

**ARGONAUTA**



**The Newsletter of the Canadian Nautical Research Society/Société  
canadienne pour la recherche nautique**

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# **ARGONAUTA**

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**Editorial**

As 2012 unfolds, commemorations of the War of 1812 are being organized across Canada and the United States and will continue for the next three years. The Canadian Nautical Research Society is providing a forum for new scholarship on this subject, as readers will see in the call for papers which appears inside the back cover. Members will be delighted to learn that the conference will be held in the picturesque town of Picton, Ontario. Those planning to visit will find the Prince Edward County website (<http://prince-edward-county.com>) useful and may want to plan a few extra days to explore the local wineries, to bicycle along the lovely paths in the area, to visit local shops and museums, and enjoy long walks along the beaches on the shores of Lake Ontario. Mark 15<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> May on your calendars.

As some in the naval history community have pointed out, logistics is a critical area of naval development and one that is sometimes overlooked among the many factors considered in fleet development and the history of naval engagements. This issue of *Argonauta* contains a very welcome piece on replenishment at sea by Jan Drent. His memories reveal that NATO navies spent considerable time and effort in developing this important area of expertise. The annexes to his paper highlight important innovations in the field from others.

An article by Karl Gagnon on the M-class destroyers draws our attention to an earlier period, when the Royal Navy provided significant support to further Royal Canadian naval capabilities at a time of severe

fiscal restraint. Victor Suthern announces War of 1812 commemorative events nicely linking the Royal Canadian Navy to an earlier period. Here volunteers make the difference, a theme that President Maurice Smith would like to emphasize with respect to the CNRS which has been run by volunteers since its inception.

For those of you lucky enough to attend the International Congress of Maritime History in Ghent, Belgium in July this year, we draw your attention to the forthcoming Keiichiro Nakagawa Lecture by Dr. Joshua Smith of the US Merchant Marine Academy. Most of our readers will likely be familiar with his role in the current debate on maritime history in *Coriolis*, and we invite you to read the words of President Maurice Smith, on this topic. We have planned a special issue of *Argonauta* in Winter 2013 dedicated to this debate.

We have several excellent articles lined up for future publication later this year; nearly all are naval and in English. Remember, this is *your* newsletter. We welcome articles in all areas of nautical research and whether your focus is naval, merchant, competitive yachting, diving, pleasure boating or other. Please send us your announcements, your memories, and your research pieces. We welcome materials on the War of 1812, but submissions dealing with other topics are equally desirable.

Isabel and Colleen

### **President's Corner by Maurice D. Smith**

A few years ago I acquired a copy of **Maritime History as World History**, edited by Daniel Finamore. It has a powerful list of contributors. And later I tackled **The Command of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 1649 – 1815** by N.A.M Rodger. To say the least these two books are challenging, but what caught my attention was the contrast between the two works and what I took to be the 'world view' of the authors. And that led to the following, in part a response to the two books above.

It is not a gauntlet nor is it a showdown at the OK Corral. Why don't we say that historian Joshua M Smith is seeking a kind of reconciliation among his fellow historians when he sets about asking, "how are we to understand the varying and different approaches to maritime history, and why do they communicate so poorly with one another". The foregoing appeared in "Far Beyond Jack Tar: Maritime

Historians and the Problem of Audience”, published in the online history journal, *Coriolis* (November 2011). Within a few pages, Smith (no relation) has divided maritime historians into “traditionalists” and “utilitarians”. Traditionalists, he says, “want intense internal discussions centered around well-defined methodology – they perceive their audience to be other academics” and, “deeply vested in scholarly respectability -- they are also more likely to use heavy academic jargon”. “For Utilitarians, maritime history is not merely a good debate among academics; it is meant to influence society’s actions and attitudes toward maritime affairs, including policy”. “An important characteristic of the utilitarian approach to maritime history is that perhaps more than any other approach to history, it emphasizes experiential learning”. Sea time. The detractors, “especially Europeans, often raise their hackles at this thought”, and “the English scholar N.A.M Rodger doubts the relevance of seafaring experience. Many historians have some sort of personal connection to seafaring... including almost the entire membership of the North American Society For Oceanic History”. And that would include many members of the CNRS, e.g. Gimblett, Glover, Smith, Adamthwaite, and Pritchard.

Smith ends up with this: “[i]f this analysis has any value, it will lead maritime historians to question whether they follow a Traditional or Utilitarian path. The answer lies in the questions that you seek to ask, your intended audience, and how you envision connecting to the historical profession, broadly defined. To me, there are only good questions in maritime history, no matter whether posed by Traditionalists or Utilitarians. But there are sometimes bad attitudes, and I encourage all scholars to practice humility and good manners in the very big tent known as maritime history”.

In the same issue of *Coriolis* Lincoln Paine, in relative terms, the shellback historian, senior in years to Smith has this to say in “Maritime History and Its Discontents: A Response to Smith and Chaves”. “For whatever reason, we labour under the misapprehension that maritime history is a class or phylum of history rather than its own kingdom. That is, we continue to accept it as subordinate rather than equal to an (unnamed) terrestrial history. In his introduction to *Maritime History as World History*, Daniel Finamore nails it when he asserts that, 'Human interaction with the sea is a fundamental factor of world history, not a dissociated force of particularism concern.' Ignoring this fundamental truth compels us to proclaim our discipline’s legitimacy. Small wonder that as Smith writes, 'some scholars do not consider themselves maritime historians. We drive them away'.

### **Announcements**

In mid-May, the Osher Map Library/Smith Center for Cartographic Education at the University of Southern Maine will open an exhibit of ocean liner documents from a collection donated by the late Norman Morse, who assembled these materials over the course of eight decades. The Morse archive includes nearly 3,000 items that trace the development of the North Atlantic passenger ship from the 1870s through the present. These include ships plans, brochures, daily schedules, abstract logs, postcards (some unused, others written and sent), rate cards, menus, passenger lists, snapshots, and articles from such journals as *Marine Engineering* and *Shipbuilding and Shipping Record*.

Thanks to Mr. Morse's generosity, the Osher Map Library is in the process of digitizing the collection to make it available in its entirety, and for free, on the Internet. For additional information, including exact dates and hours, please visit [\\*http://usm.maine.edu/maps/](http://usm.maine.edu/maps/).

Osher Map Library/  
Smith Center for Cartographic Education  
University of Southern Maine  
314 Forest Avenue Portland, Maine

### **Admirals' Medal 2010 Recipient – Mr Ken Macpherson**

The Awards Committee of the Admirals' Medal Foundation is pleased to announce Mr Ken Macpherson as the recipient of the Medal for 2010.

Established in 1985, in conjunction with the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Naval Service in Canada, the Admirals' Medal is bestowed upon individual Canadians in recognition of their outstanding achievements in the advancement of maritime affairs in Canada. Named for Rear-Admirals George Stephens and Victor Brodeur and Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, the silver medal is awarded annually for outstanding achievement in the areas of maritime related science, technology and academic studies or for the application of practical maritime skills warranting special recognition.

Past recipients of the award, of which there are presently 24, include: (1985) Mr. Robert Hendy, a founder of the Canadian Institution of Strategic Studies and organizer of the Royal Canadian Naval

Association; (1988) Miss Moira Dunbar, author of "*Arctic Canada from the Air*"; (2000) retired naval commander Tony German, whose book "*The Sea is at Our Gates*," continues to promote interest in Canada's maritime history; (2004) Mr. Mike Eaton, one of the key personnel behind the development of the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS); and most recently (2009) retired naval commander Peter Haydon, for his lifetime contributions to educating Canadians with regard to maritime affairs.

Mr. Macpherson, a well-known author, editor and historian, has written and collaborated on several outstanding reference works about the ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and Maritime Command. These include: *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1985* (and updates to 2002); *The River Class destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy, Corvettes of the Royal Canadian Navy 1939-1945*; and most recently *Cadillac of Destroyers: HMCS St Laurent and Her Successors*. Before retirement in 1987, Mr. Macpherson was a historian in the Ontario Provincial Archives and custodian of its picture collection.

