May Meetings

We have just recovered from attending the annual meeting of our Society, rejuvenated and ready for another year's efforts. Held at Kingston in conjunction with the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Society for Oceanic History, it was most enjoyable and informative. The local arrangements, spearheaded by Maurice Smith of the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston and with all the work done by Lannie Gallienne and the museum staff (or so they told us!), received a great response. Your editor's respect on the home front was greatly enhanced when he was able to bring home for a day or two a "cool dude" who could discuss the most recent rock music along with book reviews and permanent journals! Members will find the official report of the meeting elsewhere in this issue; but unsaid there is the camaraderie and fellowship of these meetings which have to be witnessed to be fully understood. We do our very best to cover the country in our choice of locations and urge all those who are able to join in on the fun, entertainment and education.

Also singled out for praise during the meetings were two people whose work seldom gets recognition -- Elsie Roberts, of Ottawa, who has to put up with Alec Douglas and his continuous stream of letters, notes, anecdotes and reminders, and Shireen Hall, who has the even harder task of dealing with your editor's ramblings. Our thanks go out to these ladies for their efforts on behalf of the Society.

One of the most obvious things that came out of Kingston is the burgeoning of our annual bibliography -- to be produced as a separate publication this year. With Skip Fischer as the driving force, ably assisted by Stephen Salmon, and a host of authors writing on relevant topics, it is rapidly becoming an invaluable research tool for our members -- and many others beyond. This very explosion of writings, however, makes it more than ever imperative that all members do their best to bring to the attention of these two gentlemen or any Society officer whose name and address appear inside the front cover, articles and items that they in their own unique realms feel might miss the eagle eyes of Skip or Stephen. Again, we are only as good as our contributors, and this is one area where all members can contribute without prejudice.

(cont'd next page...)

Your newsletter is only as good as the contributions you send in -- so PLEASE CONTRIBUTE.
EDITORIAL continued...

In addition to the secretary's report of the annual meeting (which has been shortened slightly for considerations of space: any who wish it verbatim should simply write to your editor), deliberations were held two weeks later in Hamilton, Ontario, at an august meeting of members. The following Publications Committee was selected: Skip Fischer, Stephen Salmon, Walter Lewis, Maurice Smith, David McGinnis and Ken Mackenzie. We trust we are not premature in announcing this, but as members will see this committee is to make a report by 1 September and must therefore get going. There have surely been enough editorial comments in these pages and during annual meetings for members to have a good idea of the intent of at least some of our members -- so if you have anything to contribute to our on-going deliberations concerning the establishment of a proper journal, now is the time to speak out.

Ten Proud Princes

We received an excellent response to Terry Elworthy's article on "Ten Proud Princes", that will be most helpful to the author in clearing up a number of minor errors of fact. We certainly do have a knowledgeable audience out there, and if we keep getting the type of assistance we got this time, Canadian maritime history will be much the better for it.

The corrections are too numerous for us to give -- and indeed some of them are incorrect! -- but they do nothing to challenge Elworthy's purpose in preparing the paper (for a conference last year in Vancouver): to underscore the almost total lack of authoritative written material on the CN west coast fleets. He had to start from scratch and from his own memory of having served in the fleet decades ago. The response would indicate that there is indeed work going on in the field -- so look out, Terry, there are some people fast catching up to you; they simply haven't had the inclination to appear in print yet!

Book Reviews

In our usual strong book review section pride of place goes to our Keith Matthews prize winner. All for the freedom of reviewers! I guess we cannot please all with our book selections! Of considerable gratification in this section is the range of reviewers, both geographically and according to their background. This seems to be one area in which we are able to get participation from all. Long may it keep up -- and all you potential reviewers make sure you contact Skip with suggestions, reviews and comments, whether or not they are solicited.

The Matthews Awards Committee presented awards for the best book and article published in 1986 at the May annual meeting of the Society. The winners of the awards, which are presented annually to publications either on Canadian maritime topics or by Canadians, were drawn from a list of over 400 eligible publications. The Committee for the 1986 awards consisted of Skip Fischer (chair), Stephen Salmon and Laurier Turgeon.

The award-winners, along with runners-up (listed alphabetically) were:

Book

Winner:
Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communications and Community, Oxford University Press.

Runners-Up:

Charles A. Martijn (éd.), Les Micmacs et la Mer, Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec.

Shannon Ryan, Fish Out of Water: The Newfoundland Salt Fish Trade, 1814-1914, Breakwater Books.

Article

Winner:

Runners-Up:
J.F. Bosher, "Financing the French Navy in the Seven Years' War : Beaujon, Goosens et Compagnie in 1759", Business History, July.

MATTHEWS AWARDS continued...


CANADIAN NAUTICAL RESEARCH SOCIETY

SOCIÉTÉ CANADIENNE POUR LA RECHERCHE NAUTIQUE

Annual General Meeting

Minutes of a meeting held at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, 23 May 1987.

The meeting came to order at 1130. Twenty members were present.

After the Agenda had been adopted it was moved by Douglas and seconded by Fischer to adopt the Minutes of the last meeting as read, having been circulated to the membership.

Carried.

President's Report

The President expressed satisfaction with the orderly growth of the Society, indicated by the quiet year it has been from his point of view. He was delighted with the newsletter, and was prepared in stepping down to support his successors. Moved by Emily Cain, seconded by Faye Kert, that this report be adopted.

Carried.

Moved by Fischer, seconded by Gough, that Gerry Panting be given a vote of thanks.

Carried, with enthusiastic applause.

Treasurer's Report

Due to circumstances, this was read in absentia. Emily Cain asked what had been done to solicit funds, and the Secretary replied that we encouraged donations from members, who could receive a tax credit, but had not asked for corporate donations or government grants apart from the annual meeting in 1986. She suggested looking at the Ontario Heritage Act for possible sources of financial support.

Secretary's Report, and Liaison Committee Chairman's Report

Membership is still hovering around the 200 mark, including at least 14 institutional members and at least 176 paid up members. Renewals continue to come in for last year, and the mailing list includes 212 names. The Secretary asked the meeting to recognize the work of Elsie Roberts, whose efforts are largely responsible for the despatch of dues reminders, maintenance of the mailing list and typing of correspondence.

NEWFOUNDLAND SPLINTER FLEET - ADDENDA

Clarenville is now a floating restaurant in the harbour at Owen Sound, Ont., called The Clarenville Restaurant. She is owned by Thelma and Hank Buitendijk, but under the name of Highland Cove Marina, now of Owen Sound. She did not operate at Kincardine, but in fact was a replacement for:

Twillingate, which was brought up to Kincardine, Ont., to be a restaurant. After two years, in 1981, it was decided to move her to Owen Sound, a larger place, with more potential clientele. On passage, her engines broke down in a storm, and she drove ashore near Tobermory on the Bruce Peninsula. She was abandoned, although some fittings were saved. Later she was set afire, and slid off the shelf into deep water, and lies there still. Some of her hatch covers have been made into table tops in Clarenville.

Their food is good, and the ship has been decked over like an RN training hulk of 50 years ago, to provide a nice large bar and upper deck dining room. She is worth a visit, for both food and for nostalgia!

Fraser M. McKee
Ottawa, Ontario
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING continued...

As Chairman of the Liaison Committee, the Secretary had had the opportunity to travel literally from coast to coast during the year, and was very pleased to announce the appointment of Eric Sager as Chairperson for the Pacific region, leaving only the northern region unfilled. However, in spite of the presence of enthusiastic chairpersons in each region (David Flemming in the Maritimes, Eileen Marcil in Quebec, Maurice Smith in Ontario and Christon Archer in the Prairie provinces, besides Eric Sager on the Pacific coast), and other active members in places like St. John's, Newfoundland, only in Ottawa had a local chapter been formed. It was functioning well, and Faye Kert had just been elected President, Dan Harris having stepped down. Noting the encouraging presence of chairpersons from the Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario, he wondered what was happening in Toronto, where we had many members but few signs of activity. At least two Torontonians were at the conference, Don Withrow of the Provincial Marine 1812 Society, and David Fry, and it was noted David Fry was present at this business meeting. It was hoped that something might be done to foster more interest in the Toronto area. David Flemming had begun to get people in the Halifax area interested in giving more support to the Society, and possibly to host the Society at an annual meeting in the future. Eileen Marcil indicated she was planning activities in the coming year, and Ken Mackenzie noted that Montreal was going to be a suitable site for such a conference in 1992.

Eric Lawson has won a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council to pursue his research on the Canadian built sailing ship Egeria for one year. Members will recall that the Society passed a resolution last year recommending that the New Brunswick government give Eric Lawson such support. The Lieutenant Governor, Dr. George Stanley, passed on this resolution, but nothing further has been heard from that government, so it was particularly satisfying that this award had been made.

The Secretary reported he had a growing number of files, the beginning of a Society archive. He took the opportunity of showing members present the planned new letterhead for Argonauta, and announced that similar plans were being made for a Society letterhead. Finally he showed members the award certificates made out to the winners of the Keith Matthews awards for 1987.

Amendment to the By-laws

Moved by Douglas, seconded by Gough, to amend Article 24 of the By-laws to read:

The management of the Society shall be vested in a Council consisting of the President, the First Vice President, the Second Vice President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the Past President and two Councillors elected at the Annual General Meeting; and ex officio, with full voting rights, members in good standing of the Canadian Nautical Research Society who also hold executive office in the International Commission for Maritime History or the North American Society for Oceanic History.

'Skip' Fischer said that he would propose two amendments.

While in full agreement with the principle of including members of other national and international societies in the business of the CNRS, he felt that members of council should only have full voting rights if they were accountable to the membership. Moved therefore by Fischer, seconded by Salmon, to strike the words "with full voting rights". In discussion, the Secretary noted that the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs would want the status of ex officio members to be clearly defined. The amendment was therefore amended to read "replace the phrase 'with full voting rights' to 'with voice but not vote' or equivalent wording acceptable to the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs".

