As historians, we try to teach our students not to confuse the present with the past. There is a real need to instill a sense of the temporal dimension in young people; indeed, some recent research suggests that the concepts of time and change are among the most difficult of concepts to grasp. We constantly remind students that just because something is a certain way today does not mean that it was the same at some point in the past.

If this type of argument can be accepted generally, it is even more true in relation to Canadian maritime history. At various points in our history Canada cast a much broader shadow in maritime affairs than it does today. One example of this can be seen by looking at the important naval contributions we made in the two World Wars. Another, of course, is the important role we played during the golden age of sail in the second half of the nineteenth century, a period in which we were one of the truly significant shipping nations. One of the comparative advantages we possessed at that time was our ability to build low-cost wooden vessels.

Unfortunately, it appears likely that new generations of Canadians are going to come to maturity without having the opportunity to see examples of the craft practised by Canadian shipbuilders. None of our maritime museums, as splendid as some may be by many criteria, possesses a square-rigged vessel constructed in this country in the nineteenth century. Indeed, there is only one Canadian-built square-rigger left anywhere in the world. This is the Egeria, a vessel built in the Millidge shipyard in Saint John, New Brunswick. At present it is a hulk in the harbour in Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. CNRS member Eric Lawson has devoted years to the study of the Egeria, as we have reported in previous newsletters.

Elsewhere in this issue of ARGONAUTA we have another item about the Egeria, a story which provides an additional reason for being concerned about conserving an important part of our maritime heritage. Eric appears to be in a position to confirm that there were unique practices involved in the construction of this vessel. In other words, based on his findings it seems as though Canadian shipbuilders may well have used techniques found nowhere else in the world.

This is an important discovery, and it lends weight to the argument that steps should be taken to conserve what can be salvaged from the Egeria. There is some urgency in all this, since the vessel, Eric reports, is deteriorating rapidly. Indeed, it is far too late to save the entire barque; the best we can now do is to salvage parts of her.

Eric Lawson has campaigned hard for just this. He has not been totally alone; indeed, CNRS passed a resolution in 1984 urging the federal and New Brunswick governments to provide funds to conserve what is left of Egeria and to bring the artifacts back to Canada. The lack of response from govern-
ments has been disappointing.

This does not, however, mean that we should give up. 1990, as we reported in the last issue of ARGONAUTA, has been proclaimed "International Maritime Heritage Year" by the World Ship Trust. The purpose of this designation is to focus attention on the maritime past and particularly on the vessels that plied the world's seas. We believe that the happy conjunction between Eric Lawson's latest findings and the forthcoming special maritime year ought to be put to use. The time is right for a new effort to convince governments of the imperative need to preserve an important part of our past, a slice which not only reflects where we have been as a people but also has the potential to add some important data to our understanding of nineteenth-century shipbuilding techniques. If Eric and the expert he has consulted are correct, the loss of the Egeria also means losing an irreplaceable part of Canada's contribution to maritime affairs.

To start the ball rolling, we intend to introduce a new motion calling for government action at this June's annual meeting in Halifax. This resolution will incorporate the new data that Eric Lawson has brought to light. We hope as well to include a convenient tear-off form with the July ARGONAUTA which members can send to Ottawa urging speedy and enlightened action. If the motion is passed, we also will undertake to contact every maritime and heritage group in this country to try to enlist their support in this campaign.

History, one wag claimed, gives its practitioners the right to sit in comfortable armchairs and second-guess past decisions. We believe that it should be more than this. As people interested in Canada's maritime heritage, we believe that we--and CNRS--have a duty to get out of our over-stuffed chairs and try to save the Egeria. To do less is to make a mockery of our professed concern for the very subject we study.

Lewis R. Fischer
Gerald E. Panting

COLUMNS WANTED

As part of our attempts to provide the kind of newsletter that members want, we are interested in attracting CNRS members willing to contribute regular columns to ARGONAUTA. Subjects might include the navy; merchant shipping; geographic regions; modelling; shipbuilding; and current maritime affairs--indeed we would be interested in publishing regular columns on almost any topic that members wish. Given the size of our membership (and our limited financial resources), columnists would of course have to be content with seeing their work in print in lieu of remuneration! CNRS members interested in exploring the possibility of writing a regular column should contact the editors of ARGONAUTA as soon as possible. We will keep readers informed of progress in attracting columnists, and we would also welcome suggestions on the types of columns that you would like to see.

ARTICLES

THE MARINDUS CLASS

By René Beauchamp
Montreal, P.Q.

The Marindus class of vessels is certainly a success story. The fact that as many as twenty-five were built and that the orders were placed by well-established shipping firms speaks for itself. The name of the class comes from the name of the shipyard that built them: Marine Industries of Tracy, situated across the Richelieu River from Sorel. This type of freighter was designed as a multi-purpose ship; that is, it was geared to handle general cargo, including containers as well as bulk commodities. The first twenty-one to be delivered had the following general characteristics: 159.2 m. X 22.8 m.; tonnage approximately 11,739 GRT (7050 net and 15,850 deadweight); speed, 18.5 knots. The last four to be constructed, designed for Polish Ocean Lines, were a modified version. They were not designed with Seaway trade in mind as their beams exceeded the 22.8 m. mark, the maximum imposed by Seaway authorities. The were constructed to the following specifications: 168.3 m. X 24 m.; tonnage 13,024 GRT (7880 net, 17,608 deadweight); speed, 22 knots. Oddly enough, to my knowledge only one Marindus vessel is known to have ventured into the Great Lakes, and it was a trip that her owners will remember for a long time (see the fleet list below).

This class of ships was very much in evidence in the shipping press in the late seventies when six of them constructed for the Michael A. Karageorgis Group were refused by this shipping enterprise on the grounds that the vessels did not fulfil the requirements laid down in the contract. In fact, the Karageorgis Group had originally ordered ten of these craft, but four were cancelled following the breach of contract. After periods of idleness ranging from several months to more than a year, the famous shipowner Nedlloyd B.V. came forward and chartered the six freighters. They were satisfied enough that less than a year later they purchased them outright. While laid up, the six unlucky vessels had been placed on the Liberian register by Marine Industries. This transfer was "on paper only," as the Liberian flag was never hoisted nor was the port of registry--Monrovía--ever painted on the side. Furthermore, fictitious subsidiary companies, with bases in Panama, were created. It may be of interest to note that the Karageorgis Group also refused delivery of vessels ordered from a Spanish shipyard in the 1970s.

More than half of the Marindus class (13 vessels) was built for French owners. Nos. 14 and 15 were constructed for Algerian account. The next six were to be operated under the Greek flag and the last ones were Polish-registered. All vessels for French owners were registered at Dunkerque; the pair for the Algerians at Algiers; and the four Polish vessels were registered at Gdynia. Piraeus was to have been the port of registry for the Greek-commissioned vessels.
Fleet List


409. Correze...Launched January 12, 1974; Completed in 1974. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In 1985, transferred to the Bahamas register and the subsidiary Clematis Maritime Corporation and renamed Gongola Hope. One year later, transferred to another subsidiary (Shipping Enterprises III) and renamed Maris Beacon. In 1987, sold for operation under the Cyprus flag and renamed Janika by Catmint Navigation Co. Ltd. (Silver Carriers S.A.). At the end of 1988, she was reported as having been sold to Italian shipbrokers, but this remains unconfirmed. If true, this would be the first Marindus broken up.

410. Canial...Launched April 3, 1974; Completed in 1974. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In 1986, transferred to the subsidiary Transport and Chartering International Ltd. under the British flag and renamed Marine Coral. Until 1987 she was operated by Shipping Management S.A.M. (V. Ships); at that time she became the responsibility of their other subsidiary, African Trading Corp., and re-flagged to the Bahamas.

411. Calvados...Launched August 17, 1974; Delivered in 1975. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In 1983, sold to L. Martin and Co. and renamed Mungo. In 1986, left the French flag to take Bahamas registration; at the same time, her operation was transferred to Shipping Management S.A.M. (V. Ships).

412. La Pallice...Launched February 15, 1975; Completed in 1975. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. Her maiden trip was to Montreal on August 5. In 1984, she was renamed Angelique by the subsidiary Wyvern Navigation Corp. of Panama under the Management of European Navigation Inc. This firm ceased to represent Wyvern Navigation in 1987.

417. La Rochelle...Launched March 27, 1975; Completed in 1975. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In the early 1980s, she was chartered to South African Marine Corp. (Safrmarine), whose markings she was given. In 1982, the vessel was re-flagged to the Bahamas and renamed Namrata. She then found another charter which lasted for one year. For the chartering period she was given the name Franco Express. Taking back the name Namrata in 1983, she was for a short time transferred to Bahamas registry for the subsidiary Overseas Transport and Chartering Ltd. and oddly enough sailed under her original name of La Rochelle for one year. In 1984, another name change occurred, this time to the Nicole, for another Bahamian offshoot, Herts Maritime Ltd. Starting in 1985, European Navigation Inc. managed her.

418. Poitiers...Launched July 19, 1975 and completed in 1976. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In 1981 she went on charter to Scindia Steam Navigation on Bombay and renamed Jalapoieters. Remained on the French register until 1982 after the charter expired. At that time, she was re-flagged to Panama and renamed Nathalie. Two years later, the subsidiary Universal Gloi Inc. took over the ownership. In 1987, she was sold to Bluenoise Shipping Ltd. and renamed Antares under the Cypriot flag. Early in 1989 she was reported as having been purchased by Norwegian interests.

419. Rochefort...Launched September 20, 1975 and completed in 1976. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. She was renamed Matis Otter by them in 1983 after being re-flagged to Panama. In 1988, she was sold to Silver Carriers S.A. of Piraeus and renamed Silver Glory on the Cyprus registry.

420. Royan...Launched January 17, 1976 and completed the same year. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. In 1982 she was chartered out and renamed Ile de France I. In 1983, she was transferred from the French to Panamanian register and renamed Maris Sportsman. In 1986 or 1987 she was transferred to Shipping Enterprises (No. 1) Corp. In 1988 Silver Carriers S.A. bought her and painted the new name, Silver Charter, and the new port of registry, Limasol.

421. Tours...Launched June 26, 1976 and completed the same year. Owners: S.N.C.D.V. Renamed Celya and re-flagged to Panama in 1982. At the end of 1984, the offshoot Gangotok Steamship Co. took over operation for Universal Gloi Inc. In 1986, she was renamed the Kitty Bay and in 1987, still under Panamanian registry, she was renamed the Pioneer Sky for her new owners, Marine Cooperation S.A.

422. Babor...Launched June 26, 1976 and completed the same year. Owners: Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation. Made countless trips up the St. Lawrence River to ports such as Montreal, Sorel and Quebec since her entry into service. Of all the Marindus built for non-Polish owners, she was the one with the most "peaceful" life.
423. Biban...Launched September 11, 1976 and completed in 1977. Owners: Compagnie National Algerienne de Navigation. On June 20, 1979, she departed Montreal for Duluth and came back much later than expected. At Duluth, she suffered a major power failure. After a protracted time to decide how to proceed, the decision was made to tow her all the way from the Lakehead to Montreal for repairs. The tugs South Carolina, Maryland, and Superior, all owned by Great Lakes Towing Company, and the Leeny B., owned by Calumet Marine Towing were chartered for the tow, and the vessel finally arrived in Montreal on July 29. The idea appeared to be that she would be repaired by Marine Industries employees, but this proved not to be the case, presumably because she was no longer under warranty. Instead, another period of delay followed, and she lay in the old harbour for more than four months. Finally, on December 11 she was towed to a European shipyard by the French tug Abeille 30. As far as I know, she is the only Marindus ever to make a trip into the Great Lakes—and what a trip it was! About the middle of 1982, Biban was again the victim of misfortune. Although details are sketchy, it appears that she had a collision overseas that put her out of service for about three months.

424. Aristides...Launched December 11, 1976 and completed in 1977. Owners: Michael A. Karageorgis Group. She was the only Marindus ordered by Karageorgis which actually was given her proper markings: the funnel was painted white with a black base and top, with the letters M and K (overprinted on the M) in white inside a blue horizontal diamond-shaped pattern. This was one of the vessels not accepted by Karageorgis. Early in 1978 she was renamed the Marindus Sorel by Marine Industries' hastily-created subsidiary Estrella Armadora S.A. of Panama and registered in Liberia. In 1979, the Dutch firm Nedloyd Bulk B.V. took her on charter, having established for that purpose the subsidiary Amstelstraat Navigation C.V. She was renamed Amstelstraat under Dutch registry for operation by the Indonesian shipping line Trikora Lloyd, themselves an affiliate of Nedloyd. The next year she was bought by this affiliated company, transferred to Indonesian registry, and renamed L. Jalabert Bontang.

425. Aristarchos...Launched April 3, 1977 and completed the same year. Owners: Michael A. Karageorgis Group but not accepted. As far as I can tell, the name was embossed on this vessel but was never actually painted. In 1978 she was rechristened Marindus Tracy by Maralada Armadora S.A. The next year, leased by Amstelstraat Navigation, she was renamed Amstelstraat and the Trikora Lloyd markings were given. Like all the other five would-be Karageorgis vessels, Rotterdam became the first port of registry to be painted on her stern. Also, like the others, she was acquired outright in 1980 by the Nedloyd Group. She then received her fourth name, Palengang, under the Indonesian flag.