### **Future Nominations for Admiral's medal**

Nominations close on the 31<sup>st</sup> of March annually, and should be made by letter with the attached nomination form fully completed. Please include relevant biographical information, a brief description of the work, achievement or display of practical skill that it is proposed to recognize, along with the name of the individual or organization submitting the recommendations. Nominations and all correspondence related to the Admirals' Medal should be addressed to:

Executive Secretary The Admirals' Medal Foundation

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### **Archives and Collections Society**

We are growing. The Archives and Collections Society is expanding, and has been for many years. Our collections, research facility and historic premises in The Victory have been evolving and developing into a significant facility, not only for Picton and Prince Edward County, but also for Ontario and Canada. Our collections and archive are globally significant, one of the outstanding naval/marine research centres in Canada.

To reflect our growth, strategic significance and future plans, the Archives and Collections Society has been undergoing a branding review with the help of one of North America's top branding, marketing and research specialists, Lord Robbie Sprules. Our Board of Directors has approved a strategic plan to move forward with a new name and brand to better reflect our current reality. Lord Sprules has donated his time and expertise, research program, design and marketing support at no cost to the Society.

Starting 1 January 2012, we will be known as the Naval Marine Archive, The Canadian Collection. We are proud of our new name and our significant growth. Over the past years, the support of our Board, community, business colleagues and friends has allowed us to develop into one of the world's finest archive and collections of artefacts, journals, books, paintings and memorabilia. You will be seeing some changes, to our brand and to our building, over the coming months and years. We continue to be the home of the Canadian Society of Marine Artists, and will exhibit their incredible paintings in The Victory on a regular basis.

We invite everyone to drop in, say hello, and browse through this fine archive and collection. The Naval Marine Archive, The Canadian Collection continues to expand and grow with the receipt of many private collections. Although our archive and collections hold a significant number of naval/marine artefacts and books including our extensive yachting collection, we also have received air and land archival collections. Our collection is second to none, a true Canadian treasure. We are proud of our achievements, and with the continuing support of our community and the Canadian public, we hope to stand with the world's top collection institutes and research facilities. Thank you for your continuing support. Any financial donations will receive a charitable donation receipt for taxation purposes. Please join us in celebrating this significant moment in our history, and support us with any help you are able to give.

### **Naval Association of Canada – Conference**

You may have heard of the transformation of the venerable **Naval Officers Association of Canada** (NOAC) into the new and revitalized **Naval Association of Canada** (NAC). As a first step towards raising the Navy's profile and perhaps bring the interest groups together, NAC will hold a series of major naval-themed annual conferences. The first



will be held in conjunction with NAC`s Annual General Meeting in Ottawa. The conference itself will be held at the National Arts Center on Friday 1st June 2012. Senior speakers led by the Minister of National Defence have been invited to discuss the Government`s National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy further including high-tech command, control and ship management systems. Registration information and forms will soon be posted to the new NAC web site at [www.navalassoc.ca](http://www.navalassoc.ca). In the meantime I can answer any questions at [kensummers@telus.net](mailto:kensummers@telus.net).

### **RAS and I: Experiences of Replenishment at Sea by Jan Drent**

*As a Junior Officer:*

My first experience with underway replenishment was as a cadet in *Iroquois* in the summer of 1955. We did jackstay transfers with the light cruiser *Quebec*. We first year cadets were used to provide brawn on steadying lines, but we were also supposed to be observing, learning and recording our impressions and explaining how a jackstay was rigged in our journals. *Crusader* was my first destroyer as a junior officer. I remember that the fuelling position just forward of the break of the forecastle was cramped. This made handling the heavy fuel hose with its Admiralty coupling all the more tricky. The end of the fuelling operation involved the supplying ship "blowing through" after pumping to clear any residual oil. I recall the messy conclusion to one such replenishment. Heavy black oil sprayed all over our fuelling party as the coupling was being disconnected. A junior stoker below had probably closed the valve on his tank before the "blow through" was completed- or else the tanker had kept blowing after signalling they had stopped. Our First Lieutenant was incensed about his immaculate paintwork. His early service on the lower deck in the Thirties had inculcated an impressive focus on the "seamanlike" appearance of our ship and on seamanship in general.

*Aircraft type probe for liquid transfers:*

I served in four destroyer escorts starting in 1960 working up to department head and then Executive Officer. Their mid-ships fuelling position with adequate working space was better laid out than had been the case in the *Tribals* and *Crusader*. Tucked in abaft the superstructure

the fuelling party was less exposed. We frequently operated with the carrier and fuelled from North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] tankers. Replenishment at sea became more frequently practised once *Provider* joined the fleet in 1964. Planning how to keep the carrier's escorts topped before we had our own operational support ships [hereafter AOR] took ingenuity. I remember that when Commodore Stirling took the fleet up to Ungava Bay in 1961 the coastal tanker *Dundalk* was positioned in Goose Bay so that we could fuel going north.

*Replenishment at sea [hereafter RAS] as an evolution:*

*Bonaventure* didn't really carry enough fuel to support her screen but on occasion we used her to extend our legs. We did a passage across to Gibraltar from Bermuda in 1964 at a leisurely speed of advance [SOA] to work in lots of exercising. The rest of the 5th squadron went into Ponta Delgada to fuel but we stayed with the carrier as plane guard and topped up from her.

There were two significant developments in replenishment in the mid-Sixties. *Provider's* arrival in the fleet in 1964 moved the Royal Canadian Navy [hereafter RCN] into embarking both liquids and solids underway. The switch from burning black oil to the much lighter and cleaner distillate enabled the introduction of a probe system for transferring fuel underway instead of having to first connect the cumbersome old couplings. *Columbia* apparently changed to distillate in 1963 as a trial and the east coast *St Laurents*, *Restigouches*, and *Mackenzies* switched soon afterwards. The probe fuelling system took full advantage of *Provider's* tensioned span wires. Probe fuelling was introduced around 1966. The probe came across on a tensioned wire and dropped into a sort of oversized sleeve on the receiving ship's deck. Gravity helped the probe engage the sleeve. If the probe didn't come down quickly enough it did not trip the four locking devices inside the sleeve but this problem rarely happened. The probe system, based on air-to-air fuelling arrangements, had been recently been adopted by the United States Navy [hereafter USN]. It was known as the Parker Probe/Receiver System – possibly the Parker Company which still makes aircraft fuelling hardware were the manufacturers. At the time we believed that this probe system had been developed by a Canadian, but I have not been able to find supportive evidence. Stan Hopkins, a naval engineer serving in National Defence Headquarters in 1963-66, recalls that another engineer, Keith Davies, constructed a brilliant model in his basement of a probe system showing the crucial arrangement of the

receiver and the adjacent strong points, fastenings, wires and cables in the receiving ship. Possibly Keith Davies, then a Lieutenant, was involved in the design project for modifying the destroyer escorts to take the probe.

The former Engineering Officer of *St Laurent*, Rear Admiral (Ret'd) Denny Boyle, who did trials on the new probe system in 1966, recalls that fuelling could now be accomplished far more quickly – which had compelling operational advantages. His recollections are at Annex A. I believe that the faster fuelling was made possible through a combination of switching to distillate, which was lighter and flowed more quickly than the grades of messy “black oil” formerly used, and *Provider's* pumping capacity, which must have been greater than that of oilers that Denny had worked with previously. It's interesting that the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic [hereafter SACLANT] subsequently adopted the Parker Probe system in the late Sixties based on the Canadian experience. An email from an officer who was on the SACLANT staff is at Annex B.

Directing fuel into one of several tanks was orchestrated by the Engineering Officer using sound-powered telephones to a Stoker at each tank. Communications foul-ups, if the valve at the tank was not closed in time, resulted in unwelcome floods. Black oil made a real mess but distillate would also lift the vinyl asbestos deck tiles in mess decks. The pungent odour of a spill would linger in such areas and waft through the ship. Pushing the envelope is an element in the naval ethos. By the mid-Sixties we were recording and reporting various times involved in replenishment: time from waiting station to first line, time to start pumping, time from stop pumping to disengaging, etc. An annual contest for RAS proficiency was introduced.