Carried.

Secondly, 'Skip' Fischer pointed out that members of CNRS were officers in other national and international societies besides ICMH and NASOH. He was thoroughly in favour of building bridges to such societies. Moved therefore by Fischer, seconded by Salmon, to strike all after "executive office" and insert "in other national or international maritime organizations".

Carried.

The meeting thus approved the amended wording as follows:

The management of the Society shall be vested in a Council consisting of the President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the Past President and two Councillors elected at the Annual General Meeting; and ex officio, with voice but not vote, members in good standing of the Canadian Nautical Research Society who also hold office in other national and international maritime organizations.
Nominating Committee Report

Glenn Wright presented the report of the Nominating Committee. No further nominations having been received by 22 May, the following slate was given unanimous approval:

President
Professor Barry Gough, Wilfrid Laurier University. A charter member of CNRS, Professor Gough won the first Keith Matthews award for his book, Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-1890. (University of British Columbia Press, 1984)

Past President
Professor Gerald Panting, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland. Chairman of Memorial's Maritime History Group, delegate to the International Commission of Maritime History, he and the late Keith Matthews founded the Shipping History Project at Memorial.

First Vice President
Professor Lewis 'Skip' Fischer, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland. An original member of the Shipping History Project at Memorial, he is presently attached to the Institute of Economic History at Bergen, Norway and is Book Review Editor of Argonauta.

Second Vice President
Captain T.C. 'Tom' Pullen, RCN (Rtd), the well known authority on arctic navigation who, after a career in the Royal Canadian Navy during which he commanded the icebreaker HMCS Labrador, has been active in promoting interest in the Canadian arctic.

Councillor
Professor Eric Sager, University of Victoria, and Chairperson for the Pacific coast region. Previously a member of Memorial University's Shipping History Project, he has published widely in the field of Canadian shipping history, and organized the programme for the Society's conference in 1986.

Councillor
Dr. Eileen Marcil, Chairperson for the Quebec region, is the leading authority on shipbuilders of the St. Lawrence region during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Treasurer
Ed Reed, of the Bank of Canada, an enthusiastic devotee of maritime history, organized the Ottawa chapter of the CNRS.

Barry Gough then took the chair and after he had said a few words in appreciation of the work done by Gerald Panting and the preceding Council, and indicated his general intentions for the coming year, the meeting proceeded to other business.

Publications

'Skip' Fischer announced that members would be getting a request, by 15 June, to send in their research interests for an international newsletter he edits. He also asked for a decision about the publication of the annual bibliography, which will have over 450 titles. The President suggested Professor Fischer make his recommendation to the Council as soon as possible.

Ken Mackenzie issued a plea for help from members in contributing to the newsletter. He acknowledged 'Skip' Fischer's support in editing the book reviews, and emphasized the need for a publications committee that would meet, act and make recommendations. Moved therefore by Panting, seconded by Hadley, to create a publications committee with a brief to make its first report by 1 September 1987. Carried.

Adjournment

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 1230.

W.A.B. Douglas
Secretary

PRIVATEERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA, 1812-1815

by Faye Kert

In June 1812, President Madison declared war on Great Britain. Within a month, enthusiastic Nova Scotians had outfitted the first of 40 private armed vessels from the Atlantic provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Carrying licences or letters-of marque signed by Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia and Vice Admiral of North America, each privateer was entitled to take enemy ships as prize and, subject to Admiralty law, retain the proceeds from the sale of that captured ship and/or cargo. Between July 1812 and January 1815, Halifax
PRIVATEERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA continued...

Vice-Admiralty Court records indicate that over 200 prize cases were adjudicated. This represents the condemnation of hundreds of thousands of tons of American shipping.

Throughout the war, privateering stimulated the economy of Atlantic Canada by providing employment, investment opportunities, a steady supply of prize goods and specie, a reconnaissance service, a cheap defensive weapon, and an opportunity for combining public service with private profit. While the entrepreneurial possibilities of privateering attracted only a small percentage of Canada's maritime population, those that were involved formed a respectable, closely-knit commercial fraternity linked by family, business, political or social relationships. While not nearly as large in scale as American privateer operations based in Charleston or Baltimore, privateer activity by New Brunswick and Nova Scotia served to deprive the enemy of supplies, interrupt his communications, and inflate prices and insurance rates. It harassed American merchants and embarrassed their government. Both at sea and in the courts, the provincial privateers chipped away at American commerce, disabling ships, capturing valuable cargoes and generally disheartening a population who had reluctantly supported the war in the first place. In the final analysis, privateering contributed to rather than caused the conclusion of hostilities.

Over six centuries privateering, or guerre de course, had evolved into an internationally-accepted weapon of commerce destruction whose rules were recognized, if not respected, by all maritime states. Traditionally the resort of a weaker against a stronger maritime power, privateering in the War of 1812 was a feature of both American and Canadian strategies.

Unable to muster a naval force of more than a few small frigates, gunboats, sloops and brigs at the outset of war, the American navy was dismayed by The Times of London as no more than "a few fir-built frigates with strips of bunting, manned by sons-of-bitches and outlaws." [1] While the navy did turn out to have a few surprises to offer the overconfident British public, one American historian contends that "private armed vessels were the only successful American weapon after 1813." [2]

As practised by the merchants, investors and seamen of Atlantic Canada, privateering was primarily a business undertaken "by commercial men upon principles of mercantile calculation and profit." [5] In his study of Baltimore privateers of the period, Garitee...
PRIVATEERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA continued...

maintains:
...in its organizational structure, capitalization, method of operation and distribution of profits, privateering as a business was as soberly directed as any conventional commercial, industrial or banking enterprise. [6]

According to Gazette, the cost of outfitting a first class American privateer, and presumably a Canadian one as well, was approximately $25,000. Since this was more than twice the average cost of preparing a merchant vessel, there must have been good reason for participants to believe that their investment would be recouped. The career of the privateer Liverpool Packet was the stuff of which such dreams were made. Purchased at a prize auction for $400 in 1812, the former American slave tender Black Joke earned a reputation as "the evil genius" of the American coasting trade by capturing over 40 ships in 30 months and netting her owners amounts estimated at up to one million dollars! Thomas Freeman, owner and master of Retaliation, another ex-American schooner-turned-Liverpool privateer, is said to have made up for losses accrued over 20 years of seafaring in just two weeks of cruising aboard Retaliation. However, for every Freeman, there were others like the three unlucky owners of the Union who "died totally insolvent; the two latter hardly leaving sufficient property to pay their funeral charges and the former a large family of orphan children quite destitute." [7] Nevertheless, the lure of profit was strong and many young seamen turned to privateering as a means of earning their livelihood while avoiding the British pressgang.

In their motives, methods and development, privateers were quite distinct from both pirate and naval vessels. Whereas pirates earned their notoriety capturing ships of friend or foe alike, obeying no laws but their own, and seizing or destroying whatever ship took their fancy, privateers were licensed to capture only enemy ships in accordance with strict Vice-Admiralty regulations. Although the line between privateering and piracy was often mighty slim, possession of a letter-of-marque meant that privateers were legally recognized as vessels of war. If captured by the enemy, privateer crews were treated as prisoners of war; pirates were hanged. [8]

While all privateer ships had to carry letters-of-marque to ensure legal title to their prizes, not all letter-of-marque ships were privateers. An armed merchantman with a commission was usually on a commercial voyage first with a weather eye out for likely prizes that might cross his path. Privateers, on the other hand, carried larger crews, more guns and no cargo. They cruised the coasts deliberately seeking out their prey. However, while some privateers captured rich prizes and realized substantial rewards, most ventures were only marginally successful. Many of the 40 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia privateers licensed did not make a single capture. Others had hard-earned prizes turned back by the court. Often prize crews sailing a vessel home were in turn captured by American ships. Storms, navigation hazards and accidents took their toll as well. This is not to mention the competition from British and American naval ships and the more than 500 U.S. privateers all eager for prizes. The risks were serious enough that the arrival in port of one ship in three was considered acceptable. [9] But the potential for wealth beckoned with the "fascination of a lottery" [10] and every success encouraged others to try their luck.

If privateers were not pirates, neither were they navy. From the earliest days, privateer ships were privately capitalized vessels whose main interest was to capture as many prizes as possible with little or no risk to themselves. They did not attack heavily armed vessels for fear of sustaining costly damage or delays and thus did little to advance the strategic goals of the navy. Over the years, these freebooting ships gradually assumed the role of commerce destroyers and general auxiliaries to the navy. [11] Inevitably, the British navy and the privateers competed for men, ships and prizes. While there was never a problem drumming up a crew for a privateer cruise, the Navy was chronically short of men and had to resort to press gangs and harsh discipline to keep their ships afloat. Admiralty Law expressly protected privateer crews from impressment but, according to the documents, at least one naval vessel during the War of 1812 was not above helping herself to a prize crew. The Nova Scotia privateer Crown lost two men to HMS Atalante after a dispute over a captured American prize. When the ship's master put into Shelburne for extra hands, three more men jumped ship and he had to sail away even more shorthanded. Unable to defend herself, Crown was subsequently captured by the Americans.

Officially, the navy demanded that privateers assist them by keeping track of enemy shipping and reporting back on a regular basis. The letter-of-marque for the Broke ordered the captain to keep an exact journal, list all prizes (when and where taken), their value, the movements and strength of the enemy, and any other information regarding the enemy they could determine, and transmit this to the Commissioner of the Admiralty.
PRIVATEERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA continued...

or the Secretary. In the 200 cases on file in the public archives of Canada, only one instance of a privateer communication with Admiral Warren has been found. In March 1813, the New Brunswick privateer Sir John Sherbrooke wrote:

Nave in Boston/President/Congress Rede For Sea/& the Constitution RF Sea. [12]

Whatever their official relationship, "the navy never quite approved of privateering, complaining, among other things, that it was a mercenary institution which demoralized seamen by substituting greed for patriotism." [13] How they explained their own thirst for prizes was not made clear. In light of this rivalry, it is no wonder that the British navy wanted to distinguish their ships from those of the privateers. After 1739 privateers were forbidden to fly any jack, ensign or pendant worn by naval vessels. Instead they flew a distinctive red flag with the Union Jack described in the canton at the upper corner near the staff. [14] Fortunately, the naval code of honour did not oblige ships to fly their authentic colours until preparing to open fire. Thus, privateers could and did fly any flag they chose while they considered whether to fire or retire. Once the risks were weighed and the prize deemed worthy, up ran the red jack and on sailed the privateer.