426. Aristodros...Launched September 3, 1977 and completed the following year. Owners: Michael A. Karageorgis Group but not accepted. In February 1978 her name was replaced by the number 426 on her bow. Not long after, she was renamed the Marindus Montreal for Maraplomo Amadora S.A. In 1979 she became the Amstelstrom for Amstelstraat Navigation and eventually was named the Suhadiwono Panyin in 1980. The other details are the same as for the two previous ships.

427. Aristippos...Launched November 5, 1977 and completed in 1978. Owners: Michael A. Karageorgis Group but not accepted. Name was embossed by never painted. In 1978, she was renamed the Marindus Quebec by Panatlantica Armadora S.A. Like the previous ships, in 1979 she was chartered by the Nedloyd Group. Her new owners were Amstelstraat Navigation and she took the name Amstelstad. In 1979, this vessel (and the two subsequent ones) experienced different histories than the first three ships rejected by Karageorgis. She was taken on charter, but under Dutch rather than Indonesian operation. In 1980, she was renamed the Nedloyd Madras and lengthened by twenty-seven metres in Japan by Nippon Kokan at Kobe. Her gross tonnage was increased to 14,123 and her designation by Lloyd's was altered to part-container ship.

428. Marindus Trois-Rivieres...Launched March 3, 1978 and completed the same year. Owners: Viafama Armadora S.A. She had been ordered by M.A. Karageorgis and was to be named Aristagoras. In 1979, she went on charter to Amstelstraat Navigation and renamed Amstelstraat. In 1980, she was purchased by nedloyd and lengthened by Nippon Kokan at Yokohama by their subsidiary Tsurumi Shipyard. Renamed the Nedloyd Manila, her name was shortened to Manila in 1982. She took back the name Nedloyd Manila in 1982, which was again shortened to Manila for a short time to 1984. Since then, she has traded as the Nedloyd Manila. Other details are the same as the Nedloyd Madras.

429. Marindus Rimouski...Launched May 25, 1978 and completed the same year. Owners: Argocoreno Armadora S.A. She had been ordered by M.A. Karageorgis and was to be named Aristodimos. In 1979 she was renamed Amstelstotf for Amstelstraat Navigation. In 1980, after being acquired by the Nedloyd Group, she was renamed Nedloyd Marseille. She was lengthened by twenty-seven metres by Nippon Kokan at Yokohama by Tsurumi Shipyard. In 1978, a postcard illustrating this Marindus was put on sale in the Sorel area. It shows the vessel on her sea trials and no doubt will become a rare collector's item.

430. Jacek Malecowski...Launched November 12, 1978 and completed the following year. Owners: Polish Ocean Lines.


432. Artur Grotger...Launched August 12, 1979 and completed the following year. Owners: Polish Ocean Lines.
442. Boleslaw Rumiński...Launched November 10, 1979 and completed the following year. Owners: Polish Ocean Lines. This was the last vessel of the Marindus class built. She left Sorel for overseas on July 6, 1980.

No doubt, readers will have noticed the gaps in the shipyard numbers. The explanation of the missing yard numbers is as follows:

412...Ferry Camille Marcoux delivered in 1974.
413...Tanker Leon SIMARD delivered in 1974.
414...Not allocated.
415...Tanker Arthur SIMARD delivered in 1973.
434...Tanker Gulf Guatineau delivered in 1976.
435...Tanker Gulf Mackenzie delivered in 1976.
436...Tanker Primero de Mayo delivered in 1977.
437...Tanker 24 de Febrero delivered in 1977.
438...Tanker 5 de Septiembre delivered in 1978.

NOTES ON THE CUSTOMS PREVENTIVE CRUISERS 1897-1931

By David J. McDougall
Montreal, P.Q.

Between 1897 and 1931 the Department of Customs and Excise had a section called the Preventive Service whose business was to detect and prevent the smuggling of goods into Canada. During those years a fleet of Preventive Service cruisers and smaller craft patrolled the lower river and Gulf of St. Lawrence and the coasts of the Maritime Provinces, while a smaller number were stationed on the Great Lakes and the West Coast. In 1897 there were seven Preventive vessels, only one of which was an armed sea-going cruiser, but thirty-five years later the fleet consisted of ten armed and wireless-equipped sea-going cruisers and twenty-one smaller craft on the East Coast and the St. Lawrence and two patrol boats on the West Coast. Between 1897 and 1931 the Preventive Service owned and chartered at least twenty-eight cruisers, with the largest expansion during the later part of the era of Prohibition in the United States (between 1927 and 1931) when huge amounts of illegal liquor were being landed on Canada's East Coast. On April 1, 1932 the Preventive Fleet became the Marine Section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and in 1939 most of the fleet was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force. After the war new vessels were acquired and in 1970, what by then was the Marine Division of the RCMP was transferred to the Canadian Coast Guard.

From 1897 to 1931 the crews of the cruisers and small craft were almost all from towns and villages on the shores of the lower river and Gulf of St. Lawrence or from the Maritime Provinces. From the early 1900s to the late 1920s the fleet had the nickname "the Gaspé Navy" because so many of the officers and crew were from Gaspé Bay and nearby communities. In 1932 many of the officers and crew transferred to the Marine Section of the RCMP and early in World War II most enlisted, the majority in the Royal Canadian Navy but a few in the Royal Canadian Air Force. After the war a small number rejoined the RCMP. Possibly no more than a dozen men who served on the Customs Preventive cruisers before 1931 are still alive. By good fortune I have been able to draw on the memories and records of five of them (one of whom is now dead and others who are in their late eighties and early nineties) as well as on records kept by the sons and grandsons of others.

The following descriptions of the vessels used as Preventive cruisers between 1897 and 1931 which are known to have been either owned or chartered by the Customs Preventive Service are arranged in approximate chronological order of their acquisition or use. The years from 1897 to 1913 were the formative years when most of the cruisers were on loan from the Department of Marine and Fisheries; followed by 1914 to 1926 when the Preventive Service acquired a new cruiser only to have it transferred to Canada's Naval Service during World War I. After it was returned, in 1919 the Preventive Service attempted to control rum-running with two cruisers during the earlier years of Prohibition. Following the Customs Scandal of 1926, the fleet was rapidly expanded in 1927 and 1928, often by the make-shift expedient of using over-age vessels; and finally, during 1929 to 1931, modernization of the fleet by the construction of new vessels. Insofar as has been possible, the descriptions include the vessel's dimensions and tonnage, motive power and speed, and armament and size of crew. Where known, the names of officers are listed. Where earlier information is lacking RCMP muster rolls for 1932 have been drawn on for the officers of cruisers acquired after 1927.

1897 - 1913

The single screw wooden-hulled Constance was built for the Department of Marine and Fisheries at Owen Sound, Ontario in 1891 by the Polson Iron Works Company Limited. It had a length of 125 feet, breadth of 19 feet 6 inches, depth of 11 feet 3 inches, measured 254.5 gross tons and was powered with a coal-fired compound engine of fifty nominal horsepower giving it a speed over a measured mile at Owen Sound of 11.67 knots. With a crew of twenty-three officers and men, a ram bow and three quick-firing guns, one in the bow and the others amidships on the port and starboard sides, it was described at the time as a "very formidable lake commerce destroyer." The vessel was commissioned at the Port of Québec, June 13, 1892, then transferred to the Department of Customs. By 1897, it was under the control of Fred L. Jones, the newly appointed Chief Preventive Officer. From 1892 until about August 1908, when it was returned to the Department of Marine and Fisheries, its master was Captain George M. May with First Officer Caron and Second Officer McGough as his mates (from 1897 to 1904 or later). From at least as early as 1904 a substantial part of the crew
of the Constance were from Gaspé Bay and throughout the period it was used by Customs it was based at the Port of Gaspé during the ice-free months and patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Northumberland Strait and the lower St. Lawrence River. In his 1902 report Captain May commented that he could wish that the Constance was both larger to face the gales of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Atlantic and faster because of the urgency for both speed and the distance to be travelled. In 1903, bilge keels were added to the hull to help reduce the vessel's roll and an electric generator, electric lights and a searchlight were installed. In early August 1904, when leaving the harbour of St. John, New Brunswick, the American schooner Butte Robinson collided with the Constance, carrying away the foremost and causing minor damage to the boat davits and rigging, the first accident Captain May had in forty years of seafaring. In 1906 the Constance was returned to the Department of Marine and Fisheries, which employed her as a Fisheries Protection cruiser on the East Coast until she was sold in 1920. During the years 1928 and 1929 the vessel was again employed as a Preventive Cruiser with its crew reduced to nineteen, its three guns removed and an armament of six rifles. The vessel is reported to have been still in use as a ferry on the Cape Breton coast in 1938.

The Victoria was used as a Preventive cruiser on the Cape Breton coast in 1897 under the command of Captain Alexander A. Demers. This vessel was probably chartered but its identity is uncertain because there were several Victoria's on the Canadian registry books of the time. However, it was probably built at Sorel, Quebec in 1892, rebuilt in 1897 and owned by W. Paul Jr. of Sorel in 1898. This ship was a steam screw vessel, 104 feet 5 inches in length, 17 feet 1 inch in breadth, 4 feet 6 inches in depth and measured 146 gross and ninety-one net tons. Much later, in 1926, Captain Demers (by then the head of the Dominion Wreck Commission) reported that he had been in charge of a cruiser on the Cape Breton coast from 1892 to 1901 doing Preventive work similar to that of Captain LaCouvé on the Margaret. However, besides the Victoria the only other record which has been found is of another vessel under his command was the tug Florence C. with a crew from the Curlew, which had been chartered from 1899 to 1901 for Fisheries Protection on the southeast coast of Nova Scotia.

The Stanley had been built in 1888 by Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering of Glasgow, Scotland as Canada's first icebreaker and during the winter season was employed by Marine and Fisheries maintaining communications between Pictou, Nova Scotia and Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. From at least 1891 until 1900 it was also employed as a Fisheries Protection cruiser patrolling between East Point, Prince Edward Island and Port Daniel on the Gaspé coast during the summer season of 1898 it was used as a Customs Preventive cruiser, probably under the command of its usual Marine and Fisheries master, Captain A. Finlayson. It was a steel-hulled vessel with a length of 207 feet, breadth of 32 feet, depth of 13.5 feet, measured 914 gross tons and was powered by a triple expansion steam engine of 2300 horsepower giving it a speed of fifteen knots. It continued as a Department of Marine vessel until it was sold in 1935.

The Gladiator, which was used as a Preventive Service vessel at the same time as the Stanley, had been chartered by the Department of Marine and Fisheries from David Rudderhouse of Sydney, Nova Scotia. It was a screw tug, built at Miramichi, New Brunswick in 1885, seventy-four feet in length, eighteen feet in breadth, eight feet in depth and measured seventy gross and thirty-six net tons.

The iron-hulled Christine, built at the Port of Glasgow, Scotland in 1881 had a length of 126 feet, breadth of 17 feet 2 inches, depth of 9 feet 9 inches and measured 140 gross and ninety-five net tons. It was powered with a forty nominal horsepower steam engine, giving it a speed of ten knots. It was purchased by the Department of Marine and Fisheries in July 1904 and transferred to Customs in August as a replacement for the Constance. Captain G.M. May, previously master of the Constance, was master of the vessel with a crew of twenty officers and men, many of whom were Gaspeians. It was sold by the Department of Customs in 1911 and used as a ferry between Quebec City and nearby Ste. Petronille at the western tip of Ile d'Orleans until May 18, 1915 when it sank with the loss of six men after colliding with the Montreal-built submarine H1 off Pointe St. Jean on the southeast coast of the Ile d'Orleans.

The Laurentian (ex-King Edward), built at Beverly, Great Britain in 1902, was a 355 gross, 144 net ton vessel with a length of 149.0 feet, breadth of twenty-four feet, depth of 11.1 feet powered with an eighty-four nominal horsepower engine. As the King Edward it had been brought to Canada by Holliday Bros. of Quebec City who used it until 1910 on a route along the north shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence as far east as Esquimaux Point and then to Charlottetown, P.E.I. and Sydney, Nova Scotia. In 1910 or 1911 it was acquired by A.C. and G.D. Davis of Lévis, Quebec and registered at Quebec as the Laurentian. In 1911 it was apparently chartered by the Preventive Service which used it as a cruiser based at the port of Gaspé until the end of the 1913 season, probably under the command of Captain May. In 1914 it was the property of Canada Steamship Lines and was purchased by the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1917 for use as a lighthouse supply vessel. It was broken up in its registry closed in 1947.

1914-1926

The Margaret, built at Woolton Works, Southampton, England and delivered to Customs at Halifax in April 1914, was the first vessel built specifically for the Customs Preventive Service. It was a twin-screw steel-hulled vessel, with a length of 182.4 feet, breadth of 32.3 feet, and a depth of fifteen feet, with a triple-expansion coal-burning steam engine of 355 horsepower which was converted to oil during the winter of 1924-25. In its sea trials it had a speed of seventeen knots.
(twenty knots if pushed), but one of its deck officers (Watson Aschah) has stated that by the 1920s its top speed was only fourteen knots. In 1926 it was armed with two Vickers semi-automatic six pound guns, but during 1928-29 its armament was reported to have been a six pounder plus seventeen rifles. The vessel carried a nominal crew of twenty-three officers and men but during the early 1920s carried as many as thirty-three or thirty-four and a crew of forty was reported in 1928-29.