#### *Fuelling from Astern:*

I experienced this only once, probably during *Restigouche's* Work Ups in early 1961. In fact the Flag Officer Atlantic Coast had, for the first time since 1945, recently re-created a Sea Training Staff. The Royal Navy had established the Flag Officer Sea Training organization just a bit earlier. After the Sea Training organization operating out of Somers Isles in Bermuda had been shut down in 1945 Squadron Commanders had been responsible for conducting post-refit workups. The first of the postwar Commanders Sea Training was Commander John Husher who came from command of *Haida*. *Restigouche*, having completed a

dockyard refit and *Athabaskan*, fresh from a refit by Canadian Vickers in Montreal, were worked up together. The sea phase was done out of Bermuda. We practised fuelling from a Royal Fleet Auxiliary using the astern method. The *Restigouche* and *St. Laurent* classes had a fuel connection on the forecastle, forward of the breakwater. This evolution was being carried out without previous experience and therefore everything moved slowly. Having said this, the round down complicated getting first lines and then the hose safely up on deck, and I thought at the time that using this method would be hazardous for those forward in a destroyer in any but moderate seas.

Captain (N) Robbie Allan tells me that he practised fuelling from the stern as late as 1983 when in command of *Margaree*. During a convoy exercise from Lisbon to the United Kingdom one of the chartered bulk carriers carried one of the NATO fuelling rigs. All of the escorts successfully tried using this equipment. The NATO fuelling rigs were paid for by Alliance Infrastructure Funds and were stockpiled in various ports for use in an emergency. Several countries had earmarked merchant ships which were configured to carry the rigs and could supply fuel by this method.

A tangible benefit of replenishment at sea is that it involves members of several of the ship's departments. It is also an opportunity to demonstrate proficiency and élan. When I joined *Restigouche* in 1960 I soon learned that our flamboyant captain was determined that we would make the fastest approaches to the supplying vessel and that everything else involved had to be visibly dashing and proficient. Other ships' companies naturally wanted to show off as well so there was always a competitive edge to replenishments. There were also occasional elements of showmanship. In some ships we mustered our informal band on deck to add a celebratory air and create a holiday atmosphere. Back in the sixties bolo lines were often used to make the first connection with the other vessel. Many ships had champion bolo line throwers and enthusiastic cheers would accompany particularly audacious throws across spectacular distances. Part of the replenishment procedure was of course stopping all rotating aerials. Over time, gun throwing rifles displaced bolo lines – because of the greater velocity of the line, it was less likely to end up being swept up into antennae – but was less spectacular.

*RAS as a DDH/DDE [Destroyer helicopter/Destroyer Escort] Captain:*

While in command of *Annapolis* on the East Coast and *Qu'Appelle* on the West Coast, we fuelled and replenished stores from a variety of replenishment ships from several nations. Thanks to the NATO replenishment manual we benefited from standardized procedures and communications. When I took over *Annapolis* in 1972 my predecessor, Peter Campbell, remarked, "We have become a RAS Navy". By that time we had lost the carrier but the east coast had two new AORs and Peter explained that there was a lot of emphasis on RAS proficiency. In my experience the Canadian AORs were the most efficient ships from which to replenish. We fuelled in all weathers in both *Annapolis* and *Qu'Appelle*. While with the Standing Naval Force, *Annapolis* fuelled from exotic tankers including small German auxiliaries with proficient civilian crews. These vessels were about the same length as a DDH and one didn't experience the same water pressure between hulls while alongside as was the case with larger replenishment ships. In my experience Royal Fleet Auxiliary [hereafter RFA] tankers had proficient but unhurried deck crews. In the Pacific, *Qu'Appelle* frequently fuelled from a venerable United States Naval Service civilian-manned T2 tanker of Second World War vintage. She always looked a bit scruffy. Her small deck crews almost made a fetish of working in a methodical but unrushed manner.

One replenishment in *Annapolis* to the east of Cape Breton Island with a Canadian AOR at night in late spring remains vividly in memory. We started encountering brash ice, and as we plowed along I started wondering about "bergy bits" and got the AOR Captain on the bridge to bridge telephone. Fortunately, we completed fuelling without incident.

The standard procedure was to move into an alongside position when summoned by flag or light by replenishment vessel, pass lines at about 100 feet (75-80 in benign conditions) and ease out to maybe 120 feet during liquid replenishment. Pressure wave between ships while alongside keeps them apart; the dangerous period is when passing other ship's quarter and bow. We always had our Special Sea Duty men closed up on the bridge, in the wheelhouse, and down below, as well as in the Emergency Conning Position, and I never experienced untoward incidents. I witnessed only two minor bumps during replenishments. I always had an experienced helmsman during replenishments. When practising replenishment approaches at night a destroyer escort in company had a steering problem and swung inward while alongside the

guide, causing minor hull damage. The destroyer was being steered by an Able Seaman trusted by his captain. The subsequent investigation established that there had been a momentary electrical fault in the tiller flat which interrupted power to the pumps in the hydraulic system which moved the twin rudders.

Replenishment in darkness added an extra layer of challenge. We used minimum (red) lighting on deck and switched this on only as needed. The distance line between ships had small coloured lights at 20 foot intervals. Driving a destroyer into position on a blacked-out replenishment vessel was an adrenalin-producing exercise until one could make out the wake of the other ship, or perhaps a curl of water from her stern. The unexpected made things more interesting. Alec Fox told a story about approaching a darkened RFA or United States Naval Service (civilian-manned) tanker while commanding *Athabaskan*. Just as he was about to pass the tanker's stern one of her crewman opened a door in the after house, flooding the night with white light.

Mishaps when ships are underway at close quarters are, fortunately, very rare. While replenishing off Victoria in early 1979 we in *Qu'Appelle* were on the port side of the "Fast Combat Support Ship" *USS Sacramento*, while *Mackenzie* was over on the starboard side. *Sacramento*, displacing 54,000 tons and one of the two largest warships ever built on the US West Coast, was powered by turbines originally intended for a never-completed WWII battleship. These gave her a shaft horsepower of 100,000 on two shafts yielding a top speed of 30 knots. During the RAS *Sacramento* had a steering gear failure. This mighty vessel began ponderously but unaccountably turning slowly towards *Mackenzie*. The problem was not noticed right away by the helmsman or her conning officer. However, *Sacramento's* captain, a highly-rated naval aviator putting in his deep draught command time before going on to a carrier, promptly noticed the swing and ordered a switch to emergency steering – but on the original course. *Mackenzie* was edging gingerly off the original replenishment course but when *Sacramento* abruptly turned back she brushed against *Mackenzie* aft. There was only cosmetic damage to both ships. The USN is totally unforgiving to commanding officers involved in mishaps, however minor, and the aviator captain never got his carrier command.

In 1988 LCDR (Ret'd) Rich Gimblett, then combat officer of *Preserver*, witnessed a collision with HMS *Penelope*, a *Leander* class frigate coming in to refuel during a NATO exercise to the Northwest of

the United Kingdom. *Penelope's* captain was doing a showy "crash stop" approach. This involved moving from the waiting station on the quarter at high speed, stopping both engines, applying maximum astern power to rapidly slow momentum and then getting "ahead" revolutions on in time to match the AOR's speed. Apparently the order for "Full Speed astern" was received correctly in the engine room for *Penelope's* inboard shaft, but the telegraph for the outboard shaft was not activated properly so that it continued propelling the frigate ahead. The result was a shear towards *Preserver*. The AOR ordered an "emergency breakaway" to the Norwegian frigate hooked up on her other side. The Norwegians peeled away in record time as *Preserver* started to turn away from *Penelope*. Unfortunately *Penelope* was now turning under the AOR's bows. *Preserver's* starboard anchor tore open a long gash in *Penelope's* hull well above the waterline. Fortunately there were no injuries and *Penelope* made her way home safely.