Who then were these men who were willing to risk their lives and their livelihoods on a letter-of-marque? Gomer Williams, in his History of the Liverpool Privateers describes the eighteenth-century British variety as

...a sort of half-horse, half-alligator with a streak of lightning in his composition -- something like a man-of-war's man but much more like a pirate -- generally with a superabundance of whisker. [15]

According to the documents, those who owned, invested or sailed in privateer ships included prominent merchants, traders, ship-builders, sailors, respectable businessmen, politicians, attorneys, grocers, bakers and fishermen. Most came from major ports such as Halifax, or St. John or from ship-building communities like Lunenburg and Liverpool. Names such as Collins, Allison, Freeman, Barss, Cunard, Moody and Pagan appear as shareholders as well as ship's masters from time to time. The degree of interrelationship is borne out by the fact that many prize masters and captains served on a number of different ships, apparently without any ill feeling on the part of the shareholders.

To describe the privateer community as one big happy family would be an oversimplification since competition was one of the strongest features of the business; but within their own society, privateers seemed to support each other. For example, the brothers John, James and Joseph Barss were members of one of the original Liverpool families. Among their extensive investment interests was the Liverpool Packet which they shared with their brother-in-law Enos Collins. Members of another family, the Dewolfs, owned shares in Retaliation as well as Rolla; they married into the Barss and Freeman families of Nova Scotia and the Pagans of New Brunswick who were co-owners of the Sir John Sherbrooke. Benjamin Ellenwood, prize master and captain of the privateers Retaliation and Shannon, was related to the Freemans on his mother's side. One of the Barss daughters married Snow Parker's son, while another wed Freeman Collins, brother of Enos. Since Collins' father married three times and fathered 26 children, it is not surprising to find one sister married to Benjamin Knaut, co-owner with Collins of the Liverpool Packet, and another wed to Caleb Seely, a master of the same ship. In 1816, the Seely's purchased Simeon Perkins' house from his widow while Perkins' son John lived in a house formerly owned by the Freemans. Enos Collins moved to Halifax just before the war and lived in a house built by John Moody with whom he shared part of the first bond for the Liverpool Packet in 1812.

The shipping empire of Samuel Cunard is attributed in part to his successful investment in privateer ventures. He is known to have put up bond money for three letter-of-marque ships of which one, the Dart, captured 11 prizes. Enos Collins' multi-million dollar fortune is also credited to his privateering enterprise. His wartime partnership with Joseph Allison enabled him to purchase American prizes and sell their cargoes at a profit. Although there is some suggestion that the firm also prospered by illegal trade with New England, such activities did not seem to affect Collins' standing in the community. He went on to found the Halifax Banking Company in 1825, with which Cunard was also associated.

In assessing the impact of Canada's Atlantic privateers on the War of 1812, it must be realized that there were just 40 ships involved and only 200 prizes made it to court. The men who engaged in this business were solid, respectable citizens who were far more horrified by red ink than red blood! None of the prize actions seems to have been particularly heroic and, as a rule, none took more than a half-hour to conclude. One indication of the relative civility of the process was the fact that in three years of war,
no more than a half-dozen privateer crewmen were killed. In general, captures were well-conducted, small scale, non-violent and only moderately profitable. However, what the privateers did do was help to initiate a whole new import trade of American goods while exporting prize goods condemned in Halifax. As a result, the economy of Nova Scotia was booming while Britain and the United States faced enormous national debts. Although never more than a secondary weapon of commerce destruction, privateering had played a role in disrupting American commerce and reducing the enemy's will to continue the war.

By January 1815, the war was over. Privateers returned to their previous peacetime activities of fishing, trading or ship-building and a little-known chapter in Canadian history succumbed to the fortunes of war.

NOTES to PRIVATEERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA, 1812-1815

* * * *

CHARTS ONE OF PROVINCES BEST KEPT SECRETS

by

Gail Lethbridge
Valley Bureau

MIDDLETON, Nova Scotia — They've been called one of Nova Scotia's best kept secrets. The Atlantic Neptune charts were drafted and published in 1776-77 to unlock the geographic mysteries shrouding the irregular shape of Nova Scotia's seacoast.

When Joseph Frederick Wallet DesBarres, the Swiss Huguenot-turned Nova Scotian mapmaker, finally completed the colossal project, he revealed far more than just the geographic features of the Nova Scotia coastline. But it has taken more than 200 years to uncover those secrets.

As the first accurate and scientific atlas ever produced in North America, it was the standard navigation guide of its day. It was used by such sea-going greats as Horatio Nelson and admirals fighting in the American Revolution.

Yet for all its historic, scientific and artistic value, the first precise drawings of this province have eluded public display and explanation for two centuries. Until now.

Pages from Book I and II of the critically acclaimed Atlantic Neptune atlas are on display, for the first time, in the Nova Scotia Room of the Annapolis Valley-Macdonald Museum in Middleton.

"In the mapping world, the Atlantic Neptune has been called one of the most important graphic publications of the last two centuries," says Walter Morrison, guest curator of the exhibit.

As a retired instructor of cartography at the Nova Scotia College of Geographic Science at Lawrencetown, Mr. Morrison was the first to "crack" the mystery of
CHARTS continued...

how DesBarres named the places, some of which have stuck to this day.

It was a question which piqued Mr. Morrison's curiosity because he knew there had to be a system. The answers hidden within the maps and DesBarres nominations would yield as much political and social information about England during the time of George III as the maps themselves would tell of Nova Scotia's coast.

"It nagged at me, but when I finally cracked the system, it was like eating peanuts and I couldn't stop," he now recalls with a smile.

Mr. Morrison discovered that DesBarres renamed virtually all the prominent coastal features in honour of people of influence in England during the 1700s. With study and research, he learned of the interwoven relationships and political associations the names divulge about DesBarres' times.

In Georgian England, patronage was a way of life and DesBarres, a graduate from military school in England, paid homage to his superiors. The prominence of a geographic feature on his chart corresponded directly to the stature of its English namesake.

Port Hood, Cape Breton, for example, was named for Samuel Hood, Naval Commander-in-chief in North America. Mr. Morrison verified his hunch about the naval chief by examining various clues sprinkled around the countryside on DesBarres chart. The place names Susannah, Linzee, Port Portsmouth represented Samuel Hood's wife Susannah Linzee who was the daughter of the mayor of Portsmouth in England.

The laborious task of surveying the highly irregular coastline took years to complete -- at great expense. DesBarres devoted the better part of 10 years to accurately surveying the coast and went to great length to have the charts depicted with an innovative and attractive flare (flair?).

Years ahead of his time, he designed the charts to guide the navigator and please the eye of the viewer.

The reference view placed on each map is a scenic depiction of Nova Scotia's coast -- a view of the shoreline as it would have appeared to navigators of the day.

The watercolour views, drawn as navigational guides, have themselves been the subject of art exhibitions in Nova Scotia.

"These showed that DesBarres really was an innovator," Mr. Morrison explains. "These reference keys had never been done before in maps. The way he placed each boxed view gave the whole map an attractive, three-dimensional representation."

For the years he devoted to the Atlantic Neptune, DesBarres received little in return. He was never fully paid for his work, but instead was appointed first governor of Cape Breton, where he lived in poverty.

He was later named governor of Prince Edward Island and remained in that position until the age of 91. He died at 103.

* * * * *

THE SEA COASTS OF NOVA SCOTIA:

from the pages of Book I and II of J.F.W. Des Barres' Atlantic Neptune, at the Annapolis Valley-Macdonald Museum, Middleton, N.S., April 12 - July 2, 1987. (Museum open Tues. to Sun., 1 to 5 p.m.)

An exhibit offering a rare opportunity, perhaps the once-in-a-lifetime chance to view all the NEPTUNE charts of Nova Scotia side-by-side opened April 12 in Middleton, Nova Scotia, at the Annapolis Valley-Macdonald Museum to the critical acclaim of invited representatives of the historical and heritage community.

The first issue of The Atlantic Neptune's Books I and II contain all the charts of Nova Scotian waters actually surveyed by Joseph Frederick Wallet Des Barres in the period 1764-1774. Most of these charts were released for sale as soon as the hydrographic information was completed but many weren't finished in other details. This means these charts are a collection of the various stages through which the plates progressed until the project was completed. Some never were finished.

In addition to mapping this province minutely, Des Barres renamed virtually all the prominent coastal features in honour of people of influence in Georgian England. The study of the associations which these names divulge is a subject in itself of the interwoven political times in which Des Barres lived. This subject is addressed for the first time in this exhibit.

The exhibition includes a technical section covering latitude, longitude, Mercator's projection, papermaking, copperplate engraving and printing. On display as well are two actual plates used to print the
THE SEA COASTS OF NOVA SCOTIA continued...

Halifax and Port La Tour charts and a drafting set made for George III at the time of Des Barres' involvement in the mapping of Nova Scotia.

Comparisons and cross referencing among charts, the area coverages and even the errors and omissions from plate to plate, become a matter of relative ease when all are gathered and shown together as they were originally issued in 1776 and 1777.