Throughout its career as a Preventive Service cruiser it patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence and adjacent waters during the ice-free months with a base at the port of Gaspé. In World War I it was transferred to the Minister of Naval Services and then returned to Preventive work in 1919. Its master when it was commissioned in 1914 was Captain George M. May, followed in 1915 and from 1919 to 1927 by Alfred C. LaCouvée, who had been an able-bodied seaman on the Constance in 1896, in charge of the patrol boat Puritan on the Baie des Chaleurs from 1903 to 1906 and First Mate of the Margaret in 1914.

When the Margaret was a Canadian naval vessel during the war years of 1916-18, at least four other vessels were used as cruisers by the Customs Preventive Service. The first was a Department of Fisheries lighthouse supply vessel, the Dollard, which had been built in 1913 by Kingston Shipbuilding in Kingston, Ontario. It was used as a Preventive cruiser in 1916 with its base in Gaspé. It was 170 feet in length, 31.5 feet in breadth and 15.5 feet in depth, with a gross tonnage of 761 and a net tonnage of 232 powered by a triple-expansion steam engine of 182 NHP. In 1916 its master was Alfred LaCouvée, with a crew made up mainly of Gaspeians. The vessel was subsequently used by Marine and Fisheries and its successors until it was sold in 1961 and is reported to have been still afloat in 1966.

In 1917 a vessel called the Restless was in use as a Preventive cruiser, under the command of Alfred LaCouvée, from May until late-July when it was officially reported to have been sold at North Sydney, Nova Scotia. Its identity is uncertain because the only vessel of that name in the Canadian Registry Books at the time was a Department of Marine and Fisheries vessel stationed on Canada's west coast from 1908 to 1927. Late in July Captain LaCouvée went to Toronto to bring a small gasoline-powered patrol boat named Ebbie L. to Saint John, New Brunswick for use as a harbour boarding boat. The vessel had engine trouble during the trip down the St. Lawrence and when it was under tow Captain LaCouvée lost a leg when it was caught in a loop of the tow hamper. About mid-August the Department of Public Works tug Canso was placed on Preventive patrol duty in the Gulf of St. Lawrence for the remainder of the season as a replacement for the Restless. The Canso was 91.6 feet in length, twenty-two feet in breadth and 11.7 feet in depth, 224 gross and forty-seven net tons, and powered with a forty-six IHP engine. No information has been found concerning its officers.

During the ice free season of 1918 another Department of Public Works tug, the Lisgar, was used as a Preventive cruiser in the Gulf of St. Lawrence under the command of Alfred LaCouvée, who was now fitted with an artificial leg. This vessel had nearly the same dimensions as the Canso, with a length of 91.8 feet, a breadth of 22.1 feet, and a depth of 10.7 feet. With a tonnage of 210 gross and 118 net, the vessel was fitted with a forty-six IHP engine. The other officers included Russell F. Coffin as First Mate and H.E. Berry, the Chief Engineer.

The Margaret was returned to the Preventive Service in 1919 and for most of the pre-World War II period its crews were drawn almost entirely from Gaspé Bay and nearby communities. In 1919 the officers were Alfred LaCouvée, Master; Russell Coffin, First Mate; Joseph Deslauriers, Second Mate; Allan Beattie, Third Mate; John Koenig, Chieft Engineer; J. Despres, Second Engineer; Reginald LaCouvée, Third Engineer; and J. Simard, Fourth Engineer. Joseph Deslauriers became First Mate in 1920-21, followed by Hubert Coffin during 1922-26. In 1924 the other officers were John Macdonald, Second Mate; Watson Aschah, Third Mate; John Koenig, Chief Engineer; J. Despres, Second Engineer; Reginald LaCouvée, Third Engineer; and Fred Paine, Fourth Engineer. On December 10, 1927, after forty-seven years at sea, Captain LaCouvée asked to be relieved of command of the Margaret because of ill-health, and Watson Aschah took command until he was transferred to command of the Conestoga about mid-October 1928. Hubert Coffin was the next master, serving until he was transferred to command of the new cruiser Preventor in 1929. For the next two years several officers served briefly as master, including Albert Aschah, John Vaughan, J.C. McCarty and finally in 1931, Russell Coffin. The vessel was transferred to the RCMP Marine Section in 1932 but because of high operating costs, it was sold the same year and later used as a gunboat on the coast of South America.

The Grib, built in 1907 at Sandefjord, Norway, was a steam screw whaler registered at Montreal in 1915 as the property of the Canadian Whaling Company Limited of Seven Islands (Sept-Iles), Quebec. It was later wrecked, recovered, and registered at Ottawa in 1917 as the property of the Minister of Naval Services and then transferred to the Minister of Customs and Internal Revenue in 1920. It had a length of 94.5 feet, breadth of 18.7 feet and a depth of 10.2 feet. The craft measured 140 gross and seventy-eight net tons and was powered by a forty-three IHP engine. It was used as a Preventive cruiser from 1920 to 1926, primarily on the Atlantic coast, with Russell Coffin as master. In the early 1930s the Royal Canadian Navy used it as a target for gunnery practice and sank it off the Nova Scotia coast near Halifax.

The Patrol IV (ex-rum-runner Stumble Inn) had been an American submarine chaser, built at Brooklyn, New York in 1917. It was 87.8 feet in length, 14.6 feet wide, and eight feet deep, measuring seventy-six gross and forty-eight net tons and powered by two Fairbanks-Morse six cylinder gasoline
engines, each of 150 horsepower. After it was seized by Canadian Customs it was transferred from Bridgeburg (Fort Erie) to North Sydney, Nova Scotia on July 11, 1924, at which time it was described as a gasoline launch of fifty-four tons with a crew of seven men under the command of Hubert Coffin, formerly First Mate of the Margaret. In 1928-29 it had a crew of eleven and was armed with a three pound gun and four rifles. In 1929 it was based at North Sydney, Nova Scotia with a Captain Croft as master. In 1932 it was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at North Sydney with a crew of thirteen, including Sp.Cst. J.W. Bonner, Master; Sp. Cst. F.M. MacKenzie, First Officer; and Sp. Cst. G.L. (Gordon) Coffin, Chief Engineer. It was still in use on March 1, 1934 with Skipper J.F. (James) Aschah as master, but a year later it was apparently out of service and in charge of Leading Seaman P.R. Roberts.

The Department of Marine and Fisheries hydrographic survey vessel Cartier, built by Swan Hunter at Newcastle, England in 1910, carried a crew of thirty-four officers and men. It was 164 feet in length, twenty-nine feet in breadth and fifteen feet in depth, measuring 556 gross and 234 net tons and powered by a triple-expansion coal-fired steam engine of 142 NHP. During the half year that it served as a Preventive cruiser on the Nova Scotia coast (August 1926 to January 1927) the master was Hubert Coffin.

The patrol boat Scaterie was built for the Preventive Service at Orillia, Ontario in 1926. Measuring 71.7 feet in length, 13.7 feet in breadth and six feet in depth, it had a capacity of forty-one gross and fourteen net tons. The vessel was powered by an eighty horsepower Fairbanks-Morse engine and by two Kermath gasoline engines. During 1928-29 it carried a crew of eight and was armed with three rifles; in 1932, it was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at Cheticamp, Nova Scotia with a crew of nine, including Sp.Cst. R.J. Herman, Master (since at least 1929); Sp.Cst. R. Grandy, First Officer; and Sp.Cst. H.E. Cochrane, Chief Engineer. It was later classified as a "B" class RCMP cruiser and was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy at the start of World War II.

The steam yacht Mayita, which had been built at New York in 1889, had a length of 118.1 feet, breadth of 18.4 feet and a depth of 9.1 feet. It measured 112 gross and sixty-three net tons and was powered with a fifty-one NHP steam engine, which was probably coal-fired. In September 1926 its owners, Alex. McKay Co. Ltd. of Quebec City chartered it to the Preventive Service, but by November its engine was in such bad shape that it had to winter at Gaspe Bay. Although it was used again in 1927, by August it was towed to Quebec by the Margaret and returned to its owners. The only officer whose name is known was the Second Mate, James Aschah.

1927-1928

The Vigilant, built in Toronto by the Polson Iron Works in 1904 as a smaller version of the Canadian Navy's first warship, Canada, was the first Canadian-built steam-powered warship. It was originally armed with four one and one-half pound quick-firing guns, two forward and two after, and carried a crew of fifty-three officers and men. Described as a Third Class Cruiser, Vigilant was 177 feet in length, 22.1 feet in width and 13.2 feet in depth. She measured 396 gross and 243 net tons and was powered by a sixty-five NHP engine. Vigilant was mainly used as a Fisheries Protection cruiser on the Great Lakes until she was sold in 1924. In mid-July 1927, stripped of her guns and armed with three rifles, the vessel was on the eastern seaboard as a Preventive cruiser, manned by a crew of thirty-four including Russel Coffin as master. The craft continued to be used by the Preventive Service until at least 1929.

The Baroff (ex-rum-runner Bo Peep) was an American submarine chaser built at New York in 1918. She measured 87.8 feet in length, 14.6 feet in breadth and was eight feet deep, measuring seventy-six gross and forty-eight net tons and was propelled by two Fairbanks-Morse six-cylinder engines, each capable of generating 150 horsepower. It was chartered in 1927 and then bought by the Customs Department in 1928. Beginning in 1927 it was based at the port of Gaspé and patrolled the lower river and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In the fall of 1927 John MacDonald was the master, with James Aschah as First Mate. The following year Gordon Roberts became master, with James Aschah as Mate and W. Trenholm as Chief Engineer. Of the remaining eleven crew members, eight were from the north shore of Gaspé Bay. In 1928-29 it was reported to be armed with four rifles and to carry a crew of fifteen. By 1932 it was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at Gaspé, with a crew of twelve and the same officers as in 1927. It continued to be used as a Preventive cruiser by the RCMP until about 1936. Its history from 1936 to the end of World War II is not known, but after the war it was disposed of by the War Assets Corporation.

The Department of Marine and Fisheries hydrographic vessel Bayfield (ex-Lord Stanley) was built by D. and W. Henderson in Glasgow, Scotland in 1889 and was purchased by the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1901. It was a steel-hulled, twin-screw vessel, 140 feet in length, 24 feet 1 inch in breadth, and 11 feet 3 inches in depth. She was measured at 276 gross and 114 net tons and was equipped with a 160 horsepower triple-expansion engine. When the Preventive cruiser fleet was being expanded it was chartered about 1927 and with a crew of twenty-eight and armed with five rifles, patrolled the coasts of Prince Edward Island until December 1928 when it was returned to the Department of Marine. It was sold in 1935 and wrecked on the Newfoundland coast in 1949.

The diesel-powered cruiser Bayhound (ex-yacht Tiliaeum), built at New York in 1910, was 114 feet in length, 17.2 feet in breadth, and six feet in depth, measured 135 gross and seventy-eight net tons, and was equipped with a Fairbanks-Morse four cylinder engine of four hundred horsepower. It was acquired by the Preventive Service about 1928 and continued to be used as a Preventive cruiser by the Marine
Section of the RCMP until 1936. In 1928-29 it was armed with two rifles and carried a crew of sixteen. By 1932 it was based at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, with a crew of nineteen, including Sp.Cst. J. Vaughan, Master; Sp.Cst. T.G.M. Cotton, First Officer; Sp.Cst. F.E.A. Miller, Second Officer; and Sp.Cst. M. Nickerson, Chief Engineer.

The Conestoga (ex-yacht Pathfinder) had been built at Racine, Wisconsin in 1896 and was 136 feet in length, 18.3 feet in breadth and 10.3 feet in depth. The craft measured 168 gross and fifty-nine net tons and was powered by an oil-burning steam engine of fifty-one HP, giving it a speed of fourteen knots. It was chartered by the Customs Preventive Service from James Playfair of Midland, Ontario in 1927, transferred from Lake Huron to the east coast and then purchased in 1928. In 1928-29 it was armed with two rifles and carried a crew of eighteen officers and men. In May 1927 its master was Hubert Coffin, followed in mid-October 1928 by Watson Asch. In 1929 the other officers were: John Macdonald, First Mate; Adam Bowser, Second Mate; and John Tizzard, Chief Engineer. Although the vessel was transferred to the RCMP Marine Section in 1932 it was not commissioned because of high operating costs. During 1932 and 1933 it was laid up at the Marine Section Depot in Halifax under the care of a watchman and then returned to its previous owner. During World War II the Royal Canadian Navy used it as a training ship based at Hamilton, Ontario.