*As an Underway Replenishment Ship Captain:*

I commanded *Provider* 1982-84 on the west coast. We had many taskings and in 1983 were away for 204 days and steamed 43,000 nautical miles, which made it the busiest year since the ship had come around from the Atlantic in 1970. Replenishment with Pacific navies was generally straightforward because they all were familiar with the basic NATO procedures and communications methods. USN warships and replenishment ships were generally handled in a cautious manner, and their deck crews deliberate. The USN was using replenishment ships with naval crews which had aviators as captains getting deep draught time before moving up to command a carrier. They also had civilian-manned oilers. Their deck crews were proficient but deliberate. The Australians and New Zealanders had the same competitive spirit about demonstrating proficiency as did Canadian ships. As is often the case in smaller navies, the Japanese and Koreans were anxious to demonstrate their professional standards. Prior to an exercise with the Japanese we briefed them on a quick-release slip for disengaging the probe high wire after fuelling. This was a standard item for most navies, but not the Japanese. We could have used a modified rig, but it was impressive that the Japanese returned within 24 hours with a slip they had manufactured, opening a canvas bag on the wardroom deck with a flourish to verify that they were properly equipped.

Our tasks took *Provider* right across the North Pacific and we experienced a variety of sea conditions. Selecting a replenishment

course meant juggling the intended movement of the fleet or squadron with wind and sea. As the replenishment ship captain I always had the last word on the replenishment course to be used. When doing "Consolidation Replenishments" with other oilers we would negotiate the course. While fuelling into the wind and swell made station keeping by destroyers and frigates easier, in conditions over Force 5 (i.e. wave height greater than 3m; winds more than 20 knots) we generally had to select a down-wind course. Steering was never a problem for *Provider* due to our deep draught and a well-designed underwater hull. In heavy weather we had the destroyer or frigate close from an abeam waiting station. The disadvantage compared with approaching from a waiting station on the quarter is normally a longer time to close. We had to conduct one down sea replenishment in a Force Nine Gale (winds of just over 40 knots). Our customer was an American frigate whose fuel state was approaching his lower operating limit and heavier weather was forecast. Fortunately this ship was well-handled. In benign conditions we could replenish on courses other than up or down wind/sea, but in order to avoid the risk of yawing by the smaller vessel, avoided having the sea on the quarter except in swells of less than one meter. The North Pacific can be an unforgiving operating environment. We did a major exercise in the early spring of 1983 up off Kamchatka with a United States Strike Fleet with three carriers. Concern about fuel states in destroyers and frigates in heavy weather prompted orders for *Provider* to locate escorts on distant picket stations during the night to top them up as a major storm approached. After we had fuelled our last customer we were buffeted by heavy seas in the darkness, which buckled stanchions on the pilotage bridge wing 16 meters above the water.

*Provider's* open tank or "jungle" deck, about 3.5 meters above the water, could be hazardous in cross seas. Manning the pump control compartment down on the jungle deck was part of preparing for replenishment. I learned that in heavy weather we had to steam down sea for a few minutes to allow for the pump room team to close up – an operational limitation if the fleet was barrelling away during this time. Despite this precaution we had men get soaked (not desirable at the start of a long session) and in one case injured. We submitted proposals for solid bulwarks to be fitted and these were later added. Fortunately *Protecteur* and *Preserver* were built with sheltered jungle decks. We did many "Consolidation Replenishments" with American tankers, and on occasion exercised passing fuel to United States carriers. The consolidation replenishments sometimes lasted over nine



hours because *Provider's* pumping capacity was limited. The Canadian and American navies operated a fuel exchange program under which no cash was paid unless one navy received more fuel in a year than the others' tankers or facilities. It was a responsibility of Maritime Command Pacific [MARPAF] to balance out the account at the end of the fiscal year, and for this reason we were tasked every March to deliver fuel to the Americans and this accounted for some of the consolidation replenishments. On other occasions when on a long deployment supporting a destroyer squadron, it was operationally convenient to receive fuel from the USN while underway.

Our most memorable consolidation replenishment was done in darkness up in the Bering Sea north of the Aleutians during an American – Canadian amphibious exercise. This was in late November and it was snowing.

While simultaneously fuelling we frequently transferred stores to modified *Restigouche* class ships of one of the West Coast Squadrons using a second tensioned highline, as they were fitted with an innovative retractable kingpost. We also did many "VERTREPS" (Vertical Replenishments) using our embarked USNR Sea Kings or other helicopters in the force. During a passage from Hawaii to Esquimalt there was a requirement to supply aviation fuel to a New Zealand frigate. We were not equipped with hoses and connections but were able to improvise and attach the fuelling hose to a jackstay. Altering course during replenishment is a standard evolution and we practised this with ships of several navies. Course is stepped round in moderate amounts each time and both ships settle down on the new course before a further step.

### *Disseminating Lessons Learned:*

Professional lore about replenishment is passed on by experienced officers and Chiefs and Petty Officers to those new to this game. Since replenishment is frequently practised there is a body of first-hand experience in individual ships. Guidance is available in publications - in my day our bibles were Crenshaw's *Naval Shiphandling*, a book by a USN officer, and *The Admiralty Guide to Seamanship Vol III*, with an excellent and succinct section on the interaction between ships during replenishment. We used to read an annual RN publication called *Collisions and Groundings* which drew lessons from real life incidents. After an unfortunate grounding by *Saskatchewan* in Active Pass in 1968, Maritime Command began

promulgating PRNOTES (Professional Notes) which passed on lessons learned during challenging ship-handling situations. These have now been revived after a hiatus of several years, and contain descriptions of problems and particular issues experienced by Canadian Replenishment Ships – including a description of how we berthed *Provider* (which unlike her later near sister AORs did not have a bow thruster) without tugs in Esquimalt by dropping an anchor and “dredging” it along the bottom, an evolution first practised by Andy Fulton when in command in the early seventies.

*Conclusion:*

My sea time was spread over thirty years. During this period I experienced replenishments in all weathers and observed how standardized procedures facilitated smooth transfers of liquids and solids with ships of several other navies. I also observed how Canadian ships maintained high standards of replenishment proficiency due to thorough training and good equipment.

**Annex A- Extract from Email by Rear Admiral (Ret'd) Denny Boyle, former Engineering Officer of HMCS St Laurent 1965-66  
April 1 2011**

As Engineering Officer of *St. Laurent* (the second, I think, after conversion to DDH 205) for one cycle starting in the fall of 1965, I relieved John O'Neil. We did the receiver end of the Royal Canadian Navy probe trials sometime in the spring of 1966 for which we had been fitted during our refit cycle in the winter months of the same year. I don't recall who the Engineering Officer of *Provider* was at the time, the name of the probe or very much else about its development or history, but for some reason or other I have (had) it in my mind that it was a Canadian Chief Research and Development [CRAD] development.... But I wasn't interested in those kinds of things at the time, as I was far more concerned about not flooding the mess decks with FFO, which would not have done much for my reputation let alone my life-expectancy.

This of course is before Ron's recollections as described in your other email, [Annex B] and our recollections seem to be a good fit time-wise. As far as I recall again, we never refuelled at sea any other way from then on, and there always seemed to be a tanker available with a Probe delivery system, even when we were in the Eastern Atlantic and the Baltic. This recollection doesn't seem to fit with Ron's story that the

system did not become NATO Standard until 1968 or later. It is possible we had *Provider* or some US Tanker with us but that seems improbable. I must conclude therefore that this second recollection of mine is suspect.

The most important recollection I have is that this was a magnificent way of refuelling, but we had to open the deck lids to the fuel tank, and man each tank filling valve and each deck lid in the ship because we were often taking fuel into every tank in the ship except the one in use and its back-up, all at the same time, and the stuff was coming in at a previously unheard of rate - so fast that the guy at the tank top had to tell the guy at the valve to shut it when the tank was about 75% full because by the time he could close the valve the tank would be at 90% or more, and he still had to get the lid on and screws tightened down in lightning speed to stop a leak because of a roll of the ship. We didn't manage to succeed every time, but none of the spills were serious - just a different "perfume" in the mess decks for a few days. I also seem to recall that the most difficult operation was setting up to receive the probe and getting it to connect on the first try, but this was primarily because the fuelling point was too close to the after bulkhead of the Wardroom. If we did get a connection on the first try and if we had really good communications with the tanker and all of the "valve/tan top" teams, we could take a 50-60% fuel load in somewhere less than 10 minutes from connection to release. If all went well, the time from alongside and passing the high-line to release and pull away could be about 15 minutes. AWESOME!!!!!!!!!!

