Punctuality

It has been suggested to your harried editor that there is no need for contributors to meet deadlines because the Newsletter is always late.

WRONG: Nothing could be further from the truth. We will admit to having been tardy—but, given the nature of things, and the necessity to keep the costs to a minimum, we do not always take the most expeditious routes. If contributors missed deadlines that would simply extend the whole process and the Newsletter would be later still. We have not built up a stock of items yet (more on that later) and thus we are considering material for inclusion right up until the last possible moment.

We reaffirm our publishing schedule of 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December. By that we mean that these are the last possible dates for us to get material to our producers. Then, depending on our printer’s schedule, we must wait—followed by the efforts of wives and sweethearts and families and just plain good folk, we stuff, address and mail the finished product. So, if sometimes the process takes a little longer than we would all like, please bear with us.

Review Essays

In this issue readers will find a new feature, and one that we will try to build on in the future—the review essay. This allows us to present an in-depth treatment of a broad topic by noted authorities in the field. We are particularly fortunate with the authors of the two in this issue, all of whom are noted in their specialities. Interestingly, we have seen copies of The Ship anthology being remaindered in W.H. Smith’s—or if you can get some. At $2.99 they are a bargain!

New Publications

Two new publications of interest to readers are Seascape, a new British maritime affairs journal, the first issue of which will appear in March. Interestingly, its Subscription Order Form has a photograph of HMCS Iroquois loud and clear. It can be obtained through Seascape Publications Ltd., 52-54 Southwark Street, London, SEI 1UJ. Introductory subscription for 1 year is £10 ($18 US).

* * * * *

Your newsletter is only as good as the contributions you send in — so PLEASE CONTRIBUTE.
New Publications continued...

The other is the "Newsletter" of the Maritime Economic History Group, put out by our own peripatetic Skip Fischer, and Helge Nordvik. As Skip tells us:

it is designed for people with a research interest in economic and social history related to merchant shipping and the fisheries.

Anyone interested in this--Vol. 1 No. 1 contains a rich mine of information detailing researchers in those fields--simply has to write to Dr. Lewis Fischer at Memorial University of Newfoundland between 15 May and 15 August, or to him at Institute of Economic History, Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway, thereafter.

Documentary Index, Montreal Trinity House Records

As we sit in our majesty and debate in high philosophical terms whether or not we should take the plunge and publish something substantial, or whether there is a market for our efforts, others are acting on their beliefs. Just come to hand is a superb source document for historians of 'maritime St. Lawrence Canada'--it is an exhaustive index to the records of the Montreal Trinity House.

Properly entitled Répertoire Analytique des Documents de la Maison de la Trinité de Montréal/1806 - 1873/ Analytical Index of the Documents of the Trinity House of Montreal, the fully bilingual document is truly a labour of love. The work of Gordon Rabchuk, an archivist and historian, and Ernest Labelle, the hardworking archivist of the Port of Montreal, it was written to publicize the Port of Montreal's history and to alert historians to its extensive archival collections, of which these are only a part. As the foreword states, the Trinity House collection "comprend des procès-verbaux, registres de correspondance et documents sur le fonds des pilotes infirmes". (Your editor has chosen the euphemistic opportunities of French on this occasion because the English for 'pilotes infirmes'--decayed pilots--has always struck him as being particularly unfair.) The majority of the documents, however, which are well preserved, are in English.

Your editor has chosen to notice this volume now, rather than through the usual channels, both to get the word to you quickly and because he does not intend to part with his copy.

Contributions

Robert Louis Stevenson once told a budding missionary how hard it was to persevere in the face of what at times appeared to be monumental indifference--it was like chopping wood without seeing the chips fly, he told her. Well, finally your editor thinks he can detect a chip or two. M.B. Mackay has sent us some valuable comments to supplement the fleet list we published in our June 1986 issue--pointing out that even the company's name was incorrect, CN Marine having become Marine Atlantic during 1986! We also print in this issue a "Preliminary Fleet List" of the so-called Newfoundland 'Splinter Fleet', as well as a piece on the NORTON class tugs of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Responses such as this enable us to catch glimpses of woodchips; we exhort you all to contribute. It is hard to imagine that anyone interested enough in becoming a member of our Society does not have something of interest to impart to fellow members. Don't forget, the entire topic of Canadian maritime history is so new that almost everything written will break new ground. So, please, write us with your articles.

Don't Forget

JOINT MEETING

NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR OCEANIC HISTORY
AND

CANADIAN NAUTICAL RESEARCH SOCIETY

"The Great River, the Great Lakes and Beyond"

Kingston, Ontario
Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston
The Royal Military College of Canada
May 21 - 23, 1987

Programme Chairman: Dr. Barry M. Gough

Registration: Thursday, May 21/87, 1800 - 1930 hours

Direct questions to: Maurice D. Smith, Director
Marine Museum of the Great Lakes
55 Ontario Street
Kingston, Ontario K7L 2Y2
(613) 542 2261
**PRELIMINARY FLEET LIST**

The 'Splinter' Fleet

Built 1944-46, Newfoundland Government Shipyard, Clarenville. Officially termed 'Point' class wooden motor coasters. 325+ grt 123.7' x 28.2' x 11.8' (depth) and had 425 bhp engine. Owned by Newfoundland Dept. of Resources and operated by the Newfoundland Railway until 1949 when three were taken over by CNR and the remainder sold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>grt/yr built</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BONNE BAY</td>
<td>/44</td>
<td>46: Lost St. Shott's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURIN</td>
<td>336/44</td>
<td>49: CNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65: AVALON COASTER Avalon Coaster Ltd. (Puddister &amp; Bennet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Drifted ashore broke up on rocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLARENVILLE</td>
<td>336/44</td>
<td>49: CNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63: S.W. Mifflin Ltd., Catalina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81: Hank Buitendijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82: Highland Cove Marina Kincardine, Ontario.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODROY</td>
<td>337/45</td>
<td>49: CNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65: AVALON TRADER (i) Avalon Trader Ltd. (Puddister &amp; Bennet)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68: NORTHERN TRADER Puddister &amp; Bennet Shipping Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 9, 1970 holed in ice 5 mi. south St. Albans, lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64: WHITE COAT RJ, AJARK Sumarah, Halifax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65: ERIK A NIELSEN Nielsen Shipping (Ole A. Nielsen) Halifax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>March 18, 1966 sank, ice damage, Magdalen Is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERRYLAND</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>49:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREPASSEY</td>
<td>336/44</td>
<td>47: Chartered to British Graham Land Expedition Jan 47 Erebus &amp; Terror Gulf to Weddell Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64: Nielsen Shipping (Ole A. Nielsen), Halifax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 16, 1964 caught fire 75 mi. south Sambro Lightship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 17, 1964 abandoned, exploded, sank. Carrying 40 tons of explosives for use in oil exploration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWILLINGATE</td>
<td>346/46</td>
<td>49: THOMAS V. HOLLETT, Hollettes Transportation, Burin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>: AVALON VOYAGER, Avalon Voyager Ltd. (Puddister &amp; Bennet).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73: AVALON VOYAGER II, Waterman's Services (Scott) Ltd., Toronto.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above is a preliminary list. Any additions or amendments gratefully received.

M.B. Mackay
Halifax, Nova Scotia
NORTON CLASS TUGS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY

During World War II several types of tugs were built in Canada. Among them was the NORTON Class of eight tugs for the RCN. The NORTONs were built primarily for towing naval gunnery targets, but they were also outfitted for general towing, salvage and ship berthing. They were steel-hulled and powered with a direct drive 9 cylinder 1000 bhp Dominion Sulzer engine. They carried a towing winch, 1½ ton derrick and gear hold and were ice strengthened.

Dimensions were 111'-0" oa, 26' breadth, 12'-6" depth and 10'-6" draft. Gross tonnage was 230-260 tons and they carried 85 tons of fuel. Accommodation was provided for a naval crew of 26 and they were armed with a Lewis gun.

All were completed in 1944 and served with the RCN until war's end when four were transferred to the Canadian Naval Auxiliary Service and were manned with civilian crews but continued to perform the tasks for which they were originally designed. The remaining four were assigned to the War Assets Corporation for disposal.

Beaverton was based at HMC Dockyard in Halifax until she was lost in collision with Empire Macalpine in the St. Lawrence River on August 27, 1946. Her master and one crew member were lost. She had been en route to Quebec City to rendezvous with the RCN aircraft carrier Warrior to escort her to Montreal.