1929-1931

The diesel-powered cruisers Fleurdelis and Preventor were built for the Preventive Service at Vickers in Montreal in 1929 and were described as resembling First World War "P" class naval destroyers. They were each armed with a six-pound gun and carried crews of twenty-two officers and men. Their dimensions were identical: 164.8 feet in length, 21.1 feet in breadth and 11.7 feet in depth. There was, however, a slight difference in tonnage: Fleurdelis measured 316 gross and ninety-two net tons, while Preventor measured 317 gross and ninety-six net tons. Both were equipped with three six-cylinder Winton engines, each of six hundred horsepower. In 1932, when both were RCMP Marine Section cruisers based at Halifax, the officers of the Fleurdelis were Sp.Cst. J.C. McCarty, Master (since 1929); Sp.Cst. M.A. Hyson, First Officer; Sp.Cst. M. Pellitier, Second Officer; and Sp.Cst. C.M. O'Leary, Chief Engineer. At the same time, the officers of the Preventor were Sp.Cst. H.W. (Hubert) Coffin, Master (since 1929); Sp.Cst. S.C. Bechemaville, First Officer; Sp.Cst. F.H. Faulkner, Second Officer; and Sp.Cst. J.M. Murphy, Chief Engineer. Both vessel were later class as "A" RCMP cruisers, but the Preventor was disposed of in 1937. In 1939 the Fleurdelis was the Marine Section Depot ship at Halifax and then was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy at the start of World War II.

The patrol boats Chaleur and Madawaska were both built at Orillian, Ontario in 1930. They had identical dimensions and engines: 73.3 feet in length, 13.7 feet in breadth and 7.2 feet in depth, measuring sixty gross and nineteen net tons and powered by two gasoline engines producing a total of 117 (probably indicated) horsepower. In 1932 the Chaleur was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island with a crew of eight, including Sp.Cst. C.W. Heather, Master; Sp.Cst. J.W. Tremaine, First Officer; and Sp.Cst. R.A. Conrad, Chief Engineer. The Madawaska was under the command of Albert Asch in 1930 and by 1932 was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at Rivière-du-Loup, Québec with a crew of seven, including Sp.Cst. L.Rioux, Master (since 1931); Sp.Cst. G. Coté, First Officer; and Sp.Cst. H.L. Fortin, Chief Engineer. Both vessels were later classified as "B" class RCMP cruisers and transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy at the start of World War II.

The diesel-powered cruiser Aitchasse was built at Sorel, Québec in 1931. It was 116.4 feet in length, nineteen feet in breadth and 11.3 feet in depth, measuring 157 gross and twenty-eight net tons and equipped with two Winton eight-cycle engines, each of 375 horsepower. Its master in 1931 was Albert Asch. In 1932 it was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at Shediac, New Brunswick with a crew of fifteen, including Sp.Cst. Albert Asch, Master; Sp.Cst. L.S. Rioux, First Officer; and Sp.Cst. J.M. Sharp, Chief Engineer. It was later classified as an "A" class RCMP cruiser and transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy at the beginning of World War II.

The diesel-powered cruiser Adversus had been built at Orillia, Ontario in 1931. It was 132.3 feet in length, nineteen feet in breadth and eleven feet in depth, measuring 157 gross and forty-five net tons and powered by two Winton eight-cycle engines, each of 375 horsepower. In September 1932 it was an RCMP Marine Section cruiser based at North Sydney, Nova Scotia. It was then transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast via the Panama Canal, arriving at Vancouver on May 12, 1933. It was later classified as an "A" class RCMP cruiser and returned to the east coast on August 10, 1937 under the command of Skipper Lieutenant Albert Asch. In 1939 it was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy and during the war sank off Shelburne, Nova Scotia without loss of life.

The steam-powered cruiser Ulina had been built at Southampton, England in 1909. It was 115.7 feet in length, 18.5 feet in breadth and 10.2 feet in depth, measuring 167 gross and fifty-one net tons. Powered by a forty-one IHP engine, she was armed with a three-pound gun in the bow. Originally an American yacht, the craft was chartered by the Customs Preventive Service from W. McDonald of Sydney, Nova Scotia in 1931 and then purchased by the RCMP Marine Section in 1932. That year it was based at Gaspé, Québec with a crew of fifteen including Sp.Cst. J.P. Fraser, Master; Sp.Cst. J.W.G. (Watson) Asch, First Officer; Sp.Cst. J.A. MacLeod, Second Officer; and Sp.Cst. Wm. Reynard, Chief Engineer. It was later classified as an "A" class RCMP cruiser and was still in use as a Preventive cruiser in 1939. After the beginning of World War II it was returned to its owners.
in Sydney, who used it as a passenger and freight carrier around Cape Breton.

The foregoing has been assembled from a variety of sources including published, archival and private records. But the writer would welcome any additional information on the Customs Preventive cruisers, patrol boats and smaller craft including where they patrolled, what ports they sailed from, crew lists, seizures of contraband goods, and so on.

**FIRST SUBS EVER TO ST. JOHN'S**

*By J. David Perkins*
*Dartmouth, Nova Scotia*

Laid down in the sheds at Canadian Vickers during the second week of January 1915, the first four H-class submarines, out of a total British order of ten, were ready for service late that May, having been built and commissioned in the remarkably short time of four and one-half months. Trials were undertaken in deep water near Murray Bay on the St. Lawrence and final preparations were completed at Quebec City. H1-H4 had been ordered to proceed to the Aegean and they departed Quebec on 10 June 1915.

With a surfaced displacement of only 355 tons, the H-class were tiny submarines by today's standards. Dived displacement was 467 tons and the boats measured 150'3" in length; 15'3" beam; and in normal surface trim they drew 12'4". They were armed with four eighteen inch torpedo tubes in the bow and equipped with two 480 horsepower direct-drive diesel engines for surfaced running and two 160 horsepower motor/generators for charging the battery and underwater propulsion.

For the passage to their operational bases, each boat was provided with a nucleus crew consisting of a captain, a navigator, and a compliment of fifteen men. The third officer and anywhere from six to ten men required to complete the operational crew in each submarine were scheduled to join when the boats reached their depots.

At 5 A.M. on 10 June the little convoy set out downriver on the first stage of its long journey. The first destination was St. John's, Newfoundland. The four submarines were escorted by the ex-fisheries protection gunboat HMCS Canada and accompanied by the collier SS Glenalmond, which carried the spare gear outfits for all ten submarines and which was ballasted by a cargo of unfilled twelve inch projectiles.

**H1**, which had already been in one collision during trials, fouled a pontoon and badly damaged her port propeller upon leaving the berth at Quebec. Keeping Glenalmond to assist and to supply a spare propeller, L.t. W.B. Firie, the captain of H1 and the senior officer for the entire convoy of submarines, sent the other ships on ahead. By early evening H1 had been repaired and set out with Glenalmond to catch up. Their rate of advance was restricted to the collier's best speed of about ten knots.

On leaving Quebec City the submarines and their escorts journeyed down the picturesque St. Lawrence and into the Gulf in fine early summer weather. By noon on 12 June, however, this tranquil scene had changed completely. As the vessels were entering the Cabot Strait they found themselves in the thick of a worsening gale with high winds and rough seas coming at them from out of the northwest.

That first stormy night was one of great apprehension for the submariners. They were in unfamiliar waters, aboard unproved vessels; they had no logs, gyros or wireless sets; and to complete their discomfiture, the magnetic compasses had not been adjusted and were therefore not to be trusted. The submarines had been instructed to keep station on their escort, but in the gale and darkness this proved impossible. Sometime during the night H4, commanded by Lt. Henry E. Smyth with Sub-Lt. Anthony G. Cunard, a grandson of Sir Samuel Cunard, as first lieutenant and navigator, became separated from the group and disappeared, having last been seen about ten miles west of the island of Miquelon. During the forenoon of 13 June Canada reported to Halifax that she had only H2 in sight and requested assistance to help locate the others. A few hours later she reported finding H3 but confirmed the disappearance of H4. Canada led her two charges into a sheltered anchorage at Bay Virgin in the lee of Miquelon where they waited for the weather to improve.

Around 7 AM the next morning they were joined by H1 and Glenalmond which had heard of the H4 episode the previous day from AMC Calgarian, one of the ships which had been diverted to search for the missing submarines. Canada, leaving her convoy at anchor, set out to join in the search for the missing H4.

By midnight of the 13th no fewer than five steamers, including two large troop transports, had been diverted from government business to search for H4 while all shipping in the area between Cape Ray and Cape Race was warned by wireless to keep a lookout for the lone submarine. Added to the concerns that H4 might have foundered in the gale were fears that the submarine might have been discovered on the surface, mistaken for a German U-boat and attacked by the large, fast steel-hulled steamers, many of which were armed. It was also feared that her unescorted presence might precipitate a panic among the local fishermen if spotted in an area frequented by the large fleets of inshore fishing craft that plied these waters.

H4, however, was oblivious to all this and was in fact quite safe. At the height of the gale the submarine had put about and for nearly two days steamed into the weather; during this time the boat had covered almost one hundred miles in the direction from which she had come. When the weather eased early on the 15th Lieutenant Smyth found his bearings and put into Rose Blanche Bay near Port-aux-Basques, where he was able to telegraph his position and intentions to NSHQ in Ottawa. Yet for some unexplained reason it would take...
nearly twenty-four hours for Ottawa to get word back to Halifax and from thence to the searching ships before the hunt was called off. By the evening of the 15th H4 was reported passing Lameline Light at the southern tip of the Burin peninsula, about twenty-four hours behind the main group and well on her way to St. John's.

Glenalmond and the other three boats had weighed anchor at noon on the 14th and set course for St. John's to be joined shortly afterwards by Canada. Upon rounding Cape Race the following morning they encountered massive icebergs and banks of cold, thick fog, all of which heightened their anxiety for the missing H4.

Shortly after noon the three storm-battered British H-boats secured alongside in the old seaport. The surface of the harbour was dotted with dinghies and dories full of sightseers, while hundreds of spectators were gathered on the quayside to witness the arrival of the first submarines ever to visit that ancient colony. Once the boats were secured, the men were given leave to go ashore and the locals were granted permission to come aboard. But it was as if an invisible barrier separated them, since the crowd would not approach closer than about one hundred feet. Indeed, it was several hours before the crewmen could entice the good folk of St. John's to come closer for a good look.

The submarines must have seemed very strange craft indeed to those accustomed to simple steamers and sail-driven fishing vessels. After a while, the invisible barrier began to dissolve and once they had overcome their shyness (for that's what it proved to be), the naturalness openness of Newfoundlanders prevailed and the British sailors and their curious craft were made heartily welcome. The next day the submariners' minds were put at rest when news of H4's progress reached them from the telegraph office ashore. That night the British tars really had something to celebrate and their hospitable hosts proved only too willing to see that they did it properly.

Early on the morning of the 17th the tardy H4 put into St. John's, salt-stained and rust-streaked but none the worse for her adventures. The H-boats, it had been discovered, were very good seaboats, riding the long Atlantic rollers with buoyant ease, quite unlike their consorts which had plunged through the high seas, their upper decks awash. With H4's safe arrival HMCS Canada took her departure and returned to Québec, leaving the convoy to prepare for its long trans-Atlantic voyage to Gibraltar in the care of its escort, the 17,515 GRT armed merchant cruiser Calgarian. The largest and newest liner in the fleet of G.P. Allan, the Calgarian was on a troopship run from Halifax to Liverpool by way of St. John's and Gibraltar.

After an abortive start on the 19th, called off because of dense fog outside the harbour, the convoy finally got under way at 10 AM on Sunday, June 20. Aboard the Calgarian the 242 blue-putteed soldiers belonging to "F" Company of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and eighty-five Newfoundland naval reservists gave the submarines a wild, song-filled send-off as they sailed past the liner while leaving harbour. So ended the first and only visit of British submarines to St. John's during the Great War.

The rest of the trip across the Atlantic was accomplished successfully despite engine problems and bad weather. The "Rock" was sighted at 8 AM on the second of July and two and one-half hours later the submarines secured alongside the mole at Gibraltar, thirteen days and twenty-five minutes after slipping from the jetty in St. John's. For the first time ever, submarines had crossed the Atlantic under their own power.

NEWS

MARITIME AWARDS SOCIETY

The Maritime Awards Society, an affiliate of the Naval Officers Association of Vancouver Island, exists to foster national awareness of the importance of maritime awareness to the economic development of Canada and to the well-being of all Canadians. To achieve this aim, the Society is prepared to provide incentives to young Canadians to prepare for a career in one of the many professions dedicated to our maritime interests. These incentives take the form of awards, scholarships, and research fellowships in fields such as trade, resources, marine environment, defence, diplomacy, and culture as they relate to the maritime sector.

The Society has established a Maritime Studies Endowment Fund out of which it makes awards. The programme consists of prizes and fee support to assist in the achievement of career goals in a maritime field. The Society selects educational institutions and the area of study to be undertaken; the institutions chosen are responsible for selecting the individual recipients.

The Maritime Awards Society is a public foundation registered under the Income Tax Act of Canada. Sustaining memberships are offered for $100.00 per year and Corporate Memberships for $1000.00, but donations of any size are gratefully accepted. Receipts for income tax purposes will be issued for all donations of ten dollars or more.

To make a donation to this worthy cause, or for more information about their programmes, readers are urged to contact the Maritime Awards Society, P.O. Box 5328, Station B, Victoria, B.C. V8R 6S4.