### **Annex B: An Email Account by Commander (Ret'd) Ron Mace About how NATO Came to Adopt the Probe Fuelling System, February 20, 2011**

I was on SACLANT'S Staff (as a Lieutenant Commander) when Admiral Tom Moorner was SACLANT in the late sixties. I remember when there was an exercise at sea that was a disaster because of refuelling and Admiral Moorner told my boss, "fix it". As the only Marine engineer on his staff I was assigned the task. I assumed he would be the one to chair the meeting. I asked all the NATO Members at the time (13, minus France) to send me their most up-to-date refuelling at sea equipment and times for setting up.

The best report I received was from Canada which had just adopted the USN method of refuelling at sea, the Parker Probe/Receiver

System. J.Y. Clarke had done a sterling job on the report that compared the Probe with the ones in use at the time. The information I received was clear and the best system was the Parker Probe System. I presented a report to my Captain who I expected to chair the meeting which was held in Malta in the fall of 1968 (I believe) and was very surprised to hear him say that I knew more about it than he did and that I would chair the meeting. This would be a high profile meeting with a real hard currency cost to the European Nations. He said to remember that I was representing a four star Admiral, which would trump any delegate.

SACLANT assigned the tanker *Mississinewa* to set up each of the Nations' refuelling-at-sea fittings and proceeded to refuel a destroyer, and time the events. We met the next day in Malta. There was a representative from Parker Probe/Receiver at the meeting to answer any questions pertaining to his equipment. As we reviewed the previous day's events, it was the Royal Netherlands Navy delegate (a Navy Captain) who proposed that we all vote on the one that was the safest and best. We all agreed that the best of the lot was the Parker Probe/Receiver, except the German delegate, a civilian who voted for the "Neue Argus" coupling, the German coupling. When I asked him why he had voted for this coupling he replied that he was only authorized to vote for his country's coupling. Even the Brits, another Captain RN, had voted for the Parker Probe.

Then the Parker rep revealed that he was authorized to offer a reduction in price for the Parker System IF the buy was sufficient. The purchase order was duly recorded and it was sufficient to meet the reduction. In the RN's case the order was huge. SACLANT was not expecting success at the first meeting. I was told to brief all the staff (with photos) on the meeting. The next meeting was held in (where else) London, at which the Royal Navy were represented by Two Captains. I don't remember who chaired the meeting but I would not be surprised if it was the British. They tried in vain to reverse the results of the previous meeting, but the results were clear, (and you don't go back on your word against a four star unless there was a good reason).

The rest is history. This fuelling method was in my memory one of the best ship alternations [ShipAlts] I ever saw in my time at sea or in my various positions of Maintenance Management, and especially so for the safety of the ship and tanker as they are "sitting ducks" when refuelling.

**Experiences of Replenishment At Sea cont'd**

Photos from LCDR Bill McRitchie of *Provider* fuelling *Columba* in North Sea 1966 using probe method

**Canada's First Destroyers, the M-Class  
by Karl Gagnon**

The first M-class built for the Royal Navy under the 1913-14 programme was designed by the British Admiralty, based upon on the previous destroyer class, L-class. The ships were designed to provide coverage to the Fleet when deployed. In total, 103 ships in this class, were constructed by different builders (Admiralty, Hawthorn, Thornycroft, and Yarrow) in batches; each builder modified the basic design, resulting

in different characteristics such as the number or shape of the funnels. The bulk of the class was standard Admiralty pattern and numbered around 85. The list of names beginning with the letter M ran out and the later vessels had names beginning with N, O and P. All, regardless of their batches, carried the same armament.

The two ships Canada acquired were built by Thornycroft of Southampton and were part of a batch of six completed between 1914 and 1916; they differed from the standard Admiralty M-class as their central funnel was thicker and the mid-ship gun was located between the second and last funnel. The Thornycroft-built vessels had a slightly higher freeboard than their sister ships. Ordered in February 1915, HMS *Patrician* was launched on 5 June 1916, and HMS *Patriot* on 20 April 1916; both were completed in that same year. The Thornycroft ships displaced 985 tons standard, 1,070 tons full load, and the overall dimensions were 274.25 x 27.25 x 10 feet (83.6 x 8.3 x 3 m). They were manned by a crew of 80 and carried eight weeks<sup>1</sup> of provision.

They were not particularly handsome ships, having a short forecastle extending around one quarter the length of the hull with an almost straight bow. The hull was narrow and, tapered into a deep “V” for speed. They had flare for improving sea keeping and their hull aft was flat in order to ride the waves. Their hull was assembled using, as other vessels of the time, rivets and had bilge keels from the bridge to the first torpedo tubes. Due to a shortage of zinc, galvanising could not be applied, reducing the life of the ships; this fact was accepted as a war measure<sup>2</sup>. Galvanising was effective for eight to ten years. The M-class vessels had a ram bow and are the last Canadian vessels with such weapon. The bridge was open to the elements but had light shielding in the form of splinter mattresses in canvas. The bridge was above the chart room in a superstructure located at the end of the forecastle and behind the forward gun. The helm and engine controls were located on the bridge with back-up sets between the last torpedo banks and the after gun. Like most previous British destroyers, they had one rudder of 42 square feet area. Although a good runner, the M-class vessels were not considered the most seaworthy British destroyers of their time and were behind the S, V, R and V (leader) classes<sup>3</sup>; movie clippings of the

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1 *Warship 1991*, British “M” class Destroyers of 1913-14, by Keith McBride, pp 34-49.

2 *British Destroyers, a History of Development 1892-1953* by Edgar J. March. Seeley Service, London, (1966).

3 *British destroyers: from Earliest Days to the Second World War*, by Norman Friedman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, (2009).

time show that much spraying to the bridge at speed.

The early Ms, with their cruising turbines, had three shafts and the later ships, including Canada's, had only two shafts attached to Brown-Curtis turbines served by three Yarrow boilers developing 27,500 h.p. The performance was not affected and the maximum speed was around 35 knots (kts) (64.8 km/h); during trials *Patriot* reached 37.34 kts (69.15 km/h) and *Patrician* 35.6 kts<sup>4</sup> (65.93 km/h). Each shaft was fitted with a three blades propeller. Although not the first, the M class was among the first British destroyers not powered by coal. Their main engines burned oil and the M-class carried 202 tons in war-time tanks; they had also above-water peace-time tanks of 52 tons<sup>5</sup>. These tanks were not popular as they made the ship roll. This feature was eliminated after January 1915 to gain space<sup>6</sup>; it is unknown if the Canadian boats had their's removed. Although the Admiralty claimed the two Canadian ships range was 2,200 nautical miles (NM) (4,074 km), calculations by a consulting naval engineer for the RCN estimated *Patrician's* range to be 1,818 NM (3,367 km), or 9 NM per ton<sup>7</sup>, and *Patriot* at 1,616 NM (2,993 km), 8 NM per ton, at 11 kts with fuel in war tanks. These figures were considered close to the theoretical figures from builder's curves for daily fuel consumption of 30 tons at 11 kts. The range the Admiralty claimed had to be with both sets of tanks. The range for these destroyers was important for Canada as the great circle distance between Halifax, Nova Scotia and Portsmouth, England, is 2,475 NM (4,583 km) and between St. John's, Newfoundland, and Portsmouth is 1,993 NM (3,690 km). The vessels required preparations and putting into port and crossing the Atlantic in good weather. Both destroyers sailed with the cruiser HMCS *Aurora* in late November 1920 via the Azores and Bermuda.

