

BOOK REVIEWS

Michael Duffy, Stephen Fisher, Basil Greenhill, David J. Starkey, Joyce Youings (eds.). *The New Maritime History of Devon, Volume I: From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth Century*. London: Conway Maritime Press and Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993. 256 pp., illustrations, maps, figures, tables, index. £35, cloth; ISBN 0-85177-611-6.

This is a massive and scholarly work, one inspired by the original *Maritime History of Devon*, written nearly a century ago by Michael Oppenheim though not published until 1968, while at the same time attempting (as the title makes clear) to bring Oppenheim's subject up to date. By and large, it is a successful venture, though the book does manage to annoy the reader in a number of ways as well. The book is also a deceptive work, for its large format, glossy paper, and profuse illustrations are more characteristic of a coffee-table work than a scholarly tome. Yet make no mistake - this is a book of great substance, not simply because the small font and double-columned pages compresses a lot of information between its covers but also because the book is rich in ideas and information, conveniently summarizing the research of more than two dozen scholars.

For me, the book began slowly; early essays by Alan Carr on "The Environmental Background," by A.J. Southward and G.T. Boalch on "The Marine Resources of Devon's Coastal Waters," or even by Sean McGrail ("From the Ice Age to Early Medieval Times") failed to capture the imagination or make clear their relevance to later chapters. A few, like Peter Allington's

exposition on "The Principles of Shiphandling" or Alan Stimson on the "History of Navigation," while bearing on the maritime history of Devon, revealed little about Devon *per se*. Some essays - Peter Pope's on "Excavations at Ferryland" and E.A.G. Clark's on "Three Exeter Pioneers in the Italian Trade" are two examples - contribute little to the overall theme. Yet, as one delves deeper into the book, the many specialized articles begin to work their cumulative effect. For instance, what first drew me to the book was Devon's role in the Newfoundland fisheries and trade. At first, I was disappointed that David Starkey's essay on this theme was so derivative, drawing heavily from Keith Matthews' unpublished 1968 Oxford D.Phil. thesis; there really is very little that would justify defining his essay as "new history." On the other hand, the collective effect of the essays, not only by Starkey but also by Wendy Childs, Todd Gray, H.A.S. Fisher and others, forcefully brings home the degree to which the Newfoundland fishery and trade afforded Devonshire capitalists with another opportunity to enhance their wealth. Thus, Starkey reminds us that one of the Newfoundland fishery's great appeals was the way even "a modest investment could secure entry into the industry," (p. 168) while Fisher reveals how frequently the movement of fish to southern European markets included not only Newfoundland cod but also local pilchard and herring. To what extent, then, was Devon's success in the Newfoundland trade enhanced by the degree to which that trade could be integrated into patterns of investment, commerce, credit, marketing, etc.

established by other commodities?

Similarly, John Appleby's essay on Devon privateering to 1688 is primarily anecdotal; without the kind of documentation that supports Starkey's treatment of the same phenomenon after 1688, he cannot make a completely persuasive case. Appleby's suggestion (p. 90) that investments in piracy and privateering were a springboard for later trans-Atlantic colonial enterprises is unsupported by examples. Appleby later concludes that few ventures were profitable and concedes that the documentation is simply too weak for a truly thorough analysis of privateering in this period. Nevertheless, together, the articles by Appleby and Starkey not only contribute to insight into the maritime history of one county but also manage to transcend the purely local focus of the volume, providing an excellent overview of privateering in the Age of Sail.

Michael Duffy's study of "Devon and Naval Strategy... 1689-1815" leads off a fascinating series of essays that reveal how the emerging pattern of Anglo-French naval activity off the mouth of the English Channel led to the decision to develop naval facilities at Plymouth. Subsequent essays by Jonathan Coad, N.A.M. Rodger, A.J. Marsh and Roger Morriss explore the economic and social impact of that dockyard on the community and environs of Plymouth. Together they reveal that the massive investment by successive British governments in the dockyard facilities at Plymouth was not an unmixed blessing. Rodger emphasizes, and Marsh demonstrates, that Devon "remained self-sufficient in spirit, independent of the Navy as of all central government and un beholden to it. Even Plymouth long had poor relations, and poor communications, with the naval town around the dock..." (p. 215)

Some essays seem out of sequence. H.A.S. Fisher's chapter on "Devon's Maritime Trade and Shipping 1680-1780," which follows the several essays on the naval dimension of Devon's maritime history,

would have been more useful had it appeared earlier in the book. Indeed, Fisher's note #6, which cross-references to Starkey's article "below" when in fact Starkey's article appeared earlier in the volume, indicates that the Fisher essay had originally been intended to appear earlier. As well, the editors have made no attempt to provide the volume with the unifying touch that would bring the essays together. There is an introductory essay, but none to conclude the volume, and no attempt was made to link the essays with introductory comments, where common themes could be identified and traced. All this suggests that the volume could have used some additional editorial polishing before its publication.

Undoubtedly the book's greatest appeal will be for those who seek a better understanding of the maritime dimension to the history of Devon. Yet those who wish to learn more about North Atlantic maritime history in the centuries prior to 1789 will ignore this book at their peril; the three dozen essays in this volume cover a myriad of themes, including commerce, shipping, shipbuilding, seafaring labour, the relation between land and sea, the effect of war, the nature of smuggling, to name but a few. If the conclusions are not always new, the context may be, and certainly the synthesis of so much information in one convenient volume is well worth the price.

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Lewis R. Fischer and Walter Minchinton (eds.). *Research In Maritime History No. 3: People of the Northern Seas*. St. John's, NF: International Maritime History Association, 1992. xv + 204pp., maps, figures, tables. US \$15, paper; ISBN 0-9695885-2-6.

The eleven papers offered here were presented at the sixth conference of the Association for the History of the Northern Seas, held in Finland in 1992. I was not present,

so I missed the aroma, which may have been everything. Like the well-acquainted cadets on a modern tall ship, which earlier had been a Portuguese salt cod schooner on the Grand Banks, I cannot smell the stink of fish or see the unpainted planking, the frayed rope and the rusting metal fastenings. Everything now is shipshape, well painted and polished, and the crew keen, satisfied and young. Yet, compared to the creative talent gathered at a succession of highly successful international conferences sponsored by the Shipping History Project at Memorial University of Newfoundland in the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, this conference produced an exceedingly uneven and, except in a few instances, a largely uninspired, under-researched and very narrowly focused set of papers.

The northern seas constitute the only unifying theme, as the papers vary from Minchinton's survey of the British coast-guard since 1817 to Brace's study of Aleut communities after Russian contact in the early eighteenth century, through Janzen's study of a handful of French fishermen resident before 1755 in the south west of Newfoundland, Kaukiainen's work on the grim conditions of Finnish sailors, and Hinkkanen's Finnish missions for seamen in Hull and London in the 1880s. The business and economic side is represented by Layton's delineation of a merchant from North Sweden who weathered the post-war (1815-19) depression with apparent ease, Warner's note on a British spy in Russia in the 1720s, Munro's analysis of 4,000 promissory notes protested in St. Petersburg in 1773, Williams' and Hutchings' examination of the incidence of iron sailing vessels from 1838 to 1857, and Fischer and Nordvik's inquiry into Norwegian shipbroking, 1869-1914. The volume ends with a powerful critique by Holm of Hastrap's *Den nordiske verden* (1992).

Janzen's is a carefully researched reconstruction from documents surviving in Paris, at Kew, as well as in certain departmental archives. It is a small-scale piece of the sort

Bosher has been writing so extensively for many years, and Brière and Turgeon have been accomplishing much more recently. Many of his French fishing families, displaced by British hegemony after 1713 on the southwest coast of Newfoundland, relocated on Isle Royale, and some of the documents he used are available at the Fortress Louisbourg research centre. He could have consulted Donald Chard's Ph.D. thesis for illegal New England trade to Louisbourg, as it long ago superseded Clark's *Acadia* on this matter.

Brace's work, by contrast, is entirely drawn from published sources. This gives her conclusion that, long before the mid-nineteenth century, "Russians and Aleuts for all practical purposes had formed a single society," (p. 45) little weight and leaves me full of scepticism. Does Aleut oral tradition confirm her view?

Kaukiainen's study of Finnish sailors matches those undertaken elsewhere to demonstrate that both seamen's pay and working conditions sharply deteriorated in the nineteenth century, just as they improved for masters. Declining real wages and longer contracts led to high levels of desertion. We are, unfortunately, not told where the desertions occurred. If in North America, immigration rather than working conditions might have been the primary reason why such men deserted in such numbers at the outset of the voyage.

The force of Hinkkanen's account of itinerant Finnish seamen in England is to show that no matter how many decades separated them, they still thought of Finland as home. Yet such sentiments might not take concrete form by sending part of their wages to their families. As history, this is pretty thin.

Layton gives us no reason to care about Abraham Stenholm (d. 1821), the north Swedish merchant. His enthusiasm at discovering a lengthy inventory of Stenholm's estate at the time of his demise is curious, in view of the ready availability of such docu-

merits. Were they rare for Lulea? There are micro-studies which act as useful correctives, or which chart new courses of research. As this does neither, it deserves oblivion.

It is curious to learn that as common an instrument of exchange as a promissory note had no legal basis in Russia before 1729. Anciently established in the Mediterranean and Atlantic trading worlds, it flourished wherever commerce was conducted and where the courts could be resorted to for redress. Much of the civil law related to debt collection, and the promissory note was the principal legal security for repayment, a role later taken by bond and mortgages. If the promissory had not existed earlier in Russia, it could not have been needed, as some other device performed the same role. About this we learn nothing from Munro. Nevertheless he mined his source diligently and puts the problem in a suitable historical context. If his analysis proved interesting, his conclusions are utterly forgettable.

Williams and Hutchings, in a well-composed piece, remind us that the iron sailing ship came to dominate all United Kingdom tonnage under sail from 1873 onwards. Within the Empire, at least in the two decades covered by this study, it seems to have been a peculiarly British phenomenon, as no British North American-built vessels are noted. It builds upon earlier work by Palmer, Harley and MacGregor.

Shipbroking — vessel chartering, arranging the purchase and sale of vessels and acting as a customs' broker to facilitate port entrances and clearances - is the topic of Fischer and Nordvik, now engaged with others in writing a history of Astrup Fearnley. There is a stimulating account of the rise of the firm from 1869 to 1914, when their business was largely with Norwegians, before the Great War gave them the chance to cut into British markets. They find such studies of British shipbrokers, which usually focus on a single firm, to be less than satisfactory. They fail to tell us why their study of Astrup Fearnley will be different from

these, since the company is paying for much of the research.

Warner's is an amusing little piece on a literate English spy in Russia on the lookout for Jacobites in the 1720s, who penned an account of the creation of the Russian fleet under Tsar Peter I. It reads like a chunk of the introduction he is preparing for his new edition of Deane's work for the Navy Records Society. It was the only article that could be read at the beach, without thought or note-taking.

Minchinton's study of the coastguard seems to signal his withdrawal from serious scholarly enterprise. This seriously under-researched piece reads rather like a pamphlet designed to provide new recruits with a brief institutional history, than a conference paper designed to interest even a friendly audience. Like so many pieces in this volume, it is a minor piece on a minor point, when entire oceans beckon.

The extended review of a two-volume collection of essays on the Nordic world intended to define Nordic-ness, is dismissed by Holm for its ill-considered, wrong-headed exaltation of a pan-Nordic identity. This Holm damns - and he provides adequate reasons - as not only bad scholarship but offensive chauvinism. In the face of such a powerful critique, the editors should have allowed space for a rejoinder.

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James C. Boyajian. *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. xx + 356 pp., maps, tables, appendices, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. US \$48.95, cloth; ISBN 0-8018-4405-3.

This book is a study of the most successful phase of Portuguese commercial relations with Asia and transforms our understanding of the nature of Portuguese presence in, and impact on, Asia. It also revises many cur-

rently held views on what the Portuguese made of their great voyages of discovery and their monopoly of the Cape route between Europe and Asia. The current historiography tends to emphasise the political and military character of the Portuguese royal enterprise and looks upon it as constituting for most of the sixteenth century a regime of plunder, the extraction of tribute and the privileged trade of the Crown and its aristocratic dependents under the Portuguese flag. The author here directs attention to the movement of goods, capital and shipping, the entrepreneurs involved and the nature of the commercial rewards that were enjoyed. It thus breaks free of a conceptual mould that has characterised the historiography of the Portuguese in Asia and looks upon the whole enterprise as predominantly a commercial one, based on contemporary methods of trade in Europe and Asia.

To do this effectively, he has taken the period 1580 to 1640 as his time-span, when Portuguese naval dominance of the Indian Ocean had begun to decline and was successfully challenged by the Dutch and the English. Yet he constantly goes back to the middle decade of the sixteenth century to discuss the origins of the features that he is describing and to argue for a natural evolution of Portuguese commercial practices both in Europe and in the Asian maritime world. This process of the evolution and expansion of total Portuguese commerce in and from Asia is discussed in its several stages, with a great deal of quantitative data, carefully culled from a variety of official and private sources: customs and revenue records in Asia and Europe, sales returns, cargo manifests, private and family papers of leading merchant families.

The book's main strength is in its presentation of Portuguese trade in its totality - Crown trade, concessionary trade, privileged trade and private trade. By 1580, all these elements were in place. The Crown conducted its monopoly trade through the *carreiras da India* but this was becoming less as

a proportion of total trade as other elements took over. Initially caused by the growing liquidity problems of the Crown, in a variety of ways a large proportion of the trade passed into the hands of private investors from the *fidalgos* and titled nobility and from the wealthy and influential merchant groups of Portugal and Spain. This process was accelerated under Spanish occupation as the Portuguese Crown was further reduced in its ability to invest in Asian trade.

The study concentrates on the period 1580 to 1640, divisible into two phases - 1580 to 1640 which saw the height of Portuguese trade in Asia and 1620 to 1640 which saw a decline under the impact of Dutch and English assault on the Portuguese overseas empire. At its height, the author's estimate of the value of Portuguese trade within Asia and between Asia and Europe is considerably more than is allowed for in much of the current historiography. He values this trade at 4.3 million *cruzados* as opposed to a valuation of between 1.8 million and 2.8 million *cruzados* in the current literature. He justifies this valuation on the basis of a variety of contemporary evidence - sales returns, customs in Europe and Asia, value of concessionary fees paid for specific voyages and correspondence between merchants and agents.

A great part of this estimated value was private investment by merchants of the Iberian peninsula and those settled in the *Estado*. There was an increasingly large share of it invested in goods sent from Asia to Europe in the *carreiras*, as the Crown decreased its share due to cash flow problems. Within Asia there was a growing network of trade from the middle decades of the sixteenth century. This trade was carried out from Portuguese forts and settlements in maritime Asia but soon extended to several other ports outside the *Estado*. A major strength of this work is in the account of this trade, the entrepreneurs involved, the ports and trade routes that it embraced. The author makes a major contribution to our

knowledge of Portuguese trade in Asia through this detailed analysis of private sector trading. The most profitable routes are all charted here. The trade from Goa via Malacca and Manila to Macao seems to have been far and away the most profitable. Then there were the routes from Goa westward to the Persian Gulf, southwards and eastwards to Malabar and Bengal. There were routes from Goa and Cochin to Coromandel and Burma. The Portuguese appear to have tapped every major trade network in operation in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas.

A major characteristic of Portuguese trade as it developed was the break from excessive dependence on pepper and spices to a greater variety in imports from Asia into Europe. The author has shown from statistical evidence that the Portuguese entered the trade in cotton and silk, indigo and diamonds and exploited the markets long before and in much greater volume than the Companies did, at least till the first four decades of the seventeenth century. In this way, the author argues that the joint-stock Companies, far from pioneering and innovative in respect of Asian trade, were merely following in the footsteps of the Portuguese. By an intensive comparative study of the trade of the three parties - the Portuguese and the two joint-stock English and Dutch, the author establishes the superiority of the Portuguese in respect of their extensive networks, market familiarity, entrepreneurship and profitability.

Basing himself on this evidence, the author goes on to develop an argument that joint-stock trading monopolies were not a superior form of commercial organization to prosecute eastern trade, as was felt at that time, and has been subsequently asserted in the literature. He says that a multiplicity of trades operating in competition did better in Asian trade and questions the wisdom of the Dutch in constituting a monopoly organization and investing a large part of their capital in assembling instruments of coer-

cion. While this argument is acceptable in the limited time-frame of the first four decades of the seventeenth century that he has selected, it does not seem valid to compare a newly established Dutch Company trade in raw figures with a Portuguese enterprise that has been in operation for over a century. As it happens the rewards of Dutch investment in force and the acquisition of monopoly of specific commodities were flowing in the decades after 1640 and, on a long-term view, Dutch policies seem justifiable. Having said this, it must be admitted that the author's criticism of the proportion of Dutch spending on instruments of coercion is a valid one and is vindicated when one looks at the situation in the eighteenth century.