CAIRD JUNIOR RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP

The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England announces the Caird Junior Research Fellowship in Naval and Maritime History and Associated Studies. This fellowship is offered annually by the Trustees of the museum. It will normally be granted in the field of British naval and
maritime history, but a Fellow may be appointed in any of the following fields: history of the nautical sciences (astronomy, navigation, hydrography, and cartography); maritime art; nautical archaeology; or museum conservation. Applicants, who may be of any nationality, will be judged on the quality of their proposals. The Fellowship is intended for recent graduates, or for those working towards a higher degree. Equivalent projects, not to be submitted to a university, will also be considered. The conditions for a Fellowship are:

1. The grant for a Fellowship will be £7,500. This grant may be renewed for one year. There will not normally be more than one Fellowship at any one time; and
2. Any publication arising from the tenure of the Fellowship would receive printed acknowledgement in the publication.

A Fellow will be expected to attend conferences and symposia on behalf of the museum and to participate in informal seminars with staff. The Fellow will also be expected to report regularly on research progress.

Applications may be made at any time. Appropriate forms, and further information on the Fellowship, may be obtained by writing to the Secretary, Caird Fund, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London SE10 9NF, England.

UPCOMING CONFERENCES

CNRS ANNUAL CONFERENCE

David Flemming, the Programme Chair for this year’s conference which will be held in Halifax 22-24 June, tells us that planning is coming along nicely. It is expected that there will be about twelve papers on the programme covering a wide range of maritime topics. There will also be an a banquet, at which Niels Jannasch, the founding director of the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic, will give the keynote address. Members who know Niels will realize that this speech in itself provides ample reason for attendance! David and his hardworking committee are also planning other events to coincide with the conference, including a boat tour of Halifax harbour. CNRS members who have not yet contacted him about attendance should do so by writing to him at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic, 1675 Lower Water Street, Halifax, N.S. B3J 1S3. We hope to see as many of you as possible in Halifax this June.

MARITIME HISTORY AT THE CHA

For readers planning to attend this year’s Canadian Historical Association meetings at the University of Laval, which will be held from June 1-3, we might draw your attention to two specifically maritime sessions. The first will be held at 9 AM on the opening day and will deal with "Fear and Symbolism in Eighteenth-Century France: The Sea and the Plague." Papers will be presented by Dr. Laurier Turgeon on "Archives judiciaires et production symbolique du pouvoir autour du monstre marin de Guillaume Pottier (27 septembre 1701);" Alain Cabantous on "Les gens de mer et les autres: visions d'un monde (17e-19e siècles); and Pierre Grégoire, "Fléau collectif et mie en texte: l'exemple de la peste marseillaise de 1720." The second session will be held at 4PM the same day on "British and French Naval Strategies in the Americas in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." The papers will be given by F.J. Thorpe on "The Cod Fishery in French American Strategy, 1660-1783;" and Gerald Jordan on "Nicaragua: The Royal Naval Expedition of 1848."

WAR ALONG THE NIAGARA

The "Third International Symposium on the War of 1812 and its Legacy in Canada and the United States" will be held in Buffalo, New York, 8-10 September 1989. This year's meeting marks the 175th anniversary of the Battles of Chippewa, Lundy's Lane and Fort Erie, and the Treaty of Ghent, which brought the war to an end. The conference will feature papers on various topics related to the events of 1814 along the Niagara, including some naval topics. There will also be a full day of bus touring on both sides of the Niagara with lectures and demonstrations by experts at each site. If there is enough interest, there will also be a Sunday morning tour of Buffalo harbour as an extra option. For further information, contact War Along the Niagara Symposium, Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society, 25 Nottingham Court, Buf falo, New York 14216, U.S.A.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

UNDERSEA DIMENSION OF MARITIME STRATEGY
Halifax, N.S., 21-24 June 1989

Panel One: The Evolution of Undersea Warfare

Chair: Dr. Marc Milner

1. To be announced, "The Underwater Environment"
2. Dr. S.M. Davis, "The Development of the Submarine, 1900 to 1945"
3. Dr. Jurgen Rowher, "Submarine Warfare: Operational Concepts and Missions"
4. Dr. George Lindsey, "The Development of Anti-Submarine Warfare: Surface Ships and Aircraft"
5. Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, "Anti-Submarine Warfare: Operational Concepts and Missions"

Rapporteur: Dr. Michael Hadley

Panel Two: National Experiences of Undersea Warfare

Chair: Admiral D.L. Hanington
INSTITUTE FOR GREAT LAKES RESEARCH
(PERRYSBURG, OHIO)

The Institute announces the appointments of Robert W. Graham as Archivist and Jay V. Martin as Assistant Archivist. The Institute has recently published a revised edition of American Ship Building Company and Predecessors, 1867-1920, a catalog of pre-1921 marine architectural drawings in the Institute's collections. As well, the Institute will host the annual meeting of the Association for Great Lakes Maritime History, 21-24 September 1989.

PORT OF VANCOUVER ARCHIVES (VANCOUVER)

The Vancouver Port Corporation recently has established the "Port of Vancouver Archives." The objective of this repository is to collect pertinent information regarding the history of the port. It also wants to record data kept in other British Columbia archives. The Archives will also be pleased to receive input from members of CNRS, and is especially interested in old photographs. The Archives operates under the guidance of Miss Gwyneth Foulds, who can be reached at the Vancouver Port Corporation, 1900-200 Granville Street, Vancouver, B.C. V6C 2P9 (tel.: [604] 666-0355).

On a related note, the corporation and the archive are interested in learning more about the barque Ellen Lewis, which was the first vessel to carry export cargo from the port. The barque left Burrard Inlet on 9 November 1864 with lumber and pickets destined for Adelaide, Australia. Little is known about this vessel, and any information or a picture would be appreciated.

ARGONAUTA CALENDAR


April 7-8 1989 "American Maritime History: The Atlantic Maritime World," Third Spring Symposium of the Williams College-Mystic Seaport Program in American Maritime Studies, Mystic, Conn. (Information: Williams-Mystic Program, Mystic Seaport Museum, Mystic, Conn. 06355)

April 11-14 1989 Canadian Maritime Heritage Conference, Fredericton, N.B.


June 1-3 1989 Canadian Historical Society Annual Meetings, Université Laval, Québec, P.Q.


June 19-23 1989 Fourth Annual Northwest Maritime History Workshop, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington (Organizer: Dr. James H. Hitchman, Department of History, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Wash. 98225)


September 22-25 1989 Annual Meeting of the Association for Great Lakes Maritime History, Bowling Green State University, Perrysburg, Ohio
November 3-4, 1989

November 1989
"Toronto's Changing Waterfront: Perspectives from the Past," Toronto, Ontario (Information: Michael Moir, Toronto Harbour Commission Archives, 60 Harbour Street, Toronto, Ontario M5J 1B7)

March 16-17, 1990
"Redirecting: Defending Canada--The Pacific Perspective," University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. (Information: Dr. David Zimmerman, Department of History, University of Victoria, P.O. Box 1700, Victoria, B.C. V8W 2Y2)

August 19-24, 1990
Tenth International Congress of Economic History, Including Sessions on "Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950" (Sponsored by the Maritime Economic History Group (Organizers: Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik); and "Methodology of Quantitative Studies on Large Sea Ports" (Organizers: Dr. Jean Heffer and Prof. dr. Karel F.E. Veraghtert), Louvain, Belgium

August 26-31, 1990
VII Triennial Congress of the International Congress of Maritime Museums, Statens Sjöhistoriska Museum, Stockholm, Sweden

August 26-Sept. 1990
International Congress of Historical Sciences, Including Conference of the International Commission for Maritime History on the "Maritime Transport of Foodstuffs" (Organizer: Prof. dr. Klaus Friedland, President, ICMH, Kreienholt 1, D-2305 Heikendorf, F.R. Germany); and a Session Sponsored by the Association for the History of the Northern Seas (Organizer: Prof. Walter E. Minchinton, President, AHNS, 4 Alexandra Terrace, Exeter EX4 6SY, England), Madrid, Spain

September 1990
Sixth Conference of the International Maritime Lecturers Association, Bremen, F.R. Germany

October 1990
"Jack Tar in History: Seamen, Pirates, and Workers of the North Atlantic World," St. Mary's University, Halifax, N.S. (Organizer: Dr. Colin D. Howell, Department of History, St. Mary's University, Halifax, N.S. B3H 3C3)

1990
International Tug Conference, Halifax, N.S. (Information: Thomas Reed Publications, 80 Coombe Road, New Malden, Surrey KT3 4QS, England)

April 17-19, 1992
Vancouver Conference on Exploration and Discovery, Vancouver, B.C. (Information: Dr. Hugh Johnston, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. V5A 1S6)

August 1992
First International Congress of Maritime History, Liverpool, England (Organizer: Lewis R. Fischer, Maritime Studies Research Unit, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Nfld. A1C 5S7)

BOOK REVIEWS


This excellent book is about the factors--up to January 1986 only--comprising "the politics of surface shipping through the Northwest Passage and its eastern and western approaches." The provocative theme is that Canada has to put up or shut down our sovereignty in the Arctic:

"Either Canada does more to honour its undertaking to support commercial navigation or it effectively leaves it to others to look after their own interests.... If it is assumed that Canadians would prefer not to leave the Passage to others, then they have no option but to attend to the evolving requirements of Arctic marine transportation and all that goes with it, from excellence in Arctic science and icebreaking through co-operation with the circumpolar Inuit to a gradual resolution of the national defence issues associated with foreign nuclear submarine operations in Canada's Arctic waters."
Professor Griffiths began assembling the articles for this scholarly book about five years ago to update both The Arctic Frontier (1966) and The Arctic in Question (1976). However, when it appeared in late 1987 it was already almost two years out of date, the contributed chapters having all been submitted by May 1985 when the US Coast Guard gave notice of the east-west transit, in early August, by its new heavy icebreaker Polar Sea. When the transit took place, with two invited Canadian observers on board, it was followed on 10 September by a "Statement on Sovereignty" in the House of Commons announcing further steps the government would take to consolidate Canada's claims to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. Although none of the contributed articles deals with these significant events, the editor has discussed them in his introduction and conclusion and has appended the text of the Sovereignty statement.

Castigating "the leisurely pace of Canada's marine development programs in the Arctic" as the wrong approach, Professor Griffiths regrets that "awareness of an interest in Arctic shipping is deficient at the public and decision-making levels alike. Current Canadian interest in the waters of the Arctic archipelago is centred not so much on commercial shipping as on the defence of sovereignty. The focus is more on legal and political means of affirming control over the Passage than on furtherance of sound uses of Canada's Arctic waters."

He has grouped the chapters into four parts. The first, "The Setting," consists of Graham Rowley's essay on the historical, environmental, economic and social conditions for developing surface navigation in the Passage and Peter Jull's paper on "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas."

The second part, "International Arctic Politics," begins with "The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath" by political scientists John Kirton and Don Munton, both of whom specialize in Canadian-American relations. Then law professor Donald McRae discussing negotiating, in the UN Law of the Sea Conference, article 234 on "specially vulnerable areas," in particular ice-covered waters. It was negotiated by Canada (determined that the Passage not be treated as an international strait), the USA (accepting functional jurisdiction by the coastal state for pollution control, etc., in such areas without prejudice to their status as international straits for surface, sub-surface and air navigation), and the USSR (at least sympathetic to Canada's position, likening it to its own control over the Northeast Passage). Then follow two papers setting out the views--legal, environmental and social--of Canada's northern neighbours, Alaska and Greenland/Denmark, with which we share responsibility for the Passage as a potential shipping route.

In the third part are four articles on "Canadian Arctic Politics," starting with Globe & Mail reporter Jennifer Lewington's critique, "Lessons of the Arctic Pilot Project," Petro-Canada's shipping venture in the early '80s. Peter Burnet's paper on "Environmental Politics and Inuit Self-Government," with Peter Jull's article in Part I on Inuit politics and L.T. Rasmussen's on "Greenlandic and Danish Attitudes to Canadian Arctic Shipping," set out the position of the aboriginal peoples on the uses proposed for their traditional homelands and hunting territories. Harriet Critchley has a paper on "Defence and Policing in Arctic Canada," dated when Perrin Beatty tabled his Defence White Paper last June and set off the still-current controversy over the government's plans to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines.

Completing the picture of what Canada is actually doing to support shipping while defending sovereignty in the Arctic, Kim Nossal has a paper on "Polar Icebreakers," subtitled "The Politics of Inertia," thus putting himself on-side with his political science colleague, Professor Griffiths, who wrote his conclusions to the book under the emotive rubric "Beyond the Arctic Sublime."

Politics of the Northwest Passage is, like The Arctic Frontier in 1966, a more scholarly treatment of the issues than was The Arctic in Question in 1976. The five maps are of excellent quality, as is the whole book. Though not a book for readers of more popular, less scholarly works, in my view it is a book to be read by those in our Society who want to comprehend the issues behind the continuing controversy with the USA on whether the Canadian portion of the Passage is an international strait or is internal Canadian waters through which ships, submarines and aircraft may pass only with Canada's consent and subject to Canadian law.