The M-class was the prototype of the War Programme boats and the R-class was almost similar. The turning table of the M-class was not available but the R-class had a mean tactical diameter of 481 yards (440 m) at 25 knots (46.3 km/h) and 494 yards (452 m) at 36 knots (66.7 km/h)<sup>8</sup>. The M-class was equipped with wireless telegraphy for long-range communications and was probably Spark Type 4 with Arc Type 15

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4 *British Destroyers, a History of Development 1892-1953* by Edgar J. March. Seeley Service, London, (1966).

5 Ibid.

6 *British destroyers: from Earliest Days to the Second World War*.

7 Memorandum to the Director of the Naval Service from T.C. Phillips, Consulting Naval Engineer, 10 January 1921 (LAC: RG24 Volume 5632 File N.S.S. 31-1-1).

8 *British Destroyers, a History of Development 1892-1953* by Edgar J. March.

wireless telegraphy transmitter and receiver. The type 4 was a medium-powered spark transmitter/receiver, fitted in all types of British destroyers. The approximate range was up to 200 NM (370 km), but the maximum reliable range was around 80 NM (148 km). The aerials were fitted on top of and spread between both ship's masts. The International Radio Call Sign (IRCS) for *Patriot* was GCSO and GCPA for *Patrician*<sup>9</sup>. The ships could also communicate short distances by flashing light, semaphore and flags. All ships carried one 20-foot (6.5 m) motorboat on the starboard side and one 25-foot (8.1 m) whaler on the port side.

The class carried three Q.F. (Quick Firing) 4-inch (102-mm) Mark (Mk.) IV<sup>10</sup> (40 calibres or calibers) guns fitted on Mk. P. IX single mountings, on the centreline. This gun was designed around 1904 and fired ammunition in separate parts; the round weighed 47.5 lb (21.5 kg) but a 52.3 lb (23.7 kg) became available during the Great War. Technically, the guns could fire a High-Explosive (HE) projectile of 31 lb (14.1 kg) to 10,000 yards (9,144 m) at 2,370 fps (722 mps); however, the mounting limited the range to 9,600 yards (8,780 m). The highest angle achieved was 20° elevation. Extreme range was not important as hits over 1000 yards were unlikely from a hand-operated gun without a director<sup>11</sup>. The M-class used a simple rangefinder to aim the main guns; it was an improvement from the previous classes. The guns were located on the forecastle, quarterdeck and between the second and last funnels. The dispersion of the guns was necessary in case the ship was hit; however the configuration limited the concentration of fire and only one gun could fire ahead or aft. For a single target on either side, all the guns could bear on it. None of the guns could be deployed against aircraft because of the mounting limitation and the absence of sighting for fast targets. The forward gun had 296° of arc of fire<sup>12</sup> and the aft gun had 310°. The mid-ship gun, located on a platform above the boiler room, had an arc of fire limited to 30° forward from the centre line to 150° aft, due to the ship's funnels. Because of the handling of the ammunition, the height of that platform was limited to around 5 feet (1.52 m)<sup>13</sup> above the weather deck. A trained gun crew could fire 15 rounds per minute (rpm) but it is unlikely that that rate could be maintained for long, and a rate of 10-12 per minute would be more

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9 LAC: RG24 Volume 5632 N.S.S. 31-9-1.

10 Britain, and Canada, used Roman numerals to denote Marks, or Mk., (models) of ordnance until after the Second World War. This was the fourth model of 4-inch QF naval gun.

11 *The Grand Fleet*, by D.K. Brown, Chatham Publishing, (1999).

12 HMS *Patriot's* plans (LAC: NMM Acc. 82303/9 items 28 and 29).

13 Ibid.



realistic. The ships carried 120 rounds per gun<sup>14</sup> and that number was judged adequate<sup>15</sup>. All 4-inch guns were protected by half-shields, which left the gunners partially exposed to shrapnel and weather, the latter causing fatigue in the gun crew; the shields were more to protect the guns' components against the elements. The broadside of this British built destroyer was comparable to the other allied navies such as the American Wickes or Clemson classes and most of the German destroyers of the period.

Although the air threat was recognized before the war, the single anti-aircraft armament was an automatic 2-pound (0.97 kg) "pompom" 40-mm gun, on a H.A. (High Angle) II mounting in the centre line between two banks of torpedoes. The gun was a scaled-up version of the Vickers-Maxim machine gun. It was water-cooled with a belt-feed, the basic design that originated in the 19th Century. The gun could, theoretically, fire at a rate of 90 rpm and with a muzzle velocity of only 620 m/sec for a range of 3,800 yards (3,475 m) at 45°. However, bursts of 7 to 12 rounds were the reality for many reasons. The maximum effective range was 1,200 yards (1,100 m) due to the weak ballistics and the small charge of propellant. The gun was placed on a platform one deck higher than weather deck, allowing a greater arc of fire. The gun could train 360° with elevation of -5° to 80°. The arc of fire was relatively unobstructed except by the funnels and mast forward and the searchlight platform and main mast aft. This weapon could also be used against fast torpedo boats. The class carried 1,000 rounds for the 2-pound gun in its magazines.

The ships carried two double banks of torpedo tubes of 21-inch (533-mm) for attack against heavy naval units; they were located aft of the funnels. This represented the typical British destroyer allotment of the period. The tubes could pivot 360°; however, the weapons could be only released when the target was + or - 25° of the beam. The torpedoes were ejected from the tube by compressed air. No reload of torpedo was carried. There is no indication of which model of torpedoes were accommodated in the tubes but it was probably Mk. II or II\* torpedoes designed in early 1910, entering service in 1914. The Mk. II\* was 22 feet 3 ¾ inch (6.79 m) in length, and, including the warhead of 330 lbs or (150 kg) of trinitrotoluene, (TNT) weighed 2,908 pounds (lb) (1,322 kg). The weapon had a maximum range of:

- 17,500 yards (16,006 m) at 19 knots (35.2 km/h) for a

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14 *British Destroyers, a History of Development 1892-1953* by Edgar J. March.

15 *Warship 1991*, British "M" class Destroyers of 1913-14.

running time of about 27  $\frac{1}{4}$  minutes;

- 14,000 yards (12,805 m) at 24 knots (44.5 km/h) for about 17  $\frac{1}{4}$  minutes; or,

- 4,200 yards (3,841.5 m) at 44.5 knots (82.4 km/h) for about 5  $\frac{1}{4}$  minutes.

As Canada's ships were built during the war, it is possible that they could also carry the Mk. IV torpedo, which was designed in 1912 and entered service in 1916. With a weight of 3,200 lb (1,455 kg) and a length of 22 feet 7.5 inch (6.9 m), the weapon carried a warhead of 515 lb of TNT. It had four settings for speed and range:

- 4,500 yards (4,115 m) at 44.5 knots (82.4 km/h) for a running time of about 5  $\frac{1}{2}$  minutes;

- 11,000 yards (10,060 m) at 29 knots (54 km/h) for about 11 minutes<sup>16</sup>;

- 15,000 yards (13,720 m) at 25 knots (46.3 km/h) for about 17  $\frac{3}{4}$  minutes; or,

- 18,000 yards (16,460 m) at 21 knots (39 km/h) for about 25  $\frac{1}{4}$  minutes.

Compared with their contemporary American and German counterparts, early war British destroyers carried fewer of these weapons on board.

These ships were not equipped with ASDIC (named after the Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) as they were designed and built before this equipment was conceived; there is no indication that detection equipment was installed during or after the war. Only a few depth charges at the stern were installed. No depth charge chutes or mortars were installed while in Canadian service. As seen on the plans of *Patriot*, the anti-submarine weapon system consisted of two light davits for Q-type paravanes with small charges attached to the towing lines. The principle was for the destroyer to steam into the submerged submarine path for one of the charges to hit it, sinking or damaging it, or forcing it to the surface where it could be gunned down or rammed. The paravanes and their davits and winches were removed when the boats were transferred to Canada, leaving only the depth charges and the roller fairway of the paravanes. Only eight ships of the class had specific equipment installed to carry out high-speed minesweeping. Some M-class boats, including *Patriot*, were fitted to carry and tow a kite observation balloon during the Great War<sup>17</sup>; photos

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16 *The Grand Fleet*, by D.K. Brown, Chatham Publishing, (1999).