An important contribution of the book is its insight into Portuguese merchant families and their operations in Asia. There is a great deal of information on investors in trade in Europe and on family connections in Asia. Of particular significance is the information on the important roles played by New Christian merchant families and their networks. Through these networks Portuguese merchants linked Asian trade not only with the Atlantic but also, importantly, with South America and West Africa. In an extended maritime world, the merchants operated through family linkages, brokers, employed agents and correspondents, in much the same way as Asian merchants did at that time. In this way, Portuguese settlers fitted into the scene and, when they operated outside the territory of the Estado, they became part of the cosmopolitan mercantile world of maritime Asia.

The evidence presented here of a large Portuguese investment in Asian trade has interesting implications for our present knowledge of trends in Asian trade. What effect did this increasing Portuguese participation have on Asian trade, its total volume, its regional flows and the share of various existing participants? Was this Portuguese participation at the expense of any contem-

porary traders? It does not appear that there was a diminution in the scale of activity of any sector of Asian merchants. Was there then an expansion in the total volume of trade? If so, we may have to push back the time-span when Asian trade is believed to have begun a process of expansion to the sixteenth century. Further, with such an extensive trade being carried out, it would be interesting to know how they contacted the producing markets to ensure constant supply. There is ample evidence in the records of the Companies on the development of relationships with Asian merchants. It is to be wished that similar evidence could be uncovered on the nature of Portuguese-Asian commercial relationships.

All in all, the book makes an important contribution to our literature on maritime history.

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Robert Brenner. *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. xx + 734 pp., tables, maps, index. US \$59.50, cloth; ISBN 0-691-05594-7.

There has been a fashion recently in early modern political history for volumes of inordinate length, and Robert Brenner's study, at 734 pages, would have been improved and clarified by judicious pruning. The core of the book is based on his doctoral dissertation (Princeton, 1970) on the merchant community in civil war London, and from the footnotes (regrettably there is no bibliography) it seems clear that his reading has not kept up with much important new work. After an over-simplified account of the developments in English commerce in the century before the civil war, which over-emphasises and pre-dates the importance of imports and re-exports, Brenner turns to the emergence of political

conflict in the years 1620-42. Here he reiterates what is generally accepted, that the close relationship between the English crown and merchants in chartered trading companies was of central importance to both parties; but he agrees with Valerie Pearl, against Robert Ashton, in arguing that the relationship was not seriously strained or broken until the revolution of December 1641 / January 1642 in the City of London. On English trade from the 1620s to 1653 and its leading merchants, Brenner's research reveals points of great interest, especially on the American "new merchants" whose group development followed a novel course, since Atlantic commerce was largely handled by small-scale merchants who had often started out as shipmasters or shopkeepers. These men, he observes, were "poles apart from the Levant-East India Company merchants who formed the core of the City company merchant establishment" (p. 159). It was the new merchants, along with domestic tradesmen, who made common cause with the opponents of King Charles just before the outbreak of the civil war. Brenner relates how between 1648 and 1653, the new group was able to seize their advantage and press for an aggressively pro-commercial foreign policy that would increase their profits. The naval campaigns of Blake and Penn re-opened English trade routes, which had suffered badly from royalist privateers and their European allies; humiliated Portugal and laid the basis for future English trade to the Portuguese colonies; and ensured safe access for English merchants to the lucrative regions of southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Royalist revolts in the colonies were put down, a policy of total exclusion of the Dutch was implemented, and Atlantic trade was firmly organised in the interests of the new merchants as against those of the great majority of colonial planters. This is illuminating and perceptive, but unfortunately, on the political as distinct from the commercial side, and especially on the attitudes of those mer-

chants who served in parliament, Brenner is much less reliable. Many of the political positions and groupings he describes, particularly for the 1620s, are shaky and unconvincing. The forthcoming volumes of the *History of Parliament 1604-60* with its detailed individual biographies will present a different picture of men such as Sir Christopher Clitherow of the East India and Eastland trades.

The last section of the book is an extended "Postscript" of some eighty pages, which attempts to survey how the previous chapters contribute to broader interpretations of the political conflicts of Stuart England. He argues for a fundamentally socio-economic explanation, "in structural problems emerging as a consequence of the long-term transformation of English society in a capitalist direction," (p. 649) "those processes whereby neo-feudal lords became commercially responsive capitalist landlords." (p. 651) History here seems to become merely grist for the sociologist's mill, and both medievalists and early modernists may well find English society impossible to recognise in his cloudy and chronologically imprecise descriptions. Moreover Brenner's anti-revisionist arguments suffer badly from the fact that Conrad Russell's two recent major works appeared when the book was in press, and although he regards his postscript as "an initial attempt to take their results into account," (p. 647) it seems clear that he has not absorbed their thrust. Lengthy footnotes wrestle with major points raised by historians such as Russell and John Morrill, whereas in the main text, his own discussion of parliamentary matters proceeds on a basis of uncritically accepted and narrow reading which often ignores recent scholarship, particularly the work of Anthony Fletcher and Kevin Sharpe. Nor has Brenner made any attempt to re-conceptualise, for lurking beneath his new socio-economic explanation there seems to be the familiar old conflict between two monoliths, "the patriarchal monarchy" and

what he repeatedly calls "the parliamentary classes". He does not explain what he means by the latter expression, nor how such a model explains a civil war which broke out above all as a conflict *within* the landed classes, with both the House of Lords and the House of Commons deeply fractured.

Since this is a very assertive and broad-ranging book, the reader is entitled to ask on what basis of evidence it has been erected. Not only is there no bibliography; far more serious, there is no list of manuscript or printed primary sources. Some parts, such as the descriptions of merchant groupings and the patterns of London trade in the 1640s and 1650s, seem convincing and well researched, others appear merely to synthesise secondary material, some of it old and unreliable. Readers of this journal are fortunate that their interest in commercial and maritime matters will coincide with those areas where Professor Brenner most frequently is on strong ground and writes with most verve and expertise.

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Jacob M. Price. *Perry of London: A Family and A Firm on the Seaborne Frontier, 1615-1753*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. xiv + 191 pp., figures, tables, appendices, selected bibliography, notes, index. US \$30, cloth; ISBN 0-674-66306-3.

Perry of London is the story of two Micajah Perrys: a grandfather who rose from obscurity to build a family fortune in the tobacco trade at the end of the seventeenth century; and a grandson who entered politics and destroyed the firm a mere half-century later. Micajah I was endlessly attentive to detail, happy to make money in stages, and assiduous at obtaining political favours for his planter-correspondents in Virginia. Between the 1660s and the 1690s, he rose from his apprenticeship with a London haberdasher to become far and away the largest tobacco

importer in the land. Micajah III, by comparison, had little patience with the time-consuming demands of daily business, preferring the front stage of parliament to the back-room politics of patronage. By 1745, he had mismanaged the family business to the point where he had to hand it over to his creditors. The grandfather's flexible policies of diversification and constant attention to his suppliers' petty, personal interests were ones that worked in the colonial trades of the early modern period. The grandson's rigid insistence on specializing in the consignment branch of the tobacco trade, leaving more time for his political interests, doomed the family to bankruptcy.

The tale of the Perrys is an interesting one, and Jacob Price, a master of business history, tells it with his customary sensitivity to the merchant mind. The family's career unfolds within the context of the maritime economy that Price has studied for decades, and in evaluating the factors behind their rise and fall, he tries to place equal weight on both the individual peculiarities of his two protagonists and the broader economic forces against which they both had to struggle. Thus, Micajah I's ascent is explained in terms of his success in exploiting the high prices and high risks that attended the tobacco trade during the war years of 1689-1713. Conversely, Micajah III's failures are understood within the general softening of tobacco markets after 1725 and the difficulty of profiting in the risky consignment business in an era of falling prices - especially given the rising competition from merchants based in Glasgow. Blending his understanding of macro-economic forces with his close character reading of the merchants involved and the style of business they espoused, Price has produced a study that persuades while refraining from easy generalization.

The book is not without flaws. Price spends too much time on the Perry family's ancestors and descendants, a story that contributes little to the subject of the study.

One sometimes feels as if Price is trying to stretch a long article into a short book-length manuscript. In general, however, the book is instructive and interesting in its effort to explain how business and politics intertwined on England's early modern seaborne frontier.

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Dilys Horwich & Paul Rees (comp. & ed.); researched by Gordon Read. *Ships and Seafarers of 19th Century Liverpool: A Selection of Facsimile Documents from Merseyside Maritime Museum*. Liverpool: Merseyside Maritime Museum, 1992. £5.95 + £1 p&p; order from: Stock Controller, NMGGM Enterprises Ltd., P.O. Box 33, 127 Dale Street, Liverpool L69 3LA, England.

It is an excellent thing for an institution possessing an archive as rich as that of Merseyside Maritime Museum to encourage greater awareness of its holdings; even more so when the target audience is a young generation of researchers. This pack, consisting of facsimile reproductions of seventeen nineteenth-century documents, is intended for the classroom. It could be used at every level from early high-school grades to undergraduate. It might double, too, as a souvenir of a visit to this once-great port. Canadian visitors should be warned, however: there is not one document which deals directly with Liverpool's extensive maritime connections with this country. Regrettable as that is the collection includes interesting items and it is well worth acquiring.

Liverpool shipbuilding is represented in the builder's agreement and specifications for the American Civil War blockade runner *Banshee*. A page from the *Illustrated London News*, dated February 1865, documents the launch of no less than five steamers in one day from Jones Quiggin's yards. This was the period when shipbuilding still flourished on the east bank of the Mersey. It was to be

squeezed out from the docks and from highly populated areas in the city. An auction catalogue for the machinery and stock of H. M. Lawrence's Sandon works in 1863 shows the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board taking a direct hand in breaking up a shipyard. Laird's yards, illustrated as they looked in 1856, are evidence of the growing importance of shipbuilding on the opposite bank of the Mersey. This year the closure of Cammel Lairds at Birkenhead brought an end to Liverpool's long involvement in shipbuilding.

The nineteenth-century port was busy with tonnage and its docks often congested with shipping. Illustrations of the ships and cargoes come from the painter, Samuel Walters (sadly, not reproduced in colour); from the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board's fine collection of late nineteenth-century photographs; and from an earlier engraving showing seamen (black and white) off-loading cotton. The wider nexus of trade and commerce is represented in pages from the fascinating journal of William Oates dated 1853-4. He was employed as a shipping master at Calabar. A document concerning average adjustment on the damaged cargo of the *Brazilian*, wrecked on a Boston-Liverpool run in 1881, is a reminder of the hazards of trade. For an earlier period, 1830, a Customs Bill of Entry affords a profile of the port's shipping and cargoes in two weeks of May (and here is to be found mention of Canadian vessels). The passenger trade is represented in a Cunard brochure of 1900 which uses the letters of satisfied customers to tout for more trade.

The collection also reflects the ordinary people who made the port. The emphasis on youth, evident in the choice of two pieces from the Liverpool Seaman's Orphanage, an apprentice seaman's indenture and a letter from a young seaman in Port Stanley to his mother, suggests an attempt to catch the imagination of a young audience. That seafaring was, for most, an experience of youth, involving adventure and often danger,

is amply brought out. A late nineteenth century Crew Agreement, valuable in a general sense for details of manning and labour, is rather less well chosen. Owing to a peculiarity of the West African voyage the entire crew is signed on at a shilling a month. Some explanation might have been provided rather than risk a generation of Liverpool school-children growing up in the belief that their ancestors sailed for such derisory rewards.

In general, however, the attempt to explain and provide context is limited. "Some Thoughts for Teachers" are kept brief, and the short description of contents imparts little towards a wider understanding. The idea may be to encourage self-discovery, in which case the absence of a bibliography is a significant omission. Poor proof-reading too spoils the overall effect. Mis-spellings like "registry" simply should not have passed into print. This said, the pack is a welcome extension of the Museum's educational activities, and a boon to those who believe that the best way to teach maritime history is through the ample primary records of shipping and seafaring.

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Douglas L. Stein. *American Maritime Documents 1776-1860, Illustrated and Described*. Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1992. 158 pp., photo-reproductions, appendix, bibliography. US \$20, paper; ISBN 0-913372-62-5.

Douglas Stein, Curator of Manuscripts at Mystic Seaport Museum, has produced a beautifully illustrated volume of American maritime documents from the era when the young republic attained maritime supremacy. The book contains explanations and black-and-white photographs of more than one hundred and ten documents, arranged alphabetically from "Abstract Log" to "Whalemen's Shipping Paper." Oldest is the

"Articles of Agreement" between owners and sailors of the privateer *Revenge* for a cruise against the British in 1778. Most recent is a "Sea Letter" printed in French, Spanish, English, and Dutch, and signed by President Lincoln in 1863. The United States government issued Sea Letters to merchant ships as a form of passport. Sea Letters established proof of the vessel's nationality, and advised foreign powers that she was under the protection of the American government.

Many researchers and collectors of maritime memorabilia are not familiar with Sea Letters, Bottomry Bonds, Enrolment Certificates, or a host of other early nineteenth-century shipping papers. Stein explains each, contextualizing them within the history of the US Customs Service, the agency from which most originated. Researchers will be able to familiarize themselves quickly with the language and content of many common maritime documents.

Stein's book is as aesthetically pleasing as it is informative. Substantial care was taken to photograph the documents in their entirety. We see their ragged edges, creases, and water stains, and almost feel the three-dimensionality of raised notarial seals. The lovely engravings of vessels, sailors, American eagles, and other nautical emblems adorning many documents are real treats. The care with which representative documents were selected, and the high quality of the photography, makes this volume a valuable addition to any personal library.

If the book has any shortcoming it is that the author does not suggest as fully as he could how scholars might use each of these documents. For example, "Articles of Agreement" and "Crew Lists" contain statistically significant information for researchers interested in seafaring labour: the seaman's age, place of birth, race, station aboard ship, and pay, among others. That data can be manipulated to reveal aspects of seafaring sociology, especially when the "Articles" and "Crew List" for the same vessel are examined simultaneously. Stein could have

pointed out that sort of linkage and analysis. His wonderful photographs, however, help readers make those connections. By looking at the categories of information on each document, researchers with a variety of interests will recognize the utility of maritime documents to many history projects. For example: "Passenger Lists" include passengers' occupations. Stein's photograph from 1828 reveals passengers aboard the *Chelsea* listed as "Gentlemen." A scholar interested in social levelling in antebellum America might chart the decline of the term "Gentleman" as an occupation from 1800 to 1860 to examine the erosion of deference in an increasingly democratic society. This could make "Passenger Lists" useful to many historians - not just maritime historians.

Douglas Stein should be proud of this book. It introduces a neglected historical source to a wide public. Like the best of the vessels whose history it explains, the volume is sound in structure and pleasing to the eye. *American Maritime Documents* will long endure as the standard reference work piloting students of American history through the shoals of maritime archives.

W. Jeffrey Bolster
Barrington, New Hampshire

Lars U. Scholl. *Der Industriemaler Otto Bollhagen 1861-1924*. Herford, Germany: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992. 120 pp., photographs, plates (colour; b&w). DM 49,80, cloth; ISBN 3-7822-0543-X.

In this extremely well-produced volume, Lars Scholl presents the reader with a fascinating view of the life and work of a marine artist and his *oeuvre*.

It is an *oeuvre* which for long has been under-rated, possibly because it was not considered to be art, but only commercial art. For nearly twenty years, Bollhagen was responsible for the interior design of the North German Lloyd's passenger steamers. In his studios were created innumerable

paintings showing the richly decorated dining rooms, salons and cabins of the floating palaces.

In his later years Bollhagen concentrated on bird's-eye view presentations and detailed illustrations of the interior of industrial establishments such as shipyards and steel and chemical industries - a rich field for a man of his abilities, for he was much sought after by German industrialists.

This is a volume one can peruse again and again with great pleasure. There is always something new to be discovered. The splendid reproductions of Bollhagen's paintings are ever so much better in evoking images of the past than photographs of that period. They certainly give one a feel and understanding for the time, not that long ago, when people still believed in uncontrolled progress, without any consideration for pollution and other side effects of industrial development. Scholl and his publisher are to be commended for rescuing Bollhagen and his work from the past.

Niels W. Jannasch
Tantallon, Nova Scotia

Atle Thowsen. *Handelsflåten i Krig 1939-1945. I: Nortraship: Profitt og Patriotisme* [*The Norwegian Merchant Fleet at War 1939-1945. I: Nortraship — Profit and Patriotism*]. Oslo: Grendahl Dreyers Forlag A/S, 1992. 494 pp., maps, photographs, tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index. 388 Nkr, cloth; ISBN 82-504-1895-6.

Lauritz Pettersen. *Handelsflåten i Krig 1939-1945. V: Hjemmeflåten: Mellom venn og fiende* [*The Norwegian Merchant Fleet at War 1939-1945. V: The Home Fleet - Between Friend and Enemy*]. Oslo: Grendahl Dreyers Forlag A/S, 1992. 400 pp., maps, photographs, tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index. 388 Nkr, cloth; ISBN 82-504-1895-6.

The first two volumes in a scheduled work of five books covering the Norwegian mer-

chant fleet during World War II have recently been published. Director Lauritz Pettersen, Bergen Maritime Museum, writes about the fleet which came under German control. Pettersen's colleague, Associate Professor Atle Thowsen, takes care of the fleet that escaped the invaders and took part in the allied war effort.