Professor Griffiths concludes: "No longer can southern Canadians afford to appreciate the Arctic from a safe distance. As the 21st century draws near, an alternative vision of the Arctic is required, one that evokes the expectation of future achievement, overcomes passivity, and brings forth a united effort on behalf of a distant goal." This book will contribute in no small way to the formation of such a vision among scholars concerned about marine affairs.

Allen D. Taylor
Cantley, Québec


This is a comprehensive survey of the history of French maritime fisheries from medieval times to the modern era. It was written as part of an ambitious reference series on French history, the "Bibliothèque historique Privat", and accordingly it is aimed at general or undergraduate readers. The book consists of several lengthy essays organized chronologically and written by several contributors under the direction of Michel Mollat, an acknowledged authority on the subject. Employing a team of historians is not without its drawbacks, especially in producing a survey history, but on
balance the result is a praiseworthy overview of a complex and extremely diverse economic and social phenomenon. Despite its length, this volume remains too slim to be a definitive work. Nevertheless it is significant as the first attempt in several decades to examine the subject in so comprehensive a manner. By drawing upon a large body of recent literature, including a number of articles and theses which many readers would have difficulty in finding, the authors have provided an invaluable service.

There are several indications that the book has been written for a general audience; there are no footnotes; there is no overall bibliography, although there are suggestions for further readings (sometimes quite detailed suggestions) at the end of each section or essay; the number of photographs and illustrations is quite profuse. At the same time, the book does not descend to its readers with simplistic arguments or analysis. Thus, in discussing the phenomenon of overfishing and the depletion of fish stocks, the contributors concede the role of technological innovations within the fishery, such as motorized stern druggers. Yet they also insist that technological innovations on land, especially in transportation, have played an even greater role in the depletion of fish stocks by greatly increasing the capacity of the fish distributors to reach new customers further inland, or by making fish cheaper and more desirable to existing customers. In short, the reader is made to recognize that innovation, change, and developments within the fisheries usually require awareness of what is happening on land as much as they require attention to what is happening at sea.

The reader is also reminded that, in recent years, researchers have dispelled a number of myths about the place of fish in European diets. One such myth is that Catholic Europe ate a great deal of fish for religious reasons; another is that fish was cheaper than meat, and therefore was consumed fairly frequently by the lower classes, while meat was reserved for the élites. In fact, fish was quite expensive: the primitive state of transportation before the advent of the railway made it difficult to distribute fish inland except at great cost. Nor has the situation changed very much in this century, despite the development of new methods of preservation. Here, aesthetic factors in the marketplace come into play. As Paul Adam notes in his section on the post-war fishing industries, market preference for fresh fish remains much stronger than for frozen, with the result that fish remains at least as expensive as (and usually more costly than) red meat. My own experience while living for a year in France bears this out.

In addition to Paul Adam, who also wrote the Introduction (subtitled "point de vue d'un économiste"), the contributors include Jean-Claude Hocquet (on the medieval fisheries), Laurier Turgeon (on long-distance fisheries, 1500-1850), Alain Cabantous (on the social history of the fisheries, 1600-1850), and Claude Vauchare (on the transformation of the fisheries during the era of industrialization, 1850-1939). In relying upon several contributors instead of a single historian, the publisher has adhered to a formula which it has tried and tested through dozens of books appearing in three earlier series on French local, provincial, and regional history. This approach gives the book a number of strengths. For instance, it means that the expertise of a specialist is brought to bear on each period and theme of the history of French maritime fisheries. It also means that the book is extremely up-to-date, both in its sources (some of which were published only in 1986) and in its subject matter (the current dispute between Canada and France is discussed briefly and, in my opinion, even-handedly). The book has, in consequence, a degree of relevance and timeliness which is difficult to match in a monograph, for which the gestation period is usually much longer.

Nevertheless, a book written by several contributors also carries with it several disadvantages. One is the tendency for each historian to see the special significance of the period in which he specializes. Thus, Laurier Turgeon defines his period (1500-1850) as one of proto-industrialization, during which the expansion of the long-distance fisheries led to increasing concentration of capital, a widening gulf between capital and labour, and the increasing professionalization and proletarianization of the fisherman (pp. 134, 176-8). Yet Claude Vauchare declares his period (1850-1939) to be the significant era in the transformation of fishermen into a seagoing proletariat (p. 244). While these two positions are hardly reconcilable, they can pose problems for the student who turns to this book expecting answers, not debates. Another problem has less to do with the team approach favoured by the publisher than with the ambitious nature of the book. The period covered is enormous (approximately eight hundred years). So is the diversity of its subject, as all the contributors are careful to emphasize: the title encompasses coastal fisheries and long-distance ones; it includes fisheries in the Mediterranean and North Seas as well as the Atlantic Ocean; it touches the pursuit of several species of fish as well as mussels, crustaceans, sea mammals, and even seaweed and coral; it looks at the fisheries as both economic phenomena and social phenomena—all within the confines of the covers of a single book. Inevitably, the narration becomes compressed, sometimes to the point of distortion. When Paul Adam declares that the Fairtry series (the first factory-freezer trawlers) during the early 1950s was not a commercial success (p. 310), he fails to add that the failure came in the marketplace (where British consumers were unreceptive to the new frozen fish) and not at sea, where the new vessels were very successful (judging by the speed with which the Soviets copied their design and quickly launched a fleet of factory-freezer trawlers before the end of the decade).

While such problems are annoying, they are hardly sufficient to justify condemning the book. If there is a certain roughness in the transition from one essay to the next, there is nevertheless a strong degree of thematic continuity. And, in a book designed as an addition to a reference series, is this not what is most important? Such themes as the subordination of supply to demand, of the enormous diversity of the fisheries, of the gradual transformation of the fisherman from
independent producer into a seagoing proletarian, are developed in all of the essays. Moreover, it is this stress on thematic continuity which makes the book a useful addition to the collections of readers in other countries, including Canada. Quite apart from the role which the French fisheries played in Canadian history, the themes which characterized their evolution can be useful in developing a better understanding of the evolution of our own fisheries.

Otal Uwe Janzen
Corner Brook, Nfld.


In 1942 young Bill Hageland shipped as a deckhand on the whaler Brown, of Victoria, B.C. His Hoist the Chase Flag, now, sad to say, long out of print, was a fictionalized account of his experiences, and this book recaps some of the same material. A great deal of fresh ground is covered as well, particularly relating to the whaling activities of B.C. Packers and the American Pacific Whaling Company.

William Hageland's experience differs in a significant way from that of other veteran whalers of my acquaintance. His story opens a remarkable window onto the whaling technology of long ago—and not the past of 1942 but the past of 1911 or so, a generation earlier. Even in 1942, the Brown was a howling anachronism. Norwegian and German whalers with whom I have talked, were at the time serving on relatively up-to-date steam whaleboats and using more or less modern equipment. None had experience in anything so primitive as the Brown, with her coal-burning engine, primitive accommodation and antiquated plumbing.

The Brown was only one hundred tons, ninety-two feet long, and had no gunner's gangway connecting the bridge with the gun-platform. With her engine of about 275 IHP, she could manage twelve knots. The muzzle-loading cannon was of very heavy construction, the recoil being taken on rubber pads in the mounting fork. To put this in perspective: Thor Dahl's Dutch-built whaler Thorde, in the early 60s, was 658 tons, over 204 feet long, developing 1600 Shaft HP, and capable of doing seventeen knots. As to the harpoon gun: the glycerine recoil cylinder was first introduced about 1911, and the breech-loading whaling cannon appeared in 1925. The gunner's gangway, which was such a feature of the later whalers, was first fitted in the 1925-6 season.

Of particular interest to anyone focusing on the maritime history of western Canada and the Puget Sound region are the stories about whaling on the west coast which he gleaned from others. In researching the book, he interviewed among others, Arne Borgen, William Lagen, Dode MacPherson, Allan Heater, Charles Watson, and Harry Osselton, all of whom provide items of unusual value to anyone interested in the maritime history of the Pacific coast.

The production is very professionally done, and there are refreshingly few spelling mistakes. One might note, however, that the Christian name of the Norwegian whaling pioneer Svend Fyn, has a silent terminal "d" and that the steamer Gray might perhaps better be described as a "typical British raised quarterdeck coaster" rather than as a "fore and aft coaster."

Highly recommended. A really good read.

John H. Harland
Kelowna, B.C.


This book covers the same ground as Lionel Casson's The Ancient Mariners (1959) and Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (1971) which, with W.L. Rodgers' Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (1937), are usually considered to be the definitive works on the subject. It presents, very clearly and concisely, just about all that we know of the maritime history of the Mediterranean from the earliest times, from about 3000 BC (but in more detail from about 1500 BC) to the end of the Roman Empire in the west about 500 AD.

More than half of the book is devoted to the pivotal maritime struggles of ancient times: Greeks vs. Persians, the Peloponnesian war, the wars between the successors of Alexander, the Punic wars and the Roman civil war. The principal battles are described, so far as their details are known, together with their effect on the outcome of the campaigns as a whole. After all, the real reason that Hannibal crossed the Alps was that the Roman fleet controlled the seas. Had the Carthaginian navy been as powerful as it had been in the first Punic war, he would have much preferred the sea crossing, elephants and all.

The details of ship construction are dealt with only briefly but, like virtually all writers on the subject, the author presents his theories about the "oarage" (i.e. how many oars, how many rowers and where they sat) of the enormous vessels built by the Hellenic monarchs in the third century B.C. He agrees that the really big ones were double-hulled (catamarans), but how so many hundreds of oarsmen could row in unison and how such a vessel could be controlled remains a mystery to us moderns. In fact we find it difficult to agree on the exact arrangements of such a long-lasting design as the trireme, as evidenced by the continuing discussion in recent issues of The Mariner's Mirror.

Not only the freak vessels but all oared warships required huge crews. There were usually thirty banks of oars, so a trireme had about 180 oarsmen, while the standard warship of the Rome-Carthage struggles, the quinquereme, needed three hundred rowers and carried eighty marines. Mr. Meijer points out that the ancient writers tended to exaggerate the
number of ships and men, but even so the principal battles of the first Punic war--Mylae (260 BC), Cape Hermæcum (255 BC) and the Aegeates Islands (242 BC)--involved fleets of 140 to 250 vessels carrying sixty thousand to ninety thousand men, or three to five times the number that were engaged at Trafalgar. When, after Cape Hermæcum, the Roman fleet together with its numerous Carthaginian prizes was caught in a violent storm, 250 ships and one hundred thousand men perished.

Other chapters of the book are concerned with trade and piracy, port development, Roman maritime policy and the administration of the Roman fleets. Trade, trade routes and commercial affairs are dealt with effectively enough, but briefly. Lionel Casson is better in this respect.

The book's illustrations and maps are very clear and well chosen. Each chapter is annotated and there is a comprehensive bibliography and an index. This is a basic history of early Mediterranean seafaring and is as up to date as possible. It is easy to find the main facts of all the principal events, so far as they are known, and the bibliography is there to steer the student towards more detailed study of particular aspects of the subject.

C. D. Maginley

Sydney, Nova Scotia


Through the last decade Canada has been able to maintain its position as a major fishing nation almost in spite of itself. While many fishing states have been forced to undertake changes in fish harvesting, processing and marketing, Canada--largely as a consequence of its advantageous proximity to rich fishing grounds and the large U.S. market--has been a laggard in terms of innovation. An industry-wide crisis in 1981-82, however, required federal government intervention to prevent the collapse of the four largest corporate entities, Nickersons, National Sea Products Ltd., Fishery Products, and the Lake Group (with its affiliate John Penney and Sons). The government's response was to appoint a Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries to help negotiate renewed financing arrangements with lenders. Possibly a more important long-term contribution of the Task Force was the introduction of new policy guidelines for the fishing industry (see Navigating Troubled Waters, 1982). The implications of the government's mandate to become "market driven" were probably not fully-comprehended when the Task Force concluded its work; however, by 1983 all sectors of the industry were cognizant that changes were obligatory. As the industry began to rebound, a sense of optimism that crisis might, in fact, become opportunity gradually took hold.

Delegates to the 1985 Atlantic Fisheries Technology Conference (the first of its kind in eleven years), listened to presentations detailing the advantages of updating fishing gear and equipment, fish handling and on-board handling practices and in-plant operations. Several speakers noted that, by and large, Canadians had failed to capitalize on opportunities resulting from growing consumer interest in seafood products, rising fish prices and increasing availability of raw materials. Producers were criticized for approaching technology on a piecemeal basis; that is, basing decisions to invest in new equipment on perceptions that profitability could be increased by reducing human labour with machinery. Happily, conference organizers invited some of the best and brightest innovators to share their experiences and ideas about how profitability might be restored to one of Canada's most important, albeit conservative, resource industries. Increased mechanization, with subsequent labour force reductions, was not promoted as a panacea for sluggish profits. Peter Hjul, editor of Fishing News International, noted, for example, that the Japanese hired additional crew members on factory trawlers to achieve quality production. Speakers representing government and commercial consultant interests emphasized how shipboard and processing plant re-design could assist in reducing worker stress and fatigue and therefore enhance performance objectives. Speakers emphasized that contemporary managers must learn to view industry operations from a systems perspective, i.e., from sea to table.