This is the land of eighteenth century Nova Scotia as viewed through the eyes of a unique individual in the truest sense of the word. Joseph Frederick Wallet Des Barres was a Huguenot (French protestant) of Swiss birth. His life and careers span two centuries for he lived almost 103 years. During this time he was a soldier in the Seven Years War at Louisbourg and Quebec, an engineer at Montreal and St. John's, Nfld., a surveyor in Nova Scotia, a publisher in London, and finally, the first Lt. Gov. of the Colony of Cape Breton and the third Lt. Gov. of Prince Edward Island. After all that, he retired at the age of ninety-one.

Des Barres was an innovator as he shows over and over in The Atlantic Neptune, described as a "magnificent contribution to hydrography and a classic of the minor arts," by his biographer, Dr. G.N.D. Evans. His designs made his charts far ahead of their time artistically and his meticulous surveys gave his work relevance for a generation to come. His charts were the standard for the next fifty years.

The exhibit guest curator is Walter K. Morrison, Cartographer Emeritus at the Nova Scotia College of Geographic Sciences at Lawrencetown, Annapolis County, Nova Scotia.

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UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, SHIPPING WORLD SYMPOSIUM
MAY 1987

Synopsis of Papers

THE QUEST FOR THE EFFICIENT SHIP
Fred M. Walker
Naval Architect
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

In the 17th and 18th centuries, voyages were long and perilous and were geared more to seasons than to tides. Ships returned to their home ports to discharge, repair and if necessary lay up. We are accustomed to seaports with quays thronged by vessels of all kinds, a situation which has changed recently, as turn round times have decreased and the proportion of sea time increased beyond the wildest expectations of 20 years ago. The change was summed up neatly by the manager of a ferry company: "I don't like seeing ships in port -- they should be at sea earning their keep!"

Accurate Records
Prior to 1800 changes in ship design came very slowly and were cosmetic in character. As the largest ships were small by today's standards little could be done to improve their speed and capacity. Development was hampered by lack of knowledge of the physical laws governing the motions of a vessel on the surface of water, and further by the secrecy and mystique surrounding ship design. One great step forward was the mastery of ship drawing using the principles of orthographic projection.

Mechanical Efficiency
Measurements of performance came through comparisons of the speed, fuel consumption and other variables of the earliest steamships. Competition between shipbuilders became a spur to improving technology.

Improved Sea Time
At the end of the 18th century, a massive exercise was carried out coppering the bottoms of all wooden sailing vessels of the Royal Navy. At one stroke the problem of fouling was solved, speed marginally increased, but most important the Navy (then on continental blockade) could remain on station as long as provisions lasted.

Hull Efficiency
Attempts were made (some with massive experimental programmes) to find the key to comparing the performances of ships of different sizes. This was not to become a reality until the 1860s when William Froude enunciated the naval architect's Law of Comparisons. With his theoretical and empirical work with models in the River Dart and later at the Torquay Test Tank, he paved the way for future work on resistance and power prediction at hundreds of tanks world wide and tested full scale on HMS Greyhound, the Lucy Ashton and more recently HMS Penelope.

Only in the past few years have there been a move to numerical techniques for the prediction of power and sea keeping qualities.

Structural Efficiency
The late 18th century saw the introduction of iron to boat building, but from 1819 there was a developed shipbuilding technique pioneered by the Vulcan. Iron
allowed vessels of any shape or size to be constructed and allowed variation to be used in the layout of watertight compartments, enabling real imagination to enter the ship design process. Properly serviced, iron ships had lives well in excess of 50 years, their only disadvantage being the recurrence of underwater fouling.

Improved Fuel Consumption
Throughout the 19th century, boiler pressures increased and with the introduction of multi-expansion steam engines, larger cargoes could be carried economically round the world. The introduction of oil firing in the 20th century further reduced engine room complements and allowed fuel storage in otherwise unusable compartments, enhancing cargo bale capacity and stability characteristics.

Propulsive Efficiency
The submerged propeller now 140 years old is unlikely to have any immediate successor, and during this century has improved in efficiency. The controllable pitch propeller while marginally less efficient eliminates the need to change either the speed or rotational direction of the main engine.

Weight Reduction
Steel has been available for well over a century, and was used in 19th century blockade runners where weight savings were more important than first cost. In the 1880s shipbuilding quality mild steel became available widely and cheaply and there were immediate savings of 10% on net steel weight of ships -- increasing their deadweight by the same amount. Similar percentages savings came from welding in the 1930s and 1940s, and even in the present day, savings of up to 1% per annum have been recorded by improving structural design.

Thermal Efficiency
The standard British tramp of 1900 with coal fired boilers and triple expansion steam engine used about 10% of the available energy, the remaining 90% being lost in the sea water circulating in the condensers or rising up the funnel. This has changed and the modern bulk carrier with a turbo charged slow speed two stroke diesel directly coupled to a large diameter propeller can use well over 40% of the fuel efficiently -- the big diesels, which are relatively cheap have efficiencies of over 50% on test bed conditions.

Decreased Down Time
The anti-fouling saga continued until the 1970s when new paints known as self polishing co-polymers were introduced reducing the need for costly drydockings from a minimum of one per year to one every four years. With sophisticated cargo handling gear and complex layouts many ships can spend the vast bulk of their working lives at sea. To have a ship of this sort requires careful economic appraisal of the complete shipping operation as the first costs, the maintenance costs and the expenditure on crewing are of fair magnitude.

Maintaining First Cost
A by-product of modern shipbuilding technology is the accuracy of part manufacture, which is reflected in reduced cost.

The Future
At least six international "efficient ship" projects are underway in Europe and the Far East. It is interesting to note the factors that have been identified in all the projects. They may be a pointer to the future.

a) Acceptance of high initial costs
b) Advanced automation
c) Dramatically reduced crewing

CLASSIC SHIPBUILDING TECHNIQUES
John R. Hume

The transition from wood to iron in shipbuilding involved traumatic changes in technique. The framework of an iron ship was built of smaller sections, but these had to be shaped hot, rather than cold, using hammers rather than edge tools. The covering in the earliest iron ships was made of narrow, plank-like strips of iron, but quickly this style was superseded by broader iron plates. These, unlike their wooden predecessors, frequently had to be bent in two planes to form the required boat shape. Fastening could no longer be done by iron, copper or wooden nails: the boiler-making technique of riveting provided the answer.

With increasing size of ships larger plates and sections were used, and these called into being ponderous machines for cutting and forming hull parts. The availability of open-hearth mild steel from the late 1870s resulted in a rapid transition to the new material. The full economies made possible by using steel were only achieved by using very much longer plates. To handle these much larger machines were required, and in due course mechanical handling techniques were developed.

Even in its developed state, riveted ship construction was a highly skilled, labour-intensive activity.
Electric welding had the potential to reduce both the skill and the labour required in hull construction. The adoption of this technology was jerky. It was stimulated by the Second World War, which generated an unprecedented demand for naval and merchant vessels. The adoption of welding imposed serious strains on traditional yards, and proved too much for many. Both management and men found the transition very difficult. The problems were compounded by moves away from traditional types of ship to much larger vessels of less sophisticated hull form and outfitting. These factors tilted the balance of advantage away from established yards to new units where flow-line production could be adopted. The de-skilling inherent in these trends made the trade of shipbuilding appropriate to countries with little or no background in it.

This paper will illustrate the trends outlined in this summary, and attempt explanations of the success of the British Isles in the first two phases, and failure in the last.

THE SHIPBUILDING MARKET: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN SHIPOWNERS AND SHIPBUILDERS, 1920-1970s
A. Slaven

This paper reviews the nature of the shipbuilders market and the connections between major shipbuilders and shipowners in two contrasting periods. The first is the interwar years, 1920-1938 when world shipbuilding and shipping were burdened by considerable surplus capacity. The second, 1945-75, was the period of very vigorous growth in world shipping and mercantile fleets which witnessed the eclipse of British shipbuilding.

1920-1938
In this section, the paper concentrates on establishing the main market trends, the building patterns of the main British yards, and the nature of the links, formal and informal between builders and clients. The pattern reveals a heavy dependency of British shipbuilders on orders from the British merchant marine, with foreign sales playing a very minor role. Customary links between builder and client strongly influenced marketing practice and expectations for orders.

1945-1975
In this phase of very rapidly increasing demand British builders do not respond quickly to changing market trends and persist with the patterns of builder-client patronage established in the interwar years and earlier. Analysis of the main market sectors indicates a continuation of dependency by major builders on a narrow range of shipping clients for large parts of their order books. The changing nature of order books is discussed in relation to the experience of the shipyards on the Clyde. The paper concludes that traditional builder-client linkages and customary dependency on orders from the British merchant marine made the industry unresponsive to market changes and hastened its decline.

LORD INCHCAPE AND CLYDE SHIPBUILDERS
Stephanie Jones, LSE

This paper will particularly concentrate on the relationship between Inchcape and Alexander Stephen & Son, for the period 1901 to 1932, and is based on the letter books of the Stephens shipbuilding business in the archives at Glasgow University, with material from the P&O Board Minutes and correspondence between Inchcape and his associates in London (Gray Dawes), in India (Mackinnon Mackenzie) and in Australia (the British India and Queensland Agency and Macdonald Hamilton).

What was the nature of Inchcape's demand for tonnage? What type of vessels did he require, in tonnage and specialist design, and in what quantity? What fleets did he control, and where were their main areas of operations? To what extent did Inchcape use Stephen, compared with other Clyde shipbuilders? To what extent did Inchcape invest in non-Clyde ships, and did he generally buy new vessels or second-hand?

When did Stephen's business first take off, and when did he first meet Inchcape? How important a customer was he, in terms of the total output from the yard?

What were the changing conditions in the shipping industry in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and how did these affect the relationship between the shipbuilder and the shipowner? What were the causes of the major fluctuations?

What does the correspondence reveal of Inchcape's knowledge of steamship technology? How particular was he in directing the building, and did he forsake technical advantages on the grounds of price?