Thowsen's book covers the period from the outbreak of the war to the New Year 1943, when the so-called Hogmanay-Treaty came into force. (The period 1943-45 will be taken care of by Bjorn Basberg in Volume II.) This treaty was the last in a series of agreements which placed the entire free Norwegian fleet at the disposal of the Allies. These vessels, numbering more than a thousand, were of major importance, both to the Norwegian government in exile, who needed the fleet's currency earnings, and to the Allies, who desperately wanted more transport capacity. Thowsen describes the process in which these vessels were requisitioned and put under government control through Nortraship (the Norwegian Trade and Shipping Mission), and how they gradually had to take their turn in the ongoing war. *Nortraship: Profitt og Patriotisme* illuminates the many conflicts within the organisation itself as well as the continuous tug of war between the Norwegians, the British and the Americans on the use of the vessels as well as on the level of freight rates. Thowsen's book is packed with details and gives the reader a very good insight in Nortraship's birth and first years. This first volume of the Norwegian merchant fleet at war is a milestone in Norwegian maritime research, with its rich use of sources, its well structured chapters and reader-friendly layout. It is a good example of how it is possible to keep a high scientific standard, and at the same time cater to the general audience. I have only one critical comment: In his concluding chapter Thowsen claims that the focus of his book has primarily been on the economic aspect of Norwegian shipping during the first war years (p. 432). Yet,

except for a reference to a rough calculation on Nortraship's operating profits, there is no information on economic performance. Questions on whether or not Norwegian ship owners made profit in the analysed period are never answered. This will undoubtedly be greatly missed by a number of readers.

Pettersen writes about the "home-fleet," i.e., those vessels which came under control of the invaders and were employed in occupied Norway throughout the war. When the battle of Norway ended in the summer of 1940, more than 800 vessels larger than 100 grt were at the disposal of the Germans, most of them small ships in local trade. These made up 15 per cent of the total Norwegian merchant fleet. Since Pettersen makes reference to about 280 individual Norwegian vessels in his book, one could easily think that this is merely a list of ships and their fate. Not so, for *Hjemmeflåten: Mellom venn og fiende* covers a broad spectrum of topics concerning shipping in occupied Norway: ship owners, seamen, shipyards, new buildings, economic results (which for some shipping companies were quite good), insurance and sailing routes. A wealth of information is in the book, and it keeps the same high standard as Thowsen's. However, what would have increased the value of the book even more, is information on what kind of trades these vessels were employed in. Since Pettersen claims that the "home-fleet" played an insignificant role in Norway's foreign trade during the war, (p. 332) it would have been of interest to get more insight into what they actually carried in their local trade.

With the exception of archives belonging to the Seamen's Union in Norway, both Pettersen and Thowsen have had access to, and made optimal use of, all relevant sources to present a wide and fascinating picture of their topic. Together with the three volumes still to be released on the Norwegian merchant fleet in World War II, they fill an open hole in maritime history.

One wonders, then, why these books are published in Norwegian only. This unique work deserves an international audience. Regretfully, the five volumes will largely be read only by Scandinavians.

Anders Martin Fon
Bergen, Norway

S.C.Heal. *The Maple Leaf Afloat, Volume I: West Coast Maritime Memories*. Vancouver: Cordillera Publishing Company, 1992. 181 pp., photographs, tables, map. \$17.95.paper; ISBN 1-895590-02-7.

Here is a book that contains a rather loosely connected and greatly varied group of short accounts of different aspects of marine related history. In the introduction the author mentions the criteria of handiness, readability, and accuracy that he has tried to incorporate in this volume. Let us see how it measures up to them.

The book is handy both in size and because it is divided into short accounts. However, there is no logical order, topical or chronological, to the way the topics are presented. In fact, the collection is a real salad. The book also lacks an index, so details cannot be readily found.

As for readability, the inclusion of anecdotes from the author's experiences give it a folksy style. However, in some of the accounts much digressive material must be waded through to reach the material suggested by the title of the account. In fact, in some accounts the lead-up seems longer than the story. The title tends to mislead the reader into expecting the book to be about Canadian ships. In fact, accounts cover deep-sea freighters, some of which visited Canada and some which did not, foreign fishing ships, ships of the Nelsonian period, ships of the Royal Navy, fish farms, and British shipping lines. In some cases the accounts have very tenuous connections with Canada, tending to leave the reader wondering why they were included at all.

The book contains much accurate material interspersed with numerous inaccuracies. In the introduction Norman Hacking is credited with writing a column in the wrong newspaper. Later, Island Tug & Barge Limited is said to have been started by Harold Elworthy with one tugboat. In fact it was started by three partners with two tugboats. The tugboat *Sudbury II* is described as "turbo-electric" when she was diesel-electric. The account of Georgia Shipping Limited, of which the author was one of the owners, wanders all over in its introduction. When it finally gets down to the topic, the author makes several mistakes in relating the history of its first tugboat, the *Ocean Comet*. In the account of the wreck of the collier *Miami*, the writer attempts to correct the writings of another author with facts that are themselves erroneous. The *Miami* sailed from Oyster Harbour, which is now Ladysmith Harbour, not Boat Harbour. The chapter entitled "Kelly's Folly" is amusing, but it is hearsay rather than accurate history. The self-dumping log barges were first constructed in the mid-1950s, not in the 1940s. These errors undermine the concept of "factual chapters" claimed in the introduction, and leave the reader uneasy about the accuracy of the rest of the material.

The highlight of *The Maple Leaf Afloat, Volume I* is the extensive collection of good quality photographs. The chapter headings give some ideas of where specific photos can be found, but an index would make them much more accessible.

After reading the book, one is left with the impression that its contents are a tapestry of the writer's memories and interests connected with the marine world, woven in such a way that it envelops photos that he has collected. In creating the manuscript, however, he has wandered outside the main topic suggested by his title and he has failed to meet his stated criteria.

Robert L. Spearing
Victoria, British Columbia

Pol Chantraine. *The Last Cod-Fish: Life and Death of the Newfoundland Way of Life*. St. John's: Jespersen Press, 1993. 156pp., map. \$14.99, paper; ISBN 0-921692-45-5.

Rarement verra-t-on un ouvrage autant d'actualité dans le secteur des pêches canadiennes. En effet, lors d'une récente Conférence de presse à Halifax (le 6 juillet 1993) les scientifiques du gouvernement fédéral confirmaient l'inévitable. En fermant immédiatement la pêche à la morue à Terre-Neuve et dans le golfe Saint-Laurent, on pourrait espérer un recouvrement raisonnable des stocks de morue vers l'an 2000. La fermeture complète de cette pêche signifierait pratiquement 140 000 pertes d'emploi dans l'Atlantique selon les derniers estimés (Emission Bonjour Dimanche, Radio Canada, le 11 juillet 1993). La situation s'apparenterait étrangement à celle de l'Ouest canadien lors de la dépression des années 1930. Mais comment en sommes-nous arrivés là? C'est ce à quoi tente de répondre Chantraine. Bien que l'ouvrage soit divisé en dix-huit chapitres, on en retient trois grandes démarches; i) démontrer l'impact de la crise de la morue sur le mode de vie traditionnel des communautés de pêche côtière de Terre-Neuve, ii) dénoncer le manque de vision du gouvernement fédéral et de par ce fait, iii) sa faible position diplomatique internationale dans la question de la surpêche.

Ceci dit, il est important de souligner que la démarche de Chantraine ressemble davantage à un long reportage qu'à une recherche académique. Il s'efforce surtout de relater ses propres expériences journalistiques sur la question des pêches, en les confrontant aux nombreux rapports et politiques préconisées par les experts en pêche du fédéral. Autant les chercheurs universitaires déploreront l'absence de références et la structure parfois déficiente du contenu, autant les non-initiés bénéficieront de l'approche vulgarisée de l'auteur. Il a sans contredit réussi à cerner l'essentiel du problème

et à démystifier une question fort complexe.

On peut cependant signaler quelques redondances d'un chapitre à l'autre, surtout lorsque l'auteur fait référence à l'évolution des équipements et techniques de pêche utilisées à compter des années 1920. Il a toutefois bien résumé l'évolution des pêches terre-neuviennes avant cette période. D'une façon simplifiée peut-être, mais qui reflète néanmoins l'essentiel des éléments qui ont façonné et formé les grandes valeurs socio-économiques des communautés côtières de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador. Ces villages qui, selon l'auteur, sont devenus de simples laboratoires sociologiques dans lesquels les bureaucrates conduisent des expériences de relance économique. La crise actuelle n'est guère plus qu'une répétition plus grave de crises semblables survenues dans le passé mais desquelles nous n'avons retenu que peu de choses. Des premières études alarmistes des années 1920 jusqu'au grand rapport Kirby du début des années 1980, transpire la nécessité d'agir rapidement. Mais le fédéral n'aura jamais le courage politique de passer résolument à l'action.

L'une des grandes erreurs fondamentales fut de croire que la zone des 200 milles allait ramener les pêches miraculeuses. Malheureusement l'accroissement phénoménal des capacités de pêche canadiennes fit que l'on devint aussi pillier que les pays que l'on avait chassés! Les Européens en vinrent aux mêmes conclusions: les Canadiens exploitaient outrageusement les stocks et en plus, refusaient de partager leurs données scientifiques sur le sujet. Ceci dit, le Canada perdait toute crédibilité sur la scène internationale, dans ses démarches alarmistes pour faire cesser la surpêche aux confins de la zone de 200 milles.

Dans sa croisade pour la sauvegarde de la morue, Chantraine ne s'attirera guère la sympathie des protecteurs du phoque. Selon lui, le problème de la morue est qu'elle n'a pas la physionomie sympathique du petit phoque blanc recouvert de sang et achevé à coups de bâton sur la banquise.

Cet ouvrage est donc la première grande vulgarisation d'une quantité incroyable de rapports et d'articles de tout acabit, commentant et prévoyant la catastrophe écologique que nous vivons. Il y a fort à parier que les prochaines années nous réservent un bon nombre de publications sur la question. Elles seront possiblement plus éclairées, bénéficiant d'un certain recul toujours si important en histoire.

Nicolas Landry
Shippagan, New Brunswick

Gottfried Hilgerdenaar. *Seemann will ich werden...Erlebnisse auf Fischdampfern und Frachtschiffen 1946-1962*. Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1991. 127 pp., photographs, glossary. 22 DM, paper; ISBN 3-926958-70-7.

This unpretentious book describes sixteen years at sea. It is well illustrated by the author's own photographs, mostly of everyday scenes in the working lives of merchant seamen. The result is a straightforward story of seafaring in the immediate post-war period. It is a slice of social history of the working conditions that vanished when automation, small crews, rapid harbour turnarounds, and better accommodation standards transformed life in merchant ships.

Gottfried Hilgerdenaar decided as a teenager to go to sea. The war intervened, and he served as a submarine radio operator. When peace came the only seagoing positions available were on fishing vessels. Getting a berth proved difficult but eventually Hilgerdenaar learned how to bribe an official at the hiring hall and he was off to sea in a trawler owned by a Bremen company. He spent five hard years as a deck-hand fishing off Iceland and in the Barents Sea. Most voyages were three weeks long. The author's descriptions of working conditions in these coal-burning trawlers, his companions, visits home in the tough postwar era, forays ashore in Iceland and heavy weather are the best-written part of the book.

Although more modern trawlers began joining the German fishing fleet Hilgerdenaar decided that deep sea freighters would prove less arduous and more interesting. He sailed in a small Bremen freighter trading from the Baltic to Spain and then in a new 11,000-ton heavy-lift freighter which took him out to India and to Boston.

Hilgerdenaar's next ships traded to the Levant and to Portugal and Spain. He includes a picture of the Texas Bar in Lisbon, with which many mariners will be familiar, depicting the famous lifeboat, complete with bar orchestra. There are also descriptions of loading in small primitive ports. By then he had been at sea as a deck-hand for nine years. He therefore decided to attend a navigation school in order to sit for a mate's ticket. After voyages as the only mate in a small coaster, Hilgerdenaar spent the next seven years in modern diesel coasters in the Baltic and North Seas. He was in a ship trading to London as Chief Officer and describes his impressions of England thirty years ago. London was a favourite port for German sailors but he was bemused by the archaic labour practices of the British stevedores. He got along well with the London dockers but he found it frustrating to be told that he and his crew were not even permitted to clean their ship's holds during a paralysing dock strike. If a gang of stevedores was one short at the start of the working day the dockers simply played cards. One of Hilgerdenaar's social history gems is a photograph of the stevedores during one of their tea breaks - a ritual he found irksome because it was rigidly enforced. Tea was brewed on the galley stove by a docker specially detailed off for this task who spun out the time indeed.

An engaging feature of this book is the shift in the author's perspective as his responsibilities increased. The chapters on his years as a deck officer tell of coping with heavy weather, icing in the Baltic, natural disasters, and the impact of modern radio aids such as decca and radar on navigation.

Always interested in everything around him, Hilgerdenaar recorded details of radio beacons in the eastern Baltic at a time when the Soviets were not publishing navigational information. His observations were used in German Notice to Mariners.

By 1962 Hilgerdenaar was married and a father. Although tempted by the offer of command of a new ship he decided at age thirty seven to end his seagoing days. His narrative ends as he finds employment with a firm providing tank cleaning and other services to ships in Bremerhaven.

This is not a book rich in analysis. Its value lies in its unassuming descriptions of everyday details. It is particularly interesting because it tells about experiences both as a deck-hand and as an officer. Such books by ordinary mariners are rare. *Before the Box Boats* by Captain A. Kinghorn, the story of a Blue Star line Captain who first went to sea in 1949, is perhaps an English-language equivalent. *Seemann will ich werden* should be of interest to those looking for the "feel" of life at sea and in harbour only a few years ago when cargo handling and ships were still labour-intensive.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia

Gunnar Thompson. *American Discovery: The Real Story*. Seattle, WA: Misty Isles Press, 1992. xx + 395 pp., maps, illustrations, figures, tables, references, bibliography, index. US \$17.95, paper; ISBN 0-9621990-4-4.

American Discovery is described as an introduction to the achievements of pre-Columbian voyagers. In fact, it is the author's interpretation of the cultural origins of the American people. As a paperback it will undoubtedly reach a wide field of readers, for he presents his interpretation, from remote antiquity to the present era, in simple terms for the benefit of easy reading and a better understanding of a great heritage.

Thompson's saga commences 300,000

years ago with early inhabitants using pebble-stone tools, the arrival of Pacific voyagers and the land and sea crossings of the Bering Strait by Australoid and Mongoloid hunters and fishermen from northeast Asia. Thompson maintains that prehistoric landings on America's vast open coastlines were frequent, and he asserts that the Atlantic Ocean was no obstacle to the resourceful mariners of the first great civilizations of the Mediterranean and Middle East. According to Thompson, Asiatics, Polynesians, Indo-Sumerians, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Minoans, Iberians, Greeks, Romans, Africans, Norsemen, Britons and other migrants all contributed to the peopling of America. Moreover, he believes that they brought with them the cultures and skills to create the advanced civilizations of Central and South America - mining, building, agriculture and weaving techniques, architecture, stone monoliths, engravings, inscriptions, artifacts, symbols and relics of all kinds, religion, languages, and ancient burial customs, all of which Thompson identifies with the distinct cultures of the Old World. He presents a mass of evidence to support his interpretation. For instance, citing the 6000 BC red-ochre burials along the northeast coast of America, he associates these with similar burials of the same period in Norway, and concludes that America and Scandinavia share a common heritage. The book is well illustrated and supported by an impressive list of sources and references, all dedicated to his thesis, that the native peoples of America owed their evolution and development to the influence of the world-wide diffusion of cultures.

Unfortunately, much of the evidence in Thompson's pocket history is slender and the criteria which allow one to draw reliable conclusions is not present. Inaccuracies and mis-statements in the text and the elementary errors in the chapter on ancient Egypt are unacceptable in a serious historical work, with the result that the book will not stand close analysis. For instance, he is quite

wrong when he claims that Queen Hapshet-sut's "Land of the Setting Sun" is America. She referred to Punt, an Egyptian mining colony in southeast Africa where the coastline turns southwest into the setting sun. Her successor, Rameses III, also referred to Punt when he described it as the "Land of the Inverted Waters," underneath Africa. Thompson's statement (after Jairazbhoy) that this refers to America is but one of many false assumptions based on untested information. Similarly, the sacred homeland of the Pharaohs was the Land of Punt, not the Sudan, and Manetho of Sebennytos was an Egyptian priest of the Ptolemy I dynasty, 305-283 BC, well known as the author of the Egyptian King List and not a Pharaoh of the 3rd Millennium BC; Ophir is ancient Hebrew for Africa, and King Solomon's mines were in the Land of Punt, not South America. Nor is there any record in ancient history of a chieftain or tribal leader in West Africa with either the status or capability of mounting a crossing of the Atlantic Ocean to Mexico. Besides, such a voyage is improbable given the direction of the prevailing winds between West Africa and Mexico.