Clifton and Heatherton were transferred to the Pacific Coast and based at HMC Dockyard at Esquimalt. Heatherton was sold in 1975 and in 1977 sailed back to the St. Lawrence River in 41 days. She was renamed Robert-H. and is still in service, based in Trois Rivières. Clifton was sold in 1978 and is presently reported to be serving in Mexico.

Riverton remained at HMC Dockyard in Halifax and performed a variety of towing duties until sold in 1979 to Quebec City owners who renamed her Techno-St-Laurent. She is still in service.

Maxwellton was acquired by Price Navigation in 1946. She was dismantled and transported on 18 rail cars overland to Lac St-Jean where she was reassembled, renamed Hugh Jones and towed log rafts until 1971. She was again dismantled, wheels attached to her hull and her superstructure placed on a truck trailer and she was moved to Chicoutimi and reassembled. Unfortunately she sprang a leak on her delivery trip and sank 70 miles from Quebec City. Her owners later acquired Heatherton.

Clifton and Birchton were both sold to Marine Industries of Sorel and both were busy towing surplus ships to their wrecking yards. Clifton was sold to Portuguese owners in 1948 and may still be in service. Birchton was renamed Capitaine Simard and was employed with the dredging fleet until the late seventies. She was laid up for a long period and eventually sold to the owners of Riverton for spares and broken up in 1982.

It is interesting that the three NORTONs no longer in service all met their end within a few miles of each other on the St. Lawrence and that the remainder are still in service after 42 years.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the following for their assistance: René Beauchamp, Montreal; W.A.B. Douglas, DND Ottawa; German & Milne, Montreal; La Cie Price, Quebec; Maritime Museum of the Atlantic.

M.B. Mackay
Halifax, Nova Scotia

NORTON Class tugs of the RCN Fleet List

ALBERTON Pennant No. W 48
1946: to War Assets Corp. for disposal.
Renamed AVEIRO. Still listed Lloyd's Register 1985.

BIRCHTON Pennant No. W 35
Builder: Montreal D.D. Launched 1943, completed 1944
1946: to War Assets Corp. for disposal.
1946: Marine Industries Ltd., Sorel, Quebec.
Renamed CAPITAINE SIMARD.
1978: Assets acquired by Sceptre Dredging, vessel laid up.
NOTES ON NEWFOUNDLAND GULF & COASTAL TRADE FLEET LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Builder</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRUCE (ii)</td>
<td>Renamed MALYGIN (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINTROSE</td>
<td>Renamed SADKO (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOYRA</td>
<td>May 12, 1945 caught fire off St-Jean, I.O., beached Beaupre Flats. Had been on voyage Montreal-Nfld. Total loss. Owner: Moyra Shipping Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE SPLINTER</td>
<td>1984: Sold to Renamed CAVALIER DES MERS. Used as excursion and whale watching boat on St. Lawrence River, based Tadoussac. M.B. Mackay Halifax, Nova Scotia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CANADIAN NAVAL POLICY

There has been a remarkable growth of interest in Canadian naval history during the last ten years. [1] The outpouring of books, graduate theses and scholarly articles has sharpened our understanding not only of the many false starts and discontinuities in Canadian naval development but also of enduring long-term influences. Although much basic research remains to be done, the wealth of new material on higher policy has brought the broad themes of Canadian naval development more clearly into focus.

The question of naval defence has always pulled Canada in two directions. Alliance with immensely strong seapowers—Great Britain and, latterly, the United States—has guaranteed Canada’s shores against any but minor attacks. Prior to 1939, defence against this relatively slight danger and the assertion of sovereignty over territorial waters, a task to which Canadian governments attached much greater importance, required only modest coastal vessels. The Canadian land militia tradition of a home defence force, composed of partially-trained reserves and a small professional cadre, seemed an appropriate model for such a localized sea service. Canadian governments, however, were also subject at critical junctures to pressure from senior allies, special interest groups and professional sailors for the provision of major warships to reinforce allied sea-going fleets. But domestic political opposition to either alliance commitments or substantial defence expenditure in peacetime scuttled the big-ship proposals and inhibited local defence programmes as well.

The Second World War called forth an enormous contribution by Canada’s small-ship, reservist force, but in that effort is also to be found the origins of the large, professional post-war navy. New Canadian attitudes towards defence and international relations made possible the expansion of the 1950s and 60s, but the decline of the fleet during the past twenty years suggests a resurfacing of older traditions and again raises the question of whether the navy should look to the immediate defence of Canada or to larger alliance roles.

This dichotomy between home defence and alliance commitments originated in the transformation of military relations between Britain and her self-governing colonies during the last half of the nineteenth century. Change had been initiated by the withdrawal of British army garrisons from the colonies. The immediate concern was to relieve the Imperial treasury of soaring overseas defence expenditures. There was, however, a special imperative in the case of Canada, for it was becoming clear that efforts to balance burgeoning American power with British land forces were futile and possibly a dangerous provocation. At the end of 1871 the last Imperial troops, save those guarding the naval base at Halifax, departed. [2]

In turning the defence of the vulnerable North American land frontier over to the Canadian government, Britain "fully acknowledged the reciprocal obligation of defending every portion of the Empire with all the resources at its command." [3] The Royal Navy was the instrument that made good that pledge by insuring that a reinforcing army could be landed in a crisis, and, more importantly, in its ability to operate offensively against the American Atlantic seaboard (the large Union fleet of the Civil War which had brought some British naval officers to question the chances for a successful offensive had been rapidly demobilized after 1865, reducing the United States Navy to its usual meagre strength). In fact, the decisions taken in London during the 1860s marked a fundamental transition in overseas defence policy that, aside from extreme emergencies, limited the British commitment to naval support.

Canadian leaders treated the Imperial pledge as a cast-iron guarantee that Britain would attend to all naval aspects of Canadian defence. An abiding faith in the supremacy of British seapower was only part of the reason. Canadian authorities were also seeking to avoid additional defence expenditure by removing any pretext for further British reductions, and with good cause. Seeking additional financial relief, in 1865 the Imperial Government had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act to empower self-governing colonies to raise their own local naval forces.

For Canada the issue centred on the Great Lakes. Naval command of these inland seas, as had been demonstrated in the War of 1812, was crucial to the defence of the land frontier, but isolation from the Atlantic by the limited capacity of the St. Lawrence canal system necessitated the establishment of costly special gunboat forces and dockyards. The Canadian government had taken quick action when crises loomed, organizing naval militia companies on the lakes in 1862 and then employing them to convert steamers in the spring of 1866 to meet the threat of Fenian raids. Almost immediately, however, the vessels were turned over to Royal Navy crews and during the next four years the Canadian and Imperial governments bickered over financial responsibility for the force. Canada did maintain two gunboats in service in 1869-70, but as soon as the Fenian threat receded, they were decommissioned and the naval companies disbanded. [4]
Clearly the naval defence of Canada involved a good deal more than waiting for the British fleet to come to the rescue in the increasingly unlikely event of war with the United States. More probably, a war between Britain and a European or Asian power would expose Canadian ports and shipping to attack by raiders preying on the Empire's trade while the main strength of the Royal Navy was committed in a remote theatre of operations. This was the danger that shaped Canadian naval policy until the Second World War.

The 1878 crisis inspired a number of proposals for a Canadian naval organization to which the government was by no means unsympathetic. In the late 1880s, for example, Sir John A. Macdonald supported a scheme put forward by Andrew R. Gordon, an ex-Royal Navy officer who commanded the new Fisheries Protection Service, to militarize that service by acquiring two torpedo gunboats. This worthy idea came to nothing, at least partly because the Admiralty gave very faint encouragement. [8]

British policy towards colonial navies was, in fact, undergoing a volte face, one of several that would greatly affect Canada. In the mid-1880s, the uncertainties that had clouded British naval policy began to clear with the emergence of standardized types of steam-driven, armoured warships possessed, unlike earlier transitional designs, of good sea-keeping qualities. Confidence returned that, just as in the days of sail, centrally directed sea-going squadrons could contain enemy fleets and raiders. Indeed, the Empire's survival depended upon large-scale expansion of the Royal Navy to meet the growing strength of competing maritime powers, a policy that the British government adopted with the Naval Defence Act of 1889. Colonial coast defence flotillas that had seemed a necessary margin of safety in the 1860s and 1870s now looked like a squandering of resources that should properly be used to strengthen British sea-going fleets. [9]