The experience of Fishery Products International gave Conference attendees a concrete example of ways to match advanced computer, satellite and communications technologies with new industry requirements to produce quality fish products. The company is experimenting with an onboard monitoring system which relays real-time information about deck, engine room and wheelhouse activities via satellite to shore-based facilities. With information about catching capacity, the company gains greater control and can direct production to respond to market demand. For example, if a vessel is catching large quantities of turbot but onshore prices of turbot are depressed, the vessel may be directed to fish another species in another location. In addition, communications about vessel activity facilitates shore-based processing; if one plant is working to full capacity, fish landings can be directed to resource-short plants, thus reducing delays at the wharf and minimizing costs associated with glut situations.

The Conference must be regarded as being successful in many ways. There is little doubt that all understood the message, i.e., that utilizing technology to achieve quality enhancement and increase operational efficiency are the keys to survival in an intensely-competitive global marketplace. However, the concluding remarks by the then Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Dr. A.W. May, must be repeated:

"We have the tools, the knowledge, the will, but perhaps we need a game plan.... There will be trade-
offs involved as change occurs, but that does not mean we should back away from them. It argues that we should work harder to better understand just what is happening and just what tradeoffs really are required."

Some of the trade-offs alluded to were the subject of discussions at a 1984 Symposium, "Labour Developments in the Fishing Industries" in Rimouski, Quebec (See Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Special Publication of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 72, 1984). The Technology and Labour Conference proceedings volumes should be read as a set; certainly there is evidence that certain aspects of fishing work could benefit from the application of new technologies. On the other hand, in the rush to embrace technological change to expedite work, we must not neglect the need to improve safety, maintain morale and foster opportunities for career development among fishermen and fish processing personnel alike. The fishing industry is no longer an occupation of last resort; profits and continued success hinge on the ability of all industry participants to see themselves as partners in a revitalized Canadian fishing industry. Technology is but one tool in the kit of industry viability.

Cynthia Lamson
Hubbards, Nova Scotia


The University of South Carolina Press is to be congratulated for its second reissue of a biography of a major American naval figure (the first was on Adm. Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., USN) in its new "Classics in Maritime History" series, edited by William N. Still, Jr. Not only is the subject important, but the writing is the very model of what biography should be. Father Durkin's methods of research and narrative style have aged not at all since the book was first published in 1954. The reissue is also attractively and sturdily produced to earn a place as an invaluable addition for any library which includes works on mid-nineteenth century naval warfare.

Stephen R. Mallory (1810/11[-1873]) was the first and only Secretary of the Navy of the Confederate States of America, the short-lived government of Southern states in rebellion against the United States during 1861-65. His longevity was remarkable because of his lack of preparation for the post, because of the continuous turnover of virtually all the other secretaries in President Jefferson Davis' cabinet, and because he was generally unsuccessful in meeting his government's naval needs in what was basically a land war. On the other hand, the Confederate Navy fought the Civil War along the same strategic lines as the young American republic during the Revolution of 1776-83 and the War of 1812, meaning that his countrymen could not expect him to do much more than he did. Mallory never entertained the idea of building a battle fleet to command the seas, although the author once flirted with the now-antiquated notion of Harold and Margaret Sprout in 1942 that such a battle fleet was the only proper course for any navy to pursue.

Durkin's treatment of Mallory as a self-educated lawyer, customs inspector, Seminole War boat commander, and Florida senator reveals Mallory's interest in the sea in the four decades before the war, culminating in an eight-year tenure as Chairman of the U.S. Senate's Naval Affairs Committee. Fascinated by "naval Matters," the Senator promoted warship types to match those of the British; pushed the naval personnel reform bill through Congress to retire mediocre officers; and vainly advocated the retention of corporal punishment in the U.S. Navy as the only tried method of enforcing shipboard discipline. Durkin finds Mallory's personality "elusive" but delights in Mallory's chace to win the hand of his wife, who proved overbearing throughout their married life, greatly distressing him.

As wartime administrator of the Confederate Navy, Mallory is depicted as methodical and conscientious—but no means great—educating himself and his tiny staff of seven to the immense tasks of defending the Southern coast (the same length as the coast of Europe from the Danish Straits to the Dardanelles) and of attacking Yankee merchant shipping. Durkin wisely observes that the lack of a Southern business class and sufficient shipyard capacity greatly hampered Mallory, as did inadequate manpower to produce naval equipment or raw specie to pay the mounting costs of running a navy of seven hundred officers, four thousand men, and forty vessels. Not surprisingly, unpaid shipyard workers often walked off the job.

Though deficient in strategic expertise, Mallory exhibited an "impulsive progressivism" toward the new ironclads, his "pet" being the Virginia (Merrimack), though early in 1862 he naively wanted her captain, Franklin Buchanan, to cruise to New York and "burn the city," like the few Southern gunboats and many innovative floating mines and submersibles, the ironclads were designed for harbor and river defense. Mallory's biggest strategic failure was his erroneous belief that New Orleans would be attacked from the Mississippi River side rather than the seaward approach, trusting his spies and the power of the seaward forts. Slow in adopting spar-torpedo boats, he then found the Union navy imitating them. Mallory was plagued by lack of cooperation from the army but still managed to hold the ports of Charleston, Wilmington, Savannah, Galveston, and especially Richmond until the last weeks of the struggle. And his support of the several commerce raiders bore fruit in driving Yankee ships from Union registry if not from the sea. An investigation exonerated him of blame for the naval reverses of 1862.

The author shares Mallory's criticism of Jefferson Davis, as a cold, aloof leader who seemed to have had confidence in only two cabinet members, Mallory and Judah P. Benjamin,
who were not surprisingly close friends. Durkin often uses a nice turn of phrase, as in his description of Mallory's top civilian aide, E. Tidball: "a handsome, dapper little robot, seldom guilty of an original thought, but a tireless and utterly reliable weaver of red tape." The author's only shortcoming is not following up on the results of some of Mallory's schemes, like Master Thomas Hogg's apparently successful seizure of a Yankee ship at Panama in 1863. Also, Mallory's ten-month prison term and postwar life are overdone and anticlimactic.

Mallory's voluminous letters and diary make this a volume an exceptionally rich source depicting life in the Confederate government, especially since Mallory was a keen reporter. He marvelled, for example, at Secretary of State Benjamin's usual jauntiness even on learning that Richmond must be evacuated in April 1865—meaning the final defeat was at hand; Benjamin gave "expression to that careless confidence of the last man outside the ark, who assured Noah of his belief that 'it would not be such a h-- of a shower after all.'"

In fact, the same might well be said of Mallory himself when, four years earlier, he had opposed secession but accepted the decision of his state to leave the Union in spite of the dismal prospects of success.

Clark G. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


The author, a professor in the program in maritime history and underwater research at East Carolina University, has written an interesting monograph about the naval shipbuilding program of the confederacy. The study is divided into three sections entitled the Program, the Facilities, the Material, the Work and the Conclusion.

When the Confederate Congress created a navy department in 1861 and appointed S.R. Mallory, a former collector of customs and Admiralty lawyer, as Secretary of the Navy, the South's maritime forces consisted of only ten vessels with a total of fifteen guns, plus some small craft belonging to four of the seceding states. President Jefferson Davis had neither interest in nor understanding of naval power, and directed his attentions chiefly to the land forces. There was no coordination of effort between the two services on any level. In fact the President, congress and the public believed the army's role in the war was paramount; the navy was to be a small force subordinate to the army's interests.

Mallory had some two hundred former U.S. navy officers as the nucleus for his new force, but he never had any chief of naval operations to consult on technical, tactical and strategic matters. He believed cruisers purchased abroad such as the Alabama would harass union shipping and that a series of iron-clad vessels would be able to provide coastal defence. While Congress authorized funds for the acquisition of iron-clads abroad, only one the French-built Stonewall was ever delivered. Mallory therefore decided to build iron-clads at home. These vessels were to have wooden hulls, flat bottoms, and were to be clad with two and one-half to five inch plate.

In 1860, the Confederacy had no mills able to roll two inch plate and lacked suitable plants to make engines. Nevertheless three mills eventually were adapted to roll plate to the required gauges. Iron and coal shortages contributed to the failure of Mallory's ambitious plans. The Southern states railway system was unable to move more than eight thousand tons of ore annually to the largest rolling mill at Richmond, which had an annual capacity of 2400 tons. The railways had only forty five-cars available to move coal from the mines to the rolling mills, engine works, and dockyards. The iron shortages led to the seizure of the railways' stocks of rails, and in certain circumstances the pulling of rails which were to be rolled into armour plate. These actions only contributed to greater transportation problems. Seasoned timber for ship construction was in short supply, and consequently the hulls of the iron-clads and gunboats had to be built of green timber. No copper was available for sheathing, and caulking with cotton proved unsatisfactory; as a result, vessels too often needed repairs. The navy took engines from river and other craft for its ships as a temporary measure. Eventually, the Tredagar works at Richmond and the engineering plants at Charlotte, North Carolina and Columbus, Georgia were able to manufacture engines for the iron-clads. In 1863 the rope walk at Petersburg was able to produce sufficient cotton rope and tarred cotton for the navy but two years later the supply ended when the union forces took the city.

Mallory was never able to overcome the skilled labour shortages. When the war began, many of the foreigners and northerners who made up most of the south's skilled labour pool left; in addition the army conscripted many of the remaining skilled mechanics and tradesmen. Although the Davis cabinet instructed the army to release skilled tradesmen to the navy, it refused to do so unless the navy found substitutes for any men transferred. The Congress passed a bill in 1862 "detailing artisans and mechanics from the army" to try to remedy the shortage of shipyard workers, but it was delayed and eventually killed by a new conscription act. The congress instructed the army to detail men to work on ships under construction but the army was able to defeat the directive. Free skilled black workers found employment in the naval establishments and in the associated industries, and slave labour was utilized to cut timber and to work in the mines. Mallory's navy department persuaded skilled labour, home on leave from the army, to work in naval establishments and hoped to arrange for their transfer to the navy, but the army refused to agree to any transfer of personnel. As a result, at the end of the war the navy owned the plant and equipment to build and maintain its fleet but lacked necessary skilled operational personnel.

During the Civil War the navy department converted, contracted for, or laid down 150 vessels. One-third were wooden
gunboats, one-third converted steamers and one-third ironclads, but only five wooden and twenty-two armoured vessels were actually completed because of the lack of materials and skilled labour.

The book's principal sources are Mallory's diaries and those departmental records still in existence. The author has provided very informative notes, footnotes, a bibliography and an index which take up some twenty pages of the book. The volume also contains four drawings showing the arrangement of machinery, fire tube boilers, and a body plan for ironclads. Two sketches show a plan of an iron-clad, and the spar and deck plan of a wooden gunboat, respectively.

Appendices containing particulars of the iron-clad's engines, and a list of the vessels completed with details of their subsequent fate would be useful additions.

Dan Harris
Ottawa, Ontario


The United States Senate on 16 April 1798 passed a bill establishing a naval department. On 30 April, President John Adams signed "An act to establish an executive department, to be denominated the Department of the Navy." By chance, as another man was first nominated, Benjamin Stodder became the first Secretary of the Navy on 21 May. His nomination was confirmed and his appointment and commission from Adams, sent in a short note, came on the following day from Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.

With these opening observations, Mr. Palmer sets the stage for the beginning not only of the quasi-war with France but also of the genesis of a formal force under the auspices of a department of the U.S. government restricted to naval concerns. Prior to this, President Adams and the heads of other departments had all had a hand in decisions relating to the navy. That Benjamin Stodder was a good choice and that the training of the navy was a joint operation is confirmed in Mr. Palmer's book.

This comprehensive treatment of the naval operations of a small force with a multiplicity of duties is very illuminating. It was a difficult task performed under unusual conditions. Weather and the health of the seamen were as vital to operations as the number of ships involved. The West Indies and the Caribbean were not ideal as the scene for offensive action. The French naval vessels and privateers had much the better of the chase, and yet the new navy earned its share of successes.

Stodder, whose learned along with the rest of the navy, encountered problems of new construction, ship repair and armament. His officers were a mixed group and not all competent seamen. There was political infighting and indifference to goals as well as logistical and manning problems. That Stodder did not solve every issue without difficulty or strain, and that not all his decisions bore fruit, is clearly shown. His task of forging of professional navy was difficult, but on the whole was performed successfully.

The British, though nominally neutral and even at times helpful, became at times a thorn in the American side. The impressment of American seamen and the right to search neutral vessels remained issues of concern. Thankfully, neither dispute triggered bigger issues and the war ended as it began, with little real damage or undue distress. The original Directory had by then been replaced by Napoleon, who promoted agreement with his former American allies.

With noteworthy brevity, this book covers some thirty-four months of catch-as-catch-can operations, describing what seems a predictable exercise in democratic warfare—improvising almost from scratch to sufficiency. A good read and a well-produced book.

William P. Avery
Bethel Island, California


One of the weaknesses of maritime history has been the tendency to confine the discipline within artificial boundaries of national historiography. While it would be foolish to deny the attractions of studying maritime topics within local, regional or national contexts—and while admitting that some topics are indeed best studied in this way—it ought also to be obvious that shipping, an activity that transcends national borders, requires a broader perspective. Unfortunately, an acceptance of this argument in theory almost immediately raises a host of problems in practice. Two of the more intransperable are the barriers of knowledge and language. Although both objections are too frequently raised on spurious grounds, neither is without foundation. Historians tend to be trained in one national literature, and none of us have command of as many languages as we might like.