MC Gregor, GOW AND THE GLEN LINE: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SCOTTISH SHIPPING COMPANY IN THE FAR EASTERN TRADE, 1870-1911
Malcolm Cooper

One of the pioneers of the steamship trade between Britain and the Far East, the Glen Line achieved early success through the exploitation of the highly
SHIPPING WORLD SYMPOSIUM continued...

profitable carriage of China tea. Changes in trade patterns and the intensification of competition, both foreign and domestic, had eroded the Line's position of dominance by the 1890s, and, having failed either to diversify its services or to extend its financial base, Glen was eventually taken over by the Royal Mail Group.

This paper looks at the organization and operational record of the Glen Line in order to provide insights into the problems facing the British liner sector in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The period before the First World War is generally seen as the heyday of the British shipping industry, but in the liner trades at least, many firms were experiencing difficulties adjusting to more demanding operating circumstances than those in which they had been formed. The result of a widespread failure to expand and diversify, from what was often a very narrow financial base, was a generational crisis in the liner trade, which saw the heirs of many of the steamship pioneers disposing of their vessels at low prices rather than attempting to operate them in an increasingly hostile business environment.

BRITISH SHIPPING AND JAPANESE COMPETITION - SUMMARY
P.N. Davies
Liverpool

This paper is an attempt to describe and analyze the differing experiences of the British and Japanese ship-operating and ship-building industries since the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan in 1853. At that time Britain was the leading maritime nation and by taking advantage of her early lead in iron and steam technology she was to retain this position until at least 1914.

The nineteenth century saw a rapid growth in overseas trade and by reducing the real cost of transport the shipping industry further encouraged the carriage of low-cost, high bulk cargoes. Britain's position as "the first industrial nation" and as the financial and commercial centre of the world was fully exploited by her shipowners. These made the most of their opportunities and their activities were characterized by a high level of entrepreneurship and skilful management.

The only state to make a serious challenge to Britain on the seas during this period was Germany. The United States made moderate gains and Japan's market share grew from very small beginnings. At first, however, even this limited progress could only be achieved with British-built vessels.

The Meiji government in Japan had decided from an early date that shipping was too important to be allowed to fall into foreign hands and had given its development a high priority. It soon found that support for MITSUBISHI SHOKAI offered the best promise and this company eventually evolved into the NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA. The independent formation of the OSAKA SHOSEN KAISHA then led, in time, to the existence of two state supported regular, or SHASEN, lines. These gradually extended their services so that by 1914 they were carrying a useful portion of Japan's growing trade on routes throughout the globe.

The remainder of the shipping industry was unsubsidized and was known as SHAGAISEN. Their owners and managers operated small vessels on short sea routes but some evolved to provide long-distance services on a regular basis. During this process the need for ever larger capital led to the separation of "owners" from "operators" in a uniquely Japanese system. The employment of many of these vessels by the SOGO SHOSHA gave another distinctive flavour to this aspect of Japanese shipping.

The First World War provided a profitable interlude for all sides of the industry but the return to peace meant that no further ships could be exported. Some progress was made in ship-operating by the adoption of high speed, but economical motor ships for particular routes. Cheap vessels with low-cost crews also proved viable in some trades. During this period the U.K. continued to dominate ship-building but the ending of coal exports led her TRAMP shipping to begin an era of rapid decline.

After the Second World War both Japan's ship-building and ship-operating industries were obliged to begin again on their previous foundations. Since then both sectors have become world leaders and Japan is currently the largest builder and operator of merchant ships. At the same time the British construction has declined drastically and its share in ocean carriage has decreased significantly.

The reasons for these differing fortunes are the subject of keen debate. It is hoped to suggest some possibilities in respect of past performances and then to examine the likelihood of future trends.

* * *

The chief distinction of maritime history is its focus on the one physical medium that simultaneously divides and unites the globe. Because the seas are at once highways and barriers, they create both opportunities and risks; and it is this ambiguity that maritime historians most fruitfully explore. Ian Steele believes that many scholars do not hold to this point of view. Especially among historians of the American colonies, at whom the book is directed, a misconception prevails that oceans functioned only "as vast and empty moats" (p. vii), and that seaborne communications in the age before the steamship and telegraph were "dangerous, slow, infrequent, and unchanging" (p. 274). The English Atlantic, 1675-1740 is a carefully structured attack on this position.

Maritime communications were, as the book demonstrates in considerable detail, far more dependable than these stereotypes allow. A good number of trading vessels completed transatlantic crossings to most colonial and British ports in every month of the year, Steele has calculated from customs records, and they carried with them news that was rarely more than ten weeks old. This was not always true for the outposts on the far rim of the empire: Jamaica, for example, was nearly four months' travel from London, and both Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay were cut off from English news entirely through the winter. But the vast majority of British subjects lived within the orbit of regular shipping routes that carried recent and usable information. Reinforcing the normal connections of commerce, moreover, were the professional news carriers: the posts, papers, and packet boats. The postal services of England and her North American colonies, which linked the major transatlantic shipping routes by providing their respective terminal points on each side of the ocean with land connections, were developed during the period in question. Local newspapers in English provincial towns and the larger colonial ports, carrying news chiefly from London and foreign parts, multiplied swiftly after 1700. Packet boats were not to be a regular feature on the English Atlantic until after 1755, but a West India service operated during the War of the Spanish Succession effectively enough to sustain communications at a peacetime level. These specialized initiatives combined with the growing volume of seaborne commerce to shrink the effective size of the English Atlantic between 1675 and 1740 and to bind the British subjects who dwelt around its shores into an "economic, political, and social community" (p. 278).

Steele has charted the flow of information across the North Atlantic through this 65-year stretch with as much precision as one could reasonably expect, and for this reason The English Atlantic will be a book of considerable use to the specialist. The author himself demonstrates this in a case study of the Glorious Revolution in America. By determining accurately the speed at which the news of a Dutch landing, the overthrow of James II, and the proclamation of William of Orange spread around the imperial rim, he has shown that the colonial uprisings in Maryland, New York, and Boston were not daring challenges to Stuart tyranny -- as the participants and some of their historians have claimed -- but merely confirmations of James' deposition: a response to the news, "carried...with much more efficiency than was subsequently admitted" (p. 110), of the Revolution in England. By emulating Steele's sensitivity to the patterns of information flow and making use of the tables in his appendices, measuring the rate and frequency at which news travelled, historians can sort out the precise pattern of specific events with much more success.

Unfortunately, for a work so nicely executed, The English Atlantic suffers from problems of conception. Steele has aimed his book against a position that few modern scholars seriously entertain. Clearly, during the colonial decades under consideration, the transmission of news across the Atlantic was never totally haphazard. Such a view would be nonsense -- as much as the claim that information moved at a pace that was entirely swift and regular. The book does sensibly place the real state of communications between these two extremes and shows that it was gradually improving; but surely, after decades of work on the history of seaborne commerce, we already knew this. It is true that we now see more clearly, for example, how much closer in time was Massachusetts than Jamaica to the centres of power in London; the same can be said comparing eighteenth-century Virginia to her seventeenth-century predecessor. But how did these truths actually alter the character of the colonies concerned? If prevailing winds and ocean currents had run on reversed courses, would life in Barbados, Charles Town, or Newfoundland have developed any differently? The author has tuned our picture of North Atlantic communications to a finer point, but the meaning of this precision -- it leads us to an altered understanding of the colonial world -- is never well explained. Thus, we are left with a careful and intelligent commentary on an existing picture but little that we had not seen in general outline already.
BOOK REVIEWS continued...

There are aspects of the conventional wisdom surrounding maritime communications that could use revision. The question of pacing is one of these: did the English Atlantic shrink in breadth more quickly at certain times than at others? Did the process accelerate as the centuries progressed or not? This problem demands a wider time-frame than Steele allows, but its resolution would be of interest. Early modern historians could also profit from a quantitative examination of information flows that compares the maritime pattern with its landward equivalent. The question of whether oceans functioned as significant barriers would then receive a proper testing.

Steele has chosen to circumscribe his study within the period, 1675-1740, in order to distance himself both from the uncertainties of the earlier colonial decades (pp. 16-17) and from "teleological preoccupations" with the American Revolution (p. ix). He has devoted his book entirely to the ocean because he wishes to redress the "land-oriented bias" of other historians (p. vii). Yet, in following these tactics, he has isolated his subject from the most useful comparative standards at hand. And so a book that is strong on specifics never finds the solid purchase which might have allowed the ambiguities of his maritime subject matter to be more fully prised open and illuminated.

Daniel Vickers
St. John's, Newfoundland


This is one of the three or four books that have changed perceptions of the eighteenth century navy among twentieth century historians. N.A.M. Rodger, who should be a familiar figure to habitues of the Public Record Office at Kew where he is an assistant keeper, and whose name should be recognized by readers of the Mariner's Mirror where he is an acerbic book reviewer, and by members of the Navy Records Society of which he has been the Hon. Secretary since 1975, is not one to hide his light under a bushel.

Scornful of Victorian prudery and post-Victorian self-righteousness, impressed by the values of Georgian gentry, he has a remarkable grasp, one that is possibly unrivalled, of British sources for the history of the Royal Navy during the Seven Years War. As other reviewers have already explained, and as he says in his introduction, the purpose of the book is to correct popular misconceptions about the navy before the industrial revolution. He is not the first to attempt this, by any means, but he has made some telling arguments to contradict conventional wisdom about the harshness of discipline, the distress caused by impressment, and the often desperate conditions for seamen in a man of war, or in hospitals ashore.

Rodger presents his credentials as a historian of the 'new' school. This is beginning to become a tiresome claim; every generation of historians has its differences, and there can be few historians of the 'old' school, whatever that may mean, still practising their craft today. He is not quite a quantifier, because he has not selected his data by statistical sampling methods, but he makes his obeisances to the Respectable Professors of the Dismal Science with a series of appendices that contain the most useful set of statistics about the navy in the Seven Years War ever published, at least to this reviewer's knowledge.