The Australasian colonies had, by British lights, shown the right spirit when in 1887 they had agreed to pay an annual cash subsidy to augment the Royal Navy's Australian squadron. During the following two decades the Imperial government repeatedly urged other self-governing dominions to help underwrite the cost of the British fleet while discouraging the development of colonial flotillas. With the Royal Navy concentrated against the enemy's squadrons, only one or two cruisers could slip through to raid the colonies, and these vessels were unlikely to act boldly given the risk of interception by superior British forces. Colonial land forces therefore provided adequate local defence. [10]
Bids for contributions to the Royal Navy met with a very chilly reception in Ottawa. It was an issue that went straight to the heart of Canadian domestic politics because of French-Canadian (and, indeed, significant English-Canadian) antipathy to the idea that Canada should make sacrifices and compromise an essential right of self-government to control defence expenditure for the sake of larger Imperial interests. [11]

The fact was that Canadians did not feel threatened sufficiently to induce them to contribute to anything outside their own immediate purview. Australia and New Zealand, feeling profoundly vulnerable in their isolation from the north Atlantic centre of British sea-power, were glad to pay for strengthened Pacific squadrons that would directly guarantee their security. By contrast, Canadians believed that the great fleets in British home waters would deal with any threat to Canada by a European power, while the Imperial government's successful efforts to secure American friendship eliminated serious danger from the United States. When in 1904 the Admiralty closed the dockyards at Halifax, NS and Esquimalt, BC and withdrew the squadrons from the Western Hemisphere to concentrate the Royal Navy's strength in European waters, these measures were announced as a gesture of confidence in the United States. And with that view the Laurier government was in full agreement. Sir Frederick Borden, minister of militia, was already publicly declaring that the Monroe Doctrine afforded Canada additional security against hostile overseas powers. [12]

Yet Laurier did admit that Canada needed some form of naval defence to uphold her special interests, and his answer was virtually identical to the one Macdonald had ultimately contemplated. Responding to growing pressure from both the British government and Canadian Imperialists for a contribution to Imperial sea-power, Laurier had undertaken to militarize the Fisheries Protection Service and thereby relieve the Royal Navy of residual responsibilities in Canadian waters. In 1903 two steel gunboats were ordered for the Fisheries Service, and on one rudimentary military training was given. [13]

The accelerating naval race between England and Germany and a new shift in Imperial policy forced Laurier to do more. Royal Navy withdrawals from the Pacific in 1907-08 brought the Australians to press for an end to their subsidies and to lay plans for a local navy of sea-going destroyers. Reluctantly, the Admiralty agreed. On 29 March 1909, a resolution for the creation of a Canadian navy received unanimous support in the Canadian House of Commons. The government's immediate intention was to obtain older cruisers and destroyers from the Royal Navy both for fisheries protection duties and for an expanded naval training programme. [14]

This scheme was instantly overtaken by a political crisis in Britain over the scale of naval expansion needed to meet the German challenge. Cries from British "panic-mongers" that the German dreadnought battleships would soon match or exceed Britain's had the unexpected effect of arousing offers of special assistance to the Royal Navy from the overseas dominions. New Zealand would pay for a dreadnought for the British fleet; so too would Australia (although the government hinted it would rather spend the money on strengthening its own navy). Canadian Imperialists, who had great influence in the Conservative party, demanded that Laurier should also offer an "emergency" contribution. [15]

Finally realizing that an appeal to growing nationalism would inspire a much greater effort than Imperial subsidies ever had, the Admiralty responded that each dominion should now raise a full-fledged navy, including a dreadnought battlecruiser, for service on the Pacific. Thus relieved of commitments in distant seas, the British fleet could then complete its concentration against Germany. The Australians immediately adopted the proposal, for their ships would directly defend their own shores. As the Admiralty admitted, however, Canada had no need of such large ships in her own waters: they would be earmarked for duty on the far side of the Pacific. The only way in which British officers could relate such a policy to specific Canadian interests was to argue that a larger Imperial effort on the Pacific would balance the growing strength of the United States Navy on that ocean; Canadian sovereignty would be more secure than if the dominion were entirely dependent upon American forces for the defence of British Columbia. Certainly there were leading Canadian figures who had expressed concern about American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere. But Laurier was entirely unpersuaded about the need for Canada to build a capital ship navy for the Pacific, not least of all because of his confidence, not shared by the Australians, that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would endure. [16]

Nevertheless, Laurier did agree to a far-reaching compromise which greatly increased the scope of the Canadian navy project. Four modern cruisers and six destroyers would be built for the defence of both Canadian coasts, but would also be available to
An Historical Perspective continued...

protect Imperial trade on the high seas. On the basis of this scheme the Royal Canadian Navy was founded in 1910, and the immediate results of this decision are well known. To nationalists it was nothing less than an Imperial service squadron, and to Imperialists a harbinger of separation from the Empire; this odd alliance helped bring down the government in 1911.

It is less well known that Robert Borden, the new Conservative prime minister, hoped to defuse the naval issue by reviving the Liberal government's original scheme for the gradual militarization of the Fisheries Protection Service. No less than Laurier or Macdonald, Borden appreciated that to win widespread political support, a Canadian navy must grow from Canadian traditions in response to particular Canadian interests. Borden's plan was of course scuppered by a further shift in British policy. Winston Churchill had become First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1911 and he quickly denounced the naval agreements of 1909. Facing strong political resistance in Britain to further increases in naval expenditure and genuinely fearful of continued expansion of the German fleet, Churchill asked Borden to make good on his party's earlier commitment to a special contribution. The subsequent political crisis in Canada over Borden's legislation to provide a gift of $35,000,000 to the Admiralty blocked any action on naval policy. [17]

When war broke out in August 1914, Canada's naval defences comprised only the rump of Laurier's navy: two old cruisers that had been purchased from the Royal Navy for training purposes. This meagre force got to sea, with substantial assistance from Royal Navy personnel, but it was British squadrons, reinforced by Australian and allied Japanese warships, that quickly secured North American waters against marauding German cruisers, much as Admiralty planners had predicted.

Churchill had wisely advised Borden against attempting substantial expansion of the RCN in wartime, but entirely unforeseen developments ultimately required the creation of a coastal patrol force very much like the one Canadian prime ministers had contemplated since the 1880s. As soon as the Royal Navy had neutralized the German surface fleet, there was a new menace. German submarines proved devastatingly effective in sinking Allied merchant ships and capable of sustained long range operations. When in the spring of 1917 it seemed that the U-boat assault on shipping might bring a German victory, the Allies organized a trans-Atlantic convoy system to protect trade. Canadian flotillas of small anti-submarine vessels, cobbled together at the urgent request of the Admiralty, secured the approaches to the Dominion's convoy assembly ports and escorted shipping in coastal waters where danger of U-boat attack was greatest. The backbone of the organization—which ultimately included some 130 converted yachts, commercial ships and emergency built trawlers and drifters—was the pre-war government marine service. The sea-going revenue and fisheries vessels were among the very few craft available with the endurance for extended escort duties, while seasoned marine services personnel provided an essential leavening to inexperienced volunteers who were hurriedly recruited. [18]

Effective as the convoy system was for protecting shipping—the three U-boats that hunted off Nova Scotia in August-September 1918 sank only two steamers of any size, both unescorted—the Canadian flotillas included not one ship with the speed and armament required to engage a modern submarine. Canada was left in the unenviable position of begging senior allies who had no destroyers (the ideal anti-submarine type) or fast, well-armed patrol vessels to spare. Certainly the lack of suitable warships and of fully competent personnel accounts for the RCN's failure to strike back at the U-boats on the two occasions when they were known to be operating on the surface within reach of patrol craft. Objectively, it did not matter, for the measure of success in trade defence is the "safe and timely" passage of merchant shipping, not fiery combat with the enemy. Yet this was imperfectly understood at the time, and Canadian sailors, indoctrinated as they had been with the big-ship, offensive action traditions of the Royal Navy, felt humiliated at their inability to strike back at the enemy.

Canada must have destroyers and other fast patrol craft to hunt down the enemy in coastal waters, the naval staff advised the government in 1919, and she should also have light cruisers with which to reinforce Imperial sea-going squadrons. British Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe lent his endorsement when he visited Canada at the end of 1919 to advise on naval policy, and he confirmed the view of the Canadian staff that although the German fleet had been destroyed, these forces were needed to counter growing tensions with Japan. Certainly the Canadian interest in big ships suited Imperial purposes: Jellicoe advised, as the Admiralty had done in 1909, that Canada should also procure battlecruisers for Imperial service on the Pacific. For its part, the Admiralty in 1918-21 made proposals much broader than Jellicoe's for participation by the dominions in an integrated Imperial navy under centralized British control. [19]
An Historical Perspective continued...