17 "Necessary stepping stones", by William Schleihau, *Canadian Military History*, Volume 9, Number 3, Summer 2000.

surveyed indicate the equipment was also removed before the transfer to Canada.

In 1917, the Canadian Prime Minister had indicated that Canadians would prefer ships that took action upon the oceans<sup>18</sup>. After the war, the Admiralty earmarked two Talisman class destroyers to be presented to Canada. This initial choice was changed, after which the *Patrician* and the *Patriot* were sent instead. Both destroyers were a gift to Canada including all permanent equipment on board, but Canada was responsible for the running costs from their commission into the RCN as well as any refit and alterations that were to be done. Oil-burning vessels were preferred by the Canadians when the ships' transfer was being discussed.

Both M-class destroyers had very few modifications for their transfer to the RCN. Besides the removal of the paravanes and their equipment, the armament of both classes remained, in general, unchanged after the Great War. The following modifications were made: an additional light dynamo engine was installed to support the auxiliaries and wireless and to be a back-up for the existing dynamo; the galley was enlarged, sacrificing the Captain's forward lavatory ifor extra storage, and its fuel converted from coal to oil. The final modification was light solid bridges built on top of the chart room in preparation for the crossing; this addition would provide better shelter in Canadian weather conditions. The removal of the paravanes reduced the top weight by about 15 tons, which was beneficial for the crossing. The total modification costs to make the destroyers seaworthy were £8,208 for *Patriot* and £8,497 for *Patrician* for about five weeks of work.

#### *Patrician* and *Patriot* (first of the name)

HMS *Patrician* was launched on 5 June 1916 and served in the Royal Navy in the Great War; she was engaged in anti-submarine operations and patrol duty in the North Sea. She was paid off after the war but was reactivated in 1920 and outfitted for transfer to Canada.

She was commissioned as HMCS *Patriot* in the RCN on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1920 at Devonport, now Plymouth, England, along with her sister ship, HMCS *Patriot* and the light cruiser HMCS *Aurora* (ex-HMS *Aurora*).<sup>19</sup>

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18 *Minutes of the Imperial War Conference, 4<sup>th</sup> Day*. 28 March 1917, quoted in Nicholas Tracy (editor), *The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900-1940*.

19 DHH 81/520/8000 Box 195 File 2.

The three ships were offered to Canada and they retained their original names. HMCS *Patrician* was in better condition than her sister with regard to her deck scupper work. Their machinery was in good condition and their boilers were tested. In the company of her sister ship and the cruiser, HMCS *Patrician* departed for Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 30 November; all three ships crossed the Atlantic by way of the Azores and Bermuda and arrived at Halifax on December 21<sup>st</sup>. They were to replace Canada's first warships: HMCS *Niobe* and HMCS *Rainbow*. The following spring they proceeded via Bermuda and the Panama Canal to Esquimalt, British Columbia. By mid August, the ships were back in Halifax. The squadron visited Montréal at the end of that month. After the cruiser HMCS *Aurora* was paid off, due to budget cuts in 1922, HMCS *Patrician* was transferred to the West Coast and operated from Esquimalt, providing a naval presence and a training platform for officers and non-commissioned members. She cruised twice a year to Prince Rupert and accompanied ships of the 8<sup>th</sup> Cruiser Squadron when they visited Canadian waters. During winter, she visited San Francisco, San Pedro and Seattle. Perhaps the strangest assignment of her career, HMCS *Patrician* was detailed in November 1924 to intercept a band of Nanaimo bank-robbers trying to reach the United States by fast motor launch. In October 1927, after returning from a cruise, she was placed in reserve as her general condition<sup>20</sup> and the worn state of her machinery and boilers rendered her unfit for further sea service. HMCS *Patrician* was paid off on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1928 in Esquimalt and replaced by HMCS *Vancouver* (first of the name). She was then sold for \$10,888.88 and scrapped the following year in Seattle, Washington. Although both destroyers had hull numbers assigned to them during their service in Canadian hands, HMCS *Patrician* (G57/H57/H87) and HMCS *Patriot* (G56/H56/H86)<sup>21</sup>, no known photo shows the number on their hull. Both ships did not have the official Canadian badge.

Launched on 20 April 1916, HMS *Patriot* was commissioned into the Royal Navy on 17 June of the same year. She served in the 14<sup>th</sup> Destroyer Flotilla and was employed until the end of the war on patrol and anti-submarine duties in the North Sea. HMS *Patriot* was credited with the destruction of submarine *U-69* on 12 July 1917; using her balloon, she spotted a submarine on the surface 28 miles in the distance

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20 A Certain E.R.A. the life and times of Engineer Rear-Admiral, by George Leslie Stephanes, Seawaves Books, (2011).

21 *Canadian Warship Names*, by David Freeman, Vanwell, St.Catharines, (2003).

and sank her using depth charges after arriving on spot<sup>22</sup>. The ship was transferred into the RCN and followed her sister-ship HMCS *Patrician*, until HMCS *Aurora*'s paying off. HMCS *Patriot* performed the same function as that of HMCS *Patrician* on the east coast. She provided a unique function in September 1921 when she assisted Dr. Alexander Graham Bell by towing his experimental hydrofoil craft *HD-4* at high speed on Bras D'Or Lake near Baddeck, Nova Scotia. By 1927, the general condition of both Canadian destroyers was poor; in particular the plates of their boilers were bad. A refit for HMCS *Patriot* was deemed "not a practicable proposition" and she was paid off on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 1927 and replaced by HMCS *Champlain* (first of the name). She was sold for \$15,135.33 for scrap in 1929, to be broken up at Briton Ferry, in Wales. Her name was re-assigned after the Second World War to the Naval Reserve Training Centre and Headquarters in Hamilton, Ontario<sup>23</sup>.

Canada's first destroyers were "gifts" from Great Britain and, as the M-class was numerous, built with a short life in mind and rendered obsolete by improved classes, it is not surprising that ships of this class were proposed to Canada. These "gifts" had advantages; the young RCN required ships immediately, and history suggests the budget cuts that sang HMCS *Aurora*'s end would not permit the building of new vessels. Furthermore, HMCS *Niobe* and HMCS *Rainbow* were obsolete and unserviceable before the Great War concluded and both destroyers were 20 years younger than the newest cruiser; destroyers were beginning to take over some of the duties previously assigned to the latter. The other wartime vessels were of little value. The immediate availability of HMCS *Patriot* and HMCS *Patrician* saved the RCN from becoming a navy limited to the coastal sphere, despite both vessels not having long range or great firepower. Their torpedo armament allowed them a limited capacity to defend the country by assault from the seas; these weapons were better and more lethal than the torpedoes on the old cruisers used by Canada during the war. The destroyers' maximum speed was nearly 15 knots faster than the same old cruisers. The small size of their crew was certainly an asset for the years to follow when the RCN strength and budget was dramatically reduced.

Although the arrangement of the gun armament was not the best, it was comparable to most destroyers of other navies of the time. It

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22 DHH 81/520/8000 Box 195 File 15.

23 *Canadian Warship Names*.

improved in postwar classes; however, it is interesting to note that no attempt was made to include anti-aircraft guns in the design. The air threat was underestimated and this type of armament remained embryonic until the Second World War. *Patriot and Patrician* did not have the range of the cruisers, but it is doubtful the RCN intended to deploy the destroyers away from Canada unless they were deployed with the RN. Burning oil instead of coal made refuelling much easier, faster and cleaner and made the engines more efficient. The disappearance of the bow ram after the M-class demonstrated that battles were going to be fought at longer range, and the appearance of optical equipment, heralded this development. Their torpedo armament was not as strong as their American and German wartime counter-parts, but the numbers of tubes would increase in the years following the war. These ships were a good beginning for the long series of destroyers that became the workhorse of our navy. However, the M-class destroyers were on their last legs because of the way they were built and because of their wartime service; very few survived the scrapyards in the early 1920s. Both ships were not the perfect “gifts;” however they probably saved the RCN in difficult times.