Some of the statistics are straightforward and predictable, such as the relation of desertion to length of service and the age of ships' companies. Others are important new contributions to our understanding of the size and composition of the navy between 1754 and 1765, and support his contention that "the cost of the impress service, which the (House of) Commons no doubt supposed, as modern historians have supposed, to represent the cost of impressing men, actually represented the total expenses of a service which spent only part of its effort on impressment".

Rodger is taking particular aim here at Stephen Gradish, whose The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years War, published posthumously by the Royal Historical Society in 1980, is one of the few other books of major significance in this field. Rodger says it is "marred by serious misunderstandings"; this is the only instance of such misunderstanding that I can detect. To be fair, Rodger also says it is an important and valuable work, and whether he depended on it for information or no -- because he gives every sign of first hand knowledge of all the documentary sources he uses -- he generously implies that Gradish was first off the mark to analyse this fundamental aspect of Britain's naval past. In fact, with the exception of Michael Lewis, who seems to be out of favour with the author, Rodger is careful to acknowledge others who have toiled in the field.

Further relating his statistical tables to the narrative, Rodger makes some penetrating observations about life on board ship, the health of seamen, and with a fine sense of the period the real attractions of a naval life for Englishmen in the mid eighteenth
BOOK REVIEWS continued...

century. Rum and the lash may have been common currency, tolerated by all, but sodomy and theft were capital crimes. The ship, the unit upon which the Admiralty had to depend if there was to be a navy, was a family, and for the most part, from the examples he produces, a happy one. All this is well taken, and it is something that needed to be said in scholarly fashion. Moreover, the success of British fleets in war owed much to the unsentimental and balanced approach of seamen to their profession. Byng deserved what he got. That, too, needed to be said.

Much of what Rodger says was taken for granted by historians like Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, or John Knox Laughton, who were closer to the days of sail. Laughton probably made unjustifiably sweeping generalizations, as Rodger thinks he did, but this could be a case of the pot calling the kettle black. When one looks carefully at the ships selected by Rodger for his appendices, they seem to follow no definable pattern. This would be a good thing, if random sampling had been used, but here one sees a preponderance of ships on the Home station, allowing the correct observation that even in war a ship spent more time in harbour than at sea. In home waters, time in harbour was also time for recuperating and training. On foreign stations not only was more time spent at sea, but returning to harbour meant something entirely different. For example, in Portsmouth, men went ashore to the new hospital at Haslar. In Halifax they went ashore to a tent hospital from which they were lucky to emerge alive. Elsewhere conditions were worse.

In 1758 Captain Robert Routh of the Scarborough landed his sick to a 'slight' hospital on Kennedy's Island, in New York harbour. The agent for the sick and wounded, Richard Ayacough, to increase his profits, deliberately put smallpox victims among the ships' men. This was discovered, but "he has had better success in another, for two boys being sent ashore with the itch, and one for the cure of a fever, the three were put together so that he who went to be cured of a fever returned with the itch and communicated it to five more...".

Rodger demonstrates the general healthiness of seamen, and cites ships like Torbay, Boscawen's flagship. As he points out, it contained many of the Admiral's 'followers', tin miners from Cornwall (men who, incidentally, were to play a vital part in building saps during the 1758 siege of Louisbourg). He does not have the means of establishing what proportion of the navy was similarly blessed. If, for example, he had examined all the ships in Boscawen's squadron, which opened the Seven Years War in North America with the capture in 1755 of the Lys and Alcide, he would have found ships riddled with disease and by the end of the summer practically disabled from loss of men. Rear Admiral Mostyn said of the Monarch's "scabby crew", "I don't know where they came from, but whoever was the Officer that received them ought to be ashamed; for I never saw such except in the condemned hole in Newgate." This does not necessarily disprove Rodger's general assertions, but they need to be followed up by thorough analysis of ships in a squadron, sailing together on a distant cruise, to see if all the positive commentary in this book holds up under different sets of conditions.

Of course, our principal witnesses of the age are the officers themselves. Rodger's sympathy is unmistakably with the occupants of the quarterdeck, and his understanding of that class shines through every page. Rodger has done his best to give us some of the flavour of the life on the lower deck from such sources as court martial proceedings, but it seems to me that his picture is still somewhat rosy. One officer about whom he writes, Lord Colvill, was also a prominent actor on the North American station throughout the war. His record belies the generally moderate picture of discipline Rodger paints. Colvill's punishment returns for 1762 at Halifax included nineteen courts martial, three of which resulted in acquittal, one in the breaking of a purser, two in hanging -- one for theft and one for desertion -- six in punishment of 400 lashes or more, seven of 300 lashes or less. It may not have been the rule, but if it is the exception, surely it ought to be acknowledged as such.

This is still a splendid book, well written, dilligently researched, attractively produced. It will influence all subsequent studies of the navy in the Seven Years War, and will give some future young Turk the opportunity to test Rodger's solid interpretation with still more sophisticated methods of research, and with similarly bold challenges to accepted wisdom.

W.A.B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


This is an excellent little book. It follows the style and format of others in the Observer's Book series. There have been two previous editions; the latest is in paperback format and measures only some 6 by 4 by half inch thick, (150x100x12 mm), making it very easy to carry around.
BOOK REVIEWS continued...

Originally written for those with an interest in "ship spotting" as a hobby, the author describes how the hobby can become more rewarding as expertise is developed and greater knowledge of ships is gained. The author is well qualified to write for this audience since his career, based on visual arts, included the very responsible task of interpreting air photographs for the R.A.F., and subsequently teaching ship recognition to aircrews.

There are sections explaining nautical terms, tonnage measurement, sketches and silhouettes of Hull Forms and ship outlines. A brief but detailed section describes mechanical propulsion methods. A long section of the book describes sailing ships comprehensively; a part of this section includes descriptions of many of the sailing school ships. Many classes of both British and American warships are described. The book also includes brief sections on signalling systems and navigation aids -- that is, running lights and buoys.

It is a useful reference book for checking ship types and propulsion methods when travelling by sea or visiting marine installations and is probably best regarded in that light, and there is a lot of information packed within it that makes for interesting brief periods of reading.

This is recommended as a book to give to young people developing an interest in ships and the world of shipping. It is also a useful reference book to carry on journeys or marine visits for those with good general knowledge who may wish to check facts about ship construction or the shipping operations it describes.

Brian E. Keefe
Williamstown, Ontario


This very thorough account of Norway's wartime naval vessels is the result of a labour of love by the Norwegian naval historian Frank Abelsen, which must have necessitated innumerable trips back and forth across Oslo Fjord, as he researched the material in the naval archives at Horten.

It describes in detail the particulars and history of the more than 370 vessels, including those requisitioned, which served in one capacity or another with the Royal Norwegian Navy. There is a great deal more detail here than one finds in comparable books dealing with other national naval forces, for instance the series published by Ian Allan about twenty years ago.

With each vessel is listed: builder, original owner, displacement or gross tonnage, engine, horse power, bunker capacity, range, armament, including number of depth charges, type of Asdic equipment, complement, names of the commanding officers, the units with which they served, together with the date of launch, and commencement of operational service. Their post-war fate is also listed, including those vessels which survive to this day -- for instance the floating crane Basen, still to be seen on the Toneberg waterfront.

The photographs are well chosen, and reproduced on good quality glossy paper. There are also many interesting plans, including one of the conversion of the whaler KOS XVI for minesweeping, a generator house replacing the whaling winch. From this one can form an excellent idea of the wartime appearance of the whalers which served in the RCN.

The Norwegians served, for the most part, in vessels similar to those used by the Royal Navy, manning among other vessels, 9 B-Fairmiles, 21 O-Fairmiles, 5 75' Thornycroft MTBs, 3 60' Vospers, 4 YMs, 2 MMSs, 4 Isles Class trawlers, 6 Flower Class corvettes, a Castle Class corvette, 5 Town Class destroyers, 2 S-Class destroyers, 1 Hunt Class destroyers, and 3 ex-British submarines, and 3 US Subchasers. Of particular interest to the reviewer were the 30 or 30 requisitioned whalers listed. One ex-RCN vessel, the Trawler TR-55, built in Collingwood in 1918, is also featured.

A very fine effort, the standard of production being comparable to the invaluable Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1981 by Ken Macpherson and John Burgess -- a standard reference which will be familiar to many members.

John H. Harland
Kelowna, British Columbia


Peter Tamm of Hamburg, West Germany, possesses a priceless collection of paintings, documents and
artifacts of maritime interest. In 1986 a selection from his collection was exhibited in the Vancouver Maritime Museum, this being the first presentation outside Germany. The items chosen for exhibition illustrated aspects of seapower, its development, definition and influence on world history over the last five centuries. The Advance of Seapower is a most interesting little book prepared to accompany the exhibition.

The book opens with an introductory essay in which Richard Unger, Professor of History at UBC, traces the development of naval forces from earliest times to the present. He discusses how changes in technology, in political philosophy, in economies of nations and, ultimately, how changes in ideas on the nature of seapower itself formed the basis of the development of seapower. The greatest fleets, those of the 1900s on, were built because of convictions that seapower was critical to national well-being and greatness.

The items exhibited include fifty paintings, prints and engravings, ship models, a shipyard model, old charts, letters of Lord Nelson, a sketchbook, Midshipman’s Journal, one of the first signal books, an Enigma Machine, a rigging warrant, a Trafalgar Medal and one of Kaiser Wilhelm’s uniforms. In all there are eighty-two items; the earliest circa 1600, the most recent 1983.

Each item is described in a comprehensive note by Robin Inglis of the Vancouver Maritime Museum and Michael North of the University of Kiel. The notes are in chronological order grouped under headings ranging from “Introduction of the Big Gun” to “Into World War Two and the Modern Age”. The remarks under the headings relate to the development of seapower and expand on points raised in the Introductory Essay.

The Advance of Seapower provides an overview of a subject which has affected everyone. Seapower determined much of the modern history of the world: what is its role in the future? Two most powerful nations evidently still believe in seapower. Even though each possesses other means of total destruction at long range, their enormous and vastly expensive fleets cruise the seven seas.