Another ridiculous fallacy is the statement that a clumsy reed boat sailed from Egypt to the Ganges in less than a month. In later years, the fastest Roman ships took six weeks to sail half the distance - from the Red Sea to southwest India. The reed boat was for short-haul work in sheltered waters, never for regular trans-oceanic travel. We know that Heyerdahl's first ocean crossing failed, and that the Ra II just got across to Barbados minus its bow and stern post and main steering oar, with the underwater hull intact but awash and unfit to continue.

These and other misconceptions and misinterpretations detract from the value of the book as an authoritative account of America's cultural history, and the story is yet to be told in full.

Edmund Layland
Cape Town, South Africa

Anthony Grafton. *New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992. xii + 282 pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. US \$29.95, cloth; ISBN 0-674-61875-0.

This impressive book has entirely overcome the potential restrictions of the mandate to its author. Anthony Grafton, an accomplished scholar of early modern European intellectual history, was asked to write a volume and organize an exhibit that celebrated the New York Public Library's rare book collection on the occasion of the five-hundredth anniversary of Columbus' first voyage. The challenging assignment was to "trace the transforming effects of the voyages of exploration upon European scholarship, learning, and culture from 1450 to 1700." (vii) Grafton has expertly used the wondrous collection of fifteenth and sixteenth century books in the NYPL to write an elegant and sophisticated challenge to the conventional wisdom that Europe's thinkers virtually ignored the new worlds when revolutionizing their approach to knowledge.

The importance of the "bound world" of ancient learning was being rediscovered and disseminated by critical new translations by fifteenth-century humanists and the printing of these texts. The Bible, Tacitus, and Herodotus provided accessible mental templates with which to observe new peoples and places. The *Geography* of Claudius Ptolemy, the great second-century Greco-Egyptian astronomer and geographer, was not translated into Latin until the early fifteenth century and was printed only seventeen years before Columbus sailed for America. Grafton indicates that Ptolemy did much more than inspire some new geographical errors. He provided a model of geographical description that was uncluttered by ideology and flexible enough to accommodate the impending flood of new facts.

Works of several mariners, including Columbus and Vespucci, and merchants like

Florentine Goro Dati are explored to reveal the filters that recovered ancient learning provided for practical people interpreting new sights. The famous debate between Bartolemé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda could only be premised upon reconciling new-found Amerindians with the world of ancient texts. Jesuit José de Acosta was almost unique in responding bluntly to the realities of sailing into the tropics: "What could I do then but laugh at Aristotle's *Meteorology* and his philosophy?...where everything, by his rules, should have been scorched by the heat, I and my companions were cold." (p. 1)

Grafton traces a sixteenth century "loss of coherence" in the study of human history, as American ethnohistory by writers including Bernardino de Sahagún and Garcilaso de la Vega added to a story that was becoming a compendium of paradoxes and accumulating contradictions, illustrated well in Sebastian Munster's *Cosmographia universalis* (Basel, 1550). Grafton keeps the Reformation, the other great loss of coherence in this period, a little too far in the background. Giordano Bruno was burned in 1600 for pantheism rather than for suggesting a separate creation of Amerindians, and ferocious religious sectarianism only aggravated growing intellectual difficulties. Grafton is the scholar best able to offer a sequel on the origins of the new learning of the seventeenth century which would weigh the contribution of the discovery of new worlds against those of internal European intellectual and social dynamics.

Grafton credits Francis Bacon with a precursor's place in the subsequent transformations to new learning, and uses the innovative University of Leiden most effectively to illustrate the new empiricism. Books increasingly shared space with cabinets of curiosities in the studies of Ole Worm in Copenhagen, Hans Sloane in London, Elias Ashmole in Oxford, or Athanasius Kircher in Rome.

This thought-provoking and beautifully-

printed book may be an unusual venture for those of us who read maritime history, but Grafton is an excellent guide on a profitable voyage.

Ian K. Steele
London, Ontario

Roger Morris. *Atlantic Seafaring: Ten Centuries of Exploration and Trade in the North Atlantic*. Camden, ME: International Marine Publishing, 1992. 184 pp., figures, drawings, maps, glossary, notes, index. US \$34.95, cloth; ISBN 0-87742-337-7.

Atlantic Seafaring displays the combined talents of both a gifted maritime artist and the highly readable text of an educator. The author "sets out [in one volume] to illustrate some of the sailing ships which were engaged in exploration, settlement and trade across the North Atlantic, and relate a few of the events in which they were involved" (p. 6) - no mean feat given the timespan covered and the numerous passages made! The author's experience as a professional sailor adds another dimension to his qualifications to produce a work of this nature.

The volume follows a format adopted by Morris for an earlier publication - *Pacific Sail: Four Centuries of Western Ships in the Pacific* (Camden, Maine, 1987). In fact, the books are almost identical in both layout and the use of illustrative material. Having arrived at a winning format in *Pacific Sail*, the author and publisher evidently elected to employ the same layout for the latest endeavour. Lavishly illustrated with slightly over 150 drawings (including details), hull plans and diagrams, and maps — over fifty in full colour - the publication is both a delight to the eye and a well researched visual record of the vessels that traversed the Atlantic.

Atlantic Seafaring opens with a simplified explanation of the prevailing winds and currents of the North Atlantic which so influenced the routes west and the return voyages to Europe. An abbreviated lesson in

deepwater sailing ships to the year 1700 follows to show the evolutionary changes which took place. This is somewhat heavy reading for readers without at least some previous knowledge of rigging and navigation terminology; a number of seafaring terms are not fully explained. However, this shortfall is partially corrected by the inclusion of a glossary and several carefully labelled diagrams illustrating rigging details.

Morris recognizes that he has omitted many important voyages and mariners, but with reason. He did not wish to drag readers through a long series of "abbreviated *accounts*." *Atlantic Seafaring* is concerned with the sailing vessels that have plied the Atlantic, and is not intended to present a complete history of exploration and the various transatlantic trades. Further, Morris wisely states that there are many gaps in our present knowledge concerning both the earliest ships and their largely unrecorded voyages.

Following his introduction and the chapter on early deepwater sailing ships, a succession of travellers and their vessels are traced beginning with the Norse. Subdivided into twenty-two miniature chapters, *Atlantic Seafaring* outlines topics ranging from "The Bristol merchants" to "The timber droghers." Morris not only examines the various craft employed, but also places them in their historical context and reveals how they were sailed under varying seasonal weather conditions and oceanic currents. Reasons for many of the voyages are offered and knowledgeable speculation concerning routes taken is provided.

Beyond the inclusion of carefully researched and executed vessel illustrations, this reviewer appreciated the fact that Morris clearly shows that, in all probability, there were a number of earlier voyages to the New World prior to the expeditions of Columbus and the Cabots, and quite possibly before the Norse. In all too many volumes, the general public is only exposed to the verified voyages of discovery. It is refreshing to see an author of a popular publi-

cation citing problems surrounding the lack of conclusive historical evidence and at least giving some passing mention of the likes of John Lloyd and Gaspar Corte-Real.

While the book's numerous sub-divisions do tend to make the whole somewhat disconnected, it does accomplish its intended purpose. Except for a few minor historical errors in the text and in at least one illustration (the painting of the *Marco Polo* on page 171 does not show that ship's proper stern decoration and several of the signal flags are incorrect), this publication contains an abundance of useful information. It is a worthwhile addition to contemporary marine literature offering pictorial glimpses of the sailing craft that challenged an unforgiving ocean. Both *Atlantic Seafaring* and *Pacific Sail* merit addition to your library.

Robert S. Elliot
Saint John, New Brunswick

Steven D. Singer. *Shipwrecks of Florida: A Comprehensive Listing*. Sarasota, FL: Pineapple Press, 1992. 368 pp., illustrations, photographs, maps, appendices, bibliography, index. \$29.95, cloth; ISBN 1-56164-006-9. Distributed in Canada by Nimbus Publishing, Halifax, NS.

Kevin M. McCarthy. *Thirty Florida Shipwrecks*. Sarasota, FL: Pineapple Press, 1992. 128 pp., maps, illustrations, index. \$19.95, paper; ISBN 1-56164-007-7. Distributed in Canada by Nimbus Publishing, Halifax, NS.

Florida is the spawning ground of media-hyped shipwreck tales and pirate treasures in American waters. It has provided fodder for sensational accounts of maritime incidents published scores of books and magazines, as this reviewer can attest after fifteen trips to Florida since 1974. However, these two books, unlike most of the fluff that has appeared in print on Florida shipwrecks, represent a more enlightened, responsible approach to the topic.

Singer's book is a comprehensive listing of over 2,100 ships wrecked in Florida waters since the sixteenth century. The shipwrecks are arranged chronologically within each of seven geographical areas into which Singer divides the state; the two exceptions to this approach are Civil War and World War II wrecks, which he lists for the entire state in separate chapters. With the assistance of an appendix succinctly listing the military losses, these could probably have been included in each of the area sections, thereby maintaining the much-appreciated uniformity of the other chapters. There are also individual chapters on "Unknown locations" and "Unidentified Wreck Sites."

Thumbnail histories and technical descriptions, averaging nine per page for 242 pages and ranging in length from one line to about twenty lines, easily provide the most complete reference available to date on Florida's shipwrecks. The bibliography, with over a hundred primary and secondary sources, including books by "old school" professors along with publications of activist archaeologists like Marx and Mathewson. By numbering these sources and utilizing the numbers in the "sources" after each shipwreck listing, Singer simplifies his footnoting method beautifully.

Including a chapter of "Shipwreck Narratives" seems out of place; these six stories, averaging four pages each, were taken mostly from previously published primary sources, perhaps to avoid criticism for otherwise providing only the briefest of vignettes for each of Florida's shipwrecks. This book can certainly stand tall on its own merits as a reference text without this attempt to make it something it is not. For instance, the heavily-illustrated Appendices contain a wealth of well-researched and tightly-written information. Sections on Research, Search & Salvage, Wreck Identification, and Artifact Conservation (Metal) enthusiastically share facts about magnetometers, sidescan sonar, underwater metal detectors, under-

water video systems, dredges, airlifts, and identification of cannon, anchors, rigging, wood, sheathing, fastenings, china, coins, and more. In an appendix entitled "Rights to Wrecks," Singer realistically outlines the confronting sides of archaeologists/government and sport divers/salvors before describing existing legislation and detailing information on archaeological research permits and exploration and salvage contracts for the State of Florida.

This black-and-white book contains thirty-five archival ship's photographs, several drawings and reproductions of paintings, a mere handful of underwater photographs (a surprising scarcity in view of the author's well-known proclivity for scuba diving), numerous maps, artifact recovery photos, and even a few tacky pictures of Dan Berg, the self-glorifying, author-with-artifact-from-each-shipwreck type, which should have been omitted, given that Singer's impressive list of acknowledgements projects a strong connection with authority. Nevertheless, the book is a valuable, academic piece of research on Florida's shipwrecks, so it is easy to overlook the occasional minor lapse into pretension.

Where *Shipwrecks of Florida: A Comprehensive Listing* is a necessity on the reference shelf, *Thirty Florida Shipwrecks* is an oversize, colourful book that is ideal for the coffee table. Kevin McCarthy, a scuba-diving English teacher, selected thirty shipwrecks from the thousands available in Florida's history, researched their circumstances and wrote detailed and entertaining stories, each two to three pages in length. The stories cover a wide chronological range, from the story of young Fontaneda, who wrecked in 1545 and was held captive by Indians for seventeen years, to the story of the 327-foot Coast Guard cutter *Bibb*, which was sunk off Key Largo in 1987 to provide an artificial reef and dive-site. A foreword by Dr. Roger Smith, a Florida State Underwater Archaeologist, legitimizes the *raison d'être* for such a history book while providing at the same

time an opportunity to preach the "take only pictures, leave only bubbles" policy of marine conservation which would have been more *à propos* in Singer's book.

To each tale, the talented marine artist William Trotter has contributed a full-page colour painting, depicting a dramatic scene from the incident. A map pin-points the location of each story, and a list of references appears after each of the thirty tales (the book has no final bibliography), while a black-and-white remarque highlighting a portion of the accompanying colour painting concludes each chapter.

What McCarthy's book lacks in historical research (when compared with Singer's) is easily counterbalanced by the well-written prose of each story; McCarthy's entertaining tales comprise a book that can be read with joy and ease from cover to cover. Singer's terse, technical facts, hitting the reader with machine-gun rapidity, are characteristic of the reference book that it intends to be. Both publications have their value and their place, and both share the detailed, dramatic artwork of William Trotter on their covers, a fitting similarity for two worthy books on the shipwrecks of Florida.

Chris Kohl
Chatham, Ontario

Gary Brannon. *The Last Voyage of the Tonquin: An Ill-Fated Expedition to the Pacific Northwest*. Waterloo: Escart Press, 1992 [Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1]. 97 pp., figures, maps, illustrations, bibliography, chronology, index. \$13.95, paper; ISBN 0-9692383-7-1.

The *Tonquin* story is one of the classic sea dramas of the nineteenth century. Having found riches in the eastern land fur trade, John Jacob Astor found little but tragedy and lost dreams when he sent the *Tonquin* on its ill-fated expedition to the Pacific Northwest in 1810-11 to establish a land

base for the enormously lucrative maritime sea otter trade. Though retold many times over the last 170 years, the *Tonquin* saga will be discovered by a new set of readers in this slim book by Gary Brannon. With large print, ample spacing, a dozen or so illustrations, and an equal number of maps, the book does not pretend to be scholarly or definitive. Rather, it is intended for those who have neither the time nor desire to read more detailed accounts such as Gabriel Franchere's *Journal of a Voyage on the Northwest Coast of North America During the Years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814* (Toronto, 1969) which W. Kaye Lamb edited for the Champlain Society, or scholarly treatments such as James Ronda's *Astoria & Empire* (Lincoln, 1990), or James R. Gibson's *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods* (Montreal, 1992). And yet, if it succeeds in introducing neophytes to our maritime heritage and encouraging them to explore the *Tonquin* tale further in texts, then the book will fulfil its apparent mandate.

While Astor had a stranglehold on the land-based fur trade of America, he turned to the sea, like many other Eastern merchants, drawn by stories of Pacific sea otter pelts selling for \$30 per pelt in China. A voyage for sea otter pelts, returning with silk, tea and porcelain from China, could return \$150,000 profit on a \$50,000 investment in less than two years. The trade originated with Spanish and British explorers of the 1790s, but by 1805 was dominated by Americans. In 1810, Astor assembled a partnership of Scottish-Canadian, French-Canadian and American fur traders including David Stuart, Alexander McKay, Duncan McDougall, Donald Mackenzie and Wilson Price Hunt. Together they planned to establish a fort in the Pacific northwest as a toe-hold for the western expansion of Astor's fur empire. The *Tonquin* was supposed to play the pivotal part in that expansion. Carrying fifty-four crew and artisans, the ship departed New York on 6 September, 1810 to establish the fort and trade with the

natives up the coast. An overland expedition, roughly following Lewis and Clark's route, was expected to link up with the *Tonquin* at the new fort.

Some would argue, myself included, that Astor's primary error was in his choice of captain, Jonathan Thorn, a decorated US Navy lieutenant. However, Brannon's is not an analytical work and he places no blame. Thorn was a despot. He stranded crew and partners on the desolate Falkland Islands, forcing them to row in horror after their departing ship. He flogged, beat and keel-hauled the crew. Upon arrival at the Columbia River during a gale on 23 March, 1811, Thorn ordered that passage be found immediately through the treacherous sands at the river's bar. Eight died making the attempt, at a few hours' saving. This was only a small glimpse of the tragedy to come.

After the fort was built, *Tonquin* left on 1 June, 1811 to trade for furs up the coast. By mid-July two ships at the north end of Vancouver Island had heard "flying reports" that the *Tonquin* had been destroyed in a native attack. The sole survivor, a half-breed interpreter, reported that Thorn had slapped a chief when he would not agree to Thorn's prices. The natives, probably numbering several hundred, swarmed the ship and eventually killed all but one of the crew. That mortally wounded crew member set fire to the ship's magazine killing dozens of natives and destroying the ship. Soon after Astor's expedition to the west collapsed and Fort Astoria was handed over to the British.

The expedition's story was soon in print. Astor had engaged several clerks, including Alexander Ross, Ross Cox, and Gabriel Franchere, to write accounts of the expedition. As well, Astor commissioned Washington Irving, the top writer of his time, to tell the *Tonquin* saga and immortalize Astor in *Astoria*. Since then the story has been retold many times including a dozen or so fictionalized accounts, including a Hollywood movie. Like all good stories, it should be retold many times for many audiences.

Brannon's version is not an Irving classic or an academic account like Lamb's or Gibson's. Nor is it meant to be. Himself a geographer, Brannon's strength is in illustration, not historic analysis; thus, for so short a text, there are many maps and figures. Yet, in the end, much has been left out, as is to be expected in this format. While he captures the bare essence of the story, Brannon does not analyze the cause or consequences of the tragedy. That he leaves to more academic tomes.