### **Conjuring Images Of 1812: The Navy’s Colonial Sailor Program by Victor Suthren**



The replica 19<sup>th</sup> Century “pinky” schooner ‘La Revenante’, part of the ‘1812 Squadron’ being assembled.

When the Royal Canadian Navy’s Directorate of Naval History and Heritage received instructions to do what it could to assist in the

Navy's observation of the War of 1812 Bicentennial, it had a ready-made tool at its disposal. Under the direction of the DNHH's former director, Graeme Arbuckle, a program had been created utilizing carefully selected sail training ships, replica longboats, and the unique talents of naval and marine "living history" re-enactors: hobbyists from all walks of life who make a pastime out of the study of sailors from the colonial days of Canada's past, and who recreate those days as authentically as possible. The premise was that the operational needs and demands on Canada's modern naval personnel made difficult their participation in commemorative or pageantry events, and the selected naval re-enactors would, in many senses, stand in for them in programs designed for public education. Known as The Colonial Sailor Program, or CSP, the program had been in operation since 2005, staging a single major commemorative event in a different Canadian community each year. The largest of these was the colourful *Founding of the Royal Navy Dockyard 1759-2009* event, staged at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Timed to coincide with the visit of the Atlantic Tall Ship fleet, the event employed over 20 replica longboats and naval re-enactor boats' crews from Canada, the USA, the UK and Australia to mark the anniversary of the Dockyard's founding. A procession of longboats under oars along the Halifax waterfront culminated in the presentation of an historic telescope replica to the Admiral commanding Canada's East Coast navy, at a public ceremony on the waterfront. This event, and the others of the CSP, are designed and led by the former Director General of the Canadian War Museum and author Victor Suthren, who is also an honorary Captain in the RCN.

With the advent of the 1812 Bicentennial, the new Director of the DNHH, Dr Richard Gimblett, saw that the Colonial Sailor Program offered an excellent and cost-effective tool to enhance public awareness of the naval aspects of 1812's legacy, while supporting activities of the modern RCN such as ship port visits as they marked the Bicentennial. Suthren was asked to design and implement a multi-year continuation of the CSP, beginning with the 1812 Bicentennial in 2012, and utilizing the proven elements of traditional ships, boats, and hand-picked re-enactors. Dependent upon resources and a yearly assessment of the success of the program, the planned CSP continuation provides for commemorative programming right through and including the Confederation 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of 2017.

The event for 2012 will take place at Niagara-on-the-lake, Ontario, on the weekend of July 13-15, and will be based at the former

Provincial Marine building known as Navy Hall, and Fort George National Historic Site. A partnered event with Parks Canada, the event will be known as *The Navy of 1812: Sailors on the Lakes*. Some 300 to 500 naval and military re-enactors and their families, all in correct period dress, will be joined by 25 longboat replicas from Canada and the United States, and an '1812 Squadron' of 4 brigantines and 2 schooners that will voyage over from Toronto for the event. A sail past and staged landing of troops will be followed by a narrated 'Sham Battle' on the Niagara-on-the-lake waterfront, followed by the opening of the lantern-lit naval encampment to the public, set to the theme of "The Sailors' World of 1812". Demonstrations of everything from rope work and shipboard doctoring to Regency dancing will be presented, with the encampment enlivened by performers acting out social roles of individuals found in a colonial Canadian waterfront of the 1812 era. Period musicians and the glow of hundreds of candle lanterns will complete the scene. The event will end with the departure of the '1812 Squadron' on the Sunday, to ringing gun salutes.

For 2013, the scene will shift to Kingston, Ontario, where a July event of similar scale will be based on the grounds of the former Royal Navy Dockyard during the War of 1812 on Lake Ontario, and now the home of the Royal Military College of Canada. The ships and longboats will carry out exercises off the Kingston waterfront, including an emotional sail past and Gun Salute to Canadian veterans gathered in a waterfront park, and interaction with the rampart guns of Fort Henry National Historic Site in a major 'Sham Battle' scenario. This event will be known as *The Navy Of 1812: Salute to the King's Port*.

In 2014, CSP plans now call for a still-developing scenario involving the former Naval and Military Establishments at Penetanguishene, Ontario, now known as Discovery Harbour, and a passage of a schooner-and-longboat flotilla to Wasaga Beach at the mouth of the Nottawasaga River, where the British schooner 'Nancy' was destroyed by American forces.

In 2015, the Colonial Sailor Program will undertake its most ambitious, multi-community event, with the passage of a schooner-escorted flotilla of replica longboats under sail and oar from Summerside, Prince Edward Island, to the communities of Victoria, Charlottetown, Woods Island, and Pictou, Nova Scotia.

The event will then culminate with the voyaging onward of the historic schooner to Halifax, and its entry there escorted by several of



the longboats trailed over from Pictou. This ambitious scheme is to be known as *The Provo Wallis Commemorative Voyage*, after Halifax native Admiral of the Fleet Provo Wallis, who served aboard HMS 'Shannon' in its defeat of USS 'Chesapeake' and brought both ships in to Halifax after the battle, being the only unwounded British officer.

Planning for 2016 and 2017 Colonial Sailor Program events is in the preliminary discussion stages, but the 250th anniversary of James Cook's eclipse observations on the coast of Newfoundland in 1766, and which assisted in his selection to begin his exploratory voyages in the Pacific, have led to interest in a schooner replica voyage and port visit program commencing at Corner Brook and retracing Cook's charting and surveying of portions of the Newfoundland coast. For the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Confederation, the Colonial Sailor Program is preparing a number of varied scenarios that would use the Great Lakes, the St Lawrence River, and the coasts as possible venues for programs in support of the Royal Canadian Navy's marking of the anniversary. Using the best in civilian volunteerism and the skills of young people and adults who keep alive the lost arts of sailing from the days when Canada was being formed, the Colonial Sailor Program will be there alongside the ghost-green hulls of the modern Royal Canadian Navy to add colour and life to the commemoration of Canada's naval past.



The civilian 1812 re-enactor boat's crew of the longboat 'Albion'

**Call for Papers****Canadian Nautical Research Society Conference****The War of 1812 to be held in Picton, Ontario****15 – 19 May 2012**

The title of our 2012 conference has yet to be finalized, but the Society has selected the War of 1812 as the theme and is calling for papers containing new scholarship, varying perspectives, and fresh analyses. Authors are invited to address nautical, political, ethnological and related subjects treating the causes, events and outcomes surrounding the events of 1812-1814; a very broad approach is encouraged including geographical perspectives from Europe and both sides of the North American participation.

The Society reserves right of first refusal for publication in our journal *The Northern Mariner* / *Le marin du nord* or newsletter *Argonauta*, as appropriate.

New scholars are invited to apply for the **Panting Bursary** to support travel to deliver a paper. Une participation en langue française est également encouragée.

Please submit paper proposals by 15 April 2012 to:

Dr Paul Adamthwaite  
CNRS 2012 Conference Chair  
*The Victory*, 205, Main Street,  
Picton, ON K0K 2T0  
Telephone: 613-476 7598  
email: [paul.cnrs@aandc.org](mailto:paul.cnrs@aandc.org)

**Call for Papers****The War of 1812, Bicentennial Conference Series:  
Part I "Origins and the War at Sea,"  
Saint John, N.B.****27-29 September 2012.**

The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick, in conjunction with the Canadian-American Studies Program of the University of Maine at Orono and the New Brunswick Museum, is pleased to announce the first in a series of three conferences/symposia in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812.

This first conference will deal with the origins of the war, the period of 'undeclared' warfare in 1812, and the war on the high seas. Dr. Andrew Lambert, the author of *The Challenge: America, Britain and the Naval War of 1812* (Faber & Faber, 2012), will be the keynote speaker.

Those interested in presenting at the conference should send the title and a brief description of the paper (250 words) along with a short biography to :

Dr Marc Milner,  
Director of the Gregg Centre at  
[milner@unb.ca](mailto:milner@unb.ca)  
before 1 April 2012.

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