Today’s military strategists find themselves in a quandary. Never before have armaments and their capability for long distance delivery made such remarkable advances. Never before has total defence against devastation seemed so doubtful. Perhaps, at last, major war as a matter of policy really is obsolete.

In any case, The Advance of Seapower is thought-provoking, full of interesting information and ideas and a good little reference book to have in one’s library.

L.B. Jenson
Hubbards, Nova Scotia


American Clipper Ships 1833-1858 is a reproduction of a work originally issued as Publication Number Thirteen of the Marine Research Society, Salem, Mass., in 1926-27.

Howe and Matthews have taken a very different approach to the subject than the other writers who have dealt with the history of the American Clipper. Captain Arthur H. Clark in The Clipper Ship Era, published in 1910, Basil Lubbock whose China Clippers came out in 1919 and Carl C. Cutler in Greyhounds of the Sea (1930) all tackled the subject in much the same way: an account of the origin and development of the type with special reference to the trade requirements which gave rise to the demand for fast ships and a more or less chronological account of the ships built, enlivened with anecdotes and sailors’ lore. In contrast, the book under review lists alphabetically every American-built clipper, (and every ship that was claimed to be a clipper), from the Ann McKin of 1833 to the Star of Peace of 1858. The information given for each ship includes: builder and date of launch, dimensions, tonnage (by both old and new measurement if appropriate), the original and subsequent owners, and an account of the ship’s history, varying in length from twelve or thirteen pages for the better-known clippers to short paragraphs for vessels about which little is known. Most rate two or three pages. The names of captains, best passages, races, and accounts of important events or interesting episodes in which the ship was involved are given, together with the subsequent owners and final fate of the vessel.

This information is all derived from contemporary sources: logbooks, the correspondence between captains and owners, passengers’ letters and accounts of voyages and newspaper articles. The launch of a new clipper was an important event in the early 1850s and was extensively covered by the press. These accounts are given in full. Many of them are very detailed and include descriptions of the figurehead and exterior carvings, the saloon and cabin decoration and the
material and scantlings of the hull components as well as the dimensions of the masts and yards. This information would be of great interest to model builders as well as to historians.

All this contemporary information gives the book a certain authentic but conservative flavour. The authors do not editorialize. Little is said of the often brutal treatment of the clipper ship sailors by hard-case skippers and bucko mates. The New York-to-San Francisco voyage of the Challenge in 1851 under Captain Robert H. "Bully" Waterman was marked by a near (or unsuccessful) mutiny and the loss of several of the crew. According to Lubbock these men were murdered, but Howe and Matthews merely quote Captain Waterman's own account in a letter to a friend in which he mentions that three men fell from the mizzen-topsail yard and were killed and that four more died later from dysentery. After all this time the precise truth about such incidents can never be known but the reader should be aware that it is the official view that is reflected in this history.

Two things struck me very forcibly in going through these accounts: the extensive correspondence between Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury and the many clipper ship captains who helped him to compile his records of oceanic winds and currents and who improved their passage times by following his advice; and the number of these beautiful vessels that were destroyed during the Civil War by Confederate commerce-raiders, especially the Sumter and the Alabama under Captain Richard Semmes. Almost all of those who survived the first few years of the Civil War were transferred to foreign, mostly British, registry. The heyday of the American clipper was really very short. The majority of the vessels described were built between 1850 and 1855 and only a very few after 1856 as economic depression and the shadows of the coming conflict put an end to clipper construction.

Because of its layout the book is an excellent companion volume -- actually two volumes -- to other books on the subject. The details of ships mentioned in passing in other accounts or of ships in paintings or illustrations can quickly be found. But just opening the book at random can provide fascinating reading. I will give just two examples. The clipper Wild Wave was wrecked on an uninhabited Pacific atoll on March 5, 1858, 24 days out of San Francisco. After an epic small boat voyage, with $18,000 in gold coins on board and during which one boat was lost and another built, the Captain and some of the crew found a U.S. warship and were able to effect the rescue of the rest of their shipmates. This is a real adventure tale that can hardly be matched in fiction, but the story of a typical successful passage is, in its own way, just as interesting. The account of Mr. Bayard Taylor of his voyage as a passenger on the clipper Sea Serpent from Whampoa, China, to New York in 1853 provides a vivid picture of life on a clipper during a fast voyage.

This is an excellent reference book for any marine library or private collection and is so attractive that I feel that a larger-format hardcover version, with the illustrations in colour, would be well worth the extra cost.

C. Douglas Maginley
Sydney, Nova Scotia


Cette brochure a été publiée à l'occasion d'une exposition sur les baleines et la pêche à la baleine sur la Côte Ouest, ouverte le 27 novembre 1984 à Vancouver.

L'auteur évoque brièvement la pêche côtière des indiens et leurs légendes sur les baleines, puis l'arrivée des premiers navires baleiniers européens et américains, chassant la baleine franche dans le Nord-Est du Pacifique, à partir de 1834. Mais Victoria, qui aurait pu devenir un lieu de relâche pour les baleiniers américains allant dans l'Arctique à la poursuite des baleines polaires, ne concurrence pas sérieusement Honolulu et San Francisco.

De 1868 à 1872 eurent lieu le long de la côte quelques essais de capture des baleines à bosses (jubartes) à l'aide de bombes-lances, qui explosaient à l'intérieur de la baleine, par Thomas Roys et d'autres.

Mais ce n'est qu'avec la technologie moderne, mise au point par le norvégien Sven Foyn, que la Colombie Britannique devint une région de pêche baleinière significative. Un harpon explosif, tiré par un canon monté à la proue d'un rapide navire à vapeur permit de s'attaquer à des espèces de cétacés jusque là non molestées.

En 1905 la Pacific Whaling Company installa une station baleinière sur l'île de Vancouver, puis une deuxième l'année suivante. Le procédé du docteur Ludwig Risamuller fut utilisé pour faire de l'huile et
BOOK REVIEWS continued...

transformer les os et la chair des cétacés en "guano" (engrais). Des navires chasseurs furent achetés en Norvège.

En 1910-1911, la Canadian North Pacific Fisheries Ltd. détentrice de dix licences de pêche acquit cinq navires chasseurs et construisit deux nouvelles stations. Après une très bonne année en 1911 (1623 baleines prises), la société fit trop de dépenses et fit faillite en 1914.

Les actifs furent repris par la Victoria Whaling Company devenue Consolidated Whaling Corporation Ltd. Dans les années 1920 et 1930 la pêche fut irrégulière, avec une population de cétacés en nette diminution. La pêche cessa en 1943.

Après la Guerre, une nouvelle société, la Western Whaling Corporation installe une station à Coal Harbour, dans une ancienne base de la Royal Canadian Air Force, et reprit la pêche en 1948 avec trois nouveaux navires, transformés en chasseurs, sans beaucoup de succès. Elle cessa son activité en 1959.

Un accord fut alors fait avec la première société baleinière britannique pour utiliser la station à produire de la viande de baleine pour la consommation du marché japonais. La pêche reprit en 1961 et cessa définitivement en 1967.

L'auteur prépare un ouvrage plus développé sur le même sujet: The History of Whaling in the Pacific Northwest, dont la parution, prévue pour 1988 est attendue avec impatience. Il sera intéressant de voir si les documents subsistants permettent de dresser une liste des baleiniers à voiles qui ont pêché dans la région à partir de 1834, ainsi que des statistiques de pêche, espèce par espèce, de 1905 à 1967.

Thierry Dupasquier
Paris, France


The naval battle of 31 May 1916, Jutland to the English, Skagerrak to the Germans, has been a subject of controversy among naval officers and historians since it was fought. Many books have been written about the battle but John Campbell is the first historian to utilize action and damage reports, ammunition expenditure returns and dockyard reports and also give an adequate account of the destroyer actions and the attempted submarine actions. The book is based on the actual fighting with little attention being paid to the strategic and political issues; how the individual ships stood up under fire and the quality of each ship's gunnery is the main purpose of the book.

The book contains eighteen chapters; two cover naval operations in the North Sea prior to Jutland, the preliminaries to the battle and the composition of the fleets, twelve chapters cover the battle and three describe the return of the fleets to their bases and the repair of the damaged ships. The final chapter is a summary and discussion of the battle.

The battle is divided into six phases with each phase described in two parts: each ship's participation, ammunition expended, hits on the opposing ships and damage sustained. There are line drawings of the hits scored and damage caused and a table showing shells and torpedoes fired and hits obtained.

Campbell does not agree with some of the accepted versions of Jutland. The combination of weather conditions and heavy smoke made visibility an important factor but not to the extent of some accounts. The breakdown of H.M.S. Warspite's steering, at Windy Corner, was caused by mechanical failure in the port steering engine due to continued use under heavy load at high speed. Near misses may have aggravated the condition by straining the hull. The hit by S.M.S. Derrflinger is usually credited with causing the breakdown but the time of the hit and the course of the shell show that it hit after the breakdown. The loss of the British battlecruisers was due more to the type of charges used by the British than lack of flash precautions. The real cause of the loss was the use of cordite, as a propellant, in silk bags against the German use of a brass cartridge case. It is very unlikely that they would have blown up if German-type charges had been in use. It is an error to state that the Germans introduced flash precautions as a result of the Dogger Bank action. The only change made was to limit the number of charges out of their cases or in open cases. Examination of the surrendered German ships, in 1918, revealed that the flash control was below British standards. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, the oldest battlecruisers in both fleets, scored four 12" hits on S.M.S. Lutzow which caused damage forward of A turret, below the armoured deck, causing flooding which subsequently resulted in the loss of the ship. The British were more apprehensive of mines and torpedoes, yet they inflicted the most damage with these weapons. The British fired ninety-four torpedoes, scoring six hits, while the Germans fired one hundred five for a total of three hits. The
only mine damage was to S.M.S. Ostfriesland, which hit a mine laid by H.M.S. Abdiel, off the Vyl Lightship, earlier in the month.