The enormous cost of the Canadian war effort in blood and treasure, and the impetus it gave to Canadian nationalism, had sapped any political support for Imperial defence commitments, however. Borden, and his successor Arthur Meighen, now adopted Laurier's pre-war position in rejecting Imperial naval projects. In 1920 Meighen accepted the gift of a light cruiser, two destroyers and two submarines from the Admiralty to form a Canadian force that was really a shrunken version of the one Laurier had tried to establish in the face of Conservative opposition in 1910-11.

William Lyon Mackenzie King, who lead the Liberals to power at the end of 1921, reverted to earlier schemes for a coastal defence militia. In 1922 the RCN was cut back to two destroyers, five trawlers from the wartime flotillas, and 500 permanent personnel who were to serve as a training cadre for the reserves, now reorganized as the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (for merchant seamen), and the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (for men who were not professional seamen). The naval staff established VR divisions in every province to build political support for the navy, while senior officers ceaselessly lobbied for the acquisition of six destroyers as the bare minimum needed to defend one coast against submarine or surface raiders. [20]

These efforts were not without effect. During the late 1920s, the King government approved the acquisition of two additional modern destroyers. When, in the depression years of the early 1930s, cuts in the defence estimates brought Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the tremendously influential chief of the general staff, to urge disbandment of the navy on the grounds that the limited funds would be more effectively spent on maritime patrol aircraft, R.B. Bennett's Conservative government would not give its sanction. [21]

McNaughton's radical proposal was in fact a warning that Canada's coast defences must be immediately strengthened, by extreme methods if necessary, as a matter of national survival. It was no secret that the Royal Navy, run down since 1919 in the face of anti-militarism in Britain no less pervasive than that in Canada, was incapable of simultaneously containing the expanding fleets of Germany, Italy and Japan. Canada would be dependent on American military support in a future war, and if she could not attend properly to her own local defence, the American services might well occupy operating bases on Canadian soil "bringing to an end the political independence of this country." [22]

When in 1937 Mackenzie King's third Liberal government launched rearmament, it was cast as a coastal defence programme to meet Japanese and German submarine and surface raiders. Determined not to alienate Quebec, King avoided any hint of Imperial commitments. Interestingly, in view of the traditional association in Canada of the navy with Imperial defence, King gave first priority to that service. Here is some measure of the navy's success in demonstrating that its destroyer programme was essential for national defence. [23]

The original scheme for six destroyers and four minesweepers had been completed by the outbreak of war in September 1939, and with these vessels the RCN took up the same east coast patrol and local escort role it had carried out in 1918. In 1940 Canadian shipyards began construction of anti-submarine corvettes and minesweepers to augment this modest force. [24]

Disasters to the allied cause thrust Canada's little warships into much broader commitments. Most importantly, the unexpected success of U-boat operations against convoys created an urgent requirement for anti-submarine escort across the full breadth of the Atlantic. In May 1941 the RCN shouldered the main responsibility for the Newfoundland Escort Force, whose vessels made the long run between St. John's and Iceland (later, Northern Ireland). As the intensity and scope of the U-boat offensive escalated over the next two years, so too did the size of the RCN commitment. As in 1918, but now on a much grander and truly decisive scale, Canada's reservist navy and her unsophisticated shipbuilding industry filled a critical gap in the big-ship navies. [25]

Vital as this contribution was, senior Canadian officers were increasingly discontent with the role of operating small warships in what was perceived to be an unglorious, purely defensive role. Indeed, the U-boat crisis had upset the Canadian naval staff's plans, articulated as early as 1940, to acquire major warships that could be retained as a permanent peace-time fleet. Determination to overcome the sad "past history of paper programmes and shattered hopes" was at the very heart of thinking at Naval Service Headquarters. A fleet of small vessels scattered among American and British commands could be only too easily dispersed and forgotten with the return of peace. [26]

During the last two years of the war the Canadian staff seized opportunities afforded by requests that the RCN take over RN ships to alleviate British man-power shortages, and by preparations for increased Commonwealth participation in the drive across the Pacific against Japan. Insisting that the RCN must
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not be confined to an anti-submarine role in the Pacific, Naval Service Headquarters persuaded the British to transfer two light fleet aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and large fleet destroyers to form a full Canadian task force for offensive surface action. [27]

Mackenzie King believed he was up against an Imperial plot. Far from playing the role of dutiful colonials in negotiations with the Admiralty, however, the naval staff had waged a determined campaign for a balanced force of the most modern and capable vessels while rejecting the older, less suitable types that were offered. Senior officers, moreover, urged the task force programme in terms that echoed McNaughton's passionate nationalism.

The question actually at issue...is in effect whether Canada seeks the status of an independent power of not inconsiderable consequence...or whether Canada intends to depend wholly upon the United States for protection...with a consequent reduction in status to the level of Mexico and other Latin-American satellites of the United States. Naval defence is an essential element in national self-preservation, and if Canada cannot normally assume a responsible share in the command of her own oceans, she can then exist as a free...nation only through the grace of the United States....

That being said, King's suspicions were understandable. Aside from the transition from the British to American strategic spheres, the naval staff was making a familiar bid for big-ship alliance contributions. [28]

Murmuring about the proper role of Canadian naval forces being local coast defence and the dangerous pretensions of big ships, Mackenzie King led his colleagues in cutting the RCN (and the other services) to the bone in the early post-war years. Nevertheless, the big ships the navy ultimately acquired as a result of its late-war campaign (one light fleet carrier, two cruisers, and fleet destroyers) were retained. When in the early 1950s Canada embarked on a radically new military policy, making substantial peacetime commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the task force provided a nucleus for expansion of the RCN. As it turned out, the purpose of the big-ship fleet was utterly different from the glamorous surface combat role that Naval Service Headquarters had projected in 1945-5. Rather paradoxically, the navy returned to its often despised wartime role as an escort force to counter Soviet submarines on the sealanes to Europe. Anti-submarine warfare was in fact now universally recognized as a vital and technologically sophisticated role for professional navies, belatedly shedding its low status as a job that could safely be left to reservists manning odd little ships. [29]

From the perspective of 1987, the RCN of the 1950s and 60s looks like an historical anomaly. Older traditions have been evident during the last two decades in the priority given to sovereignty defence over alliance commitments, reductions in fleet strength, and minimal modernization programmes. Against Soviet maritime forces that have grown tremendously in both size and trans-oceanic capability during the same period, the existing fleet can adequately meet commitments for neither the direct defence of Canada—a mission in which the Pacific and Arctic can no longer be given as low a priority as in the past—nor the escort of shipping to Europe. Moreover, the passing of Canada's security in geographical isolation from major sea-borne attack, together with the technological imperatives that have immensely complicated warship construction and the training of personnel, make it exceedingly doubtful that large-scale expansion can again be successfully undertaken after the outbreak of war.

Still, as evidenced by the current patrol frigate programme, ambitions for major warships which can undertake alliance roles in distant waters continue to have a decisive influence on Canadian naval policy. Soaring costs, however, have limited firm orders to only six vessels; even one-for-one replacement of the existing destroyer fleet is very unlikely. It is this economic imperative that has stimulated discussion about the acquisition of less costly weapons platforms—aircraft, submarines and more modest surface vessels—in larger numbers. Although not well suited to sustained mid-ocean or overseas operations with alliance forces, these alternatives would do much to strengthen Canadian defence. [30]

When considering the balance between local defence and alliance commitments for future programmes it might be worthwhile to remember events in Canadian waters during the closing months of the Second World War. At that time the RCN's best resources were concentrated in European waters and being marshalled for the Pacific offensive. Only small corvettes and minesweepers, most of them lacking the latest weapons and equipment, and a few, larger frigates only recently commissioned and not properly "worked up", were available to Canadian waters. It was this force that faced the final trans-Atlantic offensive by Germany's new
An historical perspective continued...

Schnorkel-equipped submarines. Experience overseas quickly demonstrated that these supremely elusive craft could be destroyed only by superbly equipped and trained hunting groups (among them, RCN groups based on British ports). Events off Canada’s shores soon confirmed this. The only U-boat kills were achieved by seasoned American destroyer and escort aircraft carrier formations despatched to assist the RCN. As it was, between December 1944 and April 1945 three schnorkel boats operated with impunity within sight of the Halifax headlands, sinking eight ships, including the minesweepers HMCS Clayoquot and Esquimalt, despite the concentration of large numbers of RCN ships against them. Poorly-equipped and trained vessels were virtually powerless given the uniquely difficult sonar conditions in the near Halifax approaches. Loss of life on the stricken vessels was heavy, but only good luck prevented a much greater disaster when torpedoes fired by U-1232 narrowly missed the liner Nieuw Amsterdam, fully loaded with Canadian troops, as she left port. [31]

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NOTES to An Historical Perspective
On Canadian Naval Policy.


