur, eut un impact majeur en Nouvelle-France. L’information qu’apportait Bougainville entraîna un changement radical dans la disposition des troupes. Conscients des préparatifs d’invasion au sud des lacs Champlain et Ontario, Vaudreuil et Montcalm avaient stationné la grande majorité de leurs effectifs dans le district de Montréal, laissant Québec à découvert. Au lendemain de l’arrivée de Bougainville, cinq des régiments français et plus de 10,000 miliciens partirent pour Québec. Les soldats passèrent les cinq à six semaines suivantes à établir un camp retranché le long de la baie de Beauport et à renforcer les fortifications de la capitale. L’apparition des quatre navires du roi sous le commandement de Jean Vauquelin et des transports du convoi de Kanon permirent aux autorités d’envisager une résistance soutenue. La récolte de 1758 avait été la pire de la guerre. Sans les provisions et munitions venues de France, Québec aurait capitulé en juillet par manque de ressources matérielles. La troisième contribution de la
 marine fut l’apport de son artillerie, soit 335 canons, et la présence de près de 2000 marins, en plus des 400 soldats dépêchés par la métropole. L’entrée de la flotte anglaise dans l’estuaire du Saint-Laurent peu après le passage des bâtiments français signifiait que les 20 navires ancrés devant Québec ne pouvaient plus sortir.

Le gouverneur Vaudreuil était un officier de marine, mais il avait gagné ses galons dans les compagnies franches et non en mer. Sa stratégie concernant l’utilisation des effectifs marins à sa disposition est discutable. Sa première décision est la plus extraordinaire. Il s’abstint d’utiliser les frégates dans leur rôle combattant, particulièrement pour bloquer l’étroit passage de la Traverse, entre le cap Tourmente et la pointe nord de l’île d’Orléans. En fait, il éloigna de Québec tous les vaisseaux venus de France excepté quatre. Les transports remontèrent le fleuve sur cent kilomètres jusqu’à Batiscan où fut établi un dépôt de provisions. Trois frégates prirent position plus près, à Deschambault. Deux vaisseaux du roi restèrent à l’anse des Mères, à Québec, pour un temps, avant de chercher refuge eux aussi en amont. Un minimum de marins demeura à bord de ces navires comme équipage de service. Les matelots devinrent pour la plupart artilleurs aux batteries de la ville, qui furent augmentées par des canons de la flotte. Le reste arma des brûlots et des canonnières.

Le premier effort naval fut contre l’avant-garde britannique alors qu’elle mouillait à l’île aux Coudres. Le plan était de lancer des radeaux emflammés contre l’escadre, mais il fut vite abandonné. Le second effort fut au passage de La Traverse. Un brûlot prit position au nord de l’île d’Orléans et des radeaux incendiaires s’établirent aux environs du village de Saint-François. Une batterie de quatre canons fut aménagée sur l’île. Les marins britanniques découvrirent cependant le navire et armèrent des chaloupes pour s’en emparer. Le raid fut repoussé grâce à l’intervention de canots amérindiens. L’effet de surprise étant perdu, l’assaut fut annulé, d’autant que les Canadiens qui armaient les radeaux refusaient d’y participer. On rembarqua la batterie et tout le monde s’en retourna à Québec. La troisième tentative de brûlots prit place le 28 juin alors que le gros de la flotte anglaise était à l’ancre en
face de Saint-Laurent de l’île d’Orléans et qu’elle était quelque peu désorganisée suite à une forte tempête la veille. Trois navires du convoi furent sacrifiés en cette occasion, soit l’Américain, l’Angélique et les Quatre Frères. La Toison d’Or, qui avait également été convertie, avait pris feu lors des travaux, tuant douze hommes. Trois chalutiers furent ajoutés au groupe qui quitta l’Anse des Mères peu après minuit. Les conditions étaient excellentes, mais les Français allumèrent le feu beaucoup trop tôt, permettant aux bâtiments anglais de manœuvrer et aux marins de remorquer les brûlots. Aucun dommage ne fut infligé. Une quatrième tentative fut faite un mois plus tard avec 70 radeaux et chaloupes reliés par des chaînes sur une longueur de 200 mètres. La progression de cet ensemble était cependant trop lente et les Britanniques réussirent encore à déjouer la manœuvre. Un dernier essai du genre fut effectué le 10 août par un seul bâtiment chargé d’explosifs. La détonation tua un jeune officier de la Royal Navy et fit cinq blessés. La portion du plan de défense naval français favorisant les brûlots se révéla donc un échec complet. Une des raisons fut le recours à des marins civils pour la conduite de ces opérations.

L’utilisation de canonnières s’avéra aussi inefficace. Douze chaloupes, appelées jacobites, furent équipées d’un canon de huit livres. Six carcassières reçurent un canon de 24. Ces embarcations conduisirent leur première attaque au début de juillet contre la brigade du général Monckton nouvellement débarquée à la Pointe de Lévy. Ils firent une douzaine de morts avant d’être chassées par des frégates qui pénétrèrent dans la rade. Des assauts contre les vaisseaux de guerre prirent également place une fois que ceux-ci eurent mouillé en face de la ville. À la fin de juillet la moitié des canonnières avaient été mises hors de combat sans avoir causé de dommage.