Thomas F. Beasley
Vancouver, British Columbia

Brendan O'Brien. *Speedy Justice: The Tragic Last Voyage of His Majesty's Vessel Speedy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 1992. xl + 167pp., illustrations, maps, appendix, notes, index. \$35, cloth; ISBN 0-8020-2910-8.

In January 1992 the *Toronto Star* offered over half a page to the question, "Did Ontario 'triangle' sink the *Speedy*?" The *Star* profiled the work of Ed Burt and the HMS *Speedy* Heritage Foundation on a specific shipwreck site somewhere in the "Sophiasburg Triangle" off Presqu'ile Point. What does this have to do with Brendan O'Brien's *Speedy Justice*? Absolutely nothing. Which is perhaps as good a recommendation as any for this volume. Unlike Burt's fantasies, O'Brien should be taken seriously.

The facts of the *Speedy* case are relatively simple. In the fall of 1804, the *Speedy* was assigned to transport an Ojibwa, Ogetonicut, to Newcastle (a community on the tip of Presqu'ile Point, south of Brighton, Ontario - not to be confused with other communities and points of the same name). He was to be tried for the murder of a white man. A storm blew up and *Speedy* disappeared. But the full story has never been that simple. O'Brien and the Osgoode Society were drawn to the tale because, in addition to Ogetonicut, *Speedy* took down

with her Justice Thomas Cochran, Solicitor General Robert Gray and Sheriff Alexander Macdonell, not to mention a number of lesser lights. In an instant, a significant portion of Upper Canada's legal expertise had been lost. Yet there was no official action, no board of inquiry. Only now, two centuries later, is a legal brief presented on the matter by Brendan O'Brien.

O'Brien is both speculative and argumentative, probing everywhere for clues, seeking someone to blame for the tragedy. It has all the elements of a mystery, and indeed, that is exactly what Roy McMurtry and Peter Oliver promise in the foreword. This, however, has all the mystery of a prosecutor's case: before the main arguments are made, everyone in the court knows who is on trial, for McMurtry and Oliver tip the plot: "the villain turns out to be the governor, Lieutenant-General Peter Hunter." (p. x) Apart from his unpalatable character, Hunter is specifically charged with failing to authorize necessary repairs, and forcing the *Speedy* to sail over the better judgment of her captain, Thomas Paxton.

To support his case, O'Brien culls evidence from a wide range of surviving papers as well as some elements of the oral tradition surrounding the case which passed into the written record around mid-century. Unfortunately when we come down to the specific charges there are no smoking guns. The surviving discussion of repairs dates from three to four years before her loss (p. 79). The experience of the Provincial Marine with other vessels in this era suggests to O'Brien that the *Speedy* was probably near the end of her natural life span (p. 94). While no legal expert, this does strike me as rather circumstantial.

The more serious accusation is that Hunter irresponsibly ordered the *Speedy* to sail over the more considered remonstrations of her captain. O'Brien calls this "inexcusable" conduct, "interfering needlessly" with Paxton's operation of the vessel, all because of a perceived need for "speedy

justice" in the Ogetonicut case. However, while Hunter may not have been a sympathetic character, neither is there sufficient evidence presented here to hang him.

The evidence comes from three sources, two of which are very weak: a merchant's letter hinting that people "blamed" Hunter for the loss, and a reminiscence in 1868 of a conversation published for the first time in 1904. The strongest source, reproduced in the Appendix, is a petition by Paxton's son twenty-three years later, stating that his father had protested that the *Speedy* wasn't seaworthy, and asking for land (pp. 137-8). Yet Thomas Paxton Jr. was only six or seven at the time of his father's death. He does not indicate he was an eyewitness to the argument, nor was he a disinterested party, though this is not to suggest that what Paxton Jr. has to say should not be given serious consideration.

Several times, O'Brien laments that Paxton wasn't in command of his own ship. Instead, here was a naval officer forced to obey the orders of army officials with no competence in matters relating to ship operations. Such a conclusion suggests a fundamental misconception of the role of the Provincial Marine in the affairs of Upper Canada. True, some of the officers had naval backgrounds, and its role in the American Revolution and the War of 1812 encourage the view that the Provincial Marine was a naval force. Indeed the best work on the marine, Alec Douglas' article "The Anatomy of Naval Incompetence" focused on just that role: wartime. But in peacetime the Provincial Marine was a transport service, and an army transport service at that, moving troops, gear, weapons, and Indian presents between frontier posts. When she went down, *Speedy* had only a crew of six: captain, mate, boatswain and three seamen - scarcely a good gun crew. Though much is made of Paxton's naval background, no evidence is presented about his rank. Another officer in the Provincial Marine, James Richardson Sr., signed

on as second lieutenant, yet his previous naval experience had been that of quartermaster aboard the *Ramillies*. O'Brien should re-read Douglas on the association of rank between the Royal Navy and the Provincial Marine officers during the War of 1812. Besides, would Paxton have had his repairs authorized any faster by naval officers in Halifax or London?

Why did the *Speedy* sink? First, she was near the end of her natural lifespan without a major overhaul. Moreover, she was probably sailing very light, with so many passengers aboard. Add to this the likelihood that she didn't have a centre-board or drop-keel, and must have been very shallow draft to service the unimproved ports on Lake Ontario. Stir in a night and a day of October gale out of the northeast, and her loss becomes less mysterious. Where is she likely to be found? Pieces associated with the *Speedy* were found on the south shore near Oak Orchard in the days following the storm. O'Brien does a good job demolishing the "logic" and wishful thinking of C.H.J. Snider, local historians, and Ed Burtt in suggesting that the *Speedy* might be found inshore near Presqu'ile Point.

While the volume does little to advance our understanding of the early marine history of Upper Canada or of the Provincial Marine in particular, O'Brien does wrestle with a larger set of issues. He probes the spirit of early white-indian relations, especially as they related to matters of legal jurisdiction. He is fascinated by the personal nature of government in this era, and he argues for the general mismanagement of the Provincial Marine by shore personnel. O'Brien therefore makes a major contribution to the study of frontier justice and white-indian relations in Upper Canada. For this reason, *Speedy Justice* is a worthy addition to the *oeuvre* of the Osgoode Society.

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario

Katherine Plummer. *The Shogun's Reluctant Ambassadors: Japanese Sea Drifters in the North Pacific*. 3rd ed., rev. ; Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1991. xxi+283pp., maps, illustrations, tables, appendices, notes, sources, index. US \$19.95, paper; ISBN 0-87595-235-6.

Katherine Plummer tells the stories of Japanese sailors and fishermen who were cast adrift on the Pacific Ocean. In the highly unstable weather conditions off the coasts of Japan, many small craft were caught in the winds blowing towards the middle of the Pacific, or in the northerly winds which took them to the South China Sea and the Philippines. Some of these unfortunate mariners were then assisted across the Pacific by the north equatorial current, or by the Kuroshio, the current which sweeps northeast from Japan towards Alaska.

Among Plummer's drifters we meet Dembei, who landed in Siberia in the late 1690s and visited the Russian court of Peter the Great. In the 1780s Kodayu, "the scholarly drifter," brought back extensive information about Russia. Another drifter to Russian shores in the 1790s joined a Russian expedition and may have been the first Japanese to sail around the world. In 1815 Captain Jukichi, after drifting for over a year, arrived on the coast of California. According to Plummer, Jukichi was the first Japanese sailor whose arrival in North America was documented, although she believes that he was preceded by others who left no records. She cites apparent linguistic similarities between Japanese and some North American Indian languages as evidence of prehistoric contact and borrowing, though the reader should remain sceptical of this kind of "evidence," since similarities often exist in the absence of contact.

In the 1840s a Japanese teenager named Manjiro was rescued by American whalers, spent several years in the United States, and returned to Japan, where he taught English and served occasionally as navigator and

translator. He was followed by others who brought back news of Mexico, Alaska, the Sandwich Islands, and other distant places.

Using both English and Japanese sources, Plummer tells the stories of several Japanese drifters. The book is carefully produced, and the appendices offer a list of Japanese drifters between 1617 and 1854, and a description of some of the Japanese memorials to drifters.

Plummer attempts briefly to give her stories a larger historical significance, arguing that the drifters became the tools of either western or Japanese governments, providing information about distant countries at a time when information was scarce. She also argues that the drifters left an enduring legacy, helping to dispel myths about the "fearsome barbarians" living across the ocean (p. 227). This argument is hardly convincing, especially if one accepts Plummer's statement that governments suppressed or controlled very tightly the information brought back by the drifters. The growth of contact between Japan and the West is another story, involving other influences and other people. The drifters remain of interest, not for any lasting effects of their voyages, but for the glimpses they afford into the meeting of ordinary folk from very different cultures.

Eric W. Sager
Victoria, British Columbia

G.P.V. Akrigg and Helen B. Akrigg. *H.M.S. Virago in the Pacific 1851-1855: To the Queen Charlottes and Beyond*. Victoria, BC: Sono Nis Press, 1992, 212 pp., illustrations, maps, index. \$21.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55039-030-9.

"Rich in varied scenes, incidents and quotations, (this book) is a continual pleasure to read." So wrote C.V. Wedgwood (*Daily Telegraph*) describing Professor Akrigg's first book on an entirely different subject and era (*Jacobean Pageant: The Court of*

King James I). Nevertheless, these words apply equally well to the Akrigg's newest work, written thirty years later. The Akriggs are probably best known for their books on British Columbia place names and their *British Columbia Chronicle* (two volumes), widely respected as probably the most reliable, readable and entertaining history of Canada's west coast for the period from 1778 to 1871.

The present volume is their first venture on a purely nautical theme. Admiral P.W. Brock has remarked that HMS *Virago* was a "literary warship," as several of her officers contributed to the *Illustrated London News*, *The Mariner's Mirror* and *The Nautical Magazine*. This book is based on these accounts, supplemented by private journals and reminiscences.

Virago was a ten-year-old wooden paddle wheel steam sloop when she sailed for the Pacific Station in 1851. In her first year out she dealt with mutineers and pirates in Chile, spied on the French throughout the South Seas, and engaged in mock battles with other ships of the Royal Navy. In her second year, a visit to Pitcairn Island was accompanied by romance, sadness and amazement at the civilized tranquillity which relative isolation had brought the children of the famed *Bounty* mutineers.

Northern Mariner readers will probably be most interested in those portions of the book which cover northern seas. Several place names on the west coast of Canada remind us of *Virago's* short but eventful four months in 1853 and two months in 1854. The intervening fourteen months found the sloop in California, Mexico (turned smuggler, paying higher than the official Mexican rate for cargoes of silver), Darien (rescuing Americans attempting to survey a canal route through near impassable jungles and mountain ranges), and Kamchatka (taking part in an ill-fated Anglo-French attack on Petropavlovsk).

Excellent maps, sketches and other illustrations (many previously unpublished)

supplement the text. Several of these illustrations, together with the short, pithy character sketches, capture the essence of various individuals and events. This book, which deservedly earned for its authors an "Honourable Mention" in the book category of the Canadian Nautical Research Society's 1993 Keith Matthews Awards, admirably evokes the era when the Royal Navy was counted upon to police the seas and keep small countries safe from mutineers, pirates and other nautical desperadoes.

W.H. Wolferstan
Victoria, British Columbia

James P. Delgado. *Dauntless St. Roch: The Mounties' Arctic Schooner*. Victoria: Horsdal & Schubart, 1992. x + 53 pp, map, photographs, figures, appendices, glossary, index. \$10.95, paper; ISBN 0-920663-15-X.

This is a modest little book, only fifty-three pages in length, but it tells an extraordinary story of Arctic voyages, of great risks taken, of incredible endurance in a very small ship and of the men who manned her. The RCMP schooner *St. Roch* became a legend in the high Arctic under the command of Henry Larsen. He is still remembered with great respect, admiration and affection in the Inuit communities across the eastern and western Canadian Arctic and the ship has never been forgotten.

St. Roch had serviced RCMP posts and Inuit settlements in the western Arctic since 1928, but it is for her epic voyages through the Northwest Passage from west to east between 1940 and 1942, and the return voyage in 1944, that the ship - only a hundred feet in length and with a 150 horsepower engine — is remembered. Delgado includes a section on the long distance sledge patrols by dog team, when the ship was frozen in for the winter. It would have been interesting to have had some excerpts from Larsen's laconic reports on such patrols; thus, "1,000 miles on return to the

ship. Expenses nil!" After returning to *St. Roch* from one such long sledge patrol in 1942, Constable Chartrand, a crew member, died of a heart attack. Sergeant Larsen, Constable Hunt and the Inuit Equalla sledged four hundred miles to contact a Catholic priest so that he could come to the ship in the spring to conduct the funeral service. The total length of that patrol from February to May was 1,140 miles. Chartrand's grave was marked by a fifteen-foot rock cairn at Pasley Bay which remains to this day. The book also emphasizes the fact - and rightly so - that for many years, *St. Roch* was the only presence in the Arctic of Canadian sovereignty. Our claim was well served by a very small ship and a crew of eight Mounties.

James Delgado is to be congratulated on an excellent book on *St. Roch* and on the accompanying photographs and illustrations. This should be required reading in our high schools, for it is an exceptional but regrettably little known piece of Canadian history. It is hoped that *St. Roch* can continue to be preserved at the Maritime Museum in Vancouver as a Canadian heritage. Superintendent Henry Larsen's death in Vancouver in 1964 in his 65th year was a great loss to Canada and his friends in the Arctic.

Tom Irvine
Nepean, Ontario

Michael Duffy (ed.). *Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993. vi + 144 pp., tables, notes. £11.95, paper; ISBN 0-85989-385-5.

This volume in the Exeter Maritime Studies series brings together papers relating to a common theme presented by David Davies, Jeremy Black and Roger Morriss at the Dartington maritime history conferences organized by the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies of Exeter University, as well as Nicholas Rodger's 1991 Harte Lecture at Exeter University, Michael Duffy's 1990

Autumn Lecture to the Society for Nautical Research, and a further essay by Jeremy Black stemming from work associated with his recent *War for America: The Fight for Independence 1775-1783*.

In recent years, a more critical approach to British naval history has emerged as an alternative to the traditional, triumphalist interpretation. The essays in this volume extend this approach by marking out the tortuous path by which Britain groped and struggled first towards gaining and then endeavouring to maintain naval supremacy, by examining the obstacles along that path, and by considering just what that supremacy could achieve in practice.

Davies shows that the creation of a great battlefleet led merely to the problem of deciding what to do with it. Both his and Black's two essays show that mobilization of the battlefleet in peacetime could have important diplomatic effects in the right circumstances, though this game of bluff could also miscarry spectacularly if the government mistook its appreciation of the respective balance of forces. Mobilization would, however, be less effective without a clear strategic plan of how to use this naval power if the bluff was called. Davies shows how the later Stuarts struggled to arrive at a strategic plan to confront first the Dutch, then the French. The Dutch Wars provided planners with their best ever opportunity to embark on a so-called "Blue Water" strategy, devoid of heavy military commitment to a continental war, but Davies provides a timely caution against regarding "Blue Water" as any clear-cut strategic solution. It was not a single option, and its implementation was unsuccessful because planners were constantly torn between the various "Blue Water" options — either a concentrated attack on the Dutch battlefleet, or an assault on Dutch commerce, or amphibious landings on the Dutch coast.

Davies also argues persuasively that Charles II and his brother James were concerned at the threat from the rapidly

expanding French naval power and that they planned thoroughly and seriously the strategic deployment of the Royal Navy in the event of a French war. It was this plan that formed the basis for the arrangements made by the new Williamite regime when that war finally came in 1689, though this rapidly revealed logistical obstacles to its operation that are discussed in Duffy's essay.

Black's first contribution to the volume emphasizes a major constraint on the free use of Britain's naval power by its strategic directors: the fact that Britain lacked a large army, which tied the Royal Navy down as a substitute for the many roles that land forces would otherwise have performed. Chief among these roles was defence against invasion. The threat of invasion enabled France in particular to deprive Britain of the strategic initiative by paralysing British operations until a substantial naval defence could be established and by tying down powerful British squadrons to guard against an attack that might never come.

The lack of a large army also required the Royal Navy to substitute for land forces in other ways: to provide some of the co-operation in military operations on the continent expected by Britain's European allies, particularly in the Mediterranean, and to provide manpower, artillery and haulage on land, as well as transport by sea, in support of the army's colonial expeditions. These roles absorbed resources that could not then be deployed to advantage in the purely maritime struggle — the defeat of enemy battlefleets, the defence of trade, and the destruction of enemy maritime commerce. Its many responsibilities frequently left the Navy hard pressed, no matter how large its numerical superiority over rival navies — and that superiority was, at times, small or non-existent.

The later Stuarts had expected that a French war would assume the same shape as the Dutch, with hard-fought, concentrated battlefleet actions. When, however, the French switched their policy away from fleet

actions after 1692 to commerce raiding, while keeping their fleet available as a potential threat, English strategy had to change as well. This led to changes in the fleet's composition. The number of smaller cruisers was increased and the fleet became more dispersed to meet the Navy's many responsibilities. One policy that England developed before the French was the establishment of overseas naval bases. Careening, supply, victualling and hospital facilities were established at these bases, enabling the Navy to maintain a year-round presence on permanent stations, as opposed to the French practice of sending out squadrons from Europe for short periods each year.