NOTES continued...


[23] Ibid., chaps. 6-7.


[26] Naval Service Headquarters, "Staff Memorandum on Canada's Post-War Navy," Nov. 1940, p. 8, DHist, NHS file 1650-1 vol. 2. Note, for example, the Canadian naval staff's grim persistence in procuring large Tribal class destroyers in 1940-2, despite British pleas that shipbuilding resources should instead be devoted to smaller, more economic vessels that were desperately needed for convoy escort: Tucker, vol. II, 29, 34, 58-60, 79.

[27] Ibid., chap. 4.

[28] Ibid., chap. 4.


FROM RAFTS TO "RO-RO": THE SHIP IN HISTORY


Historical series written for the popular market have generally enjoyed mediocre reputations. And deservedly so: by trivializing complex issues, often to the point of banality, they have frequently done a disservice to history while simultaneously insulting the intelligence of the interested layman. If this generalization is broadly true for historical series in general, it has even more validity to maritime history. Perhaps the worst example in recent years has been Time-Life's multi-volume History of Seafaring. The best that can be said for most of the works in this series is that they are competent coffee table books. Bearing the hallmarks of Time's famous "committee" writing style (authors are never identified on the title pages), the History of Seafaring is almost totally lacking in insight. In fact, in my view it is potted history at its worst.

Fortunately, it is not written in stone that maritime series have to be this way. This judgment is amply supported by the first-rate series produced jointly by the National Maritime Museum and Her Majesty's Stationery Office entitled, prosaically enough, The Ship. The genesis of this ten volume work is almost as interesting as the books themselves. In 1980 the British Broadcasting Corporation in cooperation with the National Maritime Museum commissioned an exhaustive radio series on the history of shipping in the United Kingdom. The series itself was perhaps the best thing of its kind ever produced; it remains a pity that no North American network has ever had the courage to air it. As part of the package, the NMM, with the general reader in mind, also commissioned a series of short volumes on the historical development of the ship. While these books were not intended to supersede more detailed treatments of vessel development, they were conceived in order to make available to a wide audience the fruits of years of more specific studies. Richly illustrated, and produced by some of the foremost experts in the field, the series as a whole has attained its goals brilliantly. In the process, it has also achieved a level which makes it of great value to the specialist. While it is possible to quibble here and there with the judgments of individual authors, and it is frequently feasible to criticize both emphases and omissions, for the most part The Ship stands as a solid, indispensable collection which will delight the laymen while at the same time meriting a place on the bookshelf of every serious maritime historian.

The grandeur of this achievement can be put into some focus by considering the alternative approaches that the general editor and the individual authors could have followed. They could, for instance, have adopted a highly romantic approach to their subject. Had they done so, they would have been following in a long and not totally dishonourable tradition. Consider, for example, one of my favourite passages from the pen of the late American historian, Samuel Eliot Morrison:

These clipper ships of the 1850s were built of wood in shipyards from Rockland in Maine to Baltimore. Their architects, like poets who transmute nature's message into song, obeyed what wind and wave had taught them, to create the noblest of all sailing vessels, and the most beautiful creations of man in America. With no extraneous ornament except a figurehead, a bit of carving and a few lines of gold leaf, their one purpose of speed over the great ocean routes was achieved by perfect balance of spars and sails to the curving lines of the smooth black hull; and the harmony of mass, form and colour was practiced to the music of dancing waves and of brave winds whistling in the rigging. These were our Gothic cathedrals, our Parthenon; but monuments carved from snow. For a few brief years they flashed their splendor around the world, then disappeared with the finality of the wild pigeon.

This not atypical passage from The Maritime History of Massachusetts is itself not dissimilar to the romanticism that characterizes much writing about the ship. Morrison's defenders (and he has had many) like to stress what one has called "the literary power of his uplifting prose." But regardless of what literary merit it may or may not possess, the quotation above
The sweep of the series is impressively broad, covering changes in maritime technology from the rafts and boats of prehistoric times to the tankers of the 1980s. Yet the scope is perhaps not as broad as the titles of the volumes may indicate. For the most part, the focus is on developments occurring in the British Isles. In his introduction to the series, Basil Greenhill admits this explicitly, and makes no apologies for this approach; given the importance of British entrepreneurship in initiating change, it may be that none are required. But not all major developments have been pioneered in the United Kingdom, and the books would have been more satisfying had the authors been encouraged to write more about changes taking place elsewhere. Indeed, it is only in the first two volumes, and in Ewan Corlett's concluding book on the post-war era, that the reader can develop a real appreciation for non-British contributions. In addition, most of the volumes on merchant craft concentrate a bit too much on technological change and innovation and tell us too little about shipping. None of the volumes is guilty to an overwhelming degree, but all exhibit this characteristic to a certain extent.

Given these arguments, it is not surprising that in my view the best books are those which most successfully avoid the pitfalls discussed above. One of these is the first volume in the series, written by Dr. Sean McGrail, longtime Chief Archaeologist of the National Maritime Museum. Of all the books in the series, Rafts, Boats and Ships pays the least attention to the technological change in the broadest geographical setting. In chapters on areas including Asia, Arabia, Africa, India, China, Indonesia, Australia, Oceania, and America (as well as Europe), the author is able to show concretely how different cultures added bits and pieces to the process of improving waterborne transport. Technological diffusion, in McGrail’s view, did not proceed outward from one centre, but rather was characterized by a complex process of cross-pollination. The prose is clear and lucid, and the illustrative material (which is an important part of all the volumes) is a model of its kind. For these reasons it is one of the three most essential volumes in the series.

The book by Robin Craig is another particularly satisfying effort, and again it is successful precisely because it avoids some of the overly narrow focus that characterizes many of its companion volumes. Craig is concerned with the first century of deep-sea steam vessels; while his discussion centres mainly upon
England and Scotland (not surprising given the lead taken by the United Kingdom in both technological innovation and the introduction of steam into commercial service), the author spends more time than any of the others in linking changes in ship construction and propulsion to the reason that merchant vessels are so important: the cargoes carried in their holds. He is also successful at elucidating in a few short passages the reasons for the timing of the transition from sail to steam. The book is worth the price for those few pages alone, but the careful reader will find much else that is worthwhile between its covers.

In my view the other particularly successful volume is the final one in the series, edited by Ewan Corlett, an important and thoughtful British naval architect. Because of his grounding in the technology of modern vessels, he is able to explain clearly the meaning of some of the often bewildering changes that have overtaken ocean transport in the years since the conclusion of the Second World War. As he argues, ships have undergone more dramatic transformations in this relatively brief span of time than in any comparable historical era. Thus, the amount of material with which he is confronted is truly immense. Yet Corlett clearly explains the tanker revolution, the development of natural gas carriers, the introduction of "ro-ro" technology, and much more in only a few brief pages. I have used this volume in a university course in modern maritime history, and have always found that even the least technically-oriented student comes away from the Corlett book with a clear comprehension of the scope of the "revolution". The only drawback to the volume concerns the author's attempts actually to explain the changes; most of his explanations strike me as both ahistorical and simplistic. But since the description rather than the explanation of the postwar shifts in merchant shipping is the author's principal concern, it would perhaps be unfair to judge him too harshly on this criterion.

Unfortunately, not all the volumes that comprise The Ship are worthy of this level of praise. Quite naturally, some of the books are weaker than others. John Morrison's Long Ships and Round Ships, which to a certain extent overlaps the material in McGrail's book, is an interesting study of the evolution of vessels in the nations of the Mediterranean rim, but the narrowness of the geographic focus lessens its utility. A far better book could have been written by comparing Mediterranean experiments with attempts at innovation elsewhere; as it stands, the book raises far more questions than it answers. In Tiller and Whistaf, Alan McGowan attempts too much by trying to examine changes in both merchant and naval vessels. Despite the fact that in the period with which he is concerned (1400-1700) merchant and naval craft were more closely related than they would be in later periods, in attempting to analyze both facets of maritime technology he ends up doing justice to neither. The other two volumes dealing with naval vessels, David Lyon's Steam, Steel and Torpedoes and Antony Preston's Dreadnought to Nuclear Submarine, each of which deal with discrete time periods (the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively) do a much better job of exploring their important topics.