But one potential strategy for obviating these difficulties is presented by the Kattegat-Skagerrak project, which brings together researchers from three nations surrounding the Danish Sound. The aim of the project is to comprehend in the broadest possible terms the maritime traditions and practices in southern Norway, southwestern Sweden and Denmark. To be fair, the researchers associated with this project have comparative advantages which are difficult to
reproduce elsewhere. One is that the three languages involved are comparatively similar—while a Dane, say, would likely have a great deal of difficulty writing gramatically correct Swedish, he would have much less trouble reading it. The language similarities thus make a study of maritime societies on either side of the straits much easier than a comparable study of, for example, England and Belgium. In addition, the historical traditions of the three nations from which the researchers are drawn are much more similar than in most other sets of nations. But they are not identical: a Norwegian is no more likely to understand the Swedish past than is an American likely to understand Canadian history, and for the most part historiographies in the three nations are constrained by national boundaries. Still, by focusing upon a more or less homogeneous region rather than a broader, heterogeneous spatial unit, the Project has made great strides in situating maritime activities into their transnational contexts.

The fruits of this research are available in the fifteen volumes published thus far. Still to come are a final book of essays and a summary volume, being prepared by Poul Holm. As might be expected, the essays currently available are somewhat uneven in quality, but when judged by volumes rather than individual contributions, none is less than interesting and a few are of international importance. The strongest collection—indeed I wish it were available in English—is number 12 (1986), which focuses upon women’s work in the fisheries. The studies in this book could add much to our understanding of the female role in the Canadian fishing industry. Also worthy of attention is number 7 (1984), which is devoted to migration across the straits. None of the others is so uneven in quality, but all contain some insights or data worthy of attention.

While admirable, the Project has made several mistakes that prevent it from being a perfect model for internationally oriented research. The first is the decision to publish the articles in Scandinavian languages. This was a mistake not because combined the Scandinavian nations comprise a population less than two-thirds that of Canada but because it limits their audience. Few non-Scandinavians read the languages; a fact that might be lamented but which is a fact of life that ought to have been considered. A second mistake involves distribution. Their grants enabled them to distribute the volumes free of charge, but largely (although not totally) due to the language decision, distribution has been limited almost entirely to Norway, Denmark and Sweden. The third failing, however, is more serious: the researchers are far too unfamiliar with relevant literature elsewhere. This means, in part, that all too often the historians involved with the Project are engaged in the maritime equivalent of reinventing the wheel; the other corollary is that too many essays lack the most satisfying contexts precisely because the authors were unaware of insights that could have been derived from other national literatures.

But to harp on the failings is to place the emphasis in the wrong place. What needs to be emphasized is not that the Project and its writings could have been better but that at the very least they chart a rational course toward an internationalization of the discipline. For this the historians who conceived the research deserve recognition. Many of the participants are now broadening the concept to institute regular seminars on the North Sea, a unifying concept that, while it will present greater linguistic and historical difficulties, is a logical next step in which they deserve our support. One way of showing this support is by encouraging libraries to order the volumes of the Kattegat-Skagerrak Project. While few members of CNRS will be able to read the results, most of the essays contain information in tabular or graphic form which can be comprehended without too much difficulty. And since much of the material they have collected can provide a much-needed comparative perspective for the work of Canadian maritime historians, these collected essays may well assist us in shedding the national shackles that limit our own research and writing.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John’s, Nfld.


Canadian efforts to establish permanent trade relations with Japan, China and other nations of the western Pacific, stretch back to the turn of the century. For various reasons, including ignorance of Asian practices and the proximity of the more easily penetrated American market, the efforts were at best sporadic and never very successful except for a few commodities, such as silk. By the end of the 1920s there was insufficient trade to support a Canadian Government Merchant Marine presence in the western Pacific.

In more recent years, concern over Canada’s massive dependence on the American market inspired fresh efforts to seek more diversified markets, particularly in Japan, China, and South Korea, although also in other ASEAN and NIC (Newly Industrializing Countries) nations. Within the last two decades Canadian trade with Pacific Rim countries began to surpass traditional trade with Europe. In the recent controversy over bilateral free trade with the United States, however, relatively little was said about how such a North American commitment might inhibit this country’s long-term prospects for a greater share of western Pacific markets.

The Pacific Rim, published last year, is a welcome source of information on the nature, potential and pitfalls of trading with what has become the world’s most dynamic market. It is edited by Peter N. Nemetz, Chairman of the Policy Analysis Division, Faculty of Commerce, University of British Columbia. The authors of the book’s ten essays are economists, geographers and resource consultants, of whom four are Canadians: Michael Goldberg, Faculty of Commerce, UBC; Vaclav Smil, Department of Geography, University of
Manitoba; Edward English, Department of Economics, Carleton University; and Harold Halvorson, a Vancouver resource consultant.

The essays range over a wide variety of topics, including investment and even an examination of Pacific Ocean mineral deposits. Of most interest to Canadians, and particularly western Canadians, is the second half of the book, which zeroes in on the role of petroleum and coal in Pacific Rim development. Given the varied contents of the essays, Nemetz tries to link them in an Introduction and Overview. "The conscious effort to seek Asian markets in the face of the irresistible imperative of Canadian-American linkage is clearly a strategy which entails risk," he writes. "While offering the tempting promise of revitalization for a stagnant world economy, the economic situation in the Western Pacific is more complex, uncertain and indeed unstable than it may first appear." One such risk is explored by Halvorson and concerns the over-optimism that resulted in the creation of an over-capacity of British Columbian coking coal production for a declining Japanese steel industry. Halvorson concludes that little if any growth in Japanese steel industry can be expected. "Consequently B.C. producers can expect a long period of over-capacity, downward pressure on prices, and increased aggressiveness by competitors to capture the business that exists."

On the brighter side, however, are the Canadian efforts to increase understanding and to build trade contacts. Fifteen years ago, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported: "Pacific Asia is the least familiar to Canadians of all the world’s great zones of civilization. A larger-scale concerted national effort to improve Canadian understanding of the Pacific regions is a vital prerequisite to broader and more fruitful Canadian involvement." Since then, there have been many positive developments in the form of trade missions, governmental visits back and forth, and successful efforts by over one thousand individual Canadian companies to do business in the area. One of the more promising developments, despite a slow start, has been establishment of the Vancouver-based Canadian Asia Pacific Foundation, which provides a framework for economic and cultural rapport.

The Pacific Rim, as its cover states, is a useful resource for university students of business, political science, Asian studies and economics. Because of the efforts, particularly by Prof. Nemetz, to counterbalance over-dependence on U.S. markets, it also has a message for businessmen and Canadians in general who care about the country’s future. Whatever the risks of promoting trade with the western Pacific, Nemetz argues, bilateral free trade with the U.S. also has its risks: "Canada may face increased deindustrialization and an ultimate economic, social and political union with its powerful southern neighbor." Before that happens, it would be wise to re-examine Canada’s role in Pacific Rim trade.

Donald MacKay
Montreal, P.Q.


This is the first in what is planned as a continuing series of Yearbooks from the Association for the History of the Northern Seas, a group which already publishes a useful annual bibliography. It includes seven contributions on topics in the history of the northern waters surrounding Europe and the lands which border them. The editors do not claim any kind of unifying theme; instead, they inform us that the essays "reflect some of the interests of members and friends of the Association." Indeed, this reviewer would have liked to read one or two deliberations on what goals may be achieved by this Yearbook which are not already served by existing academic journals.

Individually, however, all the contributions are of very high standard though of very varying scope and methodology. The opening essay by Jaap R. Brujin of the University of Leiden, entitled "Recrutement et Enrôlement dans la Marine Marchande dans les Ports Néerlandais (1600-1900)," summarizes his important studies on Dutch maritime labour; his conclusions are in this setting made more accessible to colleagues not familiar with the Dutch language. The publication of this kind of summary is certainly a worthwhile function of the Yearbook.

Five of the contributions deal mainly with nineteenth century timber trade. Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik present a stimulating and wonderfully critical study of "Wages in the Norwegian Maritime Sector, 1850-1914: A Re-Interpretation". The subject seems narrow, but the authors bring out the full weight of their re-interpretation which must cause historians to rethink this crucial period in the formation of one of the world’s largest fleets. And the methodology of this essay sets a new standard for future maritime economic history. The same authors contribute "The Nordic Challenge to British Domination in the Baltic Timber Trade to Britain, 1863-1913". This essay brings together several data sets of Canadian, Norwegian and British origin and in combination highlight the value of problem-oriented, international cooperation. This kind of work is essential to the academic field of maritime history if we are to bring our subject out of obscurity and into the centre of the historical profession.

David M. Williams' "Pamphleteering and the Timber Duties, 1809-1851: A Bibliographical Essay" is a very meticulous study on one of the side-issues in the dispute over timber duties. In the general context of the Yearbook, the study may seem a little out of place, although it does deal with one of the most important issues in nineteenth century maritime affairs.
Two Finnish studies underline the usefulness to the English-speaking world of the Yearbook. Yrjö Kaukiainen’s, "From Days and Knots to Pounds and Dollars: Some Problems in the Study of the Economics of Late Nineteenth Century Merchant Shipping," illuminates some of the problems in tackling the micro-economics of Finnish shipping, and he puts forward a set of proposals for studying the topic and handling the records of shipowners. Jorma Ahvenainen, in "The Financing of the Finnish Timber Industries, 1870-1939," deals with firmly land-based industrial interests and refers to shipping only in passing, but his study offers a useful background to that all-important Baltic trade.

Finally, Lars U. Scholl provides a clear exposé of "German Whaling in the 1930s," focusing on the political context for the German decision in 1935 to enter the hunt for whales. It was a vain attempt to make up the deficit in the trade balance of fat and to build up adequate stores in the event of war.

The Yearbook is to be welcomed on its merits. It presents original work in the field of maritime history and provides readers with good summaries of work hitherto too little known because of language difficulties. For the same reason, it is to be hoped that the editors may find a publishing company which may help to provide the circulation which this truly international annual on regional history deserves.

Poul Holm
Esbjerg, Denmark


This work is a survey of the invasions and attempted invasions of the British Isles from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries and is intended for the general reader. In an introduction to his subject, the author points out that although it is a cliché that British seapower prevented a successful invasion of the United Kingdom for centuries, it was not until Britain became a first-class sea power in the sixteenth century that she was indeed worthy of invasion. It is the author’s thesis that it was the discovery of America and the scramble for colonies that transformed Britain from a marginal power into one that attracted invasion, as continental enemies quickly realized that the most effective method of neutralizing British seapower and limiting her imperial aspirations was to strike at the home islands. The emergence of Britain as a principal on the European political scene coincided with the inception of modern naval strategy based on the gun-armed warship in the late sixteenth century and it is at this point that the author begins his examination of invasion attempts.

With the inception of the gun-armed warship, invading forces, which in previous times could cross the sea unmolested, now had to be protected against destruction en route and the

invader’s major problem became the protection of his transport fleet. To preserve the transports, three major strategies were available to the invader: a combined operation, with fleet and transports sailing together; searching out and destroying the British fleet prior to the sailing of the transports; or a surprise assault without a declaration of war. All of the invaders who attempted to land in the British Isles between 1588 and 1940 chose one of these three strategies.

Using the strategic framework, McLynn recounts the history of attempted invasions of the British Isles from the Armada to the Second World War. There is little new in this survey with the exception of the author’s emphasis on the importance of British intelligence-gathering activities and it would appear from McLynn’s brief study that the constant fear of invasion led to an early British pre-eminence in this field. One questions the author’s sense of proportion in arranging his material—the various Jacobite risings and invasions each receive a full chapter of coverage while the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century warrant only a few pages. While the Dutch may never have attempted an invasion, the reform of the Royal Navy that resulted from its disastrous performance against them was a contributory factor to the increasing professionalism of British seapower. The fact that McLynn is the author of three books on the Jacobites possibly accounts for his sense of priorities.

This reviewer must take issue with McLynn on one point. The author’s statement that the advent of air power "did not revolutionize the technique of invasion" is manifestly unsound and betray’s an ignorance of the importance of that arm and its effect on warfare. Air power, in the form of vertical envelopment with airborne forces, tactical air support of beachhead landings, the destruction or disruption of defending land forces and warships and, most importantly, air interdiction of the movement and supply of defending land forces most certainly did "revolutionize the technique of invasion". The case is proved not so much by Hitler’s misuse of air power in 1940 but by the Allies successful use of it in 1944. Proper employment of air power made a cross-channel invasion possible.

In sum, Invasion: From the Armada to Hitler is a work of popular history about an interesting and important aspect of British history which covers its subject matter in breadth rather than depth. Although I found McLynn’s survey interesting and informative, I wish that the author had devoted more space to the technical aspects of large amphibious operations including the logistical preparation, the selection of a landing place and the effects of tides, winds and currents on the plans of invading forces. The author has supplied the broad canvas but his work lacks a lot of interesting and important detail.

Donald E. Graves
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