Who won at Jutland? Campbell does not answer the question directly. From the British viewpoint, the result was completely unsatisfactory. Her numerically superior fleet suffered heavier losses than it inflicted yet the losses were too small to affect the war at sea. The High Seas Fleet was in no condition to continue the battle on June first; only the closeness of its bases prevented the loss of several heavily-damaged ships. It had never been Scheer's intention to engage the entire Grand Fleet. He had hoped for a still more favourable loss ratio so as to claim at least partial success.

A.W. Mears
St. Stephen, New Brunswick


Strategy is defined in the OED as "the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign". The most serious threat to North America is attack with nuclear weapons. This slim book condenses the publicly available knowledge of those weapons and their delivery systems, and provides a brief history of their development and deployment.

In essence, modern nuclear weapons can be delivered en masse as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) or submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCM). The likely path for the first two between the USSR and the USA is over northern Canada but submarines can be deployed at will in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans or the Caribbean and, increasingly, throughout the Arctic Ocean. The aim of both great powers now appears to be mutual and stable deterrence resulting from mutual assured destruction. This involves establishing a very fine balance between the offence and defence acceptable to both sides, as demonstrated by involved treaties and lengthy discussions over limitations or control of nuclear weapons. It must be remembered that nuclear deterrence is a potent means of preventing the use of conventional weapons, e.g., to quote Lindsey, "Just as an effective defence against ballistic missiles would make defence against cruise missiles necessary, an effective defence against both would make effective conventional defence more important."

Both sides have similar problems. For example, ground installations are vulnerable, despite hardening, concealment, dispersal and attempts at mobility, while keeping large numbers of aircraft constantly aloft is unduly wearing. Again, passive defence measures such as shelters and evacuation of likely targets cannot prevent millions of civilian casualties. The two powers are so suspicious of each other that any advantage, real or perceived, is destabilizing until the strategic balance is considered redressed. That is the USSR's main objection to the U.S. plan for a space-based missile defence system.

For Canadians, the northern defence warning system, airborne tracking, supersonic interceptor aircraft and increased control over Arctic waters are essential contributions to North American defence plans. A thought-provoking book in an esoteric field. Expect more submarines and intense development of "eyes in the sky".

C.H. Little
Ottawa, Ontario


No historian knows more about the bullion trade, or indeed has written as gracefully or prolifically about it, than Artur Attman. His two previous books, on the bullion trade between Europe and the East and on the pivotal role of the Dutch in shaping the character of the world trades in precious metals, respectively, were seminal contributions to both economic and maritime history. Thus, his new volume on the place of American bullion in world trade between 1600 and 1800 has been eagerly anticipated. This book fulfils all expectations.

This thin study deepens our understanding of the bullion trades, and of the way that the various markets accommodated (and redistributed) the flow of precious metals from the Americas. Professor Attman examines in detail the operations of the Spanish, Portuguese, French and English bullion markets; in the process he demonstrates more clearly than ever before how the comparative advantages possessed by the entrepôts of northern Europe allowed them to outstrip their southern competitors. An understanding of this is
crucial to maritime historians, because it is a large part of the explanation of why the northern nations came to dominate world trade and hence to construct the largest merchant fleets in the world by 1800.

But perhaps the most important contribution of the book is a set of new trade balances that Professor Attman has carefully calculated. These cover a variety of world trades, but of particular significance is his conclusion that by the late 1780s the Baltic nations were enjoying trade surpluses of approximately 8 million rix-dollars (about £1.88 million) per year. This finding is obviously important for specialists in Baltic trade, but it has a more far-reaching significance for maritime historians of the eighteenth century in general. This is because of the existence of the "Sound Toll Registers", a remarkable set of documents which detail the vessels and cargoes that passed the tip of Denmark on their way into, or out of, the Baltic proper. Some ambitious Dutch historians have computerized these accounts, and the results have appeared in a number of path-breaking publications, the most recent of which was Hans Chr. Johansen's important volume, Shipping and Trade between the Baltic Area and Western Europe, 1784-95 (Odense, 1983).

By refining our understanding of the size and composition of the regional trade imbalance, Professor Attman has cleared the decks for maritime historians to explain (using the Sound Toll Registers and other sources) the impact that this had on shipping in the region.

For once again breaking new ground, Artur Attman deserves the gratitude of all maritime historians concerned with trade before 1800. His detailed study of the bullion trade will be indispensable reading for students of the period. Young historians searching for research topics would do well to emulate his model and give us equally careful studies of other world trades.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


The Big Book of Marine Electronics is an excellent guide for the user of electronic aids for mariners. The book covers all types of equipment used on board extending from the old to the new. The operations, installation and upkeep of each system is the main theme of the book. This approach follows along with the contents of an equipment manual that comes with most marine electronics systems. In this way, the owner of a boat can bridge the gap between the technical aspect of the equipment manual and the uncomplicated descriptions given in the big book.

The book is laid out in six sections, namely: navigation equipment, communication equipment, depth instruments, miscellaneous equipment, fundamental appendices. Each section is broken down into chapters with each chapter describing a particular system. For example, Section I, Chapter 1 describes LORAN-C. The verbal description given is strongly reinforced with photographs, charts and tables to ensure an overall comprehension of the subject. Section V is especially useful because of its strong practical content. This section not only stresses the importance of proper care and installation of equipment but shows you how to do it. From experience I can assure you that much frustration and expense can be avoided by the guides laid down in Section V alone.

After reading this book I am left with the impression that a sailor will sail with a minimum of electrical/electronic headaches if he or she keeps this book on board.

Peter Matchim
St. John's, Newfoundland


As a former Merchant Seaman of 24 years, plus another 22 years working on the Montreal waterfront, it has always surprised and fascinated me that the interest in ships of all types by the ordinary person is so powerful. Almost everybody has had at least one experience of visiting a ship, travelling on a ship, or just sighting ships on the river or canal. In addition, many people have worked on board or around vessels during their working lives and still retained an interest. Ships are always a good topic of conversation at dinner.

This little book is just right for them. It is really just an update of volumes 1, 2 and 3 which are now out of print. Also, ships on the seaway seem to change their style and design gradually every 10 years or so, therefore a good update is quite essential.
BOOK REVIEWS continued...

The book is divided into 9 categories: Bulkers, Self-unloaders, Tankers, Cement Carriers, Freighters, Passenger Ships, Barges, Tugs, and Foreign-going.

Examples of each category are shown with a black and white photograph and a brief history of the ship underneath. Also, due to economic difficulties with shipping in recent years, the changes of names and owners is taken care of. There are also many mentions of accidents and incidents in which every ship is involved over her lifetime.

Altogether an interesting little book one could take with one on a visit to the Welland Canal, The Visitors' Gallery at the St. Lambert Lock, or the Rampart at Quebec City to do a bit of ship spotting in the summer, or to get out in the dead of winter round the fireplace and remember times gone by.

John Walker
Montreal, Quebec

SOME REMARKS RECENTLY MADE BY YOUR EDITOR

These remarks were made at our Society's annual meeting in May. They are not to be taken as gospel according to the CNRSI -- but they do express my feelings in an area of vital concern to us. (See also the "Open Letter to a Dissident Member" which follows these remarks.)

I have observed, as editor of Argonauta, that we are running the risk of losing the interest and loyalty of our non-academic members. In the context of these sessions -- and what we must do with Argonauta -- let it be well understood that we are not aiming exclusively at the academic (or any other) audience. We must involve all our members in all our events, and solicit active participation from those who wish to present less standard treatments of the subjects -- within our basic parameters -- they desire, and which they feel will educate those attending or reading the newsletter.

MY idea of our meetings is as a forum for the exchange of information and concepts, where papers can be AIRED, not ventilated, and receive the informed, personal criticism of peers given informally and without malice. Only by this practice can we attract non-academic participation, particularly at conferences. If we are to welcome our non-academic peers fully into the fold, then we must have fewer of the trappings of academe. There are conferences where polished, definitive papers are mandatory; ours, I submit, are not such.

OPEN LETTER TO A DISSIDENT MEMBER

Dear Writer:

Your complaints concerning our Newsletter are of such import to its acceptance that we cannot let them go unchallenged or unexplained. A reiteration of your editor's philosophy on many of the things you attacked can be found elsewhere in this newsletter. But here we will deal specifically with your points.

You make a glaring mistake when you state that the December issue contained "no papers or articles about Canadian maritime history", with the exception of Bustard's obituary. In fact we did have an extensive article on the CN 'Prince' ships on the west coast. You therefore did not read the offending newsletter from cover to cover.

You also state there are too many book reviews and that no one is really interested in the overseas events we notice from time to time. As to the reviews you are the only person to complain in this manner. All others who have taken the time to comment have been most favourable; this is a fact you will have to live with -- simply do not read that part. Where you attack us for mentioning overseas events you are running the risk of committing the same mistake of which you accuse us, of being too biased one way or another. You would be surprised at how many of our members are indeed in a position to attend such events. More importantly, though, many of these meetings produce printed summaries (we have one such in this issue) or even distribute copies of the papers presented. That automatically brings them right into the grasp of all members with access to the mails. Maritime history by virtue of its international flavour lends itself like few other studies to international debate. We would be sorely deprived if we could not compare our activities with those of other countries.

But it is in your perception that we are too academically-oriented and by insinuation irrelevant that we are more concerned. Nothing is further from our intention. If our earlier issues give this impression it is simply a reflection of the efforts of those few who have taken time and effort to contribute. We are totally dependent on our contributors. You acknowledge historical events in the Canadian scene susceptible to research and writing. It is up to all of us to get to work and bring them forward, academics and amateurs alike.

Finally, we note your intention still to support the CNRS with your membership and your best wishes for it. Bear with us, contribute, and help make the newsletter relevant to all members.