Le 18 juillet, six navires britanniques passèrent de nuit sous le cap Diamant. Ces bâtiments s’installèrent dans le secteur de Cap Rouge et Saint-Nicolas. Dans les semaines qui suivirent ils menèrent différents raids et menacèrent les convois de provisions acheminés de Batiscan. Le 25 août, le gouverneur Vaudreuil se décida enfin à armer des frégates pour éliminer cette menace à ses lignes de
communications. Mais, le 27, d’autres navires anglais réussirent le passage sous les canons de la ville et Vaudreuil annula l’opération. Lors de cet effort raté, la frégate *Aimable Nanon* s’échoua et coula. Les Britanniques firent deux passages additionnels, de sorte que le 5 septembre 21 bâtiments, dont un navire de ligne de 50 canons, trois frégates et cinq sloops armés, pouvaient opérer à leur gré en haut de Québec devant une absence d’opposition navale.

Après la capitulation de Québec, le vice-amiral Saunders commença à retirer ses navires de Québec. Tous étaient partis en date du 26 octobre à l’exception d’une couple de goélettes qui hivernèrent au Canada. Il restait alors 15 navires français en amont de la ville. Les quatre navires du roi et un transport demeurèrent dans la colonie. Jacques Kanon, de son côté, tenta une sortie avec les dix autres. Malheureusement, durant la nuit du 22 au 23 novembre, alors que ce groupe était à l’ancre à l’embouchure de la rivière Chaudière, il y eut une terrible tempête et l’*Élizabeth*, le *Maréchal de Senneterre*, le *Soleil Royal* et le *Duc de Fronsac* cassèrent leur chaînes et s’échouèrent. Dans la nuit du 24 au 25 novembre, les six navires restant firent le passage devant la ville. De 200 à 300 boulets et une centaine de bombes furent lancés contre eux. Le dernier transport, le *Swinton*, ne réussit pas à s’esquiver. Plus tard, la *Chézine* fut capturée par le HMS *Rippon* dans le golfe Saint-Laurent. Le sort de la *Vénus* ne nous est pas connu. Seulement trois des navires de Kanon retournèrent donc en France soit le *Machault*, le *Bienfaisant* et le *Colibri*.

Le grand plan français contre l’Angleterre ne put être exécuté suite aux défaites écrasantes de Lagos et des Cardinaux, respectivement en août et en novembre 1759, qui marquèrent la disparition de la marine de Louis XV en tant que force militaire. Les demandes de Lévis pour des renforts en 1760 ne pouvaient en conséquence être satisfaites. L’effort naval de 1759 avait été limité. Il aurait pu permettre à Montcalm et à Vaudreuil de gagner suffisamment de temps pour éviter une défaite. Mais le résultat final serait sans doute demeuré le même. Sans une marine, la France ne pouvait espérer maintenir des colonies outremer.
Carte de l’Île d’Orléans montrant l’emplacement des villages.
2013 CONFERENCES

CNRS 2013 Conference
"Maritime Connections"
to be held in conjunction with the
Laurier Center for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies
in Waterloo, Ontario,
May 1-5, 2013.

NASOH 2013 Conference
to be held at
NOAA’s Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary
in
Alpena, Michigan
May 15 - 18, 2013
Nominations for Executive Officers and Councillors (2013-2014.)

In accordance with Article 31 of the Society's By-Laws, the Nominating Committee proposes the following Officers and Councillors be re-elected at the 2013 Annual General Meeting:

President: Maurice D. Smith
1st Vice-President: Christopher Madsen
2nd Vice-President: Roger Sarty
Treasurer: Errolyn Humphreys
Secretary: Robert L. Davison
Membership Secretary: Faye Kert
Past President: Paul Adamthwaite
Councillor: Isabel Campbell
Councillor: Dan Conlin
Councillor: Richard O. Mayne
Councillor: Barbara Winters

The Nominating Committee will accept proposals for candidates, in writing and with the signatures of three members, including a written undertaking signed by the nominee to accept the position if elected, not later than the 20th day of April, after which no more nominations will be accepted.

Paul Adamthwaite
Chair
Nominating Committee

MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL PAGE

CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord*, a quarterly refereed journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the North Atlantic, Arctic and North Pacific Oceans. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, nautical archaeology and maritime societies.
• Argonauta, a quarterly newsletter publishing articles, opinions, news and information about maritime history and fellow members.
• An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime minded locations across Canada such as Halifax, Vancouver, Hamilton, Churchill and Quebec City.
• Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at $65 for individuals, $20 for students, or $90 for institutions. Please add $10 for international postage and handling. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to subscribe to one of several other levels of membership, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and any donation above the cost of basic membership to the Society is automatically acknowledged with a tax-receipt.

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