Overseas support bases thus considerably extended the parameters of British naval power, albeit at great expense in ships, men and money, which tied down resources, limited alternative strategic deployments, and exposed the small squadrons on these stations to the risk of being overwhelmed by any larger force sent out from France. The French, by contrast, chose to concentrate rather than to scatter their naval resources. British policy was torn between the conflicting demands of the need to disperse the Royal Navy to exercise command of the seas, protect British trade and destroy French trade and colonial resources, and the need to maintain that command by being able to concentrate sufficient force to defeat any challenge to it mounted by France. Only in the middle of the eighteenth century did a strategy that rationalized this widespread deployment by making the most economical use of the resources available emerge. The new strategy was that of maintaining a powerful "Western Squadron" in the Bay of Biscay and in the Channel Approaches, which could guard against invasion of the British Isles, protect incoming and outgoing British trade and intercept that of the French, and prevent the French from sending forces overseas to defend their colonies from attack or to attack those of Britain, all at the same time.

Davies shows that some of the advantages of such a strategy had been seen as early as 1668. The problems in the way of implementing that strategy were, however, enormous. These are detailed, together with their eventual laborious resolution, in Duffy's essay. Primarily, it was achieved by expanding operational capabilities through developing an entirely new support system from a new domestic naval base begun in 1690 at Plymouth and, in general, it would seem that British naval administrators were much more impressed with the need for an adequate supporting infrastructure to maintain their ships at sea than were their rivals. A major factor extending the parameters of British naval power was, therefore, the dry-dock capacity of British dockyards, which facilitated the major overhaul of warships, and, with twenty-three dry docks in 1793-96 as against eight in French and eight in Spanish yards, the Royal Navy could turn round more ships at a faster rate than its rivals. This was a capacity of which the Western Squadron had particular need, seeking to operate as it did in the area most exposed to the elements of all those that the Navy attempted to hold.

Duffy demonstrates how the Western Squadron system was developed by trial and error, though its evolution was accelerated by the mid-eighteenth-century threat of invasion and, as he and Black show, the particular need, in the later stages of the War of the Austrian Succession, to defend British colonial successes in order to use them at the negotiating table so as to counterbalance French military success in the Low Countries. That the policy should have been so spectacularly successful in the middle of the eighteenth century, however, was the result of two developments that deserve greater recognition.

The first was the rapid growth of the French empire and its wealth in the first half of the eighteenth century. France now had far more to lose in a maritime war than in the wars between 1689 and 1713, and its

government finances, and hence its ability to wage war, were more dependent on its colonial commerce. This situation obliged the French to send out their navy to defend that trade and empire, which exposed it to defeat and enabled Britain to fight effectively using its own strengths at sea and overseas rather than against France's strength on the Continent - provided Britain could shut off France's ability to despatch that strength overseas. In 1759, that task was triumphantly achieved by the Western Squadron, which simultaneously defended Britain from invasion and protected British attacks on the French empire in Canada and the West Indies against interruption from France.

The second development is described by Black in his first and at the end of his second contribution to this volume, where he points to the effect of the altered diplomatic situation. Black stresses the importance of diplomacy in freeing the Royal Navy from some of its overload of commitments. For example, following the lead provocatively given by Daniel Baugh, who has asserted that Britain's lack of continental commitments enabled it to outlast France, Spain and Holland in the American War of Independence, Black argues that the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756 in fact stabilized the political situation in western Europe until the early 1740s, hence allowing Britain to limit the extent of its continental commitments. The Royal Navy was one of the main beneficiaries of this limitation.

Even in this much improved situation, however, naval resources were still extremely stretched. Although naval administrators were perpetually worried about warship building, the greatest problem was not number of ships available; rather, it was the shortage of manpower to meet all the tasks that the Royal Navy was being called upon to perform. Manpower constraints constituted a further parameter of British naval power, and is considered in this volume by Rodger and also in part by Morriss. Rodger argues that the heart of the problem was a

basic shortage of men with particular vital skills, which took at least two years of sea-going experience to acquire. Rodger points out that this élite group of petty officers and able seamen who could work the sails aloft constituted only a fifth of a ship of the line's company. Yet without them the ship could not be sailed. This important point serves to highlight an often unappreciated factor behind British success in its two most successful naval wars of this period, the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic War; by catching so much French shipping at sea by an unexpected attack before the declaration of war (1755-6) or by a surprise declaration of war (1803), the Royal Navy was able to inflict an initial crippling blow on its French counterpart by capturing large numbers of these skilled and indispensable French petty officers and able seamen.

While the Royal Navy did its utmost to deprive its opponents of this necessary commodity, Rodger also shows how the mid-eighteenth century Navy sought to secure it for itself by the personal relationship established between captains, responsible for recruiting their own crews, and seamen who knew and trusted them. Recent research, in which Rodger has been prominent, has re-evaluated the qualitative differences between service in the Navy and in the merchant marine and has overturned previous assumptions by showing a balance of advantages by no means unfavourable to the Navy. Here Rodger demonstrates how, in these circumstances, personal relationships that encouraged volunteering could play an important part in naval recruitment, either by professional acquaintance to secure the ables or by local connection to secure the landsmen and ordinary seamen necessary to haul on ropes and to man the guns. The Admiralty's replacement of this personal system of recruitment by increasing use of the Impress Service in the later eighteenth century broke that bond and heightened problems of recruitment, retention and relations on board ship.

The issue, however, was not just one of recruitment but also of retention, for the Royal Navy lost men by desertion and sickness. It was a drain but its impact can be exaggerated: as Rodger has demonstrated, the desertion rate in the Seven Years' War was contained at a replaceable seven per cent per annum. The other major problem of the manpower retention problem was sickness, and this is considered by Duffy in relation to the Western Squadron. The capacity of sickness to devastate crews, to the extent that they might no longer be able to work their ships safely, was a problem that beset all navies. The crowded, badly ventilated, constantly damp living conditions on warships were virulent breeding grounds of disease among men weakened by constant hard labour and poor nutrition. Perhaps because the British were the most dependent for national survival on keeping their ships at sea, they seem to have made greater efforts than their maritime rivals at coming to grips with this problem, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The War of American Independence increased the demands made upon the Royal Navy by tying it down in support of the army in a continental war. It had never been comfortable with this role in Europe, and Black's second contribution to this volume shows that it fared no better in North America. Perhaps the Navy might have achieved more had it been larger and equipped with the right ships, but Lord North's attempts to maintain political unity at home by keeping costs down to what he felt would be an acceptable level proved to be a false economy, both in impeding the Navy's performance in the purely North American stage of the war and also by delaying for too long the far more extensive mobilization required when France prepared to intervene in the struggle - which resulted in the Navy having to contest the early years of the conflict with France and Spain at a disadvantage.

This episode is probably as good an

illustration as could be found of another major parameter of British naval power - financial constraint. Recent studies of the French navy have shown how this was an all-pervasive limitation on French naval power. In wartime, British governments and public alike were generally far more ready to direct resources to their navy than their French counterparts. However, a navy was an expensive instrument and, in peacetime, there was an irresistible temptation for harassed ministers, looking to reduce the burden of unpopular taxes, to cut naval expenditure to the bone. Black shows how Pitt's willingness to invest in rebuilding the fleet enabled him to use its rapid mobilization to capitalize on France's inability to make a similar extra financial effort and so achieve major diplomatic successes in 1787 and 1790. Equally indicative of the financial parameters of naval power, Pitt withdrew from confrontation with Russia in 1791 when he saw that Parliament was unwilling to finance the necessary naval armament.

The total defeat of Napoleonic France by 1815, however, led successive post-war governments to ignore naval advice in order to reap the resultant peace dividend. The national horror at the immense tax burden that had been needed to finance victory over Napoleon lasted into the middle of the century, so that, yet again, the Royal Navy was stretched to the limits both to fulfil the demands made upon it to support the immediate needs of British diplomacy and to maintain and to develop the fleet and its infrastructure for any future major war.

In the final contribution to this volume, Morriss shows that it was this financial constraint, rather than any rooted aversion to new technology, that held back the Royal Navy's exploration and adoption of steam power. Morriss' re-examination of the person who is frequently cited as the archetypically reactionary naval officer and administrator of the period, Sir George Cockburn, shows a man conscious of the practical needs of maintaining seapower and struggl-

ing to meet them within a limited budget, yet willing to experiment when the funds and the right technology appeared to be available. Morriss sees Cockburn rather as exemplifying the solid professionalism that had been at the heart of British naval administration (far more than at that of French administration), and that enabled the Royal Navy to survive financial constraints, to tackle pragmatically and to overcome the many strategic, technological and logistical problems which it encountered on the way to establishing naval supremacy.

A valuable introduction by Duffy draws the various strands in the essays together and provides an overview of the subject as a whole. The volume provides a model of how such a collection of essays should be organized and can be read with pleasure and profit both by students of the period and by modern naval strategists.

G. Edward Reed
Ottawa, Ontario

Charles Dana Gibson with E. Kay Gibson. *Marine Transportation in War: The U.S. Army Experience, 1775-1860*. Camden, ME: Ensign Press, 1992. 183 pp., illustrations, maps, appendices, vessel index, general index. US \$27(+ \$3.50 postage/handling; \$5 outside USA), cloth; ISBN 0-9608996-2.

This is the first volume of what is projected to become a three-volume series, "The Army's Navy," which will examine the amphibious components of the United States Army. Between its covers, Charles Dana Gibson presents material relating to the Revolutionary War, the period leading up to the Mexican War in the 1840s and from there to the beginning of the Civil War.

The first chapter is typical of what follows. The author first summarizes for us the origins of George Washington's continental navy, the first eight warships commissioned by the Americans. These were all operated under military jurisdiction. Each

vessel is then described in detail. In the subsequent chapters, Gibson summarizes the events of each time period; specific information about individual vessels is presented in the appendices.

Some imaginative formatting has been used in the packaging of this book. Curiously, it is presented in manuscript-like, double-spaced fashion with large portions of blank page. Throughout the book there are only four illustrations and one map, and some segments of the text are very brief. The section dealing with the War of 1812, for example, is only two pages long and omits any detailed reference to Commodore Chauncey's use of army boats at Sackett's Harbor or ordnance from military-controlled gunboats at New York.

While the subject matter would make a passable journal article, it hardly seems sufficient to justify the price of this book. The effect, then, is to cast some doubt on the value of the rest of the series.

Robert Malcomson
St. Catharines, Ontario

René Chartrand. *Napoleon's Sea Soldiers; Men at Arms series, No. 227*. London: Osprey Publishing, 1990. 48pp., illustrations. £6.50, paper; ISBN 0-85045-998-2.

Is there anyone who has browsed the trade books of military museums who has not been drawn to Osprey's Men at Arms series books? Probably not. The colourfully uniformed soldiers of different eras and nations stand out on glossy covers and invite inspection of the beautifully illustrated little pamphlets. Though the series is frequently described as being aimed at the miniature hobbyist market, it is not unusual to spot Osprey volumes in the offices of academe. There are now well over two hundred titles in the series, and it continues to grow. Ancient, medieval, and twentieth century warfare is well covered, but not with the depth of the Napoleonic period, which is

represented with over thirty-five titles.

Readers will find *Napoleon's Sea Soldiers* an interesting synopsis of the reforms of the navy and the marines after the French Revolution. Beginning with the reorganization of the marines in 1782, author René Chartrand traces the transition from the *Corps royal des canonniers-matelots* to the formation of the Marine Artillery Demi Brigades in 1795 and to their reorganization again in 1803-4 as the *Corps impérial de l'Artillerie de la Marine*. He also discusses the naval reforms of 1791 and of 1800-1801, the creation of the Boulogne Flotilla, and the formation of the *Equipage des matelots de la Garde impériale*. He is particularly attentive to the naval and marine manning problems that came after Trafalgar and the Third Coalition War. Chartrand argues that Napoleon did not abandon the navy after its great naval defeat to march his marines off to land war. Instead, he points to the growth of the fleet from 1806 to 1813 and quotes Napoleon's remarks at St. Helena that he had never found his Nelson.

Napoleon's Sea Soldiers refers to, but does not feature, naval and marine operations. Considering its size, it is quite interesting as a study of the human component of the fleet. It is profusely illustrated, containing tables and excellent colour drawings describing uniforms. Some readers may find this miniaturist description of the details of dress interruptive, but the bibliography opens up a larger body of other literature.

This is a welcome and unusual addition to the Men at Arms series, focusing needed attention on the neglected sailors and marines who went to sea in this era. It is also the first volume in the series devoted exclusively to a naval and marine subject. One can only hope that it will encourage Osprey to live up to its name by venturing out to sea more frequently to greet the seamen and sea soldiers of other nations and eras.

Richard H. Warner
Fredericksburg, Virginia

William S. Dudley. *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. Volume 11: 1813*. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1992. xlv + 779 pp., maps, illustrations, tables, index. US \$43, cloth; ISBN 0-945274-06-8.

The United States Navy's Naval Historical Center is a wonderful resource for historians. It is the sort of place where you can immerse yourself in the documents, and absorb the atmosphere, of the American naval past. It is where you can meet other scholars working in the field, and where official historians can both commiserate with each other (official historians have a lot to commiserate about) and flaunt their respective achievements.

The Center has some fine achievements of its own to its credit, including a series of publications documenting the birth and early history of the US Navy. Dr. William J. Morgan edited the first set of these publications, *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (nine volumes thus far, and more to come). William S. Dudley, who succeeded Morgan as Senior Historian, has now edited two of three projected volumes on the War of 1812.

Dudley has emulated his predecessor with exceptionally handsome books, with superb illustrations, attractive typeface and with careful attention to the accuracy of the documents reproduced. He and his team have produced a research tool that will save an enormous time and effort, and that complements other documentary collections in existence.

But what about such collections? And what of the secondary literature in the field? Nowhere in this volume will the researcher find a coherent guide to such sources. There is no mention, for example, of the Champlain Society's four volumes of *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, edited by William Wood and published between 1920 and 1928. Some of the same documents appear in both series. In order to find a way into the historiography

of the War of 1812 the reader of the *Documentary History* must do some laborious cross-referencing and use a good bibliography, of which none are so far as I can see listed in the volume. The documents here published rest entirely on their own not inconsiderable merit, and although in many cases they cast new light on the War of 1812, they must be read in conjunction with what has appeared in both the published primary and the secondary literature. It is true that a select list of recent journal articles, and some indispensable other sources, provide useful leads in this respect, but many titles are missing.

I have some quibbles, therefore, with the methodology. The short headnotes preceding each section of documents are well written and provide context, but not in adequate detail. Let me take some examples from the section on the Northern Lakes Theatre. To say for example that Roger Hale Sheaffé "provided a weak excuse for his defense of the town [York]" (p. 464) demands further discussion. It contradicts the judgement reached in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. To say that the Americans seized or destroyed valuable stores and supplies in York (p. 448) contradicts Isaac Chauncey's own statement (p. 450) that "The enemy [i.e., the British] set fire to some of his principal Stores, containing large quantities of naval and military stores..." As C P. Stacey documented in a well-known article on the Battle of Lake Erie, it was this destruction of the York depot (in which the magazine blew up, killing Zebulon Pike) that deprived Commander Robert Heriot Barclay of naval stores later that year.

There is no good evidence that Long Point was "the British depot for stores," and certainly none that on 30 July Barclay went there to "ready the sails and armament for his new ship *Detroit*," (p. 544) The statement does not square with other circumstantial evidence, even though Ernest Cruikshank argued without documentation, in his article on the contest for command of Lake Erie,

that the ships did go in for supplies. We know that Barclay used *Queen Charlotte's* spare sails for *Detroit*, but it is more likely that he implemented that solution to his problem in Amherstburg, not Long Point. And although it is true to say that Barclay was desperately short of trained seamen, it is wrong to say (p. 550) that the soldiers in his vessels "knew nothing of sailing." Most of them were Newfoundland fishermen in the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, sent there precisely for that reason. It is ironic, finally, that Michael Palmer, who was in the research team for this volume, has produced a fine revisionist study challenging the traditional laudatory view, one that is certainly not challenged in these pages, of Perry's tactics at the battle of Put-in-Bay.

As a source of documentary material this is a magnificent effort, and I commend it to all historians of the War of 1812. As a "documentary history" I have to say it is suspect. Use it with caution, complement it with other sources, and be prepared to challenge its implications.

W. A. B. Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario

George Nekrasov. *North of Gallipoli: The Black Sea Fleet at War 1914-1917*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992. vi + 225 pp., maps, figures, photographs. US \$28, hardcover; ISBN 0-88033-240-9. Distributed by Columbia University Press.

This idiosyncratic mix of history and penny philosophy attempts to clarify, according to the author's epilogue, "the story of the Black Sea Fleet in World War I, as I see it." (p. 145) It is a muddled and awkward account. That is unfortunate, for the story is really worth telling well despite the acknowledged difficulties of tracking down sources.