Despite my few caveats, in general The Ship is a model history that deserves to be read by both layman and specialist alike. And it is a model in more ways than one. It demonstrates what can be done within the genre, and it would suggest how series on slightly different topics might be constructed. It would be nice, for instance, to have a parallel series that dealt with shipping in all its ramifications. And a similar set of works with a focus broader than the United Kingdom would be welcome. But what I would really like to see is a series on the history of Canadian shipping. The expertise exists within the Canadian Nautical Research Society. Yet for the most part, members of the society (and especially the academic members) display a typical, if understandable, predilection toward writing for specialists. Before my academic colleagues dismiss this notion out of hand, it is worth repeating a message that the American economic historian, Douglass North, delivered several years ago to members of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project: "your story is too important to be told to academics alone." What is true for the history of the shipping industry in Atlantic Canada is even more valid for the larger Canadian maritime sector as a whole.

As an historian, I have a perhaps understandable bias toward believing that the past is important for its own sake. But I am also realistic enough to recognize that attitudes extend in society today are to a great degree the products of the way we think about our past. Those concerned with the merchant shipping sector are wont to complain that, in effect, Canada no longer has a deep-sea merchant fleet. And those interested in the navy frequently bemoan the neglect with which the Canadian fleet has been saddled in recent years. It would be foolhardy to argue that the production of a well-crafted series of books on the history and traditions of the Canadian maritime heritage would magically reverse either of these long-term trends of decline. Nonetheless, it would be equally silly to pretend that the ignorance of Canada's maritime past shared by the bulk of our population is...
The Ship continued...

somehow unrelated to the lack of public concern about the state of our various maritime industries today. In other words, this kind of series deserves to be written not only to rescue our maritime past from oblivion but also because of the impact that it could have in inducing attitudinal change.

The Ship provides us with a modern example of how such a series can be produced. Whether Canadian maritime scholars are willing to take up the challenge remains an open question. The Ship deserves to be read for its own merits, but when viewed from a contemporary Canadian perspective, the series takes on a new poignancy and importance. To be sure, this series merits the attention of all maritime historians. But as a model of how such a project can be conceived and implemented, it also deserves to be read as an option for future research agendas.

Lewis R. Fischer
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BOOK REVIEWS


Like so many truly great explorers, Vilhjalmur Stefansson was an enigmatic figure whose exploits in the Canadian Arctic and theories about the North stimulated strong positive or negative responses from colleagues, supporters, and opponents. Indeed, one of the major contributions of William Hunt's biography is to sort out the conflicting evidence about Stefansson and to explain why his reputation has continued to shine in Europe and the United States while he remains something of a pariah in Canada. In today's Canadian North, Stefansson's visionary foresight should be more than sufficient to offset his occasional failures. He was an excellent explorer and without doubt a gifted anthropologist who realized the importance of learning as much as possible about Eskimo culture. Stefansson's successes at "going native" permitted him to travel across sea ice in winter conditions and to make major discoveries in the Arctic Islands. At the same time, his propensity to praise the native diet and to adapt to their style of life made him critical of most whites, including missionaries, traders, adventurers and scientists who did not take time to learn about northern culture.

Stefansson emerged as a great publicist for the Arctic, but his detractors criticized him for using every opportunity to focus the limelight upon himself. His discovery of unknown Eskimo bands held great scientific promise, but Stefansson became bogged down in sensational press coverage following exaggerations that led to the "blond Eskimo" controversy. Stefansson did enjoy public attention and he sought media exposure that helped to advance his career as a popular lecturer and writer. Unfortunately, he neglected to credit the work of some associates who were to become his sworn enemies.

Recognized as a major northern explorer, Stefansson received command of the Canadian Arctic Expedition (1913-1918), which was designed to advance exploration and to undertake a major scientific study of the Arctic. Stefansson's remarkable abilities as an explorer did not translate into effective leadership of a large scientific expedition of seventy persons. Hunt describes him as a loner, but many frictions had to do with the inflexibility of the southern scientists and Stefansson's own total acclimatization to Arctic lifestyle. Although Stefansson was not present or responsible, the loss of the expedition vessel Karluk, the marooning of the crew on Wrangel Island, and the deaths of eleven men caused severe criticism of his leadership. Stefansson led a remarkable expedition across sea ice to explore Brock, Borden and Meighen Islands, leaving the scientists of the Southern Party under Rudolph Anderson to conduct experiments and to grow more restive. Anderson and some other scientists became lifelong detractors of Stefansson whom they described as publicity hungry. The publication of Stefansson's book My Life with the Eskimos brought new criticism from Anderson, who was left off the title page, and from missionaries and other white observers who expressed open contempt for his favourable view of native culture.

Returning to the lecture circuit in the United States, Stefansson's advocacy of the North led him into new controversies. The publication of The Friendly North in 1921 annoyed many polar experts who shared little of Stefansson's enthusiasm for the Arctic. His backing for a disastrous colonization scheme on Wrangel Island and the failure of a reindeer domestication program on Baffin Island tended to support the views of those who said that the North was a terrible and inhospitable place. Despite continuing controversies, until his death in 1961 Stefansson remained an Arctic visionary. While some may continue to condemn him for egotism and love of personal publicity, Hunt has placed Stefansson into a new and more understandable perspective. Some aspects of Stefansson's career...
require additional research, but the author has banished many of the reasons why Canadians have neglected him. Stefansson was a leader in understanding the future potential of the Arctic. As Canada looks northward, Stefansson appears all the more important and worthy of recognition.

Christon I. Archer
Calgary, Alberta


Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada is the forty-second in a series of booklets published by the Canadian Historical Association for students and the general public. But because this pamphlet is a précis of the work done by the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project at Memorial University it is of great interest to more specialized marine scholars. In a mere twenty-one pages the authors have not only managed to present a clear and straightforward explanation of the rise and decline of these two allied industries but also to include a useful mini-bibliography and a number of line drawings to aid the landsman.

The beginnings of these two industries (shipbuilding and shipping in Atlantic British North America were interrelated yet separate endeavours) were intimately connected with the region’s staple trades. The Napoleonic Wars gave the timber trade, and with it shipbuilding, an early boost. Initially most ships were built for export to Great Britain but by the 1850’s many local merchants were turning to shipowning themselves. The “golden age” of Atlantic sail lasted until the late 1870’s. This increase in investment took place as the British market for British North American ships was drying up. These shipowners, who most often described themselves as merchants, invested in vessels to help meet the demand for tonnage caused by the great upsurge in American staple exports. These wooden vessels, primarily barques, ships and barquentines, were the “bulkers” of the 1860’s and 70’s carrying wheat, cotton and petroleum from U.S. east coast ports across the Atlantic to Europe. This was a risky business with increasingly thin profits. For the labour force, the seamen who manned the vessels, this workplace was perhaps the most dangerous of any of the nineteenth century. The sailors were young (most were under thirty) and as time went on increasingly recruited from outside the region. Because the industry operated more and more at the margin, “Bluenose” masters and mates gained a reputation for hard driving and “cracking on”. The inevitable result was endemic desertion, as the sailor’s only protection from these harsh conditions was to jump ship.

Why did the shipping and shipbuilding industries decline after the late 1870’s? The authors have no single answer to this complex problem. They cite a number of factors to explain the end of the era of “Wooden Ships and Iron Men”, but perhaps the basic cause was the conscious decision by the shipowning merchants not to invest in iron hulled steamships. Rather, prompted by the National Policy they chose to make what they felt to be better and safer landward investments.

In conclusion it must be said that the authors have provided a most useful introduction to Atlantic Canada’s golden age of sail.

M. Stephen Salmon
Navan, Ontario


In The Rise and Fall of the British Navy, Richard Humble mounts a well-argued and scathing attack against successive British governments which since 1945 have systematically reduced the Royal Navy to impotence in the face of a mounting seaborne threat from the Soviet Union. He uses 400 years of the history of British seapower through 1945 to demonstrate that national survival depends on an effective balanced naval force including adequate air resources. His thesis is successfully proven, the argument diminished only by a few historical inaccuracies, particularly in the Second War period.