The general reader will be more familiar with the German side of the conflict in the exploits of the German battlecruiser SMS *Goeben* (renamed *Sultan Yavuz Salem*)

and the light cruiser SMS *Breslau* (renamed *Midi Hi*). Here German ships under the Turkish flag forced their way through the Dardanelles in 1914 and exerted enormous strategic pressure on Russia by carrying out operations in the Black Sea. Books on the subject in English and German appeared as early as 1916. Nekrasov seems familiar with none of them. Still, he does draw upon Russian-language sources in an effort to broaden the picture.

At the beginning of World War I Russia's Black Sea Fleet consisted of five older ships of the line, two cruisers, thirteen torpedo-boat destroyers, four torpedo-boats and four older submarines. The Turks had virtually nothing with which to oppose them. Enter *Goeben* and *Breslau*. In November 1915, the second of Russia's new battleships *Imperatrice Ekaterina* joined the Fleet. In clearly marked historical phases, which Nekrasov fails to clarify, Russia attacked coal ports and merchant shipping in 1914, and undertook a major offensive in 1915 against East Anatolia; it turned to mine-offensives in 1916 beginning in the Bosphorus in July that year in order to block the *Goeben* and *Breslau* prior to Rumania's joining the Allies on 27 August, and operated in 1917 against maritime supply lines along the Turkish coast. Though the Revolution of 1917 crippled the Russian navy, the Black Sea Fleet remained relatively free of the revolutionary movement until June 1917. Behind this outline lie crucial naval and political questions that invite serious exploration.

Nekrasov, however, seems more interested in exploiting his topic as a cautionary tale for demonstrating outdated defence sentiments. Pithy sayings and homiletic asides mark his narrative struggle through the years 1914-17. Thus, nations who do not keep an eye on maritime defence (hence the Russian example) become "affected by that dreaded peacetime disease: stagnation." (p. 4) He strikes out at current politicians, whom he regards as dreamers out of touch

with reality, and niggles at "professional Naval historians" who should "Get Cracking!" (p. 145) on his neglected topic. He then treats us to a summary of his previously stated "lessons of history" followed by reflections on his "lesser lessons." To the former belong such insights as "predicting threats is not an exact science," "war is a struggle between opposing minds and wills," "where there is a will there is usually a way," and "one must never underestimate the power of gossip." (pp. 140-2). Key among the "lesser lessons" is that "effective leadership should release the talents of the subordinate commanders and men." (p. 143)

It is a shame this odd little piece of hack-work was ever published without rigorous revision. Still, it does leave us something to ponder: "Superficially looking at these lessons results only in people repeating past mistakes and blunders with greater accuracy," (p. 147) Well, bless my soul.

Michael L. Hadley
Victoria, British Columbia

Jurgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hummelchen; trans. Derek Masters. *Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945: The Naval History of World War Two*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. xiv + 432 pp., indices, abbreviations, glossary. Cdn. \$67.50, US \$49.95 jcloth; ISBN 1-55750-105-X. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ont.

This work was first published in two volumes in 1972-74 and quickly established itself as one of the major reference sources for the naval history of World War II. However, like so many of its contemporaries, its first edition no longer reflects our current knowledge of this titanic struggle. The authors and their publisher felt that it was imperative to issue an up-date which would incorporate the results of the past two decades of research on this period. Both of its collaborators are well known and very

active in researching the naval history of World War II — although the publisher chose to omit the German umlaut from Hummelchen's name!

The main text is divided into seven distinct parts, beginning with 19 August, 1939 and ending with an entry for 30 November, 1945. The information is presented in a year-by-year format. There are essentially three types of entries: outlining the events of a single day, full operations, or by theatre within a definite time period. On those occasions when one event is connected with another which happened earlier or later, the text directs the reader to the appropriate entry. The main text is heavily supported by seven indexes which greatly facilitate the search for any specific individual, force, or ship mentioned. Readers will benefit immensely from the preface, which outlines the various international sources utilized in the creation of this work. The authors have also very wisely incorporated a detailed two-page combined glossary and list of abbreviations at the front of this volume.

For the most part, the entries are accurate, brief, and crisp. Nevertheless, a few do require a second reading for complete clarity. Readers who want to use this book to uncover warship trivia will be somewhat disappointed because the authors have deliberately ignored details such as warship launching, completions or commissionings, as well as the dates of name changes or even transfers from one navy to another. For example, readers will only know that the HMS *Uganda* was turned over to the Canadian Navy between 12 June and 16 July, 1945. Even the date that the German pocket-battleship *Deutschland* was renamed *Liitzow* is not indicated. The authors have also, perhaps wisely, decided to steer clear of offering opinions on the war's few remaining controversies. For example, they state that the *Hood* was sunk in an engagement with the *Bismarck* and *Prinz Eugen*, without assigning any credit to either ship. Perhaps the major drawback of this edition is the

complete lack of any illustrations, photographs, maps, or tables. This makes the work slightly more tedious to read, but is consistent with a work designed to be skimmed, or used as a quick reference.

Apart from these minor criticisms, this new edition is a far superior guide to the naval history of World War II. Readers will certainly benefit from the major change in this edition, the incorporation of details illustrating the impact of "Ultra" and "Purple" on the operations of the Allies. Strangely, it appears that this source of intelligence was exploited far more successfully against Germany than Japan in some ways. Even with the aid of "Purple" intercepts some US submarines were simply not able to attack Japanese warships and merchantmen successfully. Nevertheless, it is clear that without the information gleaned from this source, the war would have lasted much longer. Overall, readers will profit immensely from consulting this edition and it must be considered a classic reference source on the naval history of World War II.

Peter K.H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Quebec

Marc Milner and Ken Macpherson. *Corvettes of the Royal Canadian Navy 1939-1945*. St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Publishing, 1993. 174 pp., photographs, fold-out drawings, maps, appendices, index. \$35, cloth; ISBN 0-920277-83-7.

John McKay and John Harland. *Anatomy of the Ship: The Flower Class Corvette Agassiz*. London & St. Catharines, Ont.: Conway Maritime Press and Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 1993. 160 pp., photographs, figures, sources. \$44.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55068-084-6.

The Flower Class corvette of World War II has come to be the most significant representative of the history of the Battle of the Atlantic, and is, as Marc Milner phrases it, "...intimately connected with Canada's naval

heritage..."(p. 6) This small warship was too slow, too small and too lightly armed for its most noteworthy responsibility, shepherding mid-Atlantic convoys, usually manned by amateurs to the naval warfare profession, or at best ex-merchant seamen. But then, in its heyday of 1940 to mid-1943, there were far too few other or better ships - sloops and destroyers, even after the US Navy's entry in 1941 - for the struggle against the U-Boats and *sommergibili*. Without these 123 Canadian-built ships, and their 143 British and French-built contemporaries (four were built in France, and taken over by the Germans!), the Atlantic supply line would have been severed, and even more merchantmen sunk than the losses already recorded.

Corvettes of the Royal Canadian Navy book contains an astutely reasoned eighty-page evaluation of the corvette's place in the battle. Milner's initial text is a carefully researched examination of the RCN's purposes in selecting this class as its emergency anti-U-boat vessel, while it considered the advisability of proceeding with the larger twin-engined frigates, and secretly yearned for the true naval spirit embodied in the large, and complicated, Tribal Class destroyers. He makes many valuable points: the lack of ice-free shipyards on the East coast for building or even repairs; the lack of suitable secondary armament, of even gyro compasses and thus gyro-stabilised Asdic sets; the shortages of trained officers and crews. Some points are new, certainly to this reviewer, such as why so many corvettes looked so care-worn so often: the reason was that Canadian yards had little ability and no time to "pickle" the new steel hull plating and thus remove the mill scale left by the manufacturing process, with the result that paint sloughed off later. And the fact that the new-construction *Bangor*'s sweepers got gyros and retractable Asdic domes due to their planned employment while the corvettes had to wait. The RCN paid an unrecognised penalty for their ill-equipped ships, for the RN assigned them to

the slow convoys, which forced them to spend more time in the air gap and more time getting through the U-boat lines, than those escorting the faster convoys.

The second part of this book consists of photos, many of them new ones, of every RCN-manned corvette, including the twelve Castle Class ships, with a very brief summary of its building, modernization (eight were not given the extended foc's'le) and fate. This part, and the two appendices listing the pendant numbers and the operational status of each ship throughout the war, are largely taken from Macpherson and Bishop's *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces, 1910-1985* (Vanwell, 1986). But Milner's review of the corvette programme, development and use, and a host of still-evocative photographs make this a valuable reference. Some of the photos are worth the price alone — a brand new *Cobourg* en route to sea; *Shediac* on the West Coast as a surprisingly handsome short foc's'le; the startling variety in the way hull numbers were painted on. The book also provides an easier-than-expected solution to the problem of distinguishing the later Increased Endurance corvettes from their earlier sisters - by their lack of engineroom cowl ventilators, due to forced draft enginerooms. As CNRS member Louis Audette, himself an ex-corvette CO., says in the foreword, "...few books will stir more memories."

In *Anatomy of the Ship: The Flower Class Corvette Agassiz*, Dr. John Harland's text and selection of many close-up photos (not all of them of useful clarity) and John McKay's 500-odd meticulous drawings is obviously designed for the detailed model maker and corvette *aficionado*. The brief thirteen pages of explanatory paragraphs provide a brief discussion of the class and its equipment as represented specifically by HMCS *Agassiz*, its derivation from the Smith's Dock and Norwegian whalecatchers (described in equally minute detail in Harland's previous book *Catchers and Corvettes: The Steam Whalecatcher in Peace and War,*

1860-1960 (Boudriot, 1992). The drawings, to various but constant scales, illustrate both the original short foc's Te corvette and *Agassiz* as modified with her extended foc's'le. These drawings range from full profile and plan views and sheer lines in various aspects to detailed sketches of the inner workings of depth charges, the fire bucket rack, an engine room air pump, and even cross-sections of stringers and shell plate fastenings and the cap at the top of the jackstay! With some magnification, one could build an actual corvette from these drawings. They are certainly all that one would need in making any model, or part model, such as the 4" gun or an anchor windlass! A few minor errors in the text - the Hedgehog threw an oval pattern, not a figure-of-eight, for instance - detract not at all. The drawings, in larger scale, are available from McKay at Box 752, Fort Langley, BC, VOX 1J0. It is a unique, expensive, specialty book, but fascinating.

F.M.McKee
Markdale, Ontario

John B. Dwyer. *Scouts and Raiders: The Navy's Special Warfare Commandos*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. xiv + 189 pp., figures, maps, photographs, glossary, select bibliography, index. US \$49.95, cloth; ISBN 0-275-94409-3.

A number of elite units were created during World War II, and this slim volume relates the story of one of these. The Scouts and Raiders (S&R) were a small group of officers and men in the US Navy who volunteered to learn and practice the hazardous tasks associated with finding appropriate beaches for amphibious landings, and guiding assault troops into the right beach. These tasks have always called for special individuals, capable of independent operations under difficult conditions. It will come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that this book is filled with tales of derring-do.

The book briefly relates the origins and initial training of this group, and then details their involvement in the war in ten succeeding chapters. These chapters are broken down into campaigns grouped by chronology or geography, as appropriate. As amphibious operations were a hallmark of US operations throughout the war, the list of operations where S&R units were involved covers most, but not quite all, of the US amphibious operations in the war. In Europe the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Elba, southern France and Normandy are covered, as well as some small actions in the Adriatic. In the Pacific, S&R actions were not as pervasive, missing Tarawa and the Marshalls, as well as Guadalcanal, but thereafter employed in most of the operations during the campaign along the coast of New Guinea leading back to the Philippines, as well as the central Pacific thrust leading from Kwajalein through the Marianas to Okinawa. The usual activities of S&R units were pre-landing reconnaissance of proposed landing beaches using 36-foot scout boats, rubber boats, kayaks or fol-boats. On the actual day of the landings S&R units would lay just off the beach and indicate the proper landing sites to the assault boats using infrared lights or other devices. During the actual landings the S&R units were occasionally embarked in larger craft, and sometimes equipped with heavier weapons such as rockets which allowed them to provide direct support to the early waves of landing craft.

In addition to the many assault landings that S&R units assisted with, there were a number of other actions which saw their involvement. The most usual variety was in support of guerilla operations. This ranged from supporting Tito's troops in the Adriatic to operating alongside Chinese guerillas deep inside China.

The author conducted numerous interviews with S&R veterans, as well as referring extensively to the unpublished memoirs of this group. This research provides a solid

base for the numerous anecdotes recounted, and the description of individual exploits. This element of the book is its best element.

The author also makes some effort to weave these individual actions into the vast fabric of World War II. He has relied on some of the broader accounts published by individuals involved in amphibious operations, as well as the official USN histories compiled by Morison. This endeavour is not as successful as the depiction of individual events, resulting in a somewhat uneven book. This aspect of the book is also marred by some minor errors. These detract from the effort to place S&R exploits in context, as well as perhaps suggesting the depth of the author's research, with respect to the wider canvas of the war, was somewhat shallow. For example, readers might be startled to learn that the Isle of Wight lies south of Plymouth (p. 67) and that the day Rome fell is the same one that Allied forces landed at Normandy (p. 61; in fact, it was two days before D-Day).

For those interested in small units and their activities during the war, this book fills a useful niche. The firm focus on individuals and careful attention to personal histories and anecdotes make this book interesting to read. On the other hand, those looking for an analysis of how such units fit into the overall war effort would probably do better to look elsewhere.

Doug McLean
Victoria, British Columbia

Charles W. Koburger, Jr. *Naval Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean 1940-1945*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993. xvi + 169 pp., maps, tables, photographs, appendices, glossary, annotated bibliography, index. US \$49.95, cloth; ISBN 0-275-94465-4.

This study puts together the many threads in the five years of warfare in and around the Mediterranean. It does not add to our knowledge of the history of this period, but

it does add to our understanding of it. The author, an American specifically addressing an American audience, seeks to recast the somewhat chaotic events of a chaotic period into a more coherent tale set down in a balanced manner in one place.

His avowed purpose is to alert Americans to the differences between warfare on the open ocean, with which Americans are familiar, and on the narrow seas with which, he suggests, they are not. In his view the wars of the next decade will take place on the narrow seas, and Americans should understand the difference.

He analyses the positions of each contender as their fortunes vary over time in terms of the constraints upon their actions in three categories: geography, weapons and morale. For Koburger's target audience this approach may well be most effective and it will help the rest of us, but for readers in the British tradition accustomed to the use of naval power in both the open ocean and the narrow seas, there are times when it comes close to belabouring the obvious. It is hardly conceivable that the heirs of Hawke and Nelson would not be aware of the uses and hazards of the geographic context. Koburger's intent is to address this kind of gap in his own country's vision, and he has forged a useful tool for this purpose.

In the Mediterranean the switch from methods suitable for open ocean warfare to those appropriate to the narrow seas occurred with the collapse of Italy and the neutralization of its battle fleet. The removal of this constraint left the Mediterranean Fleet with no one to fight and what remained of it was called away to other theatres or not replaced when damaged. Thus the fleet actions of the "great Malta convoys," for example, gave way to the "piratical brawls" of the light Coastal Forces particularly in the Aegean and the Adriatic seas. Similar adjustments were made in other components of the strategic mix, shore- vs. ship-based air support, mines and minesweeping, the greater use of commando

operations, and so forth, generally of a more intimate nature. At the same time, presumably, American public attention slipped away to the Pacific to focus on their own great open ocean efforts, thus weakening what public interest there then was in the narrow seas.

This book will appeal to anyone interested in naval operations whether professional or amateur. In illuminating significant events in the Mediterranean part of World War II, it is both informative and entertaining. There is no sign of bias, and errors are few and minor. The book is clearly and briskly written.

Gordon Stead
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Edward J. Sheehy. *The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945-1947*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992. xi + 191 pp., map, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. US \$45, cloth; ISBN 0-313-27615-3.

As American carriers and assault ships form up in the Adriatic, it is useful to reflect upon the circumstances under which the United States Navy first established a permanent presence in the Mediterranean basin. Having contributed in strength to the North African and Italian campaigns, the American fleets left for other seas even before World War II ended. Washington apparently was content reverting to its traditional acceptance of British regional dominance, dispatching warships only in times of crisis. Within months of the end of the war in Europe, however, the US Navy had returned. This book describes the process by which, over the course of late-1945 to 1947, the Americans came to be re-established in the Mediterranean, culminating in the creation of the now-famous 6th Fleet.

There is ample scope here to reinterpret the move not as a departure, but as a continuation of the traditional American policy.

The post-war Mediterranean was fertile territory for application of a "crisis-oriented" (p. 107) naval-diplomatic response, ringed as it was with opportunities to influence events by "showing the flag": Greek elections overshadowed by communist-inspired civil war; Soviet threats to Turkey and control of the Dardanelles; the future of the Palestine Mandate; rising nationalism in Egypt and across North Africa; even the necessity to bolster the confidence of Western Allies in French Algeria, southern France, and Italy. However, the author adheres to the conventional interpretation, ascribing the American return and buildup as "a logical program of naval visits to counter the perceived Soviet danger to Mediterranean countries." (p. 108) This is certainly true in the first two situations listed above, but not necessarily so in the others, as was appreciated even then.