The author’s treatment of the post-war era is succinct and accurate. The Royal Navy’s experience in Korea, the Suez debacle and the Falkland War are used to reinforce his argument for the continuing need for a balanced fleet capable of power projection as well as sea control. However, his main thrust is to argue that the lessons of history have been lost to British politicians, and that a “design to cost navy” capable of winning votes but not a major war has placed national security in jeopardy. This lack of “nautical-mindedness” flies in the face of all the cumulative experience of an island nation entirely dependent on the sea for survival. The decline is well documented and blame is apportioned accordingly.
The reader will enjoy the author's frank and spirited handling of the subject and should forgive the licence he has taken in interpreting some of the material. He is fair and even-handed in dealing with the personalities involved. All post-war politicians, including those in uniform, are treated with equal disdain. The Royal Navy receives brickbats for silent acquiescence during its steady decline as an effective counter to the Soviet threat and as a credible protector of the sea lanes of NATO's eastern flank. The author is generous with well-deserved bouquets for the Royal Navy's brilliant performance in the Falklands War, despite its lack of capabilities in vital areas. He is particularly critical of the decision in the 1966 White Paper which robbed the navy of its carrier capability and hence the fighter, attack and AEW aircraft which would have given the Royal Navy an overwhelming advantage in the Falklands. Instead, the government opted for the SLBM option in the Polaris nuclear submarines, which gave the navy no additional conventional capability at all and at best a questionable strategic capability. In following this cheap option, Humble argues that the British have in uncharacteristic fashion shifted the primary responsibility for their own as well as NATO's defence onto the shoulders of the United States. His prescription is to retrieve a full conventional capability and the responsibility for NATO control of the Eastern Atlantic and the Norwegian sea. Subsequently, he suggests phasing out the strategic nuclear capability, which he argues is irrelevant to Britain's real seapower requirements.

Richard Humble's opinions in *The Rise and Fall of the British Navy* are worth reading. His style is attractive and compelling. Excellent thought has gone into the design and printing of the book. There are few notes and no bibliography which limits its academic value. Of particular interest to Canadian readers are the comparisons that can be made to the Canadian Navy's experience since 1945. Some of the similarities are startling.

W.G.D. Lund
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This collection of essays covers the North Sea and adjacent lands from the Cambrian era to the 1980s. That the southern shore of the North Sea may have been habitable soon after the retreat of the glaciers is suggested by Egil Bergsager. Hubert H. Lamb points out the enduring turbulence of the North Sea as being responsible for climatic variations considerably wider than has been believed hitherto.

Helen Clarke and Alan Binns discuss the relations between the Vikings and their neighbours. From the fifth to the ninth centuries Clarke argues for unity as a characteristic of the region. Alterations to the hull and sails of Viking vessels allowed them to impose their influence on neighbouring peoples. Binns' analysis of the chronicles of the tenth and eleventh centuries identifies the death of Canute and improved ships, maritime techniques and tactics as crucial for the English link to Normandy. Analyzing medieval clinker-built boats, Angela Evans discerns differences between merchantmen and warships, and also discusses a number of different shipbuilding traditions.

From the five essays dealing with medieval history leading up to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it becomes evident that the Frisians and Dutch played a central role in the economic development of the area and in advancements in ship designs that were part and parcel of this dominance. For Detlev Elmers, the Weser River cog owes its existence to the peculiar harbourside settlements of Frisian merchants. Frisian trading colonies led to the interpenetration of German and Norwegian trade and to the launching of the Baltic Hanse.

Phillipus Meese Boscher invokes both Admiral Mahan and Arnold Toynbee to explain the metropolitan position of the Dutch, whose geographical location at the mouths of rivers, combined with their polyglot population, contributed to their sea-based greatness from about 1600 to 1750. Jaap Bruijn's analysis of the timber trade brings out the importance of Dutch markets and capital--as well as Frisians and Norwegians--to Dutch shipping. Jarle Bjorklund, focussing upon the new metropolises rising around the southern shore of the North Sea, notes that British ports replaced their Dutch competitors as maritime trading centres during the eighteenth century. Carl Olof Cederlund sees low cost Dutch shipbuilding as the centre of an economic structure from which both vessels and technology could be exported, e.g., the Swedish warship, the *Wasa*.

Boscher, Cederlund and Bård Kolltveit all link naval growth to state evolution. The latter finds new tactics based upon English ship-destroying weaponry from the middle of the seventeenth century. For
Anthony Nicholas Ryan, the predominance of the British fleet made both possible and inevitable the penetration of Napoleon's Continental System by British commerce. In the twentieth century, Geoffrey Till identifies British and American opposition to continental Germany and Russia as a struggle between the ideas of Mahan and H.J. Mackinder.

Alan Pearsall suggests that Britain's technological mastery of steam, applied in her narrow seas, produced new modes of mass transportation, eventually tying ships to rails. During the nineteenth century as well, the Dutch were overtaken in the herring fishery, leading to the triumph of deep-sea techniques, as Alan Hjorth Rasmussen sees it. Post-1945, Atle Thowsen discerns a trend from steam to diesel power and specialized vessels; he also argues that this transition was characterized by intense competition. Jan Haglund sketches for us the entry of Norway into the modern petroleum industry via state ownership of the means of production.

On the one hand, there are some fascinating lines of inquiry here; but on the other, there is no summary to focus this wealth of ideas. What one looks for is a short paper in which the editors draw together the themes underlying the individual presentations. In short, there is a need here for some kind of synthesis. Lacking this, the book is slightly less useful than it might have been.

Gerald E. Panting
St. John's, Newfoundland


This is an interesting social study of mutineers in the French navy and merchant marine during the eighteenth century. Because mutinies have been a favourite theme of novels, comics and films, the author argues that there exists a stereotype of the mutineer, who is generally portrayed as a disobedient, violent and ruthless individual. He questions the validity of this image and then attempts to trace a more realistic portrait of mutineers by studying them as a social group.

Alain Cabantous has unearthed nearly one hundred rebellions gathered from a large number of sources: the major administrative series (B2, B3, C4, C5 and C9A) of the Marine Archives in Paris as well as the judicial records of several provincial admiralties (Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Le Havre, Morlaix and Bordeaux) for a period running from 1680 to 1794. He does of course recognize that his survey of the provincial admiralty records is not exhaustive and that many of the smaller cases did not make their way to the Ministry of the Marine in Paris. But even accounting for these omissions, he points out that mutinies appear to be rather rare and rebellious behaviour less frequent than one would expect.

The author goes on to discuss the nature of mutinies and their distribution through time and space. They were most common in the Royal Navy during periods of war. Practically non-existent in the coastal trade, their numbers increased in the Newfoundland salt cod and West Indies trades. The length of voyages was a crucial factor, as was the size and social composition of the crews. Large and heterogeneous crews were more prone to rebellion than small homogeneous ones. The large majority of mutinies took place during the homeward voyage, when fatigue and disension were at their peak. Few of them, though, were violent. Most often crews expressed disagreement verbally or by simply refusing to work, which reminds us of the labour strike of a more modern day. Violent protests were usually of an individual nature and arose out of personality conflicts and/or disagreements over salaries and food rations. Most protests, whether peaceful or violent, were instigated by the officers.

The book also contains an interesting discussion of sentences and different types of punishment meted out to mutineers. Although the Ordonnance of the Marine of 1681 stipulated that the authors of seditious action could receive the death sentence, judges showed themselves to be rather lenient. Mutineers were acquitted if they could justify their disobedience. Beatings and other forms of "inhuman" treatment were considered acceptable justifications. More frequently, captains would punish mutineers on the spur of the moment by reducing their bread and wine rations or by exposing and whipping them on deck. In the worst of cases, the mutineer was condemned to the "cale" which consisted of lifting him off the end of the main yard with a rope and letting him fall into the sea. The blow was usually fatal.

Although Cabantous's study does have geographical limitations and thorough analysis of individual cases is lacking, his book is new and stimulating. He succeeds in painting a more social, a more humane and a more convincing portrait of the mutineer. His work is indeed an important contribution to the social history of maritime peoples.

Laurier Turgeon
Québec City, P.Q.
Great cities, large communities either of historical significance or simply physical size, can inspire books that not only look great on library shelves and livingroom coffee tables but also ring up nice profits in the bookstores. When such volumes are copiously illustrated their readership appeal is correspondingly accentuated. However, there may be mixed feelings in this particular instance.

Philadelphia on the River is exactly what its title says. Published over the imprimatur of the Philadelphia Maritime Museum to mark the 25th anniversary of that institution, it is "put forward as a lasting tribute to maritime Philadelphia, and to attorney J. Welles Henderson, son of one of America's preeminent admiralty lawyers." The father founded the Museum in 1960.

In essence this is a 175-page "picture book", a beautifully bound arrangement of illustrations with extended captions making up the text. The author's preface states that "many of the pictures, but by no means all, have been drawn from the collections of the ....Museum," from the print, painting and photographic archives of that repository; and that they represent "hundreds of others" still waiting for such special treatment, enough to make mouths water in similar jurisdictions, even older than the City of Brotherly Love and William Penn's frustrated creation.

Readers looking for that expression of the more familiar face of Philadelphia, such as the Quaker and Pennsylvania Dutch aspects or the birthplace of the American Constitution, may be a mite disappointed. But for maritime history buffs, not too familiar with the city's marine ramifications, the book's contents resemble a treasure salvaged from some sunken ship.