In fact, there is little new here. The volume appears to have been intended as (and certainly has the makings of) a textbook case study of the application of sea power as a tool of foreign policy. Sheehy makes occasional reference to the works on that subject by Booth, Cable, and others, but unfortunately this is not a stand-alone volume, and must be read in conjunction with the standard texts. It is not for want of material. Examples abound where timely showing of the flag appears to have been a stabilizing influence, but the author does not exploit the opportunities for analysis, deferring to the Navy's own rationale that "[it] had difficulty quantifying the effects of these tours." (p. 103) The details of major battleship and carrier cruises are all here — the ports of call, airpower demonstrations, and summaries of contemporary local reactions, as well as of Washington and Moscow - but the impact of ongoing at-sea operations is left unexplored.

Two themes of interest do emerge. The close relationship between Secretaries of the Navy Forrestal and of State Byrnes discloses a sophistication in the application of naval power not normally related to confronting

the Soviets. In a similar vein, the Americans' response to what was the trickiest of the crises facing them - the Soviet threat to Turkey - comes across as perhaps the most deftly handled, exemplifying a theme of "remind but not provoke." (p. 110)

The text is not long (113 pages, as compared to seventy-six for the detailed notes, extensive bibliography and thorough index), but it highlights the danger of expanding a subject beyond its proper scope. Important themes and opportunities for analysis become diluted in detail. The final (six-page) concluding chapter provides a good summary, some aspects of which could have been better integrated in the main text. With its wealth of detail, the volume is a useful primary reference for studies of naval diplomacy. I was left wanting more.

Richard H. Gimblett
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Yogi Kaufman and Paul Stillwell; photography by Steve and Yogi Kaufman. *Sharks of Steel*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. xxii + 152 pp., photographs. Cdn \$54.95, US \$39.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-451-2. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ont.

Sharks of Steel is the companion volume to the Discovery Channel four-part documentary on submarines, but stands on its own as a richly illustrated coffee-table book. Although claiming to tell the story of the submarine, in fact, the focus is primarily upon the American experience with only passing reference to the German U-boats of the two world wars and the contemporary Russian *7>/?/joo<<-class submarine*. The gap between the chapters on the World War II and the present-day is bridged only by a brief tribute to Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy. Thus, the book really treats two stages in the evolution of the submarine rather than the full story.

The text was written by Yogi Kaufman,

a retired US Navy admiral and former submariner, and Paul Stillwell, a naval historian. Like the mini-series, the book is divided into four parts: the manning of World War II submarines, wartime operations in the Pacific, the 688 or *Los Angeles-class* nuclear attack submarine, and the nuclear missile submarine. Stillwell and Kaufman have created a hypothetical boat to represent each of the three types and then take the reader along on a typical patrol, devoting considerable attention to the daily routine of the ordinary submariner, as well as to the duties of the captain and officers. This technique effectively depicts life at sea, but is less convincing in the manning chapter which explores the motivations of those who volunteered for submarine duty.

The photographs are the real strength of *Sharks of Steels*. Kaufman and his son shot the modern submarines, ensuring a close relationship between the text and the illustrations. In addition to spectacular photographs of submarines at sea, their cameras take the reader inside the living compartments, and operational and machinery spaces of US attack and missile submarines. Crew training, maintenance, and the loading and storing of missiles and torpedoes are also featured. Some photographs of a massive Russian *Typhoon*, the world's largest submarine, are included but unfortunately none of her interior, even though the co-author toured one and was allowed to take some pictures. Full captions do justice to the photography.

The mix of photographs and art that illustrate the World War II chapters have been drawn primarily from the US Naval Historical Center, Navy Combat Art Collection, and National Archives. The selection presented is limited by an almost exclusive reliance upon early colour photographs; there is only one black-and-white photo in the volume. However, these rare colour shots and the art do succeed in conveying a sense of the primitive and cramped conditions of wartime submarine life.

Within the limitations of the US-centred coverage, *Sharks of Steel* is highly readable and superbly illustrated.

Robert Fisher
Ottawa, Ontario

Allan Du Toit. *South Africa's Fighting Ships Past and Present*. Rivonia, South Africa: Ashanti, 1992[Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Ltd, PO Box 5091, Rivonia 2128, South Africa]. xxvii+ 360pp., photographs, tables, general and ship-name indices. US \$29 (+ postage), cloth; ISBN 1-874800-50-2.

Because of the depreciation of the Rand against the dollar, this extremely well-organized and handsomely produced volume is a real bargain for the North American warship enthusiast. It gives full particulars, photographs and operational history of every unit which served in the South African Navy from 1922 on.

The expression "South African Navy" first came into use in 1951, the force earlier having been known as "South African Naval Service" (1922-1939), "Seaward Defence Force" (1939-1942), and "South African Naval Forces" (1942-1951). As in Canada, the onset of World War II found South Africa woefully unprepared for a war at sea, her fleet consisting of a couple of *Mersey* class trawlers, the survey vessel *Protea*, and, on order from England, the monitor *Erebus*. The gap was filled by requisitioning a few trawlers and some fifty whalers, to form what was essentially a "Whaler Navy."

As in the RN and RCN, catchers were fitted for sweeping acoustic and magnetic mines, with a generator house on the foredeck, and a Kango hammer rigged at the bow. There was no room for a proper LL-reel, the bights of cable being manhandled in and outboard and stowed fore-and-aft. After the raider *Atlantis* laid contact mines off Cape Agulhas in 1940, some whalers were fitted for Oropesa minesweeping, a task for which they were

singularly ill-fitted. Apart from lacking space for handling floats and multiplanes, the whale-winch was much less adaptable to minesweeping activity than that found in trawlers. However, by substituting wire-reels for the winch's warping heads, the job was managed somehow.

Later in the war, the SANF acquired three frigates, one of which, *Natal*, distinguished itself on its way to workup at Tobermory by sinking a U-boat four hours after leaving the builder's yard! There was no large scale wartime shipbuilding in South Africa, but a great deal of repair work was carried on, and some of the smaller yards, such as Louw & Halvorsen in Cape Town, turned out HDMLs as well as building MFVs for the Royal Navy. Besides manning the ships of the SANF, a great many South Africans served in the wartime Royal Navy.

The postwar build up of the SANF was fraught with problems, mainly of a political nature. In the immediate postwar years they re-equipped by acquiring ex-RN vessels, but from 1964 on, Britain became unwilling to supply them with modern warships. Four corvettes were ordered in Portugal but these were seized by the government following a coup d'état in 1974. Then a pair of sloops of the *D'Estienne D'Orves* class were ordered in France. These had actually been commissioned by their crews when the French government embargoed the sale.

All in all, this book is highly recommended.

John Harland
Kelowna, British Columbia

Richard Sharpe (ed.). *Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-94*. Coulsden, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group Ltd., 1993. 875pp., photographs, glossary, indexes. £145, cloth; ISBN 0-7106-1065-3.

This year's *Jane's* does not, at first, seem very different from last year's edition, (reviewed in *TNM/LMN* September 1992).

However, a perusal of the main section of the book, showing the national fleets, soon reveals that far more old warships and submarines have been deleted than new ones added. The Russian and western navies have been reduced in size but also, on the average, modernised, and there are fewer classes of ship in service. This is also becoming the case with the Canadian surface fleet as the *Halifax* class frigates replace older types, but not our submarine force which must still make do with obsolete "O" class boats.

The US Navy is still incomparably powerful: really major cuts are yet to come. In Russia, the new carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* has been conducting trials with fixed-wing aircraft; the other two Northern Fleet carriers are reduced to helicopters only, while the two Pacific Fleet ships are out of service, one permanently. There are problems with the disposal of old nuclear submarines. However, anyone who visited the cruiser *Marshal Ustinov* and the destroyer *Admiral Kharlamov* during their visit to Halifax this summer could not fail to be impressed by these formidable and well-kept warships. It is clear that Russia, in spite of economic problems, intends to keep up a navy.

France continues the very long-drawn-out construction of the nuclear powered carrier *Charles de Gaulle*, which was commenced in 1989 but probably won't be in service until 1998. Post cold-war situations may well call for different types of naval vessel. The Italian navy is building the third of a very economical and versatile type of Landing Ship (Dock), with a full flight deck, which would be very suitable for United Nations operations. The United Kingdom is considering a larger similar vessel. Other navies are continuing the trends noted last year. British *Leander* and American *Knox* class frigates are being passed on to minor navies in all parts of the world, replacing much older ships. It is interesting to find that a number of ex-USN World War II destroyers are still in service in countries like Turkey, Greece, Brazil and Taiwan.

These are nearly fifty years old - a great tribute to their builders.

The editor makes his usual comprehensive survey of the naval situation, region by region. He discusses the need for expertise in the command and control of joint operations, especially international ones, and he touches on social issues such as women and homosexuals in the services. This is the section on which the press likes to pounce, especially when "dire warnings" are included, but this time there is not much that is really controversial. We are again reminded that industrial nations that trade by sea need competent navies. All this is true, of course, though it is sometimes hard to sell to governments intent on retrenchment.

There is a new section on the ranks and insignia of the world's navies, and the flag section now includes Croatia and Slovenia, as well as the white flag with a blue lower border, (actually the old Soviet ensign with red star and hammer and sickle removed) that is the flag of the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet. The rest of the Russian Navy now flies the blue St. Andrew's cross of the old Tsarist Navy and, in port, the old Tsarist jack, which is rather like a British Union Jack with the colours reversed.

Since the book was published, several nations have announced even more drastic cuts. These will be reflected in next year's edition. Jane's continues to be up-to-date, detailed and full of informed comment; the most comprehensive reference book on the navies of the world.

Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia

George C. Wilson. *Flying the Edge: The Making of Navy Test Pilots*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 271 pp., photographs, index. Cdn. \$29.95, US \$22, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-925-5. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ont.

This book is billed as "...avery personal

inside look at the challenges and dangers facing naval test pilots in the 1990s." It is written by a military correspondent for the *Washington Post* who had previously provided a similar pop history of life aboard the USS *John F. Kennedy*.

Wilson begins by sketching an anecdotal history of the evolution of test flying in the USN from its origins in 1911 up to the establishment of the Experimental Test Flight Center at Patuxent "Pax" River, Maryland in 1942. The actual story of the development of the base itself is extremely interesting, calling to mind the frenzied development of hundreds of similar air fields in Canada at the same time, replete with gamblers and ladies of leisure among the cast of characters. It soon became obvious that not only were acceptance and experimental testing required but the need to train pilots to do so systematically was critical to the whole endeavour. This began in 1945 some two years after a similar system had been developed in the United Kingdom at the Empire Test Pilots School, a fact to which the author does not refer.

The bulk of the book is concerned with the personalities and experiences of a class of thirty-four military and civilian aviators, including one Canadian, as they progress through the US Navy test pilot class at Patuxent "Pax" River, Maryland in 1991, including the type of flying that they did, the applications for their training and their subsequent careers. The anecdotal style employed provides a breezy insight into this obviously high stress environment and the ambitious, competitive and motivated people who inhabit it.

Moving somewhat beyond the realm of the actual training of the test pilots, Wilson also ventures into a description of the grave risks such flying involves, the tragedies which occur and the shortcomings of Pax River's emergency response operation in the face of crashes into Chesapeake Bay. Beyond that, he indulges in a critical evaluation of the US Navy decision to adopt and

adapt the British Aerospace Hawk as a shipboard trainer against the advice of its test pilots and an opinionated review of the controversial 1991 Tail Hook convention whose antics are still washing over the Navy. The Hawk story is typical of controversial weapons systems procurement experiences and tangential to the central purpose of the book. The excursion into Tail Hook is completely out of place in a book about training test pilots, though of significant importance in its own right.

It is difficult not to recommend this book because it does provide many insights into the process of developing test pilots and of testing contemporary aircraft. It sheds a critical but not unique spotlight on the dynamics of weapons procurement and the interface between the industry and its military customers. The focus is not sharp, however, and the reader can tire of the reconstructed conversations and the somewhat clean cut approach to it all.

Christopher J. Terry
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Wynn F. Foster. *Captain Hook: A Pilot's Tragedy and Triumph in the Vietnam War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. xiii + 242pp., photographs, appendix, index. Cdn \$36.50, US \$26.95, cloth; ISBN 1-55750-256-0. Canadian distributor, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ontario.

Captain Hook is two stories. The first concerns the author's career as a navy attack pilot in the air war over Vietnam; the second describes the loss of an arm in combat and, once recovery from that horrible wound was complete, his fight to remain in the US Navy. In combination the two make an enjoyable and informative book.

Although Foster's wound and struggle to stay on the active list seems to attract the most attention in reviews and in the publisher's promotional material, the vast majority of the book - and, in this reviewer's estima-

tion, the most valuable part - covers his combat career in the Vietnam War. Between May 1965 and July 1966, Foster flew an incredible 163 attack missions, a total made remarkable not only by the fact that his carrier was on station for less than seven months of that period but also because the author had previously flown seventy-five missions in the Korean War (of which, unhappily, little is said). Far from presenting a dreary chronicle describing mission after mission, Foster takes us inside the inner workings of an attack squadron - in this case VA-163, the famous "Saints." The reader gains valuable insights about the reliable A4E Skyhawk (or "Tinker Toy" to its pilots), the anatomy of a strike, life in the ready room, the strain from flying seemingly endless missions and the negative impact that the restrictive rules of engagement imposed by the Pentagon and White House had on morale. Foster commanded VA-163 from December 1965 and his comments on this assignment, particularly the challenge of handling one pilot not performing up to snuff, are illustrative of the heavy responsibilities that come with that position.

Captain Hook would be good value if it ended there but what follows is a wonderful tale of courage and determination. In July 1965, Foster was wheeling into a bomb run over North Vietnam when AAA ripped through his cockpit, severing his right arm above the elbow. Squeezing the wound with his left hand to stem the flow of blood, the dazed pilot coaxed his damaged Skyhawk out of enemy air space before ejecting over a destroyer positioned off the coast. Seventeen excruciating minutes after being hit, Foster was plucked from the ocean by the ship's whaler.

The aviator recovered from his wound but does not mince words about the sometimes inept and de-humanizing medical treatment he received upon his return to the United States. Mainly due to his own efforts, Foster learned to adapt to the loss of his right arm and was eventually fitted with a

prosthesis. He then faced an uphill battle to remain on the active list. Foster knew that he could not fly again but thought himself well-qualified to perform other duties. Others in the medical and personnel branches were not so sure but, with the support of several officers in influential positions, he surmounted numerous bureaucratic hurdles to win his case. Foster soon found himself back off Vietnam as operations officer in a carrier, and was eventually promoted to captain, hence the obvious moniker "Captain Hook."

This book is recommended to anyone interested in naval air or who just wants a good read.

Michael Whitby
Almonte, Ontario

Harry Munns and Hal Sutphen (eds.). *Cruising Fundamentals*. Camden, ME: International Marine Publishing and American Sailing Association, 1992. i + 127 pp., photographs, illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. US \$17.95, paper; ISBN 0-87742-334-2.

Cruising Fundamentals is a manual for the novice sailor intent on becoming a competent coastal cruising sailor in vessels thirty to fifty feet in length. The basics of the subject of sailing are covered in the American Sailing Association (ASA) publication, *Sailing Fundamentals*. The material in *Cruising Fundamentals* will prepare the student for ASA Certification.

The manual is divided into five sections, each containing sailing knowledge and skills. Sailing knowledge discusses theoretical matters; sailing skills deal with the elements of sailing which must be performed and practised. Each section is illustrated with clear black and white photographs and diagrams. Section summaries and conclusions are highlighted, including review questions for Sections I to III. Highlighted marginal boxes detail step procedures for such diverse oper-

ations as Alcohol Stove Operation, Man Overboard Recovery, VHF Channels for US Radio Users, and so on. The appendices include checklists of various sorts, practice questions and answers, glossary and short bibliography.

A pleasing, uncluttered page layout and clear, uncomplicated prose render this manual highly readable and instructive. The essentials are here from the opening section titled *Getting Acquainted* (topside orientation, clothing and personal gear, safety equipment, starting, stopping, etc.) to Section V, *Problem Solving/Trouble Shooting* (dragging anchor, running aground, engine failure, etc.).

This is an American manual and uses American references. In the matter of safety there are differences in requirements between the American and Canadian Coast Guards. Thus, horseshoe liferings (p. 11) are acceptable in the United States but not in Canada, where the solid lifering is required. (The Canadian authorities argue that the solid ring can be thrown more effectively.) According to *Cruising Fundamentals* vessels less than forty feet are not specifically required to carry a whistle, horn or bell. Not so in Canada, where a horn is required and twelve distress flares, of which six at least must be nighttime visible. Apparently in the United States, this requirement is reduced to three daylight (smoke) and three nighttime (light) visual distress signals.

Harry Munns, a founder of the American Sailing Association, has trained hundreds of sailing instructors. This fact alone should be sufficient recommendation for *Cruising Fundamentals*.

Geoffrey H. Farmer
St. John's, Newfoundland