Some may be surprised to learn that the Delaware River (with its Schuykill tributary) was once known as the "American Clyde" because of its "pervasive" ship-building industry. There are numerous examples in more than 220 reproductions of scenes from the late 18th century to the mass-produced "Hog Islanders" of the First World War and the (1959) Savannah, the world's first nuclear-powered commercial vessel.

The book is artistically printed and laid out to show the pictures to their best advantage. A striking feature is that, apart from the dust-jacket, there is not a single bit of colour throughout. While this might seem conceited in these days of truly remarkable colour reproduction, it must be presumed to be intentional. The starkness of the black and white vistas is most revealing and more in character than many other tomes in the "heritage preservation" genre, which often look not just gaudy, but unreal.

The author explains that the selected illustrations were intended to "resurrect in the mind's eye of the present day, the ambience of past times long erased". There's no doubt that he and his collaborators have succeeded within the somewhat narrow confines of their own formula.

Michael Harrington
St. John's, Newfoundland

Skinboats of Greenland is the first volume in a projected series on "ships and boats of the North". It deals with kayaks and umiaks as built and used by the Inuit of Greenland. The author has the necessary expertise to write about this subject: he is a Greenlander by birth and has published a number of earlier studies on various aspects of life on the island.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One describes the kayak, and includes chapters on its construction, the tools and materials used, gear and fittings, weapons used for hunting from the craft, hunting floats, towing gear and special kayak clothing. Information is included on the types and properties of various driftwoods used for construction of kayak frames before increasing trade with Denmark made the use of imported planks more common. There is also a detailed explanation of how locally-made tools fashioned from stone, bone, wood and rock were used to work wood and other materials prior to the advent of European implements. The history of the kayak is discussed, as well as the reasons for its shape, development and local variations.

Part Two describes the umiak, a much larger boat with open top and skin-covered sides. Photos show as many as fourteen people travelling in one of the vessels, which gives a good idea of its size. These craft were also durable: there are several descriptions of hunting expeditions made by families over long distances. As with the kayak, Mr. Petersen presents extensive
information on the umiak, including its structure, building methods and materials used, the choices of skin for covering, and the different variations built.

Skinboats is a large hardcover book (26.5 by 28.5 by 1.7 cm.). It is well laid-out and is copiously illustrated with both photographs and line drawings which serve to illustrate in great detail the technology of the kayak and the umiak. The text and photographs are well-matched and indeed it would be hard to find fault with this book. One has only to glance at the glossary, which is given in Greenlandic, Danish and English and extends to 144 terms, to recognize the prodigious research encompassed in this book. The glossary also suggests the problems involved in translating a book of this type. Not only the author but also the translator are to be commended on this excellent English edition.

Eric D. Lawson
Bowen Is., British Columbia


Anyone taking more than a casual interest in the America's Cup races in Australia this winter will find Doug Riggs’ book, Keelhauled: The History of Unsportsmanlike Conduct and the America's Cup, to be a worthwhile read. It provides interesting background material for the manoeuvrings and protests that are part of the daily fare of the reports coming from Australia.

The book is intended for the general reader. It lacks both a bibliography and footnotes although the author does endeavour to credit the secondary sources that he used. The first two thirds of the book covers familiar territory as it deals with the history of America's Cup racing up to 1983. There are already several books that do this. Riggs tries to focus specifically on the negotiations that went on between the challengers and defenders during this period illustrating the attempts by both sides to gain an advantage that would result in the winning of this most valued of yachting trophies. Thus the book is typical of much sports reporting of our time, dealing mostly as it does with the contests within the committee rooms, as opposed to the ones that took place on the water.

It is clear that there would be problems from the very beginning to maintain an absolutely fair and sporting atmosphere in this challenge series. The British, who first issued the challenge, were not amused to find that the United States challenger, America, was clearly superior to anything that they were able to muster. There were rumours that the colonials had somehow cheated. Once the Cup was in the United States, every effort was made to ensure that it would only be extracted from the New York Yacht Club, which became its eventual guardian, with great difficulty.

As Riggs admits, the real difficulty in maintaining a sportsmanlike atmosphere for the America's Cup challenges lay in the very nature of the trusteeship itself. The NYYC was both the defender of the Cup and the arbiter of the rules under which competition could take place. It is no wonder that James Ashbury of Britain felt it necessary to consult his lawyers during the negotiations for the second defense in 1871! This basic conflict of interest was the source for feelings of distrust that finally boiled over during the infamous Keelgate affair in 1983. When the NYYC needed friends in the face of a very determined challenger, it found that even the American public was sympathetic to the eventually victorious Australians.

But the real value in Keelhauled comes in its final 130 pages. Here Riggs tries to provide some balance to the reporting of the 1983 defense. One of the reasons why the Americans were so successful in defending the Cup for 132 years was their clear technological advantage in hull and sail design. The rules specified that challengers must use only designs and technology that was available in their home country. By 1983 the rules had been relaxed somewhat so that only the hull was subject to this restriction. Riggs casts considerable doubt as to the legality of the winged keel that was reputed to have given the Australians such an advantage. He argues that the New Yorkers were unjustly maligned by the press for their efforts to make the Australian challengers prove that their boat was a legal design.

Yet one still feels little sympathy for the NYYC. Their attempts to trace the source of the winged keel were singularly inept. Moreover one cannot swallow entirely their attempts at sportsmanship, given the generous allowances to the rules that were allowed to Dennis Connor, the Cup's defender that year.

No one comes off very well in Riggs' book, except perhaps Sir Thomas Lipton, during the glorious J-Boat era of the 1920’s and 30’s. After reading the book one wonders if anyone in their right mind would want
to spend all that money (the New Zealand challenge is rumoured to have cost at least $15 million) to be associated with this group of gentlemen who compete for the America's Cup.

J. Thomas West
Toronto, Ontario


There may, perhaps, be some general unfamiliarity among readers with the prestigiously titled Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. For a century this civilian body—although wearing Naval uniform while under training or serving at sea—was responsible for the design and construction of Britain's warships. As Prince Philip notes in the foreword:

The book tells the story of remarkable achievements, some more successful than others, and it shows how the interaction between professional seamen and professional designers has shaped and guided British maritime power.

This account deals with Britain's warships from the days of sail, to those of nuclear propulsion—and with all the many aspects of research and development associated with their design. More than this, however, it indicates who—among the members of 'The Corps'—was responsible for these endeavours.

There is no doubt that, in this period, the RCNC had a very good opinion of itself (not wholly unjustified) and tended to be somewhat impatient with the 'professional seamen' whose needs it sought to meet, or whose technical concerns it had to coordinate into a successful warship.

When the RCN decided to set up its own Constructor Branch during World War II, it borrowed senior officers from the RCNC for a number of years. The most remarkable and gifted of these was Commodore R. Baker (later Sir Roland), whose brilliant and enthusiastic efforts led to the ST. LAURENT Class and their successors. It is thought that the RCN was somewhat wiser in ensuring that their Constructors were part of the officer complement with, as far as possible, a common pattern of training. This appears to have given a somewhat more sympathetic understanding on all sides.

This book certainly represents a great deal of research and would be of particular value to those interested in vessels of the Royal Navy. Construction in Canada is also given a reasonable treatment. But since one is supposed to engage in some nit-picking, it has to be observed that, in the index, this reviewer's name was spelt incorrectly (Davies) and, worse, was given the wrong page reference! Diligent searching, however, was surprisingly rewarded.

S. Mathwin Davis
Kingston, Ontario


The book contains 179 photographs illustrating 165 classes or types of warships from nuclear-powered submarines to landing craft, preceded by a four-page introduction and notes explaining the classification system and terms used in the text. The two indices list the warships by navies and by class or type.

The ships are grouped into 14 functional types with data for each class or type; role, builder, user, basic data, crew, propulsion, sensors, armament, top speed, range, building programme and notes. They are listed in descending order of displacement. The photographs are clear, showing armament and sensors. The majority are broadside or three-quarter bow views. The remainder are air views.

Canada's Maritime Command is represented by three classes of ships; OJIBWA class submarines, IROQUOIS Class destroyers (280 Class), and ANNAPOLIS Class frigates. The submarines are listed as Patrol Submarines, PORPOISE/DERON Class with similar submarines of Australia, Brazil, Chile and the United Kingdom. The illustration shows the Chilean Navy's O'Brien (S22). The book is handy pocket size. The one draw-back is that the user must know ship generic type, task or nationality to make quick identification.

Arthur W. Mears
St. Stephen, New Brunswick